Petition — Loucas v. United States

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QEC 19 1980

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

—-—-

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

NO.

EMMANUEL LOUCAS, PETITIONER,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JAMES F. COMPANION

Schrader, Stamp & Recht

816 Central Union

Building

Wheeling, West Virginia

26003

(304) 233-3390

Attorney for

Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ....-.ee0-

LIST OF ALL PARTIES ....... coc cccccccccecs

OPINION BELOW oeeeeneeeneneeneeeneeeneneeeneeneee @#

JURISDICTION ..ccccccsccccveccaccccecceccs

STATUTES

INVOLVED ..cccccrcccccacccccseces

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..ccccvevccccvvvece

ARGUMENT

he

Il.

Iit.

Fourth Circuit and Sixth

Circuit Conflict on Whether

One Can Be Convicted of

Aiding and Abetting Under

the Travel Act Without

Knowledge that the Principal

Travelled in Interstate Commerce

Fourth Circuit's Ruling That

Proof of an Actual Violation

of the Underlying State Statute

in a Travel Act Indictment Is

Not a Necessary Element Dis-

torts the Plain and Literal

Meaning Of the Act ..ccccccceces

The Failure to Recognize

"Implied Bias" of Jurors

Precludes a Defendant from

Being Tried by a Fair and

SUOGEEEOL JULY 6 cece sn cese seeeees

CONCLUSION ........ corer cccccee coccccccce

Appendix

A, Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit Decided

September 26, 1980 ...... coun

12

15

la

Page

Appendix B, District Court's Judgment

and Probation/Commitment

Order Entered February l,

Oe Stéuscedand teehee keeekcas 12a

Appendix C, District Court's Order

Modifying Sentence Entered .

POEUOEY 2235 SFG0 60s 8sece ee l6a

Appendix D, Judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

Entered September 26,

i Se eee ey ear eee 18a

Appendix E, Order of the United States

Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit Denying

Petition for Rehearing

Entered October 27,

Bee Wk 6 OG wb ee bee cube Ose eas 2la

Appendix F, Statutes Involved .......... 22a

6» a ree 22a

Be WellvGa BAPUS savececusios 22a

W. Va. Code, §61-10-1 ...... 24a

Appendix G, Indictment Count VI ........ 27a

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Caminetti v. United States, 242

ae OTe Bee bia ce enh awe ee 12

Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d

614 (10th Cir. 1963), cert.

denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963) .... 14

McIntosh v. United States, 385

Fete 27e Cee GEE. SPOT? sees ta

United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d

Fhe COGN GOlse LITE! sec bvcdovers 7

United States v. Hiatt, 527 F.2d

SUGe tee Gans LOTTO) ese ese wees . Asya

United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272

(2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied,

2. o ke fe FR | ee) bb) re 11

United States v. LeFaivre, 507

F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974),

cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004

tha: | eee ee ree ee eee 6, 7

United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S.

'. Pe: > ee pepe eS eae 11

United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d

7L (7th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976) .... 8

United States v. Pomponio, 51l F.2d

vas. (Sen Cis. L975). Gert.

denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975),

rehearing denied, 423 U.S.

FUe NOP TSE 6044806656 O85 Oe 9 0% 10

Cases:

United States v.

— —_——_—

Prince,

F.2d 1108 (6th Cir.

cert. denied, 429 U.S.

(1976)

United States v.

529

1976),

Sellaro,

114 (8th Cir.

denied. 421 U.S. 1013 (1975)

United States v.

630 (Sth Cir. 1971) ..

United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d

Stevens,

1973), cert.

1046 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976)

Statutes:

514 F.2d

444 F.2d

Aiding and Abetting, 18 U.S.C. §2 ..

Travel Act,

W. Va. Code,

18 U.S.C.

§61-10-1

iv

§1952 (a) (3)

14

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

No.

EMMANUEL LOUCAS,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Emmanuel Loucas, of Weirton, West Virginia,

respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari

to review the judgment and opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

previously entered in this case.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1) Whether one can be convicted of

aiding and abetting under the Travel Act,

7

18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (3), without knowledge

that the principal has travelled in inter-

state commerce.

(2) Whether proof of an actual viola-

tion of the underlying state statute named

in a Travel Act indictment is a necessary

element for conviction under the Act, 18 U.

S§. C. § 1952(a) (3).

