Petition — Connor v. Warren

8 0 x 6 4 (Supreme court, U.S.

FILED

No .

OCT 15 1980

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK }

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

JOHN R. CONNOR, Petitioner,

Ve

GEORGE WARREN, Administrator,

Estate of Mary A. Connor,

Deceased, et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

John R. Connor, Pro se

380 Wyoming Avenue

Millburn, New Jersey

(201) 762-5587

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions presented <....cccccsccecccccs

Parties to the proceeding ............

Jurisdiction eeeee#ee¢#7€e. eeeeeetexseeenwe#e#eee8eesee

Constitutional provisions and court

WRne SUVOLURE: 5 ks soa dade abn cee ces

POS wc cectbetcceeee 0+ 0s aR eo o-

Reasons for granting the writ ........

COBMCLUSLON ..6ccce. re iets Chbeee ee

MOGNGIs A .ccccccs toh + 08 seew euee hate

YE EGRESS tel Sita aoe m8 eeees eS's

Appendix C ....... boceeees er ee x

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GUE SD. We-Se ss 48 6s cbaus Trey ee ee

CY 6 4 oh ae-e0e bebe eae Ter TTT eT

Te CTR ETS CCE ee ne

ke a ee cen tehne ewes enon

PEE ©. 8 s.c0 6ectéeeewns TUPereee eta

Appendix ‘STELTTSEPE CeCe Tir) eT ee

EG MTEC TTT TL eT ee

a re per rrr tn suey

Page

2

2

3

14

40

la

3a

6a

7a

8a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Aris Gloves, Inc. v. U. S., 188 F.

“Supp. 50 (Cust. Ct. 1560)........ 28, 32

Berkowitz v. Lyons, 98 N. J. L.

‘ gs fee

Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065(C.A. 4).. 26

Brown v. Ryder, 42 N. J. Eq. 358, 7A.

ee eee, CE. 1966) ..nccccccececs 12

Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v.

Caliwelt. 58 F.2d 721, 731

a ate Me MO. 1932) ..cce ithe 6a maces 6 20

Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v.

Garett, 70 F.2d 969 (Cc. Cc. A. Okla.

NE wii be 4 600 6eca 00s <eéep. Oe

Cowley v. Smith, 46 N. J. L. 380,

50 Am. Rep. 432 (1884)..... Led atte eae 36

Dation v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Mich.

152, 22 N.W.2d 252, 258 (1946)...... 25

Duff v. Sherlock, 432 F. Supp. 423

(D. fil Pa. ' 2s ee oeeeeeveee oeeneee 37

Dupu, v. Tedora, 204 La. 560, 15 So.2d

6, 890 | a area oeeeveee - 25

Field v. Boyle, 503 F.2d 774

4 sll Se A. Till. ee ee 25

Frantz Equipment Co. v. Anderson, 37

N. J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962)......29, 32

; Green Bay v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S.

PEGE CSO ME CesbcCeresorecenscae Lf

ii

Page

Heyer v. Sullivan, 88 N. J. Eq. 165,

102 A. 248 (Sup. 1917), affirmed

88 N. J. Eq. 595, 103 A.

(E. & A. PEPE irk a hin bine aukk wate a tw 17

Hill's Executor v. Smalley, 25

Be Do Le 374 (Bap. L856)... cc cccee 17

Holcomb v. Coryell, 12 N. J. Eq.

eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeene 30

Holly Development, Inc. v. Board of

County Comrs., 140 Colo. 95,

" | ga 2 CR we hb he aera & 0: 28

In the matter of the Estate of

W iam Hadfield, Deceased, 70

N. J. Super. 483 (Union County

te RE ite eben & aie ek able 6a oak 21,22

In re East Windsor Mun. Util. Auth.

v. Shapiro, 57 N. J. 169, 170

eee eveteeeeeeeeeveeeeeeeneneeeeee 16

In re State Treasury Note Indebted-

ness, 185 Okla. 10, 90 P.2d 19,

22 CP te a aaa a

In re Weeks, 4 F. Supp. 558, 560

a). ah SAEED 6 iso 6 bw aleve gu'éie ato ae

Luedeke v. Rosell, 115 N. J. L.

Py SOE Ms TEP ALO 9G) os a vccbvacceces

Lyster v. Berberich, 3 N. J. Super.

78, 65 A.2d 632 (App. Div. 1949)...36

Neilson v. Russell, 76 N. J. L. 655,

659, 71 A. 286, 288, 19 L. R. A.,

N. S. 887, 131 Am. St. Rep. 672

oe NS RS ae ee, by

Polizzotto v. B_aqosting, 170 La.

932, 129 So. 4, 536 (1930).......34,35

iii

Page

Portage Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Reich,

N. J. Super. 600, 148 A.2da 47

De aa ele yt ie ee 29,33

Potter Title and Trust Co. v. Berk-

Shire. Life Ins. Co., 156 Pa. Super.

i 39 A.2d 2608 SE bak ac oe ss & acc 29

Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N. J. 321,

A.2da 204 , SPP al See 39

Sinclair v. Sinclair, 196 Tenn. 538,

S.W. . a 75 Tae) eiesedne 25

The Mechanics National Bank at

Newark: v. Burnet Manufacturin

company, 33 Eq., 6 Stew. 487

eoe@eaoesev eevee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 38

Tidewater Oil Co. v. Mayor and

Council of Cartaret, 44 N. J.

