Petition — Loucas v. United States
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QEC 19 1980
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
—-—-
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
NO.
EMMANUEL LOUCAS, PETITIONER,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JAMES F. COMPANION
Schrader, Stamp & Recht
816 Central Union
Building
Wheeling, West Virginia
26003
(304) 233-3390
Attorney for
Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ....-.ee0-
LIST OF ALL PARTIES ....... coc cccccccccecs
OPINION BELOW oeeeeneeeneneeneeeneeeneneeeneeneee @#
JURISDICTION ..ccccccsccccveccaccccecceccs
STATUTES
INVOLVED ..cccccrcccccacccccseces
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..ccccvevccccvvvece
ARGUMENT
he
Il.
Iit.
Fourth Circuit and Sixth
Circuit Conflict on Whether
One Can Be Convicted of
Aiding and Abetting Under
the Travel Act Without
Knowledge that the Principal
Travelled in Interstate Commerce
Fourth Circuit's Ruling That
Proof of an Actual Violation
of the Underlying State Statute
in a Travel Act Indictment Is
Not a Necessary Element Dis-
torts the Plain and Literal
Meaning Of the Act ..ccccccceces
The Failure to Recognize
"Implied Bias" of Jurors
Precludes a Defendant from
Being Tried by a Fair and
SUOGEEEOL JULY 6 cece sn cese seeeees
CONCLUSION ........ corer cccccee coccccccce
Appendix
A, Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit Decided
September 26, 1980 ...... coun
12
15
la
Page
Appendix B, District Court's Judgment
and Probation/Commitment
Order Entered February l,
Oe Stéuscedand teehee keeekcas 12a
Appendix C, District Court's Order
Modifying Sentence Entered .
POEUOEY 2235 SFG0 60s 8sece ee l6a
Appendix D, Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Entered September 26,
i Se eee ey ear eee 18a
Appendix E, Order of the United States
Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit Denying
Petition for Rehearing
Entered October 27,
Bee Wk 6 OG wb ee bee cube Ose eas 2la
Appendix F, Statutes Involved .......... 22a
6» a ree 22a
Be WellvGa BAPUS savececusios 22a
W. Va. Code, §61-10-1 ...... 24a
Appendix G, Indictment Count VI ........ 27a
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Caminetti v. United States, 242
ae OTe Bee bia ce enh awe ee 12
Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d
614 (10th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963) .... 14
McIntosh v. United States, 385
Fete 27e Cee GEE. SPOT? sees ta
United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d
Fhe COGN GOlse LITE! sec bvcdovers 7
United States v. Hiatt, 527 F.2d
SUGe tee Gans LOTTO) ese ese wees . Asya
United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272
(2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
2. o ke fe FR | ee) bb) re 11
United States v. LeFaivre, 507
F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
tha: | eee ee ree ee eee 6, 7
United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S.
'. Pe: > ee pepe eS eae 11
United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d
7L (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976) .... 8
United States v. Pomponio, 51l F.2d
vas. (Sen Cis. L975). Gert.
denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975),
rehearing denied, 423 U.S.
FUe NOP TSE 6044806656 O85 Oe 9 0% 10
Cases:
United States v.
— —_——_—
Prince,
F.2d 1108 (6th Cir.
cert. denied, 429 U.S.
(1976)
United States v.
529
1976),
Sellaro,
114 (8th Cir.
denied. 421 U.S. 1013 (1975)
United States v.
630 (Sth Cir. 1971) ..
United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d
Stevens,
1973), cert.
1046 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976)
Statutes:
514 F.2d
444 F.2d
Aiding and Abetting, 18 U.S.C. §2 ..
Travel Act,
W. Va. Code,
18 U.S.C.
§61-10-1
iv
§1952 (a) (3)
14
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1980
No.
EMMANUEL LOUCAS,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Emmanuel Loucas, of Weirton, West Virginia,
respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment and opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
previously entered in this case.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1) Whether one can be convicted of
aiding and abetting under the Travel Act,
7
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (3), without knowledge
that the principal has travelled in inter-
state commerce.
(2) Whether proof of an actual viola-
tion of the underlying state statute named
in a Travel Act indictment is a necessary
element for conviction under the Act, 18 U.
S§. C. § 1952(a) (3).
