Petition — Kelce v. U. S. Financial Inc.

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| FILED Fs

80-1101 DEC 31 1980

CLERK}

In the Supreme Court of oe | f

United States

Ocroser TERM, 1980

In re U.S. Frvanctau INCORPORATED,

a Delaware Corp. & Affiliates, Debtors.

Rosert D. KEtce,

. Petitioner,

vs.

U.S. Frvancrau [NcorporaTED,

a Delaware corporation, and affiliates,

and Swan Constructors, INc.,

a California corporation,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

William D. Scheid

Law, SCHEID AND F'ARABEE

A Professional Corporation

3100 First of Denver Plaza

633 Seventeenth Street

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 573-4800

Counsel for Petitioner

December 3U, 1980

a

SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET. SAN FRANCISCO 94108

(i)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether property to which a bankruptcy reorganization

debtor had but bare legal title and no equitable interest

when it filed under the Bankruptcy Act, may be liquidated

and distributed to general creditors under a reorganization

plan?

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

RPS EELS NORE oe aS EPR RT ED RT (i)

UU We FN SNNIIUD ys cnnescthisiwonsenenetanecineceenes 1

Grounds on Which Jurisdiction Is Invoked...................... 1

Statutory Provisions Involved......................-c-scsessecceeeeeeees 2

TO NN OU as ico nasieh cei hcncupeleemsiicicnbnances 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ..................2...:.scssecsceeeeeoeees 4)

1. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Conflicts

with this Court’s Decision in Pearlman v, Reli-

ance Insurance Company, 371 U.S. 132 (1962)...... )

2. The Decision Below Raises Significant and Recur-

ring Problems of Considerable Practical Impor-

tance in the Administration of Both the Bank-

ruptey Act and the Bankruptcy Code..................... 8

GRR TARE TIT ASS EI ee i SANOMO RA AERO ERE os phe 11

Following

___ERASSEESINE SE RS I cP OM Ee EE Pe Page 11

Appendix at

Order (of Bankruptey Court) .-.-.....2cccccsciccescsscosvensceserqeeces 1

Judgment (of Bankruptcy Court) 0.2... eeeeeeeeeeeeeees 3

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Bankruptcy

BCE EES SPST LEN COT COROT TONY SIRE EONS MORE D TT TS RCO IE 5

Amendment to Memorandum of Opinion Re: Defend-

ants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for

Summary Judgment (Bankruptcy Court).................... 11

Memorandum of Opinion Re: Defendants’ Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Jude.

MOREE TERMINI YT CTE) ccoivecescgeecsevccsncsnsecbseveseccnccneicenes 13

Judgment on Appeal (District Court) ...0000200.22....ee- 19

Copiers CCOCEE CE AOR a) acne csetccdcecniceesesnccees 22

Order (Denying Rehearing (9th Circuit) )...0000.00000000.... 42

(ii1)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages

Pearlman v, Reliance Insurance Company, 371 U.S.

5 RS a eo een Se 5, 6. 7, 8, 9, 9 n.6, 10

Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S.

| RU cocescnAibstpiiciceaenlaiiniladgbceed olaisnecinanchigetoaibanasel 4n.4,5,8

In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 425 F. 2d 761 (9th

Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976)................ 10

STATUTES

NO UR Oi tee 5

UE I Oi i ili scictesninacdi 2,10

PN as 2, 10

Ve er 2,5

Re SS ERTS CU eee ae ONSEN 2,9

ee ee) EIR AD ct icine Leased phates bisnnd opt Lastnnionmmoneint 3,8

MISCELLANEOUS

pe RD |, hf | Seinen eee 3

Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine, 41

a UI lita cicttciectnerincsisiietcnninines

124 Cong. Ree. S 17,413 (October 6, 1978)... )

H. R. Rep. No, 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess, (1978)......

©

In the Supreme Court of the

United States

Octosrr Term, 1980

In re U.S. Frvancrau INcoRPORATED,

a Delaware Corp. & Affiliates, Debtors.

Rosert D. Kewce,

Petitioner,

VS.

U.S. Frvanciau [ncorporaTen,

a Delaware corporation, and affiliates,

and Swan Constructors, Inc.,

a California corporation,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

COURT OF APPEALS

The opinion delivered by the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit is not yet reported, The decision of the Bank-

ruptey Court from which appeal was taken is reported at

3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (C.F.R.) 507 (July 22, 1977).

GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION IS INVOKED

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit delivered its

opinion affirming the District Court on October 2, 1980.1

1. Herbert J. Solomon, Trustee for Respondents, is the only

party to this proceeding whose name is not included in the caption.

2

Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Court

of Appeals by its Order dated November 24, 1980. This Court

has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of

Appeals by Writ of Certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Former 11 U.S.C. § 110 (§ 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, as

amended)

The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his suc-

4 cessor or successors, if any, upon his or their appoint-

ment and qualification, shall in turn be vested by

operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of

the date of the filing of the petition initiating a pro-

ceeding under this Act....

Former 11 U.S.C. § 586 (§ 186 of the Bankruptcy Act, as

amended )

A trustee, upon his appointment and qualification, shall

be vested with such title as a trustee appointed under

section 44 of this Act would have.

Former 11 U.S.C. § 621 (§ 221 of the Bankruptcy Act, as

amended)

The judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that...

(2) the plan is fair and equitable, and feasible ....

, 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (§$541(d) of the Bankruptey Code)

Property in which the debtor holds, as of the com-

mencement of the case, only legal title and not an

equitable interest .. . becomes property of the estate

under subsection (a) of this section only to the extent

of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to

the extent of any equitable interest in such property

that the debtor does not hold.

3

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (§ 1129(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy

Code)

Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of

the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this

section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect

to a plan, the Court, on request of the proponent of the

plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the re-

quirements of such paragraph if the plan does not

discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with

respect to each class of claims or interests that is im-

paired under, and has not accepted, the plan.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked be-

cause the issues presented arise under the Bankruptcy Act,

as amended.?

On and shortly after July 23, 1973, Respondent U.S.

Financial Incorporated and various of its subsidiaries, in-

cluding Respondent Swan Constructors, Inc.,? filed petitions

for arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act,

(former 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.) in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of California. All

proceedings were consolidated for joint administration. On

August 29, 1975, Petitioner commenced an action in the

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California

pursuant to Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules, to reclaim

certain real property which Petitioner had transferred to

USF in exchange for preferred stock of USF in a trans-

2. References to the Bankruptcy Act refer to former 11 U.S.C.

§§ 1 et seq., as amended to July 23, 1973, the date on which Re-

spondent U.S. Financial Incorporated filed its Petition under Chap-

ter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. References to the Bankruptcy Code

refer to the Bankruptey Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.).

3. Hereinafter Respondents U.S. Financial Incorporated and

Swan Constructors, Inc., are referred to jointly either as “USF” or

“Respondents’’.

4

action in which Petitioner relied upon false and misleading

financial statements of USF. Subsequently, the USF Chap-

ter XI proceedings were converted to Chapter X proceed-

ings (former 11 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seg.), and Herbert J.

Solomon was duly appointed and qualified to act as Trustee

for the reorganization of the Respondents.

The grounds upon which Petitioner based his claim for

reclamation of the real property were:

(i) under California law, Petitioner had the right to

rescind the transaction by reason of the fraud of Respond-

ents and that thus Respondents, and later their Trustee,

held only bare legal title to the remaining property, which

Petitioner beneficially owned ; and

(ii) under California law, Respondents, and later their

Trustee, held the real property in constructive trust for the

benefit of Petitioner by reason of Respondents’ fraud.

On May 18, 1977, the Trustee for Respondents moved for

Judgment on the Pleadings. The Bankruptcy Court granted

Respondents’ Motion by Order entered on August 11, 1977.

Appendix p. 1. In granting Respondents’ Motion, the Bank-

ruptey Court held that, while under California law, Re-

spondents’ fraud would entitle Petitioner to reclaim the

real property, nevertheless, the “absolute priority rule”

precluded reclamation in Chapter X proceedings.* Appendix

pp. 10, 18. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed a plan of reor-

ganization which provides for the liquidation of the debtors’

property, including the property claimed by Petitioner, and

distribution of the proceeds to general creditors. Appendix

p. 9.

The District Court for the Southern District of California

affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court on July 14,

4. The “absolute priority rule” was made applicable to Chapter

X reorganization proceedings in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod-

ucts Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). The rule is discussed in more detail

at pages 5-6, infra.

5

1978, (Appendix p. 19), and the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court

by opinion rendered on October 2, 1980. Appendix p. 22.

Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing was denied on Novem-

ber 24, 1980. Appendix p. 42.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

1. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Conflicts With This

Court's Decision in Peariman v. Reliance Insurance Company,

371 U.S. 132 (1962).

The Court of Appeals held that the absolute priority rule

precluded Petitioner’s reclamation of the real property on

either a rescission or e constructive trust theory. The Court

held that, even though the real property was beneficially

owned by Petitioner, and Respondents and their Trustee

held but bare legal title, the proceeds of the property must

be distributed to Respondents’ creditors. This holding con-

flicts with this Court’s decision in Pearlman v. Reliance

Insurance Company, 371 U.S. 132 (1962) (“Pearlman”).