(3) Whether "implied bias" is a sufficien

reason for striking jurors for cause upon an

appropriate and timely defense motion with-

out a showing of actual bias.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

The caption of the case in this Court con-

tains the names of all parties.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reported at

629 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1980) and appears in

the Appendix hereto at pp. la - lla.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit was entered on September 26,

-2-

1980. A timely petition for rehearing and

Suggestion for rehearing in banc was denied

On October 27, 1980, and this petition for

certiorari was filed within 60 days of the

last-mentioned date. This Court's jurisdic-

tion is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved in

this case are as follows:

(1) the federal aiding and abetting

statute, 18 U.S.C. §2;

(2) the federal statute prohibiting

interstate travel in aid of racketeering

enterprises commonly known as the "Travel

Act," 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3);

and

(3) the West Virginia statute relating

to keeping or exhibiting gaming devices,

West Virginia Code, §61-10-1l.

The aforesaid statutes are set out verbatim

in the Appendix hereto at pp. 22a - 26a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 5, 1979, the petitioner,

Emmanuel Loucas, was indicted in the United

States District Court for the Northern District

of West Virginia for conspiracy to violate

a gambling statute and a bribery statute of

the State of West Virginia and for aiding

and abetting another to travel in inter-

state commerce for the purpose of promoting

activities alleged to violate four dif-

ferent gambling statutes of the State of

West Virginia.1+ Both the conspiracy

count and the aiding and abetting count

related to alleged violations of the Travel

Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3).

After a first-trial hung jury, Loucas

was acquitted in a second trial on October 18,

1979, on the conspiracy charge and was con-

victed on the aiding and abetting count.

On January 22, 1980, the District Court

lhe aiding and abetting count is set

forth verbatim in the Appendix at p. 27a.

sentenced Loucas to serve two years in the

custody of the Attorney General and five years

of supervised probation and to pay a fine of

$5,000.00. (App. 12a-15a). Thereafter, on

February 13, 1980, the District Court re-

duced the confinement portion of the sen-

tence from two years to six months.

(App. 16a-17a).

Loucas filed a timely appeal of his con-

viction in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit. On September 26,

1980, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the con-

viction. (App. 18a).

With respect to Loucas' first question

for review presented in this petition, the

Fourth Circuit overlooked the issue or at

least did not specifically address the

knowledge question in its opinion. (App. la-

lla). Therefore, Loucas filed a timely

petition for rehearing and also requested

a hearing in banc because the Fourth Circuit

and the Sixth Circuit are in direct con-

flict on whether knowledge by the aider and

~ =

abetter of his principal's interstate travel

is a necessary element for convicting the

aider and abetter under 18 U.S.C. §1952(a)

ar Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit

denied the petition for rehearing on October 27

1980. (App. 2la).

With respect to the other two questions

presented for review in this petition, the

Fourth Circuit held that proof of an actual

violation of the underlying state statute

named in a Travel Act indictment is not a

necessary element for a conviction under the

Act , 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3), and that a

showing of "implied bias" is not a sufficient

reason to strike jurors for cause. (App. 7a-

8a, 10a).

r “The Fourth Circuit has held in United

States v. LeFaivre, 507 F. 2d 1288 (4th Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975),

that in a Travel Act case, knowledge by the

aider and abetter that his principal has

travelled in interstate commerce is not

necessary in order to convict the aider and

abetter for violating the Travel Act.

However, the Sixth Circuit, in a more recent

case, United States v. Prince, 529 F. 2d

1108, 1112 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 838 (1976), has taken a completely

contrary view.

ARGUMENT

I.

Fourth Circuit and Sixth Circuit Conflict on

Whether One Can Be Convicted of Aiding and

Abetting Under the Travel Act Without Know-

Ledge that the Principal Travelled in Inter-

state Commerce.

In upholding Loucas' conviction, the Fourth

Circuit, in essence, reaffirmed its holding in

United States v. LeFaivre, supra note 2, that

one can be convicted of aiding and abetting

under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3),

even though the aider and abetter had no

knowledge that the principal has travelled

in interstate commerce. This holding di-

rectly conflicts with the view in the Sixth

Circuit as expressed in United States v.

Prince, supra note 2, where the court stated

as follows:

"An aiding and abetting charge

requires proof of a 'specific

intent to facilitate the commission

of a crime by another.' United

States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d

912, 920 (6th Cir. 1972). In

the absence of proof that (the

defendant) had knowledge of

=Jo

(the principal's) violations of

the Travel Act, (the defendant)

cannot be held for aiding and

abetting (the principal) in the

violation thereof."

