Opposition — Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Lewis

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No, 80-938

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1980

BURBANK ANTI-NOISE GROUP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v,

ANDREW L, Lewis, JR., SECRETARY OF

TRANSPORTATION, ET AL,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

Wapbe H. McCres, Jr.

Solicitor General

ANTHONY C, LIOTTA

Acting Assistant Attorney General

PeTer R, STEENLAND, JR,

Ropert L, KLARQUIST

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

| (202) 633-2217

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-938

BURBANK ANTI-NoIse GROUP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

ANDREW L. Lewis, Jr., SECRETARY OF

TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals’ affirmance of the district

court's judgment was correct where the district court had

held, as to an environmental impact statement ( EIS) pre-

pared by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) con-

cerning its decision to provide federal financing for the

purchase of an existing commercial airport by local juris-

dictions, that even assuming that the EIS was required by

law, summary judgment should be entered in favor of the

defendants because the EIS met all applicable requirements.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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| rrr rr eerste ots tren ore eee 5

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Burbank Anti-Noise Group, et al. v. City of

Burbank, et al., No. C-207043 (Los Angeles

Super, CA. (ec. ZB, 1FTT)) ow ccisccvccevesess 4

Cady ¥. Morton, S27 F. 24 766 wccccccivcsivcs 6

Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United

RE OO FO cos OURO Rw UREO Sse cecbaar 6

County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior,

562 F. 2d 1368, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 .... 6

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of

Engineers, U.S. Army, 470 F. 2d 289,

ee eR ee 6

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman,

Pe ee ED Ain oks Goa boa es 605 baR Re em 5, 6

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.

Cpe a5 SY rE OED Pee Urey rene ee sr 6

Statutes:

Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,

Ata TOE PO Sider ksi doe weetis Rens I

Section 16(c)(4), 49 U.S.C. 1716(c)(4) ....... 3

Ill

PREVIOUS PAGE WAS BLANK |

IV

Page

Statutes—Continued:

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,

er ENE. 4s o's be eh So sane 0 600s 063 4

California Environmental Quality Act,

Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq. |

CAGE Gs ES TOD oes cc cbc cc cessenves’s 2

ee, SONS GE TLE vc theese sadeeenede nes 2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. C) is

reported at 623 F. 2d 115. The oral opinion of the district

court (Pet. App. B) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July

14, 1980. A petition for rehearing was denied on September

8, 1980 (Pet. App. D). The petition for a writ of certiorari

was filed on December 5, 1980. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Hollywood-Burbank Airport, located in Burbank,

California, was established in 1930 as a privately owned

commercial airport serving the greater Los Angeles metro-

politan area. The Lockheed Corporation purchased the

airport in 1940. By 1973, when Lockheed decided not to

continue operating the facility, Hollywood-Burbank Air-

port was the only privately owned major commercial air

terminal in the United States.

Upon learning of Lockheed’s decision to cease operating

the airport, the City of Burbank and other adjacent com-

munities notified Lockheed of their interest in purchasing

the airport and maintaining its use as a commercial air

terminal. In 1973, pursuant to the Airport and Airway

Deve'opment Act of 1970 (AADA), 49 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.,

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made a grant

to Burbank to finance a portion of the cost of a master

planning study to determine whether public acquisition of

the airport would be feasible and whether the airport should

continue to exist as a public air transportation facility. The

ensuing master plan report, which was the subject of public

hearings, indicated that public acquisition of the airport

and its continued use as a terminal were feasible.

2

As work on the master plan report progressed, the FAA

requested that an Environmental Impact Assessment

Report (EIAR) be prepared before it considered an applica-

tion for airport funding under AADA. At the same time, in

accordance with the procedures and requirements of the

California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res.

Code § 21000 et seg. (West Cum. Supp. 1980), the Burbank

City Council elected to prepare a draft Environmental

Impact Report (Draft EIR) and a final Environmental

Impact Report (Final EIR). In light of the similar state and

federal environmental statutes, local government and fed-

eral officials made a policy determination that the most

expeditious and economical course would be to prepare a

combined EIAR/ Draft EIR. A private environmental con-

sulting firm was selected to oversee preparation of the com-

bined EIAR/ Draft EIR.

