Opposition — Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v. Costle

Supreme Court brief1981

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MAR 9819

No. 80-1236

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In the Supreme Court of the United Sintes |

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF

THE UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

WapeE H. McCreE, JR.

Solicitor General

ANTHONY C. LIOTTA

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNEL

Davip E. DEARING

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

”

Whether a federal district court, in a “citizen suit

brought under Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Act, has

jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of nationally appli-

cable regulations promulgated under that Act by the

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,

when Section 307(b)(1) of the Act provides that a petition

for review of such regulations shall be filed “only” in the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia Circuit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below ....... MARGHERITA Mecano) 8 I

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,

SO SEATS behhe CeCe eR AOE Ree bee bee eyiE ye 8

Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 ..........05.: i

Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus,

OEE A PE Cake Ra ARR eRe ee Cake neeie'e 8

Associated Securities Corp. v. Securities &

Exchange Commission, 283 F.2d 773 ........ 7

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 .... Il

City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681,

CONS, I RS AP GET kk bv ox scabuehecs ees 8

Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,

Me Shee PE hi UNS Seb Cede ee ake 8. 10

ey ee MN es A. yy a 11

Hynning v. Partridge, 359 F. 2d 271,

Cort, Gewied | Fes Urbs OSE ew eee swe be we veces ae

Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F. 2d 310 .......... 8

Il

PREVIOUS PAGE-WAS BLANK ANK |

IV

Page

Cases—(Continued):

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 ........5000- 1]

Morrow v. District of Columbia,

EE, Sor os CE RS REAR KON Senne eer gas 11

National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon,

2 SE Se ar Pare 11

Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train,

PO NT NS hb as bea 4 6 RM eeu nb mds vies 8

Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S.

SE SE hoki eek Feb Ks hie hme Ke Woe whee ees 11

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253,

aff'd per curiam, 4 E.R.C. 1815, aff'd by an

equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 541 ......... 12

Superior Trucking Co. v. United States,

ES ads 5 ok SG b RRS viss oe e 4k oe 6-7

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of

BR St err ee re yee ee 11

United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 ......... 10

Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v.

Federal Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921 ..-+ 7

Statutes, rule and regulations:

Clean Air Act, as amended by the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,

91 Stat. 685, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

7521 et seq.:

- Sections 202-216, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

LK bx ARAN MOMS RRR ALDER TOR 2

Section 207, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. HII) 7541 ..... I

Page

Statutes, rule and regulations—(Continued):

Section 207(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IH)

WEEN o g'b:a v's 0 Miaee Kaw ied odes 3,4

Section 207(b), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

nara ITS TOR Rit IC COIIOICIOE a3

Section 207(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

eG eka lee e eA oA web o 6 es 2

Section 207(c)(3), 43 U.S.C. 1857f-Sa

EGU ge eds so bWebees voces e 3

Section 207(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. Il)

ye a a ee Sh wietiedsee és . 3,4

Section 209(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

CEE Le bis babs ng oo ne ©

Section 209(c), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

eg Da ign is ays bes 0:4 0:0 0.0.6 2

Section 304, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) .

ee Cede bceddct Ween coee 1.4.9

Section 304(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

a cea neh be has bevcesee 9

Section 304(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II)

er ee go csc cee 6 7

Section 304(d), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II)

ee Ue Cee yeaa ee eee 4

Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

MMe Leas Raven neti cdse pewcsccces l

Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

ED nih by 4 wack Hoe 4.5.7.8. 10. 11, 12

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.

No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1696 .............. 2

\

a el ew ciecwes 4

I Me ices vsclaeccedess 6

i

|

Vi

Page

Statutes, rule and regulations—(Continued):

MEU SG LG ke kic cc cccccccccececcees 4

40 C.F.R. 86.077-39 (1976) .......... eee ee eee 3

Miscellaneous:

45 Fed. Reg. (1980):

EEA Ri a Gla vis,b.0'5 6 0 o-oo 0 0h a oie oe 00's 3

ee Sab asso fda ss vie ot 606 83 6 3-4

DP OEEC Lada ehwess coveseescrecses 3

DE ward wk v doce vs iv bee eesees 4

Gia ea GWE V Shee es phe ces veces 4

eee a Lawadeh oes tee sesvccesd's 4

S. Rep. No. 95-127, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.

i anon 66 wo 0.n 60 04.0 6.0 6:8 00.05 0 3

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1236

MoTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF

THE UNITED STATES, INC.,ET-AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 13a-18a) is

not reported. The opinion of the district court (Pet. Ave

la-7a) is not reported.

~ JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

September 19, 1980. Rehearing was denied on October 23..

1980 (Pet. App. 21a-22a). The petition for a writ of certio-

rari was filed on January 21, 1981. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTEINVOLVED-

Sections 207, 304, and 307(b) of the Clean Air Act. 42

U.S.C. (Supp. II1) 7541, 7604, 7607(b). are set forth in the

petition (Pet. App. 27a-38a).

2

STATEMENT

1. Sections 202-216 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

(Supp. II1) 7521-7550, establish a scheme for the regulation

of emissions from new motor vehicles. Section 202 empow-

ers the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency (“the Administrator” or “EPA”) to prescribe stan-

dards limiting the emission of certain air pollutants from

new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7521.

As one means of ensuring that motor vehicles maintain

compliance with EPA’s emission standards throughout

their useful lives, Section 207(b) of the Act requires that

vehicle manufacturers provide a performance warranty. 42

U.S.C. (Supp. II1) 7541(b). Congress first enacted this war-

ranty provision as part of the Clean Air Amendments of

1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1696; it was

amended by Section 209(a) and (c) of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 756.

The manufacturer’s performance warranty comes into play

if a vehicle fails a state emission inspection and maintenance

(“I/M”) test at any time during the vehicle’s useful life. If the

vehicle owner is subject to sanction or penalty under state

law for the failure of his vehicle to pass the test, then under

the performance warranty, the automobile manufacturer

must remedy the nonconformity at its expense,provided the

owner has complied with the manufacturer’s instructions

for proper maintenance and use of the vehicle.

Section 207(b)(1) required the Administrator to issue

regulations implementing the performance warranty, after

making two sets of findings. These findings relate only to

the availability of testing methods and procedures for use in

the state I1/M programs and the availability of facilities for

conducting the state tests.

In 1977 Congress enacted s~veral provisions designed to

offset any potential anticompetitive effects associated with

the warranty. Among other things, these provisions required

3

creation of a voluntary parts certification program, through

which independent parts manufacturers could certify that

use of their parts would not invalidate the warranty.! Sec-

tions 207(a)(2) and 207(b), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 7541(a)(2)

and 7541(b). Implementation of the parts certification pro-

gram was not made a prerequisite to the promulgation of

the warranty regulations.

The 1977 Amendments also provided the Administrator

with additional authority to regulate the manufacturers’

instructions for maintenance and use. Prior to the 1977

Amendments, Section 207(c)(3) of the Act required vehicle

manufacturers to furnish purchasers with “such written

instructions for the maintenance and use of the vehicle or

engine by the ultimate purchaser as may be reasonable and

necessary to assure the proper functioning of emission con-

trol devices and systems.” 42 U.S.C. 1857f-S5a(c)(3).? The

1977 Amendments replaced the “reasonable and necessary”

language with a requirement that the maintenance and use

instructions simply “correspond to regulations which the

Administrator shall promulgate.” Section 207(c)(3), 42

U.S.C. (Supp. II) 7541(c)(3).

2. The Administrator made all the necessary findings

relating to the testing methods and procedures for the state

I/M tests (45 Fed. Reg. 34802 (1980)), and all necessary

findings concerning the availability of facilities and equip-

ment for conducting such tests (id. at 34830). Under the Act.

therefore, the Administrator was required to promulgate

the warranty regulations, which he did on May 22, 1980. 45

iSee S. Rep. No. 95-127, 95th Cong.. Ist Sess. 81, 82 (1977).

>Pursuant to that provision, the manufacturers submitted proposed

instructions to the Administrator: the Administrator evaluated the

proposed maintenance instructions and advised the manufacturers

whether they satisfied the “reasonable and necessary” requirement. 40

C.F.R. 86.077-39 (1976).