Admittedly, the Fourth Circuit's view is

shared by a majority of circuits which have

considered the question;°2 nevertheless,

this petition for writ of certiorari should

be allowed in order to resolve this con-

flict. Where, as here, circuits are divided

Over what constitutes an essential element of

a federal criminal statute, this Court should

resolve that conflict so that the federal

criminal laws are applied uniformly in all

circuits.

366 for example United States v. Peskin,

527 F.zd 71, 78 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Sellaro,

514 F.2d 114, 120-121 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.

denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975); and United States

v. Villano ,529 F.2d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).

Il.

Fourth Circuit's Ruling That Proof of An Actual

Violation of the Underlying State Statute in a

Travel Act Indictment is Not a

Necessary Element Distorts the Plain

and Literal Meaning of the Act

By holding that proof of the underlying

state violation (in this case, West Virginia

Code, §61-10-1, prohibiting the keeping or

exhibiting of gaming devices) is not a necessary

element in a Travel Act conviction, the Fourth

Circuit is ignoring the plain and literal

wording of 18 U.S.C. §1952 (a)(3) and is saying

that one can violate the Travel Act even with-

out evidence that a state law has been vio-

lated. The operative words of §1952(a) (3)

are as follows:

"Whoever travels in interstate

commerce... with intent to-

promote, manage, establish, carry

on, or facilitate the promoticn,

management, establishment, or

carrying on, of any unlawful

activity... shall be (guilty of

an offense)."

Summarized fairly, this statute makes it a

_—

federal offense to cross state lines for the

purpose of conducting an unlawful activity.

However, the Fourth Circuit, citing its earlier

holding in United States v. Pomponio, 5ll F.

2d 953, 957 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423

U.S. 874 (1975), rehearing denied, 423 U.S.

991 (1975), and the Eighth Circuit case of

McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274, 277

(8th Cir. 1967), would rewrite the statute

by injecting the words "could have" so as to

broaden the statute to include anyone who

travels in interstate commerce and either

conducts an unlawful activity or "could have"

conducted an unlawful activity. The

emphasis on the words "could have" as used

in United States v. Hiatt, 527 F.2dq 1048,

1051 (9th Cir. 1976), is misplaced. At

page 1050 of the Hiatt case, the court said,

"The third argument advanced by

appellant is that to be found

guilty of a violation of the

Travel Act, there must be a

finding that the underlying

activity was in violation of

state law."

After further explaining the argument, the

-10-

court then said at page ]05l,

"Tt is correct that the existence

of a state law violation is an

element of the violation of the

Travel Act and that the court must

make a determination of whether

the underlying state law has been

or could have been violated.

United States v. Kahn, 472 F. 2d

272, 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

411 U.S. 982, 93 S.Ct. 2270,

36 L. Ed.2d 958 (1973); see United

States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286,

89 Ss. Ct. 534, 21 L. Ed. 2d 487

(1969)."

Why the Hiatt court used the words "could

have" is a mystery. The cases cited after

those words, Kahn and Nardello, do not even

mention "could have." Thus, it would appear

that the Hiatt court used the words unwittingly

or without special significance. Nevertheless,

the Fourth Circuit has given them emphasis.

(App. 7a).

It is fundamental and basic law that the

meaning of a statute must, in the first

instance, be sought in the language in which

the act is framed. Where that language is

plain and unambiguous, the courts are not

free to add words which change or extend its

-ll-

intended application. Caminetti v. United

States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916). Thus, this

writ should be allowed in order to clarify

what appears to be the obvious meaning of

18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3).

IIl.

The Failure to Recognize "Implied Bias" of

Jurors Precludes a Defendant From Being Tried

By a Fair and Impartial Jury.

The Fourth Circuit's refusal to recognize

the "implied bias" theory as a sufficient

reason to excuse jurors for cause is a sub-

stantial denial of the right to be tried by

a fair and impartial jury and is another reason

for allowing this writ.

At the time of Loucas' trial, he was one

of 25 or 26 individuals arrested for gambling

and racketeering violations resulting from a

combined undercover investigation conducted by

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, West

Virginia State Police and the Sheriff of

Hancock County, West Virginia. Included among

-12-

those accused were the Prosecuting Attorney of

Hancock County, two other lawyers (one of

which was the petitioner Loucas) and at least

two alleged members of "organized crime." From

the date of the first of several indictments

on February 6, 1979, to the start of Loucas'

trial on October 15, 1979, the counties of

West Virginia from which the jurors were

drawn were literally deluged with television,

radio and newspaper publicity concerning these

Similar and related cases.

