Petition — SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY v. RAYMOND J. J. DONOVAN (Nos. 80-1155, 80-1134, 80-1170)

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| . Supreme Court, U.S.

80-1155 la: FILED

Sat 9 198)

IN THE MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the Wnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

>

SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, ef al.,

Petitioners,

—against—

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, F.

RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, and EULA BINGHAM,

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and

Health,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals For the District of Columbia

CARL F. GOODMAN

Surrey & Morse

485 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(212) 935-7700

Attorney for the Petitioner South

Central Bell Telephone Company

and Bell System, Petitioners

Of Counsel:

JAMES A. DEBOIS

JAMES E. BARDEN

American Telephone &

Telegraph Company

295 N. Maple Avenue

Basking Ridge, New Jersey 07920

January 9, 1981

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioners herein join in the questions presented in the

Petition for Certiorari filed by the Lead Industries Association,

Inc. (“LIA”), and concur in the reasons set forth in that

Petition as to why it should be granted. In addition, Petitioners

believe that the following two additional questions are worthy

of certiorari.'

1. Where OSHA has failed to explain its action in applying a

standard to an industry and, has failed to make a threshold

finding of “significant risk of harm at the workplace” in such

industry, must the standard be vacated as to said Industry?

2. Does a court of appeals have authority to require an

industry to comply with an OSHA standard during the period

of remand of such standard to the agency, when there is no

substantial evidence in the record to support the standard at

issue?

LIST OF PARTIES

The names of the petitioners or intervenors who sought

review of the revised permanent standard for occupational

exposure to lead issued by the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration on November 13, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 53007-14

(November 14, 1978) are set forth in footnote 2 below.’ The

1 The questions presented herein, while relevant to some of the

Petitioners in Petition No. filed by the Lead Industries Associa-

tion et. al., do not form the main concern of most of the separate

industries joining in said Petition.

2 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC; International

Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement

Workers of America; National Constructors Association; Oil, Chemi-

cal and Atomic Workers International Union; and Cast Metals Federa-

tion (No. 79-1048); American Iron & Steel Institute, Inc.; Bethlehem

Steel Corp.; Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.; National Steel Corp.;

Republic Steel Corp.; United States Steel Corp.; and The Shipbuilders

é

ii

respondents are F. Ray Marshall (Secretary of Labor), Dr. Eula

Bingham (Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational

Safety and Health) and the Occupational Safety & Health

Administration.

Council of America (No. 79-1054); Lead Industries Association, Inc.;

Chloride, Incorporated; Standard Industries; Dixie Metals Co.; Schuyl-

kill Metals Corp.; and Bunker Hill Co. (No. 79-1078); Battery Council

International, Inc. (No. 79-1079); ASARCO Incorporated (No. 79-

1080); Southwire Co. (No. 79-1081); National Paint & Coatings Asso-

ciation, Inc. and Sigma Coatings, Inc. (No. 79-1082); PPG Industries,

Inc. (No. 79-1083); South Central Bell Telephone Co., Inc.; Southern

Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.;

American Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Bell Telephone Co. of

Nevada; The Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania; The Chesapeake and

Potomac Telephone Co.; The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.

of Maryland; The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virgi-

nia; The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West Virginia;

Cincinnati Bell Incorporated; The Diamond State Telephone Co.;

Empire State Subway Co. (Limited); Illinois Bell Telephone Co.;

Indiana Bell Telephone, Inc.; Michigan Bell Telephone Co.; The

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.; Malheur Home Tele-

phone Co.; The Ohio Bell Telephone Co.; New England Telephone and

Telegraph Co.; New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.; New York Telephone

Co.; Nortnwestern Bell Telephone Co.; Pacific Northwest Bell Tele-

phone Co.; The Pacific Telephone Co.; The Southern New England

Telephone Co.; Wisconsin Telephone Co.; Bell Telephone Laborato-

ries, Inc.; Transoceanic Communications, Inc.; Transoceanic Cable

Ship Company, Inc.; and Transpacific Communications, Inc. (No. 79-

1084); General Motors Corp. (No. 79-1106); Ford Motor Co. (No. 79-

1107); Chrysler Corp. (No. 79-1108); National Association of Recy-

cling Industries, Inc.; Inland Metals Refining Co.; Keystone Resources

Corp.; and RSR Corp. (No. 79-1111); Ethyl Corp. (Nos. 79-1114 and -

1145); Corning Glass Works (No. 79-1120); St. Joe Minerals Corp.