Pearlman involved a conflict between state law property

rights and § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act (former 11 U.S.C.

§ 104), which prescribed priorities for distribution of a

bankrupt’s property in a straight bankruptcy liquidation

(former 11 U.S.C. Chapters I-VI). The instant case in-

volves a conflict between state law property rights and Sec-

tion 221(2) of the Bankruptcy Act (former 11 U.S.C.

§ 621(2)) which provides that a reorganization plan to be

confirmed by a court must be “fair and equitable.” This

“fair and equitable” requirement has long been held to

mean that distributions under a plan of reorganization must

comply with the “absolute priority rule.” Case v. Los An-

geles Lumber Products Co., supra n.4, The absolute priority

rule requires that a reorganization plan prov.de that prop-

erty of a Chapter X debtor be distributed to claimants on

6

the basis of the claimants’ priorities upon involuntary liqui-

dation of the debtor; that is, senior claimants must receive

full compensation before junior claimants may participate.

Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine, 41 Chi. L.

Rev. 651 (1974). The absolute priority rule governs distri-

butions under reorganization plans and must be satisfied

before any plan may be found to be “fair and equitable.”

Pearlman set down the rules governing the interplay be-

tween state law property rights and Bankruptcy Act distri-

bution rules. This Court held that:

One argument against the [claimant’s claim] is that

this controversy is governed entirely by the Bank-

ruptey Act and that § 64... which prescribes priorities

for different classes of creditors, gives no priority to

[the claimant’s] claim for reimbursement. But the

present dispute—who has the property interest in the

fund, and how much—is not so simply solved. Own-

ership of property rights before bankruptcy is one

thing; priority of distribution in bankruptcy of prop-

erty that has passed unencumbered into a bankrupt’s

estate is quite another.

371 U.S. at 135.

In holding that the absolute priority rule precluded Peti-

tioner from reclaiming the subject real property notwith-

standing the fact that the property was beneficially owned

by Petitioner, the Court of Appeals clearly contradicted

the admonishment of Pearlman that “[o]wnership of prop-

erty rights before bankruptcy is one thing; priority of dis-

tribution . . . is quite another.” It is clear that under the

rule of Pearlman Petitioner is entitled to reclaim the sub-

ject property. Pearlman held that

“[I]f the [claimant] at the time of adjudication was,

as it claimed, either the outright legal or equitable

owner of this fund, or had an equitable lien or prior

7

right to it, this property interest of the [claimant]

never became a part of the bankruptcy estate to be

administered, liquidated, and distributed to general

creditors of the bankrupt. . . . Consequently our ques-

tion is not who was entitled to priority in distributions

under § 64, but whether the [claimant] had, as it

claimed, ownership of, an equitable lien on, or a prior

right to this fund before bankruptcy adjudication.

371 U.S. at 136. In the case at bar, the question is not

whether Petitioner is entitled to priority in a distribution

under a plan governed by the absolute priority rule, but

whether Petitioner had equitable ownership or a prior right

to the subject real property at the time Respondents filed

their Petitions under the Bankruptcy Act.* The answer

lies not in a rule of priority of distribution but rather in

applicable state property law. The Bankruptcy Court’s

findings and conclusions make it clear that Petitioner had

superior title under applicable state law. Appendix at 8, 16.

Pearlman made it clear that two separate questions are

involved in any distribution of property under the Bank-

ruptey Act. First, what property is subject to distribution?

Secondly, what are the rules which govern the priority of

distribution of property which has been determined to be

subject to distribution? The holding below conflicts with

Pearlman in holding that property equitably owned by Peti-

tioner could be distributed to the general creditors of Re-

spondents. Further, it used the absolute pricrity rule, which

concerns the second question, to decide the first question.

5. It appears that had USF been liquidated under the straight

bankruptey liquidation provisions rather than under Chapter X,

Petitioner would have long ago had his property.

8

2. The Decision Below Raises Significant and Recurring Problems

of Considerable Practical Importance in the Administration

of Both the Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Code.

The holding of the Court of Appeals reflects a determi-

nation of law that has important ramifications for all claim-

ants in a reorganization proceeding who claim that they

hold a superior title or interest than that of the debtor in

an asset in the possession of the debtor on the date of com-

mencement of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. Al-

though the instant case involves a stockholder seeking to

reclaim property which he beneficially owned and to which

he held a superior title, the principle of law announced by

the Court of Appeals goes to the very roots of the interplay

between state law property rights and Bankrupte” Act dis-

tribution rules. Although it was thought that Pearlman

clearly outlined the rules by which one determines whether

property is subject to distribution to general creditors

under the Bankruptcy Act,® the Court of Appeals’ decision

in this case casts a shadow of confusion on Pearlman in

contradicting it in a Chapter X context. Petitioner is ad-

vised by the Administrative Office of the United States

Courts that there were 202 Chapter X cases pending at

June 30,. 1980.

The issue presented here will remain important and re-

curring, notwithstanding the passage of the new Bank-

ruptey Code. Just as under the Bankruptcy Act, a plan of

reorganization proposed under the Chapter XT Bankruptcy

Code (11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.) must be “fair and equi-

table.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). Under Case v. Los Angeles

6. Although Pearlman was not a Chapter X case, and the Court

of Appeals distinguished it for that reason, we note that this Court

spoke broadly when it said that “[T]he Bankruptey Act simply

does not authorize a trustee to distribute other people’s property

among a bankrupt’s creditors.” 371 U.S. at 135-36.

9

Lumber Co., supra, n.4, it follows that the “absolute pri-

ority rule” will apply and this was the Congressional intent.

H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978) 413. Sinee

the distribution requirements of the absolute priority doe-

trine were relied upon by the Court of Appeals to overcome

the California law as to title, the decision stands as author-

ity for the identical proposition under the Bankruptey

Code. In enacting the provisions of the Bankruptey Code

relating to title of debtor’s estates (11 U.S.C. § 541) Con-

gress intended to reiterate “[T]he general principle that

where the debtor holds bare legal title without any equitable

interest, that the estate acquires bare legal title without any

equitable interest in the property.” 124 Cong. Ree. S 17,413

(October 6, 1978). The logie of the holding below applied

to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would thwart that

intention.

Barkruptcy courts are frequently faced with conflicting

claims of title to and interest in property of debtors, and

this Court has consistently held that such conflicting claims

must be resolved before it can be determined whether the

property may properly be distributed among general credi-

tors. For the first time since Pearlman, a circuit court has

held that the conflicting claims of title and interest are not

important—even if the claimant has superior title to the

property and beneficially owns it, the property can never-

theless be distributed to general creditors.

Thus, where a reorganization debtor holds property as

trustee under an express trust agreement, the trust property

would be subject to distribution to general creditors because,

although the beneficiary of the trust would have a claim

of equitable ownership of the property, that claim would be

inferior to the claims of secured creditors and no greater

than the claims of unsecured creditors by reason of the

10

erroneous application of the absolute priority rule in

the instant case. The question will continue to be raised

outside of the context of a trust. For example, the question

will frequently arise where a seller of goods seeks reclama-

tion under the Uniform Commercial Code. See In re Tele-

mart Enterprises, Inc., 425 F. 2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976).

Tn all such instances, bankruptcy courts nationwide will

be presented with the interplay between state law property

rights existing before bankruptcy and distribution rules

contained in the Bankruptcy Code. Pearlman recognized

that “such property rights existing before bankruptcy in

persons other than the bankrupt must be recognized and

respected in bankruptcy.” 371 U.S. at 136. In the instant

case the appellate court, notwithstanding Pearlman, refused

to recognize and respect such property rights despite the

fact that § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, applicable by reason

of § 186 of the Bankruptcy Act, and Pearlman both require

such recognition.

Bankruptcy courts and litigants alike need this Court

to throw light on the obvious division between the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and this Court. It appears

that the problem was not resolved by Pearlman. The prompt

resolution of this question will obviously have immediate

and recurring importance beyond the Petitioner here, and

will affect and guide numerous bankruptcy courts and liti-

gants in resolving conflicting claims to property, in the

hands of the debtors when proceedings in bankruptcy reor-

ganization begin.

11

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, a Writ of Certiorari

should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the

Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Law, ScHEID AND F'ARABEE

A Professional Corporation

By Wii D. ScHerw

William D, Scheid

/s/ Jeffrey L. Beattie

Counsel for Petitioner

3100 First of Denver Plaza

633 Seventeenth Street

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 573-4800

December 30, 1980

Appendix

THomas Henry Coteman, Esq.

Jayson Burton Lumiss, Esq.

Rirxinp, Stertine & Lockwoop,

INCORPORATED

9454 Wilshire Boulevard, 6th Floor

Beverly Hills, California 90212

(213) 278-0970

Attorneys for Herberi J. Solomon,

Reorganization Trustee of U.S.

Financial and Swan Constructors

United States District Court

Southern District of California

Bankruptcy No. 17007, et al

Complaint No. 21

In re U.S. Frvancrau Incorporate,

a Delaware corporation and Affiliates,

Debtors.

Rosert D, Ketce,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. Frvanctar Iycorporatep, a Delaware

corporation, and Affiliates, and Swan

Constructors, Inc., a California corpo-

ration,

Defendants.