(3) Whether "implied bias" is a sufficien
reason for striking jurors for cause upon an
appropriate and timely defense motion with-
out a showing of actual bias.
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The caption of the case in this Court con-
tains the names of all parties.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reported at
629 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1980) and appears in
the Appendix hereto at pp. la - lla.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit was entered on September 26,
-2-
1980. A timely petition for rehearing and
Suggestion for rehearing in banc was denied
On October 27, 1980, and this petition for
certiorari was filed within 60 days of the
last-mentioned date. This Court's jurisdic-
tion is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The statutory provisions involved in
this case are as follows:
(1) the federal aiding and abetting
statute, 18 U.S.C. §2;
(2) the federal statute prohibiting
interstate travel in aid of racketeering
enterprises commonly known as the "Travel
Act," 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3);
and
(3) the West Virginia statute relating
to keeping or exhibiting gaming devices,
West Virginia Code, §61-10-1l.
The aforesaid statutes are set out verbatim
in the Appendix hereto at pp. 22a - 26a.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 5, 1979, the petitioner,
Emmanuel Loucas, was indicted in the United
States District Court for the Northern District
of West Virginia for conspiracy to violate
a gambling statute and a bribery statute of
the State of West Virginia and for aiding
and abetting another to travel in inter-
state commerce for the purpose of promoting
activities alleged to violate four dif-
ferent gambling statutes of the State of
West Virginia.1+ Both the conspiracy
count and the aiding and abetting count
related to alleged violations of the Travel
Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3).
After a first-trial hung jury, Loucas
was acquitted in a second trial on October 18,
1979, on the conspiracy charge and was con-
victed on the aiding and abetting count.
On January 22, 1980, the District Court
lhe aiding and abetting count is set
forth verbatim in the Appendix at p. 27a.
sentenced Loucas to serve two years in the
custody of the Attorney General and five years
of supervised probation and to pay a fine of
$5,000.00. (App. 12a-15a). Thereafter, on
February 13, 1980, the District Court re-
duced the confinement portion of the sen-
tence from two years to six months.
(App. 16a-17a).
Loucas filed a timely appeal of his con-
viction in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. On September 26,
1980, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the con-
viction. (App. 18a).
With respect to Loucas' first question
for review presented in this petition, the
Fourth Circuit overlooked the issue or at
least did not specifically address the
knowledge question in its opinion. (App. la-
lla). Therefore, Loucas filed a timely
petition for rehearing and also requested
a hearing in banc because the Fourth Circuit
and the Sixth Circuit are in direct con-
flict on whether knowledge by the aider and
~ =
abetter of his principal's interstate travel
is a necessary element for convicting the
aider and abetter under 18 U.S.C. §1952(a)
ar Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
denied the petition for rehearing on October 27
1980. (App. 2la).
With respect to the other two questions
presented for review in this petition, the
Fourth Circuit held that proof of an actual
violation of the underlying state statute
named in a Travel Act indictment is not a
necessary element for a conviction under the
Act , 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3), and that a
showing of "implied bias" is not a sufficient
reason to strike jurors for cause. (App. 7a-
8a, 10a).
r “The Fourth Circuit has held in United
States v. LeFaivre, 507 F. 2d 1288 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975),
that in a Travel Act case, knowledge by the
aider and abetter that his principal has
travelled in interstate commerce is not
necessary in order to convict the aider and
abetter for violating the Travel Act.
However, the Sixth Circuit, in a more recent
case, United States v. Prince, 529 F. 2d
1108, 1112 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 838 (1976), has taken a completely
contrary view.
ARGUMENT
I.
Fourth Circuit and Sixth Circuit Conflict on
Whether One Can Be Convicted of Aiding and
Abetting Under the Travel Act Without Know-
Ledge that the Principal Travelled in Inter-
state Commerce.
In upholding Loucas' conviction, the Fourth
Circuit, in essence, reaffirmed its holding in
United States v. LeFaivre, supra note 2, that
one can be convicted of aiding and abetting
under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3),
even though the aider and abetter had no
knowledge that the principal has travelled
in interstate commerce. This holding di-
rectly conflicts with the view in the Sixth
Circuit as expressed in United States v.
