Petition — Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

Supreme Court, U. S,

FILED

NOV 17 1980

No. 8 0 -795

IN THE

K, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the Anite

.

October Term, 1980

MICHAEL HEFFRON, Secretary and Manager of the

Minnesota State Agricultural Society Board of Managers,

HARVEYDALE MARUSKA, President of the Minnesota

State Agricultural Society Board of Managers, the Members

of the Board of Managers of the Minnesota Agricultural

Society, and WARREN SPANNAUS, Attorney General of

the State of Minnesota, individually and in their official

capacities,

Petitioners,

vs.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CON-

SCIOUSNESS, INC., and JOSEPH BECA, on behalf of

themselves and THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR

KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS members,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF MINNESOTA

WARREN SPANNAUS

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

KENT G. HARBISON

Special Assistant

Attorney General

515 Transportation Building

Saint Paul, Minnesota 55155

Telephone: (612) 296-7537

Attorneys for Petitioners

224-7631 — Review Publishing Co., 287 E. % K., St. Paul, Mim. S510L 8 — 224-763)

QUESTION PRESENTED

May the International Society For Krishna Consciousness

and its members be exempt, under the First Amendment,

from Minnesota State Fair’s rule which requires that all

persons who solicit money or sell or distribute products or

other materials during the annual 12-day fair do so only

from a booth or other fixed location on the fairgrounds, when

that rule is applied equally to all persons without regard to

the content of their literature or products or religious beliefs?

PARTIES IN PROCEEDINGS

IN MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

Since the issuance of the judgment of the Minnesota

Supreme Court there has not been any change in the parties

participating in this case. Consequently, the caption of this

Petition contains the names of all parties.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

,,, . ĩ ͤäv TS 2

Jurisdiction ......... VCVVVVV cage wey Te 2

I Sok ssi, aaiSoapad'ss · BE es... 3

Statement of the Cage . 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ 6

I. The Majority Opinion of the Minnesota Supreme

Court is in Conflict With the Decisions of

Several Federal Courts in Almost Identical

Cases and Inconsistent With the First Amend-

ment Standards Established by this Court. 6

II. The Minnesota Supreme Court Misapplied this

Court’s First Amendment Standards to the State

Fair’s Booth Rule. i SRA 9

A. Introduction. 9

B. The Booth Rule Serves Significant Govern-

mental Interests and is a Reasonable Time,

Place and Manner Restriction Consistent

with First Amendment Standards. 11

1. The Booth Rule Serves Significant Public

Interests. 12

PREVIOUS PAGE-WAS BLANK |

8 5 INTE CORR MRE TON BE

Page

2. Peripatetic Solicitations and D*stributions

by Krishnas Would Be Unfair To Other

Similarly Situated Exhibitors and Conces-

ea Silt ooh ey es pa LStae aks Wee Peas 15

3. For First Amendment Purposes, The Na-

ture, Purpose and Lay-vut of the Minnesota

State Fair Set It Apart From Open Parks,

Transient Facilities and Other Traditional

N Am ² . cee ws 18

III. The Record Herein Clearly Shows Fraudulent

Conduct And Violations Of The 1977 Tro By

J ra nee kis ah en iet Bee 20

r ee

Appendices

Appendix r ˙ . e

r EI Naa . A-19

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Supreme Court

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)

Page

9

10, 12, 16

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) 9, 12, 13, 14

Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)

Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)

Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)

Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,

418 U.S. 298 (197 .

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)

Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)

Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,

394 U.S. 147 (1969)

United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia

Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)

Other Jurisdictions:

Bowen v. International Society for Krishna

Consciouness, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1979),

cert. den., 100 S.Ct. 448

Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago,

509 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den.,

478 F.Supp. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)

V

15

13, 18

ay 9

10, 18, 19

16, 18, 20

13, 19

9,15

10

6, 7

Page

International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.

Barber, et al., No. 77-CV-328 (N.D.N.Y., filed

eech Se aaa oy a ~ £22

International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.

Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 19799 2 7

International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.

Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio 1977) 6, 7, 9, 18

International Society for Krishna Consciousness v.

McAvey, 450 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 8, 19

United States v. Boesewetter, 463 F.Supp. 370

CR CA ohn So ldots FRR ES 8

Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83

(2d Cir. 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 940 9, 16, 18, 19

Statutes and Rules:

Minn. Stat. § 37.01 (1978) ....... | 19

Minn. Stat. § 37.15 (1978) : an 19

Minn. Stat. § 37.16 (1978) | be 3

Rule 6.05, Minnesota State Fair eee 2

—_— —

18

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

No.

MICHAEL HEFFRON, Secretary and Manager of the

Minnesota State Agricultural Society Board of Managers,

HARVEYDALE MARUSKA, President of the Minnesota

State Agricultural Society Board of Managers, the Members

of the Board of Managers of the Minnesota Agricultural

Society, and WARREN SPANNAUS, Attorney General of

the State of Minnesota, individually and in their official

capacities,

Petitioners,

vs.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CON-

SCIOUSNESS, INC., and JOSEPH BECA, on behalf of

themselves and THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR

KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS members,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF MINNESOTA

2

Petitioners (hereinafter “the Minnesota State Fair”) re-

spectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of

Minnesota which reversed the declaration of the Minnesota

District Court, Second Judicial District, that Minnesota State

Fair rule 6.05, which restricts all fairgrounds’ sales, solicita-

tions and literature distribution to a fixed booth location, is

constitutional under the First Amendment as applied to re-

spondents International Society For Krishna Consciousness

(hereinafter “ISKCON” or “Krishnas’’).

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court is not yet

reported. A copy of the majority and dissenting opinions are

contained in Appendix A, infra. The Judgment and Order of

the state district court are also unpublished and are set out

in Appendix B, infra.

JURISDICTION

The Opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court was filed on

August 18, 1980. In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court,

the highest state court in Minnesota, held that Minnesota

State Fair Rule 6.05, which has the force and effect of state

law, is invalid as to ISKCON under the First Amendment to

the United States Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court

is found in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(3).

3

LAW IN QUESTION

Rule 6.05 (hereinafter “booth rule”) of the Minnesota State

Fair provides:

Sale or distribution of any merchandise, including

printed or written material except under license issued

[by] the Society [State air] and/or from a duly-licensed

location shall be a misdemeanor.

The State Fair has the statutory authority to promulgate

and enforcé such rules under Minn. Stat. § 37.16 (1978). The

Minnesota Supreme Court ackncwledged that the booth rule

has been applied to restrict sales, solicitations and distribu-

tions of materials to fixed locations on the fairgrounds. See,

Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion at A-3 and Stipulation of

Facts at para. 16.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was commenced on August 24, 1977, challeng-

ing the constitutionality of the State Fair booth rule in

Ramsey County district court. On August 18, 1978, that court

denied ISKCON’s motion for a permanent injunction and

granted summary judgment to the State Fair.

In essence the rule challenged by ISKCON provides that any

person or group seeking to sell, exhibit or distribute materials

during the annual Minnesota State Fair must do so only from

a fixed location on the fairgrounds. Stipulation of Facts, para.

16. This policy is applied equally to all persons. Id. at para. 17.

The State Fair leases space in booths and other buildings to

such persons on a “first-come, first-served” basis without

regard to the content of the materials distributed or sold. /d.

The State Fair has not discriminated against ISKCON in any

4

manner and had expressed a willingness to rent booth space

to its members. Stipulation of Facts, paras. 22, 23.

The fairgrounds occupies about 125 acres. From 1973-1978

the average attendance at the annual 12-day fair was about

1,320,000. The average week-day attendance has been 115,000,

and the average attendance on Saturday and Sunday has been

160,000. The bulk of these persons as well as hundreds of

exhibitors, concessionaires and State Fair employees are con-

fined to about one-third of the entire 125 acres. Stipulation

of Facts, paras. 20-21.

ISKCON claims to be a religious organization with rights

under the First Amendment exempting them from the State

Fair space rental policy. At least 40 other groups of religious,

political, or journalistic nature have rented fixed booth space

for the annual state fair. See Michael Heffron Affidavit, para.

10 and Exhibit A attached thereto.

The Krishnas hold a religious tenet which requires them

to go into public places to proselytize and solicit funds.

Krishna Joseph Beca, however, testified under oath there

would be no harm suffered by either himself or ISKCON, if

their activities were confined to booth space. Beca Deposi-

tion at 57-58.