ORDER

At San Dreco, Cauirornis, Tuts 11 Day or Aveaust, 1977.

7%

2 Appendix

The Motion of Herbert J. Solomon, Reorganization Trus-

tee of defendants U. S. Financial Incorporated and Swan

Constructors Inc., for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment, having been heard

by this Court on June 6, 1977, and the Court having read

and considered the files and records of the above-entitled

adversary proceeding and having heard the arguments of

counsel, plaintiff having appeared by Law, Nagel & Clark,

by Jeffrey L. Beattie, Esq., and the Reorganization Trustee

having appeared by Rifkind, Sterling & Lockwood, Incor-

porated, by Jayson Burton Lumish, Esq., and Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law having been made and filed

herewith;

Now, THeEreForeE, It Is HereBy OrperRED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED :

That the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed

herein by Herbert J. Solomon, Reorganization Trustee of

defendants U. S. Financial Incorporated and Swan Con-

structors, Inc., he and the same hereby is granted, and

that the Reorganization Trustee be and he hereby is author-

ized to sell, dispose of or otherwise deal with that portion

of the 939 Coast Boulevard property known commonly as

the “Annex,” free and clear of any claim of plaintiff based

upon any purported right to rescission or reclamation.

/s/ Herpert Katz

Herbert Katz, Bankruptcy Judge

Appendiz 3

o

United States District Court

Southern District of California

Bankruptcy No. 17007, et al

Complaint No. 21

In re U.S. Frnancrat INCORPORATED,

a Delaware corporation and Affiliates,

Debtors.

Rosert D, Ketce,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. Frvanciar Incorporatep, a Delaware

corporation, and Affiliates, and Swan

Constructors, Inc., a California corpo-

ration,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

At San Dreco, Cauirornia, Tus 11th Day or Aveust, 1977.

The Motion of Herbert J. Solomon, Reorganization Trus-

tee of defendants U. S. Financial Incorporated and Swan

Constructors Inc., for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment, having been heard

by this Court on June 6, 1977, and the Court having read

4 Appendix

and considered the files and records of the above-entitled

adversary proceeding and having heard the arguments of

counsel, plaintiff having appeared by Law, Nagel & Clark,

by Jeffrey L. Beattie, Esq., and the Reorganization Trustee

having appeared by Rifkind, Sterling & Lockwood, Incor-

porated, by Jayson Burton Lumish, Esq., Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law having been made and filed here-

with, and this Court having ordered that the Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings be granted, and good cause

appearing therefor;

Now, THeErerore, It Is HEREBY OrpERED, ADJUDGED AND

Decreep that Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby entered

against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants on Complaint

No. 21.

/s/ WerBert Karz

Herbert Katz, Bankruptcy Judge

Appendix 5

United States District Court

Southern District of California

Chapter X

No. 17007-K

Complaint No, 21

In re

U.S. Frvancut, Inc., a Delaware

co) poration, and affiliates,

Debtors.

RoBert D. KEtcez,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. Fryancut, Inc., a Delaware

corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Motion of Herbert J. Solomon, Reorganization Trus-

tee of defendants U. S. Firyanctar, Inc., and Swan Con-

structors, Inc., for Judgment on the pleadings or, in the

alternative, for Summary Judgment, having been heard

by this court on June 6, 1977, and the court having read

and considered the files and records of the above entitled

adversary proceeding and having heard the arguments of

counsel, plaintiff having appeared by Law, Nagel & Clark,

by Jeffrey L. Beattie, Esq., and the Reorganization Trustee

having appeared by Rifkind, Sterling & Lockwood, Incor-

porated, by Jayson Burton Lumish, Esq., the court hereby

makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In December 1968, plaintiff ROBERT D. KELCE

(“KELCE”) owned approximately 98 condominium units

6 Appendix

known as “939 Coast” in La Jolla, California, together with

a two story apartment building adjacent thereto, known as

the “Annex.”

2. In December 1968, KELCE and defendant U. S.

FINANCIAL, INC., (“USF”) entered into a contract

whereby USF obtained an option to purchase the 939 Coast

property for $5 million, payable $1 million down, the bal-

ance to be evidenced by a promissory note secured by the

property.

3. In or about March 1969, USF offered to purchase the

property in exchange for preferred stock.

4. Ultimately the transaction was concluded. USF re-

ceived the property and KELCE received the consideration

he was to receive, which included 300,000 shares of USF

Preferred Stock, Series A, and 100,000 shares of USF Pre-

ferred Stock, Series B.

5. The Series A stock was to be redeemed at the rate of

60,000 shares per year at a redemption price of $10 per

share.

6. Redemptions of the Series A stock were made in 1970,

1971 and 1972. However, no redemptions have been made

thereafter and KELCE still owns 120,000 shares of the

Series A stock.

7. All other consideration received by KELCE has since

been disposed of by him, as has the consideration received

by USF, save and except for the property previously de-

scribed as the “Annex,” which has a value of $161,000.00.

8. This action was commenced by plaintiff in order to

reclaim that portion of the property and proceeds of the

sale thereof which are still in the possession of the T'rustee

in exchange for that portion of the Series “A” stock which,

when valued at his purchase price of $10.00 per share,

equals the value which the reclaimed property had on the

date he transferred it to defendants.

Appendix 7

9. For purposes of this motion it will be assumed that

plaintiff is in fact a defrauded shareholder, having acquired

his shares in reliance upon a materially false, misleading

and fraudulent financial statement.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

10. This court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the

subject matter of the above entitled adversary proceeding.

11. The issue to be decided, based upon the pleadings

on file, is whether a defrauded shareholder, preferred or

otherwise, may obtain rescission and reclamation in a Chap-

ter X reorganization of those assets with which he parted

which are still in the possession of the defendant.

12. This question divides itself into segments as follows:

(1) Under California law, is the remedy of partial

rescission available to this plaintiff.

(2) If so, does the application of the absolute pri-

ority rule deny the remedy of rescission and reclama-

tion to plaintiff; and

(3) Does the intervening creditor rule bar the relief

sought.

13. Except for applicable bankruptcy considerations,

California law governs this transaction.

14. The precise issue here raised is a question of first

impression.

15. In California the general rule is that one must re-

scind all of his contract and may not retain rights which he

deems desirable and repudiate the rest.

16. The purpose of rescission is essentially to restore

the parties to the status quo ante.

17. However, there have been exceptions made to the

general rule by which partial rescission, which is what the

plaintiff here seeks, is allowed.

8 Appendix

18. California Civil Code §1691(b) provides that a

plaintiff need not restore all of the consideration received

by him where, as here, the defendant is unable to do so.

19. It has also been so held where, without plaintiff’s

fault, it is impossible to effect a full rescission.

20. <A review of the facts in this case, together with the

law of California, has led the court to conclude that this

case is one where, absent the bankruptcy proceedings, par-

tial rescission would be a proper remedy.

21. The only way to do equity in this situation is to

allow partial rescission and reclamation so the defrauded

party can salvage something. To hold otherwise here would

be an injustice and countenance fraud.

22. If plaintiff is successful in his rescission action, he

would make what otherwise would be at best an unsecured

claim into a secured claim. That is, as he presently stands,

he is a member of the class of creditors who, because of

the hopeless insolvency of defendant, would receive nothing

by way of distribution under the “absolute priority rule”

as embodied in Section 221(2) of the Bankruptey Act.

23. If, however, he has a right to rescind and reacquire

the property songht in his complaint, then, to that extent

he would become a secured creditor and be able to effectu-

ate a larger dividend on his claim than otherwise possible.

24. In the present reorganization proceeding, all credi-

tors and stockholders are victims of a massive frand.

25. Congress, in enacting Section 221(2), intended in

a Chapter X proceeding to differentiate between equity

owners and general creditors. The scheme as set forth

therein provides for full and complete compensation of

each class of claims in descending order before the next

class can participate.

Appendix 9

26. To comply with that purpose a plan must rank

claims beginning with secured creditors, then senior unse-

cured creditors, then subordinated creditors, and finally

shareholders. Consequently any arrangement “by which

the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are

attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights”

of creditors “come within judicial denunication.” Northern

Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S, 482, 505 (1913).

27. While plaintiff KELCE may have acquired his

shares for property, rather than money, and in a private

transaction, rather than on the open market, he neverthe-

less is, and remains a shareholder and should not be

allowed, in view of the “absolute priority rule,” to obtain

senior creditor standing merely because a portion of the

consideration he paid for his stock is fortuitously still in the

possession of the defendant.

28. The court agrees with Professors Slain and Kripke

who state, in their article entitled “The Interface Between

Security Regulations and Bankruptey—Allocating the Risk

of Tilegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and

the Issuer’s Creditors,” 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev, 261, 294 (1973),

that

“Regardless of one’s view as to the propriety of parity

treatment, it is clear that the resciding [sic] stock-

holders should not wind up as a secured party, ... The

general creditors should not be further prejudiced by

the fortuitous fact that the shareholders can trace the

issuer’s use of his investment.”

29. The Plan of Reorganization in this Chapter X pro-

ceeding is a plan of liquidation.