(No. 79-1121); and RSR Corp. (No. 79-1146).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Reasons for Granting the Writ... ......cccccscccscoes

THE DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW IS IN-

CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND IN THE FIRST

OSHA CASE TO BE DECIDED BY A COURT OF

APPEALS SINCE THIS COURT’S DECISION IN

AMERICAN PETROLEUM’ INSTITUTE SE-

RIOUSLY MISCONSTRUES THAT DECISION

CREATING SUBSTANTIAL UNCERTAINTY ON

ISSUES RELATING BOTH TO ADMINSTRATIVE

LAW IN GENERAL AND THE PROPER IN-

TERPRETATION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT. acccccisvoccesoves

A. The court below allowed OSHA to apply a stan-

dard to the telecommunications industry without

explaining its reasons for such action and without

requiring that OSHA make a preliminary finding

of significant risk of harm at the worksite in that

odo G.v ka sR neenhd ockx a hees Che ines a

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B. OSHA Failed to Demonstrate that a PEL of 50

ug/m? is Relevant to an Industry Characterized by

Intermittent Exposure, and There is no Evidence

in the Record, Let Alone Substantial Evidence, to

Justify Application of Such a PEL to the Telecom-

IS TIE 8 oc Sine dia vedbenvenitenrs.

Appendix A—Listing of Subsidiaries and Affiliates of

American Telephone & Telegraph Company

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE

AFL v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1975)......... 7

ee ee es GD Fc, BOW CERISD occ cveccccccccces 7

Dry Color Manufacturers Association v. Department of

Labor, 485 F.2d 98, 105 (3rd Cir. 1973)............. 7

FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 246

OEE OE ee er 7

Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum

Institute, 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980) .............. earn s

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)........... 6, 7

Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall, 630

I I i oak vt ed caesavcavescecacs 6, 8

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435

PTE each vaccecccccntecccacccscccec’s 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

Docket No.

_>

SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, et al.,

Petitioners,

—against—

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, F.

RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, and EULA BINGHAM,

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and

Health,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals For the District of Columbia

OPINION BELOW

The opinions of the Court of Appeals are unofficially re-

ported at 8 O.S.H.C. 1810 (August 28, 1980) and appear in the

Appendix to the petition of the Lead Industries Association

(pages la to 286a).’ The standard for occupational exposure to

lead (the “Standard”) which was issued by OSHA on Novem-

ber 13, 1978, is found at 43 Fed. Reg. 53007-14 (Nov. 14,

1978); OSHA’s preamble and explanatory text appear in vol-

3 ~The majority decision was written by Chief Judge Wright, with

Judge Robinson concurring, and is cited to the Appendix in LIA’s

petition as “Maj. Op. at ___”; the dissent was written by Judge

MacKinnon and is cited “Diss. Op. at ___”.

2

ume 43 of the Federal Register at pages 52952-53007 (Nov. 14,

1978) and pages 54354-509 (Nov. 21, 1978), and are cited by

Federal Register page and column (e.g. 52952/1).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

August 15, 1980. Petitions for rehearing were filed by National

Association of Recycling Industries, Inc. on August 29, 1980,

and, as permitted by the lower court, by South Central Bell

Telephone Co. (Bell System Petitioners), and others on Sep-

tember 25, 1980. On October 16, 1980, certain industry peti-

tioners moved for a stay of the Standard until 30 days after the

final determination of the rehearing petitions, advising the

Court of Appeals that “the industry petitioners in this action

intend to seek review by the Supreme Court in the event that

their Rehearing Petition is denied.” By order dated October 24,

1980, the lower court denied all pending motions and directed

that the mandate become effective immediately. Subsequent

applications to this Court by NARI, the American lron and

Steel Institute, LIA and others for a stay of the standard were

granted on December 8, 1980 with respect to provisions relating

to engineering and work practice controls, compliance plans,

new hygiene facilities ZPP tests, multiple physician review

procedures, signs and certain start up dates. This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved in this case are: Sections

3(8), 4(b)(4), 6(b)(5), 6(b)(7) and 6(f) of the Occupational

Safety and Health Act (the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8),

653(b)(4), 655(b)(5), 655(b)(7) and 655(f). The relevant text of

these provisions is set forth at pages 287a through 290a of the

Appendix to the Petition of the Lead Industries Association

No.

rw

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners adopt the statement of the case appearing in the

Petition for Certiorari of the LIA and other Petitioners No.