One day before the beginning of the 1977 Minnesota State

Fair, ISKCON and Beca filed their complaint in Ramsey

County District Court and moved for a temporary restraining

order. No evidence or testimony was received. Since the 1977

Fair was to end shortly, the court issued a Temporary Re-

straining Order two days after the motion, August 26, 1977.

The Order enjoined the enforcement of the State Fair rule

except as it applied to “sales” of materials by ISKCON.

Thus, in 1977 the Krishnas were still prohibited from “selling

or inducing others to purchase” any materials except from a

rented fixed location on the fairgrounds.

5

Approximately 17 to 18 ISKCON members then conducted

their solicitations and distributions during five or six days of

the 1977 fair. Beca Deposition at 10, 23. The record in the

trial court, however, showed that Krishnas had violated the

trial court’s order against sales outside a booth and had

engaged in various deceptive practices. See Affidavit of

Michael Heffron, July 27, 1978, para. 16, and Affidavits of

Elizabeth Ann Murphy, Dwayne Bronk, William Paddock,

Michael Gene Krogness and Glen Larson. Generally, these

sworn and unrebutted affidavits showed that during the 1977

fair ISKCON members misrepresented their identities and

the purposes of their solicitations of funds, solicited money

from minors, and engaged in other similar conduct. As noted

in some of the foregoing affidavits, one of the common forms

of such conduct was the practice of ISKCON members of

purporting to offer a fair patron a book, leaflet, flag or sim-

ilar item as a gift, only to take it back if the recipient de-

clined to make a monetary donation.“ See Murphy, Paddock

and Larson Affidavits, supra.

The state district court upheld the booth rule in an Order

dated August 18, 1978. Exactly two years later, the Minnesota

Supreme Court, by a 5-3 decision, reversed the trial court.

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE MINNESOTA SU-

PREME COURT IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECI-

SIONS OF SEVERAL FEDERAL COURTS IN AL" ST

IDENTICAL CASES AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE

FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY

THIS COURT.

The 5-8 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidat-

ing the State Fair’s booth rule on First Amendment grounds

is contrary to recent decisions of several other courts. For

example, in at least three other Krishna-State Fair cases

federal district courts have rejected the Krishnas’ First

Amendment claims in sustaining booth rules almost identical

to that at issue herein. International Society For Krishna

Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, et al., No. 77-CV-828 (N.D.

N. V., filed August 25, 1980); Hynes v. Metropolitan Govern-

ment of Nashville, 478 F.Supp. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); and

International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio 1977).

Like the rule at issue in the instant matter, the challenged

rule in each of the foregoing cases required all fairgrounds

exhibitors or concessionaires to confine their sales and mone-

tary solicitations to a booth or other fixed location. Recogniz-

ing that First Amendment rights may be reasonably restricted

in the face of significant or compelling countervailing state

interests, those courts relied on several findings and conclu-

sions relevant to this case. The state fairs’ needs to protect

the health and safety of all fairgoers and exhibitors, to pre-

serve order and convenience in congested areas, to give all

exhibitors and concessionaires equal access to fair patrons,

and to minimize the problems of theft, fraud and misrepre-

7

sentations of solicitors and vendors were deemed significant.

ISKCON v. Barber, supra, at 6-7, 17-29; Hynes v. Metro-

politan Government of Nashville, supra, 478 F. Supp. at 11-12;

and ISKCON v. Evans, supra, 440 F.Supp. at 423-425.

The size of the fairgrounds, the method of space rental,

the number of fairgoers, the number of exhibitors and con-

cessionaires and the limited nature of the fair rules were

considered crucial to the inquiry. It is noteworthy that, as

described hereinafter, the Minnesota State Fair’s booth rule

is no more restrictive than the rules in the New York, Ten-

nessee and Ohio fairs, and the Minnesota Fair’s attendance

and participation statistics are comparable to the largest of

those three fairs. See, ISKCON v. Evans, supra, at 418 and

Minnesota Supreme Court decision at A-6, 7.'

In addition to the above-cescribed state fair cases, there

recently have been federal court decisions in other contexts

which appear to be contrary to the Minnesota Supreme

Court’s opinion. The court of appeals in International Society

For Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 828-29

(5th Cir. 1979) sustained that part of an Atlanta airport

regulation which limited Krishna monetary solicitations to

booths. 4s was true in the above state fair cases, the Court

in Eaves concluded that de governmental unit’s need to

minimize congestion and enhance crowd control was a sub-

1 It is true, of course, that this Court declined to review the deci-

sion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adverse to the

Indiana State Fair in Bowen v. International Society For Krishna

Consciousness, 600 F. 2d 667 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 100 S.Ct.

448. But, unlike the instant case, the record in the Indiana case

suggested that Krishna members had been singled out for punish-

ment, criminal prosecution and harassment. Id., 456 F.Supp. 437,

440 (S.D. Ind. 1978). Not only is such evidence non-existent in

this case, it is established that the only remedy used against

persons who violate the Minnesota State Fair’s rule is expulsion

from the fairgrounds. Affidavit of Michael Heffron, dated August

25, 1977, at para. 15.

7%

8

stantial health and safety interest which outweighed the lim-

ited restriction on the Krishnas’ claimed right to collect

money peripatetically throughout the airport. Jd. Similarly,

a federal district court has upheld a New York City World

Trade Center rule which restricts solicitations to fixed areas

in the Center’s shopping concourse. International Society For

Krishna Consciousness v. McAvey, 450 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.

N.Y. 1978).

Another example of the divergence among the jurisdictions

as to the restrictions which may be placed on sales and solicita-

tions activities is United States v. Boesewetter, 463 F.Supp.

870 (D.D.C. 1978). In that case the district court dismissed

a criminal prosecution against an individual who had violated

a federal regulation which totally prohibited the sale or

distribution of newspapers and pamphlets anywhere inside

certain park buildings, including the Kennedy Center. The

court, however, expressly stated that time, place and manner

restrictions would be appropriate in order to respect the

rights of competing pamphleteers and solicitors. Jd. at 373.

As will become more clear hereinafter, the State Fair’s

booth rule is a limited and reasonable time, place and manner

restriction that is applied equally to all persons and, unlike the

majority decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, is con-

sistent with this Court’s standards for evaluating First

Amendment claims.

9

II. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT MISAPPLIED

THIS COURT’S FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS TO

THE STATE FAIR’S BOOTH RULE.

A. Introduction.

This Court has employed different approaches to the vari-

ous types of disputes that arise under the First Amendment.

For example, measures which regulate the content of a speak-

er’s message are viewed far more harshly than regulations

involving a speaker’s access to a locale from which to express

his views. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)

with Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). Similarly, far

stricter standards have been applied to laws and regulations

which impose prohibitions on First Amendment activities

than to measures which do not effect a total deprivation.

Compare United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) with

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).

It is, therefore, helpful to follow the advice of Mr. Justice

Frankfurter in Niemotko v. Maryland, and “first set to one

side decisions which are apt to mislead rathor than assist.”

340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See

also ISKCON v. Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414 (1977). For that

reason it is important to focus on what the State Fair’s booth

rule does not require.

First, the State Fair does not prohibit particular persons

or groups from attending the fair and discussing their beliefs

in any public area of the fairgrounds. Second, the State Fair

rule does not vest officials with any real discretion in ascer-

taining whether or not Krishnas are entitled to engage in

their desired practices at the State Fair. Stipulation at para.

20. Third, the State Fair rule does not restrict any activity

on the basis of the content of anyone’s speech. Fourth, this

10

case does not involve any abridgment of rights of belief and/or

association. Finally, in this case the State Fair has not sought

to insulate totally its property from use as a public forum.

See e.g., Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago,

508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992. Cf.,

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. C. I. O., 307

U.S. 496 (1939).

Regulating speech by its content, vesting discretion in state

officials in determining what can and cannot be heard, de-

priving people of rights of equal opportunity in employment

because of beliefs and associations are matters of serious First

Amendment concern and have been so treated in the cases.

However, such considerations are not applicable when the

state imposes a reasonable restriction only on the time, place,

or manner under which the purported First Amendment ac-

tivity may be practiced. A time, place or manner regulation

is thus necessarily entitled to a greater deference of constitu-

tionality, and indeed this Court has expressly adopted this

position:

A restriction . . . designed to promote the public con-

venience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to

abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disre-

garded by the attempted exercise of some civil right

which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to pro-

tection.

Cox v. Louisiana, (Cox I) 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).

In light of the limited nature of the State Fair’s booth rule

and what it does not entail, it is stressed that in the instant

case the Krishnas are not carrying the banner of a fight

against censorship, non-access or discriminatory treatment.