30. The Federal bankruptey power being paramount

and supreme over competing or conflicting State law by

virtue of the Supremacy clause of the United,States Con-

stitution, the State law must give way.

a tian ee |

10 Appendiz

31. Having determined that rescission and reclamation

is not available to plaintiff because of the “absolute priority

rule,” it is unnecessary to discuss the effect of the “inter-

vening creditor rule.”

32. In light of the foregoing, the Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings filed herein by Herbert J. Solomon, Re-

organization Trustee of defendants U. S. FINANCIAL,

INC. and SWAN CONSTRUCTORS, INC., must be

granted.

DATED: AUGUST 11, 1977

/s/ Herpert Katz

Herbert Katz, Bankruptcy Judge

Appendix 11

United States District Court

Southern District of California

Chapter X

NO. 17007 K

Complaint No. 21

In re

U. S. Fovancrar, Inc., a Delaware corpo-

ration, and affiliates,

Debtors.

Rosert D. Kewce,

Plaintiff.

Vs.

U.S. Fovancuat, Ivc., et al.,

Defendants.

AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON

THE PLEADINGS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Memorandum of Opinion in the above entitled mat-

ter, heretofore entered and filed by the court on July 22,

1977, is hereby amended as follows:

1) The paragraph commencing at page 2, lines 19

through 21, is stricken and the following paragraph inserted

in its stead:

This action was commenced by plaintiff in order to

reclaim that portion of the property and proceeds of

the sale thereof, of the above described transaction,

including the “Annex,” which are still in the possession

of the trustee in exchange for that portion of the

Series “A” stock which, when valued at his purchase

price >f $10.00 per share, equals the value which the

reclaimed property had on the date it was transferred

to defendants.

12 Appendiz

The paragraph commencing on page 4 lines 27 through

30 is stricken and the following paragraph inserted in its

stead:

Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by and between

plaintiff and defendant, approved by the court on July

20, 1977, plaintiff has the right to contend or prove

that he should be classified as a member of Class 5B

of the Plan of Reorganization and receive all distribu-

tions allocable to him as a member of that class, which,

together with Class 5A will receive basically 80/95ths

of the 2 million shares issuable under the Plan.

DATED: AUGUST 11, 1977

/s/ Hersert Karz

Herbert Katz, Bankruptcy Judge

Appendix 13

United Siates District Court

Southern District of California

Chapter X

NO. 17007-K

Complaint No. 29 [sic]

In re

U.S. Frvancut, Inc.,

a Delaware corporation and affiliates,

Debtors.

Rosert D. Ketce,

Plaintiff.

v.

U.S. Frvancut, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION RE. DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The issue to be decided, based upon the pleadings on file,

is whether a defrauded shareholder, preferred or other-

wise, may obtain rescission and reclamation in a Chapter

X reorganization.

FACTS

In December 1968, plaintiff owned approximately 98 con-

dominium units known as “939 Coast” in La Jolla, Califor-

nia, together with a two story apartment building adjacent

thereto, known as the “Annex.”

In December 1968, plaintiff and U. S. FINANCTAL

(USF) entered into a-contract whereby USF obtained an

option to purchase the 939 Coast property for $5 million,

14 Appendix

payable $1 million down, the balance to be evidenced by a

promissory note secured by the property.

Subsequently, about March 1969, USF offered to pur-

chase the property in exchange for preferred stock. Ulti-

mately the transaction was concluded. USF received the

property and plaintiff received the consideration he was

to receive, which included 300,000 shares of USF Preferred

Stock, Series A, and 100,000 shares of USF Preferred

Stock, Series B.

The Series A stock was to be redeemed at the rate of

60,000 shares per year at a redemption price of $10 per

share. Redemptions were made in 1970, 1971 and 1972. None

have been made thereafter and plaintiff still owns 120,000

shares of the Series A stock. All other consideration re-

ceived by plaintiff has since been disposed of by him, as has

the consideration received by USF, save ard except for the

property previously described as the “Annex.”

This action was commenced by plaintiff in order to re-

claim the “Annex” for the 120,000 shares of Series A stock

he still holds, which is now worthless.

For purposes of this motion it is assumed that plaintiff

is in fact a defrauded shareholder, having acquired his

shares in reliance on a materially false, misleading and

fraudulent financial statemertts. [sic]

Under these facts, in the context of 4 Chapter X proceed-

ing, may such a defrauded shareholder obtain rescission

and reclamation of those of the assets with which he parted

which are still in the possession of the defendant?

The question seems to divide itself into segments as fol-

lows:

1. Under California law, is the remedy of of [sic] par-

tial rescission available to this plaintiff?

Appendiz 15

2. If so, does the application of the absolute priority

rule deny the remedy of rescission and reclamation to plain-

tiff, and

3. Does the intervening creditor rule bar the relief

sought.

It is undisputed that California law governs this trans-

action.

It is also undisputed by the parties that the precise issue

here raised is a question of first impression.

RESCISSION

In California the general rule is that one must rescind

all of his contract and may not retain rights which he deems

desirable and repudiate the rest. Simmons v. California In-

stitute of Technology, 34 Ca.2d 264, 275 (1949).

The purpose of rescission is essentially to restore the

parties to the status quo ante. Dreiske v. Los Angeles Inv.

Securities Corp., 13 Ca.App 2d 59 (1936).

However, there have been exceptions made to the general

rule by which partial rescission, which is what the plaintiff

here seeks, is allowed.

As is stated in California Civil Code § 1691(b) is that

plaintiff need not restore all the consideration received by

him where, as here, the defendant is unable to do so.

It has also been so held that where, without plaintiffs

fault, it is impossible to effect a full rescission. Stagerman

v. Vanderventer, 57 Ca.App 2d 753 (1943).

Here, the defendant no longer has but a portion of the

property transferred to it by plaintiff, having sold most

of it in the ordinary course of business, and plaintiff has

but a portion of the property given it by defendant, having

had a great portion of it redeemed under the mandatory

redemption provisions of the Series A stock.

16 Appendix

Counsel for both sides argue other authorities for and

against the remedy of partial rescission. A review of the

facts in this case, together with the law of California, leads

one to the conclusion that this case is one, where, absent

the Bankruptcy proceeding, partial rescission, that is, re-

turn of the consideration still in the hands of the parties,

is a proper remedy.

There is no way, at this stage to return everyone to the

status quo in existence in 1969. The fact remains however,

for purposes of this motion, that plaintiff was defrauded.

The only way to do equity, in this situation is to allow

partial rescission and reclamation so the defrauded party

can salvage something. To hold otherwise here would be

an injustice and countenance fraud.

Having determined that partial rescission is available,

it must next be determined whether the fact that the de-

fendant is in a Chapter X proceeding bars the exercise of

the remedy.

If plaintiff is successful in his rescission action, he would

make what otherwise would be at best an unsecured claim

into a secured claim. That is, as he presently stands, he is

a member of the class of creditors who, because of the

hopeless insolvency of defendant would receive nothing by

way of distribution under the “absolute priority rule” as

embodied in §221(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.

If he can establish his fraud claim, he would then fall

into the class with all other stock fraud claimants and,

under the terms of the plan which has been approved in

this case, would share pro rata with those claimants.

If however, he has a right to rescind and reacquire the

“Annex,” then, to that extent he would become a secured

creditor and be able to effectuate a larger dividend on his

claim than otherwise possible.

Appendiz 17

Here all creditors and stock holders are victims of a

massive fraud. The Congress, in enacting §221(2) intended,

in a Chapter X proceeding, to differentiate between equity

owners and general creditors. The scheme as set forth pro-

vides for full and complete compensation of each class of

claims in descending order before the next class can par-

ticipate. 6A Collier on Bankruptcy, § 11.06, pp 613-14 (14th

Ed. 1972) and citations therein contained.

To comply with that purpose a plan must rank claims

begining with secured creditors, then senior unsecured

creditors, then subordinated creditors, and finally share-

holders. Consequently any arrangement “hy which the

subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are

attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights”

of creditors “comes within judicial denunciation.” Northern

Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 505 (1913).

Plaintiff is a shareholder.

While he may have acquired his shares for property,

rather than money, and in a private transaction, rather

than on the open market, he nevertheless is, and remains

a shareholder and should not be allowed, in view of the

“absolute priority rule,” to obtain senior creditor standing

merely because a portion of the consideration he paid for

his stock is fortuitously still in the possession of the de-

fendant.

The court agrees with Slain and Kriple, [sie] The Inter-

face Between Security Requlations and Bankruptcy—Allo-

cating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Secur-

ityholders and the Issuer’s Creditors, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev, 261

(1973), at p, 294.

“Regardless of one’s view as to the propriety of parity

treatment, it is clear that the rescinding stockholders

should not wind up as a secured party. ... The general

18 Appendix

creditor should not be further prejudiced by the for-

tuitous fact that the shareholders can trace the issuer’s

use of his investment.”

The Federal bankruptcy power being paramount and

supreme over competing or conflicting State law by virtue

of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,

the State law must give way.

Having determined that rescission and reclamation is not

available to plaintiff because of the “absolute priority rule,”

it is unnecessary to discuss the effect of the “intervening

creditor rule.”

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted.

Counsel for defendant will prepare and submit an appro-

priate order and, unless waived, proposed findings of fact

and conclusions of law within 7 days from the date hereon,

as required by Rule 7 of the Local Rules of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Cali-

fornia.