Prince, supra note 2, where the court stated
as follows:
"An aiding and abetting charge
requires proof of a 'specific
intent to facilitate the commission
of a crime by another.' United
States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d
912, 920 (6th Cir. 1972). In
the absence of proof that (the
defendant) had knowledge of
=Jo
(the principal's) violations of
the Travel Act, (the defendant)
cannot be held for aiding and
abetting (the principal) in the
violation thereof."
Admittedly, the Fourth Circuit's view is
shared by a majority of circuits which have
considered the question;°2 nevertheless,
this petition for writ of certiorari should
be allowed in order to resolve this con-
flict. Where, as here, circuits are divided
Over what constitutes an essential element of
a federal criminal statute, this Court should
resolve that conflict so that the federal
criminal laws are applied uniformly in all
circuits.
366 for example United States v. Peskin,
527 F.zd 71, 78 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Sellaro,
514 F.2d 114, 120-121 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975); and United States
v. Villano ,529 F.2d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
Il.
Fourth Circuit's Ruling That Proof of An Actual
Violation of the Underlying State Statute in a
Travel Act Indictment is Not a
Necessary Element Distorts the Plain
and Literal Meaning of the Act
By holding that proof of the underlying
state violation (in this case, West Virginia
Code, §61-10-1, prohibiting the keeping or
exhibiting of gaming devices) is not a necessary
element in a Travel Act conviction, the Fourth
Circuit is ignoring the plain and literal
wording of 18 U.S.C. §1952 (a)(3) and is saying
that one can violate the Travel Act even with-
out evidence that a state law has been vio-
lated. The operative words of §1952(a) (3)
are as follows:
"Whoever travels in interstate
commerce... with intent to-
promote, manage, establish, carry
on, or facilitate the promoticn,
management, establishment, or
carrying on, of any unlawful
activity... shall be (guilty of
an offense)."
Summarized fairly, this statute makes it a
_—
federal offense to cross state lines for the
purpose of conducting an unlawful activity.
However, the Fourth Circuit, citing its earlier
holding in United States v. Pomponio, 5ll F.
2d 953, 957 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 874 (1975), rehearing denied, 423 U.S.
991 (1975), and the Eighth Circuit case of
McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274, 277
(8th Cir. 1967), would rewrite the statute
by injecting the words "could have" so as to
broaden the statute to include anyone who
travels in interstate commerce and either
conducts an unlawful activity or "could have"
conducted an unlawful activity. The
emphasis on the words "could have" as used
in United States v. Hiatt, 527 F.2dq 1048,
1051 (9th Cir. 1976), is misplaced. At
page 1050 of the Hiatt case, the court said,
"The third argument advanced by
appellant is that to be found
guilty of a violation of the
Travel Act, there must be a
finding that the underlying
activity was in violation of
state law."
After further explaining the argument, the
-10-
court then said at page ]05l,
"Tt is correct that the existence
of a state law violation is an
element of the violation of the
Travel Act and that the court must
make a determination of whether
the underlying state law has been
or could have been violated.
United States v. Kahn, 472 F. 2d
272, 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 982, 93 S.Ct. 2270,
36 L. Ed.2d 958 (1973); see United
States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286,
89 Ss. Ct. 534, 21 L. Ed. 2d 487
(1969)."
Why the Hiatt court used the words "could
have" is a mystery. The cases cited after
those words, Kahn and Nardello, do not even
mention "could have." Thus, it would appear
that the Hiatt court used the words unwittingly
or without special significance. Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit has given them emphasis.
(App. 7a).
It is fundamental and basic law that the
meaning of a statute must, in the first
instance, be sought in the language in which
the act is framed. Where that language is
plain and unambiguous, the courts are not
free to add words which change or extend its
-ll-
intended application. Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916). Thus, this
writ should be allowed in order to clarify
what appears to be the obvious meaning of
18 U.S.C. §1952(a) (3).
IIl.
The Failure to Recognize "Implied Bias" of
Jurors Precludes a Defendant From Being Tried
By a Fair and Impartial Jury.
The Fourth Circuit's refusal to recognize
the "implied bias" theory as a sufficient
reason to excuse jurors for cause is a sub-
stantial denial of the right to be tried by
a fair and impartial jury and is another reason
for allowing this writ.