12 *

11

B. The Booth Rule Serves Significant Governmental Inter-

ests And Is A Reasonable Time, Place and Manner Re-

striction Consistent With First Amendment Standards.

Even though much of the fairgrounds is a public forum, the

booth rule should also be judged as to whether it serves a

significant or compelling government interest in a reasonable

manner. This test is merely a combination of the following

formulations from relevant First Amendment cases:

We have often approved [time, place and manner]

restrictions. . provided that they are justified without

reference to the content of the regulated speech, that

they serve a significant governmental interest, and that

in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels

for communication of the information.

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer

Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added) ;

Although American constitutional jurisprudence .. .

has been zealous to preserve access to public places for

purposes of free speech, the nature of the forum and the

conflicting interests involved have remained important in

determining the degree of protection afforded by the

[First] Amendment to the speech in question.

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974)

(emphasis added) ;

If a municipality has authority to control the use of

its public streets for parades or processions, as it un-

doubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give con-

sideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place

and manner in relation to other purposes of the streets.

12

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 and 576 (1941)

(emphasis added) ; See also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-

ham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.

586 (1965) and the dissenting opinion of the Minnesota

Supreme Court at A-12.

It follows that it is a significant governmental interest

to adopt rules which will protect the safety, health and con-

venience of all persons who use crowded public and commer-

cial areas for which there may be competing demands. Of

course, such rules must be reasonable as to the time, place

and manner of the restrictions. Finally, the rule must not be

vague, it must be applied equally to all perons, it must not

allow the potential for an abuse of discretion by administra-

tors, and it must provide alternative means for exercising

free speech and freedom of religion rights. The record in the

instant case, as shown by the following, contains facts which

meet the above tests.

1. The Booth Rule Serves Significant Public Interests.

Several undisputed facts presented to the trial court are

relevant to the issue of public interests. For example, the

annual Minnesota State Fair is held in a fenced-in area of

about 125 acres, with the bulk of activities confined to an

area approximately one-third of that size.“ From 1973-1978

an average of about 1,300,000 persons, excluding concession-

aires and exhibitors, have attended each 12-day fair.* There

are an additional 1,400 exhibitors and concessionaires and

their employees who annually exhibit or sell products (in-

cluding religious, political and journalistic materials) from

2 Stipulation of Facts, para. 20, and Affidavit of Michael Heffron,

para. 3, July 27, 1978.

8 Stipulation of Facts at para. 21 and Affidavit of Michael Heffron,

paras. 4 and 18.

13

leased booth space.“ Furthermore, the State Fair must ex-

clude approximately 300-500 concession and exhibit applica-

tions each year due to insufficient space.“ Because of the

congested conditions during the annual fair, it is critical to

provide speedy emergency health, police and fire services.“

At the 1978 State Fair there were approximately 40 conces-

sionaire/exhibitors who leased booth space on the fairgrounds

to disseminate or sell newspapers and religious and political

materials.’

Certainly the public interests manifested in the foregoing

facts and served by the State Fair’s booth rule are as legiti-

mate and significant as those approved by this Court in other

cases. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1948) this

Court struck down an ordinance which totally proscribed

door-to-door solicitation by persons who had not first paid

a license fee which was unrelated to the need for the ordinance.

But, it was stated that not only was the holding based largely

on the arbitrariness of the license fee, but also that the manner

in which First Amendment activities are exercised raises

problems that can be regulated by police powers if done

so reasonably. Id. at 110.

In addition, when a proposed activity by one group might

conflict with or affect the use of public areas by other

citizens, it is proper to consider the public safety and con-

venience which might be affected by such activity. Grayned

v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-117 (1972) (upheld ordinances

which restricted use of public streets for picketing and demon-

strations) ; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.

147, 155 (1969) (applied reasonable time, place and manner

restrictions in the face of competing uses); Cor v. New

Stipulation of Facts, para. 19 and Affidavit of Heffron at paras.

10 and 11 and Exhibit “A” thereto.

5 Stipulation of Facts, para. 18.

6 Affidavit of Heffron, para. 7. See Argument III(B) (4), infra.

7 Id., paras. 10 and 11 and Exhibit “A” thereto.

14

Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (considered the need

for “proper policing” of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ solicitations in

order to serve public safety and convenience in the use of

public areas).

In light of the obvious and uncontroverted demands upon

the State Fair for the use of very limited space by both con-

cessionaries/exhibitors and patrons and the problems of pro-

viding responsive police, health and safety services in con-

gested areas, surely the interests served by the booth rule

are significant public concerns. The claim that roving

ISKCON solicitors would not create any congestion problems

at an already crowded fair is perhaps appealing on its face

but is naive and unrealistic. Beyond the fact that such claim

does not really deny the existence of the above-cited signifi-

cant governmental interests, it also is obvious that on a

crowded fairgrounds where there are thousands of people very

few roving solicitors, who clearly would stand out because

of their being the only group given such a privilege, would

attract curious crowds disproportionate to their numbers.

Moreover, the mere fact that the annual fair is already

crowded is an insufficient reason for the State Fair not to

minimize the problems created by crowds. Simply because it

presently may be difficult for an ambulance, fire truck or

police vehicle to reach parts of the fairgrounds as quickly

as they could without any patrons present, it cannot seriously

be suggested that the State Fair staff should not attempt to

reduce those difficulties in a reasonable manner.

The majority opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court in-

deed acknowledges the importance of the state’s undeniable

interest in preventing widespread disorder that would surely

exist” without the booth rule. Minnesota Supreme Court

opinion at A-7. But the Court then states that the proper test

1

15

is for the Fair to show that it cannot avoid any disorder by

granting an exemption from the rule to the Krishnas. Id.

But, to grant special favors to certain groups because of

an alleged doctrinal basis in that group’s underlying phi-

losophy, is to choose between the types of ideas that are

allowed to be presented to the public. It is exactly this type

of abuse that the First Amendment was designed to avoid.

See, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko

v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). ISKCON’s request for

special dispensation is a request for favoritism and special

status and thus cuts against one of the central notions of the

First Amendment, the equality of ideas.

2. Peripatetic Solicitations and Distributions By Krishnas

Would Be Unfair To Other Similarly Situated Exhibitors

and Concessionaires.

The Minnesota Supreme Court erroneously found, Opinion

at A-7, n. 7, that the practice of Sankirtan by Krishnas neces-

sitates that their sales, solicitations and distributions of

materials be done on a roving, or peripatetic, basis throughout

all public areas. That finding is contrary to the parties’

Stipulation of Facts which simply states that Sankirtan

“consists of going out into public places to disseminate or

sell religious literature and to solicit contributions. The

record herein merely supports a finding that Krishnas have a

religious belief which compels them to go out into public places

to solicit funds and distribute religious materials; that find-

ing does not exclude such activities from being carried out

from fixed locations in public places.

16

Furthermore, the record also establishes that, in actual

practice, during the 1977 Minnesota State Fair Krishnas

“disseminated” flowers, flags, fairgrounds maps and similar

objects of no realistic religious significance. Affidavits of

Michael Heffron, para. 16; Dwayne Bronk, para. 3; William

Paddock, para. 3; and Glen Larson, para. 2. It is obvious not

only that such items do not bear any relationship to the

Krishnas' religion but they merely represent the initial step

in many Krishnas’ attempts to deceive prospective purchasers

and contributors. See ISKCON v. Barber, et al., No. 77-CV-328

at 17-29 (N.D. N.Y., August 25, 1980).

The error of the Minnesota Supreme Court in finding, with-

out any support in the record, that Sankirtan mandates peri-

patetic solicitations is compounded by the Court’s failure to

give a meaningful consideration of the consequences of that

finding. Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,

804 (1974); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).

If the lower court’s decision is allowed to stand, it would

be just as reasonable under the First Amendment for the

scores of political candidates at the Minnesota State Fair to

roam the fairgrounds buttonholding patrons and distributing

campaign stickers and leaflets;* or for an unknown number

of journalists to sell or pass out newspapers and magazines

in the same manner; or for a wide variety of religious groups

ranging from the Unification Church and the Church of

Scientology to Lutherans, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baptists

to do the same things. At recent annual fairs there have been

many organizations with First Amendment rights as well

8 In Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir.

1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940, the court held that the port

authority could not absolutely exclude “political expression“ from

its terminal. This holding, of course, also recognizes that political

candidates have well established First Amendment rights.