DATED: JULY 22, 1977

/s/ Herpert Katz

Herbert Katz, Bankruptcy Judge

Appendix

United States District Court

Southern District of California

Bankruptey No. 17007, et al.

Complaint No. 21

Appeal No. 14

In re U.S. Fryanciar INcoRPORATED, |

a Delaware corporation, and Affiliates,

Debtors.

Rosert D. Kece,

Plaintiff-A ppellant,

v.

U.S. Frvanciau INcoRPORATED,

a Delaware corporation, and Affiliates,

and Swan Constructors, INc., a

California corporation,

Defendants-A ppellees.

|

19

20 Appendix

JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff’s appeal from the judgment of the Bankruptcy

Court granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings came on regularly for hearing on June 26, 1978,

the plaintiff-appellant appearing through Law, Nagel &

Clark, by Jeffrey L. Beattie, Esq., and the defendants-

appellees appearing through Rifkind, Sterling & Lockwood,

Incorporated, by Jayson Burton Lumish, Esq. The court

having read and considered the briefs submitted by the

respective parties, having further read and considered the

files and records of the above-captioned proceedings, and

having heard the arguments of counsel, has decided that the

bankruptcy court was correct and its decision should be

affirmed.

There is no precedent directly addressing the interplay

between the absolute priority rule and the common law right

of recission in the context of a Chapter X reorganization

brought about by massive fraud on the part of the bankrupt.

The court is cognizant of the authogty cited by appellee

but finds that it is not controlling in this particular Chapter

X proceeding. In an ordinary bankruptcy, fraud by ‘he

bankrupt is the exception, and recovery of property from

the bankruptcy estate on a recission/constructive trust

theory is justifiable. It is not justifiable, however, when

fraud permeates the bankrupt organization and victimizes

all who dealt with it.

It must be remembered that there is no right to the

imposition of a constructive trust. The constructive trust

is an equitable remedy for achieving justice and avoiding

unjust enrichment. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278

(1953) ; Burgess v. Williamson, 506 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1975).

It should not be imposed when these equitable geals would

not be served. As previously mentioned, this case involves

a massive fraud; everyone who did business with United

Appendix 21

States Financial: secured creditors, general creditors, and

shareholders alike, to some extent have been victims of

that fraud. There is no justification for giving this plaintiff

preferential treatment due to the fortuitous circumstances

that he happened to bvy his stock with real property and a

piece of that real property happens to still remain in the

bankrupt’s estate. Such a result would be unjust enrichment

of the plaintiff at the expense of the secured and general

creditors.

The position of this court and the bankruptcy court is

supported by recent articles of leading commentators writ-

ing on the subject Slain & Kripke, The Interface Between

Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy—Allocating the Risk

of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and

the Issuer’s Creditors, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 261, 280 (1973);

Huff, The Defrauded Investor in Chapter X Reorganiza-

tions: Absolute Priority v. Rule 10b-5, 50 Am. Bankr. L.J.

197 (1966). These articles are very persuasive and con-

tributed to the court’s conclusion that imposition of a con-

structive trust is not justified in this case.

Ir Is Heresy Orperep, ApJuDGED AND DecreeEp that the

judgment of the Bankruptcy Court granting defendants’

motion for judgment on the pleadings is affirmed in all

respects.

Dated: July 8, 1978

/s/ Gorpon THoMpPson, JR.

Gordon Thompson, Jr., Judge

United States District Court

22 Appendix

Umted States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

No. 78-2802

No. 79-3684

Bankruptcy No. 17007

In re

U.S. Frvancrau IncorporaTep,

a Delaware Corp. & affiliates,

Rosert D. Kerce,

Plaintiff-A ppellant,

vs.

U.S. Financia IncorporaTep, a Delaware

corporation, and affiliates, and Swan

Constructors, Inc., a California

corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Gordon Thompson, Jr., Judge Presiding

Argued and submitted July 1, 1980

Before: SKOPIL and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges, and

LYDICK,® District Judge

*The Honorable Lawrence T. Lydick, United States District

Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation.

Appendix 23

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge

Claimant Robert Kelce appeals from the entry of judg-

ments on the pleadings against him in two proceedings

under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,’ consolidated on

appeal. We affirm both judgments.

BACKGROUND

As of December, 1968, Kelee owned a condominium pro}-

ect and an adjacent apartment building in La Jolla, Cali-

fornia. That month, Kelee entered into an agreement with

the debtor, U.S. Financial Ine. (“USF”) whereby USF

obtained an option to purchase Kelce’s La Jolla properties

for $5 million. The option agreement specified that USF

would pay $1 million down and would sign a $4 million

promissory note payable in five equal annual installments

and secured by a deed of trust on the property. Subse-

quently, USF declined to purchase the property in accord-

ance with the terms set out in the option agreement.

Instead, USF offered to purchase the property for $1 mil-

lion down, $3 million Series A redeemable preferred stock

(300,000 shares at $10 per share par value) and $1 million

in Series B convertible preferred stock (100,000 shares at

$10 per share par value). USF provided Kelce with mate-

1. 11 US.C.A. § 501 et sea. (1970). These actions were brought

under the Bankruptey Act of 1898, as amended. That Act has since

been revised by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.

95-598. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the provision of

the Bankruptey Act contained herein refer to the Bankruptey Act

of 1898, as amended.

2. Shortly after U.S. Financial, Ine. filed its petition for an

arrangement under Chapter XI, several of its subsidiaries filed

similar petitions. All proecedings were consolidated for joint admin-

istration. As used herein, all references to “USF” refer to U.S.

Financial, Inc. and its affiliates.

24 Appendiz

rially false, misleading and fraudulent’ financial statements

for the three years ending December 31, 1968, and Kelce

relied on those financial statements in accepting USF’s

proposal.

Prior to USF’s collapse, Kelce converted his Series B

stock for approximately $1.5 million, thereby realizing a

$500,000 profit. Redemptions of Kelce’s Series A preferred

stock were made in 1970, 1971 and 1972. No redemptions

were made after 1972, and Kelce still owns 120,000 shares

of Series A stock.

In 1973, USF filed a petition for arrangement under

Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. § 301 [sic]

et seq.). At the time of filing, USF still owned four condo-

minium units and the apartment building. The history and

collapse of USF is described by Judge Anderson in Jn Re

U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.

1979).

II. RESCISSION AND RECLAMATION

On August 29, 1975, Kelce filed a complaint for rescission

and reclamation of the property still owned by USF. He

also sought reclamation of the proceeds of any sale of that

property subsequent to the filing of USF’s Chapter XI

petition.

In late 1975, the Chapter XI proceedings were converted

into Chapter X proceedings. Herbert Solomon was ap-

8. The courts below, in ruling on the trustee’s motions for judg-

ments on the pleadings, were required to accept Kelce’s allegations

of fact as true. Austad v. United States, 386 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.

1967). In reviewing their decision, we also assume the truth of

Kelce’s allegations, and we therefore assume that Kelce is a de-

frauded shareholder, having relied on materially false, misleading,

and fraudulent financial statements supplied by USF.

Appendiz 25

pointed and qualified to act as reorganization trustee, and

he subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the plead-

ings or for summary judgment dismissing Kelce’s claim.

The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings, holding that although Kelce

was entitled to partial rescission and reclamation under

California law, the absolute priority rule barred any re-

covery by Kelce. The district court affirmed and this appeal

followed.

A. Title

Kelece contends that the courts below erred in holding

that his state law right of rescission is superceded by Chap-

ter X of the Bankruptcy Act. He argues that property is

not “property of the debtor’ and therefore does not pass

into the bankrupt estate if the debtor held voidable rather

than nondefeasible title to the property at the time of filing.

It is clear, however, that the trustee did acquire title

to the property at issue here. Section 186 of the Bankruptey

Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 586, provides that a Chapter X trustee

acquires the same title as a trustee in ordinary bankruptey

receives pursuant to § 70a,° 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a). Contrary

to Kelce’s assertions, a trustee in ordinary bankruptey does

take title to property to which the debtor held voidable title,

4.

See 11 U.S.C.A. § 616, which provides in pertinent part:

A plan of reorganization under this Chapter—

eee

(2) may deal with all or any part of the property of the

debtor ....

. Section 70(a), 11 U.S.C.A. §110(a), provides in pertinent

The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt .. . upon his...

appointment and qualification, shall in turn be vested by

operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date

of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this

| ae

26 Appendiz

but he takes that title subject to the defrauded party’s

claim for rescission and reclamation. See 4A Collier on

Bankruptcy { 70.41 at 483 (14th ed. 1979). “[T]he trustee

in bankruptcy takes title to the bankrupt’s property sub-

ject to the retroactive divestment effected by such a rescis-

sion.” (emphasis supplied). A Chapter X trustee, therefore,

does take title to property which is subject to a state law

for rescission, There is, however, a critical distinction be-

tween Chapter X and Chapter XI proceedings which may

affect the ultimate disposition of property taken subject

to a rescission claim. That distinction is the necessary appli-

cation of the absolute priority rule in Chapter X proceed-

ings. See Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,

441 (1968); In Re Equity Funding of America Securities

Tatigation, 603 F.2d 1353, 1356 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979).

