Opposition — Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Lewis
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No, 80-938
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1980
BURBANK ANTI-NOISE GROUP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v,
ANDREW L, Lewis, JR., SECRETARY OF
TRANSPORTATION, ET AL,
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION
Wapbe H. McCres, Jr.
Solicitor General
ANTHONY C, LIOTTA
Acting Assistant Attorney General
PeTer R, STEENLAND, JR,
Ropert L, KLARQUIST
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
| (202) 633-2217
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
No. 80-938
BURBANK ANTI-NoIse GROUP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
ANDREW L. Lewis, Jr., SECRETARY OF
TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals’ affirmance of the district
court's judgment was correct where the district court had
held, as to an environmental impact statement ( EIS) pre-
pared by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) con-
cerning its decision to provide federal financing for the
purchase of an existing commercial airport by local juris-
dictions, that even assuming that the EIS was required by
law, summary judgment should be entered in favor of the
defendants because the EIS met all applicable requirements.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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Re re ‘Viviinathe eee rho Ganes l
RA ee E eee yee eC Lea ene ty eer te I
| rrr rr eerste ots tren ore eee 5
ED Gora hie hae e eee CHEM SE view nes eed PUN oes 7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Burbank Anti-Noise Group, et al. v. City of
Burbank, et al., No. C-207043 (Los Angeles
Super, CA. (ec. ZB, 1FTT)) ow ccisccvccevesess 4
Cady ¥. Morton, S27 F. 24 766 wccccccivcsivcs 6
Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United
RE OO FO cos OURO Rw UREO Sse cecbaar 6
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior,
562 F. 2d 1368, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 .... 6
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers, U.S. Army, 470 F. 2d 289,
ee eR ee 6
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman,
Pe ee ED Ain oks Goa boa es 605 baR Re em 5, 6
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
Cpe a5 SY rE OED Pee Urey rene ee sr 6
Statutes:
Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,
Ata TOE PO Sider ksi doe weetis Rens I
Section 16(c)(4), 49 U.S.C. 1716(c)(4) ....... 3
Ill
PREVIOUS PAGE WAS BLANK |
IV
Page
Statutes—Continued:
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
er ENE. 4s o's be eh So sane 0 600s 063 4
California Environmental Quality Act,
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq. |
CAGE Gs ES TOD oes cc cbc cc cessenves’s 2
ee, SONS GE TLE vc theese sadeeenede nes 2
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. C) is
reported at 623 F. 2d 115. The oral opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. B) is not reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July
14, 1980. A petition for rehearing was denied on September
8, 1980 (Pet. App. D). The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on December 5, 1980. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. Hollywood-Burbank Airport, located in Burbank,
California, was established in 1930 as a privately owned
commercial airport serving the greater Los Angeles metro-
politan area. The Lockheed Corporation purchased the
airport in 1940. By 1973, when Lockheed decided not to
continue operating the facility, Hollywood-Burbank Air-
port was the only privately owned major commercial air
terminal in the United States.
Upon learning of Lockheed’s decision to cease operating
the airport, the City of Burbank and other adjacent com-
munities notified Lockheed of their interest in purchasing
the airport and maintaining its use as a commercial air
terminal. In 1973, pursuant to the Airport and Airway
Deve'opment Act of 1970 (AADA), 49 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made a grant
to Burbank to finance a portion of the cost of a master
planning study to determine whether public acquisition of
the airport would be feasible and whether the airport should
continue to exist as a public air transportation facility. The
ensuing master plan report, which was the subject of public
hearings, indicated that public acquisition of the airport
and its continued use as a terminal were feasible.
2
As work on the master plan report progressed, the FAA
requested that an Environmental Impact Assessment
Report (EIAR) be prepared before it considered an applica-
tion for airport funding under AADA. At the same time, in
accordance with the procedures and requirements of the
California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res.