17

established as those of ISKCON, and the number doubtlessly

would multiply if the fair is made available for roving solicita-

tions. Affidavit of Heffron at para. 10 and Exhibit “A”. What

makes the solicitation of money more traditional for ISKCON

than any other religion?

The difficulties of providing traditional police power pro-

tection by the State Fair would, of course, be greatly mag-

nified if all religious, political and press organizations were

permitted to solicit money and distribute materials randomly

on the fairgrounds. It is largely for that reason that the

booth rule constitutes a reasonable accommodation of all

interests.

The Minnesota State Fair is a limited resource. There is

an intense desire on the part of a great many vendors and

solicitors to take advantage of the State Fair during the

limited period when the State Fair is in session. The most

reasonable, the most fair, the most neutral, the most ordered

manner by which these competing interests can be accom-

modated is by the establishment of the booth system. The

booth system, rented as it is on a first-come, first-served

basis, assures that no group, political, religious, or otherwise,

will receive a favored position, and it guarantees that all

groups wishing to disseminate ideas, sell products or solicit

funds will have the opportunity to do so without interruption.

The booth system inherently reduces the possibility for one

organization to obtain any unfair advantage over another,

both by giving all groups the same opportunities to contact

an equal number of patrons and by prohibiting them from

obstructing or interfering with others engaged in similar

activities. In addition to assuring that there can be no favor-

itism on the part of the state officials towards any group,

18

the policy also assures that any given ideology, religion or

political view will not have the appearance of state sanction.

See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The

Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority opinion, however, is

destructive of these values and legitimate First Amendment

goals.

3. For First Amendment Purposes, The Nature, Purpose

and Lay-out of the Minnesota State Fair Set It Apart

From Open Parks, Transient Facilities And Other Tradi-

tional Public Forums.

Another error of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority

opinion is that it did not truly consider the “nature of the

place” and whether “the manner of [proposed] expression

is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a partic-

ular place at a particular time.” Grayned v. Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 116 (1972). See also Wolin v. Port of New York

Authority, supra at 89, where the court noted the importance

of the “function” of the place proposed for unregulated free

speech activity. The purpose and function of most state fairs

has been appropriately defined by the court in ISKCON v.

Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414, 424-25 (S.D. Ohio 1977):

. . . to house an agricultural and industrial exposition

and to support educational and competitive junior ac-

tivities. At this time the fairgrounds are not on a con-

stitutional plane with an open-air park or street corner

“immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the

public, and, time out of mind, . . used for purposes

of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,

and discussing public questions.” Hague v. Committee

19

for Industrial Organization, 807 U.S. 496, 555, 59 S.Ct.

954, 964, 88 L.Ed. 1428 (1989).

(Emphasis added).“

The statement by the court in ISKCON v. State Fair of

Texas, 461 F.Supp. 719, 721 (N.D. Tex. 1978) that a fair

is a “congeries of hawkers, vendors of wares and services,

and purveyors of ideas .. .” does not alter the purpose of

the Minnesota fair. Furthermore, any hawking, vending or

purveying are clearly confined to fixed locations.

Certainly, the nature and purpose of the State Fair are

significantly different from those of streets, airports, bus

terminals and similar facilities which people use primarily

merely to travel from one place to another. Persons who travel

through transportation terminals, for example, are not likely

to stay there long and, thus, probably would not be approached

by more than one Krishna solicitor before their exit for

their destinations. In addition, the fairgrounds certainly is

not comparable to a public park or similar area traditionally

used by a wide variety of public speakers. Compare Wolin

v. Port Authority of New York, supra, and ISKCON v.

McAvey, supra. Similarly, persons who are solicited by door-

to-door salespersons or religious advocates can easily close

their doors at any time or refuse to answer them. Compare

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra. But, a person who pays the

admission fee and enters the enclosed Minnesota fairgrounds

naturally does so with the purpose of attending the fair and

with far less control over unwanted solicitations.

Admittedly, patrons have the freedom to reject any Krishna

solicitation and walk away, but the only certain means that

„Compare Minn. Stat. §§ 37.01 and 37.15 (1978), which provide that

the purpose of the annual Minnesota fair is to promote agricul-

ture, horticulture, stockbreeding, manufacturing, mining and

mechanical arts and sciences.

29

patrons have for avoiding repeated solicitations by the same

or other ISKCON members as they roam the fairgrounds

would be to leave the fair itself. The Minnesota Supreme

Court’s decision realistically would give thousands of un-

supportive fairgoers two choices: 1) leave the fairgrounds to

avoid roving solicitations; or 2) repeatedly reject the un-

wanted Krishna solicitations or other requests, flags, books

or flowers pinned on their clothing. Such choices simply are

unreasonable, particularly if several political and religious

groups engage in similar practices. Compare Lehman v. City

of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).

III. THE RECORD HEREIN CLEARLY SHOWS FRAUD-

ULENT CONDUCT AND VIOLATIONS OF THE 1977

TRO BY THE KRISHNAS.

In regard to the Krishnas’ desire to conduct their activities

at will throughout the fairgrounds there is another important

fact in the instant case which is relevant both to a balancing

of interests and to the appropriateness of equitable relief.

That is, there is uncontroverted evidence of deceptions, fraud

and other misconduct by Krishnas during the 1977 annual

fair.!“

The fair staff received 234 unsworn complaints, t some

of which indicated that ISKCON members not only violated

the restraining order by selling articles outside a rented booth

10 The Ramsey County District Court had initially granted ISKCON

a temporary restraining order permitting it to distribute materials

and collect donations but denying its members the right to “sell”

any items without a booth. Thus, 17 or 18 ISKCON members

solicited throughout the fairgrounds during the 1977 fair. Deposi-

tion of Joseph Beca at 10 and 23.

11 See Heffron Affidavit, para. 16.

21

but also misrepresented their identities and the purposes of

their requests for funds and solicited minors. In addition, in

support of their motion for summary judgment the State

Fair submitted 5 sworn affidavits from persons who attended

the 1977 fair and personally observed the misconduct by

ISKCON members. See Affidavits of Elizabeth Murphy,

Dwayne Bronk, William Paddock, Michael Krogness, and

Glen Larson, submitted to the district court as Exhibits B,

C, D, E and F respectively. These affidavits, which were

unrebutted, show that ISKCON members sold articles in vio-

lation of the 1977 restraining order, retrieved gifts“ if no

donations were given by fair patrons, persisted in soliciting

obviously unwilling listeners and identified themselves as

teachers and members of a Minnesota state agency. Compare

Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer

Council, supra at 771 (false or misleading speech is not pro-

tected).

A revealing insight into the Krishnas’ real sales and solicita-

tions techniques is found in the recent case of ISKCON v.

Barber, et al., No. 77-CV-828 (N.D. N.Y., Aug. 25, 1980).

Approximately 13 pages of that court’s opinion is devoted to

describing the fraudulent practices and misrepresentations

of Krishnas at the Syracuse fair from 1977-1979. The follow-

ing are but a few examples: 1) In introducing themselves to

fair patrons Krishnas were instructed to slur the word

“Krishna” to make it sound like “Christian;” 2) they would

pin flowers, flags and “Keep on Truckin’” buttons on fair-

goers without their consent; 3) coerce youths and handicapped

persons into giving substantial monetary donations; and 4)

12 Some of the complaints showed that ISKCON members told fair-

goers that they were representatives of the Department of Natural

Resources or the State Fair or were collecting funds for agricul-

tural schools or needy children. Heffron Affidavit, para. 16.

22

misrepresent purposes for which donations would be used.

As the court noted, “One of the only things that the Krishnas

did not do at the State Fairs was to discuss their religion

[with] fair goers.” Id. at 28.

The foregoing facts are wholly consistent with the Krishna

activities at the 1977 Minnesota State Fair as established by

the record before the Minnesota Supreme Court.

It has been suggested that the remedy for such misconduct

is to prosecute the individual offenders. But, that answer is

too simplistic and impractical, especially in light of the fact

that the Krishna misrepresentations and coercions appear to

be systematic. The difficulties of policing consumer fraud,

thefts and assaults by roving vendors or hawkers would be

enormous. There is no doubt, of course, that such misconduct

already occurs on the fairgrounds, but it is unquestionably

much easier to trace, investigate and prosecute offenders

when the incident occurs at an easily identifiable fixed loca-

tion with a known employer or owner than it is when the

offender is merely a face who vanishes in the crowd and

whose employer is unknown.'* Even the mere presence of

vendors in open areas of the fairgrounds realistically is likely

to attract crowds of people curious to see “what is happening.”