Kelece cites several cases in support of his claim for

rescission and reclamation, As the district court noted,

however, none of these cases addressed the interaction be-

tween the absolute priority rule and the common law right

of rescission in Chapter X proceedings. As such, none is

controlling here.

In Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co., 371 U.S. 132

(1962), the Supreme Court held that the debtor’s surety

was entitled to recover funds specifically set aside to seeure

the surety’s obligation. The debtor had no colorable owner-

ship claim to the funds in question, thus the trustee never

obtained title at all. Moreover, Pearlman involved an ordi-

nary bankruptcy, and thus the Court was not presented

with an opportunity to diseuss the absolute priority rule,

or a shareholder’s right to rescission and reclamation in

the context of a Chapter X reorganization. In fact, the case

has only once been applied in a Chapter X ease, In re Bruce

Construction Corp., 217 F. Supp. 926 -(S.D. Fla. 1963).

Appendix 27

Bruce, like Pearlman, involved a surety, and, as in Pearl-

man, the Bruce debtor had no colorable claim to title over

the fund.

Similarly, none of the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Kelee

involved Chapter X proceedings and they therefore do not

discuss the absolute priority rule. In Matter of Paderewski,

564 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977), a trustee in ordinary hank-

ruptey claimed title to a one-half interest in a community

property residence. An interlocutory divorce decree, which

had not been appealed and which therefore had become

final, had not awarded each party a one-half interest in the

residence, Since the bankrupt did not have a one-half inter-

est, the trustee did not receive a one-half interest. Again

this was not a Chapter X case. Moreover, the hankrupt

clearly did not have title to one-half of the property in

issue, and neither, therefore, did the trustee, In contrast.

USF did have title to the property in issue here, however

defective, and the trustee was vested with that title.

In re Forester, 529 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1976). involved

the subrogation of a second lien holder’s claims to collateral

to those of a first lien holder. This court made clear that

the trustee in ordinary bankruptev is vested with the hank-

rupt’s title at the moment of bankruptey. Id. at 316. Our

holding is not inconsistent with that maxim.

In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 425 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976), concerned reclama-

tion under the Uniform Commercial Code bv a seller of

goods to a bankrupt purchaser. While we held that a seller

could reclaim goods when a bankrupt received voidable

title, we were not faced with a Chapter X reorganization

and thus did not have to resolve the absolute priority issue.

As discussed below, that rule changes the foens of our in-

28 Appendix

quiry and mandates that we refuse to permit Kelce to

reclaim the property and proceeds at issue.

B. The Absolute Priority Rule

The Supreme Court has long recognized that a reorgani-

zation plan cannot be “fair and equitable,” as it must be

before it can be approved® or confirmed,’ if it fails to comply

with the absolute priority rule. Case v. Los Angeles Lwmber

Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-19 (1939) ; Protectwe Com-

mittee v. Anderson, supra, 390 U.S. at 441. This rule

requires that

[bjeginning with the topmost class of claims against

the debtor, each class in descending rank must receive

full and complete compensation for the rights sur-

-rendered before the next class below may properly

participate.

6A Collier on Bankruptcy, [11.06 at 210-11 (14th ed.

1979) (citations omitted).

We cannot square the absolute priority rule with Kelce’s

claim for rescission and reclamation. Were we to allow his

claim, we would be permitting Kelce to transform his

claim as a defrauded shareholder into a secured claim, in

derogation of the rights of senior classes and in violation

of the absolute priority rule.

The absolute priority rule is designed to vindicate the

reasonable expectations formed by claimants when their

6. See section 174, 11 U.S.C.A. § 574, which provides in perti-

nent part:

. . . the judge shall enter an order approving the plan or

plans which in his opinion comply with the provisions of sec-

jsut kg of this title, and which are fair and equitable, and

easible....

7. See section 221, 11 U.S.C.A. § 621, which provides in perti-

nent part:

. The judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that—

(2) the plan is fair and equitable, and feasible... .

Appendiz 29

investments or loans were made. Matter of Stirling Homex

Corp., 579 F.2d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439

U.S. 1074 (1979); Slain & Kripke, The Interface Between

Securities Regulation and Bankruptey—Allocating the Risk

of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Security Holders

and the Issuer’s Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 261, 286-87

(1973) (“Slain & Kripke”) ; Huff, The Defrauded Investor

in Chapter X Reorganizations: Absolute Priority v. Rule

10b-5, 50 Am. Bankr. L.J. 197, 204 (1976); Note, The Pro-

posed Bankruptey Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority

Rule for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 1786,

1790 (1974). In the instant case, those expectations will not

be vindicated—instead, they will be violated—by allowing

rescission and reclamation. Kelee is in reality seeking

relief from the general unsecured creditors of the corpo-

ration. Because of USF’s insolvency and ultimate liquida-

tion, the percentage which the general creditors would

realize would be reduced were Kelce allowed to rescind

and reclaim. The absolute priority rule will not tolerate

this eventuality. Matter of Stirling Homer Corp., supra,

579 F.2d at 213; Scott v. Abbott, 160 F.2d 573, 581 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 571 (1908).

Professors Slain and Kripke have analyzed the expecta-

tions of shareholders and creditors. They point out that

shareholders accept two risks: the risk of business insol-

vency and the risk of illegality in securities issuance. Gen-

eral creditors also accept the risk of insolvency, but they ex-

pect that their claims will be given priority in the event of

bankruptcy. The expectation of priority is implicit in their

contracts with the issuer. 7d. at 286. Shareholders bargain

for equity-type rewards in exchange for equity-type risks,

but general creditors do not:

In theory, the general creditor asserts a fixed dollar

claim and leaves the variable profit to the stockholder;

30 Appendix

the stockholder takes the profit and provides a cushion

of security for payment of the lender’s fixed dollar

claim. The absolute priority rule reflects the different

degree to which each party assumes a risk of enter-

prise insolvency; no obvious reason exists for reallo-

cating that risk.

Slain & Kripke, supra, 48 N.Y.U. L.Rev. at 286-87.

Kelce argues that he did not bargain for equity type

risks because he received preferred stock. We note, how-

ever, that Kelce sold his Series B stock at a profit of

$500,000. While Kelce lost money on his transactions with

USF taken as a whole, he clearly took advantage of his

shareholder position in converting his Series B stock. We

will not allow Kelce to benefit from his shareholder status

when he may opt out of that status when he choses. We

note that “[w]hen a corporation becomes bankrupt, the

temptation to lay aside the garb of a stockholder, on one

pretense or another, and to assume the role of a creditor,

is very strong, and all attempts of that kind should be

viewed with suspicion.” Newton National Bank v. Newbegin,

74 F. 135, 140 (8th Cir. 1896), cited in Matter of Stirling

Homex Corp., supra, 579 F.2d at 213. Moreover, we view

the Series B transaction as an indication of Kelce’s gaining

equity-type rewards, and therefore as an indication of his

acceptance of equity-type risks.

It is also appropriate to impose the risk of illegality in

securities issuance on shareholders, even though their in-

vestment may be based on an inaccurate picture of the

corporation garnered from false financial statements.

When the rescission right is enforced in bankruptev

or reorganization .. . the effect is to allocate [the risk

of illegality in securities issuance] to general creditors.

It is difficult to conceive of any reason for shifting even

Appendiz 31

a small portion of the risk of illegality from the stock-

holder, since it is to the stockholder, and not to the

creditor, that the stock is offered.

Slain & Kripke, supra, 48 N.Y.U. L.Rev. at 288.

This scheme of risk allocation is particularly appropriate

in the instant case, Initially, every creditor and stockholder

was victimized by the massive fraud perpetrated by USF.*

In view of the extent of the fraud, it is equitable to impose

the risks of insolvency and illegality on those whose invest-

ment, by its very nature, is a risky one.® Secondly, as noted

by the bankruptcy judge in his conclusions on Kelce’s claim

for parity with general unsecured creditors,’ Kelee’s trans-

actions presented USF with an opportunity to perpetrate

its fraud:

Had the transaction been concluded as originally strue-

tured, that is as a sale on a promissory note secured

by a Deed of Trust on the property sold, USF wonld

have shown the value of the property on the asset side

subject to the liability on the note. Here however, be-

cause of the exchange of the property for stock, it made

it possible for USF to show the asset free of encum-

brances and in addition USF had the abilitv to show

on its capital contribution side the share[s] of stock

which could have misled creditors into thinking addi-

tional capital had been contributed. In other words,

Kelece gave USF the opportunity (whether it used it

or not) to flail with a double edged sword in preparing

its financial statements.

8. See Huff, The Defrauded Investor, supra, 50 Am. Bankr.

L. J. at 202-03 for a discussion of USF’s pre-petition activities.

9. Moreover, it would be manifestly unfair, in light of the ex-

tent of the fraud here, to allow Kelee to obtain secured creditor

status merely because he received stock for real property and a

— of that property remained in USF’s possession at the time

of filing.

10. See discussion infra.

32 Appendix

As between the creditors and Kelce, then, Kelce is the

lesser innocent, and Kelce should not be allowed to reclaim

the property at issue at the senior creditors’ expense.

Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the abso-

lute priority rule would be rendered meaningless were we

to allow Kelce to rescind and reclaim.’ The context of the

11. Kelce also points out that the commentators cited by the

courts below stress the rehabilitative aspects of Chapter X reorgan-

ization plans in formulating their conclusions. He argues that the

rationales relied on by those commentators do not apply to a Chap-

ter X plan of reorganization the goal of which is liquidation rather

than rehabilitation. We decline to make that distinction. The term

“reorganization plan” encompasses both plans which envision re-

habilitation and those whose goal is liquidation. See, e.g., United

States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 323 (1970): “The [reorganization]

plan, an atypical one for a corporate reorganization, does not con-

template the continued existence of the debtor as.a going concern,

but amounts in substance to a liquidation.” Other courts have con-

sistently noted that a Chapter X reorganization plan may provide

for liquidation and, if so, the same rules are to be applied as would

be were rehabilitation the ultimate goal. Appellants in Banker

Iife & Casualty Co. v. Kirtley, 338 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1964),

for example, urged that ordinary bankruptcy provisions be applied

in a Chapter X reorganization which envisioned complete liquida-

tion. The court disagreed, recognizing that “Chapter X contains

numerous provisions not applicable to conventional bankruptcies,”

id. at 1009, including § 216(10), 11 U.S.C.A. §616(10), which

allows liquidation.

In addition, the eventual outcome of Chapter X proceedings may

not be clear at their outset. The reorganization trustee involved in

Matter of Stirling Homezx Corp., supra, 579 F.2d 206, for example,

“originally intended to formulate a plan of reorganization under

which Homex would continue operations. Borrowing proved impos-

sible, however, as did merger with or acquisition by a financially

sound company. He thus began the Herculean task of liquidating

Homex’s assets.” Id. at 209 n.4. It might well prove impossible to

reorganize a corporation were we to provide for the application of

different rules and standards to plans providing for rehabilitation

than we require for plans providing for liquidation. A trustee in

a Homez situation, where the goal of the plan changed over time,

would then have to comply with two different sets of standards.

Such confusion is unwarranted.

Finally, as we have noted, the absolute priority rule was designed

to reward expectations. Those expectations are formed at the time

Appendix 33

instant case is crucial to our holding; when all are de-

frauded, it is manifestly unfair to allow one shareholder

to benefit from that fraud at the others’ expense.

Ill. PARITY WITH GENERAL UNSECURED CREDI-

TORS

In the second case before this court, Kelee contends that

he deserves parity with general unsecured creditors since

he is a preferred shareholder asserting fraud claims. We

disagree and affirm the courts below.

Kelce filed a proof of claim in February, 1976, after

USF’s Chapter XT proceedings were converted to Chapter

X proceedings. The claim, as later amended, averred that

Kelece had been defrauded by USF in the sale of USF’s

preferred shares to him. Kelce sought general unsecured

creditor status for the difference in value between the price

paid for the Series A stock and the value of the unredeemed

shares. (If Kelee were granted parity with the general

unsecured creditors, he would receive compensation far

in excess of that he would receive as part of the class which

includes defrauded shareholders.)

The trustee subsequently filed a reorganization plan

which contemplated the liquidation of USF. As amended,

the plan divides USF’s creditors and stockholders into

several classes. Only three of these classes are relevant to

our discussion: Class 5B, which includes general unsecured

creditors’ claims, Class 6, which includes defrauded subor-

dinated debenture holders’ claims, and Class 7, including

of investment or loan, and by definition are not affected by the

ultimate goal of a reorganization plan. We would do violence to

the provisions of Chapter X were we to recognize such a liquidation-

rehabilitation distinction, and we decline to do so.

34 Appendix

defrauded shareholder claims.” Classes 5B and 6 were cre-

ated as a result of a compromise, which provided that the

defrauded equity holders were to accept a lower rank than

the general unsecured creditors, In return, they were re-

lieved of their burden of proving that they were actually

defrauded. Kelce did not participate in these negotiations,

and he subsequently objected to approval of the plan. Kelce

then entered into a stipulation with the trustee which pro-

vided that no provision of the plan would prevent Kelce

from obtaining Class 5B status.* The plan was confirmed,

Kelee filed an amended claim for $1,837,155, and the trustee

objected. |

Both the bankruptcy court and the district court below

held that Kelce is properly a member of Class 7. We agree.

12. A “creditor” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is a

“holder of any claim,” § 106(4), 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(4). Claims are

defined to “include all claims of whatever character against a debtor

or its property, except stock, whether or not such claims are prov-

able under section 103 of this title and whether secured or un-

secured, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent,” § 106(1),

11 U.S.C.A. § 506(1) (emphasis supplied). The reorganization plan

for the liquidation of USF, as approved by the bankruptcy court,

provides that the defrauded shareholders are creditors. For pur-

poses of this opinion we assume, without deciding, that defrauded

shareholders can be creditors. See Matter of Stirling Homex Corp.,

supra, 579 F.2d at 212.

13. The stipulation provides in pertinent part:

Herbert J. Solomon, the duly qualified and acting Trustee

... and Robert D. Kelce . . . by their respective undersigned

counsel, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:

1. Approval of the Trustee’s Restated Amended Consoli-

dated Plan of Reorganization . . . is without prejudice to, or

waiver of, the right of Kelee to contend or prove that Kelce

should be classified as a member of Class 5B of the Plan and

that he should receive all distributions allocable to him as a

member of Class 5B.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Stipulation is meant by the parties

to remove any provision of the Plan as a defense to the pos-

sible change of classification contemplated thereby and shall

not be construed as a waiver by the Trustee of any defenses

he may otherwise have to such classification change.

Appendix 35

Section 197 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 597,

requires the bankruptcy judge to “fix the division of credi-

tors and stockholders into classes according to the nature

of their respective claims and stock.” This provision “ac-

cords the court a broad latitude in classification of credi-

tors, and classifications should be based on substantial

differences in the nature of claims.” Scherk v. Newton, 152

F.2d 747, 751 (10th Cir. 1945). The requirement that classes

be fixed “according to the nature of their respective claims”

requires courts to recognize differences in the rights of

ereditors which mandate differences in treatment. Matter

of Stirling Homex Corp., supra, 579 F.2d at 211, citing

Scherk v. Newton, swpra, 152 F.2d at 750,

Kelce argues that the absolute priority rule has nothing

to do with membership in a class of creditors. We disagree.

The absolute priority rule would be rendered meaningless

if inferior claimants were classified with superior claim-

ants. Courts would then have no basis for ranking clainis

as “senior” or “junior.” It is true that reorganization courts

are

given a discretionary power of classification to be exer-

cised as the exigencies of each individual case require.

* * *

Nevertheless, the power of the reorganization court

thus broadly defined has certain limits which are al-

ways present. The foremost of these is the “fixed prin-

ciple” or “absolute priority” rule of the Boyd case

which governs all reorganization plans in determining

whether they are fair and equitable. This means that

in classifying the various claims and interests, the

classes established must be accorded the priority rank

to which their claims and interests against the estate

entitle them, and the principle of absolute priority may

not be violated by any scheme of classification which

places claimants of different rank in the same category

for treatment.

36 Appendiz

6 Collier on Bankruptcy (Pt. 2) 99.10 at 1596-97 (14th ed.

1979) (emphasis supplied).

As discussed in Section II, supra, the nature of Kelce’s

claim is significantly different from that of a general unse-

cured creditor. Kelce, for example, realized a $500,000 profit

on the sale of his Class B preferred stock. As the bank-

ruptcy judge below noted, Kelce’s interest

smacks of an equity investment with the gains attend-

ant thereto....

Kelce’s position appears to be that he was satisfied

to be an equity holder while things were going well,

but now that things have turned sour, he wants another

position, that of a general creditor.

That position seems patently unfair and inequitable

to the general creditor body.

Kelee cannot be included in Class 5B because of the

nature of his claim. It is true that the reorganization plan

itself designates defrauded shareholders as creditors. But

all unsecured creditors need not be classified together. In

fact, they may not be classified together if certain claims

“are of such a nature as to give them some right of pri-

ority or preference over other claimants. These creditors,

then, must be separately classified and accorded the pri-

ority to which they are entitled.” 6 Collier on Bankruptcy

(Pt. 2) 79.13 at 1620-21 (14th ed. 1979).

Kelce contends that his claim properly belongs in Class

5B by virtue of the Supreme Court’s decision in Oppen-

heimer v. Harriman National Bank, 301 U.S. 206 (1937).

He argues that his inclusion in Class 7 therefore neces-

sarily constituted subordination without cause, We agree

with the Second Circuit, however, in concluding that Op-

penheimer is not controlling here. See Matter of Stirling

Homex Corp., supra, 579 F.2d at 211 n.8, Furthermore, we

Appendia 37

hold that Kelce’s Class 7 classification was proper'* and

that there was, therefore, no exercise of the courts’ powers

of equitable subordination.**

The Oppenheimer claimant bought stock in a bank in

1930. The bank subsequently closed, and, during liquidation,

Oppenheimer sued for rescission based on fraud. He ob-

tained a money judgment, but the Second Circuit ordered

that he not be paid until all creditors’ claims had been

satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Oppen-

heimer’s claim was entitled to parity with other unsecured

creditors’ claims. Oppenheimer, supra, 301 U.S. at 215.

