Petition — Lavin v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California

Bite Supretne Court, U

FILED

4 80-1446 FEB 24 1gp.

In the Supreme Court of thé": re ee

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No.

IRENE LAVIN,

Petitioner,

vs.

COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD J. HOROWITZ,

A Professional Corporation

Suite 1015

11661 San Vicente Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90049

(213) 826-6619

Attorney for Petitioner

Westside Law Publishers Santa Monica, California (213) 450-1965

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the “rational basis” standard for re-

view of equal protection issues is insufficient and a type of

“‘middle-tier’” review more appropriate:

(a) where a state establishes a multi-stage

procedure for admission to its bar;

: (b) where an applicant passes each of three

required examinations, spread over a period of at

least three years; and

(c) where discriminatory grading rules are

employed on the fourth and final examination.

2. Whether the reasons given by California in

support of the rules for grading the final stage of its bar

admission procedure provide a “rational basis” for the

discriminatory nature of those rules.

-

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

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Parties to the Proceeding ...0000......00000ooooccccccececc cece. 2

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Constitutional Provisions Involved in this Proceed-

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Presentation of Federal Questions............................. 6

Argument

I

The “Rational Basis” Standard for Review of Equal

Protection Issues Is Insufficient Where a State

(a) Establishes a Multi-Stage Procedure for

Admission to its Bar, (b) Where an Applicant

Passes Each of the First Three Required

Examinations and (c) Where Discriminatory

Grading Rules Are Employed on the Fourth

A. The “Rational Basis” and “Strict Scrutiny”

Standards for Review of Equal Protection

Issues Are Too Limited; ‘‘Middle-Tier” Review

Is Frequently the Best Alternative................... 6

B. ‘“Middle-Tier’ Review Is Suitable to the Present

Il.

California’s Committee of Bar Examiners Has Not

Stated Any “Rational Basis” for its Discrimina-

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Page

Chaney v. State Bar of California, 386 F.2d 962, 966

NG ac lc levee viiubicies aha

Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190.000... 6, 10

In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)... 8

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)....... 11

Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)... 9

Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,

ey a OO ss ok... 8

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New

en NE UE & or 6). ) 12

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)... 9

Ulandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)....0.00........... 10

Younger v. Colo. State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 482 F.

Supp. 1244 (D. Colo. 1980) 00. 13

Statutes

California Business & Professions Code

EISNER, Se 5

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ES SR a SR ee Se MRD oP 3

le ec ERE, ER ener “FON, Gey Roar iy 3

§ 6066... Pe aU a yeti car oe 3

Rules

Rule VI, § 61, Rules Regulating Admission to

Practice law in Califormia..........000.........00000....... 3

Rule VIII, §§ 81 & 82, Rules Regulating Admission

to Practice Law in California... 3

Rule XI, §§ 111, 113 & 114, Rules Regulating

Admission to Practice law in California............. 4

: Rule 952(c) Cal. Rules of Court...00....... 3

Constitutions

- 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution ......................... 3

In the Supreme Court of the

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No.

IRENE LAVIN,

Petitioner,

VS.

COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

An applicant for admission to the California bar faces

many qualifying standards, including a two-part general

bar examination where a 70 percent score is deemed

passing. Applicants may opt to take the parts of the

general examination at separate sessions. This petition

raises constitutional issues concerning different and more

onerous grading rules applied to applicants who exercise

the latter option.

Petitioner has been denied admission to the California

bar after achieving a passing score on every required

examination except one portion of the two-part general

examination. Her most recent scores on the two parts of

the general examination were, in combination, above 70

percent and therefore sufficient to pass. Had she achieved

those scores in a single session of the examination, the

scores would have been combined and she would have

been admitted to practice in California. However, for

reasons which petitioner contends are constitutionally

inadequate, California refuses to combine the scores of

applicants who take the two parts of the general exam-

ination in separate sessions, requiring only those applicants

to obtain a 70 percent or better score on each part.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the “rational basis” standard for re-

view of equal protection issues is insufficient and a type of

“‘middle-tier’” review more appropriate: (a) where a state

establishes a multi-stage procedure for admission to its

bar; (b) where an applicant passes each of three required

examinations, spread over a period of at least three years;

and(c) where discriminatory grading rules are employed

on the fourth and final examination.

2. Whether the reasons given by California in

support of the rules for grading the final stage of its bar

admission procedure provide a “rational basis” for the

discriminatory nature of those rules.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to this proceeding are stated in the caption.