Such occurrences surely would create further impediments for

emergency services vehicles.

The unique difficulties for apprehending and prosecuting

a peripatetic vendor or solicitor on a fairgrounds crowded

with thousands of people were underscored by the Court in

Barber, supra:

18 Trying to apprehend a thief or someone guilty of consumer fraud

during a 12-day fair with no apparent connection to a registered

booth operator in a crowded fairgrounds is literally impossible.

The harm to the public in such situations is clear.

23

The [booth] regulation is a reasonable means to com-

bat widespread fraud that cannot be effectively checked

by the criminal justice system. .. . Plaintiffs have made

little, if any, attempt to control its members or to bring

these incidents [of fraud and deception] to a halt. Quite

the contrary, the Krishnas have condoned such practices

by using experienced ‘thieves’ to teach its newer members

how to solicit money from the public in exactly the same

way...

Id. at 38 (emphasis added).

Consequently, the evidence in this and other cases shows

that many Krishnas are not innocent disciples who are being

prevented from spreading their religious beliefs by oppres-

sive and discriminatory bureaucrats. They are, instead, often

experienced deceivers who are seeking a special monetary

advantage over other fairgrounds concessionaires and exhib-

itors, many of whom have equally strong First Amendment

claims. It was error for the Minnesota Supreme Court to

grant such advantage.

1

*

24

CONCLUSION

Thus, the petition for certiorari should be granted to correct

the result in this case so that the State Fair’s booth rule may

be applied equally to all participants in the annual fair.

Dated: November 13, 1980.

Respec fully submitted,

WARREN SPANNAUS

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

KENT G. HARBISON

Special Assistant

Attorney General

515 Transportation Building

Saint Paul, Minnesota 55155

Telephone: (612) 296-7537

Attorneys for Petitioners

A-1

APPENDIX A

No. 335 (1979)

Ramsey County

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA

CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., et al.,

Appellants,

49526

vs.

MICHAEL HEFFRON, Secretary and Manager of the Minne-

sota State Agricultural Society Board of Managers, et al.,

Respondents.

Endorsed

Filed August 18, 1980

John McCarthy, Clerk

Minnesota Supreme Court

Peterson, J. Dissenting, Todd, J., Sheran, C.J., and Scott, J.

Took no part, Amdahl, J.

SYLLABUS

Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05, which is interpreted by the

Minnesota state agricultural society to restrict to fixed loca-

tions on the fairgrounds all sales and distributions of mer-

chandise, is unconstitutional as applied to members of a

religious society who wish to distribute and sell religious

literature and solicit donations for religious purposes through-

out the public areas of the fairgrounds.

Defendants are to be enjoined from enforcing Rule 6.05

against members of plaintiff International Society for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

A-2

OPINION

PETERSON, Justice.

Plaintiffs International Society for Krishna Consciousness,

Inc. (ISKCON), a religious organization, and Joseph Beca, a

member of ISKCON, challenge drr this appeal the trial eourt's

refusal to declare Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 unconstitu-

tional and enjoin permanently the rule’s enforcement. We

conclude that enforcement of Rule 6.05 against members of

ISKCON would violate their constitutionally guaranteed right

to free exercise of religion.

Plaintiff ISKCON maintains temples and schools through-

out the world and is organized under the laws of this state

as a nonprofit religious corporation. Members of ISKCON

espouse the doctrines of Krishna Consciousness, a branch of

the Hindu religion. Krishna Consciousness requires its fol-

lowers to perform an evangelical ritual known as Sankirtan.

The performance of Sankirtan consists of going out into

public places to distribute or sell religious literature and to

solicit donations for the support of Krishna Consciousness.

The declared purposes of Sankirtan are to spread the doctrines

of Krishna Consciousness, to attract new members to

ISKCON, and to gain financial support for ISKCON’s re-

ligious and educational activities.

Plaintiff Joseph Beca is an ISKCON priest and the head

of ISKCON’s Minneapolis temple. Beca and other members

of ISKCON wish to practice Sankirtan at the Minnesota state

fair, an event which takes place from late August through

This case is presented to us upon stipulated facts. The parties’

stipulation provides in part: “In performing Sankirtan, ISKCON

devotees often greet members of the public by giving them flowers

or small American flags, but for the purpose of this lawsuit they

seek only to solicit contributions for their literature and their

religious activities, and not for these greeting gifts. They do not

seek to dance, chant, or to engage in any other potentially disrup-

tive or disorderly conduct.“

A-3

early September of each year. Rule 6.05, as promulgated by

the Minnesota state agricultural society (the society), a gov-

ernmental body which has control of the state fairgrounds and

responsibility for administration of the state fair, prohibits

the sale or distribution on the fairgrounds of “any merchan-

dise including printed or written material except under a

license issued [by] the Society and/or from a duly licensed:

location.“ The state fair’s policy in applying Rule 6.05 has

been to restrict all sales and distributions of materials at the

fair to fixed locations on the fairgrounds. In most instances

these fixed locations take the form of booths or buildings

rented from the society by sellers and distributors.“ Plaintiff

2 Minn. Stat. § 37.16 (1978) authorizes the society to make “all by-

laws, ordinances, and ruies, not inconsistent with law, which it

may deem necessary or proper for the government of the fair-

grounds and all fairs to be held thereon, and for the protection,

health, safety, and comfort of the public thereon’ and provides

that “[t]he violation of a bylaw, rule, or ordinance promulgated

by the society is a misdemeanor.”

The president and secretary of the society are authorized to

appoint “special constables or deputies * * * for the regulation of

the Minnesota state fairgrounds” who ‘shall have and exercise

upon the [state fairgrounds] all the power and authority of peace

officers and, in addition thereto, may, within these limits, without

warrant, arrest any person found violating any law of the state,

or any rule, regulation, bylaw, or ordinance of the society, and

may summarily remove the persons and property of such ffend-

ers from the grounds and take them before any court of competent

jurisdiction to be dealt with according to law.” § 37.20.

The board of managers of the society, the members of which are

defendants in this action, is vested with the management and

control of the affairs of the society. § 37.04, subd. 1. One of the

7 duties is to hold an annual fair upon the fairgrounds.

37.15.

Defendant Michael Heffron, as secretary of the board of man-

agers of the society and manager of the state fair, has responsi-

bility for supervising all activities at the state fair and for

implementing and enforcing all state fair ru'es and regulations.

Defendant Harveydale Maruska, as president of the board of

managers of the society, has responsibility along with defendant

Heffron for appointing peace officers to enforce all state laws

and all rules, regulations, bylaws, and ordinances of the society

on the fairgrounds.

Defendant Warren Spannaus, the attorne general of the State

of Minnesota, directs a member of his staff to prosecute those

arrested at the fairgrounds for violations of state laws or of rules,

regulations, bylaws, and ordinances of the society.

A-4

ISKCON has been notified that its members who practice

Sankirtan at the fair must confine all distributions and sales

of religious literature and solicitations of donations to a rented

booth.

Members of ISKCON are unwilling to have their practice

of Sankirtan so restricted. They wish to distribute and sell

religious literature and solicit donations throughout the areas

of the fairgrounds that are open to the public. In August 1977,

plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all members of

ISKCON, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1979) and Minn. Stat. § 555.01 (1978) for a judgment

declaring that Rule 6.05 violates the First and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also

asked the trial court to enjoin defendant state officials from

enforcing Rule 6.05 against members of ISKCON who practice

Sankirtan in public areas of the fairgrounds.

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order pro-

hibiting defendants from preventing members of ISKCON

from proselytizing, distributing religious literature, or solicit-

ing donations for religious purposes in public areas of the

fairgrounds during the 1977 state fair. The trial court,

however, enjoined members of ISKCON from “selling or

inducing others to purchase” religious literature or items at

any location within the fairgrounds other than one rented for

that purpose. The parties thereafter made cross-motions for

summary judgment based upon stipulated facts. By an order

dated August 18, 1978, the trial court granted defendant’s

A-5

motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion.“

This appeal ensued.

The question presented for our decision is whether it is

constitutionally permissible for defendants to apply Rule 6.05

so as to require the members of ISKCON who practice San-

kirtan at the state fair confine their distribution, sales, and

solicitation activities to a rented booth. The First Amendment

of the United States Constitution forbids the enactment of

laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion.“ The time, place,

and manner of religious activity may, however, be subject to

reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation if necessary to

further an important governmental interest. Cantwell v.

Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Defendants concede

that Sankirtan is a religious activity entitled to First Amend-

4 The trial court’s order provides:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for sum-

mary judgment is in all respects denied. Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is in all respects granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs are prohibited

from

1) Engaging in any distribution of materials (e.g., books,

flowers, flags, incense, artifacts, etc.) throughout the fair-

grounds, except from rented booth space;

2) Engaging in any sales or solicitation for monetary dona-

tions throughout the fairgrounds, except from rented booth

space;

However, plaintiffs are permitted to:

Roam throughout those areas of the fairgrounds generally

open to the public for the purpose of discussing with others

their religious beliefs.

5“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const.

amend. I. “The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legisla-

tures or the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

A-6

ment protection.“ They argue that Rule 6.05, as applied by

them to members of ISKCON, does not offend the First

Amendment because it is a permissible regulation of the place

and manner of the practice of Sankirtan.

Plaintiffs do not claim that Rule 6.05 has been applied to

members of ISKCON in a discriminatory fashion. What is

at issue here is the reasonableness of the rule as a place and

manner regulation. The application to an individual of a

governmental regulation which incidentally restricts him in

the exercise of a First Amendment right is permissible only

if the regulation “furthers an important or substantial gov-

ernmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated

to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental

restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater

than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Inter-

national Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Conlisk,

374 F.Supp. 1010, 1015 (N. D. III. 1973) (quoting United States

v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The party urging that

application of the regulation be upheld has the burden of

proving that these criteria are met. Elrod v. Burns, 427 US.

347, 362 (1976). Defendants have not sustained that burden

in this case.

Defendants assert that the state’s interest in maintaining

order at the state fair is sufficiently important to justify the

application of Rule 6.05 to members of ISKCON. The state

fairgrounds comprise approximately 125 acres. An average

6 Proselytism, the distribution or sale of religious literature, and

the solicitation of donations by members of a religious organiza-

tion who seek to attract new members and to generate financial

support for the organization have long been considered activities

protected by the First Amendment. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania,

319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 305.

For cases treating Sankirtan specifically as a bona fide religious

practice, see, e.g., International Society for Krishna Conscious-

ness, Inc. v. Bowen, 456 F.Supp. 437, 441-42 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd,

600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1979), and cases cited therein.

A-7

of 115,000 persons visit the fairgrounds each weekday while

the state fair is in progress. On Saturdays and Sundays daily

attendance averages 160,000. Approximately 1,400 exhibitors

and concessionaires rented space at the 1977 and 1978 state

fairs. We agree that these facts suggest a situation in which

the state’s interest in maintaining order is substantial. We

have no doubt that Rule 6.05’s requirement that all vendors,

exhibitors, and concessionaires perform their functions at

fixed locations furthers that interest significantly.

What defendants must demonstrate, however, is not the

importance of the state’s undeniable interest in preventing the

widespread disorder that would surely exist if no regulation

such as Rule 6.05 were in effect. Rather, they must establish

the importance of the state’s interest in avoiding whatever

disorder is likely to result from granting members of

ISKCON an exemption from compliance with the rule.“

It is fundamental that First Amendment rights may be

restricted only for weighty reasons. We note that members

of ISKCON are not prohibited from proselytizing throughout

public areas of the fairgrounds. Some disorder is bound to

attend this activity. We are not convinced that allowing

ISKCON members to also distribute religious literature and

accept money throughout public areas of the fairgrounds

7 If Sankirtan is to be practiced properiy, the various activities

included in the practice of Sankirtan must be performed in a

peripatetic manner. Members of ISKCON therefore have a special

claim to an exemption from Rule 6.05 on free exercise grounds.

Commercial vendors of literature can make no similar claim.

Defendants argue that the facts as stipulated by the parties

do not establish that Krishna Consciousness requires its followers

to perform all of the activities comprising Sankirtan in a peri-

patetic manner. We recognize that in deciding this case we are

limited by the parties’ stipulation. We believe, however, that the

peripatetic nature of Sankirtan is easily inferrab'e from the

parties’ explanation in their stipulation that the ritual is per-

formed by “going out into public places.”

A-8

would cause additional disruption sufficient to justify con-

fining those activities to a booth.“

Even if we assume the importance of the state’s interest in

preventing the disorder that will result from allowing mem-

bers of ISKCON to distribute or sell religious literature and

receive donations in public areas of the fairgrounds, we are

not persuaded that application of Rule 6.05 to members of

ISKCON is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The

state’s interest can be adequately served by means less re-

strictive of First Amendment rights. Conduct that tends to

create disorder on the fairgrounds may be specifically pro-

hibited.

8 During oral argument in October 1979, defendant suggested an

additional interest as justification for applying Rule 6.05 to mem-

bers of ISKCON: the state’s interest in protecting the privacy of

fairgoers. This interest is insufficient as long as Sankirtan is

practiced in such a way that fairgoers who wish to avoid it are

able to do so. The United States Supreme Court “has not generally

allowed government to suppress speech [or, presumably, other

activity protected by the First Amendment] solely to protect un-

willing listeners from ‘offensive expression unless substantial

privacy interests have been invaded. * * * The ‘privacy’ interests

of unwilling listeners are strongest in the home * * *. In publie

places an individual's privacy interests in avoiding offensive com-

munications are generally thought insubstantial unless the person

is deemed a member of a ‘captive audience,’ either because the

person is literally not free to leave without great burden * * *

or because the person is in a place where one cannot readily avoid

exposure to the unwanted communication.” L. Tribe, American

Constitutional Law, 677, 677-78 n. 13 (1978).

In Farmer v. Moses, 232 F.Supp. 154, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the

court considered the privacy rights of visitors to the New York

World's Fair and stated: “[T]hose of us who pay the regular ad-

mission fee and attend the Fair cannot be totally insulated from

our fellows, nor can we expect to be shielded from expressions or

ideas which are unanticipated and unsolicited. An individual’s

right of privacy is of practical necessity limited by the rights of

others when he leaves his home and ventures forth into public

areas, even those which he must pay to enter.”

A-9

[People may be prevented] from blocking sidewalks, ob-

structing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults,

or engaging in countless other forms of antisocial con-

duct. Such restraints on a solicitor’s manner of conduct

are characterized as after the fact prosecution, rather

than a prior restraint on conduct. This type of sanction

after the event assures consideration of the particular

circumstances of the situation. Therefore, [a regulation

should be aimed] at the act of obstruction itself rather

than prohibiting solicitations on public sidewalks based

on its desire to prevent obstruction and provide for the

free flow of traffic.

Jones, “Solicitations-Charitable and Religious,” 31 Baylor L.

Rev. 58, 57 (1979). If the number of persons distributing and

selling religious literature and receiving donations throughout

the public areas of the fairgrounds becomes unmanageably

large, a regulation to limit their number might be justified.“

A place regulation less restrictive than Rule 6.05 might also

be appropriate. For example, in International Society for

Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F.Supp. 1265

(S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court refused to enjoin regulations

establishing 10 areas at the World Trade Center in New York

City within which only one ISKCON member at a time could

In connection with this we note that the parties have stipulated

that “ISKCON, while unwilling to confine its religious activities

to a booth, has indicated its willingness to submit to the regula-

tion of its members in their circulation throughout the fair-

grounds to proselytize, distribute, and sell literature, and solicit

contributions.”

A-10

solicit and prohibiting solicitations within 15 ‘vet of certain

designated places.

Although we are limited by the record in this case, we

recognize that an additional concern of defendants may in-

volve the manner in which some members of ISKCON are

reputed to practice Sankirtan. Like the problem of maintain-

order, this problem can be solved by means less restrictive

than confining ISKCON members’ distribution, sales, and

solicitation activities to a booth. Persons claiming to be mem-

bers of ISKCON may be required to establish their identity

and authority to act on ISKCON’s behalf before being per-

mitted to practice Sankirtan throughout the fairgrounds.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940). Criminal

and civil actions are available to remedy abuses such as fraud

and battery in individual cases. See International Society for

Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 669-70

(7th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 48 U.S.L.W. 3351 (1979).

In Bowen, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order enjoining

Indiana state fair officials from enforcing against members

of ISKCON a policy of prohibiting peripatetic solicitation on

the fairgrounds. We share the cogent expression of the First

Amendment principle stated in these closing remarks of the

court of appeals opinion (600 F.2d at 670-71):

10 The regulations uphe!d in International Society for Krishna Con-

sciousness, Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), are

offered here only as an example. We do not intend to suggest

that the same regulations would be appropriate at the Minnesota

state fair. Regulations of the time, place, and manner of pro-

tected activity must be tailored to the forum in which such

activity takes place. The state fair is not equivalent in character

to the World Trade Center. Nor is it equivalent to an airport. See,

e. g., International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding a regulation re

quiring that the receipt of money by ISKCON members practicing

Sankirtan at the Atlanta airport take place only at a booth).