At the time of Loucas' trial, he was one
of 25 or 26 individuals arrested for gambling
and racketeering violations resulting from a
combined undercover investigation conducted by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, West
Virginia State Police and the Sheriff of
Hancock County, West Virginia. Included among
-12-
those accused were the Prosecuting Attorney of
Hancock County, two other lawyers (one of
which was the petitioner Loucas) and at least
two alleged members of "organized crime." From
the date of the first of several indictments
on February 6, 1979, to the start of Loucas'
trial on October 15, 1979, the counties of
West Virginia from which the jurors were
drawn were literally deluged with television,
radio and newspaper publicity concerning these
Similar and related cases.
By the time of Loucas' second trial,
most of the other indictments had already
been tried. In all of the previous trials,
the government's main witness was the Hancock
County Sheriff, who pretended to be a corrupt
sheriff on the take and testified concerning
his undercover activities. On July 25, 1979,
less than three months before Loucas' retrial,
the trial of Constantine "Gus" Karas concluded
resulting in a guilty verdict. Consistent
with the government's pattern of proof through-
out the several gambling trials, the sheriff
=} 3s
was the leading government witness. “Also,
the two government prosecutors were the same
two Assistant United States Attorneys assigned
to try the Loucas case.
Four of the panel of 28 jurors chosen for
the Loucas trial had served as trial jurors in
the Karas case. Since those jurors recently
sat on a similar "gambling and racketeering"
trial, had the opportunity to hear the testimony
of the sheriff and possibly other identical
witnesses and had the opportunity to observe
the same two government prosecutors, the
defense moved to strike those jurors for cause.
The denial of this motion forced the defense
to use four of its peremptory challenges to
strike these jurors.
Although United States v. Stevens, 444
F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1971), and the dissent
in Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614, 620
(10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845
(1963), support the implied bias rule, the
Fourth Circuit chose to follow the more
traditicnal view that a showing of actual
-14-
partiality is required before a juror need be
discharged for cause. However, the actual
bias requirement places a nearly impossible
burden on a defendant especially where jurors
are too timid or unwilling to reveal their
actual prejudices in response to voir dire.
By allowing this writ, this Court can rectify
a substantial denial of the right of fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, a writ of
certiorari should issue to review the judgment
and opinion of the Fourth Circuit.
Respectfully Submitted,
JAMES F. COMPANION
Schrader, Stamp & Recht
816 Central Union Building
Wheeling, West Virginia
26003
Attorney for Petitioner
December 19, 1980,
~1$—
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
NO. 80-5010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
Vv.
EMMANUEL "MANNY" LOUCAS,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia,
at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Chief District
Judge.
Argued: August 15, 1980
Decided: September 26, 1980
Before FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge; HALL and
SPROUSE, Circuit Judges.
James F. Companion (Schrader, Stamp & Recht;
John R. Mitchell on brief) for Appellant;
William A. Kolibash, Assistant United States
Attorney (Stephen G. Jory, United States
Attorney on brief) for Appellee.
la
HALL, Circuit Judge:
Emmanuel "Manny" Loucas, a West Virginia
attorney, appeals from his conviction under
the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a), for aid-
ing and abetting Silvio "Birdie" Pinciaro, an
Ohio resident and client who had travelled in
interstate commerce for the purpose of pro-
moting various illegal gambling activities in
Hancock County, West Virginia. Pinciaro,
Loucas, and Richard Tingler!/ were named in a
superseding, six-count indictment which was
returned by a federal grand jury on April 5,
1979. The indictment charged Pinciaro with
Six violations of the Travel Act for various
transactions involving bribery and gambling.
Loucas was named in two counts of the indict-
ment: Count I alleged his participation in a
conspiracy involving interstate commerce to
commit bribery and to promote illegal gambling
1/No further reference will be made re-
garding defendant Tingler since his role in
the illegal conduct is not material to the
issues raised in this appeal.
2a
activities; Count VI alleged that he aided
and abetted Pinciaro in promoting various
gambling enterprises which also involved inter-
state travel.
Pinciaro and Loucas were tried jointly
before a jury in May 1979. The jury found
Pinciaro guilty on all six counts but could
not reach a verdict as to Loucas. A mistrial
was declared and Loucas was again tried in
October 1979. His retrial resulted in a
judgment of acquittal as to Count I and a
guilty verdict for Count VI. Loucas received
a sentence of five years' imprisonment, which
was ultimately reduced to six months, five
years of supervised probation, and a fine of
$5,000. After the district court denied his
post-trial motions, Loucas appealed on the
basis of numerous assignments of error.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm his
conviction.