Significantly, the Oppenheimer decision was based on the

National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §1 et seqg., which requires

14. This court has upheld the classification of rescission claims

with claims of “holders of promissory notes which are unsecured

.’ In re Los Angeles Land & Investments, Ltd., 282 F. Supp.

448, ‘ABA (D. Hawaii 1968), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1971)

(per curiam). That ease involved land sales based upon unregistered

publicly offered contracts, and is easily distinguishable from the

instant ease. The rescission claims in Los Angeles Land were held

by those who had contracted to purchase land, and not by share-

holders who had acquired equity. Moreover, the Los Angeles Land

trustee recommended, and the courts approved, the classification at

issue there. We have noted that reorganization courts have broad

discretion in classifying creditors and stockholders. We concluded

that the Los Angeles Land classification was acceptable based

absolute priority rule. In the instant case, the trustee carefully

recommended separate classification for defrauded shareholders and

general unsecured creditors, and we have concluded that that classi-

fication is the appropriate one.

15. We have not subordinated Kelce’s claim, nor have the

courts below. Kelce is responsible for his classification here. Kelce,

unlike the general unsecured creditors, had control over the manner

in which he was paid for his property. As noted above, Kelce pro-

vided. USF with an opportunity to further perpetrate its fraud.

Furthermore, Kelee converted his Class B stock at a sizable profit,

thereby accepting the rewards of an equity holder. By originally

accepting preferred stock, Kelee accepted a position subordinate to

that of general creditors, We would be unjustifiably subordinating

the ordinary unsecured creditors were we to include Keilce’s claim

within Class 5B.

38 Appendiz

“ratable” and not “fair and equitable” distribution, Two

years after the Oppenheimer decision, the Supreme Court

held that the “fair and equitable” standard required adher-

ence to an absolute priority rule in Case v. Los Angeles

Lumber Products Co., supra, 308 U.S. 106 (1939).** Our

conclusion that Oppenheimer is not controlling here is

bolstered by two subsequent Supreme Court opinions in

which the question of defrauded shareholder’s proper rank-

ing was left unanswered. See Protective Committee v.

Anderson, swpra, 390 U.S. at 423 & n. 8, 453; Tcherepnin v.

Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 346 (1967). Moreover, as discussed

infra, there would have been no compromise necessary here

had this question been authoritatively resolved by Oppen-

heimer.

Given the significant differences set out above between

Kelce’s claim and the claims of the general unsecured

creditors, we cannot hold that the classification scheme

devised here violates § 197 or § 221(2). We are not holding

that a defrauded shareholder may never be classified with

general unsecured creditors. We merely hold that, given

the particular facts of this case, the absolute priority rule

would be violated if Kelee were granted Class 5B status.”’

16. The court in Case applied the “fixed principle” of Northern

Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 328 U.S. 482 (1913).

17. At oral argument, Kelce’s counsel argued that the reliance

by the courts below on the absolute priority rule was misplaced. If

that rule bars all equity holders from being classified with general

unsecured creditors, he argued, there would have been no basis for

a compromise here. We disagree. The question of whether defrauded

shareholders may achieve parity with ordinary unsecured creditors

was clearly an open question at the time of compromise. See Pro-

tective Committee v. Anderson, supra, compromise. See Protective

Committee v. Anderson, supra, 390 U.S. at 423 & n.8, 453;

Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, 389 U.S. at 346. (In fact, Kelce’s

argument that Oppenheimer mandates the equal treatment of de-

frauded shareholders and general unsecured creditors, if valid,

would also negate any reason for compromise.) See also Matter of

Appendix 39

We note again the massive fraud which victimized every

USF shareholder and creditor. We could not countenance

a classification scheme whereby Kelce would, by virtue of

the fraud here, be allowed to share equally with defrauded

unsecured creditors who expected priority in the event

of insolvency. Since the relative expectations of the parties

would not be realized were Kelce included in Class 5B, the

absolute priority rule will not allow us to permit that

classification.

The Second Circuit recently reached much this same

conclusion in Matter of Stirling Homex Corp., supra, 579

F.2d 206, when it held that defrauded shareholders could

fairly and equitably be classified below general unsecured

creditors. The court relied on several theories in reaching

its conclusion: it stressed the necessity of classifying claims

according to the priority to which they are entitled; the

varying expectations of equity holders and of creditors,

and the general equity powers of reorganization courts.

Equity Funding Corp. of America, 416 F.Supp. 132, 151 (C.D. Cal.

1975) :

‘there is authority for the proposition that a fraud claim, even

if based upon stock acquisition, is on a parity with general

unsecured claims in a reorganization proceeding. Acceptance

of this proposition would probably violate the expectations of

all parties, because stockholders ordinarily are entitled to no

recovery from an insolvent company.

This bona fide issue has not been authoritatively resolved.

In light of this dispute, it was not unreasonable for the trustee

and the other equity holders to negotiate a compromise. Trustees

have long utilized compromises in avoidance of litigation, Protective

Committee v. Anderson, supra, 390 U.S. at 424, and the compromise

negotiated here was correctly held to satisfy the requisite “fair and

equitable” standard.

Furthermore, as outlined above, we are not holding that de-

frauded shareholders may never be classified with general unsecured

creditors. Our holding is limited to the facts of this case.

40 Appendiz

Id. at 213-14." While we do not decide the instant case on

equity grounds, we find support for our holding in the

Second Circuit’s recognition of the importance of recog-

nizing differences in expectations when classifying claims

against the debtor.

An argument might be made that Kelce, as a defrauded

preferred shareholder, was entitled to priority over the

defrauded common shareholders. In Petition of Portland

Electric Power Co., 162 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

332 U.S. 837 (1947), for example, we held that the rights

of preferred stockholders must be recognized in bankruptcy

proceedings. Jd. at 622. The stockholders in Portland, how-

ever, were classified as stockholders, not as creditors whose

claims were based on fraud. Moreover, Kelce is not arguing

that he is entitled to a different classification from that of

defrauded common shareholders; he contends that he more

properly belongs in Class 5B than in Class 7. As presented

to us, our task is to determine which of those two classes

should more properly include Kelce.” As such, we have

18. This court noted the Stirling Homez decision in In re

Equity Funding of America Securities Litigation, 603 F.2d 1353

(9th Cir. 1979). While we neither rejected nor approved the deci-

sion, we characterized its holding that defrauded shareholders

should be classified beneath ordinary unsecured creditors as the

“majority rule.” Id. at 1356 n.5.

19. At orai argument, petitioner’s counsel suggested that pre-

ferred shareholders are more similar to subordinated debenture

holders than they are to common shareholders. This argument was

not presented to the courts below and is not properly before us.

In addition, we note that the stipulation signed by Kelee and the

trustee allowed Kelee to attempt to show that he should have been

included in Class 5B, not in Class 6.

In addition, counsel for Kelce argued that the rulings of the

courts below amounted to a rescission of the stipulation between the

trustee and Kelee. This argument borders on the frivolous.

The stipulation provided that Kelce could attempt to prove that

he more properly belonged in Class 5B. He was allowed to make

that attempt; as such, he was not precluded from making an

attempt by virtue of an existing, approved plan. The stipulation

did not mandate that Kelce be included in Class 5B; it merely

allowed him to raise the claim.

Appendix 41

determined that Kelce was correctly placed in Class 7. In

addition, we note that due to USF’s insolvency, none of the

equity holders would receive any compensation were it

not for the compromise negotiated by the trustee and the

other equity holders. Classifying Kelce with the common

shareholders, therefore, does not do violence to the pro-

visions of the Bankruptcy Act.

Finally, we note that Congress has now expressly pro-

vided that defrauded shareholders’ claims be classified be-

low those of general unsecured creditors. See § 510 of the

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. § 510(b)

(1979) .”

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

20. Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides

in pertinent part:

(b) Any claim for recission [sic] of a purchase or sale of

a security of the debtor or of an affiliate or for damages

arising from the purchase or sale of such a security shall be

subordinated for purposes of distribution to all claims and

interests that are senior or equal to the claim or interest

represented by such security.

(ec) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this sec-

tion, after notice and a hearing, the court may—

(1) under principles of equitable subordination, sub-

ordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an al-

lowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all

or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another

allowed interest ....

42 Appendix

Filed

Nov. 24, 1980

Richard Deane

Clerk U.S. Court of Appeals.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

No. 78-2802

Bankruptcy No. 17007

7%

In re U.S. Frvanciau INCORPORATED,

a Delaware Corp. & Affiliates,

Debtors.

Rosert D, Ketce,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

U.S. Frvanciar [ycorporaten,

a Delaware corporation, and affiliates,

and Swan Constructors, Inc., a Cali-

fornia corporation,

Defendant-A ppellee.

ORDER

Before: SKOPIL and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges, and

LYDICK,”® District Judge

. The panel as constituted in the above case has voted to

deny the petition for rehearing. Judges Skopil and Fergu-

son voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc

and Judge Lydick made no recommendation regarding the

en banc request.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for en

bane rehearing and no judge of the court has requested a

vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Fed. R. Ap. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion

for rehearing en banc is rejected.

*Honorable Lawrence T. Lydick, United States District Judge,

Central District of California, sitting by designation.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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