A-ll

[W]e are not unmindful, as anyone cannot be who has

travelled through a major airport facility in recent years,

that practitioners of Sankirtan have been regarded 23

annoying and often downright irritating by those they

approach. It is not, however, the cases in which the

auditor is in agreement with that which is being ex-

pressed which reach the courts under the rubric of the

First Amendment. Distaste for what is being expressed,

and often absolute revulsion, appear to be the hallmarks

of the exercise of First Amendment rights and probably

are the necessary contexts in which the preservation of

those rights can be firmly assured.

The order of the trial court is reversed and remanded with

directions that the trial court amend its order, in conformity

with this opinion, to enjoin defendants from enforcing Rule

6.05 against members of ISKCON who wish to practice

Sankirtan at the state fair.“

Reversed and remanded with directions.

TODD, Justice (dissenting in part).

I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion

because, in my view, the portion of Minnesota State Fair

Rule 6.05 which limits the sale of materials and collection of

funds to a rented booth constitutes a reasonable time, place,

and manner restriction which may constitutionally be applied

to plaintiff International Society for Krishna Consciousness,

Inc. (ISKCON).

The majority recognizes that religious activity may be sub-

ject to reasonable and nondiscriminatory time, place, and

11 Since this writing, an opinion has been published in which the

Supreme Court of Colorado, in a case virtually identical on its

facts to this case, reached the same result as we reach here. See

international Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado

State Fair and Industrial Exposition Commission, —— Colo. ——,

610 P.2d 486 (1980).

A-12

manner restrictions. In evaluating the validity of this type

of restriction, a court must determine whether the regulation

furthers a substantial governmental interest which has no

relation to the content of the first amendment expression

involved. Additionally, the restriction on the first amendment

activity must be no greater than is necessary to further that

governmental interest. United States v. O’Brien, 891 U.S. 367,

377 (1968). An application of this test requires the balancing

of the competing interests involved and a consideration of

the nature of the forum. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,

418 U.S. 298, 302-303 (1974) ; Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S.

104, 115 (1972). In his concurring opinion in the case of

Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), Mr. Justice

Frankfurter summarized the four questions which have been

considered by the United States Supreme Court in balancing

competing governmental and first amendment interests. They

are: (1) What is the interest deemed to require the regulation

of speech (or other first amendment activity)? (2) What is

the method used to achieve such ends as a consequence of

which public speech is constrained or barred? (3) What

mode of speech is regulated? and (4) Where does the speaking

which is regulated take place? 340 U.S. at 282; see also,

Intern, Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Evans, 440 F.

Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio 1977).

The restriction under consideration in this case, Rule 6.05,

as applied, requires that the activities of distribution and sale

of literature and the solicitation and accepting of donations

be confined to a rented booth. The majority concludes that

Rule 6.05, in its entirety, may not constitutionally be applied

to the religious activities of members of ISKCON because a

substantial governmental interest for the restriction has not

been shown and/or because the governmental interests in-

A-13

volved may be satisfied through less restrictive alternatives.

However, in reaching this conclusion, the majority does not

consider separately each activity which is restricted by the

rule; namely, distribution, solicitation, sale, and collection of

funds. Instead, the rule is analyzed as restricting a single form

of activity. In my view, this constitutes an erroneous evalua-

tion of the rule. Each activity which is sought to be regulated

may serve a governmental interest to a greater or lesser de-

gree and/or may serve a different governmental interest.

Additionally, each component of the rule may have a different

and/or greater or lesser impact on first amendment activity.

Thus, in the balance, some of the restrictions may constitute

reasonable time, place, and manner regulations while others

may not.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the portions of

the rule which serve to restrict the activities of solicitation

and distribution of religious literature may not.validly be

applied to the members of ISKCON. As was noted by the

majority, Rule 6.05 does not seek to regulate proselytism by

ISKCON members. There is no basis in the record for dis-

tinguishing the effect of proselytism from that of solicitation

and distribution of religious literature on the claimed govern-

mental interests involved herein. The state contends that the

limitation of solicitation and distribution of literature to a

rented booth serves a substantial state interest in maintaining

public order and minimizing crowd confusion. However, it

would appear that the acts of solicitation and distribution have

no greater impact on the public order than does the act of pro-

selytism. All three acts merely involve the communication of

ideas. In fact, solicitation may be viewed as one form of pro-

seslytism. Solicitation is an act, the purpose of which is to

obtain support for the religion involved except that the

A-14

solicitor urges financial support rather than support for

religious beliefs. The distribution of religious literature also

constitutes a form of proselytism through the spreading of

religious beliefs by means of written words rather than oral

communications. The distribution of literature may have a

lesser impact on order than oral proselytism because it may

take less time. Additionally, since large amounts of literature

are already collected by Fair patrons, the distribution of

religious literature by ISKCON members does not have any

great impact on any state concern for litter and the like.

Thus, since the state expresses no substantial interest in

regulating proselytism, it cannot validly claim to have any

greater interest in regulating solicitation and distribution.

Therefore, these restrictions may not be justified as reason-

able time, place, and manner restrictions since the acts of

proselytism, solicitation, and distribution of religious litera-

ture are equally protected first amendment activities in this

case. All three activities are religious activities which are re-

quired of ISKCON members. In fact, as plaintiffs urged at

oral argument, these activities constitute the most important

and central aspects of the Sankirtan ritual.

However, a different conclusion is required with respect to

the regulation of the sales activities of and the collection of

funds by members of ISKCON. Again, the state claims that

the restriction of these activities to a booth serves a legiti-

mate state interest in minimizing crowd confusion. The regula-

tion serves this interest in a different way and to a greater

extent than does the regulation of solicitation and distribution.

Sales and collection activities engender additional confusion

beyond that caused by solicitation and distribution hecause

they involve acts of exchanging articles for money, fumbling

for and dropping money, making change, etc. See Intern. Soe.

A-15

for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (Sth Cir.

1979). Wnile these activities are not incompatible with other

ongoing activities at the fairgrounds, they do serve to augment

an already existing crowd control problem. The substantiality

of the state’s interest in this regard is obvious. The crowd at

the fairgrounds is concentrated in about one third of the

125-acre fairgrounds. The average daily crowd is in excess of

150,000 people. Yet, the mere recitation of numbers from the

stipulation does not portray the situation. Because of the

large number of Fair patrons walking in the fairgrounds,

there is confusion and congestion throughout the lanes of

pedestrian traffic. Sales and collection can only serve to com-

pound this problem. In determining that the state’s interest

in this regard is not substantial, the majority appears only

to focus on the impact of ISKCON’s activities on this problem.

What the majority seems to forget is that its ruling today will

allow for others engaged in first amendment activity to be

excepted from the “booth rule.” As plaintiffs conceded at oral

argument, they stand on equal footing with other religious

and political groups entitled to first amendment protection.

The effect of unrestricted sales and collection on the crowd

control problem at the Minnesota State Fair may, thus, readily

be seen.“

Specifically with respect to the activities of members of

ISKCON, the restriction of its sales and collection activities

to a booth also serves a substantial and legitimate state inter-

est in protecting Fair patrons from fraud, misrepresentation,

and other acts of misconduct. At the 1977 Minnesota State

1 See Intern. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F. 2d 809

(5th Cir. 1979), Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural

Society, 476 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1979), Hynes v. Metropolitan

Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 478 F. Supp. 9

(M. D. Tenn. 1979), Int'l. Soc., Krishna Con., Inc. v. McAvey, 450

F. Supp. 1265 (S. D. N. v. 1978), Inter. Soc. for Krishna Conscious-

ness v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (S. D. Ohio 1977).

„„ a ES MRI oS Ta Oe ea

A-16

Fair, ISKCON members were permitted by court order to

distribute materials and collect donations but were denied

the right to sell items away from a booth. As a result of

ISKCON activity at this Fair, the Fair Staff received 234

complaints, some of which indicated that ISKCON members

violated the court order by selling items outside of a rental

booth under the guise of collecting donations. These complaints

also show that members of ISKCON misrepresented their

identities and purposes when requesting funds? and also

solicited minors. In support of its motion for summary judg-

ment, the state submitted affidavits which verified this mis-

conduct. By restricting the sales and collections activities of

ISKCON members to a rented booth, the state’s interest in

protecting fairgoers from such acts of misconduct would be

served because such a rule would require ISKCON members

to clearly identify themselves and their purpose and would

enable the state to adequately police their activities to ensure

that the members are not engaged in such acts of misconduct.“

The method of regulation in this case is impartial and non-

discriminatory. The rule is carefully drawn so that Fair

officials can exercise no discretion when confining collection

and sales activities to a booth. Fair officials cannot arbitrarily

2 The complaints indicated that ISKCON members stated to fair-

goers that they were representing the Department of Natural

Resources or the State Fair or were collecting funds for needy

children or agricultural schools.