’*%

4

Fed. Reg. 34829 (1980). The warranty took effect with the

1981 model year, the model year beginning after the regula-

tions were promulgated.

3. On July 19, 1980, petitioners filed this suit in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Michigan, seeking: (1) a writ of mandamus ordering the

Administrator to issue the voluntary parts certification reg-

ulations provided for in Section 207(a)(2), and maintenance

instruction regulations under Section 207(c)(3);3 (2) a decla-

ration that the parts certification and maintenance regula-

tions were necessary prerequisites to the promulgation of

the warranty regulations; and (3) an injunction against

enforcement of the warranty regulations pending issuance

of parts certification and maintenance regulations. Peti-

tioners alleged that the district court had jurisdiction under

the Mandamus Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act, the

Administrative Procedure Act, Section 304 of the Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7604 (the citizen suit provision)

and 28 U.S.C. 1331. The Administrator did not deny that

the district court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of manda-

mus ordering the promulgation of parts certification and

maintenance regulations, but urged that Section 307(b)(1),

42 U.S.C. (Supp. II1) 7607(b)(1), granted exclusive jurisdic-

tion to the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit to review nationally applicable regula-

tions such as the warranty regulations. ~

JAt the time of the district court action, the Administrator had not yet

issued the parts certification regulations; he issued those regulations on

November 25, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 78448. Contrary to petitioners’ argu-

ments, the Administrator had issued maintenance regulations prior to

the district court action as part of the warranty regulations, 40 C.F.R.

85.2102, 45 Fed. Reg. 34839 (1980). These regulations included the

“reasonable and necessary” requirement that had previously been man-

dated by Section 207(c)(3). The maintenance regulations that EPA

announced were to be postponed (45 Fed. Reg. 44117 (1980)). and that

petitioners refer to (Pet. 3), are additional maintenance regulations,

which the Administrator may issue in the future.

7%

5

The district court found that it had jurisdiction under

each of the statutes cited by petitioners (Pet. App. 2a,

.9a-10a). The district court concluded that there were no

parts certification and maintenance instruction regulations

(Pet. App. 4a-Sa, 10a), but declined to issue the requested

writ of mandamus (Pet. App. 10a-1 1a). Instead, disregard-

ing Section 307(b)(1) of the Act, the district court reviewed

the performance warranty regulations and issued an order

containing (1) a declaratory judgment that the Administra-

tor could not promulgate the warranty regulations in the

absence of parts certification and maintenance regulations

and (2) an injunction against enforcement of the warranty

regulations until parts certification and maintenance regu-

lations had been issued (Pet. App. 9a-I 1a).

The Administrator requested and received an emergency

hearing before the court of appeals. The Sixth Circuit held

that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue either its

declaratory judgment or its injunction. The court con-

cluded (Pet. App. 17a):

The district court reviewed the performance warranty

regulations when it decided that the parts certification

and maintenance regulations were necessary preceding

conditions for the issuance of the performance war-

ranty regulations. It is that review or any other review

of the regulation which is barred by Section 307(b)(1).

The Sixth Circuit promptly vacated the district court's

order‘ and ordered the case transferred to the United States

*Petitioners’ assertions that the Sixth Circuit left the district court's

declaratory judgment intact (Pet. 6), and that “[rJeview of the * * * declar-

atory judgment is now before the Sixth Circuit” (Pet. 7 n.5). make little

sense. The Sixth Circuit stated that it was vacating “{t]he district court's

order” (Pet. App. 18a). The district court issued only one order. That

the Sixth Circuit did not describe cach portion of the order it vacated ts

of no consequence. Hynning v. Partridge, 359 F. 2d 271 (D.C. Cir.).

cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966).

i

6

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Pet.

App. 13a-18a); rehearing was denied without opinion (Pet.

App. 2la-22a).

On December 15, 1980, the District of Columbia Circuit

transferred the case back to the Sixth Circuit, stating that it

lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of any district court

other than the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia (Pet. App. 23a).°5

ARGUMENT

The Sixth Circuit vacated an order that the district court

had no jurisdiction to issue. The decision below is correct -

and does not conflict with any decision of this Court or any

other court of appeals. Moreover, the question of the valid-

ity of EPA’s performance warranty regulations is currently

pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit on a petition for review filed

on July 21, 1978, by some of the petitioners in this case.®

Accordingly, review by this Court is unwarranted.