Although Loucas raises several issues on
appeal, only two merit discussion: (1)
whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain
3a
the conviction, and (2) whether the disctict
court erred by not striking four jurors for
cause. Appellant's initial assignment of
error is that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction. Although the adequacy
of the evidence is challenged on several
grounds, counsel's main argument is that no
evidence was presented at trial to show that
the retrieval of certain slot machines seized
in a raid at Pinciaro's place of business was
connected to any illegal gambling activity.
Count VI of the indictment alleged viola-
tions of four state statutes dealing with
illegal gambling activities. ?/ Of these four,
counsel asserts that the prosecution only
produced evidence connecting Loucas to aiding
and abetting Pinciaro in a possible violation
2/tThe statutes under which Loucas was
charged with aiding and abetting Pinciaro were
West Virginia Code §61-10-1 (keeping or
exhibiting a gaming machine or device),
§61-10-5 (betting on games of chance), §61-10-11
(conducting lotteries or raffles), and §61-10-lla
(conducting "policy" or "numbers" operations).
4a
of West Virginia Code §61-10-1, illegal posses-
sion of gambling machines. This evidence con-
Sisted chiefly of the sheriff's testimony that
Loucas offered bribes of $2,000 each to the
prosecuting attorney and himself in exchange
for the return of Pinciaro's slot machines
which had been seized in the aforesaid raid.
The tape recordings of three discussions in-
volving the alleged bribery scheme were also
introduced into evidence to corroborate the
sheriff's story.
Counsel for Loucas argues that a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has held that the mere possession
of slot machines is not per se illegal.
State v. 25 Slot Machines, 256 S.E. 2d 595
(W. Va. 1979). Thus, the fact that Loucas,
through alleged acts of bribery, may have aid-
ed and abetted Pinciaro in recovering and pos-
sessing slot machines does not establish an
underlying violation of state law which would
Support a conviction under the Travel Act.
The government maintains that it need not
prove an actual violation of a specific state
5a
statute, but only an attempt to engage in
activity which is illegal under state law.
Thus, while Pinciaro may not have violated
any West Virginia statute by merely posses-
Sing slot machines, there was allegedly over-
whelming evidence that these gambling devices
were acquired in furtherance of his illegal
gambling operations.
The Travel Act is aimed primarily at organ-
ized crime and particularly at persons who re-
side in one state while operating or managing
illegal activities located in another state.
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
The use of interstate commerce to violate or
attempt to violate a state statute constitutes
a federal crime, and the underlying state law
merely serves a definitional purpose in charac-
terizing the proscribed conduct. United States
v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1051
(Sth Cir. 1975); United States v. Polizzi, 500
F.2d 856, 869 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Goldfarb, 464 F. Supp. 565, 574 (E.D. Mich.
1979).
6a
It is generally recognized that "the
existence of a state law violation is an ele-
ment of the violation of the Travel Act and
that the court must make a determination of
whether the underlying state law has been or
could have been violated" United States Ve
Hiatt, 527 F.2d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis added) [citations omitted]. Thus,
"accomplishment of the State substantive
offense is not a prerequisite to a Section
1952 conviction." McIntosh v. United States,
385 F.2d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1967) [citations
/
omitted).° Following this line of cases, our
circuit has held that
[t]he ‘unlawful activity' specified
in the [Travel] Act may be [an
offense] under either state or federal
law and reference to such law is
necessary only to identify the type
od In this regard, the McIntosh court
adopted the reasoning in United States v.
Azar, 243 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mich. 1964),
that "[iJt is not required that the travel be
in itself a criminal act, nor that the subse-
quent act be itself, unlawful, if it does in
truth facilitate the carrying on [of unlawful
activity]." Azar at 350. Accord, United
States v. Teemer, 214 F. Supp. 952, 957
(N.D. W. Va. 1963).
7a
of ‘unlawful activity' in
which the defendants intended
to engage. Proof that the un-
lawful objective was accom-
plished or that the referenced
law has actually been violated
is not a necessary element of
the offense defined in section
1952.