By the time of Loucas' second trial,

most of the other indictments had already

been tried. In all of the previous trials,

the government's main witness was the Hancock

County Sheriff, who pretended to be a corrupt

sheriff on the take and testified concerning

his undercover activities. On July 25, 1979,

less than three months before Loucas' retrial,

the trial of Constantine "Gus" Karas concluded

resulting in a guilty verdict. Consistent

with the government's pattern of proof through-

out the several gambling trials, the sheriff

=} 3s

was the leading government witness. “Also,

the two government prosecutors were the same

two Assistant United States Attorneys assigned

to try the Loucas case.

Four of the panel of 28 jurors chosen for

the Loucas trial had served as trial jurors in

the Karas case. Since those jurors recently

sat on a similar "gambling and racketeering"

trial, had the opportunity to hear the testimony

of the sheriff and possibly other identical

witnesses and had the opportunity to observe

the same two government prosecutors, the

defense moved to strike those jurors for cause.

The denial of this motion forced the defense

to use four of its peremptory challenges to

strike these jurors.

Although United States v. Stevens, 444

F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1971), and the dissent

in Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614, 620

(10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845

(1963), support the implied bias rule, the

Fourth Circuit chose to follow the more

traditicnal view that a showing of actual

-14-

partiality is required before a juror need be

discharged for cause. However, the actual

bias requirement places a nearly impossible

burden on a defendant especially where jurors

are too timid or unwilling to reveal their

actual prejudices in response to voir dire.

By allowing this writ, this Court can rectify

a substantial denial of the right of fair trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, a writ of

certiorari should issue to review the judgment

and opinion of the Fourth Circuit.

Respectfully Submitted,

JAMES F. COMPANION

Schrader, Stamp & Recht

816 Central Union Building

Wheeling, West Virginia

26003

Attorney for Petitioner

December 19, 1980,

~1$—

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

NO. 80-5010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

Vv.

EMMANUEL "MANNY" LOUCAS,

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia,

at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Chief District

Judge.

Argued: August 15, 1980

Decided: September 26, 1980

Before FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge; HALL and

SPROUSE, Circuit Judges.

James F. Companion (Schrader, Stamp & Recht;

John R. Mitchell on brief) for Appellant;

William A. Kolibash, Assistant United States

Attorney (Stephen G. Jory, United States

Attorney on brief) for Appellee.

la

HALL, Circuit Judge:

Emmanuel "Manny" Loucas, a West Virginia

attorney, appeals from his conviction under

the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a), for aid-

ing and abetting Silvio "Birdie" Pinciaro, an

Ohio resident and client who had travelled in

interstate commerce for the purpose of pro-

moting various illegal gambling activities in

Hancock County, West Virginia. Pinciaro,

Loucas, and Richard Tingler!/ were named in a

superseding, six-count indictment which was

returned by a federal grand jury on April 5,

1979. The indictment charged Pinciaro with

Six violations of the Travel Act for various

transactions involving bribery and gambling.

Loucas was named in two counts of the indict-

ment: Count I alleged his participation in a

conspiracy involving interstate commerce to

commit bribery and to promote illegal gambling

1/No further reference will be made re-

garding defendant Tingler since his role in

the illegal conduct is not material to the

issues raised in this appeal.

2a

activities; Count VI alleged that he aided

and abetted Pinciaro in promoting various

gambling enterprises which also involved inter-

state travel.

Pinciaro and Loucas were tried jointly

before a jury in May 1979. The jury found

Pinciaro guilty on all six counts but could

not reach a verdict as to Loucas. A mistrial

was declared and Loucas was again tried in

October 1979. His retrial resulted in a

judgment of acquittal as to Count I and a

guilty verdict for Count VI. Loucas received

a sentence of five years' imprisonment, which

was ultimately reduced to six months, five

years of supervised probation, and a fine of

$5,000. After the district court denied his

post-trial motions, Loucas appealed on the

basis of numerous assignments of error.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm his

conviction.