>When the record of the case was received by the Sixth Circuit, its

clerk “reopened the appeal” and issued a briefing schedule (Pet. App.

25a). On February 4, 1981, however, the court withdrew the briefing

schedule (App., infra, la-2a).

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States,

Inc. v. Costle, No. 80-1828 (D.C. Cir.). In the petition for review, filed

two days after the filing of the complaint in the district court in the

instant case, the manufacturers challenged the warranty regulations,

arguing that the regulations are invalid because they were promulgated

in the absence of parts certification and maintenance regulations. All

briefs addressing the issues raised by the manufacturers in the District

of Columbia Circuit have been filed; the parties are currently awaiting

the scheduling of oral argument by that court.

The relief petitioners claim is necessary to protect their interests has

been available from the start in the District of Columbia Circuit.

Petitioners could have moved to stay enforcement of the warranty

regulations under Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

pending that court's final decision on their petition for review. Superior

7

1. Section 304(a)(2) grants a federal district court juris-

diction to compel the Administrator to perform a manda-

tory duty under the Clean Air Act, but does not grant a

district court jurisdiction to review the validity of a nation-

ally applicable regulation that the Administrator has

already promulgated. The United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit has exclusive jurisdic-

tion to review such regulations. Section 307(b)(1), 42

U.S.C. (Supp. 111) 7607(b\(1). Nevertheless, petitioners

argue that the district court had jurisdiction to issue its

order by virtue of Section 304(a)(2) of the Act, the citizen

suit provision.’ They assert that the district court’s order did

not concern either the substantive or procedural validity of

the warranty regulations and that the court of appeals’

decision improperly restricts the relief available in Section

304(a\(2) citizen suits.

Petitioners assert that the district court’s order “did not

find that [the] warranty regulations are invalid” (Pet. 11),

and that the order “has no effect upon the validity of the

warranty regulations’ provisions” but merely suspends their

enforcement “until the Administrator has fulfilled all of his

statutory nondiscretionary duties under the Act” (Pet. 1 1-

12). The district court’s order was based upon its determina-

tion that the warranty regulations were improperly prom-

“gated because the Administrator had not previously

promulgated two other sets of regulations (Pet. App. 10a).

Trucking Co. v. United States, 614 F. 24 481, 484-485 (Sth Cir. 1980):

Associated Securities Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 283

F. 24.773 (10th Cir. 1960); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v.

Federal Pows Commission, 299 F. 24 921.925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

‘Petitioners do not challenge the court of appeals’ ruling that the

other alleged jurisdictional bases for their action in the district court

were insufficient (Pet. App. 17a 0.4).

8

Such a determination, concerning the Administrator's stat-

utory authority to promulgate the regulations as a whole, is

as much a ruling on the validity of the Administrator’s

action in promulgating the regulations as would be a ruling

on the substance of any of the individual regulations.® See

Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F. 2d 310, 316-318 (6th Cir.

1976); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 688-

689 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976); Oljato

Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F. 2d 654, 660-661

(D.C. Cir. 1975); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F. 2d

1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1973); see also Adamo Wrecking Co.

v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978).

2. This Court has ruled that district courts lack jurisdic-

tion to review a challenge to any of the administrative

actions covered by Section 307(b)(1).? See Harrison v.

PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980). As the Sixth

Circuit explained in analyzing Section 307(b)(1) in Lubrizol

Corp. v. Train, supra, 547 F. 2d at 315:

By centralizing appeals in the District of Columbia

Circuit Court within a limited time period, Congress

hoped to avoid needless delays in the implementation

*The weaknesses in petitioners’ argument are underscored by the

consequences the district court order in this case would have had in the

proceedings in the District of Columbia Circuit, if the Sixth Circuit had

affirmed. Section 307(b\1) specifically provides that a petition for

review of “nationally applicable regulations promulgated * * * by the

Administrator under this Act may be filed on/y in the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia”( Pet. App. 37a; empha-

sis added). Yet, (1) the relationship between the warranty regulations

and the maintenance and parts certification regulations would have

already been determined: and (2) the warranty regulations would have

already been held invalid. There would have been little for the District

of Columbia Circuit to review.

