Opposition — Januszewski v. Connecticut

NO. 80-792

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

JEROME JANUSZEWSKI,

Petitioner

V.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

RESPONDENT,

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

C. ROBERT SATTI

State’s Attorney

302 Captain's Walk

P. O. Box 1089

New London, CT 06320

(203) 443-2835

D. MICHAEL HURLEY

Assistant State's Attorney

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Did the Supreme Court of Connecticut commit

error in affirming the Trial Court’s denial of the

defendant’s Motion to Suppress ten pounds of mari-

juana seized from the front seat area of defendant's

vehicle?

the

II. Did Supreme Court of Connecticut err in

affirming the Trial Court’s refusal to suppress inculpa-

tory statements made by the defendant to the police

officer?

III, Did the Supreme Court of Connecticut err in

the Trial Court’s instruction to the jury

tt the issue of drug dependency?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW...........

APPLICABLE STA Turns ii

TABLE OF AUrHORT iss *

I. STATEMENT OF THE CAS. 1

eee, <5 sccicasdioan 1

B. Regarding Petitioner's Statement Of The Case

F 1

II. ARGUMENT

A. THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

DID NOT COMMIT ERROR I? AFFIRMING

THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF THE

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

TEN POUNDS OF MARIJUANA SEIZED

FROM THE FLOOR OF THE FRONT SEAT

OF THE DEFENDANT’S AUTOMOBILE.... 3

B. THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S REFUSAL TO SUPPRESS THE

INCULPATORY STATEMENTS MADE BY

THE DEFENDANT TO THE POLICE

C. THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

DID NOT ERR IN APPROVING THE TRIAL

COURT’S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON

THE ISSUE OF DRUG DEPENDENCY...... 6

III. CONCLUSION............ eee e 7

APPLICABLE STATUTES

(Not already in Petitioner’s Brief)

Connecticut General Statutes §53a-i3. Insanity as

defense.

In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be

a defense that the defendant, at the time of the

proscribed conduct, as a result of mental

disease or defect lacked substantial capacity

either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of law. As used in this section, the

terms mental disease or defect do not include

an abnormality manifested only by repeated

criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.

Connecticut General Statutes §53a-54a. Murder defined.

Affirmative defenses. Evidence of mental condition.

Classification.

(a) A person is guilty of murder when, with

intent to cause the death of another person, he

causes the death of such person or of a third

person or causes a suicide by force, duress or

deception; except that in any prosecution under

this subsection, it shall be an affirmative

defense that the defendant acted under the

influence of extreme emotional disturbance for

viewpoin

the defendant’s situation under the circum-

stances as the defendant believed them to be

(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered

from a mental disease, mental defect or other

mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecu-

tion under subsection (a), on the question of

whether the defendant acted with intent to

cause the death of another person.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586,

J Pe MAMTOD vec vecicecccccccusccccs 2, 4

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct.

SE eee Cian sccceecgecencasccees 5

Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464,

.. . „„ 4

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975,

BP te „ 3, 4

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,

—́—— OE CEOs cise cccwibccecccseccccccces 5

Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89, 54 S.Ct.

BE See RA e 7

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50

Z lc acct wince cccccdbeceeses 5

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct.

SR Cy Rae, Se NR CREED bak oc cccwcniccccccences 7

Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46

D we cc Wes becebbeeceeccecseccs 3

United States v. Chadwick, 443 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476,

D %ũ R᷑ͤ :: e.. 4

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. a

100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed. 2d 497 (198) 5

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct.

820, 46 L.Ed. 2d 598 (1976) cc eeue 8

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of Facts

The respondent adopts the statement of facts as set

forth by the Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut

as contained in Appendix A of the petitioner’s brief

pages 2A through 4A.

B. Regarding Petitioner’s Statement of the Case and

Argument.

At the outset the Court should be aware that peti-

tioner’s brief is fraught with inaccuracies

statutes, facts, cases and the opinion of the Connecticut

Supreme Court.

Examples of such are as follows:

a) On page 5 of his brief petitioner incorrectly lists

the title of Section 53a-10 of the Connecticut General

Statutes as “Affirmative Defense.” The title is simply

“Defense” and the statute has nothing to do with affir-

mative defenses at all.

b) In his statement of facts he quotes the facts as

found by the Connecticut Supreme Court but omits

significant findings of the Court obviously harmful to

the defendant, such as:

1) on page 6 he omits the words, Seeing

this patently furtive conduct, Defendant’s

Appendix p. 2A third line from the bottom.

2) on page 8 he omits the phrase, both of

whom (police officers) were familiar with the

defendant and his drug related activity, Defen-

dant’s Appendix middle of page 3A.