Although Loucas raises several issues on

appeal, only two merit discussion: (1)

whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain

3a

the conviction, and (2) whether the disctict

court erred by not striking four jurors for

cause. Appellant's initial assignment of

error is that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction. Although the adequacy

of the evidence is challenged on several

grounds, counsel's main argument is that no

evidence was presented at trial to show that

the retrieval of certain slot machines seized

in a raid at Pinciaro's place of business was

connected to any illegal gambling activity.

Count VI of the indictment alleged viola-

tions of four state statutes dealing with

illegal gambling activities. ?/ Of these four,

counsel asserts that the prosecution only

produced evidence connecting Loucas to aiding

and abetting Pinciaro in a possible violation

2/tThe statutes under which Loucas was

charged with aiding and abetting Pinciaro were

West Virginia Code §61-10-1 (keeping or

exhibiting a gaming machine or device),

§61-10-5 (betting on games of chance), §61-10-11

(conducting lotteries or raffles), and §61-10-lla

(conducting "policy" or "numbers" operations).

4a

of West Virginia Code §61-10-1, illegal posses-

sion of gambling machines. This evidence con-

Sisted chiefly of the sheriff's testimony that

Loucas offered bribes of $2,000 each to the

prosecuting attorney and himself in exchange

for the return of Pinciaro's slot machines

which had been seized in the aforesaid raid.

The tape recordings of three discussions in-

volving the alleged bribery scheme were also

introduced into evidence to corroborate the

sheriff's story.

Counsel for Loucas argues that a recent

decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia has held that the mere possession

of slot machines is not per se illegal.

State v. 25 Slot Machines, 256 S.E. 2d 595

(W. Va. 1979). Thus, the fact that Loucas,

through alleged acts of bribery, may have aid-

ed and abetted Pinciaro in recovering and pos-

sessing slot machines does not establish an

underlying violation of state law which would

Support a conviction under the Travel Act.

The government maintains that it need not

prove an actual violation of a specific state

5a

statute, but only an attempt to engage in

activity which is illegal under state law.

Thus, while Pinciaro may not have violated

any West Virginia statute by merely posses-

Sing slot machines, there was allegedly over-

whelming evidence that these gambling devices

were acquired in furtherance of his illegal

gambling operations.

The Travel Act is aimed primarily at organ-

ized crime and particularly at persons who re-

side in one state while operating or managing

illegal activities located in another state.

Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).

The use of interstate commerce to violate or

attempt to violate a state statute constitutes

a federal crime, and the underlying state law

merely serves a definitional purpose in charac-

terizing the proscribed conduct. United States

v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1975);

United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1051

(Sth Cir. 1975); United States v. Polizzi, 500

F.2d 856, 869 (9th Cir. 1974); United States

v. Goldfarb, 464 F. Supp. 565, 574 (E.D. Mich.

1979).

6a

It is generally recognized that "the

existence of a state law violation is an ele-

ment of the violation of the Travel Act and

that the court must make a determination of

whether the underlying state law has been or

could have been violated" United States Ve

Hiatt, 527 F.2d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1976)

(emphasis added) [citations omitted]. Thus,

"accomplishment of the State substantive

offense is not a prerequisite to a Section

1952 conviction." McIntosh v. United States,

385 F.2d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1967) [citations

/

omitted).° Following this line of cases, our

circuit has held that

[t]he ‘unlawful activity' specified

in the [Travel] Act may be [an

offense] under either state or federal

law and reference to such law is

necessary only to identify the type

od In this regard, the McIntosh court

adopted the reasoning in United States v.

Azar, 243 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mich. 1964),

that "[iJt is not required that the travel be

in itself a criminal act, nor that the subse-

quent act be itself, unlawful, if it does in

truth facilitate the carrying on [of unlawful

activity]." Azar at 350. Accord, United

States v. Teemer, 214 F. Supp. 952, 957

(N.D. W. Va. 1963).

7a

of ‘unlawful activity' in

which the defendants intended

to engage. Proof that the un-

lawful objective was accom-

plished or that the referenced

law has actually been violated

is not a necessary element of

the offense defined in section

1952.

United States v. Pomponio, 511 F2d 953, 957

(4th Cir. 1975), citing McIntosh v. United

States, supra. In light of such authority,

the contention by Loucas that he could be

convicted only if Pinciaro's mere posses-

sion of slot machines were illegal is un-

tenable. Since the government introduced a

large amount of evidence concerning Pinciaro's

intent to dominate the gambling activities

in Hancock County, a rational trier of fact

could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that

Loucas' conduct in effectuating the return

of the slot machines did aid and abet Pin-

Ciaro in promoting or attempting to promote

various gambling activities. Thus, adequate

evidence did exist to support Loucas' con-

viction.