. This statement of the case is limited to those matters

which are of special significance in connection with the ques-

tions presented herein.

Petitioners herein are operating telephone companies, re-

search facilities and their subsidiaries who constitute a major

segment of the telecommunications industry. Unlike most of

the Petitioners in Lead Industries Association, Inc. Petition

No. , they are not industries with factories, smelters, or

other industrial establishments having a fixed work place.

Petitioners maintain, repair and replace the telecommunica-

tions cable which runs underground or on telephone poles in

the open atmosphere. To the extent that employees in this

industry have any exposure to lead, such exposure arises from

activities involving the handling of telecommunications cable.

Such cable is but one method by which telecommunications are

transmitted. Most telecommunications cable is sheathed in a

form of “plastic.” Occasionally a telecommunications worker

may have to perform repair operations or replacement opera-

tions involving lead-sheathed cable. The employees who per-

form such work are a highly mobile work force who move from

place to place, sometimes working at several different worksites

during the same day. Unlike factory workers Bell System

linespeople and splicers perform their services either in the

open air on telephone poles or near ditches where cable is

buried, or in manholes under the streets of cities.

During the course of the OSHA proceedings herein, OSHA

considered whether to apply a permissible exposure limit of 100

ug/m’ to airborn occupational exposure to lead. Without

notifying the various industry groups which had appeared at

the earlier hearings, and without publishing notice of the fact

in the Federa! Register, OSHA ultimately adopted a permissible

exposure limit of 50 ug/m’. OSHA purported to justify the 50

yy?

4

ug/m’ PEL on the basis of a theoretical (but demonstrably

incorrect) model which was prepared by the Center for Policy

Alternative (CPA) to predict blood-lead levels from occupa-

tional air-lead concentrations. This model, as well as all the

industrial studies contained in the administrative record dealing

with the issue of a permissible exposure limit, focused on

assumptions involving workers in a factory environment who

come in contact with airborn lead on a five-day week, eight-

hour a day basis. None of the scientific studies in the record or

any theoretical models based thereon dealt with an industry in

which exposure to lead was low level and intermittent, nor does

the administrative record contain any extrapolation of data

from the CPA model to an industry with intermittent expo-

sure.‘

OSHA issued the standard for occupational exposure to lead

on November 13, 1978. On November 14, 1978, OSHA

published the standard, preamble and some explanatory mate-

rial concerning such standard. On November 21, 1978 further

explanatory material was published. While the preamble and

explanatory material occupy several hundred pages of the

Federal Register, there is no reference anywhere in such mate-

rial to the telecommunications industry. However in a reference

in such material to an industry characterized by intermittent

exposure and a mobile work force, OSHA set forth such

characteristics as grounds for excluding the construction in-

dustry from the scope of the standard’s reach.

Bell System Petitioners herein joined with other industry

petitioners in the proceedings below challenging the standard.

In addition, petitioners argued inter alia, that OSHA had failed

to adequately explain its action in applying the standard to the

telecommunications industry and that the record failed to

contain any evidence that the standard is feasible for the

4 We do not wish to imply that OSHA properly utilized the CPA

model in connection with other industries; indeed, we would submit

that OSHA did not. We simply note here that there was no record

evidence which was applicable to the circumstances found in the

telecommunications industry.

