Petition — NICHOLAS DENUCCI v. UNITED STATES (No. 80-770)

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FILED

CT 17 1900

NO.

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 198

NICHOLAS DENUCCI, Petitioner

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

KENNETH E. AARON, ESQUIRE

ALFONSO TUMINI, ESQUIRE,

OF COUNSEL

DAVISON, AARON & TUMINI

Attorneys for Petitioner

Suite 900 Lafayette Building

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

(215) 629-1100

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the goods in question, copper cathodes

shipped from Antofagosta, Chile and discharged in Phila-

delphia, Pennsylvania, and at that location released to the

consignee, Cerro Sales, Inc., were part of foreign or inter-

state commerce necessary to sustain federal jurisdiction

under 18 U.S.C. §659?

2. Whether Appellant was denied a fair trial when the

Court admitted in evidence a videotape re-enactment con-

ducted by the government?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No

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NT GRAN Rh cio Wis ocbe cos 6Genewh aegwneuens 2

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Reasons for Granting the Writ..................... 5-9

IGN 65 wins 0 0de'ce dosed dcdnevnheneuws 5-9

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Appendix I — Opinion of U. S. Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit........... A-1 - A-28

Appendix II —Opinion of U. S. District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

DE eveeteesesededaae A-29 - A-33

Appendix III —18 U.S.C. §659.............. A-34 - A-36

i Ne Be

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Collins v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908

BE renee ry ee ee 8

Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1972) ..... 8

Pacheo v. United States, 367 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1966)... ‘8

United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1973),

cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974)............... 5

United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1971) ... 5

United States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1970).... 5

United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045 (Sth Cir.),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976)................ 6

United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973)................ 6

United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968)... 6 ©

United States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310(2d Cir. 1968) .... 6

Statutes:

ge a err re er eee re Pere eee 5

Other Authorities:

WIGMORE, Evidence §798A (Third Edition 1940).. 8

othe

——— er eee ee ee re ~— = —

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 198

NICHOLAS DENUCCI, Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NICHOLAS DENUCCTI, Petitioner, prays that a Writ

of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, entered in this

case on July 74 1980.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals below (Appendix,

infra, page A-1) is not yet reported. It affirmed a judgment of

conviction of Petitioner for theft from a foreign shipment in

violation of 18 U.S.C §659 and conspiracy. Petitioner was

tried in District Court by a jury.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

was entered on July 25, 1980; Petition for Rehearing denied

on August 18, 1980. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

rr rr ee

STATUTE INVOLVED

The Statute involved is 18 U.S.C. §659. Because the

provisions are lengthy, the entire text is set forth as

Appendix II, p. A-29. In relevant part, the Statute provides

as follows:

“Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes,

Carries away, or conceals, or by fraud or deception

obtains from any pipeline system, railroad car, wagon,

motortruck, or other vehicle, or from any tank or storage

facility, station, station house, platform or depot or from

any steamboat, vessel, or wharf, or from any aircraft, air

terminal, airport, aircraft terminal or air navigation

facility with intent to convert to his own use any goods

or chattels moving as or which are a part of or which

constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight,

express, or other property .. .”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on four (4)

Counts under Criminal Indictment No. 78-149 charging

him with theft irom interstate or foreign commerce in vio-

lation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (Count I); possession of the same

goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (Count II); theft from

customs custody and control in violation of 18 U.S.C. §549

(Count IIT); and conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371

(Count IV). The District Court sentenced Petitioner to con-

current one-year terms of imprisonment on Counts I, II, and

III, and to a subsequent five-year term of probation on Count

IV.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit reversed the convictions for possession (Count

II) and theft of goods from customs custody and control

(Count III), and affirmed the convictions of theft from

foreign commerce (Count I) and conspiracy (Count IV ),

2

During February, 1978, after experiencing labor

problems, Cerro Sales Corporation, which had imported

copper cathodes from the country of Chile, was forced to

divert these goods originally intended for delivery in Bridge-

port, Connecticut to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for

discharge. The date of arrival was February 22, 1978.

Because Cerro Sales Corporation determined that the

freight costs of shipping these cathodes to Bridgeport, Con-

necticut was prohibitively expensive, the goods were stored

in Philadelphia at Northern Metals Pier. The theft of the

copper cathodes allegedly began on March 22, 1978, some

twenty-eight (28) days after their arrival.

At the time of the theft, the copper had been released to

the consignee, Cerro Sales Corporation, in Philadelphia,

who exercised full control and dominion over the goods. The

goods had not been sold at this time nor had Cerro located a

purchaser for the merchandise. In fact, at the time of

Petitioner’s trial, some six (6) months later, the merchandise

was still being stored in the warehouse at Northern Metals

Pier.

Philadelphia had been designated as the final

destination of the copper cathodes on the United States

Custom Inward Foreign Manifest. Mr. Harold Pratt, a

representative of Cerro Sales Corporation, had testified that

Philadelphia was now its designated port of delivery; that

Cerro had abandoned all intent to sell the goods in Con-

necticut or New York; that the Company had taken the

copper for itself and was holding it pending a sale to a willing

buyer; and that the copper could effectively have remained in

Philadelphia indefinitely. The goods were no longer being

held under the original bill of lading.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Denucci, a Philadelphia

Police Officer, and co-Defendant, Marvin Garber, who were

observed patrolling the area where the copper had been

stored during the fourth week of March, 1978, were subse-

quently arrested for the thefts.

At trial the Court permitted the government to intro-

duce a videotape re-enactment of the alleged crime for the

avowed purpose of showing that the crime was possible of

being committed. The only foundation for the tape was the

testimony of Francis Cunningham, a Custom’s Agent, who

conducted the experiment. The tape portrayed two (2) men

easily lifting a copper cathode weighing more than three

hundred (300) pounds into the trunk of a car and then closing

the trunk, and was markedly dissimilar from how the crime

actually happened.

The case was tried before a jury and Petitioner found

guilty on all four (4) Counts.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The Statute under which Appellant was convicted, 18

U.S.C. §659, makes it a crime to embezzle, steal, or

unlawfully take or carry away from any storage facility,

station, stationhouse, platform or depot any goods moving as

or which are a part of or which constitute an interstate or

foreign shipment. United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275,

279 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974). The

test for determining whether or not a shipment is in inter-

state commerce and thus within the ambit of Section 659 is

“a practical one, depending upon the relationship between

the consignee, consignor, and carrier, the indicia of inter-

state commerce at the time the theft occurs, and the pre-

servation of the congressional intent.’’ United States v.

Cousins, 427 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1970). It should be

emphasized that the relationship between the consignee,

consignor and the carrier is most important. See, United

States v. Astolas, supra.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit is inconsistent with the prior decisions of that Circuit

Court and the case le. of various Circuit Courts and is

clearly distinguishable irom the cases upon which this Court

had relied for its determination.

Unlike the factual situation in U “ited States v. Augello,

452 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir 1971) and United States v.

Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968), upon which the

Circuit Court relies, where the merchandise was temporarily

stored until delivery at its final destination in fulfillment of

orders previously given, the facts in this case do not establish

a temporary delay pending delivery to its final destination.

For all practical purposes, the final destination was Phila-

delphia, the merchandise having remained in place for more

than six (6) months. Furthermore, there was not evidence of

intent of Cerro Corporation to resume shipment after a brief

pause. The only intent evidenced by the consignee was to

locate a purchaser which it had been unable to do.

In United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045 (Sth Cir.)

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976), the consignee had

refused delivery of the merchandise and the delivery, thus,

was never effectuated. The goods were still in the hands of

the consignor. In the instant case, unlike Gates, supra, the

goods had been released to the consignee who exercised full

control over them.

In still another case, upon which the Court of Appeals

relied for the proposition that the goods need not be ear-

marked for a specific buyer, United States v. Thomas, 396

F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968), the facts of that case indicate, and

the Thomas Court emphasized, that buyers had been

procured at the time of the theft; that of the sixty-seven (67)

cartons in the shipment, fifty-six (56) orders had already

been taken and forty-three (43) of these were destined out of

state. In this case, at no point had a buyer been located or an

order received for the copper.

Finally, in the case of United States v. Gimelstob, 475

F.2d 157 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), the

Third Circuit held that one of the crucial tests of whether or

not federal jurisdiction still attached is whether or not the

goods were still being held under the original bill of lading at

the time of the theft. In the present case, the goods were

delivered to the consignee and no longer being held under its

original bill of lading. The Court of Appeals in the instant

case, by failing to even consider this factor, abandoned the

Circuit’s position in Gimelstob and concluded that federal

jurisdiction would attach presumably until the goods

ultimately came to rest in the hands of the final consumer.

While the Courts have adopted a liberal interpretation of

what constitutes interstate and foreign commerce, the

holding of the Court of Appeals is unwarranted and an over-

extension of federal jurisdiction. The language of the Court

in United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d at 164, recognizing

the design of § 659 was to promote free flow of goods in inter-

state and foreign commerce, and that the carrying out of this

purpose is not to be hampered by technical legal con-

ceptions, is not an invitation for the Courts to assume juris-

diction in every case of theft based on some remote nexus.

This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the

conflicts in the above cited decisions and to define the extent

and limits of interstate and foreign commerce as to when a

shipment arrives at its final destination, marking the termina-

tion of an interstate or foreign shipment.

Il.

The Petitioner’s rights to a fair trial were severely

prejudiced by the introduction in evidence of a videotape re-

enactment of the crime. The avowed purpose of the govern-

ment in offering the film was to attest that such a crime was

possible of commission. However, the prejudice which

flowed from this re-enactment overwhelmingly outweighed

any probative value it may have had.

Numerous differences exist between the government

Staged re-enactment of the crime and the actual circum-

stances under which the theft is alleged to have occurred.

First, in order for the copper cathode to fit in the trunk of the

test car, the government had a frame platform built upon

which the cathode was slid into the trunk. Additionally, the

grounds at Northern Metals Pier were “cleaned up”’ in order

to provide easy access and sure footing from the copper to

the car during the re-enactment, while the terrain was

normally cluttered and treacherous. The weather was ideal

for the re-enactment which was filmed in broad daylight

while the alleged theft took place on a rainy cold night. The

test vehicle that was used for the demonstration was not the

police vehicle alleged to have been used for the thefts.

Instead, the car used was a different model, number and

year. While an actual demonstration of the alleged theft

would have been a much more accurate depiction of what, in

fact, really happened, this request by defense counsel was

refused,

There was no foundation laid before the introduction of

the tape except that of the limited testimony of Francis

Cunningham, a Customs Agent.

Before evidence of experiments may be admitted in

evidence, it must be shown that the test or demonstration was

conducted under conditions substantially similar to the

actual conditions. Collins v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d

908 (8th Cir. 1977). The evidence must be relevant and

probative, that is, the conditions are identical with or similar

to the conditions of the occurrence re-enacted. Glick v.

White Motor Cv., 458 F.2d 1287, (3d Cir. 1972).

In Pacheo v. United States, 367 F.2d 878 (10th Cir.

1966), the Court stated that the party offering evidence of an

out-of-court experiment must lay a proper fourwation by

showing a similarity of circumstances and conditions. The

Court went on to caution that such evidence should be

received with caution and be admitted only when it is

obvious to the Court from the nature of the experiment that

the jury would be enlightened rather than confused. A slight

change may wholly distort the demonstration and render the

evidence harmful and prejudicial.

Courts have been reluctant to justify the use of films in

re-enactment of crimes. The reasons are obvious. As

Wigmore aptly states:

“Theoretically, of course, the moving picture can

never be assumed to represent the actual occurrence;

what is seen in it is merely what certain witnesses say

was the thing that happened . . . and yet any moving

picture is apt to. . . impress the jury with a convincing and

partiality of nature itself. In view of these inherent risks

of misleading, the trial Judge might well deem a picture

unsafe and inadmissible when the introductory evi-

dence has not convinced him that the risk is negligible.”

WIGMORE, Evidence, §798 at page 203 (Third

Edition 1940).

In this case, the trial Court abused its descretion in

allowing the use of this videotape re-enactment with all its

inherent harms rather than permitting an actual on-the-scene

demonstration. Because of the strong reliance the jury may

place on a film, the need for the Court to enunciate standards

and principles governing the use of such films is clear.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons aforesaid, it is respect‘ully prayed that a

Writ of Certiorari be granted to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVIDSON, AARON & TUMINI

By

‘KENNETH E. AARON

Attorneys for Petitioner

BY: ma a

ALFONSO TUMINI

of Counsel

Suite 900 Lafayette Building

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

(215) 629-1100

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 198

NICHOLAS DENUCCI, Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 24th day of October, 1980,

three (3) copies of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit .were

served by First Class United States mail upon the Solicitor

General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 20530,

as counsel for the Respondent. I further certify that all

parties required to be served have been served.

DAVIDSON, AARON & TUMINI

BY:

KENNETH E. AARON

Counsel for Petitioner

900 Lafayette Building

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

(215) 629-1100

BY:

ALFONSO TUMINI

of Counsel

10

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 79-2511

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GARBER, MARVIN, Appellant

(D. C. Crim. No. 78-00149-02) j

No. 79-2517

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DENUCCI, NICHOLAS, Appellant

(D. C. Crim. No. 78-00149-01)

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Argued May 22, 1980

Before: ADAMS, VAN DUSEN and HIGGINBOTHAM,

Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 25, 1980)

Joseph N. Bongiovanni, III, Esq. (Argued)

Bongiovanni and Reagoso

Philadelphia, Pa.

Attorney for Appellant Garber

A-1

Alfonso Tumini, Esq. (Argued)

Davidson, Aaron & Tumini

Philadelphia, Pa.

Attorney for Appellant Denucci

Luther E. Weaver, III, Esq. (Argued)

Assistant United States Attorney

Philadelphia, Pa.

On the Brief:

Peter F. Vaira,

United States Attorney

Water S. Batty, Jr.,

Assistant United States Attorney,

Chief, Appellate Section

Lynell N. Staton,

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

VAN DUSEN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Defendants Marvin Garber and Nicholas Denucci

were charged in a four-count indictment with various

offenses arising out of the theft of copper cathodes from

the Northern Metal Company (Northern Metal) pier in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in March 1978. Count I

charged that Garber and Denucci stole from Northern

Metal’s storage facility eight copper cathodes which

were part of an interstate or foreign shipment of freight

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (1976). Count II charged

that they unlawfully had the same copper cathodes in

their possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. §659 (1976).

Count III charged that they unlawfully removed copper

cathodes from customs custody and control in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §549 (1976). Count IV charged that they

conspired with each other to violate §§659 and 549 in

A-2

FR SRS Sn Se RE A NT TE ATT, AT TY TT Te fe

violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (1976). After a lengthy trial,

a jury found both Garber and Denucci guilty on all four

counts. The district court sentenced each defendant to

concurrent one-year terms of imprisonment on Counts I,

II and III, and to a subsequent five-year term of proba-

tion on Count IV. The defendants were also ordered to

make restitution. Garber and Denucci filed timely ap-

peals, based on several legal claims. After considering

each contention raised by the defendants, we affirm the

§659 conviction of theft from foreign commerce (Count

1), reverse the conviction of receipt and possession of

goods stolen from a foreign shipment (Count II), reverse

the conviction of removal of goods from customs custody

and control (Count III), and affirm the conviction of con-

spiracy (Count IV).

I.

Cerro Sales Corporation (Cerro) represents the

country of Chile in the sale of Chilean copper in the

United States. Each year Cerro sells about 70,000 tons

of Chilean copper to various corporations in the United

States. In 1978 one of Cerro’s long-term contracts re-

quired it to sell 1200 tons of copper cathodes! per month

to Anaconda American Brass Company (Anaconda).

One of the monthly shipments of copper consigned to

Anaconda was enroute from Chile to Bridgeport, Con-

necticut, in February 1978 when the steamship com-

pany carrying the copper experienced labor problems at

several locations, including Bridgeport. Under the ocean

bills of lading, the steamship company had the right to

divert the cargo to other ports. In this instance the

steamship company chose to discharge the cargo in

Philadelphia. Cerro found that the freight costs for ship-

1. Copper cathodes are large sheets. weighing approximatel\

300 pounds each. To facilitate shipping and handling. 14 sheets are

bound together in a bundle.

A-3

ping the copper from Philadelphia to Connecticut were

prohibitive, making delivery to Bridgeport impracticable.

Cerro was thus forced to try to find other buyers for the

copper. In the interim the copper cathodes remained at

the Northern Metal pier, where the cargo had arrived on

February 22, 1978.

In the fourth week of March 1978, a number of

cathodes disappeared during the night from the ware-

house at Northern Metal’s pier. During that week,

Garber and Denucci, while on duty as Philadelphia po-

lice officers, drove their patrol cars onto the pier on sev-

eral nights and parked next to the area where the copper

was stored. At these times Garber was away from his as-

signed police district. Garber and Denucci always left

the pier at the same time, approximately 20 to 30 min-

utes after they had arrived. Subsequent investigations

revealed that traces of copper were found in the trunks

of both defendants’ patrol cars and on their police uni-

forms.

If.

The defendants first challenge their conviction un-

der §659, asserting that the copper cathodes were not

part of foreign or interstate commerce when they were

stolen. They argue that the foreign shipment had come

to an end when the cargo was unloaded in Philadelpnia.

Without question, a conviction under §659 can only

be sustained if there is evidence that the stolen items

were goods “moving as or which are a part of or which

constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight.”

2. 18 U.S.C. §659 provides in pertinent part:

“Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes, carries

away or conceals, or by fraud or deception obtains trom any

pipeline svstem, railroad car, wagon, motortruck, or other vehi-

cle, or from any tank or storage facility, station, station house,

platform or depot or from any steamboat. vessel, or wharf, or

from anv aircraft. air terminal. airport. aircraft terminal or air

A-4

There is no requirement of literal movement; goods

which are part of or constitute an interstate or foreign

shipment are covered by the statute even if not in motion

at the time of the theft. United States v. Gollin, 176 F.2d

889, 893 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Richman v.

United States, 338 U.S. 848 (1949); United States v.

Wills, 593 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. ), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964

(1979); United States v. Williams, 559 F.2d 1243 (4th

Cir. 1977); United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275, 279

(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Edin v. United

States, 416 U.S. 955 (1974). The test for determining

whether goods are part of an interstate or foreign ship-

ment is a practical one based on common sense and ad-

ministered on an ad hoc basis. United States v. Astolas,

487 F.2d at 279. In order to make this determination,

courts look to a variety of factors, such as the relation-

ship between the consignee, consignor, and carrier; the

indicia of interstate or foreign commerce at the time of

the theft; and the preservation of the congressional in-

tent in enacting this statute. United States v. Gimelstob,

475 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828

navigation facility with intent to convert to his own use any

goods or chattels moving as or which are a part of or which con-

stitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, express, or

other property; or

*. ° *

“Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes by any

fraudulent device, scheme, or game, from any railroad car, bus,

vehicle, steamboat, vessel, or aircraft operated by any common

carrier moving in interstate or foreign commerce or from any

passenger thereon any money, baggage, goods. or chattels, or

whoever buys, receives, or has in his possession any such mon-

ey, baggage, goods, or chattels, knowing the same to have been

embezzled or stolen—

“Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or im-

prisoned not more than ten vears. or both; but if the amount or

value of such money. baggage, goods or chattels does not ex-

ceed $100. he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned

not more than one vear, or both.” (Emphasis supplied. )

A-5

(1973); United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045, 1047

(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976); United

States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1970);

United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d at 279. The delivery

of goods to a carrier before the. theft occurred, if applica-

ble, and the physical location of the shipment when sto-

len are important considerations, United States v.

Astolas, 487 F.2d at 279, but no one factor is conclusive.

United States v. Parent, 484 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir.

1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974). Rather, each

case must be evaluated on its own particular facts, Unit-

ed States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d at 164, recognizing that

§659 was designed to promote the flow of goods in inter-

state and foreign commerce, and that “the carrying out

of this purpose is not to be hampered by technical legal

conceptions.” United States v. Waroneck, 582 F.2d 1158

(7th Cir. 1978), quoting United States v. Astolas, 487

F.2d at 279.

Both parties agree that the copper cathodes involved

in this case constituted a foreign shipment at least until

the ship docked in Philadelphia. They also agree that a

foreign or interstate shipment does not lose its charac-

teristic as such “until it arrives at its final destination

and is there delivered.” United States v. Yoppolo, 435

F.2d 625, 626 (6th Cir. 1970). Garber and Denucci con-

tend, however, that once the shipment of copper was di-

verted to Philadelphia and it became clear that the cop-

per cathodes could not be delivered to their original

destination in Connecticut, Philadelphia became the fi-

nal destination of that particular shipment. The Govern-

ment, on the other hand, argues that Philadelphia was

only a temporary stop, occasioned by an unforeseen

change in route by the shipping company.*® The Govern-

3. Jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §659 (1976) can be based on

shipments which are either interstate or foreign. Both parties char-

acterize the shipment in question as foreign. The key fact is that it

originated in Chile and ‘terminated in the United States. Since tk

A-6

ment emphasizes that the evidence demonstrated that

Cerro did not seek to have the copper delivered to Phila-

delphia, did not intend to keep it there, intended to sell

all the copper cathodes it imported, and at the time of the

theft was seeking another party to replace Anacorda as

purchaser of that specific lot of copper. We believe that a

common sense view of the facts in this case requires us

to agree with the Government’s position. Although, at

the time of the theft, Cerro did not have another specific

purchaser in mind, there was uncontradicted evidence

that Cerro had no use for the copper cathodes at its dock

in Philadelphia, and was attempting to sell the shipment

to companies located elsewhere.

Despite this evidence, the defendants vigorously as-

sert that Philadelphia must be viewed as the final desti-

nation of the copper. Their primary argument is that the

cathodes remained in Philadelphia for such an extended

period of time that the shipment could not have been

considered temporarily delayed. The cases explicitly

hold that in determining whether interstate or foreign

commerce is involved under §659, the crucial time is the

time of the theft. United States v. Gollin, 166 F.2d 123

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); United

States v. Tyers, 487 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973); cert. de-

nied, 416 U.S. 971 (1974); Winer v. United States, 228

alleged jurisdictional basis is provided by the journey from outside

the United States, whether it crosses state lines once it arrives in

the United States is irrelevant so long as the cargo from the foreign

port has not yet reached its final destination. Thus, if a shipment of

goods from Chile to Pittsburgh is shipped via Philadelphia and

hijacked on the leg of the journey from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, a

theft from a foreign shipment has occurred. Under the Govern-

ment’s theory, the copper was stolen during a temporary delay in

the trip moving the copper from Chile. Whether this copper was

destined for Pennsylvania or some other state was inconsequential.

The crucial point is that Cerro did not intend the journey from Chile

to end at the Philadelphia waterfront.

A-7

F.2d 944 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 906 (1956);

United States v. Hardaway, 455 F.Supp. 226 (N.D. Ill.

1978), affd, 593 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441

U.S. 964 (1979). Delays enroute do not deprive ship-

ments of continued characterization as interstate or for-

eign so long as the goods have not yet reached their des-

tination, United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1141

(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922 (1972), and

the shipper or carrier intends to resume the journey.

United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968).

In the instant case, at the time the thefts began, the

copper had been in Philadelphia for 28 days.* The de-

fendants argue that this demonstrates that there was

more than a brief delay in the journey.*® Under the cir-

cumstances present in this instance, we do not perceive

28 days to be such an extended length of time that it

necessarily converts a temporary destination into a final

one. In United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir.