Appellant's second issue involves the

ga

refusal of the district judge to strike four

jurors for cause because they had sat on an

earlier panel which heard a gambling case.

Loucas contends that when the defense moves to

strike jurors for cause because they have sat

on prior similar cases, the trial court must

grant the motion. United States v. Stevens,

444 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1971). This departure

from the normal requirement that actual bias

be demonstrated before removing jurors for

cause is founded on the "implied bias" theory

of the dissent in Casias v. United States,

315 F.2d 614, 620 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,

374 U.S. 845 (1963):

There is nothing new or novel in

the concept of implied bias or

disqualification based on consid-

eration of policy. It is not

uncommon for the law to say that

one occupying a status or relation-

ship which raises a suspicion of

bias or prejudice shall not be

called into the jury box, and if

called, shall be excused for cause.

Counsel argues that the failure to strike

the four jurors for cause was a substantial

error which entitles Loucas to a new trial.

The government asserts that the compe-

9a

tency of the jurors sitting in a particular

case is a matter within the discretion of the

trial court. Blevins v. United States, 12 F.

2g 548 (4th Cir. 1926). This approach is up-

held by the generally accepted principle as

set forth in Government of Virgin Islands v.

Williams, 476 F.2d 771, 773 (3rd Cir. 1973),

where the court stated that "[t]he federal

courts have uniformly held that, absent some

evidence of actual partiality, a juror is not

disqualified merely because he previously sat

in a similar case arising out of a separate

and distinct set of circumstances even though

the offenses charged in the cases are similar

and some of the same prosecution witnesses

testify in each case." [citations omitted].

This general rule has likewise been reitera-

ted in more recent cases; e.g., United States

v. Drake, 494 F.2d 648, 649 (7th Cir. 1974);

United States v. Carranza, 583 F.2d 25, 28

(lst Cir. 1978). Applying this standard to

the present record, we believe the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in re-

fusing to strike the jurors for cause.

l0a

Loucas' remaining contentions on appeal

are that: the interstate travel involved

was insufficient to sustain the conviction;

testimony about the seizure of the slot ma-

chines was improperly admitted; the trial

should have been continued due to adverse pre-

trial publicity; certain tape recordings and

transcripts were improperly admitted into

evidence; the jury verdicts were inconsistent;

appellant was the victim of selective and

discriminatory prosecution; and the government

failed to rebut the defense of entrapment. A

review of these allegations discloses that

they are unmeritorious.

Upon consideration of all the issues

raised on appeal by Loucas, we find no re-

versible error and affirm the judgment of the

district court.

AFFIRMED.

lla

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

DOCKET NO. 79-0004-E-02

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS.

Defendant:

EMMANUEL "MANNY" LOUCAS

JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/

COMMITMENT ORDER

In the presence of the attorney for the govern-

ment the defendant appeared in person on this

date --- January 22, 1980.

COUNSEL

/ / Without Counsel

However the court advised defendant of

right to counsel and asked whether defendant

desired to have counsel appointed by the

court and the defendant thereupon waived

assistance of counsel.

/ XX/ With Counsel

James F. Companion & John R. Mitchell

(Name of Counsel)

PLEA

/ / Guilty, and the court being satisfied

that there is a factual basis for the plea,

/__/ Nolo Contendere,

/ / Not Guilty

l2a

There being a verdict of : / / Not Guilty.

/XX/ Guilty.

FINDING & JUDGMENT

Defendant has been convicted as charged

of the offense(s) of aiding and abetting

travel in interstate commerce from the State

of Ohio to the State of West Virginia with

the intent to promote, manage, establish,

carry on, facilitate the promotion, manage-

ment, establishment and carrying on of an

illegal gambling enterprise as charged in

Court VI of the indictment, in violation of

Title 18, United States Code, §§2 and

1952 (a) (3).

SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER

The court asked whether defendant had

anything to say why judgment should not be

Pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to

the contrary was shown, or appeared to the

court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty

as charged and convicted and ordered that:

13a

The defendant is hereby committed to the cus-

tody of the Attorney General or his author-

ized representative for imprisonment for a

period of five years, the service of three

of which years is hereby suspended. It was

further

ORDERED that the defendant, after ser-

vice of the sentence of imprisonment im-

posed, be placed on supervised probation for

a period of five years, a special condition

of which is that the defendant engage in a

meaningful community service program to be

Supervised by the probation officer. It was

further

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

ORDERED that the defendant pay a fine in

the amount of $5,000.00. It was further

ORDERED that the bond earlier posted be

continued pending appeal.

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

In addition to the special conditions of

probation imposed above, it is hereby ordered

that the general conditions of probation set

l4a

out on the reverse side of this judgment be

imposed. The Court may change the conditions

of probation, reduce or extend the period of

probation, and at any time during the proba-

tion period or within a maximum probation

period of five years permitted by law, may

issue a warrant and revoke probation for a

violation occurring during the probation

period.

COMMITMENT RECOMMENDATION

The court orders commitment to the custody

of the Attorney General and recommends, that

the period of imprisonment be served in a

minimum security facility.

SIGNED BY: United States District Judge

ROBERT E. MAXWELL

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a

certified copy of this judgment and commit-

ment to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified

officer.

CERTIFIED AS A TRUE COPY ON. U.S. DISTRICT

THIS DATE 2/1/80, BY Helen COURT

L. Stemple, Deputy. oe AT ELKINS,

FEBRUARY 1, 1980

15a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

WEST VIRGINIA

UNITED STATES

Vs.

EMMANUEL "MANNY" LOUCAS,

Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 79-00004-E-02

ORDER

For reasons appearing to the Court, and

in accord with Rule 35(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.,

it is ORDERED that the Judgment and Sen-

tence earlier imposed upon the above-named

defendant be, and the same is hereby,

amended so as to conform with the provisions

of 18 U.S.C. 3651, to wit: that said de-

fendant shall be confined in an appropriate

institution for a period of six months.

It is further ORDERED that all other

provisions, terms and conditions imposed

upon the above-named defendant at the time

l6a

of sentencing are maintained and it is not

intended that the same should be altered,

modified or changed in any particular.

ENTER: February 13th, 1980.

/s/ Robert E. Maxwell

United States District

Judge

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

FILED AT ELKINS, W. VA.

February 13, 1980

I hereby certify that the annexed

instrument is a true and correct copy of the

original on file in my office. Attest:

Thomas F. Stafford, U. S. District Court

Northern District of West Virginia

By /s/ Helen L. Stemple

Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

September 26, 1980

TO: James F. Companion, Esq.

John R. Mitchell, Esq.

Stephen G. Jory, Esq.

William A. Kolibash, Esq.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Judgment was entered in Case No. 80-5010

this date.

The Court's opinion is enclosed.

Petition for Rehearing (FRAP 40)

Filing A petition may be filed within 14

Time

days after judgment. No extensions

will be granted save for the most

compelling reasons. Requests

based on grounds such as miscalcu-

lation of time or a need to consult

with others will be peremptorily

denied.

18a

Purpose

Statement

of

Counsel

A petition should only be made to

direct the Court's attention to one

or more of the following situations:

1. A material fact or law over-

looked in the decision.

2. A change in the law which oc-

curred after the case was submit-

ted and which was overlooked by the

panel.

3. An apparent conflict of another

decision of the Court which is not

addressed in the opinion.

The filing of a petition in order

merely to reargue the case is an

abuse of the privilege.

A petition shall contain an introduc-

tory statement that, in counsel's

judgment, one or more of the

situations exists which is de-

scribed in the "Purpose Section"

discussed above. Thereafter, the

points to be raised, succintly

stated, shall then be listed in

19a

the statement. Lacking such a

statement, the petition will be

returned to counsel without filing.

Form The 15 page limit allowed by the

Rule shall be observed. The Court

requires 15 copies of the petition;

however, a pro se party who is in-

digent may file the original only.

Bill of Costs(FRAP 39)

Filing A party to whom costs are allowed,

Time

who desires taxation of costs, shall

file a bill of costs within 14 days

after judgment.

Mandate (FRAP 41)

Issuance The mandate is issued 21 days after

Time

judgment. A timely petition for

rehearing will stay the issuance.

If the petition is denied, the man-

date will issue 7 days later. If

a stay of mandate is sought, only

the original of a motion need be

filed.

WILLIAM K. SLATE, II

Enclosure CLERK

4CCA 28

Rev. 9/17/79

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 80-5010

United States of America,

Appellee,

versus

Emmanuel "Manny" Loucas,

Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant's

petition for rehearing, by counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for

rehearing is DEWIED.