.

telecommunications industry. The Court of Appeals, in its

decision below, recognized both that OSHA had failed to

explain its action in applying the standard to the telecommuni-

cations industry and also that the record failed to contain

evidence of feasibility as to said industry. While the Court of

Appeals remanded the standard for reconsideration on the

feasibility issue, it nonetheless held that the telecommunica-

tions industry was required to comply with most parts of the

standard during the period of remand.’ Accordingly, Peti-

tioners are presently subject to most parts of the standard.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW IS INCON-

SISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF AD-

MINISTRATIVE LAW AND IN THE FIRST OSHA CASE

TO BE DECIDED BY A COURT OF APPEALS SINCE

THIS COURT’S DECISION IN AMERICAN PETRO-

LEUM INSTITUTE SERIOUSLY MISCONSTRUES THAT

DECISION CREATING SUBSTANTIAL UNCERTAINTY

ON ISSUES RELATING BOTH TO ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW IN GENERAL AND THE PROPER INTERPRETA-

TION OF THE ‘OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH ACT.

The recent activities of the American Bar Association’s

prestigious Commission on Law and the Economy attest to the

fact that our society is greatly concerned over the appropriate

role of administrative agencies in regulating conduct. With

increasing vigor, our society is demanding that administrative

agencies explain their actions. The court below, in rejecting

5 The majority of the panel below lumped the telecommunications

industry in with a group of some 30 other industries and ordered that

during the period of the remand “these industries, however shall be

immediately required to meet the PEL of 50 ug/m’ by some combina-

tion of engineering, work practice, and respirator controls.” (Maj. Op.

at 245)

6

established principles of administrative law requiring such ex-

planation, See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194

(1947), has turned back the clock of administrative democracy

and has rejected the learning of other courts of appeals specifi-

cally holding that such rule applies in OSHA standard setting.

The rejection by the court below of this Court’s decision in

Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,

100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980) by permitting an OSHA standard to

remain in effect although there has been no finding that there

exists a substantial risk to health at the worksite in the telecom-

munications industry, when coupled with the agency’s failure to

explain its action in applying the standard to such industry,

brings the regulatory process into disrepute and creates confu-

sion in the courts of appeals and a conflict with the decision of

the Court of Appeals for the Fifth circuit in Texas Independent

Ginners Association v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (Sth Cir. 1980) as

to how to apply this Court’s ruling in American Petroleum

Institute.

The confusion created by the holdings of the court of

appeals below in applying this standard to the telecommunica-

tions industry, notwithstanding the total failure of the agency

to explain why that industry should be subject to the standard

and notwithstanding the complete failure of the agency to

make any determination that risk exists at worksites in said

industry, extends beyond OSHA standard setting. Such confu-

sion extends to all notice and comment rulemaking by adminis-

trative agencies. Given the pervasive nature of regulatory ac-

tion in today’s society, this uncertainty should be resolved as

quickly as possible.

7

A. The court below allowed OSHA to apply a standard to the

telecommunications industry without explaining its rea-

sons for such action and without requiring that OSHA

make a preliminary finding of significant risk of harm at

the worksite in that industry.

The court of appeals below, in requiring the telecommunica-

tions industry to comply during the period of remand with the

standard governing occupational exposure to lead, notwith-

standing the fact that, as the court of appeals itself noted,

telecommunications was “never even mentioned in the Pream-

ble [of the lead standard]” (Maj. Op. at 224 n. 162) has placed

itself in direct conflict with the decision of the Third Circuit in

Dry Color Manufacturers Association v. Department of Labor,

485 F.2d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 1973) and AFL v. Brennan, 530 F.2d

109 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit has specifically held that

section 655(e) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29

U.S.C. § 655(e)) is a codification of the well-established ad-

ministrative law principle that an agency must explain its

actions. The rationale for this rule is several fold. By requiring

an agency to explain itself, an internal check on arbitrary

agency action is created, informed public criticism of agency

decisions is facilitated and an important part of the record for

review by a reviewing court is created. Dry Color Manufac-

turers Asso~‘ation v. Department of Labor supra. It has long

been recognized that an agency’s orders may not be upheld by

a court on any basis other than that basis set forth by the

agency itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra; FTC v. Sperry &

Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 246 (1972). Unless the agency’s

action can be supported on the explanation set forth by the

agency itself, the proper course for a reviewing court to take is

to vacate the agency order and remand the matter for further

proceedings. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).