Petitioner is Irene Lavin. Respondent is the Committee of

Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California (the ““Com-

mittee’).

OPINIONS BELOW

There are no reported opinions in this matter. The

orders of repondent Committee and of the California

Supreme Court are set forth in Appendices A, B and C.

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

Petitioner seeks review of the November 26, 1980

order of the California Supreme Court denying her

petition for a writ of review. Jurisdiction is conferred upon

this Honorable Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257,

subd. (3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

IN THIS PROCEEDING

The constitutional provision involved in the present

proceeding is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, as

follows:

“Section 1. ... No State shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-

ileges or immunity of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its juris-

diction the equal protection of the laws.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Procedural History.

Following notice that she had not passed California’s

Spring 1980 general bar examination, petitioner peti-

tioned the Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of

California for admission to the practice of law, asserting,

among other items, that her most recent scores on the two

parts of the examination were sufficient, in combination,

4

to pass. On June 25, 1980, the Committee denied the

petition. (See Appendix A.)

Petitioner filed a formal petition on July 3, 1980 for

reconsideration. On July 26, 1980, the Committee grant-

ed the petition for reconsideration and, upon reconsider-

ation, again denied the petition for admission to practice in

California. (See Appendix B.)

Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of review with the

California Supreme Court pursuant to Cal. Business &

Professions Code § 6066 and Rule 952(c), Cal. Rules of

Court. See also, Chaney v. State Bar of California, 386

F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1967). Respondent Committee

filed an opposition and petitioner filed a reply. The

California Supreme Court then denied the petition,

without opinion, on November 26, 1980. (See Appendix

C.)

B. Facts.

Prior to entering law school, petitioner passed an equiv-

alency examination required by Cal. Business & Pro-

fessions Code § 6060(c)(2) and Rule VIII, §§ 81 and 82,

Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in Calif-

ornia. The examination was required because petitioner's

university credits and nursing school degree did not

qualify her for exemption from the examination.

The next year petitioner also passed a first year law

students’ examination given by the Committee pursuant to

Cal. Business & Professions Code § 6060(g) and Rule

VI, § 61, Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in

California.

Following her graduation from law school, petitioner

passed one part of the final bar examination, known as the

Professional Responsibility Examination, as required by

Cal. Business & Professions Code § 6060(f) and Rule

XI, §§ 111, 113 and 114, Rules Regulating Admission to

Practice Law in California.

Petitioner attempted on several occasions to pass the

only remaining test, the general bar examination. The

latter consists of two sections, the Multistate Bar Exam-

ination section (weighted 40 percent of the total score) and

an essay section (weighted 60 percent of the total score).

On the Fall 1979 California general bar examination

petitioner received 437 of a possible 600 points or 72.8

percent, on the Multistate Bar Examination section. On

the Spring 1980 general bar examination, she obtained

617.5 of a possible 900 points, or 68.6 percent, on the

essay section. Petitioner's combined score on the two

sections of the examination was 1,054.5 points of a

possible 1,500, or 70.3 percent.

Respondent Committee applies two separate rules for

achieving a passing grade on the general bar examination.

An applicant who takes both sections of the examination

at one session need achieve only a 70 percent score on the

combined sections of the examination. However, an

applicant who elects under the Committee’s rules to take

the sections of the examination in separate sessions is

required to obtain a 70 percent or better score on each

section in order to pass. Accordingly, an applicant who

achieves an 80 percent score on the essay section and a 55

percent score on the Multistate section has a 70 percent

overall score and passes the examination. In an extreme

case, an applicant taking the examination in a single

session can pass with 100 percent (900 points) on the

essay section and 25 percent (150 points) on the Multi-

state section! On the other hand, an applicant such as

petitioner who achieves a higher overall score (1054.5

points) and with more consistency (72.8 percent and 68.6

percent), fails.

PRESENTATION OF FEDERAL QUESTIONS

The federal constitutional issues raised in this petition

were presented in the petition for reconsideration addressed

to the Committee of Bar Examiners and in the petition for

writ of review with the California Supreme Court. The

questions were based upon the same facts set forth in the

present petition.

ARGUMENT

L

THE “RATIONAL BASIS” STANDARD FOR REVIEW

OF EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUES IS INSUFFI-

CIENT WHERE A STATE (a) ESTABLISHES A

MULTI-STAGE PROCEDURE FOR ADMISSION

TOITS BAR, (b) WHERE AN APPLICANT PASSES

EACH OF THE FIRST THREE REQUIRED EX-

AMINATIONS AND (c) WHERE DISCRIMINA-

TORY GRADING RULES ARE EMPLOYED ON

THE FOURTH AND FINAL EXAMINATION.

A. The “Rational Basis” and “Strict Scrutiny” Stan-

dards For Review Of Equal Protection Issues Are

Too Limited; “Middle-Tier” Review Is Frequent-

ly The Best Alternative.

There is a wide consensus that the two-tier approach

(“rational basis” and “‘strict scrutiny”) to review of equal

protection issues is inadequate. Indeed, opinions of this

Court have suggested that the system is unsatisfactory and

have noted the Court’s occasional application of what

amounts to a “‘middle-tier” approach. See, for example,

Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 210-211 (Justice

Powell concurring):

“ _.. [Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)]

and subsequent cases involving gender-based

classifications make clear that the Court sub-

jects such classifications to a more critical

examination than is normally applied when

‘fundamental’ constitutional rights and “suspect

classes’ are not present. . . . As has been true of

Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be

viewed by some as a ‘middle tier’ approach. . . .”

Petitioner submits the time is ripe for overt recognition

of each of the above facts. The ends of justice and the need

for greater flexibility and realism in review of equal

protection questions will be served.

Petitioner does not suggest that the “rational basis”

standard should cease to be applied in the majority of

cases which come vefore this Court. On the contrary, in

most cases where fundamental constitutional rights and

suspect classifications are not involved, the rational basis

standard of review will no doubt lead to a just determina-

tion concerning a state’s attempt to distinguish or “draw

lines” between persons in similar circumstances. How-

ever, there are and always will be situations where a

state’s attempts at drawing lines or distinctions should be

subjected to a more exacting examination. The alternative

is to forego the opportunity for a realistic and just result in

such cases. Conversely, to impose “strict scrutiny” in

each of the latter instances will often lead to equally

unrealistic and unjust ends. Overkill has no more place in

attempts to protect constitutional rights than does neglect.

The solution, which can hardly be the subject of debate,

is application of a middle-tier approach. The questions

thus become what sort of approach or approaches to adopt

and when to apply them. The scope and purpose of the

present petition make it inappropriate to discuss all

possible instances where a middle-tier approach might be

wise. However, California’s discriminatory bar examina-

tion grading system is surely one appropriate instance

because petitioner’s situation falls between a procedurally

simple licensing scheme, where a “rational basis’’ stan-

dard is applied, and a licensing rule based upon a suspect

classification, invoking “strict scrutiny” review. Compare

Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330

U.S. 552 (1947) [Six-month apprenticeship requirement

upheld under “rational basis” standard.]; Jn re Griffiths,

413 U.S. 717 (1973) [“Strict scrutiny” standard applied

to review of Connecticut law preciding resident aliens

from being admitted to bar.].

The examination procedure for admission to Califor-

nia’s bar is neither simple nor expeditious. Rather,

petitioner and other California bar applicants must pass

several examinations, given over a period of years. For

example, upon her entry into law school, petitioner was

required to take an equivalency examination since her

existing university credits and nursing school degree were

not treated as the equivalent of a standard bachelor’s

degree. Next, petitioner was required to take a first yest

law students’ examination at the conclusion of her initial

year in law school. Following her graduation from law

school, she was required to take a professional respon-

sibility examination. Finally, she was required to take

California’s general bar examination which, in turn,

consisted of two parts, the Multistate Bar Examination

and an essay section. As noted previously, petitioner

separately passed each and every required examination

except the second (essay) portion of the general bar

examination. Her combined scores on the two-part general

examination were sufficient to pass but for the Committee’s

rules which forbid combining of her scores.

Petitioner submits that where a state requires an

applicant for any license to take a series of qualifying

examinations over a period of years, application of the

mere “rational basis” standard of review to discriminatory

grading rules on the last of those examinations is woefully

inadequate. A state simply should not be allowed to

subject an applicant to many years of differing tests and

examinations without bearing the concomitant burden of

submitting its grading rules for the last of such examina-

tions to more intensive review than “rational basis.”

It is appropriate at this point to note that petitioner is not

suggesting a lengthy, multi-step licensing procedure

bestows upon an applicant, at some point in the process, a

“vested” or “fundamental” right. Petitioner does assert,

however, that by requiring such a lengthy undertaking of

an applicant, a state should be deemed to subject any

discriminatory grading rules applied at the end of the

process to a standard of equal protection review more

exacting than an easily met rational basis approach, since

the latter is most commonly applied to a simple, one-step

licensing process.

B. ‘“Middle-Tier”’ Review Is Suitable To The Present

Case.

Several types of “middle-tier’ review of equal pro-

tection issues have been suggested by the cases and by

commentators. For example, one type may be described

as weighing the state’s need for imposing the subject

classification. Such an approach has been suggested in

several cases, including Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,

426 U.S. 88, 115-116 (1976) [argument of administrative

convenience rejected when compared to the interest of the

individual involved]; Staniey v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,

656 (1972) [“ . . . establishment of prompt efficacious

procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper

state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional

adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher

10

values than speed and efficiency.” ]; Vlandis v. Kline, 412

U.S. 441, 458-459 (1973) [ “. . . as the Court’s assess-

ment of the weight and value of the individual interest

escalates, the less likely it is that mere administrative

convenience and avoidance of hearings or investigations

will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to

be irrational discriminations.” (White, J., concurring in

judgment)].

As discussed below, California has not sought to justify

its discriminatory grading rules for its bar examinations on

the basis of administrative convenience. Therefore, this

particular middle-tier approach to review seems inappli-

cable here.

A second type of middle-tier review is to require

modification of the challenged rule to permit exceptions in

individual cases, without invalidating the rule in its

entirety. In Craig v. Boren, supra, 429 U.S. 190, 199, the

Court suggested such an approach in a case involving

gender-based discrimination:

“In light of the weak congruence between gen-

der and the characteristic or trait that gender

purported to represent, it was necessary that the

legislatures choose either to realign their sub-

stantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to

adopt procedures for identifying those instances

where the sex-centered generalization actually

comported to fact.”

As with the first suggested method of middle-tier

review, this approach appears unsuitable to the present

case. If the challenged rule violates equal protection as to

this petitioner, it should also be deemed to violate equal

protection as to all others similarly situated.

A third technique, however, seems especially pertinent

here. This approach would require the rationale for a

11

particular rule to be asserted by the state in the litigation in

which the rule is challenged, based upon the origin and

application of the rule, rather than permitiing justification

of the rule on the basis of a judicially created or

conceivable rationale never offerred by the state in its

defense. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505

(1965) [ ‘“There is no serious contention that Connecticut

thinks the use of artificial or external methods of con-

traception immoral or unwise in itself, or that the anti-use

statute is Sounded upon any policy of promoting popula-

tion expansion.” (White, J., concurring. )]

This approach is the least onerous “‘middle-tier”

technique since it provides for review of the challenged

rule on the basis of reasons given and presumably

considered by the originating state, denying the state only

the fortuitous benefit it would obtain if the rule were

approved for reasons that had no bearing on the enacting

process.

The latter approach is most compatible to the situation

existing in the present case. As discussed in Argument II,

below, the State Bar of California has suggested specific

reasons in support of a “rational basis” for its discrim-

inatory grading rules. Petitioner contends that this Court

should review those rules solely on the basis of the reasons

given by the state. If those reasons constitute a “‘rational

basis” for the discriminatory rules, then petitioner

acknowledges the ultimate lack of merit of this petition.

However, as will be dernonstrated in Argument II below,

the state’s purported reasons do not provide such a

rational basis and neither this Court nor any other court

shouid attempt to discover and articulate other reasons on

its own motion. Accordingly, certiorari should issue here

and California’s discriminatory grading rules for its bar

examinations should be found to violate equal protection.

12

IL.

CALIFORNIA’S COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS

HAS NOT STATED ANY “RATIONAL BASIS”

FOR ITS DISCRIMINATORY GRADING RULES.

Petitioner contends that respondent Committee has

failed to state a rational basis for requiring those who take

the two sections of the general bar examination in separate

sessions to achieve separate passing scores while per-

mitting those who take the parts in one session to combine

their two scores to achieve a passing grade.

Before discussing the reason given by the Committee as

a purported rational basis for its discriminatory grading

rules, petitioner briefly summarizes relevant standards

which have been applied to state administered bar exam-

inations.