à In footnote 8 of its opinion, the majority alludes to the claimed

state interest in protecting the privacy of fairgoers and suggests

that this interest is never relevant in the context of a state fair,

citing Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S. D. N. Y. 1964). While

I find that this claimed interest is not substantially served by

the regulation of sales and coliection in this case, I cannot agree

that the privacy interests of fairgoers may never be balanced

against the interests of those engaged in first amendment ac-

tivities in determining the reasonableness of a time, place, and

manner regulation. See Hynes v. Metropolitan Government of

Nashvilie and Davidson County, 478 F. Supp. 9 (M. D. Tenn.

1979), Int’l. Soc., Krishna Con., Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F. Supp. 1265

(S. D. N. V. 1978).

A-17

determine that some exhibitors are free to roam the fair-

grounds while others are not. Nor is there any discretion

given in the determination of who is entitled to rent booth

space. Booths at the Fair are rented on a first-come, first-

serve basis. Furthermore, the regulation is only minimally re-

strictive. It does not serve to prohibit any first amendment

activity. The rule only limits that activity to a rented booth.

Finally, the regulation of sales and collection only restricts

non-communicative aspects of any exhibitor’s activity. It could

not be more content neutral.

Thus, when the rule and the state’s substantial interests

in its enforcement are weighed against ISKCON’s interests

in this case, the reasonableness of the rule as a time, place,

and manner regulation becomes apparent. Members of

ISKCON have an undeniably protected interest in engaging in

acts of sales and collection of funds since these are acts which

are required as a part of the Sankirtan ritual. However, as

plaintiffs stated at oral argument, these activities do not con-

stitute the most central aspects of the ritual as do distribution

of literature and proselytism. Thus, the regulation of sales and

collection has a lesser impact on the religious activities of

ISKCON members than would the regulation of distribution,

proselytism, etc. Furthermore, the impact of the regulation

on ISKCON activities is not great since the regulation is

merely restrictive rather than prohibitive. Contrary to the

statement in the majority opinion, there is nothing in the.

record which establishes that ISKCON members are required

to perform any and all aspects of the Sankirtan ritual in a

peripatetic manner. Therefore, although the regulation of

sales and collection has some impact on ISKCON’s religious

activities, the impact is not great when compared with the

substantial state interests served by the rule.

The majority concludes that even if the state has a sub-

stantial interest in enforcing its rule against ISKCON mem-

*

A-18

bers, these interests may be served through less restrictive

alternatives and, thus, the rule may not be upheld as reason-

able. The majority suggests that the state’s interests may be

served through prohibitions of specific acts of misconduct,

limitations on the numbers of those selling materials and

collecting funds throughout the fairgrounds, requirements

concerning identification of ISKCON members, and through

the bringing of civil and criminal actions for fraud and

battery. However, in the context of the State Fair, these sug-

gested alternatives could not viably be implemented and would

only serve to increase the existing crowd control problems. All

of the suggested alternatives would require Fair officials to

police, in an individualized manner, specific acts of misconduct.

The ability to police such activities is severely restricted if

not made impossible because the fairgrounds is a large, overly-

crowded area. Furthermore, the enforcing of a partial ban

would entail the checking of credentials and other similar

acts which would increase crowd confusion and congestion

rather than ameliorate it. Additionally, all of the less re-

strictive alternatives would only serve to frustrate the legiti-

mate state interest of promulgating a rule which is effective

and easily enforceable. Thus, I cannot conclude that the re-

striction of sales and collection to a rented booth is anything

less than a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.

For the foregoing reasons, I would uphold Rule 6.05 to the

extent that it restricts the sales of materials and the collection

of funds to a rented booth.

SHERAN, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I agree with Mr. Justice Todd.

SCOTT, Justice (dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Todd.

AMDAHL, J., not having been a member of this court at

the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the

consideration or decision of this case.

A-19

APPENDIX B

STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT

County of Ramsey Second Judicial District

File No. 421843

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CON-

SCIOUSNESS, INC., and JOSEPH BECA, on behalf of

themselves and all INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR

KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS members,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MICHAEL HEFFRON, Secretary and Manager of the

Minnesota State Agricultural Society Board of Managers,

HARVEYDALE MARUSKA, President of the Minnesota

State Agricultural Society Board of Managers, The Members

of the Board of Managers of the Minnesota Agricultural

Society, and WARREN SPANNAUS, Attorney General of

the State of Minnesota, individually and in their official

capacities,

Defendants.

ORDER

The above-entitled matter came duly on for hearing before

the undersigned, The Honorable J. Jerome Plunkett, Judge

of Ramsey County District Court, at Special Term on August

8, 1978, upon plaintiffs’ and defendants’ cross motions for

summary judgment. James A. Payne appeared as attorney

for plaintiffs. Kent G. Harbison, Special Assistant Attorney

General, and William P. Marshall, Special Assistant Attorney

General, appeared as attorneys for defendants.

“

A-20

Upon the oral argument of counsel, the memoranda and

attached affidavits submitted by plaintiffs and defendants,

respectively, and upon all of the files and records of the

proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment is in all respects denied. Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is in all respects granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs are prohibited

from:

1) Engaging in any distribution of materials (e.g., books,

flowers, flags, incense, artifacts, etc.) throughout the fair-

grounds, except from rented booth space;

2) Engaging in any sales or solicitation for monetary

donations throughout the fairgrounds, except from rented

booth space;

However, plaintiffs are permitted to:

Roam throughout those areas of the fairgrounds generally

open to the public for the purpose of discussing with others

their religious beliefs.

There is hereto attached a memorandum which is a part of

this order.

J. JEROME PLUNKETT

Judge of District Court

Dated: This 18th day of August, 1978.

MEMORANDUM

The issue presented in this case is one of first impression

in the State of Minnesota.

The facts in this case are stipulated by counsel. The De-

fengant Agricultural Society, which operates the State Fair

in Minnesota, has a Rule 6.05 which prohibits the sale or

distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written

A-21

material, except under a license issued by the society and

from a duly licensed location within the fairgrounds. Minne-

sota Statute 37.16 is the authority under which the Agricul-

tural Society has promulgated said rule.

The plaintiffs contend that Rule 6.05 is unconstituticnally

invalid as it applies to them. The defendants contend that

said rule is a reasonable limitation upon the plaintiffs and

others in using the grounds at the State Fair.

The issue presented is one of free speech and the exercise

of the religious rights of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contend

that their religious belief, known as Sankirtan, consists of

going out into public places to disseminate or sell religious

literature and to solicit contributions to support their cause.

Rule 6.05 would limit the plaintiffs to the exercise of its

rights to “booth” space as is required of all exhibitors at the

State Fair. The constitutional question is a close one and the

Court can only find Rule 6.05 to be valid if it concludes that

said rule is reasonable as to time and place as it applies to

the plaintiffs.

It appears that the Federal District Court in Ohio in 1977

in the case of ISKCON v. Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio,

1977), dealt with facts almost identical to the present case.

The Ohio Fair Board had a rule similar to Rule 6.05 which

restricted plaintiffs’ activities to booth space at the Ohio

State Fair. The Federal Court held that the state’s interest

in providing all fair goers and concessionaires with adequate

and equal access to each other and in providing a minimum

of congestion on the fairgrounds was a valid constitutional

limitation upon the plaintiffs. This Court is impressed by the

Federal Court’s decision in Ohio and believes that the rationale

of said case and its holding should be applicable here.

In Minnesota there are over 1400 exhibitors at the State

Fair seeking to communicate various information. Some form

A-22

of time, place and manner restriction is clearly required if

the free speech rights of each of these exhibitors are to be

protected. In addition the public has a right of access to the

several communications which must be protected as well.

The Court, therefore, has denied the plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment and has granted the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, and has entered its aforesaid order

in this case.

J. JEROME PLUNKETT

Judge of District Court

Dated: This 18th day of August, 1978.