1971), a shipment first entered the United States when

it arrived at the docks in New York. Its final destination

was a warehouse located elsewhere within the state of

New York. It was stolen 11 days after arrival while

enroute to the warehouse. The court held that this ship-

ment, though somewhat delayed, was still in foreign

commerce at the time of the hijacking.® Moreover, Unit-

4. The copper arrived February 22, 1978; the thefts apparent-

ly began the night of March 22, 1978.

5. The defendants emphasize that the copper cathodes were

still in Philadelphia six months later at the time of the trial. This fact

is deprived of its apparent relevance, however, by the defendants’

concession that the time of the theft is the critical time for determin-

ing whether a shipment is foreign or interstate, and by the absence

of anv indication that Cerro had ceased its active pursuit of other

purchasers.

6. The intended route for the shipment from the dock to the

warehouse was intrastate. The court viewed the situation as an

uncompleted foreign journey, and based its jurisdiction solely on

the fact that the goods were still in foreign commerce at the time of

the theft. United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1141 (2d Cir.

1971).

A-8

—_

ed States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968), upon

which Garber and Denucci rely, is not to the contrary. In

Maddox, a sugar broker regularly purchased large

quantities of sugar from Puerto Rico. The sugar was

shipped to Baltimore and stored temporarily in a ware-

house. Maddox stole bags of sugar from the warehouse

over a three-month period. The court upheld his convic-

tion under §659, despite Maddox’s claim that the sugar

in the warehouse had lost its character as foreign or in-

terstate commerce. The court stated:

“The deposit of cargo in a warehouse may un-

der certain circumstances constitute a coming to

rest, marking the termination of an interstate or for-

eign shipment. At other times, however, the stop-off

at the warehouse may be only a pause in the course

of an uncompleted journey. Standing alone, the re-

moval of goods to a warehouse is not conclusive; nor

is the consignee’s power to divert the goods from the

intended interstate commerce. See Champlain Re-

alty Company v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366,

43 S.Ct. 146, 67 L.Ed. 309 (1922). These are merely

factors to be considered, but there is no rigid rule of

law that mandates a holding either way. The answer

in any particular case must depend on a factual as-

sessment.”

‘“.. . There is no absolute requirement that the

flow of commerce be continuous if there is the clear

intention to resume after a brief pause.”

Id. at 299-300. After reviewing the record, the court con-

cluded that the sugar was part of a “continuing, though

interrupted, shipment in commerce.” Id. at 300. Garber

and Denucci seize on the statement in Maddox that the

flow of commerce may be interrupted so long as there is

the intention to resume the journey after a brief pause.

The linchpin of their argument is that 28 days cannot be

considered a brief pause. Our reading of Maddox does

A-9

not lead to such an inelastic definition of “brief pause.”

First, we point out that Maddox is silent as to the length

of time the sugar had been in the warehouse at the time

of the theft. Second, we note the Maddox court's remon-

stration that there are no rigid rules in determining

whether goods have come to rest, and that ad hoc deci-

sions must be made based on the particular facts of each

case. In light of these considerations, we conclude that

the 28 days the copper cathodes were in Philadelphia be-

fore the time of the theft did not in themselves deprive

the shipment of its foreign character. ’

Furthermore, in a slightly different context courts

have often ruled that a substantial delay in one state

does not necessarily cause an item to lose its interstate

character. For example, to support a conviction under 18

U.S.C. §2313 (1976), which outlaws the sale or receipt

of stolen vehicles, the Government must show that at

the time of the crime the vehicle in question was moving

in the “stream of interstate or foreign commerce” and

had not yet come to rest within a state. United States v.

Hiscott, 586 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1978). In United

States v. Baker, 452 F.2d 21 (Sth Cir. 1971), cert. de-

~ied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972), a truck was stolen and trans-

ported across state lines to its destination state. It re-

mained there for three months and was used personally

during that time by a dealer in stolen goods. He “re-

vealed no intention of keeping it,” however, and sold it to

7. We emphasize once again that at the trial there was

undisputed evidence that Cerro continued its active pursuit of pur-

chasers for the copper throughout this period. While it may be that

’ in other circumstances, e. g., if the seller made no attempt to seek

other buyers or if the shipment consisted of a non-fungible com-

modity without a steady market, a period of 28 days might be seen

as evidence of something other than a temporary pause, we do not

have such a case before us.

A-10

Baker, /d. at 24. The court upheld Baker’s conviction un-

der §2313, stating:

“Admittedly, [the dealer] had ihe vehicle in his pos-

session for three months. Time, however, is not con-

clusive but rather one of the facts to be considered

in determining whether a vehicle is in interstate

commerce. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that

the vehicle in this case lost its interstate character.”

Id. Similarly, in United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687

(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978), the de-

fendants attacked as invalid their convictions under 18

U.S.C. §2315 (1976) for receiving and selling stolen

property which was moving in interstate or foreign com-

merce by emphasizing that two years had elapsed since

the stolen items had crossed state lines and entered the

destination state. They argued that this definitively

proved that the stolen items had come to rest and thus

had lost their interstate character. The court ruled that

simply because goods reach the state where they are in-

tended to be sold does not deprive the goods of their in-

terstate character. Jd. at 692. Rather, so long as the

transfer of goods can be considered a continuation of the

movement that began outside the state, the interstate

commerce jurisdictional requirement is fulfilled. Id. Ad-

ditionally, long delays do not necessitate a finding that

items left interstate commerce. Specifically, the Tobin

court that the two years which had elapsed between the

time the items entered the destination state and the time

of the attempted sale did not require a finding that the

items had come to rest before the sale.

In light of the cases interpreting §659 and similar

jurisdictional provisions in §§2313 and 2315, we con-

clude that in this case the 28 days between arrival of the

copper in the United States and the theft do not require

that the shipment be viewed as one which had lost its

foreign character.

A-11

Garber and Denucci base their secondary attack on

the jurisdictional prerequisite for §659 on the fact that at

the time of the theft Cerro had no specific purchaser of

the copper in mind. They acknowledge that Cerro pre-

sented uncontradicted testimony that it could not use

the copper cathodes iiself in Philadelphia and was trying

to locate buyers for the copper. Nevertheless, Garber and

Denucci reiterate that unless there is a clear intention to

resume, storage at a warehouse constitutes the termina-

tion of a foreign or interstate shipment. They further as-

sert that in order for there to be sufficient intent to re-

sume the journey, there must be a specific ultimate

destination in mind. We are not persuaded by this argu-

ment. Although generally shippers will have a specific fi-

nal destination in mind, there are instances —- and this

case is one of them — when this will not be so.®

Case law provides us with other telling examples.

United States v. Gates, 528 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976), presents a factual situation

quite similar to the one at hand. In Gates, a carton was

shipped from New York to Georgia for delivery to the

consignee in Atlanta. The consignee, however, refused

to accept delivery. The carton was stolen in Atlanta

while the truck was enroute to the local terminal. The

defendant attacked his conviction under §659, asserting

that the goods were in local transit at the time of the

8. Defendants’ insistence that in order to characterize a ship-

ment as one involved in an ongoing journey, rather than as one

which has come to its final destination, the seller must in every in-

stance have a specific purchaser in mind is too inflexible. It would

lead to such anomalous results as sustaining a conviction under

§659 if goods were stolen from a pier so long as the shipper thought

that the consignee intended to come pick up the shipment, but re-

versing a conviction under §659 if the same goods were stolen one

hour after the consignee had just cancelled the contract and re-

fused to pick up the shipment, suddenly leaving the shipper without

a consignee.

A-12

theft. The Fifth Circuit sustained the conviction, stating

that the fact that the consignee had refused delivery did

not mean the goods lost their interstate character.

“There is no need to employ complex fictions

about legal title to arrive at an artificial result. The

facts of this case strongly indicate that the stolen

goods were part of a continuing interstate shipment.

Final delivery was never effected. In fact, the goods

were stolen before they were ever removed from the

truck by an employee of the carrier. That Baron's

initially rejected the shipment is not controlling.

The carton retained its interstate character despite

the aborted delivery and the fact that were it not for

the theft, the carrier would have been forced to

make arrangements to dispose of the shipment, pre-

sumably at the direction of the consignor.

Id. at 1047-48. In United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d at

299, discussed above at pages 8-9, the Fourth Circuit af-

firmed a conviction under §659 for theft of sugar from a

warehouse. A sugar broker regularly imported large

quantities of sugar from Puerto Rico. It arrived in the

United States at Baltimore, where regular customers

picked up 40% to 60% of each shipment directly from

the pier. The rest of the sugar was stored temporarily in

a warehouse in Baltimore. Approximately 70% of the

warehoused sugar was held to meet pre-existing con-

tracts with buyers in surrounding states. The defendant

stressed that the sugar stolen from the warehouse was

no longer in foreign commerce since the individual bags

were not earmarked for any particular buyer, the sugar

broker could do with the sugar as he saw fit, and a sig-

nificant portion of the sugar had not yet been sold. De-

spite these facts, the court held that an assessment of all

the circumstances of the case indicated that the sugar

had not left interstate commerce. In United States v.

Thomas, 396 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968), 67 cartons arrived

in New York from Japan pursuant to the order of an im-

A-13

rr an =

porter located in New York City. Seven days later a

trucking company, acting as agent for the importer, re-

moved the cartons from the pier and took them to the

trucking company’s warehouse. That same day two car-

tons were stolen. The cartons were not earmarked for

specific buyers. At the time of the theft, the importer had

received orders for 56 cartons. The remaining 11 were to

be held at the importer’s New York warehouse pending

further orders. Under these facts, even though it was

unclear whether the two cartons stolen were those for

which orders had been received or not, the court sus-

tained convictions for violacing §659.°

In the case at bar there was, in effect, an aborted de-

livery to Anaconda. Cerro was, therefore, forced to make

other arrangements to dispose of the shipment. The fact

that these arrangements had not been made at the time

of the theft, when coupled with the fact that Cerro was

unexpectedly faced with the arrival of a shipment of ap-

proximately 500 tons’° of copper cathodes in a port with

no purchasers situated nearby, does not, in our view, de-

prive the shipment in question of its foreign character.

To summarize, taking a common sense approach to

the realities of this situation, we do not believe that the

unforeseen delivery to Philadelphia, with the conse-

quent cancellation of the agreement that this particular

shipment would go to Anaconda in Connecticut, thus

necessitating that Cerro attempt to find alternative pur-

9. The court in United States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.

1968), emphasized the fact that many of the cartons were ultimate-

ly destined for delivery out of state. Nonetheless, in light of the fact

that the journey originated in Japan and was continuing, though it

had been temporarily interrupted in the United States, the court af-

firmed the trial court’s finding that “the cartons were ‘in interstate

- or foreign commerce’ when they were |[stolen].” Id. at 315.

10. There was testimony that the shipment of copper consist-

ed of 3,262 cathodes. App. at 124a. Each cathode weighs approxi-

mately 300 pounds. Id. Therefore, the total shipment of copper

weighed approximately 978,600 pounds, or nearly 500 tons.

A-14

chasers for the copper, deprived this shipment of its for-

eign character. Nor do we think that the fact that at the

time of the theft Cerro had been unsuccessful for the

previous 28 days in locating buyers for the cathodes re-

quires a finding that the shipment had come to rest at its

final destination. Rather, we are persuaded that, in the

circumstances of this case, Cerro’s active pursuit of al-

ternative purchasers demonstrates Cerro’s intent to re-

sume the shipment as soon as possible. This intent is

dispositive and supports the conclusion that, at the time

of the theft, the shipment of copper cathodes had not

reached its final destination and had not lost its foreign

commerce character. Because we conclude that the de-

fendants’ challenge to the jurisdictional basis of their

convictions for violating §659 fails, we affirm the judg-

ment of conviction of Count I.

II].

The defendants also challenge their conviction for

possession of stolen goods under §659.'' Garber and

Denucci assert that they could not properly be convicted

of both theft from an interstate shipment and possession

of goods stolen from an interstate shipment when the

same goods were at issue in both charges. We agree with

their argument insofar as it attacks the sentences for

possession of stolen goods under §659. A review of the

recent cases reveals that courts have carefully examined

this and similar statutes to determine the congressional

intent in punishing multiple aspects of the same crimi-

nal act. The Supreme Court in Heflin v. United States,

358 U.S. 415 (1959), was faced with a defendant who

had multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. §2113 (1976)

11. The text of the pertinent provisions of §659 appears at note

2. supra.

A-15

arising from one bank robbery. The defendant was con-

victed of violating §2113(d) in unlawfully taking the

funds and of violating §2113(c) in unlawfully possessing

the same funds. The Court, stating that “we resolve an

ambiguity in favor of lenity when required to determine

the intent of Congress in punishing multiple aspects of

the same criminal act,” id. at 419, held that subsection

(c) was designed to reach a new group of wrongdoers,

those who only received the money from the robbers, not

to increase the punishment of those who actually robbed

the bank. Therefore, only one conviction was allowed to

stand. A similar situation presented itself in United

States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976). The defendants

had been convicted of robbing a bank and of possessing

the funds stolen in the robbery. The appellate court held

that it was plain error to allow the jury to convict an indi-

vidual both of taking and of possessing the money ob-

tained in one robbery, reversed the judgments of convic-

tion, and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed

that the defendants could not be convicted of both

counts, ruling that the trial judge should have instructed

the jury to consider, first, the theft charge, and only con-

sider the possession charge if they found insufficient

proof that the defendants actually participated in the

robbery. The Court, however, disagreed that a new trial

was necessary, and held that the error could be fully cor-

rected by simply vacating the conviction and sentence

under the possession count. Id. at 549, 552.

The Sixth Circuit adopted this approach in review-

ing multiple convictions under §659 in an opinion by our

colleague, Judge Adams, sitting with the U. S. Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. United States v. Solimine,

536 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 429

U.S. 990 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Sclafani v. Unit-

ed States, 430 U.S. 918 (1977). Finding “no indication

in the sparse legislative history of section 659 that Con-

A-16

———

gress intended to regard each theft from interstate ship-

ment as a multiplicity of discreet offenses so that the

punishment for such thett could be enhanced,” id. at

710, the court concluded that the section of the statute

outlawing possession of goods stolen from an interstate

or foreign shipment was an attempt to bring within the

scope of the criminal law a different class of wrongdoers

from the actual participants in the theft. Holding that

convictions of theft from interstate shipment and of re-

ceipt and possession of the same property could not both

stand, the court vacated the conviction and sentence

with respect to the possession count. Id. at 711. In Unit-

ed States v. Gilbert, 553 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1977), the

Fifth Circuit explicitly followed Solimine and held that

under §659 the defendant could not properly be convict-

ed of both theft from interstate freight shipments and

_ possession of the proceeds of the theft. Even more re-

cently, the Second Circuit has taken a similar approach.

In United States v. DiGeronimo, 598 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. ),

cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 180 (1979), the court held that

the defendants’ convictions of interference with inter-

state commerce by means of robbery in violation of 18

U.S.C. §1957 (1976) and of knowing receipt and posses-

sion of goods stolen from interstate commerce in viola-

tion of 18 U.S.C. §659 were improper. Acknowledging

that convictions under two different statutes were in-

volved, unlike the situations presented by Heflin,

Gaddis, and Solimine, the court nonetheless ruled that

the convictions were multiplicitous. It viewed the charge

of theft under §1951 as the functional equivalent of a

charge under the theft provisions of §659. Finding no

support in the legislative history of either statute for the

proposition that Congress wanted to “punish separately

and cumulatively the crimes of robbing a truck of its

contents and receiving the stolen goods,” id. at 751, the

court vacated the conviction and sentence with respect

A-17

to the possession count.!* See Busic v. United States, 48

U.S.L.W. 4535, 4538 (May 19, 1980), citing Simpson v.

United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).

This review of the decisional law convinces us that

the convictions of Garber and Denucci under §659 for

both theft from a foreign shipment and receipt and pos-

session of goods stolen from a foreign shipment are

multiplicitous. Since the jury’s verdict indicates that it

made factual findings that both defendants participated

in the theft and then kept the proceeds, we may con-

clude that a properly instructed jury would have stopped

after making the first finding (see discussion of Gaddis

at page 15 above). Therefore, the proper remedy is to va-

cate the conviction and sentence with respect to the pos-

session count. Id. at 711. Accordingly, we must vacate

the judgments of conviction and the sentences imposed

on Garber and Denucci under Count II.

12. Our decision in United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210 (3d

Cir. 1979) (en banc), is not to the contrary. In Gomez the defendant

was convicted of two offenses under 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (1976):

distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute co-

caine. The court affirmed both of the convictions, but vacated the

sentences in order “to effectuate the congressional intent to prevent

sentence pyramiding, and to avoid the anomalies of a technical ap-

plication of the merger theory.” Id. at 217. Gomez explicitly noted

that the Supreme Court held in Gaddis v. United States, 424 U.S.

544 (1976), that under the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C.

§2113 (1976), “a jury should be instructed that it can convict a de-

fendant for either robbery or receiving, but not for both.” 593 F.2d

at 217 n. 20. This principle applies to the instant case where the

defendants were convicted of theft frorn a shipment in interstate or

foreign commerce and of possession of goods stolen from interstate

or foreign commerce. Gomez, which arises out of a different statute

- concerning drug transactions, as opposed to theft, is factually dis-

tinguishable from the case at hand. In United States v. Dowling,

a (July 9, 1980, 3d Cir. Nos. 79-2130/31 &

80-1444/45), this court vacated in certain situations only the sen-

tences, as opposed to the convictions.

A-18

IV.

Garber and Denucci appeal, in addition, from their

conviction of removing goods from customs custody in

violation of §549. They argue that the copper cathodes

were not in customs custody in March 1978 when they

were stolen. The Government, acknowledging that the

copper was located at the pier outside the north end of

the Northern Metal warehouse and not in a facility oper-

ated by the Customs Service, contends that the cathodes

were in constructive customs custody in March 1978.

Section 549 provides in pertinent part:

“Whoever, maliciously enters any bonded

warehouse or any vessel or vehicle laden with or

containing bonded merchandise with intent unlaw-

fully to remove therefrom any merchandise or bag-

gage therein, or unlawfully removes any merchan-

dise or baggage in such vessel, vehicle, or bunded

warehouse or otherwise in customs custody or

control

* * *

[s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned

not more than two years, or both.” (Emphasis

supplied. )

Courts which have interpreted this statute have held

that goods imported into this country are in constructive

customs custody from the moment of their arrival in the

United States until their release by the Customs Service,

regardless of whether the Customs Service has actual

physical possession. United Staies v. Harold, 588 F.2d

1136, 1142 (Sth Cir. 1979); Mungo v. United States, 423

F.2d 1351, 1354 (4th Cir. 1970).

In the instant case the copper had recently arrived

in the United States from Chile. Constructive customs

custody had thereby been established. The dispute cen-

ters on whether four weeks after arrival the Customs

Service had released the shipment, thus extinguishing

A-19

>

customs custody. An examination of the record before us

reveals that the cargo arrived in Philadelphia on Febru-

ary 22, 1978. The copper in question was accepted by

Northern Metal on February 25.'% At the time of

unloading, the steamship company counted the copper

bundles in the cargo. When Northern Metal took deliv-

ery from the ship, it transferred the bundle count onto a

warehouse certificate, which it forwarded to Cerro.'* A

bond for immediate delivery had already been posted un-

der which the Customs Service could release goods prior

to the payment of the exact amount of the duty.!®

As noted earlier, this shipment was originally con-

signed to Anaconda in Bridgeport, Connecticut, but was

discharged in Philadelphia because it had unexpectedly

been rerouted by the steamship company. At the time it

was unloaded in Philadelphia, a substitute consignee

had not yet been located. The Government relies on this

fact, contending that goods are released from customs

custody only when the consignee accepts delivery from

the shipper. Unfortunately, the Government provides us

with no statutory or decisional authority for this conten-

tion.'© Therefore, we have found it necessary to review

the statutory scheme regulating imported goods.

13. Government Exhibit 6, introduced at trial, documents this

fact.

14. App. at 147a.

15. App. at 178a-182a; App. at 143a.

16. The Government asserts that goods are released from cus-

toms custody when they are “permitted,” or authorized to be deliv-

ered to the next consignee, but cites no support for this assertion. It

does not point to a single statute or case involving Customs custody

in which the word “permitted” is used. The Government turns to 19

C.F.R. §158.1 to locate the definition of “permitted.” Unfortunately,

this regulation sheds no light on this issue. It concerns relief from

duties paid on lost, damaged, abandoned, or exported merchandise,

see 19 C.F.R. §158.0 (1979), a different problem from the one at

hand. While it defines “permitted,” it does so solely for the purpose

of Subpart A, that portion of the regulation regarding lost or missing

A-20

The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§1303-1677g

(1976), sets forth an orderly procedure for ascertaining

and collecting duties. A portion of the Act, §1499, while

not phrased in terms of “release,” appears to refer to the

concept involved. It provides in part:

“Imported merchandise, required by law or reg-

ulations made in pursuance thereof to be inspected,

examined, or appraised, shall not be delivered from

customs custody, except under such bond or other

security as may be prescribed by the Secretary of

the Treasury to assure compliance with all applica-

ble laws, regulations, and instructions which the

Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service is

authorized to enforce until it has been inspected,

examined, or appraised and is reported by the ap-

propriate customs officer to have been truly and

correctly invoiced and found to comply with the re-

quirements of the laws of the United States.” (Em-

phasis supplied)

From this statute we conclude that, generally, customs

custody of imported goods continues until the merchan-

dise has been inspected, found to be correctly invoiced,

and found to otherwise comply with the laws of the Unit-

ed States. See Mungo v. United States, 423 F.2d at 1357.

Further, once the inspection and the requisite findings

have been made — or, if a proper bond is filed, before the

statutory duties are carried out — the goods can be re-

leased from customs custody. !”

packages and deficiencies in contents of packages. It is silent as to

the genesis of the term “permitted.” Furthermore, although there is

reference to theft while in customs custody in Subpart C, the word

“permitted” never appears in that subpart.

17. Another portion of the Act also addresses the issue of re-

lease from customs custody. Section 1484(j) provides in part:

“(j) Merchandise shall be released from customs custody only

to or upon the order of the carrier by whom the merchandise is

brought to the port at which entry is made, except that mer-

A-21

Applying these principles to the facts presented by

this record, we conclude that the copper cathodes had

been released from customs custody at the time of the

theft. We emphasize that a sufficient immediate delivery

bond had been posted, that Northern Metal had accept-

ed delivery from the ship and had transferred the ship’s

bundle count to its warehouse certificate, that 28 days

had elapsed since the cargo had arrived in the United

States, and that there was no representation by the Gov-

ernment that the Customs Service intended to make any

further inspection, examination, or appraisal of the ship-

ment. In view of these circumstances, we believe that

the fact that a specific consignee had not yet been

named is insignificant. Although, in the usual case, a

shipment unloaded at the dock would be earmarked for a

NOTE 17 — (Continued)

chandise in a bonded warehouse shall be released from cus-

toms custody only to or upon the order of the proprietor of the

warehouse. The customs officer shall not be liable to any per-

son in respect of the delivery of merchandise released from cus-

toms custody in accordance with the provisions of this section.

Where a recovery is had in any suit or proceeding against a cus-

toms officer on account of the release of merchandise from cus-

toms custody, in the performance of his official duty, and the

court certifies that there was probable cause for such release by

such customs officer, or that he acted under the directions of

the Secretary of the Treasury, or other proper officer of the Gov-

ernment, no execution shall issue against such customs officer,

but the amount so recovered shall, upon final judgment, be

paid out of moneys appropriated from the Treasury for that

purpose.”

Although a litera] reading of this section might indicate that a pre-

requisite to release is an order from the carrier, we believe that this

section is not controlling in the case before us. This provision ap-

pears to concern the liability of the Customs Service in a bailment

situation when actual custody and control is involved. We are con-

fronted with an instance of constructive, not actual, custody. We

find §1484(j) unhelpful in illuminating when release from con-

structive customs Custody occurs.

A-22

particular consignee and that shipment would be re-

leased directly to the consignee or its agent after a short

time on the pier, this is not the usual case. The

unintended delay of the instant shipment while Cerro

sought an alternative purchaser did not increase the

governmental interest in the goods. In the absence of

any indication that the Customs Service intended to

make any further examination or appraisal of the ship-

ment, we hold that in this case the goods had been re-

leased from constructive customs custody at the time of

the theft.

We note that the cases we have reviewed on this is-

sue are not to the contrary. In United States v. Harold,

588 F.2d at 1136-37, the defendant was employed as a

dock foreman. On the very day the cargo was being

offloaded, he removed five cartons from the ship’s cargo

containers and attempted to place them into his car,

rather than into the warehouse where they were to be

stored. The court upheld his conviction under §549, em-

phasizing that there had not even been a chance for the

Customs Service to inspect the goods or authorize them

for delivery. In Mungo v. United States, 423 F.2d at

1352-53, a ship had arrived carrying a container of im-

ported Scotch whiskey. The container was unloaded

from the ship and placed on a flatbed trailer parked next

to the warehouse at the dock. Four or five days later, the

defendants were apprehended removing cases of whis-

key from the container. In sustaining the §549 convic-

tion, the court stated that the final inspection before re-

lease of the whiskey from customs custody had been

scheduled but had not yet taken place at the time of the

theft.'® The short length of time which had passed since

the ships in Harold and Mungo had arrived and the fact

18. The fina] inspection was scheduled to be performed during

the working hours of February 27. The defendants had removed the

cases a few hours earlier, at 12:35 a.m. on February 27. Mungo v.

United States, 423 F.2d 1351. 1357 (4th Cir. 1970).

A-23

that there were specific customs inspections yet to be

performed distinguish these cases from the one at bar.

Therefore, guided by the principle that criminal

statutes should be strictly construed, we conclude that

under the pertinent statutory and decisional authority

the copper cathodes in this case were no longer in cus-

toms custody at the time of the theft. Accordingly, an es-

sential element of the offense prohibited by §549 is miss-

ing, and we must reverse the judgment of conviction on

Count III.

V.

After careful consideration of other grounds for re-

versal advanced by appellants, which are enumerated in

the Appendix to this opinion, we have concluded that

such grounds are without merit.

Vi.

In conclusion and recapitulation, our review of the

issues presented by these appeals convinces us that the

copper cathodes had not reached their final destination

at the time the theft occurred, and therefore were still

part of a foreign shipment. Thus, the convictions for

theft from a foreign shipment in violation of §659 were

proper. Since the defendants were convicted of theft of

the copper, the convictions under §659 on the posses-

sion charge were improper and will be reversed. Fur-

thermore, the facts of this case indicate that the ship-

ment of copper was not still in Customs custody at the

time of the theft. Thus, the convictions under §549 must

be reversed. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgments

A-24

with respect to the sentences imposed for receipt and

possession of goods stolen from a foreign shipment and

for removal of goods from customs custody. In all other

respects, we will affirm the district court judgments of

conviction and sentence.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

A-25

APPENDIX

Garber and Denucci also advance the following oth-

er ,rounds which they assert warrant reversal of their

convictions:

(A) insufficiency of the evidence to sustain convic-

tions of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §371;'°

(B) jury verdicts contrary to the weight of the evi-

dence and unsupported by substantial evidence which

reasonable men could be convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt was true;?°

(C) misconduct of the prosecutor in offering photo-

graphic exhibits representing the scene of the alleged

crime which were not properly authenticated, in intimi-

dating a defense witness while still under oath, and in

introducing co-defendant’s statement which the pros-

ecutor failed to disclose under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16;7'

(D) admission of evidence which should have been

suppressed because the photographic identifications

were impermissibly suggestive, because the consent to

the first search was not voluntarily given, because the

search warrants were not based on probable cause and

lacked the necessary specificity, because the magistrate

who issued the second search warrant was not informed

of the fact that a prior search had taken place, and be-

cause the statements obtained were involuntary and the

product of coercion;?”

(E) admission of statements without a showing that

such statements were in furtherance of a conspiracy and

also in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123

(1968);?%

19. Item 4 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517. It is noted that

appellant at No. 79-2511 incorporated, at page 37 of his brief, all the

compatible arguments of appellant at No. 79-2517.

20. Item 5 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

21. Item 6 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517

22. Item 7 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517 and Item IV (p.

26) of appellant's brief at No. 79-2511.

23. Item 8 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

A-26

(F) refusal to grant defendant’s motion for bill of

particulars which would have enabled him to prepare

adequately for trial;?*

(G) admission of a video tape re-enactment of the al-

leged crime without a proper foundation, which lacked

probative value and was highly prejudicial, and failure to

give limiting instructions on the evidentiary value of the

video tape film;?°

(H) admission of proof in variance with the indict-

ment;7©

(1) admission of inadmissible evidence in the nature

of legal opinions dealing with the ultimate issue at

trial;?’

(J) undue restriction of defense counsel's cross-ex-

amination of a Government witness regarding his refus-

al to undergo a polygraph examination;”®

(K) admission of photographic exhibits which were

not authenticated;?°

(L) refusal to allow an on-site inspection of the

crime scene or an actual demonstration of the events in-

troduced by the Government through its video tapes;*°

(M) exclusion of relevant and probative evidence

concerning the frequency of thefts which would have ef-

fectively refuted the Government's theory of the case;*!

(N) admission of evidence of defendant's prior

activities; 3?

24. Item 9 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

25. Item 10 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517 and Item 11 (p.

16) of appellant's brief at No. 79-2511.

26. Item 11 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

27. Item 12 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

28. Item 13 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517 and Item III (p.

24) of appellant's brief at No. 79-2511.

29. Item 14 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

30. Item 15 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

31. Item 16 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

32. Item 17 of appellant's brief at No. 79-2517.

A-27

(O) improper interference by the court with the ex-

amination of witnesses by rehabilitating Government

witnesses and extensively cross-examining defense wit-

nesses;°"

(P) instructions to the jury which erroneously stat-

ed the law and unduly stressed the Government’s

case;*4

(Q) denial of request to interrogate all jurors and er-

roneous restriction of the examination of two jurors.*°

33. Item 18 of appellant’s brief at No. 79-2517.

34. Item 19 of appellant’s brief at No. 79-2517.

35. Item 20 of appellant’s brief at No. 79-2517.

A-28

APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FORA NEW TRIAL AND

MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT, DITTER,

J. JULY 20, 1979

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES : CRIMINAL NO. 78-

OF AMERICA : 149

vs. ;

MARVIN GARBER and

NICHOLAS DENUCCI

DITTER, July 20, 1979

On August 11, 1978, a jury returned a verdict of guilty

on all counts of an indictment which charged the defendants

in this case with theft of goods in interstate and foreign

commerce, theft of goods in Customs’ custody, and con-

spiracy. Defendants have now made several post-trial

motions, all of which have been denied for reasons that

follow.

I. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

The court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for

judgment of acquittal. The government proved that the goods

were in interstate or foreign commerce since the evidence

showed that the goods were shipped from Antofogasto, Chile,

and had not yet reached their intended destination of

Bridgeport, Connecticut. See United States v. Angello, 452

F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1971). Moreover, since the goods were

not “permitted” within the meaning of 19 C.F.R. § 158.1,

they remained in Customs’ custody and control at the time of

the theft.

The verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence.

The proof offered at trial established the time and dates of the

A-29

*

crimes. The evidence showed that the defendants were the

only visitors to the area at the times in question, except for

a few taxicabs. It was also shown that particles of copper

were found in the police vehicles used by defendants on the

nights in question and on the clothing worn by the defendants

at the relevant times. The evidence showed that defendant

Denucci twice gave false explanations for defendants’

presence in the area of the crimes. Finally, the government’s

film showed that the crime could have been committed as

charged.

The photographs offered by the government were not

prejudicially inaccurate representations of what they

purported to depict. Both court and jury were informed that

the area had been cleaned and certain obstacles had been

removed after the crimes were committed but before the

photographes were taken.

The defendants have not shown that the prosecutor’s

out-of-court questioning of certain defense witnesses was

improper, and no prejudice has been demonstrated. See

United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1975).

The government had no duty to disclose the existence of

defendant Garber’s statement to government witness,

Walters since the statement was neither written nor recorded

and Mr. Walters was not a government agent. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 16.

The court did not err in denying defendants’ pre-trial

motion to suppress evidence. The reasons in support of this

denial were fully expressed in my findings delivered from the

bench on July 25, 1978. See Suppression Hearing N.T. p.

715-729.

No fatal variance existed between the indictment and

the evidence offered at trial. The alleged variance did not

modify the elements of the crime charged, and defendants

have failed to show how they were prejudiced. See United

States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1974); United

States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942); United

States v. Agnes, 453 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. 1978).

A-30

I have considered defendants’ remaining arguments in

support of their motion for a new trial, and I find them to be

equally without merit.

II. MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT

The indictment in this case was not fatally uncertain or

ambiguous. On the contrary, the indictment informs the

defendants of the charges against them with more than

adequate specificity. Each count of the indictment sets forth

the date and location of the alleged theft, a description of the

goods stolen, the approximate quantity of goods stolen, and

the specific statutes which were violated. The indictment

also sets forth, in Count IV, the specific overt acts which are

alleged to have furthered defendants’ conspiracy.

The argument that this indictment will expose the

defendants to double jeopardy is neither persuasive nor

timely. The law narrowly limits the circumstances under

which a person may be tried by the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania after he has been prosecuted by the United

States for crimes arising from the same conduct. 18 Pa.

C.S.A. §111. Before permitting such a subsequent state

prosecution, the court must determine that the Common-

wealth’s interests were not sufficiently protected by the

federal indictment and trial. See Commonwealth v. Grazier,

lve. _.._., 39S A. 2a 3355 (ISIG); Cont

monwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 286 A. 2d 638 (1971);

Commonwealth v. Mascaro, 394 A. 2d 998 (Pa. Superior

1978). Obviously, this inquiry would necessitate a com-

parison of the federal and state indictments in order to

determine whether they charge different crimes and involve

different governmental interests. Since no state indictment

presently exists, the proper inquiry cannot be conducted by

this court. Rather, the resolution of any double jeopardy

issue that may arise must be left to the state court before

which a subsequent state indictment might be brought.

A-31

III. MOTION TO FORMALLY

INTERROGATE JURORS

By my order of June 25, 1979, I granted defendants’

motion to interrogate formally two members of the jury in

this case, Peter D. Kennedy and Walter G. Wisniewski. The

interrogation was conducted at a hearing held on July 9,

1979. The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether

the jury’s deliberations had been improperly affected by any

“extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside influ-

ence.” See Federal Rules of Evidence 606.

The term “extraneous influence” has been defined to

include “publicity received and discussed in the jury room,

consideration by the jury of evidence not admitted in court,

and communications or other contact between jurors and

third persons.” Government of the Virgin Islands v.Gereau,

523 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted).

After considering the evidence offered at the hearing on

July 9, 1979, I find that no such extraneous influence

existed. The defendants have not alleged the existence of

prejudicial publicity or contact with third persons, and the

witnesses did not testify to any such influence.

The defendants have alleged that the jury was influ-

enced by extra-record evidence in the form of statements and

commentaries of a scientific nature made during the jury’s

deliberations by a juror with a technical background in

chemistry. There is some question as to whether such

statements and commentaries would constitute “extraneous

influence” within the meaning of the definition set forth in

Gereau, supra, even if they dominated the jury’s delib-

erations and had a significant impact on the verdict. I need

not address that question, however, since I find that these

statements, if they occurred at all, had no effect on the guilty

verdict rendered by the jury. It is clear from the testimony

that any such statements occurred infrequently and were

casual in nature. There is considerable doubt as to whether

they were made at all. I find that any statements of the type

alleged by defendants that were made in this case had no

effect on the verdict and were not “‘extraneous influence”’

within the meaning of Gereau, supra. I hold, therefore, that

the defendants are not entitled to a new trial on the ground of

extraneous influence

A-32

75a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES ;: CRIMINAL NO.

OF AMERICA : NO. 78-149

vs.

MARVIN GARBER and

NICHOLAS DENUCCI

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 1979, for the

reasons expressed in the foregoing memorandum, the de-

fendants’ motions for a new trial and for arrest of judgment

are denied. The defendants are ordered to report for sen-

tencing Thursday, September 6, 1979, at 9:30 A.M. in

Courtroom 6A, United States Courthouse, 601 Market

Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

BY THE COURT:

A-33

APPENDIX III

18 § 659 CRIMES Pt. 1

§ 659. Interstate or foreign shipments by carrier; State

prosecutions.

Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes, carries

away, or conceals,or by fraud or deception obtains from any

pipeline system, railroad car, wagon, motortruck, or other

vehicle, or from any tank or storage facility, station, station

house, platform or depot or from any steamboat, vessel, or

wharf, or from any aircraft, air terminal, airport, aircraft

terminal or air navigation facility with intent to convert to his

own use any goods or chattels moving as or which are a part

of or which constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of

freight, express or other property; or

Whoever buys or receives or has in his possession any

such goods or chattels, knowing the same to have been

embezzled or stolen; or

Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes, carries

away, or by.fraud or deception obtains with intent to convert

to his own use any baggage which shall have come into the

possession of any common carrier for transportation in

interstate or foreign commerce or breaks into, steals, takes,

carries away, or conceals any of the contents of such

baggage, or buys, receives, or has in his possession any such

baggage or any article therefrom of whatever nature, know-

ing the same to have been embezzled or stolen; or

Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes by any

fraudulent device, scheme, or game, from any railroad car,

bus, vehicle, steamboat, vessel, or aircraft operated by any

- common carrier moving in interstate or foreign commerce or

from any passenger thereon any money, baggage, goods, or

chattels, or whoever buys, receives, or has in his possession

any such money, baggage, goods or chattels, knowing the

same to have been embezzled or stolen—

A:-34

Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or

imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the

amount or value of such money, baggage, goods or chattels

does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not more than

$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

The offense shall be deemed to have been committed

not only in the district where the violation first occurred, but

also in any district in which the defendant may have taken or

been in possession of the said money, baggage, goods, or

chattels.

The carrying or transporting of any such money, freight,

express, baggage, goods, or chattels in interstate or foreign

commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall

constitute a separate offense and subject the offender to the

penalties under this section for unlawful taking, and the

offense shall be deemed to have been committed in any

district into which such money, freight, express, baggage,

goods, or chattels shall have been removed or into which the

same shall have been brought by such offender.

Ch.31 EMBEZZLEMENT ANDTHEFT _ 18 § 659

To establish the interstate or foreign commerce char-

acter of any shipment in any prosecution under this section

the waybill or other shipping document of such shipment

shall be prima facie evidence of the place from which and to

which such shipment was made. The removal of property

from a pipeline system which extends interstate shall be

prima facie evidence of the interstate character of the

shipment of the property.

A judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits

under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution

under this section for the same act or acts. Nothing contained

in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on

the part of Congress to occupy the field in which provisions

of this section operate to the exclusion of State laws on the

same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this section

be construed as invalidating any provision of State law

A-35

unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes

of this section or any provision thereof.

June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 729; May 24, 1949, c. 139,

§ 13, 63 Stat. 91; Oct. 14,1966, Pub.L. 89-654, § 1(a)-(d),

80 Stat.904.

A-36

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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