*Petitioners have not argued at any stage of this litigation that the

warranty regulations do not fall within the items listed in Section

307(b\( 1). See also note 6, supra.

-

| -

9

of important national programs caused by incessant

litigation and inconsistent decisions.

Petitioners seek to create an exception to Congress’ com-

prehensive scheine for judicial review by permitting any

district court to review final administrative regulations in

the context of a citizen suit. Such an exception would

permit any party to frustrate Congress’ attempt to establish

centralized, uniform review of nationally applicable regula-

tions (and seriously hamper the impiementation of EPA’s

overall air program), merely by premising an attack upona

disliked regulation on the Administrator’s failure to take

some other action that is related to the national regulation.

Petitioners claim that because of the court of appeals’

ruling “a citizen may seek only a /imited mandamus remedy

in the district court” (Pet. 16; emphasis added). The court of -

appeals made no such ruling.'° Rather, the court of appeals

held that, while a district court may compel an agency to

perform a mandatory act ina Section 304(a) “citizen suit,”a

district court has no power to invalidate regulations in such

an action. Contrary to petitioners argument (Pet. 16), the

court of appeals did not mandate bifurcated review; it cor-

rectly followed the procedures prescribed by Congress for

seeking relief concerning two entirely different matters. As

the Sixth Circuit noted (Pet. App. 17a-18a):

The district court can fully and completely grant

relief for the failure of the Administrator to issue man-

datory regulations pursuant to Section 207(a)(2) and

Section 207(c)(3) of the Clean Air Act by ordering the

Administrator to issue parts certification and mainte-

nance instruction regulations. If it is necessary to

Section 304 itself limits the relief available in a citizen suit to an

order to the Administrator “to perform such [mandatory] act or duty.”

The language cited by petitioners (Pet. 10) from Section 304(d) refers

only to such an order.

10

enjoin the enforcement of the performance warranty

regulations or to consider their viability, because the

performance warranty regulations are invalid without

proper parts certification and maintenance regula-

tions, then such actions must be brought pursuant to

Section 307(b)(1) in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia. This view most appropriately effec-

tuates the purpose of the Act. Lubrizol Corp. v. Train,

547 F. 2d 310 (6th Cir. 1976).

Petitioners complain that this statutory scheme discourages

citizen suits (Pet. 16-17). If the exclusive review provision of

Section 307(b)(1) “unfairly” limits the relief available in

citizen suits, it isa matter for Congress to remedy by amend-

“ing the Act. See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., supra,

446 U.S. at 593.

3. Petitioners claim that the district court’s jurisdiction

to order the issuance of parts certification and maintenance

regulations gave it ancillary jurisdiction to grant declara-

tory relief and “to issue an injunction based on such declara-

tion and its findings of irreparable injury” (Pet. 18).'' But

this argument ignores the exclusive jurisdiction granted to

the District of Columbia Circuit by Section 307(b)(1) of the

Act. The district court did not merely declare that the

Administrator had a mandatory duty to issue parts certifi-

cation and maintenance regulations. Rather, the district

court declared that the warranty regulations were unen-

forceable without parts certification and maintenance regu-

lations (Pet. App. 10a). Thus, the court’s declaratory judg-

ment, rather than being the “essential equivalent of a writ of

'' Petitioners suggest that the court of appeals should have addressed

the district court's finding of irreparable harm (Pet. 7, 11, 20-21). The

court of appeals’ ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issuc

the order rendered the former powerless to pass on the merits of the

case. United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936).

mandamus” (Pet. 17), was in reality much more!2—an exer-

cise of jurisdiction over a matter that Congress has commit-

ted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia.'3 The doctrine of

ancillary jurisdiction cannot authorize a court to exercise

jurisdiction in a matter that Congress has expressly

removed from its jurisdiction. In Morrow v. District of

Columbia, 417 F. 2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969), upon which

petitioners rely heavily (Pet. 19-20 & n.14), the court specif-

ically noted this restraint upon the assertion of ancillary

jurisdiction, stating that such jurisdiction may be exercised

only “{iJn the absence of some specific limitation” and,

accordingly, that a court must always be guided by “limits

on the subject matter of which [it] may take cognizance.”