United States v. Pomponio, 511 F2d 953, 957
(4th Cir. 1975), citing McIntosh v. United
States, supra. In light of such authority,
the contention by Loucas that he could be
convicted only if Pinciaro's mere posses-
sion of slot machines were illegal is un-
tenable. Since the government introduced a
large amount of evidence concerning Pinciaro's
intent to dominate the gambling activities
in Hancock County, a rational trier of fact
could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
Loucas' conduct in effectuating the return
of the slot machines did aid and abet Pin-
Ciaro in promoting or attempting to promote
various gambling activities. Thus, adequate
evidence did exist to support Loucas' con-
viction.
Appellant's second issue involves the
ga
refusal of the district judge to strike four
jurors for cause because they had sat on an
earlier panel which heard a gambling case.
Loucas contends that when the defense moves to
strike jurors for cause because they have sat
on prior similar cases, the trial court must
grant the motion. United States v. Stevens,
444 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1971). This departure
from the normal requirement that actual bias
be demonstrated before removing jurors for
cause is founded on the "implied bias" theory
of the dissent in Casias v. United States,
315 F.2d 614, 620 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 845 (1963):
There is nothing new or novel in
the concept of implied bias or
disqualification based on consid-
eration of policy. It is not
uncommon for the law to say that
one occupying a status or relation-
ship which raises a suspicion of
bias or prejudice shall not be
called into the jury box, and if
called, shall be excused for cause.
Counsel argues that the failure to strike
the four jurors for cause was a substantial
error which entitles Loucas to a new trial.
The government asserts that the compe-
9a
tency of the jurors sitting in a particular
case is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court. Blevins v. United States, 12 F.
2g 548 (4th Cir. 1926). This approach is up-
held by the generally accepted principle as
set forth in Government of Virgin Islands v.
Williams, 476 F.2d 771, 773 (3rd Cir. 1973),
where the court stated that "[t]he federal
courts have uniformly held that, absent some
evidence of actual partiality, a juror is not
disqualified merely because he previously sat
in a similar case arising out of a separate
and distinct set of circumstances even though
the offenses charged in the cases are similar
and some of the same prosecution witnesses
testify in each case." [citations omitted].
This general rule has likewise been reitera-
ted in more recent cases; e.g., United States
v. Drake, 494 F.2d 648, 649 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Carranza, 583 F.2d 25, 28
(lst Cir. 1978). Applying this standard to
the present record, we believe the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to strike the jurors for cause.
l0a
Loucas' remaining contentions on appeal
are that: the interstate travel involved
was insufficient to sustain the conviction;
testimony about the seizure of the slot ma-
chines was improperly admitted; the trial
should have been continued due to adverse pre-
trial publicity; certain tape recordings and
transcripts were improperly admitted into
evidence; the jury verdicts were inconsistent;
appellant was the victim of selective and
discriminatory prosecution; and the government
failed to rebut the defense of entrapment. A
review of these allegations discloses that
they are unmeritorious.
Upon consideration of all the issues
raised on appeal by Loucas, we find no re-
versible error and affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.
lla
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
DOCKET NO. 79-0004-E-02
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS.
Defendant:
EMMANUEL "MANNY" LOUCAS
JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/
COMMITMENT ORDER
In the presence of the attorney for the govern-
ment the defendant appeared in person on this
date --- January 22, 1980.
COUNSEL
/ / Without Counsel
However the court advised defendant of
right to counsel and asked whether defendant
desired to have counsel appointed by the
court and the defendant thereupon waived
assistance of counsel.
/ XX/ With Counsel
James F. Companion & John R. Mitchell
(Name of Counsel)
PLEA
/ / Guilty, and the court being satisfied
that there is a factual basis for the plea,
/__/ Nolo Contendere,
/ / Not Guilty
l2a
There being a verdict of : / / Not Guilty.
/XX/ Guilty.
FINDING & JUDGMENT
Defendant has been convicted as charged
of the offense(s) of aiding and abetting
travel in interstate commerce from the State
of Ohio to the State of West Virginia with
the intent to promote, manage, establish,
carry on, facilitate the promotion, manage-
ment, establishment and carrying on of an
illegal gambling enterprise as charged in
Court VI of the indictment, in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, §§2 and
1952 (a) (3).
SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER
The court asked whether defendant had
anything to say why judgment should not be
Pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to
the contrary was shown, or appeared to the
court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty
as charged and convicted and ordered that:
13a
The defendant is hereby committed to the cus-
tody of the Attorney General or his author-
ized representative for imprisonment for a
period of five years, the service of three
of which years is hereby suspended. It was
further
ORDERED that the defendant, after ser-
vice of the sentence of imprisonment im-
posed, be placed on supervised probation for
a period of five years, a special condition
of which is that the defendant engage in a
meaningful community service program to be
Supervised by the probation officer. It was
further
SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
ORDERED that the defendant pay a fine in
the amount of $5,000.00. It was further
ORDERED that the bond earlier posted be
continued pending appeal.
ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
In addition to the special conditions of
probation imposed above, it is hereby ordered
that the general conditions of probation set
l4a
out on the reverse side of this judgment be
imposed. The Court may change the conditions
of probation, reduce or extend the period of
probation, and at any time during the proba-
tion period or within a maximum probation
period of five years permitted by law, may
issue a warrant and revoke probation for a
violation occurring during the probation
period.
COMMITMENT RECOMMENDATION
The court orders commitment to the custody
of the Attorney General and recommends, that
the period of imprisonment be served in a
minimum security facility.
SIGNED BY: United States District Judge
ROBERT E. MAXWELL
It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a
certified copy of this judgment and commit-
ment to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified
officer.
CERTIFIED AS A TRUE COPY ON. U.S. DISTRICT
THIS DATE 2/1/80, BY Helen COURT
L. Stemple, Deputy. oe AT ELKINS,
FEBRUARY 1, 1980
15a
APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
WEST VIRGINIA
UNITED STATES
Vs.
EMMANUEL "MANNY" LOUCAS,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 79-00004-E-02
ORDER
For reasons appearing to the Court, and
in accord with Rule 35(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.,
it is ORDERED that the Judgment and Sen-
tence earlier imposed upon the above-named
defendant be, and the same is hereby,
amended so as to conform with the provisions
of 18 U.S.C. 3651, to wit: that said de-
fendant shall be confined in an appropriate
institution for a period of six months.
It is further ORDERED that all other
provisions, terms and conditions imposed
upon the above-named defendant at the time
l6a
of sentencing are maintained and it is not
intended that the same should be altered,
modified or changed in any particular.
ENTER: February 13th, 1980.
/s/ Robert E. Maxwell
United States District
Judge
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
FILED AT ELKINS, W. VA.
February 13, 1980
I hereby certify that the annexed
instrument is a true and correct copy of the
original on file in my office. Attest:
Thomas F. Stafford, U. S. District Court
Northern District of West Virginia
By /s/ Helen L. Stemple
Deputy Clerk
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
September 26, 1980
TO: James F. Companion, Esq.
John R. Mitchell, Esq.
Stephen G. Jory, Esq.
William A. Kolibash, Esq.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Judgment was entered in Case No. 80-5010
this date.
The Court's opinion is enclosed.
Petition for Rehearing (FRAP 40)
Filing A petition may be filed within 14
Time
days after judgment. No extensions
will be granted save for the most
compelling reasons. Requests
based on grounds such as miscalcu-
lation of time or a need to consult
with others will be peremptorily
denied.
18a
Purpose
Statement
of
Counsel
A petition should only be made to
direct the Court's attention to one
or more of the following situations:
1. A material fact or law over-
looked in the decision.
2. A change in the law which oc-
curred after the case was submit-
ted and which was overlooked by the
panel.
3. An apparent conflict of another
decision of the Court which is not
addressed in the opinion.
The filing of a petition in order
merely to reargue the case is an
abuse of the privilege.
A petition shall contain an introduc-
tory statement that, in counsel's
judgment, one or more of the
situations exists which is de-
scribed in the "Purpose Section"
discussed above. Thereafter, the
points to be raised, succintly
stated, shall then be listed in
19a
the statement. Lacking such a
statement, the petition will be
returned to counsel without filing.
Form The 15 page limit allowed by the
Rule shall be observed. The Court
requires 15 copies of the petition;
however, a pro se party who is in-
digent may file the original only.
Bill of Costs(FRAP 39)
Filing A party to whom costs are allowed,
Time
who desires taxation of costs, shall
file a bill of costs within 14 days
after judgment.
Mandate (FRAP 41)
Issuance The mandate is issued 21 days after
Time
judgment. A timely petition for
rehearing will stay the issuance.
If the petition is denied, the man-
date will issue 7 days later. If
a stay of mandate is sought, only
the original of a motion need be
filed.
WILLIAM K. SLATE, II
Enclosure CLERK
4CCA 28
Rev. 9/17/79
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 80-5010
United States of America,
Appellee,
versus
Emmanuel "Manny" Loucas,
Appellant.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the appellant's
petition for rehearing, by counsel,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for
rehearing is DEWIED.
Entered at the direction of Judge Hall
with the concurrence of Judge Field and
Judge Sprouse.
For the Court,
/s/ William K. Slate, II
FILED Clerk
October 27, 1980
William K. Slate, II
Clerk
2la
(1)
(2)
APPENDIX F
STATUTES INVOLVED
18 U.S.C. §2. Principals
(a) Whoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or pro-
cures its commission, is punishable as
a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to
be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is
punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. §1952. Interstate and
Foreign Travel or Transportation In
Aid Of Racketeering Enterprises
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or
foreign commerce or uses any facility
in interstate or foreign commerce,
including the mail, with intent to --
(1) distribute the proceeds of
any unlawful activity; or
22a
of
(2) commit any crime of violence
to further any unlawful activity;
or
(3) otherwise promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facili-
tate the promotion, management,
establishment, or carrying on,
of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to
perform any of the acts specified in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned for not more than five years,
or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful
activity" means (1) any business enter-
prise involving gambling, liquor on
which the Federal excise tax has
not been paid, narcotics or controlled
substances (as defined in section
102(6) of the Controlled Substances
Act), or prostitution offenses in vi-
Olation of the laws of the State
23a
in which they are committed or of the
United States, or (2) extortion, bri-
bery, or arson in violation of the laws
of the State in which committed or of
the United States.
(c) Investigations of violations under
this section involving liquor shall be
conducted under the supervision of the
Secretary of the Treasury.”
(3) W. Va. Code, §61-10-1. Keeping or
Exhibiting Gaming Table, Machine, or
Device; Penalty; Seizure of Table,
Machine or Devise; Forfeiture of
Money Used in Such Gaming.
Any person who shall keep or exhibit a
gaming table, commonly called A. B. C.
or E. O. table, or faro bank, or keno
table, or any slot machine, multiple
coin console machine, multiple coin
console slot machine or device in the
nature of a slot machine, or any other
gaming table or device of like kind,
24a
a
under any denomination, or which has
no name, whether the game, table, bank,
machine or device be played with cards,
dice or otherwise, or shall be a part-
ner, or concerned in interest, in keep-
ing or exhibiting such table, bank,
machine or gaming device of any char-
acter, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, upon conviction, shall be
confined in jail not less than two nor
more than twelve months and be fined
not less than one hundred nor more
than one thousand dollars. Any such
table, faro bank, machine or gaming
device, and all money staked or ex-
hibited to allure persons to bet at
such table, or upon such gaming
device, may be seized by order of a
court, or under the warrant of a
justice, and the money so seized shall
be forfeited to the county and paid
into the treasury of the county in
25a
which such seizure is made, and the
table, faro bank, machine or gaming
device shall be completely destroyed:
Provided, however, that the provisions
of this section shall not extend to
coin-operated nonpayout machines with
free play feature or to automatic
weighing, measuring, musical and vend-
ing machines which are so constructed
as to give a certain uniform and fair
return in value or services for each
coin deposited therein and in which
there is no element of chance.
26a
APPENDIX G
INDICTMENT COUNT VI
On or about November 19, 1978, in the
Northern Judicial District of West Virginia,
Silvio "Birdie" Pinciaro, aided and abetted by
Emmanuel "Manny" Loucas, did ‘travel in inter-
state commerce from Jefferson County, State of
Ohio, to New Cumberland, Hancock County, State
of West Virginia, with the intent to promote,
manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment and
carrying on of an unlawful activity, said un-
lawful activity being a business enterprise
involving gambling, betting and wagering on
sporting events and numbers and the use of
illegal gaming devices in violation of
Chapter 61, Article 10, Sections 1,5,11, and
lla of the West Virginia Code, and thereafter
did perform and attempt to perform acts to
promote, manage, and carry on and facilitate
the promotion, management and carrying on of
said unlawful activity in violation of Title
18, Section 1952(a)(3), and Title 18,
Section 2, United States Code.
27a
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.