Rejecting these established principles, the court of appeals

below in the name of (but as its rejections of American

Petroleum Institute shows, not in the reality of) concern for

employee health, has substituted its judgment for that of the

8

administrative agency. Congress did not provide that the court

of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should impose

Occupational Safety and Health standards on industries where

the agency itself had not made a reasoned determination that

such industries should be covered. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1977). By ordering the

telecommunications industry to comply with the standard for

occupational exposure to lead notwithstanding the fact that the

agency has never set forth a reasoned explanation as to why the

standard should be applied to the telecommunications industry,

the court below has usurped the functions of the administrative

agency and has superimposed its own will over that of both

Congress and the agency.*°

Shortly before the decision rendered by the majority below,

this Court rendered its decision in Jndustrial Union Depart-

ment v. American Petroleum Institute, supra. In that case, a

plurality of this court specifically held that the Occupational

Safety and Health Act required that OSHA must make a

threshold finding of significant risk to health at the workplace

before promulgating a standard for occupational health. In the

instant case, since the telecommunications industry was “never

even mentioned in the Preamble [to the standard]” it is obvious

that no finding as to this industry could have been made by

OSHA. The unique circumstances of the telecommunications

industry where employees are highly mobile, where worksites

are typically exposed to the atmosphere, where length of

duration of a single operation is very shor., and where expo-

sure to lead is intermittent, all command that the required

finding of risk from exposure to lead must be specific to the

telecommunications industry and cannot be extrapolated from

6 The agency explicitly excluded the construction industry from cov-

erage of the lead standard. The reasons for excluding the construction

industry apply with equal force to the telecommunications industry.

While recognizing the similarity between the construction and telecom-

munications industries (footnote 168) the court of appeals nonetheless

sanctioned, without explanation, the application of this standard to the

telecommunications industry during the period of remand.

9

generalized concepts regarding industrial uses of lead. Unlike

this Court which vacated the benzene standard because of

OSHA's failure to make this threshold finding, and the Fifth

Circuit’s rejection of extrapolation of cotton dust studies in

cotton yarn manufacturing to cotton ginning operations, Texas

Independent Ginners Association v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398

(Sth Cir. 1980) the court below has continued the lead standard

in effect as to the telecommunications industry notwithstanding

this failure.

Both the Occupational Safety & Health Act and this Court’s

decision in Jndustrial Union Department v. American Petro-

leum Institute, supra, require that OSHA engage in reasoned

decision making and explain the reasons for its actions. The

lower court’s decision, on the other hand, permits OSHA to

adopt unreasoned and unexplained standards.

B. OSHA failed to demonstrate that a PEL of 50 ug/m’ is

relevant to an industry characterized by intermittent expo-

sure and there is no evidence in the record, let alone

substantial evidence, to justify application of such a PEL

to the telecommunications industry.

The heart of the OSHA standard dealing with occupational

exposure to lead is the establishment of a 50 ug/m’ exposure

limit. The establishment of such a limit was justified in the

preamble to the standard on the basis of the theoretical model

utilized by the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) to correl-

late air lead levels with blood lead levels. In upholding OSHA’s

adoption of a 50 ug/m?’ standard, the court of appeals like

OSHA relied on the CPA study. (Maj. Op. at 132-140) As both

the CPA study and the opinion of the court of appeals below

show, the duration of exposure to lead was a critical factor in

establishing the 50 ug/m’ level. Thus, “a great deal of evidence

suggests that during continuous exposure to lead the lead levels

in some organs of the body increase slowly and inexurably.”

(Maj. Op. at 133), and “relying on a physiological model. . .

CPA attempted to describe the response of blood lead levels to

10

air-lead exposure by examining the dynamics of blood lead

transport and metabolism in relation to the duration of lead

exposure and the physical properties of airborn lead particu-

lates.” (emphasis added) (Maj. Op. at 134) It is, of course,

axiomatic that inhalation, the critical factor in applying an air-

lead standard to determine bi, od-lead levels, is dependent

upon both the air-lead level and the duration of exposure. Nor

is there any question but that the CPA study dealt with an

“occupational exposure. . . presented for five successive work

days followed by two days of intake from solely non-occupa-

tional sources.” (Ex. 439A, P. 3-8) In the telecommunications

‘industry, however, exposure to lead is intermittent. This, of

course, results in a substantially lower overall exposure and

inhalation of lead, at any chosen PEL, than would a daily

exposure. Petitioners herein pointed out to the court of appeals

that, even if the CPA model were correct (which it demon-

strably was not), there was no evidence in the record which

would correlate a 50 ug/m’ PEL in an industry characterized

by intermittent exposure to lead with any selected blood-level,

and thus there existed no evidence in the record which could

justify application of a 50 ug/m’ PEL to the telecommunica-

tions industry. While the majority of the panel below “ex-

amined LIA’s major criticisms of the CPA analysis and OSHA’s

responses to the those criticisms” (Maj. Op. at 139) the panel

never considered the arguments raised by the telecommunica-

tions industry. Instead, the court chose not to “second guess

the particular way the agency chooses to weigh the conflicting

evidence or resolve the dispute.” (Maj. Op. at 139) However,

the issue presented to the court of appeals below by these

petitions was not one of resolving conflicting evidence in the

record, rather, the issue presented was whether an agency may

apply a permissible exposure limit to an industry characterized

by intermittent exposure when all of the scientific evidence in

the record utilized to support the permissible exposure limit

concerned itself with continuous exposure to lead and when

both the agency and the court of appeals below recognize that

the nature of exposure—i.e. continuous vis-a-vis intermittent—

}1

is a critical factor. In short, the court of appeals below by

lumping your petitioners with more than forty other industries

failed to provide these petitioners with the judicial review to

which they are entitled.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition should be granted,

and the Occupational Safety and Health Act standard for

occupational exposure to lead, as applied to the telecommuni-

cations industry, should be vacated.

Dated: January 9, 1981

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Carl F. Goodman

CARL F, GOODMAN

Surrey & Morse

485 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(212) 935-7700

Attorney for the Petitioner South

Central Bell Telephone Company

and Bell System, Petitioners

Of Counsel:

JAMES A. DEBOIS

JAMES E. BARDEN

American Telephone &

Telegraph Company

295 N. Maple Avenue

Basking Ridge, New Jersey 07920

January 9, 1981

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13

APPENDIX A

The subsidiaries and affiliates of American Telephone and

Telegraph Company are:

American Bell Incorporated

American Bell International, Incorporated

/ merican Telephone and Telegraph Company of Arkansas

american Telephone and Telegraph Company of Baltimore

City

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Delaware

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Illinois

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of

Indiana, Inc.

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Michigan

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of New Jersey

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company of

Pennsylvania

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Rhode

Island

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of

Virginia

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company of

Wisconsin

American Telephone and Telegraph Company of Wyoming

AT&T International, Inc.

Bell Telephone Company of Nevada

The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania

Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated

195 Broadway Corporation

The Champaign Telephone Company

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of

Maryland

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of

Virginia

_ PRECEDING PAGE WAS BLANK

~~ eee

4

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West

Virginia

Cincinnati Bell, Incorporated

Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company

The Diamond State Telephone Company

East Pittsburgh Telephone Company

Eastern Telephone and Telegraph Company (Canada)

Empire City Subway Company (Limited)

Illinois Bell Telephone Company

Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated

Malheur Home Telephone Company

Manufacturers’ Junction Railway Company

Michigan Bell Telephone Company

The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph

Company

Muberta Development Company

Nassau Recycle Corporation

New England Telephone and Telegraph Company

New Jersey Bell Telephone Company

New York Telephone Company

Northwestern Bell Telephone Company

The Ohio Bell Telephone Company

The Ohio Telephone and Telegraph Company

Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company

The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company

Sandia Corporation

South Central Bell Telephone Company

Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company

The Southern New England Telephone Company

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company of Arkansas

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Oklahoma)

Teletype Corporation

Teletype International Sales Corporation

Texas Compensation Insurance Company

Transoceanic Cable Ship Company, Incorporated

Transoceanic Communications, Incorporated

15

Transpacific Communications, Incorporated

Western Electric Company, Incorporated

Western Electric Company, Limited (London)

Western Electric International, Incorporated

Wisconsin Telephone Company

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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