Entered at the direction of Judge Hall

with the concurrence of Judge Field and

Judge Sprouse.

For the Court,

/s/ William K. Slate, II

FILED Clerk

October 27, 1980

William K. Slate, II

Clerk

2la

(1)

(2)

APPENDIX F

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. §2. Principals

(a) Whoever commits an offense against

the United States or aids, abets,

counsels, commands, induces or pro-

cures its commission, is punishable as

a principal.

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to

be done which if directly performed by

him or another would be an offense

against the United States, is

punishable as a principal.

18 U.S.C. §1952. Interstate and

Foreign Travel or Transportation In

Aid Of Racketeering Enterprises

(a) Whoever travels in interstate or

foreign commerce or uses any facility

in interstate or foreign commerce,

including the mail, with intent to --

(1) distribute the proceeds of

any unlawful activity; or

22a

of

(2) commit any crime of violence

to further any unlawful activity;

or

(3) otherwise promote, manage,

establish, carry on, or facili-

tate the promotion, management,

establishment, or carrying on,

of any unlawful activity,

and thereafter performs or attempts to

perform any of the acts specified in

subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall

be fined not more than $10,000 or im-

prisoned for not more than five years,

or both.

(b) As used in this section "unlawful

activity" means (1) any business enter-

prise involving gambling, liquor on

which the Federal excise tax has

not been paid, narcotics or controlled

substances (as defined in section

102(6) of the Controlled Substances

Act), or prostitution offenses in vi-

Olation of the laws of the State

23a

in which they are committed or of the

United States, or (2) extortion, bri-

bery, or arson in violation of the laws

of the State in which committed or of

the United States.

(c) Investigations of violations under

this section involving liquor shall be

conducted under the supervision of the

Secretary of the Treasury.”

(3) W. Va. Code, §61-10-1. Keeping or

Exhibiting Gaming Table, Machine, or

Device; Penalty; Seizure of Table,

Machine or Devise; Forfeiture of

Money Used in Such Gaming.

Any person who shall keep or exhibit a

gaming table, commonly called A. B. C.

or E. O. table, or faro bank, or keno

table, or any slot machine, multiple

coin console machine, multiple coin

console slot machine or device in the

nature of a slot machine, or any other

gaming table or device of like kind,

24a

a

under any denomination, or which has

no name, whether the game, table, bank,

machine or device be played with cards,

dice or otherwise, or shall be a part-

ner, or concerned in interest, in keep-

ing or exhibiting such table, bank,

machine or gaming device of any char-

acter, shall be guilty of a misde-

meanor, and, upon conviction, shall be

confined in jail not less than two nor

more than twelve months and be fined

not less than one hundred nor more

than one thousand dollars. Any such

table, faro bank, machine or gaming

device, and all money staked or ex-

hibited to allure persons to bet at

such table, or upon such gaming

device, may be seized by order of a

court, or under the warrant of a

justice, and the money so seized shall

be forfeited to the county and paid

into the treasury of the county in

25a

which such seizure is made, and the

table, faro bank, machine or gaming

device shall be completely destroyed:

Provided, however, that the provisions

of this section shall not extend to

coin-operated nonpayout machines with

free play feature or to automatic

weighing, measuring, musical and vend-

ing machines which are so constructed

as to give a certain uniform and fair

return in value or services for each

coin deposited therein and in which

there is no element of chance.

26a

APPENDIX G

INDICTMENT COUNT VI

On or about November 19, 1978, in the

Northern Judicial District of West Virginia,

Silvio "Birdie" Pinciaro, aided and abetted by

Emmanuel "Manny" Loucas, did ‘travel in inter-

state commerce from Jefferson County, State of

Ohio, to New Cumberland, Hancock County, State

of West Virginia, with the intent to promote,

manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate

the promotion, management, establishment and

carrying on of an unlawful activity, said un-

lawful activity being a business enterprise

involving gambling, betting and wagering on

sporting events and numbers and the use of

illegal gaming devices in violation of

Chapter 61, Article 10, Sections 1,5,11, and

lla of the West Virginia Code, and thereafter

did perform and attempt to perform acts to

promote, manage, and carry on and facilitate

the promotion, management and carrying on of

said unlawful activity in violation of Title

18, Section 1952(a)(3), and Title 18,

Section 2, United States Code.

27a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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