1

3) on page 9 he omits the phrase ‘Contrary

to the statement in the defendant’s brief,”

Defendant’s Appendix A ninth line from the

bottom, p. 4A. Thus indicating that defendant

the facts in his brief to the Supreme

Court of Connecticut.

c) On pages 10 and 11 of his brief defendant

purports to recite the trial court’s charge to the jury. It

is suggested this Court compare that paraphrase of the

charge with the actual charge as quoted in Defendant's

Appendix A, footnote 17 at page 20A.

d) On page 12 the defendant states that the

Supreme Court of Connecticut treated the drug

issue as an “Affirmative Defense. A read-

ing of Section 53a-12 ‘Defenses; burden of proof.” and

the Court’s opinion will disclose that the Court did not

declare the issue of drug dependency to be an affirma-

tive defense. Rather, it merely required the defendant to

produce sufficient evidence to raise the issue of drug

dependency and thus required the state to disprove that

defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s Appen-

dix A pages 23A-24A, Defendant’s Brief page 5.

e) On page 12 of his brief the defendant claims that

the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision is contro-

vention of this Court’s decision in Arkansas v. Sanders,

442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed. 2d 235 (1979). He

fails to point out that the factual situation in Sanders is

completely different and easily distinguishable from that

in the instant case, as will be more fully developed at a

later point in this brief.

u. ARGUMENT

A. THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN AFFIRMING

THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF THE

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

TEN POUNDS OF MARIJUANA

FROM THE FLOOR OF THE FRONT SEAT

OF THE DEFENDANT’S AUTOMOBILE.

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court

ten pounds of marijuana in the front seat area of the

a plastic garbage bag, which the officer had

seen. All of this, plus the officer’s own observa-

the furtive conduct of the defendant and his

E

The finding that probable cause existed is in accord -

ance with this Court’s decisions regarding what consti-

tutes probable cause. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96

S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed. 2d 209 (1975); Chambers u. Maroney,

399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed. 2d 419 (1970);

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46

L.Ed. 2d 598 (1976).

Regarding exigent circumstances, the court not only

found the same to be present, but even articulated the

specific circumstances which constituted the exigency.

The defendant’s Cadillac was not only capable of self

elite

155

f

aH

1

fou

it

a right at least to immobilize the vehicle, the

Court has stated that “there is little to choose

of practical consequences between an immed-

without a warrant and the car’s immobiliza-

a warrant is obtained. Chambers v. Maroney,

supra, quoted in Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, 594.

Defendant’s Appendix A pp. 12A-13A.

i

4

4

rejected defendant’s arguments that the seizure of the

plastic bag in the front seat without a warrant violated

this Court’s holdings in United States v. Chadwick, 443

U.S 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1977) and Sand-

ers, supra. It stated that unlike the foot locker found in

the trunk of Chadwick’s automobile and the closed suit-

Defendant’s Appendix A. Footnote 11, p. 14A.

B. THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT'S REFUSAL TO SUPPRESS THE

INCULPA’TORY STATEMENTS MADE BY

THE DEFENDANT TO THE POLICE

OFFICER.

the suspect must be in police custody; Oregon v. Mathi-

ason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed. 2d 714

U.

(1977), Beckwith v. United States, 425

96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.

rf:

:

5

4

f

f

was present in the instant case.

In United States u. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.

100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed. 2d 497 (1980), the defendant,

agents. She was asked for identification and questioned.

She was asked to accompany the agents to an office and

consented to a search which produced drugs. The convic-

tion was upheld.

J

The court stated that as long as the person to

questions are put remains free to the ques-

tions and walk away, there has been no intrusion on

that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the

Constitution require some particularized and objective

justification. United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 100

S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed. 2d 497, 509.

4

*

C. THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

DID NOT ERR IN APPROVING THE TRIAL

COURT’S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON

THE ISSUE OF DRUG DEPENDENCY.

The charge to the jury as found in the Defendant’s

Appendix A, footnote 17, p. 20A states that the

accused’s status as a drug dependent person at the time

of the offense is an exception to the statute’s prohibi-

tion and that, by operation of Connecticut General

Statutes §19-474, the initial burden of producing

The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the

status of the defendant with respect to drug dependence

is not an essential element of the crime charged upon

which the state bears the initial and ultimate burden of

statute, Connecticut General Statutes §19-480a(b), and

ew York, 482 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53

2d 281 (1977) regarding the defense of extreme

emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor in a murder

the burden of proof on tis mitigating factor i without

The United States Supreme Court decision in

case, establishes the right of the state to require the

defendant to assume the burden of proof with respect to

an affirmative defense.

1115

be found to be an aid to the accusor without

ee the accused to hardships or oppression.

1

1

Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89, 54 S.Ct. 281,

78 L.Ed. 664 (1934).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully requested

that the petition be denied.

State’s Attorney

Assistant State’s Attorney

D. Michael Hurley

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

By: C. Robert Satti

: