Appendix — Southern California Financial Corp. v. United States

Supreme Court brief1981

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

CLAIMS.

PAUL J. HALL,

MANATT, PHELPS, ROTHENBERG,

& TUNNEY,

1888 Century Park East,

Twenty-First Floor,

Los Angeles, Calif. 90067,

(213) 556-1500,

Counsel for Petitioner.

MARSHALL MANLEY,

FINLEY, KUMBLE, WAGNER,

HEINE, UNDERBERG & MANLEY,

2029 Century Park East, |

Suite 2600,

Los Angeles, Calif. 90067,

(213) 557-0111,

Of Counsel.

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622

bisied

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Page

Appendix A. Opinion ..............cceee eee ee ee App. p. 1

Appendix B. Opinion ...............ccescseceeseeeeeeeees 40

PAE Mas MIOUEE wovshesconcccddsguegppoodcednceansévars 50

_ Appendix D. Complaint in Condemnation and De-

UE FOE FU LOGI ce veiionivcsece cpecedetaneepsasexes 51

Appendix E. Declaration of Taking ................... 57

Appendix F. Answer to Complaint in Condemnation

CONE BP ee ion, cswadbdicideccsscostchicstcvacevpecs 62

Appendix G. Motion to Strike Answer of Defendant

Southern California Financial Corporation to Com-

| plaint in Condemnation, Notice Thereof, and Mem-

orandum of Points and Authorities (As to Tract D-

WMA Tel ide dso ancndtedbencclbeabnrcine bebepesvagceieondses 66

Appendix H. Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion to

Strike Answer of Southern California Financial

SINR Ata KudundavccanssScbvasehinndvseyeseseckpanahess 78

Appendix I. Order Striking Portions of Answer of

Defendant Southern California Financial Corporation

to Complaint in Condemnation (As to Tract D-496-

Matias had cnUeeerelGacebs vel oeveetientsseses Lc coatings een 81

Appendix J. Constitutional Provision and Statutes .. 84

APPENDIX A.

Opinion.

In the United States Court of Claims, Trial Division. No.

79-74.

(Filed: October 1, 1979).

Southern California Financial Corporation v. The United

States. Taking; Inverse Condemnation; Successive Term

Leaseholds.

Marshall Manley, attorney of record, for plaintiff.

Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, of counsel.

C. David Redmon, with whom was Assistant Attorney

General James W. Moorman, for defendant.

OPINION*

SCHWARTZ, Trial Judge: Plaintiff sues for an inverse

condemnation of a tract of land adjoining that part of March

Air Force Base, near Riverside, California, which is used

as a bomb and ammunition storage area. The Government’s

motion for summary judgment was denied on December 20,

1974, and the case was remanded for trial. The case has

been tried, and plaintiff is here held to prevail on the issue

of liability. The amount of compensation remains to be

determined.

From 1949 to 1961, the United States had possession of

the tract as a tenant of plaintiff's predecessor, pursuant to

non-exclusive leases for periods of a year or less, each lease

extendible for four or five periods of a year. All the renewal

options were exercised through 1961. In 1962, the owner

declined to lease the land at the offered rental, and so the

Government condemned a 6-months lease, extendible for

*The opinion and conclusion of law are submitted together with

accompanying findings of fact in accordance with rule |34(h). The

necessary findings of fact are stated in the opinion.

wails

periods of | year each. A similar condemnation took place

in 1967.

Plaintiff bought the land in 1969. When the 1967 lease

as extended expired in 1972, plaintiff would not agree to

another lease, and asked that the Government buy the fee.

The Government thereupon instituted another proceeding

to condemn a lease of the same kind as before. A defense

in the condemnation proceeding that the series of leases

amounted to a condemnation of the fee, for which full pay-

ment ought to be made, was dismissed by the district court,

on the Government's motion contending that such a defense

could not be raised in the court in which condemnation

proceedings were instituted.

The condemnation proceeding continued in the district

court and culminated in a leasehold similar to those in the

past, beginning in 1972. Plaintiff brought suit here in 1974

for an inverse condemnation of the fee, or more properly,

of plaintiff's reversion. Another leasehold, similar to those

in the past, was condemned in 1977, extendible until 1981.

I. Jurisdiction

A preliminary argument is that only the district court has

jurisdiction. The Government having in the district court

sought and obtained a ruling which left only this court with

jurisdiction to award compensation as for the taking of a

fee, that ruling is now the law of the case and the Govern-

ment will not be heard to argue the contrary. Peerless Coal

Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 1045, 1046 (1978). Cf.

Nager Electric Co. v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl. 390, 399-

401, 396 F.2d 977, 981-83 (1968). At least one other

district court, in granting a motion to strike a defense to

condemnation of a lease on the ground of a taking of the

fee valued at more than $10,000, has held that this court

has exclusive jurisdiction of such claims. United States v.

ual Miia

1440.35 Acres of Land, 438 F. Supp. 1070, 1073-74 (D.

Md. 1977). Accord, United States v. Gila River Pima-Mari-

copa Indian Community, 391 F.2d 53, 55-56 (9th Cir.

1968). The Supreme Court has often referred to the avail-

ability in the Court of Claims of the remedy of a suit for

just compensation for an alleged unconventional, authorized

taking. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental

Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978); Regional

Rail=Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 125-36

(1974); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647, n.8 (1962).

Il. The Claimed Taking

The plaintiff contends that it has suffered a taking of the

fee by reason of valid governmental action which has de-

prived it of the economically reasonable use of the land. -

The contention is sustained, on these followiny, facts.

The bomb and ammunition storage area of the March Air

Force Base is located in its northwest corner. The tract in

question, some 119.5 acres, abuts this corner on both the

north and the west, and serves the base as a buffer or safety

zone for the event of a possible explosion of the stored

bombs and ammunition. It has appeared that March Air

Force Base, one of the oldest and largest of its kind, will

remain indefinitely a major air force base and that so long

as ‘bombs and ammunition are used, and stored as they

presently are, the plaintiff's land will be needed as a buffer

and safety zone. Further, it is agreed that there are no plans

to change the place of bomb storage; the storage installation

is a permanent one.

The basic |-year term of the successive condemnations

is no indication of any temporary character of the Govern-

ment’s need for the property. The duration of the leases is

designed to conform to the 1-year availability of the relevant

appropriations. The Government in fact plans to condemn

a7

ee

l-year leases into the indefinite future. This has been its

intention, apparently, for many years. In sum, the Air Force

uses the property as a permanent buffer zone and intends

to use it as such indefinitely, and to pay for it by means of

the l-year rentals set in the condemnation proceedings.

While the leases are non-exclusive, and reserve to plain-

tiff the right to conduct agricultural operations, the land

cannot be farmed with profit. Residential development and

substantially all other use is forbidden under the terms of.

the leases; structures for ‘‘human habitation’’ may not be

built or maintained, and gatherings of more than 25 persons

are forbidden.

On trial, plaintiff made proof that the highest and best

use of the land is to hold it for speculation for future de-

velopment as a residential area. The speculative potential

is somewhat dubious for a number of reasons, among them

the noise of overflying planes, the proximity of the land to

the ammunition dump and the restrictive zoning, under

which residential development is not possible. But exact

value aside, the fact remains that the use to which the Gov-

ernment puts the land, coupled with the intention to con-

demn an indefinite series of leases, deprives the plaintiff

of the highest and best use of the land, and gives the Gov-

ernment an interest tantamount to a fee or a perpetual ease-

ment, without payment therefor.

The Government’s motive is simply economy. The Air

Force, recognizing that its need was permanent, has at times

considered the relative cost of leasing and buying, concluded

that leasing would be cheaper, and dropped the idea of

acquisition of a fee. Moreover, it is administratively easier

to pay the modest annual rent fixed in the condemnation

proceedings than to obtain an appropriation of the money

to pay for a fee or a permanent easement. Annual rents can

be paid from a non-specific appropriation for maintenance.

per ar

Condemnation of the fee or a permanent easement, on the

other hand, would require the Air Force to seek an appro-

priation in competition with all other capital improvements

for which Congress must be asked for money. The reluc-

tance to seek a large enough appropriation to pay for the

interest actually taken is seen in the present record. A so-

phisticated commentator has suggested that such reluctance

is found in other, similar cases. See H. Pittle, Suits Against

the United States For Taking Property Without Just Com-

pensation, 55 Geo. L.J. 631, 646 (1967).

The facts establish an inverse taking comparable to that

found in Benenson v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 375, 548

F.2d 939 (1977), and Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States,

191 Ct. Cl. 389, 424 F.2d 574 (1970). In those cases the

court held that a taking took place where without ‘‘physical

invasion or ouster’’ (VBH Land Co. v. United States, 217

Ct. Cl. __, —_, 576 F.2d 317, 319 (1978)), the conduct

of the Government has deprived the owner of any reasonable

use of the property.

In Benenson, the conduct was primarily that of Congress.

In the case of Drakes Bay, the conduct was that of the

Executive Branch. While the conduct constituting the taking

in those cases was far different from plaintiff's case, the

decisions are much in point on principle. Perhaps more in

point factually is Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.

United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329 (1922), where the infre-

quent shooting of cannon over plaintiff’s hotel in peacetime,

on an artillery practice range, was held to be ‘‘ ‘the im-

position of such a servitude [as] would constitute an appro-

priation of property for which compensation should be

made.’ ’’ The threat of an ammunition explosion over the

present plaintiff's land is as much an inhibition of use of

the land as was the occasional cannon shot for the hotel on

the island in Portsmouth harbor.

ela

Details of the interference with use in the cases in federal’

and state’ courts which find a taking by deprivation of use,

would serve no purpose, for each case is different from the

others, and from this one. What is important is that the facts

'The first and leading federal case on a taking by interference with

use by flooding was Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).

The learning underlying the application of the flooding rule to the instant

case is derived from the cases cited in the text, from Pumpelly, from

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) and from the

following cases: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United

States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S.

333 (1910); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); Richmond

Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327

(9th Cir. 1977); Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260

(N.D. Cal. 1978); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.

Mich. 1966), affd 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Barnes v. United

States, 210 Ct. Cl. 467, 538 F.2d 865 (1976); Pete v. United States,

209 Ct. Cl. 270, 531 F.2d 1018 (1976); Eyherabide v. United States,

170 Ct. Cl. 598, 345 F.2d 565 (1965); Bydlon v. United States, 146

Ct. Cl. 764, 175 F. Supp. 891 (1959). Cf. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (just

compensation for removal or prohibition of interstate highway bill-

boards).

*Behiman v. Ci iy of Florissant, 548 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1977);

Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N. #4 107, 343

A.2d 408 (1975); Grasso v. Bd. of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 630, 61

A.2d 167 (1948); Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Pa. Dep't of Transp.,

456 Pa. 384, 321 A.2d 598 (1974).

The California and New York courts follow a different rule by which

an unlawful deprivation of all use by state or local regulation in the

exercise of the police power is remediable not by an action for just

compensation but by injunctive or declaratory relief. See Agins v. City

of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-77, 598 P.2d 25, 28-31, 157 Cal.

Rptr. 372, 375-78 (1979), time to appeal to U.S.Sup.Ct. extended to

Oct. 12, 1979, Justice’s Order of July 13, 1979, U.S.Sup.Ct.; Charles

v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 329, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 1303, 392

N.Y.S.2d 594, 602-03 (1977); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. N.Y., 39

hh 587, 593-95, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-86, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-10

(1976).

Pointing in the other direction entirely—against any remedy—is the

view which, in the interest of land-use and other types of regulation,

emphasizes the itted scope of the wor power at the expense of

the affected | wner’s claim of an illegal taking. See Penn Central

Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Mugler v. Kansas,

123 U.S. 623 (1887); F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The Taking

Issue (G.P.O. 1973) passim. An interplay between regulation and taking

is not present in the instant case, which involves a taking for the direct

benefit of the Government itself, as proprietor.

ORs, Wise

of the present case satisfy the rule laid down, that property

is taken when ‘‘the acts of the defendant have so impeded

and restrained the plaintiffs as to deprive them of any rea-

sonable use of their property.’’ Benenson v. United States,

212 Ct. Cl. at 388, 548 F.2d at 947. Accord, United States

v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).

Plaintiff has been deprived of more than reasonable or

profitable use. Plaintiff has been deprived of all use. All

that is left in return is the annual rent. The Government’s

use is complete. It gets the benefit of a fee or a permanent

easement, without paying for it. Full payment for the fee,

actually taken and in use by the Government, is to be

‘‘deferred interminably.’’ Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United

States, 191 Ct. Cl. at 411, 424 F.2d at 586.

That the Government may not have intended to take the

fee of the property is no matter. An explicit or deliberate

intention to take is not necessary for a finding of taking;

the intent may be implied from an act the natural conse-

quence of which is to take. Barnes v. United States, 210

Ct. Cl. 467, 476, 538 F.2d 865, 871 (1976); Eyherabide

v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 598, 601, 345 F.2d 565, 567

(1965).

The conclusion is that the acts of the Government in

condemning term leases of the plaintiff's land for a public

purpose—for use as a safety zone around a permanent am-

munition dump—with the intention to continue to condemn

such leases for the same purpose, into the indefinite future,

so subordinate the land to the public use as to constitute a

taking for which just compensation must be made. Whether

the taking is that of the entire fee or, if the use reserved to

plaintiff has some value, only an easement, may be settled

in the proceedings to determine the value of what has been

Bee ace

taken. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267-68

(1946).

The result will not, despite the Government’s protests,

intrude on the Government’s undoubted power to condemn

terms for years. It is not here decided that the condemnee

_of a term or even successive terms for years may, without

more, demand compensation for the entire fee. The decision

here is only that successive condemnations of terms for

years, coupled with a permanent need for the property and

a fixed determination to continue condemnations indefi-

nitely for the foreseeable future, amount to a taking of the

fee or a permanent easement. No other decision is possible

by the test of fairness, which, subjective.as it may be, is

the vital part of the Fifth Amendment command that property

shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); Seaboard

Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923):

This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider plain-

tiff’s alternative contention that the Government acted in

bad faith in condemning terms for years instead of a fee.

In fairness to those concerned, however, it should be added

that there is no evidence of such conspiracy or intent to

injure the plaintiff as ordinarily would warrant a conclusion

of bad faith. Grasso v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 584-77,

Order of September 9, 1978; Kalvar Corp. v. United States,

211 Ct. Cl. 192, 197-201, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-03 (1976);

Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487, 489-90, 78 F.

Supp. 126, 127-128 (1948). The Air Force did all that it

did with economy as its motive, and in the belief that its

conduct was lawful. The error as to the law is not bad faith.

The present decision is apparently one of first impression,

and ignorance of the rule now laid down cannot be char-

acterized as bad faith.

maT we"

III. Authority

The defense that the taking is without authority is rejected.

Authority there was in plenty, for the location of the am-

munition dump at the corner of the base, for the decision

that a buffer zone was needed and that it should encompass

plaintiff's land, and for the successive condemnations to

obtain the needed buffer zone. The net result was a taking

of the fee.

There was as much authority for each of the acts consti-

tuting the taking as there was for the flooding in Pumpelly

v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871); for the airplane

overflights in Causby; and for the cannon fire in Portsmouth

Harbor Land & Hotel Co. The words of Mr. Justice Holmes

in Portsmouth are apposite: ‘‘As the United States built the

fort and put in the guns and the men, there is a little natural

unwillingness to find lack of authority to do the acts even

if the possible legal consequences were unforeseen.’’ 260

U.S. at 330. See also International Paper Co. v. United

States, 282 U.S. 399, 406 (1931); Oro Fino Consolidated

Mines, Inc. v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 18, 22-23, 92 F.

Supp. 1016, 1019 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948

(1951).

NBH Land Co. v. United States, relied upon by the Gov-

ernment on the issue of authority, lays down no rule that

authority to take inversely cannot be grounded on executive

action. The conclusion there that authority was lacking was

grounded on the deliberate rejection by Congress of the

acquisition for which plaintiff sued. The court described

Benenson and Drakes Bay as takings which were ‘‘a natural

consequence of Congressionally approved measures.’’ 217

Ct. Cl. at __, 576 F.2d at 319. The present case is such

a case. The authority to take follows from the authority of

the Air Force to perform all the acts constituting the taking.

—_

BY ae:

IV. The Defense of Limitations.

Lastly, the Government contends that the action accrued

‘‘prior to 1968,’ beyond the 6-year period of limitations

provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The precise date is not more

closely fixed than by a loose reference to its occurrence

during ‘‘the long history of successive renewals of one-year

leaseholds, the continuing need for the property as a buffer

zone for the munitions storage area, and the frequent refusals

of the Government to purchase or exchange the property.”’

The cause of action for an inverse condemnation accrues

not when the actual or physical taking occurs but when it

is determinable by the plaintiff. Limitations do not run until

the plaintiff knows or has reason to know both that his land

has been taken and the extent of the taking. Braude v. United

States, 218 Ct. Cl. .... , .... , 585 F.2d 1049, 1051-52

(1978); Barnes v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. at 480, 538

F.2d at 873; Castro v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 534, 544-

45, 500 F.2d 436, 440-41 (1974); Japanese War Notes

Claimants Ass'n v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 630, 634,

373 F.2d 356, 358-59 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971

(1967). Cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749

(1947); Oro Fino Consolidated Mines, Inc. v. United States,

118 Ct. Cl. at 22, 92 F. Supp. at 1018. But cf. Kabua v.

United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 160, 164-67, 546 F.2d 381, 383-

85 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 821 (1977).

Until 1961 all that plaintiff and its predecessor could

know was that the Government was leasing the land for

periods of a year at a time, certainly little evidence of a

condemnation of the fee. The first two eminent domain

proceedings in 1962 and 1967 were not seriously contested

by plaintiff's predecessor and added little to the evidence

of the earlier voluntary leases. A condemnation of a lease,

even leases, extendible for a total of 10 years, is not com-

aes, Solio

pelling evidence of a permanent taking cf the entire prop-

erty. Besides, in the various condemnation proceedings the

Government alleged that the estate to be taken was a re-

newable term for 1 year. It may be too much to say that the

Government’s intention was concealed. Cf. Braude v.

United States, supra. But it is fair to say that the Govern-

ment’s allegations were representations and that plaintiff

was entitled to rely on them until the contrary plainly ap-

peared. Where there is uncertainty whether and how much

the Government has taken, ‘‘it would be unfair if the statute

had started running against plaintiff at a time when there

was no way of knowing the duration of the interest taken.”’

Oro Fino Consolidated Mines Inc. v. United States, 118 Ct.

Cl. at 22, 92 F. Supp. at 1018.

Realization of the intention of the Government came only

in 1973, in the course of the 1972 condemnation proceeding.

At that time the attorney for the Government, in a conference

in judicial chambers, advised plaintiff that ‘‘it was his un-

derstanding that the United States Government intended to

continue to condemn the property which was the subject of

the action continuously in the future in similar manner in

which they had done in the past and that * * * they had no

intention to release the property to the owners and * * * as

far as they could determine, they would continue to condemn

the property in the future ad infinitum.’’

Plaintiff was entitled to wait until it learned, from such

an authoritative source and for the first itme, that the Air

Force wanted and needed the property permanently, and

planned to keep possession by the condemnation of suc-

cessive leaseholds, indefinitely. Suit came soon thereafter

in 1974, well within the 6 years allowed.

The intelligence from the Government’s lawyer gave

plaintiff to understand and grounds upon which to allege,

for the first time, that the Government was actually intent

|

pee

upon a taking of the entire use of the land. Castro v. United

States, 205 Ct. Cl. at 544-45, 500 F.2d at 440-41. Cf.

United States v. Dickinson, supra, (continuous flooding;

held, plaintiff entitled to postpone suit ‘‘until the conse-

quences of inundation have so manifested themselves that

a final account may be struck’’); Oro Fino Consolidated

Mines, Inc. v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. at 21, 92 F. Supp.

at 1018 (wartime governmental closing of gold mines; held,

cause of action accrued on reopening of mine, when duration

of taking became known).

The time of accrual of the cause of action is often difficult

to determine. The fixing of the exact date of taking must

often be done in the intuitive manner in which a jury reaches

its verdict. Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 191 Ct.

Cl. at 414, 424 F.2d at 587; Barnes v. United States, 210

Ct. Cl. at 480, 536 F.2d at 873. The date is here fixed at

1973, on the available evidence. The conclusion is con-

firmed by the Supreme Court’s caution not to deny the

constitutional guarantee of just compensation by an over-

restrictive setting of a date of taking. United States v. Dick-

inson, supra.

Accordingly, it is adjudged that an authorized inverse

condemnation of the plaintiff’s tract of land took place in

1973, within the period of limitations, and that plaintiff is

entitled to just compensation, upon the delivery to defendant

of an appropriate deed, the amount of compensation and the

nature of the interest to be conveyed by the deed to be

determined in further proceedings in accordance with rule

131(c).

Findings of Fact

1. This action for inverse condemnation was instituted

on March 18, 1974. The property which is the subject of

the case is on the map of the March Air Force Base known

ee | Wk

as Tract D-496-2 and on the topographic Geological Survey

map Riverside East, Calif. , included in Tract 17. It contains

119.5 acres of land, more or less. It has been owned in fee

simple by plaintiff Southern California Financial Corpora-

tion since September 12, 1969, and it is part of a larger

parcel owned by plaintiff. County land-use maps and March

AFB maps show the subject property as part of the Base.

Voluntary Leases of the Property, 1949-1962

2. (a) The subject property abuts the northwest corner

of the March Air Force Base, Riverside, California. The

bomb and ammunition storage area of the Base is located

in that corner.

(b) In order to secure a buffer zone of vacant land

around the bomb and ammunition storage facility of the

Base, the defendant leased the subject property from the

then owners, known as the Trautwein Group, together with

adjacent parcels, for a term of 1 year effective October 1,

1949. The lease provided that the lessor retained joint use

of the property, for agricultural purposes only.

(c) Thereafter, the defendant leased the subject

property from the Trautwein Group, together with various

adjacent parcels, through an unbroken series of similar,

1-year leases which extended through and included Decem-

ber 31, 1961.

3. Onor about September 12, 1969, plaintiff purchased

the subject property from the Trautwein Group as part of

a larger transaction which included purchase of approxi-

mately 6,200 acres for a total consideration of approximately

$9,000,000.

4. In or about the fall of 1961, the Trautwein Group

and the defendant failed to reach agreement on a renewal

lease because the Group would not accept the amount of

ee,’

rent offered by the defendant. Upon rejection of its final

offer, the defendant took the steps described in the following

finding.

Condemnation of 1-Year Leases, 1962—to Date.

5. (a) On February 27, 1962, the United States filed

in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Cal-

ifornia, Central Division, Civil Action No. 62-338-S, en-

titled United States of America v. 239.82 Acres of Land,

to condemn successive leaseholds in the subject property

and in several adjacent parcels.

(b) As authority for the condemnation the com-

plaint stated that:

The authority for the taking is the Act of Congress

approved February 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C.

258a) and acts supplementary thereto and amendatory

thereof, and under the further authority of the Act of

Congress approved August 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 357, 40

U.S.C. 257); Sections 2663 and 9773 of Title 10,

United States Code, which authorize the acquisition

of land for military purposes; the Act of Congress ap-

proved August 17, 1961 (Public Law 87-144), which

act authorized the acquisition and appropriated funds

for such purposes.

(c) The complaint and the declaration of taking

provided for a lease for 6 months, extendible for five periods

of 1 year each at the election of the United States, as follows:

The estate taken for said public uses is a non-exclu-

sive term for years beginning January 1, 1962 and

ending June 30, 1962, extendible for yearly periods

thereafter at the election of the United States until June

30, 1967, notice of which election shall be filed in the

proceeding at least thirty (30) days prior to the end of

the term hereby taken, or subsequent extensions

thereof, together with the right to remove, within a

ais

reasonable time after the expiration of the term taken,

or any extension thereof, any and all improvements

and structures heretofore placed thereon by or for the

United States; reserving to the lessors, their heirs, ex-

ecutors, administrators and assigns the right to cultivate

the land for any and all crops which may be grown

thereon; provided, however, that no structures for hu-

man habitation shall be constructed and maintained on

the land; provided, further, that no gathering of more

than twenty-five persons shall be permitted thereon;

the above estate is taken subject to existing easements

for public roads and highways, public utilities, rail-

roads and pipelines.

6. In the succeeding 5 years the defendant exercised

each of its 1-year renewal options and thus retained pos-

session of the subject property through and including June

30, 1967.

7. In 1967, the Trautwein Group rejected as insufficient

the defendant’s final offer of compensation for a voluntary

lease of the subject property for the period following June

30, 1967, and the defendant again elected to condemn the

property for a similar term.

8. (a) On June 30, 1967, the defendant filed in the

U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Civil

Action No. 67-923-PH, entitled United States of America

v. 219.23 Acres of Land, in order to condemn the subject

property and several adjacent parcels.

(b) As authority, the complaint in condemnation

stated that:

The authority for the taking is the Act of Congress

approved August 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 356, 40 U.S.C.

257); Sections 2663 and 9773 of Title 10, United States

Code, which authorize the acquisition of land for mil-

itary purposes; funds for the payment of rental for the

term beginning July 1, 1967, and ending June 30, 1968,

aes. 7 a

will be made available from the Department of Defense

Appropriation Act of 1968 when enacted into law.

(c) The complaint in condemnation and the deciaration

of taking described as taken for public use the same estate

which had been taken in the 1962 condemnation action. The

term of the taking was described as follows:

The estate taken for said public uses is a nonexclusive

term for years beginning July 1, 1967, and ending June

30, 1968, extendible for yearly periods thereafter at

the election of the United States until June 30, 1972

*_* *

9. (a) In the succeeding 4 years the defendant exer-

cised each of its 1-year renewal options and thereby con-

tinued uninterrupted possession of the property through and

including June 30, 1972.

(b) The elections for the first of the 4 years took

place prior to plaintiff's purchase of the property. Plaintiff

bought the property during the lease year ending June 30,

1970, the second of the 4 renewal years. Thereafter the

defendant made similar elections for the years June 30, 1971

and June 30, 1972. Plaintiff received compensation for the

defendant’s possession during the period of plaintiff's own-

ership.

10. (a) On June 30, 1972, the defendant again exer-

cised its power of eminent domain to take the subject prop-

erty and some adjacent parcels by instituting in the U.S.

District Court, Central District of California, Civil Action

No. 72-1505-JWC, entitled United States of America v.

214.69 Acres of Land.

(b) The complaint in condemnation invoked the

authorities cited in the complaint in 1962, substituting for

the 1961 appropriation act an expected appropriation act for

1973.

(c) The complaint and the declaration of taking

further described as taken the same estate as that taken in

the 1962 and 1967 condemnation actions.

11. In the succeeding 4 years, the defendant exercised

its options to renew the lease for successive 1-year terms

and thereby continued uninterrupted possession of the prop-

erty through and including March 31, 1977.

12. On March 8, 1978, the defendant again exercised

its power of eminent domain to take the subject property

and some adjacent parcels by instituting in the U.S. District

Court, Central District of California, Civil Action No. 78-

0890-WPG, entitled United States of America v. 214.69

Acres of Land. The complaint again invoked the authorities

cited in the prior actions, substituting for earlier appropri-

ation acts a 1976 appropriation act. The term of the taking

was described as from April 1, 1977, and ending March 31,

1978, extendible for yearly periods thereafter, at the election

of the United States, until March 31, 1981.

13. The defendant moved for and obtained an order

confirming its right to continued possession of the subject

property effective April 1, 1977, and the defendant elected

to extend the term of its possession from April 1, 1978 to

March 31, 1979.

14. The defendant has continued in uninterrupted pos-

session of the subject property by means of successive con-

demnations, as described above, from February 27, 1962,

to the present.

15. The subject property has at all times pertinent been

acquired and used by the defendant for the public purpose

of providing a necessary buffer/safety zone adjacent to the

bomb and ammunition storage area of March Air Force

Base.

as

16. The bomb and ammunition storage area at the Base

is located on land owned in fee simple by the United States,

and all construction in that area since 1955 has been of a

permanent type.

17. Since no later than 1953, the intended use and an-

ticipated need for the subject property as a part of March

Air Force Base has not changed. As of 1953, and continuing

to the present, the defendant has had a need for the property

for an indefinite term contingent upon the existence of an

ammunition storage area in its present location.

18. March Air Force Base is now and will be for the

foreseeable future a major military installation of the U.S.

Air Force. So long as ammunition storage areas are nec-

essary to its function, a buffer zone surrounding the storage

area will be required. There are no plans to discontinue the

use or location of the existing ammunition storage facility.

The United States thus has a permanent need for the

subject property.

Government Consideration of Acquisition of a

Fee, 1953-63.

19, In 1953, and at several times prior to 1969, the

defendant studied the feasibility of acquiring either a per-

manent restrictive easement or a fee interest in the subject

property and adjacent lands. In each case, the decision was

made to continue acquisition of 1-year renewable term in-

terests.

20. In a letter dated June 29, 1956, from the Chief

Staff, by George A. Lavallee, Chief, Realty Operations

Section, to the Commander-In-Chief, Strategic Air Com-

mand, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, the Chief

of Staff stated:

In reviewing the above mentioned report, it appears

that the 1,851 acres presently under lease in connection

winless

with the ammunition storage area at that installation

{March Air Force Base] are a permanent requirement

and that the possibilities of acquiring a more permanent

interest in the property should be explored due to its

location in relation to the main installation.

21. By memorandum dated on or about July 17, 1956,

the Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force

Base, Omaha, Nebraska, directed the Commander, 15th Air

Force, March Air Force Base, California, as follows:

1. Itis requested that a study be made to determine

the advisability of acquiring a more permanent real

estate interest in the 1,851 acres comprising the March

Air Force Base Ammunition Storage Annex, which

area is presently under ease to the government.

2. Your comments and recommendations in this

regard are requested. If it appears to the best interest

of the government to acquire fee title to this area, this

headquarters will request the Corps of Engineers to

prepare a revised real estate planning report and take

action to include a land acquisition fee line item in a

future military construction program.

22. Thereafter, at a date not shown in the record, the

Commander-in-Chief, SAC, directed the District Engineer,

Los Angeles District, P.O. Box 17277, Los Angeles, Cal-

ifornia, as follows:

1. Request that a Real Estate Requirements Esti-

mate [for Fiscal Year 1960 Military Construction Pro-

gram] be prepared to cover fee acquisition of land and

restrictive easement acquisition over land required to

Satisfy quantity safety distance criteria for the existing

ammunition storage facilities at March Air Force Base.

23. As of November 14, 1958, the Air Force stated in

the Fiscal Year 1960 Military Construction Program a plan

to acquire permanent rights in the subject property to replace

as “aa

the leasehold of the subject property and other related lease-

holds.

24. In 1963, at one stage of the planning of the Fiscal

Year 1965 Military Construction Program, there was in-

cluded a cost study for acquisition of permanent land in-

terests in the buffer zone around the March AFB bomb and

ammunition storage area.

Abandonment of Consideration of Acquisition

of a Fee, 1963

25. Outright acquisition of these land interests was,

however, deleted from the Program in or about June 1963,

on the ground that leasehold interests were more econom-

ical.

26. On April 2, 1963, Floyd D. Bender, Deputy Civil

Engineer, March Air Force Base, reported to the 15th Air

Force that:

2. Based on advice furnished by Headquarters

SAC on the reduction of required space for a demolition

disposal area, a cost comparison to acquire these land

areas versus leasing has been accomplished with the

following results:

a. Total cost to acquire land areas,

as indicated below: $95,751.00.

Restrictive Easement 610.53 AC

R/W Road to Ammo Area 3.00 AC

R/W Road to Demolition Area 1.72 AC

Fee-Demolition Area 5.55 AC

TOTAL 620.80 AC

b. Total annual costs to lease

on a joint use basis 615.25 AC

and exclusive use 5.55 AC

TOTAL 620.80 AC

$4,054.63

Dae, aa

27. Onor about April 12, 1963, the Commander, March

Air Force Base, by Clare H. Royce, Lt. Col., USAF, and

Chief, Base Development Division, Directorate of Civil

Engineering, reported to SAC that:

2. A cost comparison survey to acquire the per-

manent land interests recommended by your head-

quarters, in lieu of land interests requested by this

headquarters in the FY 65 Military Construction Pro-

gram, has been accomplished. The cost to acquire these

reduced land interests, compared to leasing this land

on a joint-use basis, reveals it is not economically

feasible to purchase permanent interests. This survey

shows that it will take 23'2 years to amortize the cost

of permanent acquisition, based on the cost to lease

this land on a joint-use basis.

* * * * *

4. In view of the above, request subject land items

be deleted from the FY 65 Military Construction Pro-

gram.

28. Thereafter, in June 1963, Headquarters, SAC,

Omaha, reported to Headquarters, USAF, concerning the

relative costs of acquiring temporary and permanent inter-

ests in a total of 620.80 acres, including the subject property.

It was estimated that the annual expense for leasing the

lands comprising the safety/distance area around the March

Air Force Base Ammunition Storage Area on a joint-use

basis would be approximately $4,050.00. Comparatively,

it was estimated that the cost of acquiring a restrictive ease-

ment over the 620.80 acres needed would be $93,120.00.

The study concluded that:

4. In view of the above, we consider that it is more

economical to lease all lands comprising the March

Ammo Safety Area on a joint-use basis, with land-

owners’ operations limited to agriculture and grazing.

* * *

a, a en

ees, , we

6. Land items referred to in paragraph 4 of pre-

ceding Ist Indorsement have been deleted from the FY

1965 Military Construction Program.

29. On June 11, 1963, the Chief of Staff, USAF, by

Donald L. Black, Deputy Chief, Air Force Real Estate

Agency, Director of Civil Engineering, reported to Head-

quarters, SAC, that:

Concur in your recommendation that the requirement

for a restricted area around the March Air Force Base

Ammunition Storage Area be met by leasing the re-

quired restrictions only, and therefore, allowing limited

joint use of the land involved.

30. The basis for the 1963 decision to continue leasing

the land required for the March Air Force Base Bomb and

Ammunition Storage Area buffer zone on a joint-use basis

rather than acquire permanent interests in that land was that

leasing was more economical for the United States. As one

witness, an Air Force lawyer, put it, ‘‘leasing was regarded

as, to put it accurately, a better deal for the Government

than purchase.”’

The 1967 Condemnation—The Decision Not to

Acquire a Fee

31. On or about March 29, 1967, during the precon-

demnation negotiations for acquisition of a leasehold on the

subject property from the Trautwein family, the owner’s

attorney informed the negotiator for the Corps of Engineers

that the owner’s expenses for taxes and water assessments

on the subject property exceeded the annual rental of $1,120

offered by the United States.

32. (a) On about April 5, 1967, an appraisal report

on the subject property, prepared by the Corps of Engineers,

U.S. Army Engineer District, Los Angeles, California,

mo, One

stated the fair rental value of the subject property on a joint-

use basis as $1,120 per annum.

(b) The report also appraised the fair market value

of the property at $255,156, and stated that ‘‘[t]he present

value of the land is for speculation and not immediate de-

velopment.’’ ,

(c) The report further acknowledged that the ac-

quisition of the proposed restrictive easement ‘‘will affect

the liquidity of the property in event a sale were contem-

plated.’’

33. The defendant did not raise its offer for annual rental

of the subject property above $1,120 and by report dated

August 3, 1967, the Corps of Engineers’ negotiator rec-

ommended that a declaration of taking should be filed with-

out further delay.

34. (a) In about October 1967, the Office of the Sec-

retary of the Air Force, by Louis E. Turner, Deputy As-

sistant Secretary (Installations), requested an investigation

of the economic feasibility of acquiring perpetual easements

in the 219.23 acre buffer zone adjacent to March AFB. In

response to this request, Headquarters, SAC, requested that

the Corps of Engineers, District Engineer, Los Angeles

District, investigate the economic feasibility of acquiring

perpetual restrictive easements for the March AFB Ammo

Storage Area and, for comparison purposes, to include the

estimated cost of fee purchase of these land areas.

(b) The decision, however, was not to acquire the

fee or a perpetual easement but to condemn a lease, as

before.

(c) The decision was made for the reasons (1) that

it was less expensive to lease than to purchase, and (2) that

the purchase of the subject property had not been authorized

in that year’s Military Construction Authorization Act.

pam, eae

35. (a) Air Force acquisitions of interests in land with

a value in excess of $50,000 must be approved under the

annual Military Construction Authorization Act. Authori-

zation for a purchase of an interest in land in excess of

$50,000 for March Air Force Base would require the ap-

proval of the intermediate command, the 15th Air Force;

the SAC; the Director of Civil Engineering, Headquarters,

USAF; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Re-

sources and the Air Force Council; the Office of the Sec-

retary of the Air Force, specifically the Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Installations; the Office of the Secretary of

Defense; the Office of Management and Budget; the Budget

of the President of the United States; and, ultimately,

Congressional authorization through the annual Military

Construction Appropriations Act.

(b) Processing a request through the procedure of

the Military Construction Program requires, at a minimum,

approximately 1 year. When the determination had to be

made as to whether to continue the condemnation of a lease-

hold in the subject property that had begun in 1962, it was

already too late to include an appropriation for purchase of

the subject property in the 1967 Military Construction Pro-

gram. For instance, a July 1967 purchase request could not

result in authorization for funding to purchase before July

1968.

36. Air Force acquisition of any interest in land that has

a cost of under $50,000 can be handled as a minor land

acquisition funded from the annual operation and mainte-

nance program, and such an acquisition under $50,000 does

not require authorization under a Military Construction Pro-

gram.

37. In reaching the decision in 1967 to condemn suc-

cessive 1-year leasehold interests in the subject property,

the Air Force considered that the expected use of the subject

EUR. WF

property would exceed a 5-year period. The technique of

condemning a l-year leasehold renewable for a 5-year pe-

riod was chosen because leaseholds are funded under annual

funds which cannot be used to enter into an obligation for

longer than 1 year. This procedure allowed acquisition of

the subject property without involvement in the annual

Military Construction Program.

The 1972 Condemnation—No Consideration

of Acquisition of a Fee

38. In 1972, when the Department of the Air Force

decided to institute another 5-year condemnation of a lease

of the subject property, the issues that were discussed in

1967 (including whether to lease or to buy) were not re-

raised, and the condemnation action was processed rou-

tinely.

The Contested 1972 Condemnation

39. (a) On July 20, 1972, the United States served

the Notice of Filing Complaint in Condemnation and related

documents in Civil Action No. 72-1505-JWC on Peter F.

McAndrews, plaintiff's secretary and legal counsel, whose

duties included general supervision of the legal affairs of

the company. At the same time, the defendant also for-

warded to plaintiff a proposed Notice of Appearance in a

franked return envelope.

(b) Plaintiff served and filed 2 a Notice of Appear-

ance on July 26, 1972.

40. At the time plaintiff filed the Notice of Appearance,

its counsel did not know the specific location of the subject

property, and Mr. McAndrews asked the Assistant U.S.

Attorney handling the case for assistance in locating the

property. Plaintiff's counsel had not previously directed his

attention to the property, nor had he had any discussion with

—26—

other officers of the plaintiff regarding any legal action to

be taken with respect to the property.

41. On July 31, 1972, following telephone communi-

cations, plaintiff requested that the defendant enter into ne-

gotiations to arrange for a sale to the Government or have

a condemnation in the traditional and more normal sense

of the word.

42. Plaintiff's request that the United States either pur-

chase or condemn a fee interest in the subject property had

not been formulated before receipt of the 1972 complaint

in condemnation.

43. By letter of October 12, 1972, plaintiff requested

that the United States state whether ‘‘there [is] any possi-

bility of an outright purchase of the property by the Gov-

ernment or the exchange of the property for other land now

owned by the Government in the area.”’

44. Ina letter of November 15, 1972, Assistant U.S.

Attorney Bryan N. Freeman responded in the negative as

follows:

This is in response to your letter dated October 12,

1972, wherein you inquired as to the possibility either

of a purchase of the above-referenced tract by the Gov-

ernment or the exchange of the property for other land

owned by the Government.

The Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District,

has informed us that requests for an outright purchase

or an exchange of the tracts occupied by the Air Force

under lease or leasehold condemnation have been in-

stituted on frequent occasions both by the former own-

ers of Tract D-496-2 and other landowners similarly

situated, at least as far back as 1967. In each instance

the response of the Air Force to these inquiries has

been in the negative on the ground that the proposals

were not militarily feasible.

me ee

* * * %* *

The Corps further pointed out that there is always

the possibility that at some future date the Air Force

could determine the lands under lease to be excess to

its military requirements in which case they would be

released to the owners.

45. Following receipt of Mr. Freeman’s letter of No-

vember 15, 1972, Mr. McAndrews turned the matter over

to outside counsel, Mr. Marshall Manley.

46. The Notice of Appearance previously filed in Civil

Action No. 72-1505-JWC by Mr. McAndrews limited plain-

tiff’s rights to litigation of the question of valuation of the

subject property. Upon appearing in the action, Mr. Manley

made a motion for an order permitting plaintiff to file an

answer. The motion was granted, after an opposition by the

Government in which it was said that ‘‘The Estate Taken

is a Temporary Interest by the Terms of the Taking.”’

47. (a) In early 1973, after the hearing on plaintiff's

motion for leave to file an answer, Mr. Manley attended

a status conference in the chambers of Judge Jesse Curtis.

There a representative of the Department of Justice stated

that ‘‘it was his understanding that the United States gov-

ernment intended to continue to condemn the property which

was the subject of the action continuously in the future in

similar manner in which they had done in the past and that

* * * they had no intention to release the property to the

owners and * * * as far as they could determine, they would

continue to condemn the property in the future ad infini-

tum.”’

(b) This statement was Mr. Manley’s first notice

from a representative of the United States that the United

States intended to condemn the subject property for the

indefinite future.

i *

ion, Sal

48. (a) After filing of plaintiff's answer to the com-

plaint in condemnation, the Government moved to strike

plaintiff’s affirmative defenses. Among the grounds, as

stated in the captions of points 2 and 4 of the argument,

respectively, were that ‘“The Estate Taken Is a Temporary

Interest By the Terms of the Taking’’ and that ‘‘The De-

fendant May Not Challenge the Estate Taken in This Pro-

ceeding [in the district court].’’

(b) Thereafter, plaintiff filed a notice of non-

Opposition to the motion to strike answer. The notice re-

served plaintiff's right to pursue the issues raised in its

answer in the United States Court of Claims.

(c) The district court on June 15, 1973, granted

the United States’ motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s

answer; and this action was on March 18, 1974, filed in this

court.

Plaintiff s Agricultural Expert: The Property Is Not Suited

for Agriculture

49. Plaintiff's expert witness, Mr. Sherman G. Bab-

cock, is an expert agricultural consultant who is familiar

with soils, agricultural development in the Riverside area

and the costs of conducting agricultural operations in that

area.

50. He testified to his opinion that the subject property

is not economically suitable for the conduct of any agri-

cultural operations.

51. His opinion was in part based on the following facts

and considerations:

(a) The soil types on the property range from ‘‘not

suited to agriculture’’ to ‘‘severe limitations for agricul-

ture.”’

(b) There is no agricultural water available.

a

(c) There is presently a crop of barley being dry-

farmed on the property, i.e., using rainfall water.

(d) Even excluding consideration of return on in-

vestment in the !and, dry farming barley on the subject

property would produce a loss.

(e) There is no ciop that may be dry farmed that

would be more profitable than barley for farming on the

subject property.

(f) Citrus culture is technically possible on the sub-

ject property with ‘‘foreign water,’ and citrus culture has

been practiced on adjacent land. Citrus culture would pro-

duce an even greater loss than dry farming of barley.

52. (a) From and after 1975, plaintiff has not been a

party to any agricultural lease for the property, and it does

not receive any remuneration from the person who is pres-

ently growing barley on the subject property.

(b) The reason plaintiff has not entered into an

agricultural lease for the property is that the amount of rental

offered by the prospective lessee, $5.00 per acre per year,

would not compensate plaintiff for the administrative costs

attendant to such a lease and because plaintiff does not wish

the property to be encumbered by the financing statement

that is frequently filed as a consequence of a farmer’s com-

mercial borrowing.

(c) Plaintiff has not evicted the person who is

growing barley on the subject property because the farming

operation abates the growth of weeds and tends to prevent

people from dumping refuse on the subject property.

Plaintiff s Appraiser: The Highest & Best Possible Use Is

to Hold for Speculation With Ultimate Development

Into 1-Acre Residential Lots

53. Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Raynor J. Klaris, ts an ex-

pert real estate appraiser with experience in analysis of un-

developed land and agricultural and grazing properties.

ae me

54. His opinion is that, while the subject property is not

suitable for immediate residential development, it is eco-

nomically suitable for eventual development into |-acre res-

idential lots and that at the present time the economically

feasible best use for the subject property is to hold for

speculation with ultimate development into 1-acre residen-

tial lots.

55. His opinion is based on the assumption that (a) a

zoning change from 20-acre to l-acre residential sites can

be eventually obtained from the local government; (b) that

the property was not restricted by a safety hazard presented

by reason of proximity to the March AFB bomb and am-

munition storage area and the existing condemnation by

defendant.

56. He testified that:

(a) In analyzing the potential highest and best use

of undeveloped property, appropriate procedure for an ex-

pert real estate appraiser is to make the basic assumption

that the property is not restricted by zoning and then de-

termine what the highest and best use of the property would

be based upon the character and development of the area.

(b) After the real estate appraiser has determined

the potential highest and best use of undeveloped property,

the owner implements or attempts to implement that change

in the use of that property. It does not make sense to seek

a zone change before one knows whether or not the con-

templated zone change would make a given parcel of prop-

erty economically useful.

(c) Under the circumstances of this case. ‘‘there

would be no point * * * in going through a development

plan for the subject property with this [condemnation] re-

striction on the property, and potentially on the property in

perpetuity."

ex Wen

57. The bases for his opinion as to highest and best

possible use are the following facts and considerations:

(a) The property lies to the west of Interstate 15

and is near Alessandro Blvd. on the north, Trautwein Road

on the west and Van Buren Blvd. on the south. An easement

for Barton Road, which runs south to Van Buren Blvd., lies

at the eastern edge of the subject property, and an easement

for John F. Kennedy Road runs across the southern part of

the subject property.

(b) The property is located in the community of

Woodcrest, in an unincorporated area of the western portion

of Riverside County, and lies to the southeast of the central

urban area of the City of Riverside, and to the west of March

AFB.

(c) The Riverside County General Plan mistakenly

includes the property as part of the March AFB. The prop-

erty is shown to be surrounded by two types of land-use

classifications: (1) Agricultural Reserve, and (2) Open

Space and Other Agricultural Lands. While the Board of

Supervisors would have no zoning jurisdiction if the prop-

erty was actually part of March AFB, it is not. The subject

property is zoned R-A-20, which requires 20-acre lot sites.

(d) The subject property is currently zoned

R-A-20, which indicates Residential Agricultural with a

minimum lot size of 20 acres. One-acre residential lots

would not be permitted on the subject property under

existing zoning.

(e) A zone change from R-A-20 to 1-acre residen-

tial lots would require an amendment to the Riverside

County General Plan.

(f) While there is no agricultural water available

for the subject property, residential water or domestic water

is available from the Western Municipal Water District.

oP

(g) The subject property does not have access to

sewers. Septic tanks and leach lines with minimum |-acre

lot size are the typical means of sewage disposal for indi-

vidual residences in the area.

(h) The total value of building permits issued for

Riverside County increased by 91.5 percent from 1976 to

1977, and the unincorporated areas of the County showed

a 78.5 percent increase in the value of building permits

issued during the same period.

(i) The City of Riverside imposed a moratorium

on building of new single-family homes from November

1977 to October 1978, which caused demand for housing

to shift to surrounding areas. The value of building permits

in unincorporated areas of Riverside County was up 64

percent in January of 1978, during which time there was

very little building activity in the City of Riverside.

(j) Since the early 1960’s the Riverside area has

become increasingly urbanized, and agriculture is being de-

emphasized. Agricultural acreage in Riverside County de-

creased by 3.2 percent from 1974 to 1977. The tax rate and

the rising cost of agricultural water have created a situation

where ‘‘[t]he continued increase in operating costs encour-

age or even force the agricultural property owner to convert

his property from agriculture to an urban use.”’

(k) As evidenced from the development and growth

which have taken place within the general area, there is an

apparent gradual trend or transformation of rural land to

urban type use. The slow growth pattern is extending toward

the subject area from both the developed portion of Wood-

crest on the west and from the City of Riverside on the

northwest.

(1) The nearest development to subject property is

in an area which almost abuts the northeast corner of the

fae,

property. This development dates from the late 1960’s and

consists of a trailer park on the eastern portion and 1-half

acre lots on the western portion. Several of the lots which

had been vacant until a year ago now contain homes because

of the increased demand for housing.

(m) There is currently being developed a section

of the county about | mile north, northwest of subject prop-

erty. There are 12 to 15 homes, on 1 to 2'%-acre sites

completed, with three under construction. The developer

has 60 additional acres which he is trying to get the county

to rezone to l-acre building sites. This county area is similar

to subject property in most respects, with the exception of

proximity to March AFB.

(n) The typical residential development in the

Woodcrest area is large, ranch-type parcels, typically on 1

to 2'%-acre lots.

Defendant's Land Use Expert: Residential Development Is

Unlikely for a Variety of Stated Reasons

58. (a) Defendant’s witness, Mr. Richard J. Smith,

is an expert by education and training in the field of land-

use planning, zoning, state and local land-use regulation

and development trends in Riverside County.

(b) His opinion is that plaintiff’s land is unsuitable

and undesirable for residential development, now or in the

future.

59. His opinion is based on the following facts and

considerations:

(a) Holding real property for speculation entails a

business judgment that the short-term losses incurred in

holding property that has a negative income flow are jus-

tified by the expectation of future profits to be derived from

the development of that real property.

7s

eer ae

(b) That portion of section 17 (which section in-

cludes the subject property) that is not subject to condem-

nation by the United States has value for holding for spec-

ulative purposes.

(c) Given the presently existing condemnation by

the United States, an expert real estate appraiser would not

advise a client to incur the expense of a plan of development

for the subject property.

(d) The Riverside County General Plan and present

zoning preclude plaintiff's property from being used for

l-acre residential lots.

(e) The Riverside County General Plan could be

amended to allow residential development on plaintiff’s land

only after an environmental assessment is prepared by the

county, pursuant to the California Environmental Quality

Act. Such environmental assessment would be a very im-

portant factor in the determination as to whether the General

Plan should be amended. The assessment would confirm

all the adverse effects of noise, the ammunition storage area,

leap-frog development and the inconsistency of an amend-

ment with open space and conservation policies.

60. (a) The witness analyzed a recent attempt to

amend the General Plan for property, similar to that of

plaintiff, which would have allowed low density residential

development. The amendment was denied by the Board of

Supervisors of Riverside County in June 1977, on the basis

of reports recommending denial from the County Airport

Land Use Commission, the Environmental Impact group

and the Riverside Planning Commission.

(b) The desired maximum noise levels adopted by

the County Board of Supervisors in October 1975, for the

desired type of low density development was 60 dbl.dn.

The subject property was in an area tested at 65 to 75 dbl.dn

-~

noise levels, which was found to be unacceptable to persons

residing in the vicinity of the airport. Noise levels at the

subject property in suit are in the area of 70 to 75 dbl.dn.

(c) The noise level of the subject property was

considered to be somewhat higher than the laboratory-tested

noise levels since it is about 150 feet higher than runway

elevation.

(d) The similar property lies under the flight pat-

tern of March AFB, which could not be changed without

adversely affecting existing residents or flying safety. The

subject property is also located under the flight patterns of

March AFB.

(e) Soils at the similar location severely limit septic

tank use, and the location might have detrimental effects

on wildlife in the reserve south of the site. Plaintiff’s site

location contains no evidence of these limitations, but it has

not been tested for these possibilities.

61. One of the unsuitable aspects of subject property

for low density residential development is that noise levels

on this property of 70 to 75 dbl.dn exceed the desired max-

imum adopted by the Riverside County Planning Commis-

sion in October 1975. Because of these noise levels Federal

Mortgage Insurance would not be available, if desired, for

possible low cost development requiring such a subsidy.

Federal housing standards would require expensive building

improvements which would reduce noise levels by 30

decibels.

62. Another aspect of plaintiff's property that indicates

its undesirability for residential development is its proximity

to the March Air Force Base and the ammunition storage

facility. The safety considerations and the outward appear-

ance of the facility with its bunkers, large tower and barbed

sins

wire fences make residential development less than desir-

able.

63. Plaintiff's property would not be an ideal property

to zone for residential development because this would re-

quire altering the open space and conservation element of

Riverside County’s General Plan. Such an alteration would

be contrary to the desires of the local population which

wishes to keep the present open space and agricultural char-

acter.

64. Residential development on plaintiff's property at

this time would constitute a ‘‘leap frog’’ effect whereby the

development in this remote area would require the expensive

extensions of streets, sewers and other services, even though

there is an abundance of vacant land more ideally located

for such development.

Agreement That the Property Is Not Suitable for Immediate

Residential Development

65. Both parties agree the subject property is not suit-

able for immediate residential development.

Defendant's Appraiser: Assuming Defendant’ s Easement Is

Temporary, Highest and Best Possible Use Is Specu-

lative for Future Development

66. Defendant’s witness, Mr. Robert G. Hill, is by ed-

ucation and experience an expert appraiser of real estate,

land development patterns, and the real estate market in

Riverside County, California. His research for this suit in-

cluded consultation with the Riverside County Assessor,

real estate brokers, planners and planning consultants. He

has personal experience in real estate speculation and in-

vestment.

67. His opinion is that, assuming that defendant’s ease-

ment were only temporary, the highest and best use of the

ica ik

subject property is holding for speculation on future devel-

opment.

68. The bases for his opinion are the following facts

and considerations:

(a) The subject property, comprising 119 acres, is

generally undulating, with numerous outcroppings of rock -

and large boulders and washes. It has historically been

planted in barley, or grazed. It is now planted in barley.

(b) The 500-acre unencumbered tract owned by

plaintiff is zoned R-A-20, as is the subject property, but has

not been developed in any way by plaintiff since its purchase

in 1969.

(c) Development potential for the subject property

is directly affected by the economic influences of Riverside

County and March AFB, zoning and other legal restrictions,

availability of utilities, environmental controls, the prox-

imity of the March AFB ammunition storage dump and

flight operations.

(d) There is substantial commercial and residential

development presently to the east and northeast of March

AFB in the Sunnymead and Edgemont areas. Plaintiff had

developed some of these areas for residential and recrea-

tional use.

(e) Unlike the immediate vicinity of the subject

property, the Edgemont and Sunnymead areas are devel-

oping, in part, because they are near established commercial

centers, are not severely influenced by noise from March

AFB and are not near an ammunition storage agea.

(f) Market demand for commercial or residential

development of the subject property and the surrounding

area is very unlikely to arise within the next 5 years. One

cannot be specific, but such a demand is more likely in the

5-10 year period.

a, tare

69. (a) Inreaching his opinion of the highest and best

use and development potential of the subject property, de-

fendant’s expert appraiser researched and evaluated 22 land

transactions in the general area.

(b) During the period 1966-78 and continuing to

the present, the land sales market in the subject area has

been uniformly speculative. Most of the tracts have changed

hands twice or more during the period. Foreclosure actions

were filed on 11 of the 22 tracts and deeds in lieu of fo-

reclosure were given by the buyers of several other tracts.

There is a trend of residential development down along

Alessandro Blvd., from the City of Riverside, toward the

subject property.

(c) Of these properties, those on the north, or op-

posite, side of Alessandro Blvd. are more suitable for even-

tual development than the subject property. They are more

appropriately zoned, have better access, are within the Riv-

erside City limits and are not near the ammunition storage

area.

(d) Two of the sales of comparable properties were

made by plaintiff and within 2 years were foreclosed upon

by plaintiff when the buyer defaulted.

(e) The real estate market in the vicinity of the

subject property has since 1967 remained highly specula-

tive. Most properties were sold with small down payments.

Typically, buyers soon realized that the anticipated market

for development would not materialize in the near future.

Most grew disenchanted with their purchases and allowed

the title to revert to the seller, either by deed or foreclosure.

Intermediate Conclusions of Law and Fact

70. The highest and best possible use of plaintiff's land

is to hold it for speculation for future residential develop-

ment.

par ae

71. Defendant’s possession of the subject property since

1949, and its condemnations of leaseholds of the subject

property since 1962, and its intention, held since no later

than 1953, to condemn similar leaseholds indefinitely into

the future to satisfy its permanent need for a safety or buffer

zone surrounding the ammunition and bomb storage area

of the March Air Force Base, a public purpose, constitute

a taking of an interest such as a perpetual easement or a fee

for which just compensation is payable.

72. The taking was authorized.

73. The cause of action arose in 1973.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Upon the findings and foregoing opinion, which are

adopted by the court, the court concludes as a matter of law

that plaintiff is entitled to recover just compensation for the

taking of a permanent interest such as a perpetual easement

or the fee over the land which is the subject of the case,

upon the tender to the Attorney General, in a form satis-

factory to him, of a deed to the interest taken, and judgment

is entered to that effect, with the exact amount of the re-

covery and the exact nature of the estate to be conveyed by

deed to be determined in further proceedings under rule

131(c).

aie,

APPENDIX B.

Opinion.

In the United States Court of Claims, No. 79-74 (Decided

September 10, 1980).

Southern California Financial Corporation v. The United

States.

Paul J. Hall, for plaintiff; Marshall Manley, attorney of

record. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, of counsel.

C. David Redmon, with whom was Assistant Attorney

‘General James W. Moorman, for defendant. Nancy E. Stan-

ley, of counsel.

OPINION

Before Cowen, Senior Judge, Davis and Nichols, Judges.

DAVIS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: -

Plaintiff Southern California Financial Corporation sues

for an inverse condemnation of a tract of land adjoining that

part of March Air Force Base, near Riverside, California,

which is used as a bomb and ammunition storage area. The

Government’s motion for summary judgment was previ-

ously denied and the case was remanded for trial. The case

has been tried before Trial Judge Schwartz, and we now

hold, reversing the trial judge’s opinion, that plaintiff is not

entitled to prevail in this suit.'

From 1949 to 1961, the United States had possession of

the tract as a tenant of plaintiff's predecessor, pursuant to

nonexclusive leases for periods of a year or less, each lease

extendible for four or five periods of a year. All the renewal

options were exercised through 1961. In 1962, the owner

declined to lease the land at the offered rental, and so the

Government condemned a 6-months lease, extendible for

'The necessary findings of fact are contained in this opinion.

alll

periods of 1 year each. A similar condemnation took place

in 1967.

Plaintiff bought the land in 1969. When the 1967 lease

as extended expired in 1972, plaintiff would not agree to

another lease, and asked that the Government buy the fee.

The Government thereupon instituted another proceeding

to condemn a lease of the same kind as before. A defense

in the condemnation proceeding that the series of leases

amounted to a condemnation of the fee, for which full pay-

ment ought to be made, was dismissed by the District Court,

on the Government’s motion contending that such a defense

could not be raised in the court in which condemnation

proceedings were instituted.

The condemnation proceeding continued in the District

Court and culminated in a leasehold similar to those in the

past, beginning in 1972. Plaintiff brought suit here in 1974

for an inverse condemnation of the fee, or more properly,

of plaintiff’s reversion. Another leasehold, similar to those

in the past, was condemned in 1977, extendible until 1981.

The trial judge has found the following in this suit: ‘‘The

bomb and ammunition storage area of the March Air Force

Base is located in its northwest corner. The tract in question,

some 119.5 acres, abuts this corner on both the north and

the west, and serves the base as a buffer or safety zone for

the event of a possible explosion of the stored bombs and

ammunition. It [appears most probable] that March Air

Force Base, one of the oldest and largest of its kind, will

remain indefinitely a major air force base and that so long

as bombs and ammunition are used, and stored as they [now]

are, the plaintiff’s land will be needed as a buffer and safety

zone. Further, it is agreed that there are no plans to change

the place of bomb storage; the storage installation is a per-

manent one. * * * While the leases are non-exclusive, and

reserve to plaintiff the right to conduct agricultural opera-

an \, yam

tions, the land cannot be farmed with profit. Residential

development and substantially all other use is forbidden

under the terms of the leases; structures for ‘human habi-

tation’ may not be built or maintained, and gatherings of

more than 25 persons are forbidden.’’ Trial Judge’s Opinion

at 3-6.

The history of the Government’s attitude toward the

length and type of the condemnation of this land is revealing.

It is undisputed that since at least 1953 defendant has had

a need for the property for an indefinite term contingent

upon the existence of an ammunition storage area in its

present location on March Air Force Base. Beginning in

1956 the Air Force considered whether to acquire fee title

to the tract in suit, but by 1963 the acquisition of a fee had

been abandoned and it was decided to continue leasing the

land on temporary renewable terms, because leasing was

more economical for the United States—so the trial judge

has found. This decision was reaffirmed in 1967 and not

again questioned by the acquiring agency. The trial judge

found, and we need not disagree: ‘“The Government’s mo-

tive is simply economy. The Air Force, recognizing that its

need was permanent, has at times considered the relative

cost of leasing and buying, concluded that leasing would

be cheaper, and dropped the idea of acquisition of a fee.

Moreover, it is administratively easier to pay the modest

annual rent fixed in the condemnation proceedings than to

obtain an appropriation of the money to pay for a fee or a

permanent easement. Annual rents can be paid from a non-

specific appropriation for maintenance. Condemnation of

the fee or a permanent easement, on the other hand, would

require the Air Force to seek appropriation in competition

with all other capital improvements for which Congress

must be asked for money. The reluctance to seek a large

ok CO

enough appropriation to pay for the interest actually taken

is seen in the present record’’? Jd. at 5.

At the trial, plaintiff made proof that the highest and best

use of the land is to hold it for speculation for future de-

velopment as a residential area. The speculative potential

is. somewhat dubious for a number of reasons, among them

the noise of overflying planes, the proximity of the land to

the ammunition dump and the restrictive zoning, under

which residential development is not possible. But exact

value aside, the trial judge found that the use to which the

Government puts the land, coupled with the intention to

condemn an indefinite series of leases, deprives the plaintiff

of the highest and best use of the land. This, according to

the trial judge, meant that defendant had taken an interest

tantamount to a fee or perpetual easement for which just

compensation had to be made. The amount was left for

further litigation.

I.

We can assume arguendo (and without deciding) that the

trial judge’s determination of the hard facts is fully correct,

but nevertheless we cannot hold that a compensable taking

of a fee or perpetual easement has occurred. The reason

why we depart from the trial judge is that, unlike him, we

find lack of authority for the Air Force, acting by itself, to

take a fee or perpetual easement of the value involved here.

*In large part the trial judge based his conclusion that the defendant

intended a permanent taking on the following summary of a statement

by a representative of the Department of Justice at a status conference

in the 1972-73 condemnation suit in the District Court: ‘‘it was his

understanding that the United States government intended to continue

to condemn the property which was the subject of the action continu-

ously in the future in similar manner in which they had done in the past

and that * * * they had no intention to release the property to the owners

and * * * as far as they could determine, they would continue to

condemn the property in the future ad infinitum.’’ /d. at 13.

a

That authority could be given only in a Military Construction

Appropriation Act, and the Air Force deliberately refrained

from seeking such congressional sanction. There was there-

fore no authority in the Air Force to take the permanent

interest which the trial judge has found here. In the re-

mainder of this part we spell out these conclusions, step by

step.

First, it is imperative that, before a compensable taking

can be found by the court, there must be some congressional

authorization, express or implied, for the particular taking

claimed. E.g., NBH Land Co. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl.

41, —, 576 F.2d 317, 319-20 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v. United

States, 215 Ct. Cl. 716, 771-72, 572 F.2d 786, 819 (1978);

Coleman v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 1030, 1031 (1978)

(order); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 213 Ct.

Cl. 129, 147-48, 550 F.2d 639, 649 (1977); Huerta v.

United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 473, 484, 548 F.2d 343, 348,

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828 (1977); Eyherabide v. United

States, 170 Ct. Cl. 598, 606-07, 345 F.2d 565, 570 (1965).

Second, in this instance it is clear that a taking of the

permanent or indefinite character now claimed by plaintiff

would have required the specific consent of Congress under

the annual Military Construction Program.’

"The trial ‘s findings, which we adopt on this point, make this

conclusion Jan AA, slain. He found: a1

“Air Force sitions of interests in land with a value in excess

of $50,000 must ved under the annual Military Construction

Authorization Act. A ization for a hase of an interest in land

in excess of $50,000 for March Air Force Base would require the

of the intermediate command, the 15th Air Force; the SAC;

Director of Civil a sapien Headquarters, USAF; the Deput

Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources and the Air Force Council;

the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, specifically the Deputy

Assistant a for Installations; the Office of the § of De-

Office and Budget; the Budget of the President

of the United States; and ultimately, Congressional authorization

ce

Third, in seeking renewable one-year leases, the Air

Force deliberately sought to avoid the need for approval in

an annual Military Construction Appropriations Act, and

no such consent was obtained.*

Fourth, an executive agency is not authorized to take

steps resulting in a compensable taking where Congress has

refused to authorize such a taking or properly expects that

no such taking can occur unless specified procedures in-

volving Congress are followed. In NBH Land Co., supra,

the court rejected an attempt to find an implied taking where

Congress had rejected proposals to acquire the land under

the fiscal 1975 and 1976 Military Construction requests.

The court thought that, to allow judicial compensation for

an inverse taking, ‘‘when the only participation by Congress

has been to reject the acquisition out of hand, would strike

a blow at the power of the purse’’ and held that, by passing

through the annual Military Construction Appropriations Act.’ Trial

Judge's Opinion at 23,

**Processing a request through the procedure of the Military Con-

struction Program requires, at a minimum, approximately | year, When

the determination had to be made as to whether to continue the con-

demnation of a leasehold in the subject property that had begun in 1962,

it was already too late to include an a ation for purchase of the

subject property in the 1967 Military Construction Program. For in-

stance, a July 1967 purchase request could not result in authorization

for funding to purchase before July 1968."' /d.

‘Air Force acquisition of any interest in land that has a cost of under

$50,000 can be led as a minor land acquisition funded from the

annual operation and maintenance program, and such an acquisition

under $50,000 does not require authorization under a Military Con-

struction Program."’ /d.

“The trial judge found in a finding which we also accept:

“In reaching the decision in 1967 to condemn successive |-year

leasehold interests in the subject property, the Air Force considered that

the expected use of the subject yen Pater exceed a 5-year period.

The technique of condemning a |-year leasehold renewable for a 5-year

period was chosen because leaseholds are funded under annual funds

which cannot be used to enter into an obligation for longer than | year.

This procedure allowed acquisition of the subject property without in-

volvement in the annual Military Construction Program."’ /d.

-*%

sasidllii

the Tucker Act, *‘Congress did not strip itself of all control

over the obligation of public funds by land takings without

condemnation.’’ 217 Ct. Cl. at —, 576 F.2d at 319, That

case is closely germane here where the reason Congress did

not act was solely because the Air Force did not wish to

give it the opportunity to decide whether or not to take a

permanent or indefinite interest in the land. Congress and

the Air Force firmly expected Congress to consider all mil-

itary acquisitions of the size for which plaintiff seeks com-

pensation, and we cannot by-pass the congressional will

simply because the Air Force may have thought that it could

do so by condemning successive one-year terms renewable

for five years.

Fifth, it would be an invasion of the letter and spirit of

the Military Construction Program and the Military Con-

struction Appropriation Acts for the Air Force intentionally

to substitute indefinite or permanent one-year renewable

tenancies for the taking of a fee or indefinite interest costing

enough to require inclusion under the Military Construction

Program. Congress had established a procedure for the

larger expenditures which it meant and desired to be fol-

lowed. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2233a (as it existed prior to

December 1974).’ The Air Force could not attain the same

result by camouflaging a larger taking in the guise of suc-

cessive renewable leases which were not reviewable by

Congress.

Sixth, the trial judge relied on the implied authority found,

first, in decisions involving actual physical intrusion onto

or over the claimant's land (like Portsmouth Harbor Land

& Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922), and

‘This suit was brought in May 1974 and the trial judge found that

the asserted ‘‘taking’’ of the larger interest took place in 1973, within

the limitations period.

Tit. A

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)), and, sec-

ond, in cases of a taking through severe regulation or

hemming-in without physical invasion or ouster (like

Benenson v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 375, 548 F.2d 939

(1977), and Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 191 Ct.

Cl. 389, 424 F.2d 574 (1970)). Neither set of precedents

is apt. In those cases there was no congressional limitation

or understanding that Congress itself would have to consider

whether there should be a compensable acquisition of the

magnitude claimed—as there is here. On the contrary, the

takings judicially found were considered to be ‘‘a natural

consequence of congressionally approved measures’’ or

‘the good faith implementation of a Congressional Act.”’

NBH Land Co., supra, 217 Ct. Cl. at __, 576 F.2d at 319.

The express demand in this case that Congress consider and

authorize a permanent or indefinite acquisition of this size

makes all the difference. The Air Force was not empowered

by itself to take a fee or indefinite easement on plaintiff's

land, nor was it authorized to take successive one-year ease-

ments intending those easements to be permanent or without

limit in time. In the face of the express requirement to seek

Congressional consent in a Military Construction Authori-

zation statute, there can be no implied authority to take a

permanent or indefinite interest apart from that route.°

The sum of it is that, even accepting the trial judge’s

findings arguendo, we cannot see the necessary authori-

zation for the acquisition by plaintiff of a fee or indefinite

interest through this Tucker Act proceeding. As NBH Land

*We note in passing (a) that, unlike Portsmouth and Causby, there

was no existing physical intrusion onto plaintiff's land through Air Force

activities on adjacent March Air Force Base, and (b) that it is unlikely

that the mere danger from the adjacent ammunition dump, not involving

any existing invasion of plaintiff's land, would constitute, in itself, a

Fifth Amendment taking. See Avery v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 357,

362-66, 330 F.2d 640, 643-45 (1964).

ae eae

Company held, it is important for us to abide by established

limitations calling for congressional scrutiny of acquisitions,

and not to evade those restrictions via the Tucker Act. 217

Ct. Cl. at __, 576 F.2d at 319. We would thwart a specific

congressional desire if we were to hold that the larger in-

terest had been taken despite the absence of the necessary

congressional consent.

Il.

Is plaintiff left without a remedy, if the trial judge is right

that the Government’s method of procuring successive tem-

porary interest leads to the virtual use by the Government,

without proper payment, of a full-scale interest equal to a

fee or perpetual easement? We think not. Next time around

(in 1981 or 1982), plaintiff can oppose the Air Force’s effort

to obtain another group of successive one-year easements

by urging the District Court that the Government’s attempt

is not in good faith or in the exercise of proper discretion—

that the Air Force intends in fact to keep a permanent or

indefinite hold on the tract, and the method of successive

leases deprives plaintiff of just compensation. If the District

Court agrees with that contention, it should, we think, reject

the defendant’s condemnation suit on the ground that a

permanent interest is not obtainable by these successive

temporary interests and that the Government is trying to

evade the mandatory requirement of seeking and getting

congressional approval for the greater interest. See United

States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F.2d 534, 536 (3rd Cir.

1957); Simmonds v. United States, 199 F.2d 305, 307 (9th

Cir. 1952); United States v. Meyers, 113 F.2d 387, 392

sities,

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706-07 (1940).’ In that

event, the Government would be unable to secure a per-

manent or indefinite interest in the land without going

through the route of the Military Construction Program. If

despite the court’s refusal to allow condemnation in the

same form as, before, the Air Force tries to implement or

enforce a temporary easement, plaintiff will have the remedy

of an injunction.* If the District Court disagrees with plain-

tiff, the latter will have its right of appeal. We do not think

that plaintiff is on the horns of an insoluble dilemma.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The court concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff is

not entitled to recover and the petition is dismissed.

"In the 1972-1973 District Court condemnation action, present de-

fendant moved to strike present plaintiff's defense that the landowner

may challenge the Government’s denomination of its taking in the Dis-

trict Court proceeding as a succession of one-yer easements. Unfortu-

nately, present plai” uff filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion,

and it was granted by the District Court. Present plaintiff then filed suit

in this court. But plaintiff's mistake in agreeing to the Government's

motion cannot give us authority we do not have. Nor are we estopped

by the proceedings in the District Court from following the course we

believe to be compelled by the law.

‘Ordinarily, whenever there is no authority for a taking or intrusion,

the claimant although unable to obtain compensation, can seek an in-

junction or a declaratory judgment against the unauthorized govern-

mental activities.

4%

nae We

APPENDIX C.

Order.

In the United States Court of Claims, No. 79-74.

Southern California Financial Corporation v. The United

States.

Before DAVIS, Judge, Presiding, COWEN, Senior

Judge, and NICHOLS, Judge.

ORDER

This case comes before the court on plaintiff's motion,

filed September 29, 1980, for rehearing en banc pursuant

to Rules 7(d) and 151(b), with reference to the decision

entered herein on September 10, 1980. Upon consideration

thereof, together with the response in opposition thereto,

without oral argument, by the seven active Judges of the

court as to the suggestion for rehearing en banc under Rule

7(d), which suggestion is denied, and further having been

so considered by the panel listed above as to the motion for

rehearing under Rule 151(b),

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s said motion for rehearing

is denied.

OCT. 31, 1980.

BY THE COURT,

/s/)_ OSCAR H. DAVIS,

Oscar H. Davis,

Judge, Presiding

etd dice

APPENDIX D.

Complaint in Condemnation

and Demand for Jury Trial.

United States District Court, Central District of

California.

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. 214.69 Acres of

Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of

California, Erwin P. Werner, et al., and Unknown Owners,

Defendants. No. 72-1505 CC Civil.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, United States of America,

by its attorneys, William D. Keller, United States Attorney,

Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,

and Bryan N. Freeman, Assistant United States Attorney,

Central District of California, on application of the Secretary

of the Air Force of the United States of America, and by

the authority, and under the airection, of the Attorney Gen-

eral thereof, and for cause of action against the defendants,

and each of them, alleges as follows:

1. That this is an action of a civil nature brought by the

United States of America, at the request of the Secretary

of the Air Force thereof, for the taking of property under

the power of eminent domain and for the ascertainment and

award of just compensation to the owner or owners and

party or parties in interest;

2. That the authority for the taking is the Act of Con-

gress approved February 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C.

258a), and acts supplementary thereto and amendatory

thereof, and under the further authority of the Act of Con-

gress approved August |, 1883 (25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C.

257); Sections 2663 and 9773 of Title 10, United States

Code, which authorize the acquisition of land for military

purposes. Funds for such purposes will be made available

by the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 1973,

_-

mes). wes

or, if not enacted prior to July 1, 1972, by a Joint Resolution

of Congress.

3. The public uses for which said land is taken are as

follows: The said land is necessary to provide for the es-

tablishment of facilities for the use of the Department of the

Air Force and for other military uses incident thereto. The

land has been selected under the direction of the Secretary

of the Air Force for acquisition by the United States for use

in connection with March Air Force Base, Riverside

County, State of California, and for such other uses as may

be authorized by Congress or by Executive Order.

4. A general description of the land being taken is set

forth in Exhibit ‘‘1’’, attached hereto and made a part

hereof.

5. The estate taken for said public uses is a non-exclu-

sive term for years beginning July 1, 1972, and ending

March 31, 1973, extendible for yearly periods thereafter,

at the election of the United States, until March 31, 1977,

notice of which election shall be filed in the proceeding at

least thirty (30) days prior to the end of the term hereby

taken, or subsequent extensions thereof, together with the

right to remove, within a reasonable time after the expiration

of the term taken, or any extension thereof, any and all

improvements and structures heretofore or hereafter placed

thereon by or for the United States; reserving to the owners,

their heirs, executors and assigns the right to cultivate the

land for any and all crops which may be grown thereon;

provided, however, that no structures for human habitation

shall be constructed and maintained on the land; provided,

further, that no gathering of more than twenty-five persons

shall be permitted thereon; the above estate is taken subject

to existing easements for public roads and highways, public

utilities, railroads and pipelines.

poe had

6. The persons known to plaintiff who have or claim

to have an interest in the property are those whose names

and their addresses, if known, appear in Exhibit *‘2’’, at-

tached hereto and made a part hereof.

7. In addition to the persons named, there are or may

be others who have or may claim some interest in the prop-

erty to be taken whose names are unknown to plaintiff, and

such persons are made parties to the action under the des-

ignation ‘‘Unknown Owners’’.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment that the

property be condemned and that just compensation for the

taking thereof be ascertained and awarded, and for such

other relief as may be lawful and proper.

DATED: June 30, 1972.

WILLIAM D. KELLER

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

BRYAN N. FREEMAN

Assistant U. S. Attorney

By /s) BRYAN N. FREEMAN,

Bryan N. Freeman

Attorneys for Plaintiff

’*%

=

perm, 7 anes

Trial by jury of the issue of just compensation is de-

manded by plaintiff.

DATED: June 30, 1972.

WILLIAM D. KELLER

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

BRYAN N. FREEMAN

Assistant U. S. Attorney

By /s/ BRYAN N. FREEMAN,

Bryan N. Freeman

Attorneys for Plaintiff

ee ee

EXHIBIT ‘*1”’

Tract Description

TRACT D-462.

The North one-half of the South one-half of the Northwest

one-quarter. The north one-half of the South one-half of the

South one-half of the Northwest one-quarter. All in Section

16, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San Bernardino

Meridian, according to the official plat of the survey of said

land on file in the Bureau of Land Management. Situate in

Riverside County, California.

EXCEPTING therefrom the North 75.00 feet thereof.

Containing 55.46 acres, more or less.

TRACT D-468.

The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section

16, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San Bernardino

Meridian, Riverside County, State of California.

Containing 40 acres, more or less.

TRACT D-496-2.

The South 840 feet of the East 840 feet of the Northeast

quarter, and the East 1,700 feet of the Southeast quarter of

Section 17, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San Ber-

nardino Meridian, in the County of Riverside, State of Cal-

ifornia.

Containing 119.23 acres, more or less.

is, ae

EXHIBIT ‘*2”’

Names and Addresses of Purported Owners.

TRACT D-496-2: Mary Hendrick Trautwein

Caroline H. Trautwein

Emily T. Stoddard

Archer I. Schweizer

Margaret T. Stoddard

Kenneth H. Colville

William T. Colville, Jr.

Jessie Colville Powell

Dorothy Colville Dann

c/o Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Attorneys

445 South Figueroa Street

Los Angeles, California 90017

Southern California Financial

Corporation

9100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1003

Beverly Hills, California 90212

TRACTS D-462 and D-468:

Erwin P. Werner

827 Broadway

P. O. Box 815

Needles, California 92563

i.

APPENDIX E.

Declaration of Taking.

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-

fornia

United States of America, Plaintiff vs. 214.69 Acres of

Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of

California, and Erwin P. Werner, et al., Defendants. Civil

No. 72-1505-JWC.

To the Honorable, the United States District Court:

I, the undersigned, Philip N. Whittaker Assistant Sec-

retary of the Air Force, do hereby make the following dec-

laration by direction of the Secretary of the Air Force:

1. (a) The land hereinafter described is taken under

and in accordance with the Act of Congress approved Feb-

ruary 26, 1931 (46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. 258a), and acts

supplementary thereto and amendatory thereof, and under

the further authority of the Act of Congress approved August

1, 1888 (25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. 257); Section 2663 and

9773 of Title 10, United States Cocie, which authorize the

acquisition of land for military purposes. Funds for such

purposes will be made available by the Department of De-

fense Appropriation Act for 1973, or, if not enacted prior

to July 1, 1972, by a Joint Resolution of Congress.

(b) The public uses for which said land is taken

are as follows: The said land is necessary to provide for the

establishment of facilities for the use of the Department of

the Air Force and for other military uses incident thereto.

The land has been selected under the direction of the Sec-

retary of the Air Force for acquisition by the United States

for use in connection with March Air Force Base, Riverside

County, State of California, and for such other uses as may

be authorized by Congress or by Executive Order.

wet ion

2. A general description of the land being taken is set

forth in Schedule **A’’ attached hereto and made a part

hereof, and is a description of the same land described in

the complaint in the above entitled cause.

3. The estate taken for said public uses is a non-

exclusive term for years beginning July 1, 1972, and ending

March 31, 1973, extendible for yearly periods thereafter,

at the election of the United States, until March 31, 1977,

notice of which election shall be filed in the proceeding at

least thirty (30) days prior to the end of the term hereby

taken, or subsequent extensions thereof, together with the

right to remove, within a reasonable time after the expiration

of the term taken, or any extension thereof, any and all

improvements and structures heretofore or hereafter placed

thereon by or for the United States; reserving to the owners,

their heirs, executors and assigns the right to cultivate the

land for any and all crops which may be grown thereon;

provided, however, that no structures for humam habitation

shall be constructed and maintained on the land; provided,

further, that no gathering of more than twenty-five persons

shall be permitted thereon; the above estate is taken subject

to existing easements for public roads and highways, public

utilities, railroads and pipelines.

4. A plan showing the land taken is annexed hereto as

Schedule **B’’ and made a part hereof.

5. The sum estimated by the undersigned as just com-

pensation for the said land, with all buildings and improve-

ments thereon, and all appurtenances thereto and including

any and all interests hereby taken in said land, is set forth

in Schedule **A’’ herein, which sum the undersigned causes

to be deposited herewith in the registry of the said court for

the use and benefit of the persons entitled thereto. The

undersigned is of the opinion that the ultimate award for

a

said land probably will be within any limits prescribed by

law on the price to be paid therefor.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, the Assistant

Secretary of the Air Force, hereunto subscribes his name

by direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, this 22nd day

of June A.D. 1972, in the City of Washington, District of

Columbia.

/s/ Philip N. Whittaker

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

ails

SCHEDULE *‘A’”’,

The land which is the subject matter of this declaration

of taking aggregates 214.69 acres, more or less, situate and

being in the County of Riverside, State of California, and

in the same land described in the complaint heretofore filed

in this action, A description of the land taken, together with

the names and addresses of the purported owners thereof,

and a statement of the sum estimated to be the just com-

pensation for the taking of the nonexclusive use and pos-

session for the period beginning July 1, 1972, and ending

March 31, 1973, is as follows:

TRACT D-462.

The North one-half of the South one-half of the

Northwest one-quarter. The north one-half of the South

one-half of the South one-half of the Northwest one-

quarter. All in Section 16, Township 3 South, Range

4 West, San Bernardino Meridian, according to the

official plat of the survey of said land on file in the

Bureau of Land Management.

EXCEPTING therefrom the North 75.00 feet thereof.

Containing 55.46 acres, more or less.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PURPORTED OWNER:

Erwin P. Werner

827 Broadway

Needles, California

ESTIMATED COMPENSATION: $3,396.93

TRACT D-468.

The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of

Section 16, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, San

Bernardino Meridian, Riverside County, State of

California.

Containing 40 acres, more or less

ills tiie

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PURPORTED OWNER:

Erwin P. Werner

827 Broadway

Needles, California

ESTIMATED COMPENSATION: $2,450.00

TRACT D-496-2.

The South 840 feet of the East 840 feet of the North-

east quarter, and the East 1,700 feet of the Southeast

quarter of Section 17, Township 3 South, Range 4

West, San Bernardino Meridian in the County of

Riverside, State of California.

Containing 119.23 acres, more or less.

NAMES AND ADDRESS OF PURPORTED OWNERS:

Mary Hendrick Trautwein

Caroline H. Trautwein

Emily T. Stoddard

Archer I. Schweizer

Margaret T. Stoddard

Kenneth H. Colville

William T. Colville, Jr.

Jessie Colville Powell

Dorothy Colville Dann

c/o Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Attorneys

445 South Figueroa Street

| Los Angeles, California

ESTIMATED COMPENSATION: $7,302.84

The gross sum estimated by the acquiring agency to be

the just compensation for the estate hereby taken for the

term beginning July 1, 1972 and ending March 31, 1973

is THIRTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY

NINE AND 77/100 DOLLARS ($13,149.77).

4

r<

<cosls

APPENDIX F.

Answer to Complaint in Condemnation

(Tract D-496-2).

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-

fornia.

United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. 214.69 Acres of

Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of

California, Erwin P. Werner, et al., and Unknown Owners,

Defendants. No. 72-1505-JWC-Civil.

Defendant Southern California Financial Company, owner

of the tract designated D-496-2, answering the complaint

on file herein, admits, denies and alleges as follows:

1. In answer to the allegations of paragraph |, defendant

alleges that it has no information or belief sufficient to

enable it to answer the allegations contained in paragraph

1, and upon that ground denies each and every allegation

contained therein.

2. . In answer to the allegations of paragraph 2, defendant

alleges that it has no information or belief sufficient to

enable it to answer the allegations contained in paragraph

2, and upon that ground denies each and every allegation

contained therein.

3. In answer to the allegations of paragraph 3, defendant

denies that said land is necessary to provide for the estab-

lishment of facilities for the use of Department of the Air

Force and for other military uses incident thereto, and except

as denied above alleges that it has no information or belief

sufficient to enable it to answer the remaining allegations

contained in paragraph 3, and upon that ground denies each

and every allegation contained therein.

4. In answer to the allegations of paragraph 4, defendant

admits that a general description of land is attached to the

complaint as Exhibit 1 and made part thereof; and except

piel,

as admitted above alleges that it has no information or belief

sufficient to enable it to answer the remaining allegations

contained in paragraph 4, and upon that ground denies each

and every allegation contained therein.

5. In answer to the allegations of paragraph 5, defen-

dant denies generally and specifically each and every al-

legation contained in paragraph 5.

6. In answer to the allegations of paragraph 6, defendant

admits that Southern California Financial Corporation has

an interest in certain of the property subject of this action;

admits that a list of names and addresses is attached to the

complaint as Exhibit 2 and made a part thereof; and except

as admitted above alleges that this answering defendant has

no information or belief sufficient to enable it to answer the

remaining allegations contained in paragraph 6 and on that

ground denies each and every allegation contained therein.

7. Inanswer to the allegations of paragraph 7, defendant

alleges that it has no information or belief sufficient to

enable it to answer the allegations contained in paragraph

7, and upon that ground denies each and every allegation

contained therein.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.

8. For a first, separate and affirmative defense defen-

dant alleges that the Secretary of the Air Force has acted

in an arbitrary and capricious manner in determining that

the land subject of this action is necessary for the purposes

specified in the acts referred to in paragraph 2 of the

complaint herein.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.

For a second, separate, and affirmative defense defendant

alleges that:

9. The United States has condemned a one-year lease-

hold interest in the subject property renewable at the sole

eee” Pa

discretion of the United States for yearly terms up to a total

of five years every five years commencing with the year

1942.

10. At each year since 1942 the United States has

exercised its condemned right of renewal of the leasehold

interests that were condemned in 1942, 1947, 1952, 1957,

1962 and 1967.

11. Defendant is informed and believes and based upon

such information and belief alleges that the United States

intends, if their complaint in condemnation be granted, to

extend said leasehold each year until March 31, 1977 and

then further intends to file another action to condemn a

further leasehold interest for one year renewable at the op-

tion of the United States for four years in 1977; and further

intends to continue said pattern of condemnation every five

years and renewal of the leasehold interest every year for

an indefinite period in the future.

12. As a result of said past and future actions as set

forth hereinabove, defendant alleges that in fact and effect

plaintiff has taken and is seeking to take by this action in

condemnation all of defendant’s right and interest in Tract

D-496-2 and by reason thereof defendant is entitled to the

fair market value of the fee ownership interest in said tract

as of June 30, 1972.

13. The fair market value of Tract D-496-2 as of June

30, 1972 is in excess of $600,000.

WHEREFORE, this answering defendant prays as

follows:

1. That the Tract D-496-2 not be condemned;

2. That if said tract is condemned that defendant be

awarded the fair market value of the fee interest in said tract

as of June 30, 1972;

3. For cost of suit herein; and

per a

4. For such other and further relief as the court deems

proper.

Dated: January 12, 1973.

McKENNA, FITTING & FINCH,

By /s) MARSHALL MANLEY,

Marshall Manley

Attorneys for Defendant

Southern California Financial

Company

*-*

ilies.

APPENDIX G.

Motion to Strike Answer of Defendant Southern

California Financial Corporation to Complaint in

Condemnation, Notice Thereof, and Memorandum

of Points and Authorities (As to Tract D-496-2).

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-

fornia.

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. 214.69 Acres of

Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of

California et al., Defendants. No. 72-1505-JWC Civil.

FILED: May 17, 1973.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, United States of America,

by its attorneys, William D. Keller, United States Attorney,

Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,

and Bryan N. Freeman, Assistant United States Attorney,

Central District of California, and moves to strike para-

graphs 3 and 5 and First Affirmative Defense (paragraph

8) and Second Affirmative Defense (paragraphs 9 to 13,

inclusive), and paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 on page 4, from the

Answer of defendant Southern California Financial Cor-

poration to the Complaint in Condemnation, pursuant to

Rule 12(f), F.R.Civ.P., because said portions of said An-

swer contain insufficient defenses and immaterial matters,

and in particular (1) contain an attempt to challenge the

right of the United States to effect a temporary taking herein,

which is an administrative matter and not reviewable in

ear AY

these proceedings, and (2) improperly pray for costs of suit,

which are not recoverable in a condemnation proceeding.

DATED: May 17, 1973.

WILLIAM D. KELLER

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

By /s/ BRYAN N. FREEMAN,

Bryan N. Freeman, ~*

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

United States of America

’%

er eee

NOTICE OF MOTION.

TO DEFENDANT SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FINAN-

CIAL CORPORATION AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF

RECORD:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the foregoing

motion will come on for hearing before the Honorable Jesse

W. Curtis, United States District Judge, in his courtroom

in the United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street,

Los Angeles, California 90012, on Monday, the 13th day

_of June, 1973, at 10:00 o’clock A.M., or as soon thereafter

as counsel may be heard.

DATED: May 17, 1973.

WILLIAM D. KELLER

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR. uy

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

By /s/) BRYAN N. FREEMAN,

Bryan N. Freeman,

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

United States of America

lies.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.

A. Preliminary Statement

The defendant Southern California Financial Corporation

has filed an answer pursuant to motion in the within con-

demnation proceeding with respect to Tract D-496-2, con-

taining 119.23 acres. The tract is subject to the estate taken

herein, which is specified in the declaration of taking and

complaint in condemnation precisely as follows:

**. . . a non-exclusive term for years, beginning July

1, 1972, and ending March 31, 1973, extendible for

yearly periods thereafter, at the election of the United

States, until March 31, 1977, notice of which election

shall be filed in the proceeding at least thirty (30) days

prior to the end of the term hereby taken, or subsequent

extensions thereof, together with the right to remove,

within a reasonable time after the expiration of the term

taken, or any extension thereof, any and all improve-

ments and structures heretofore or hereafter placed

thereon by or for the United States; reserving to the

owners, their heirs, executors and assigns the right to

cultivate the land for any and all crops which may be

grown thereon; provided, however, that no structures

for human habitation shall be constructed and main-

tained on the land; provided, further, that no gathering

of more than twenty-five persons shall be permitted

‘thereon; the above estate is taken subject to existing

easements for public roads and highways, public util-

ities, railroads and pipelines.”’

The defendant Southern California Financial Corporation

(hereinafter SCFC), in its answer, denies that the subject

tract is necessary to provide for the establishment of facilities

for the use of the Department of the Air Force (paragraph

3), denies the estate taken (paragraph 5), alleges arbitrary

and capricious conduct on the part of the Secretary of the

|

ee, Oa

Air Force (first affirmative defense), alleges that the estate

condemned by this action is the fee ownership (second af-

firmative defense), and seeks that the tract not be condemned

or that fee value be awarded, and also that costs of suit be

awarded defendant.

The above allegations are essentially identical to the al-

legations contained in the answer of co-defendant Erwin P.

Werner, all of which were stricken pursuant to motion by

plaintiff. These allegations should accordingly be stricken

from defendant SCFC’s answer for the same reasons, as

further discussed below.

B. Statement of Law

I. THE NECESSITY OF THE TAKING IS NOT

SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHERE THE USE

IS FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES.

An excellent discussion of the subject of necessity of the

taking is contained in United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of

Land, the Court holding:

**. . . The argument that land sought to be condemned

is not really necessary for the consummation of a plan

is frequently made in condemnation cases in an attempt

to defeat the taking. This argument, however, has been

unanimously rejected by every court which has con-

sidered the matter. It is perfectly clear that the judicial

role in exémining condemnation cases does not extend

to determining whether the land sought is actually nec-

essary for the operation of the project. . . . ‘Numerous

cases sustain the proposition that the purpose intended

being valid, the necessity of the taking and the character

of the title to be taken are decisions vested exclusively

in the Secretary .. .’

‘*The only exception to this rule would occur if the

delegated official so overstepped his authority that no

reasonable man could conclude that the land sought to

Sule.

be condemned had some association with the autho-

rized project. In such a case alone could the taking be

considered arbitrary or capricious as those terms are

used in condemnation proceedings. There must be

basic to the project pervasive deception, unreasoned

decision, or will-of-the-wisp determination before

these words of pejoration are brought into play.’” (Sth

Cir. 1970) 432 F.2d 1286, 1289, 1290.

See also: Berman v. Parker (1954), 348 U.S. 26,

75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27;

United States v. Mischke (8th Cir. 1961), 285 F.2d

628, 631.

Il. THE ESTATE TAKEN IS A TEMPORARY IN-

TEREST BY THE TERMS OF THE TAKING

The defendant alleges that the taking by the United States

is a taking of all of defendant’s right, title and interest and

its entire fee ownership in the subject tract. A reading of

the estate taken as quoted hereinabove demonstrates that it

expressly limits the taking to a non-exclusive term for years

beginning July 1, 1972 and ending March 31, 1973, and

extendible for yearly periods thereafter, at the election of

plaintiff, until March 31, 1977. The taking is for a definite,

fixed, and limited period of time. Further, the right to cul-

tivate the land is reserved to the landowner, subject, of

course, to the restrictions regarding structures and gather-

ings of people on the premises. Under the terms of the

taking the landowner is free to alienate the property in any

lawful manner as he deems fit, subject to the estate taken.

Ill. IN ITS EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMI-

NENT DOMAIN, THE UNITED STATES MAY TAKE

AN INTEREST LESS THAN THE FEE SIMPLE

ABSOLUTE.

The Government has the power to condemn a term for

years. See, for example, United States v. General Motors,

an, eee

323 U.S. 373, 378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945),

Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct.

1434, 93 L.Ed. 1765.

This, of course, is in line with the provisions of the

Declaration of Taking Act, the Act of February 26, 1931,

46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. 258(a), which provides, in

pertinent part:

**In any proceeding in any court of the United States

outside of the District of Columbia which has been or

may be instituted by and in the name of and under the

authority of the United States for the acquisition of any

land or easement or right of way in land for the public

use, the petitioner may file in the cause, with the pe-

tition or at any time before judgment, a declaration of

taking signed by the authority empowered by the law

to acquire the lands described in the petition, declaring

that said lands are thereby taken for the use of the

United States....

* * *

‘Upon the filing of said declaration of taking and

of the deposit in the court, to the use of the persons

entitled thereto, of the amount of the estimated com-.

pensation stated in said declaration, title to said lands

in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest

therein as is specified in said declaration, shall vest

in the United States of America, and said lands shall

be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of

the United States, and the right to just compensation

for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto;

...’ [Emphasis added. }

The authority for the instant taking is found in Sections

2663 and 9773 of Title 10, United States Code. In particular,

in said section 2663, it is provided that:

**. . .(a) The Secretary of a military department may

have proceedings brought in the name of the United

Fett. Aa

States . . . to acquire by condemnation any interest in

land, including temporary use, .. .’’

Thus, the taking of. the subject estate in this action is fully

authorized.

IV. THE DEFENDANT MAY NOT CHALLENGE

THE ESTATE TAKEN IN THIS PROCEEDING.

In Simmonds v. United States, the Ninth Circuit, in de-

termining whether a condemnee could require the United

States to acquire an easement interest as opposed to the fee,

the Court ruled that:

**. . . Discretion regarding the acquisition of property _

by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, rather

than by direct purchase, lies with any federal officer

acting under the mandate of Congress. Congress has

established as the standard for the exercise of discretion

the ‘opinion’ of an authorized official that condem-

nation would be ‘necessary or advantageous to the

Government’. 40 U.S.C.A. § 257. . . . Therefore,

where the statute which is being implemented contains

Congressional authority to take property by eminent

domain. . ., the officer authorized to act is under the

duty of exercising his discretion as to the estate he

elects to take.’’ 199 F.2d 305, 306 (1952).

It is beyond the jurisdiction of the court to vary the estate

sought by the Government in a condemnation proceeding.

In United States v. Brondum, the issue was the interpretation

of the estate taken, whether a clearance easement or avi-

gation easement. The Circuit limited the taking precisely

as stated in the declaration of taking, holding that:

‘**... In a condemnation proceeding courts cannot

compel the United States to take and pay for an estate

not described in the declaration of taking.’’ (Sth Cir.

1959) 272 F.2d 642, 646-47.

pe,

See also: Wilson v. United States (10th Cir. 1965)

350 F.2d 901, 906;

United States v. 64.88 Acres of Land (3rd Cir. 1957)

244 F.2d 534, 536.

The fact that the subject property has been used in the

past by the Government is irrelevant in this proceeding. It

should be noted that the defendant SCFC is not in a position

to complain about prior takings, since it purchased the sub-

ject property in 1969 with notice of, and subject to, the

Government’s interest acquired in 1967. Further, the de-

fendant’s predecessors in title have been fully compensated

for the prior use of the property. Hence, regardless of a

prior use, ihe issue to be determined in the instant condem-

nation proceeding is the just compensation payable for the

estate expressly condemned herein by the Government, that

is, the designated use for the initial term commencing in

July, 1972 and ending March 31, 1973, extendible for yearly

periods thereafter until March 31, 1977.

The issue to be determined in the instant proceeding is

the fair market rental value of the interests taken as of the

date of the Government’s taking. The Supreme Court, in

Kimball Laundry v. United States, held that where there is

a taking of a temporary interest,

**., , the proper measure of compensation is the rental

that probably could have been obtained, and so this

Court has held in the two recent cases dealing with

temporary takings [citing cases]’’. 338 U.S. 1, 7, 69

S.Ct. 1434, 93 L.Ed. 1765. .

V. COSTS OF SUIT ARE NOT ALLOWABLE IN A

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING.

The Constitution requires payment for the property taken,

and this has been interpreted as excluding such incidental

damages as expenses incurred by the defendants in litigating

as, awe

their claim. In Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368, 50

S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904 (1930), the Court said:

‘*Attorneys’ fees and expenses are not embraced

within the just compensation for land taken by eminent

domain.’’

United States v. Worley, 281 U.S. 339, 344, 50

S.Ct. 291, 74 L.Ed. 887 (1930);

United States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 345, 348 (Sth

Cir. 1953).

In particular, it should be noted that Rule 71A(1),

F.R.Civ.P., provides:

‘*Costs are not subject to Rule 54(d).”’

With respect to this provision, the Advisory Committee

on Rules states:

**Since the condemnor will normally be the pre-

vailing party and since he should not recover his costs

against the property owner, Rule 54(d), which provides

generally that costs shall go to the prevailing party, is

made inapplicable.’”’

Thus, although the United States is the prevailing party in

a condemnation proceeding, costs are not allowed to be

taxed against the landowner, and, accordingly, may not be

taxed against the United States.

VI. CONCLUSION.

Plaintiff submits that the portions of the answer of de-

fendant SCFC referred to in plaintiff's motion should be

stricken, as they contain insufficient defenses and imma-

terial matters. Defendant’s answer is merely an attempt to

4

ee

have the Court enlarge the estate taken in these proceedings

beyond that expressly taken in the declaration of taking. For

this reason, said portions of the answer are improper and

are subject to a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), F.R.C.P.

Respectfully submitied,

WILLIAM D. KELLER

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

By /s/ BRYAN N. FREEMAN

Bryan N. Freeman

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

United States of America

ee, We

I, CARON RHODES, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or

employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my busi-

ness address is Office of United States Attorney, United

States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles,

California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years,

and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for

the Central District of California who is a member of the

Bar of the United States District Court for the Central Dis-

trict of California, at whose direction the service by mail

described in this Certificate was made; that on May 17,

1973, I deposited in the United States mails in the United

States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St., Los Angeles,

California, in the above-entitled action, in an envelope bear-

ing the requisite postage, a copy of MOTION TO STRIKE

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

FINANCIAL CORPORATION TO COMPLAINT IN

CONDEMNATION, NOTICE THEREOF, AND MEMO-

RANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, addressed

to McKENNA, FITTING & FINCH, 3435 Wilshire Blvd.,

24th Floor, Los Angeles, Calif. 90010. Attention: ROBERT

E. MANGELS, ESQ. at their last known address, at which

place there is a delivery service by United States mail.

This Certificate is executed on May 17, 1973, at Los

Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true and correct.

/s/ CARON RHODES

Caron Rhodes

| > *

a, ae

APPENDIX H.

Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion to Strike Answer

of Southern California Financial Corporation.

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-

fornia.

United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. 214.69 Acres of

Land, More or Less, Situated in Riverside County, State

of California, Erwin P. Werner, et al., and Unknown

Owners, Defendants. No. 72-1505-JWC Civil.

TO: ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF

RECORD HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION will not op-

pose the Motion to Strike paragraphs 3 and 5 of its answer,

the First and Second Affirmative Defenses and paragraphs

1, 2 and 3 on page 4 of its answer. This Non-Opposition

is intended to be without prejudice to Defendant SOUTH-

ERN CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION’S right

to pursue the issues raised in its answer in the United States

Court of Claims, or to its right to appeal.

Dated: June 7, 1973.

McKENNA, FITTING & FINCH

By /s/ ROBERT E. MANGELS

Robert E. Mangels

Attorneys for Defendant,

Southern California Financial

Corporation

aK, ae

Affidavit of Service by Mail.

State of California, County of Los Angeles—ss.

I, Dee Rutherford, being first duly sworn, say: I am a

citizen of the United States and a resident of the county

aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not

a party to the within action; my business address is 3435

Wilshire Boulevard, Twenty-eighth Floor, Los Angeles,

California. On June 7, 1973, I served a copy of the within

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE

ANSWER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL

CORPORATION on the parties listed below in said action

by depositing a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope with

postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at

Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

Joseph J. Weissman

Elaine Sperling

6922 Hollywood Boulevard

Hollywood, California 90028

William D. Keller, U.S. Attorney

Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Assistant

U.S. Attorney, Chief, Civil Division

Bryan N. Freeman, Asst. U.S.

Attorney

1100 U.S. Courthouse

312 North Spring Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

™

nike

Executed at Los Angeles, California, on this 7th day of

June, 1973.

/s/) DEE RUTHERFORD

Dee Rutherford, Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 7th day of June,

1973.

/s/ LOLA R. KAY

Lola R. Kay

Notary Public in and for

said county and state.

>. | ae

APPENDIX I.

Order Striking Portions of Answer of Defendant South-

ern California Financial Corporation to Complaint

in Condemnation (As to Tract D-496-2).

United States District Court, Central District of Cali-

fornia.

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. 214.69 Acres of

Land, More or Less, Situate in Riverside County, State of

California, et al., Defendants. No. 72-1505-JWC Civil.

FILED: June 12, 1973.

The plaintiff, United States of America, having filed its

Motion to Strike Answer of Defendant Southern California

Financial Corporation to Complaint in Condemnation on

May 17, 1973, the defendant Southern California Financial

Corporation having filed its Notice of Non-Opposition to

said motion, and good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following portions

of defendant Southern California Financial Corporation’s

answer be stricken:

1. Paragraph 3, on pages | and 2;

2. Paragraph 5, on page 2;

3. First Affirmative Defense, paragraph 8, on page 3;

4. Second Affirmative Defense, paragraphs 9 through

13, inclusive, on pages 3 and 4;

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5. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, on page 4.

‘DATED: This 18th day of June, 1973. _

/s/ Jesse W. Curtis

United States District Judge

~

PRESENTED BY:

WILLIAM D. KELLER

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

By /s/) BRYAN N. FREEMAN,

Bryan N. Freeman

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

United States of America

inl Raden

I, CARON RHODES, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or

employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my busi-

ness address is Office of United States Attorney, United

States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles,

California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years,

and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for

the Central District of California who is a member of the

Bar of the United States District Court for the Central Dis-

trict of California, at whose direction the service by mail

described in this Certificate was made; that on June 15,

1973, I deposited in the United States mails in the United

States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St., Los Angeles,

California, in the above-entitled action, in an evelope bear-

ing the requisite postage, a copy of ORDER STRIKING

PORTIONS OF ANSWER OF DEFENDANT SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CORPORATION TO

COMPLAINT IN CONDEMNATION, addressed to

McKENNA, FITTING & FINCH, 3435 Wilshire Blvd.,

24th Floor, Los Angeles, Calif. 90010. ATTENTION:

ROBERT E. MANGELS, ESQ. at their last known address,

at which place there is a delivery service by United States

mail.

This Certificate is executed on June 15, 1973, at Los

Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true and correct.

/s/ CARON RHODES

Caron Rhodes

74

—_Sh—-!

APPENDIX J.

Constitutional Provision and Statutes

This action involves the following constitutional provi-

sion and statutes:

United States Constitution, Amendment V:

‘*No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or in-

dictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land

or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in

time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject

for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-

erty be taken Tor public use, without just compensation.”’

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. $1491:

**The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render

judgment upon any claim against the United States founded

either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or

any regulation of an executive department, or upon any

express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding

in tort. For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or

implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange

Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast .

Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be considered

an express or implied contract with the United States. To

provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded

by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and col-

lateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing resto-

ration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty

or retirement status, and correction of applicable records,

-

and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official

of the United States. In any case within its jurisdiction, the

court shall have the power to remand appropriate matters

to any administrative or executive body or official with such

direction as it may deem proper and just. The Court of

Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any

claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor arising

under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.

‘*Nothing herein shall be construed to give the Court of

Claims jurisdiction in suits against, or founded on actions

of, the Tennessee Valley Authority, nor to amend or modify

the provisions of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of

1933, as amended, with respect to suits by or against the

Authority.”’

The Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §258a:

In any proceeding in any court of the United States outside

of the District of Columbia which has been or may be

instituted by and in the name of and under the authority of

he United States for the acquisition of any land or easement

or right of way in land for the public use, the petitioner may

file in the cause, with the pstition or at any time before

judgment, a declaration of taking signed by the authority

empowered by law to acquire the lands described in the

petition, declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the

use of the United States. Said declaration of taking shall

contain or have annexed thereto—

(1) A statement of the authority under which and

the public use for which said lands are taken.

(2) A description of the lands taken sufficient for

the identification thereof.

(3) A statement of the estate or interest in said

lands taken for said public use.

(4) A plan showing the lands taken.

iit

(5) A statement of the sum of money estimated by

said acquiring authority to be just compensation for the

land taken.

Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the

deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto,

of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in said

declaration, title to the said lands in fee simple absolute,

or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in said

declaration, shall vest in the United States of America, and

said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for

the use of the United States, and the right to just compen-

sation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto;

and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in

said proceeding and established by judgment therein, and

the said judgment shall include, as part of the just com-

pensation awarded, interest ai the rate of 6 per centum per

annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the

property as of the date of taking, from said date to the date

of payment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much

thereof as shall have been paid into the court. No sum so

paid into the court shall be charged with commissions or

poundage.

Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court

may order that the money deposited in the court, or any part

thereof, be paid forthwith for or on account of the just

compensation to be awarded in said proceeding. If the com-

pensation finally awarded in respect of said lands, or any

parcel thereof, shall exceed the amount of the money so

received by any person entitled, the court shall enter judg-

ment against the United States for the amount of the defi-

ciency.

Upon the filing of a declaration of taking, the court shall

have power to fix the time within which and the terms upon

which the parties in possession shall be required to surrender

an om

possession to the petitioner. The court shall have power to

make such orders in respect of encumbrances, liens, rents,

taxes, assessments, insurance, and other charges, if any,

as shall be just and equitable.

10 U.S.C. $2663:

(a) The Secretary of a military department may have

proceedings brought in the name of the United States, in

a court of proper jurisdiction, to acquire by condemnation

any interest in land, including temporary use, needed for—

(1) the site, construction, or operation of fortifi-

cations, coast defenses, or military training camps;

(2) the construction and operation of plants for the

production of nitrate and other compounds, and the

manufacture of explosives or other munitions of war;

or

(3) the development and transmission of power for

the operation of plants under clause (2).

(b) In time of war or when war is imminent, the United

States may, immediately upon the filing of a petition for

condemnation under subsection (a), take and use the land

to the extent of the interest sought to be acquired.

(c) The Secretary of the military department concerned

may contract for or buy any interest in land, including tem-

porary use, needed for any purpose named in subsection

(a), as soon as the owner fixes a price for it and the Secretary

considers that price to be reasonable.

(d) The Secretary of the military department concerned

may accept for the United States a gift of any interest in

land, including temporary use, for any purpose named in

subsection (a).

pa

10 U.S.C. §9773:

(a) The Secretary of the Air Force shall determine the

sites of such additional permanent air bases and depots in

all strategic areas of the United States and the Territories,

Commonwealths, possessions, and holdings as he considers

necessary. He shall determine when the enlargement of ex-

isting air bases and depots is necessary for the effective

peacetime training of the Air Force.

(b) In determining the sites of new air bases and depots,

the Secretary shall consider the following regions for the

purposes indicated—

(1) the Atlantic northeast, for training in cold

weather and in fog;

(2) the Atlantic southeast and Caribbean areas, for

training in long-range operations, especially those

incident to reinforcing the defenses of the Panama

Canal;

(3) the southeastern United States, to provide a

depot necessary to maintain the Air Force;

(4) the Pacific northwest, to establish and maintain

air communication with Alaska;

(5) Alaska, for training under conditions of

extreme cold;

(6) the Rocky Mountain area, to provide a depot

necessary to maintain the Air Force, and for training

in operations from fields in high altitudes; and

(7) other regions, for the establishment of inter-

mediate air bases to provide for transcontinental move-

ments of the Air Force for maneuvers.

(c) In selecting sites for air bases and depots covered

by this section and in determining the alteration or enlarge-

ment of existing air bases or depots, the Secretary shall

consider the need—

(d)

(1) to form the nucleus for concentration of Air

Force units in time of war;

(2) to permit, in time of peace, training and ef-

fective planning in each strategic area for the use and

expansion of commercial, municipal, and private flying

installations in time of war;

(3) to locate, in each strategic area in which it is

considered necessary, adequate storage facilities for

munitions and other articles necessary to facilitate the

movement, concentration, maintenance, and operation

of the Air Force; and

(4) to afford the maximum warning against sur-

prise attack by enemy aircraft upon aviation of the

United States and its necessary installations consistent

with maintaining, in connection with existing or con-

templated landing fields, the full power of the Air Force

for operations necessary in the defense of the United

States, and in the defense and reinforcement of the

Territories, Commonwealths, possessions, and

holdings.

In carrying out this section, the Secretary, on behalf

of the United States, may acquire title, in fee simple and

free of encumbrance, to any land that he considers neces-

sary—

(1) by accepting title without cost to the United

States;

(2) by exchanging military reservations or parts

thereof for that land, upon the written approval of the

President; or

(3) by purchase or condemnation, if acquisition by

gift or exchange is impracticable.

(e) The Secretary may, by purchase, gift, lease, or oth-

erwise, acquire at desired locations bombing and machine

7’?

—90—

gun ranges necessary for practice by, and the training of,

tactical units.

(f) At each air base or depot established under this sec-

tion, the Secretary shall remove or remodel existing struc-

tures as necessary; do necessary grading; and provide build-

ings, utilities, communication systems, landing fields and

mats, roads, walks, aprons, docks, runways, facilities for

the storage and distribution of ammunition, fuel, oil, nec-

essary protection against bombs, and all appurtenances to

the foregoing.

(g) The Secretary may direct the transportation of per-

sonnel, and the purchase, renovation, and transportation of

material, that he considers necessary to carry out this sec-

tion,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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