In September 1976, the State of California enacted legis-

lation authorizing the creation of the Hollywood-Burbank

Airport Authority (HBAA) and the issuance by it of

revenue bonds to finance the airport acquisition. Cal. Gov't

Code § 6545.1. That statute also provided in relevant part:

In operating the airport, the separate public entity

above mentioned shall not permit or authorize any

activity in conjunction with the airport which results in

an increase of the size of the noise impact area based on

a community noise equivalent level of 70 decibels as

established pursuant to Title [21], California Adminis-

trative Code, Chapter 9, Subchapter 6, and shall

further comply with the future community noise equi-

valent levels prescribed by such title as it now exists or

is hereafter amended.

The EIAR/Draft EIR was completed in early 1977.

Shortly thereafter, the City of Burbank issued a public

notice of the completion of the document and held a two-

3

day public hearing concerning the proposed airport acquisi-

tion. Following completion of the public hearings and cir-

culation of the EIAR/ Draft EIR at state, regional, and

local levels, all comments collected were considered in the

preparation of a revised ELAR/ EIR bythe FAA, the City of

Burbank, and the private consulting firm. This document,

together with oral and written comments received on the

draft, became the final EIR and the draft environmental

impact statement (“Draft EIS”).

In June 1977, the City Councils of Burbank, Glendale,

and Pasadena entered an agreement creating the HBAA.

The agreement explicitly limited the authority of the HBAA

so that it could not authorize any aircraft operations that

would result in an increase in adverse noise effects above the

present levels.

The FAA thereafter circulated the Draft EIS among

federal, state, and local agencies and among interested per-

sons. The FAA received comments on the Draft EIS, which

it analyzed and considered. Following an evaluation,

responses to the comments were prepared, and the com-

ments and analyses were incorporated in a summary

volume of the EIS. The summary volume, along with the

Draft EIS, became the Final EIS.

After completing its evaluation, the FAA recommended

to the Secretary of Transportation that federal financial

assistance in the amount of approximately $35.5 million be

provided to help the HBAA acquire the airport. The FAA

recommendation stated that the proposed action included

“airport location approval” pursuant to the AADA.! In

'Section 16(c)(4) of the AADA, 49 U.S.C. 1716(c)(4), establishes a

national policy that airport development projects authorized pursuant

to the AADA shall provide for the protection and enhancement of the

natural resources and the quality of the environment of the Nation.

That provision requires the Secretary of Transportation to consult with

the Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human Services “with

4

addition, the FAA recommended, as a condition of the

funding, that the HBAA agree to operate the airport in such

_ a manner as to produce no increase in noise impacts. The

Secretary approved the FAA’s recommendation on October

4, 1977. On June 29, 1978, the HBAA purchased the airport

from Lockheed with the aid of the FAA grant.

2. This action was filed in federal district court by six

homeowners’ associations against the FAA and other fed-

eral defendants on October 17, 1977.2 Primarily, the plain-

tiffs alleged that the EIS that had been prepared regarding

funding of the transfer of ownership of the airport did not

comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of

1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The State of Califor-

nia, the HBAA, and Lockheed each intervened in the action

as defendants.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of

the defendants on May 9, 1978 (Pet. App. A-1 to A-2). In

the accompanying oral opinion, the district court held, inter

alia, that no EIS was required by NEPA because the use of

the airport following the conveyance would be identical to

regard to the effect that any project involving airport loc..ion, a major

runway extension, or runway location may have on natural resources

** * The Secretary may not authorize any project under the AADA

found to have an adverse effect unless he first renders a written finding

“that no feasible and prudent alternative exists and that all possible

steps have been taken to minimize such adverse effect.” Such a written

finding was made by the Secretary concerning the project at issue.

2The plaintiffs had previously filed an action in state court challeng-

ing the adequacy of the EIR under the California Environmental Qual-

ity Act. Burbank Anti- Noise Group, et al.v. City of Burbank, et al., No.

C-207043 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.). In addition to the City of Burbank,

the Cities of Giendale and Pasadena and the HBAA were named as

defendants. The State of California and Lockheed intervened as

defendants. The state court granted judgment in favor of the defendants

on December 28, 1977, finding that no EIR need have been prepared

and, alternatively, that the EIR which had been prepared was adequate.

The plaintiffs’ appeal from that decision was dismissed.

5

its prior use; hence, the transfer in ownership would have no

significant environmental impacts (Pet. App. B-8 to B-17).

In the alternative, the district court held that the EIS filed

by the FAA was adequate, assuming that one was required

by NEPA (Pet. App. B-18 to B-35).

The court of appeals affirmed on July 14, 1980 (Pet. App.

C-1 to C-10). The court of appeals held, among other

things, that NEPA does not require a federal agency to file

an EIS when the proposed federal action will effect no

change in the status quo. The court of appeals did not reach

the district court’s alternative holding that the EIS was

adequate, assuming that one was required by law.

ARGUMENT

As noted above, the FAA in fact prepared an EIS in

connection with the funding of the Hollywood-Burbank

Airport. Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in

holding that the FAA was not required by NEPA to do so,

its judgment upholding the district court’s grant of sum-

mary judgment in favor of defendants is correct and pre-

sents no conflict with any decision of this Court or of

another court of appeals. Accordingly the decision does not

warrant review by this Court.

The final EIS filed by the FAA fully complies with the

requirements of NEPA, as the district court found (Pet.

App. B-19 to B-34). The preparation of the Final EIS

satisfied all procedural requirements of NEPA and it fully

‘discusses the environmental issues associated with the air-

port’s operations, including the noise impacts on the sur-

rounding communities. Much of petitioners’ argument in

the district court was devoted to their contention that the

EIS had employed an invalid methodology for measuring

noise impact; but as the district court found (id. at B-25),

petitioners demonstrated only that there was a disagree-

=

6

ment among experts over which methodology was the best.

Evidence of a disagreement among experts, however, does

not warrant invalidating an EIS. Environmental Defense

Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F. 2d 1060, 1069-1070 (8th Cir.

1977); Cady v. Morton, 527 F. 2d 786, 796 (9th Cir. 1975).

As the Second Circuit stated in County of Suffolk v. Secre-

tary of the Interior, 562 F. 2d 1368, 1383 (1977), cert.

denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978): “The district court does not sit

as a super-agency empowered to substitute its scientific

expertise or testimony presented to it de novo for the evi-

dence received and considered by the agency which pre-

pared the EIS.”

Petitioners also assert (Pet. 8) that the Final EIS is a

partisan rationalization of a mind made up in advance.

However, while the agency which prepares the EIS must act

in good faith, it need not be subjectively impartial, and a

party charging bad faith must establish its allegations by the

record. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United

States, 510 F. 2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 470

F. 2d 289, 295-296 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.

931 (1973). Petitioners failed to substantiate their charge

that the FAA failed to give objective consideration to the

3As petitioners note (Pet. 23-25), they sought to introduce additional

evidence on the factual question‘of noise impact at the rehearing stage in

the court of appeals. Petitioners cite this in connection with their

contention that the court of appeals improperly found that there had

been no major federal action with significant impact on the environ-

ment. We note here that whatever the validity of this evidence (the

characterization by a congressman of the significance of certain FAA

data for periods following the preparation of the Final EIS), it is

irrelevant to the question whether the EIS was adequate, since the EIS

must be judged in light of the circumstances existing at the time it was

prepared. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 554-555 (1978). In any event, such

a fact-bound question is not appropriate for review by this Court.

7

relevant environmental considerations. Indeed, petitioners

apparently agree that the Final EIS fully discloses the

environmental effects of the airport operations, for they

state (Pet. 18): “What the Secretary did—based on the

EIS—was to approve the location of an airport which has

the environmental impacts shown by the EIS” (emphasis

added).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. McCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

ANTHONY C. LIOTTA

Acting Assistant Attorney General

PETER R. STEENLAND, JR.

ROBERT L. KLARQUIST

Attorneys

FEBRUARY 1981

DOJ-1961-02

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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