In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New

Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239 (1957), this Court

articulated the basic requirements imposed by the Four-

teenth Amendment upon the state’s rules regulating

admission to the practice of law:

“A State cannot exclude a person from the

practice of law or from any other occupation in a

manner or for reasons that contravene the Due

Process or Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations.] A State

can require high standards of qualification, such

as good moral character or proficiency in its law,

before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any

qualification must have a rational connection

with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice

law. [Citations.}”

Under the above principles, it has been held that an

essay-type bar examination “‘has a rational connection

13

with the capacity to practice law... .”’ Chaney v. State

Bar of California, 386 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1967).

However, a limitation on the number of times an applicant

may take a state’s bar examination was declared unconsti-

tutional in Younger v. Colo. State Bd. of Bar Examiners,

482 F.Supp. 1244, 1247 (D. Colo. 1980):

“ _.. Yet, the application of a rule which

effectively places a final limitation on the number

of examinations an individual may take appears

to be based upon an assumption that a given

individual will never become competent. That

amounts to a prejudgment of the examination

results. It could also be considered to create an

irrebuttable presumption of incompetence of the

type which has been found to be constitutionally

infirm in several cases. [Citations. ]

“There is no basis for faulting any standard

requirements of additional study, training, or

development prior to any re-examination. What

is now declared unconstitutional is only the final

preclusion of any opportunity for re-examination

regardless of such requirements. That aspect of

Rule 214 cannot be considered to have a rational

connection with the compelling interest in re-

quiring a demonstration of professional compe-

tence by successful completion of a written

examination before admission to the Bar.”

With the above rules in mind, we turn to the grounds

given by respondent Committee in the present proceeding

in support of the rule upon which petitioner’s admission to

the California bar was denied. In its opposition to issuance

of a writ of review by the California Supreme Court, the

Committee contended that the rule prohibiting the com-

bining of scores from sections of the general bar examina-

tion taken separately was intended to prevent an applicant

14

from passing the examination as a result of a chance

fluctuation in scores. As stated in a declaration filed in

support of the Committee’s opposition, ““The requirement

that only a passing status and not the score on a part be

transferred across examinations was adopted so as to

prevent an applicant from passing the [general bar exam-

ination] solely as the result of such chance fluctuation in

scores. This requirement need not be imposed when an

applicant takes the [two sections] concurrently, since it is

highly unlikely that an applicant will be lucky on both

parts at the same time.” (Memorandum in Response to

Petition for Review, Appendix C, Para. 9.)

The latter reasoning provides no rational basis for the

discriminatory grading rules applied to petitioner. Neither

the Committee’s reasoning nor mathematical principles

demonstrate that the probability of chance fluctuation in

an applicant’s scores on either or both parts of the general

bar examination are in any way dependent upon whether

the applicant takes the two parts at the same or different

sessions. The Committee has in effect suggested that the

laws of probability favor “heads” over “‘tails” in a given

number of coin flips if, in a previous equal number of coin

flips, tails prevailed over heads. No expertise in the laws of

probability is necessary to recognize the fallacy in such

reasoning. The laws of probability do not change with

regard to coin flips or with regard to separate portions of an

examination on the basis of preceding events.

In short, the Committee failed to demonstrate that an

applicant’s chances for passing the general bar examination

are enhanced by the laws of probability where an

applicant takes the two sections of the examination at

separate sessions. Since this was the only argument

offerred by the Committee as a rational basis for the

discriminatory grading rules, petitioner submits that the

15

rules should be found to violate equal protection of the

laws.

CONCLUSION

Respondent Committee has failed to establish any

rational basis for placing a more onerous grading require-

ment upon bar applicants who opt to take California’s

general bar examination at separate sessions. As shown

above, only those reasons offered by the Commmittee in

support of the discriminatory grading rules should be

considered in reviewing petitioner's equal protection

contentions. This ‘“‘middle-tier” approach to equal pro-

tection review is appropriate where, as here, California

has established a lengthy, multi-stage procedure for

admission to its bar.

Accordingly, petitioner respectfully requests that this

petition for writ of certiorari be granted and that the

discriminatory grading rules applied to California’s gen-

eral bar examination be declared unconstitutional.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD J. HOROWITZ,

A Professional Corporation

By EDWARD J. HOROWITZ

Attorney for Petitioner

MARTIN K. GLICK

ROBERT \. HEINE

PATRICIA PHILLIPS

LOS ANGELES

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17

APPENDIX A

THE COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS

OF THE SPATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

POST OFFICE BON 7908

SAN FRANCISCO S4120

Telephone (415) 561-8400

1230 WEST THIRD STREET

LOS ANGELES 90017

Telephone (213) 482-4040

KENNETH D. MeCLOSKEY, Der

SAN FRANCISCO

Law School Accreditatio

JOHN A, GORFINKEL, Consultant

SAN FRANCISCO

JAMES B. TIPPIN, JR.