417 F. 2d at 734. As noted, Section 307(b)(1) denies district

courts jurisdiction to review nationally applicable regula-

tions such as the warranty regulations. '4

'?Petitioners seem to concede that the district court's order “was

something more than just a practical substitute for a writ of mandamus”

(Pet. 17).

Petitioners’ reliance (Pet. 17 n.10. 18) on National Treasury

Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F. 2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974), is mis-

placed. Nothing in that decision suggests that a court may invalidate

regulations that it has no jurisdiction to review, as the district court did

in this case. In National Treasury Employees Union, the court of

appeals held that the district court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of

mandamus requiring the President to take certain action, but concluded

that it would be appropriate. under the circumstances, to refrain from

issuing the writ.

'*None of the cases cited by petitioners supports the assertion that a

court may use ancillary jurisdiction to override a grant of exclusive

jurisdiction to another court. In neither Milliken vy. Bradley, 418 U.S

717 (1974), Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Education. 40?

U.S. | (1971): Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955):

Hecht Co. v, Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944); nor Riggs v. Johnson

County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 168 (1867), was ancillary jurisdiction

exercised or even discussed. In Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S, 802, 811-

816(1974), this Court sustained a three-judge district court's exercise of

ancillary jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional police conduct. But the

12

The Sixth Circuit properly vacated a district court order

that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue. In doing

so, the court of appeals properly protected the exclusive

jurisdiction which Congress has placed in the District of

Columbia Circuit to review the administrative actions listed

in Section 307(b)(1) of the Act. The relief petitioners claim is

necessary to protect their interests has been available from

the start in the District of Columbia Circuit. That petition-

ers chose not to seek relief there provides no reason to

ignore the statutory scheme created by Congress.

court in Allee had not ignored an explicit grant of exclusive jurisdiction

to another court, as did the district court in this case.

In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), affd per

curiam, 4 E.R.C. 18!5 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided

Court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), the district court enjoined the Administra-

tor of EPA from approving certain state air pollution control plans. See

Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12a-13a, Ruckel-

shaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-804, 1972 Term. The district court rejected

the contention that the appropriate remedy was to seek judicial review

of each approval. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, supra, 344 F. Supp. at

254-255. Although the district court concluded that one of the agency's

regulations was invalid (id. at 256), the court did not consider whether it

had jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of that regulation in light of 42

U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 1857h-5(b). Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, supra, there-

fore provides no support for petitioners in this case.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

MARCH 198]

WADE H. McCreE, Jr.

Solicitor General

ANTHONY C. LIOTTA

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNEL

Davip E. DEARING

Aitorneys

#%

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SIXTH CIRCUIT

U.S. POST OFFICE & COURTHOUSE BUILDING

CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202

JOHN P. HEHMAN

CLERK |

TELEPHONE

(513) 684-2953

FTS 684-2953

February 4, 1981

Mr. David Dearing

Land and Natural Resources Division

Appellate Section

U. S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Re: Case No. 80-1591/80-1604 - Motor Vehicle

Manufacturers Association of the United

States, Inc.; American Motors Corporation;

Chrysler Corporation; Ford Motor Company:

General Motors Corporation; Volkswagen of

American, Inc.; Ed Bailey, Inc., d/b/a Ed Bai-

ley AMC/Jeep, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs.

Douglas M. Costel, Administrator, United

States Environmental Protection Agency.

Defendant-Appellant. District Court No.

80-72618

la

2a

Dear Mr. Dearing:

This letter is to advise you that the briefing schedule set in

the above styled case on January 7, 1981 has been with-

drawn pending further instructions from the Court.

If you have any questions in this regard, please let us hear

from you.

Very truly yours,

John P. Hehman, Clerk

/s/ Yvonne Henderson

By: (Mrs.) Yvonne Henderson

Deputy Clerk

cc: Mr. Theodore Souris

Mr. Thomas Y. Au

Mr. William H. Crabtree

Mr. Kenneth I. Gluckman

Mr. Thomas P. Donohue

Mr. James M. McNee

Mr. Otis M. Smith

Mr. Gerhard P. Riechel

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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