Code § 21000 et seg. (West Cum. Supp. 1980), the Burbank
City Council elected to prepare a draft Environmental
Impact Report (Draft EIR) and a final Environmental
Impact Report (Final EIR). In light of the similar state and
federal environmental statutes, local government and fed-
eral officials made a policy determination that the most
expeditious and economical course would be to prepare a
combined EIAR/ Draft EIR. A private environmental con-
sulting firm was selected to oversee preparation of the com-
bined EIAR/ Draft EIR.
In September 1976, the State of California enacted legis-
lation authorizing the creation of the Hollywood-Burbank
Airport Authority (HBAA) and the issuance by it of
revenue bonds to finance the airport acquisition. Cal. Gov't
Code § 6545.1. That statute also provided in relevant part:
In operating the airport, the separate public entity
above mentioned shall not permit or authorize any
activity in conjunction with the airport which results in
an increase of the size of the noise impact area based on
a community noise equivalent level of 70 decibels as
established pursuant to Title [21], California Adminis-
trative Code, Chapter 9, Subchapter 6, and shall
further comply with the future community noise equi-
valent levels prescribed by such title as it now exists or
is hereafter amended.
The EIAR/Draft EIR was completed in early 1977.
Shortly thereafter, the City of Burbank issued a public
notice of the completion of the document and held a two-
3
day public hearing concerning the proposed airport acquisi-
tion. Following completion of the public hearings and cir-
culation of the EIAR/ Draft EIR at state, regional, and
local levels, all comments collected were considered in the
preparation of a revised ELAR/ EIR bythe FAA, the City of
Burbank, and the private consulting firm. This document,
together with oral and written comments received on the
draft, became the final EIR and the draft environmental
impact statement (“Draft EIS”).
In June 1977, the City Councils of Burbank, Glendale,
and Pasadena entered an agreement creating the HBAA.
The agreement explicitly limited the authority of the HBAA
so that it could not authorize any aircraft operations that
would result in an increase in adverse noise effects above the
present levels.
The FAA thereafter circulated the Draft EIS among
federal, state, and local agencies and among interested per-
sons. The FAA received comments on the Draft EIS, which
it analyzed and considered. Following an evaluation,
responses to the comments were prepared, and the com-
ments and analyses were incorporated in a summary
volume of the EIS. The summary volume, along with the
Draft EIS, became the Final EIS.
After completing its evaluation, the FAA recommended
to the Secretary of Transportation that federal financial
assistance in the amount of approximately $35.5 million be
provided to help the HBAA acquire the airport. The FAA
recommendation stated that the proposed action included
“airport location approval” pursuant to the AADA.! In
'Section 16(c)(4) of the AADA, 49 U.S.C. 1716(c)(4), establishes a
national policy that airport development projects authorized pursuant
to the AADA shall provide for the protection and enhancement of the
natural resources and the quality of the environment of the Nation.
That provision requires the Secretary of Transportation to consult with
the Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human Services “with
4
addition, the FAA recommended, as a condition of the
funding, that the HBAA agree to operate the airport in such
_ a manner as to produce no increase in noise impacts. The
Secretary approved the FAA’s recommendation on October
4, 1977. On June 29, 1978, the HBAA purchased the airport
from Lockheed with the aid of the FAA grant.
2. This action was filed in federal district court by six
homeowners’ associations against the FAA and other fed-
eral defendants on October 17, 1977.2 Primarily, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the EIS that had been prepared regarding
funding of the transfer of ownership of the airport did not
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The State of Califor-
nia, the HBAA, and Lockheed each intervened in the action
as defendants.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on May 9, 1978 (Pet. App. A-1 to A-2). In
the accompanying oral opinion, the district court held, inter
alia, that no EIS was required by NEPA because the use of
the airport following the conveyance would be identical to
regard to the effect that any project involving airport loc..ion, a major
runway extension, or runway location may have on natural resources
** * The Secretary may not authorize any project under the AADA
found to have an adverse effect unless he first renders a written finding
“that no feasible and prudent alternative exists and that all possible
steps have been taken to minimize such adverse effect.” Such a written
finding was made by the Secretary concerning the project at issue.
2The plaintiffs had previously filed an action in state court challeng-
ing the adequacy of the EIR under the California Environmental Qual-
ity Act. Burbank Anti- Noise Group, et al.v. City of Burbank, et al., No.