Execute Director

SAN FRANCISCO

Reply to:

® LOS ANGELES

June 25, 1980

NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION aed ei 5 i

Ms. Irene Lavin

646 Woodruff Avenue

Los Angeles, California 90024

Assigned Petition No. 1(b)

Dear Ms. Lavin: :

Please receive this as official notice that the Committee of

Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California while It was

in formal session in Monterey, California during June 20,

1980 denied the petition which you previously filed

wherein you sought certification for admission to practice

law in California pursuant to the provisions of the State

Bar of California, Chapter 4, Division 3, of the Business

and Professions Code.

COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS

James B. Tippin, Jr.

Executive Director

By

Suzanne M. Obermeier

(Original signed)

Director

Operations & Management

Date: June 25, 1980

caesar PREVIOUS PAGE WAS BLANK |

18

APPENDIX B

THE COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS

OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

ARMANDO M. MENOCAL.,, III, Chair

SAN FRANCISCO

HERBERT J. SOLOMON, Vice-Chawr 555 FRANKLIN STREET

Operations & Manage ment

SUZANNE M. OBERMEIER, Director

LOS ANGELES

SAN DIEGO

: : POST OFFICE BON 7908 P me Pxaminations

FRANCISCO CANCINO 1230 WEST THIRD STREET NN ) CLOSKEY, Direct

SAN FRANCISCO SAN FRANCISCO 94120 LOS ANGELES 90017 prey 4. i LY, Director

MARTIN 8. CLICK Telephone (415) 561-8500 Telephone (213) 482-4040

Law School Avereditation

JOHN A. GORFINKEL, Consultant

SAN FRANCISCO

SAN FRANCISCO

MARY ANNE HARRISON

BURBANK

ROBERT A. MINE

SOUTH PASADENA JAMES B. TIPPIN, JR.

PATRICIA PHILLIPS Execute Director

seamn <acme SAN FRANCISCO

SAN FRANCISCO

A. WALLACE TASHIMA Reply to:

‘ehiatanesn team August 14, 1980 © LOS ANGELES

CARLARD 0 SAN FRANCISCO

wotemewenne § NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION

Ms. Irene Lavin

646 Woodruff Avenue

Los Angeles, California 90024

; Assigned Petition No. 1(e)

Dear Ms. Lavin:

Please receive this as official notice that the Committee of

Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California while It was

in formal session in Los Angeles, California during July

26, 1980 granted the petition which you previously filed

wherein you sought a reconsideration of a previous denial

and upon such reconsideration, denied your petition for

admission to practice law in California.

COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS

James B. Tippin, Jr.

Executive Director

By

Suzanne M. Obermeier

(Original signed)

Director

Operations and Management

Date: August 14, 1980

JBT:sm

cc: Diane Alexander

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT

FILED

Nov. 26, 1980

LAURENCE P. GILL, Clerk

Deputy

ORDER DENYING WRIT OF REVIEW

L.A. No. 31336

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

IN BANK

IRENE LAVIN

v.

THE COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS,

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.

Petition for writ of review DENIED.

BIRD (Original signed)

Chief Justice

— _—

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

State of California

SS.

County of Los Angeles

I, the undersigned, say: I am and was at all times herein

: mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of

the County of Los Angeles, over the age of eighteen (18)

years and not a party to the within action or proceeding;

that my business address is 3340 Ocean Park Boulevard,

Suite 3005, Santa Monica, California 90405: that on

February 24, 1981, I served the within Petition for Writ of

Certiorari in said action or proceeding by depositing true

copies thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage

thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Santa

Monica, California, addressed as follows:

Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court Herbert M. Rosenthal

One First Street, N.W. Truitt A. Richey, Jr.

Washington, D.C. 20543 State Bar of California

(Hand delivered; forty copies) 555 Franklin Street

San Francisco, California 94102

Clerk, California Supreme Court

350 McAllister Street, Room 4050 Robert M. Sweet

San Francisco, California 94102 State Bar of California

1230 West Third Street

Los Angeles, California 90017

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true and correct. Executed on February 24, 1981 at Santa

Monica, California.

Kirk W. Harney

(Original signed)

Se