C-207043 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.). In addition to the City of Burbank,
the Cities of Giendale and Pasadena and the HBAA were named as
defendants. The State of California and Lockheed intervened as
defendants. The state court granted judgment in favor of the defendants
on December 28, 1977, finding that no EIR need have been prepared
and, alternatively, that the EIR which had been prepared was adequate.
The plaintiffs’ appeal from that decision was dismissed.
5
its prior use; hence, the transfer in ownership would have no
significant environmental impacts (Pet. App. B-8 to B-17).
In the alternative, the district court held that the EIS filed
by the FAA was adequate, assuming that one was required
by NEPA (Pet. App. B-18 to B-35).
The court of appeals affirmed on July 14, 1980 (Pet. App.
C-1 to C-10). The court of appeals held, among other
things, that NEPA does not require a federal agency to file
an EIS when the proposed federal action will effect no
change in the status quo. The court of appeals did not reach
the district court’s alternative holding that the EIS was
adequate, assuming that one was required by law.
ARGUMENT
As noted above, the FAA in fact prepared an EIS in
connection with the funding of the Hollywood-Burbank
Airport. Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in
holding that the FAA was not required by NEPA to do so,
its judgment upholding the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants is correct and pre-
sents no conflict with any decision of this Court or of
another court of appeals. Accordingly the decision does not
warrant review by this Court.
The final EIS filed by the FAA fully complies with the
requirements of NEPA, as the district court found (Pet.
App. B-19 to B-34). The preparation of the Final EIS
satisfied all procedural requirements of NEPA and it fully
‘discusses the environmental issues associated with the air-
port’s operations, including the noise impacts on the sur-
rounding communities. Much of petitioners’ argument in
the district court was devoted to their contention that the
EIS had employed an invalid methodology for measuring
noise impact; but as the district court found (id. at B-25),
petitioners demonstrated only that there was a disagree-
=
6
ment among experts over which methodology was the best.
Evidence of a disagreement among experts, however, does
not warrant invalidating an EIS. Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F. 2d 1060, 1069-1070 (8th Cir.
1977); Cady v. Morton, 527 F. 2d 786, 796 (9th Cir. 1975).
As the Second Circuit stated in County of Suffolk v. Secre-
tary of the Interior, 562 F. 2d 1368, 1383 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978): “The district court does not sit
as a super-agency empowered to substitute its scientific
expertise or testimony presented to it de novo for the evi-
dence received and considered by the agency which pre-
pared the EIS.”
Petitioners also assert (Pet. 8) that the Final EIS is a
partisan rationalization of a mind made up in advance.
However, while the agency which prepares the EIS must act
in good faith, it need not be subjectively impartial, and a
party charging bad faith must establish its allegations by the
record. Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United
States, 510 F. 2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 470
F. 2d 289, 295-296 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
931 (1973). Petitioners failed to substantiate their charge
that the FAA failed to give objective consideration to the
3As petitioners note (Pet. 23-25), they sought to introduce additional
evidence on the factual question‘of noise impact at the rehearing stage in
the court of appeals. Petitioners cite this in connection with their
contention that the court of appeals improperly found that there had
been no major federal action with significant impact on the environ-
ment. We note here that whatever the validity of this evidence (the
characterization by a congressman of the significance of certain FAA
data for periods following the preparation of the Final EIS), it is
irrelevant to the question whether the EIS was adequate, since the EIS
must be judged in light of the circumstances existing at the time it was
prepared. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 554-555 (1978). In any event, such
a fact-bound question is not appropriate for review by this Court.
7
relevant environmental considerations. Indeed, petitioners
apparently agree that the Final EIS fully discloses the
environmental effects of the airport operations, for they
state (Pet. 18): “What the Secretary did—based on the
EIS—was to approve the location of an airport which has
the environmental impacts shown by the EIS” (emphasis
added).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
ANTHONY C. LIOTTA
Acting Assistant Attorney General
PETER R. STEENLAND, JR.
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
Attorneys
FEBRUARY 1981
DOJ-1961-02
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