’ , A. 105, 106

DEN si SAGt Gane hGub kien eoeecescs 28

Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Morse,

43 Utah SIS- 136-P> Sé5 (1S La}— 3 ra

Trinity Episcopal Corp. v. Romney,

F. Supp. 1044, 10 De. Ge

N. Ze GENESEE RES Sve ay 37

Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Board

of Review of N. J. Unemployment

egapensat ton Commission, Be Je

td A.2a 443 She SSR 25

Wilson v. City of Lon Branch, 27

N. J. 300, 142 A 34 837, cert.

denied 358 U. S. 873 (1958)—~..... 34

iv

Page

Constitution, statutes and court rules:

United States Constitution:

Fourteenth Amendment.....3,14,18,24,27

New Jersey Statutes:

N.J.S.A. Y Tk See eee

a

ott cabeie

3A: 6—4....

New Jersey Rules:

BRABUS 646% be€ecee

WAG i pacscvisduenandscsncws

4:84-l(b)...

11,20

cocccce ee 3,9,19,21,

4:99-1(b)..

23,26

-4,9,19,20,

Miscellaneous:

21,26

33 C. J. S. Executors and Administra-

8 N. J. Practice, , Wills and

24,31

5385 Cae POP a cawas 00

Administration §

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No.

In the matter of

THE ESTATE

OF

MARY A. CONNOR, DECEASED.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

Petitioner John R. Connor, Executor-

designate of the Estate of Mary A. Connor,

Deceased, hereby petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the

Supreme Court of New Jersey in this case.

(1)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the appointment of an estate

Administrator, obtained without issuance of

an Order to Show Cause, and under circum-

stances where the court possessed prior

knowledge that decedent had died testate,

and had appointed an executor, is void un-

der the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment?

2. Whether a Notice of Application for

Letters of Administration on a decedent's

estate, not predicated upon a statutory re-

quirement of "intestacy," is void under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ARE:

John R. Connor, Pro se (Petitioner

and Executor-designate, Estate

of Mary A. Connor)

380 Wyoming Avenue

Millburn, New Jersey 07041

Albert G. Besser, Esq. (Applicant

for Letters of Administration)

Hannoch, Weisman, Stern & Besser

744 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

George Warren, Esq. (Administrator,

Estate of Mary A. Connor)

Warren, Goldberg & Berman

112 Nassau Street

P. O. Box 645

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

—_———

JURISDICTION

The order of the New Jersey Supreme Court

dismissing the within appeal (App. C, infra,

p- 6a) was entered on June 25, 1980. On

July 23, 1980 the New Jersey Supreme Court

denied a Petition for Rehearing (App. D,

infra, p. 7a). The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(c).

The opinions herein are not reported.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND COURT RULES INVOLVED.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides in part:

No State * * * shall deprive

any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person with-

in its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

N. J. Sup. Ct. C.P.R. 4:84-1(b) provides

in part:

The Superior Court for good

cause or if a caveat is filed or

a dispute arises, may issue an

order to show cause why the pro-

bate or letters sought should

not be granted. The order to

show cause and the complaint may

be served as provided by R. 4:67-

3* * *

N. J.- Sup. Ct. C.P.R. 4:99-1(b) (1968)

provides in part:

Actions in the Superior Court

relating to estates of decedents

* * * may be brought in summary

manner, if the court so orders.

Actions on notice * * * may be

tried and, except where these

rules otherwise direct, proceed-

ings may be taken as in an ac-

tion brought in a summary manner

under R. 4:67 * * * Nothing con-

tained in R. 4:80 to R. 4:99

Shall affect the right of the

Superior Court to proceed in a

plenary manner in any action.

STATEMENT

On November 24, 1977 Decedent Mary A.

Connor passed away in Overlook Hospital in

Summit, N. J. as a result of cardiac shock

following exploratory surgery.

Since 1969 Mrs. Connor had been the plain-

tiff in the matter of Connor v. Flynn, liti-

gation which originated in the Superior Court

of New Jersey, Chancery Division, but which,

at the time of her death, was pending in the

Appellate Division of the Superior Court.+

1 Connor v. Flynn, Docket No. C-2565-68

(trial); Docket No. A~2853-74 (Appellate

Division); Docket No. 16,605 (Supreme Court).

Subsequent to her death, Petitioner, who

is not only her son but also is appointed

Executor in her Last Will and Testament, be-

came occupied for several months with many

of the highly questionable circumstances

surrounding hex sedses death -- and, in par-

ticular, with the legal adequacy of the

"cause of death" listed on her death certifi-

cate.

On January 10, 1978, Mr. Albert G. Besser,

Esq-., an attorney who had previously repre-

sented decedent in’Connor v. Flynn and who,

on May ll, 1977 had had an October 28, 1975

award of $28,657.94 in attorneys' fees re-

versed by judgment of the Appellate Division, |

communicated with the Hon. Arthur Cc. Dwyer,

J.S.C., presiding Chancery justice in the

matter of Connor v. Flynn, to secure a date

for a new trial on the firm's application

for legal fees, the matter having been re-

manded for a re-trial.? (App. E, infra, pp.

8;9a).

2 connor v. Flynn, Docket No. A-898-75.

Ia response to Attorney Besser's request,

the court scheduled a plenary hearing on the

question of counsel fees for March 2, 1978.

(App. F, infra, p.l0a).

On February 27, 1978 there ensued an

event, the facts of which are critical to a

determination of this Petition. On that day

Petitioner personally hand-delivered a let-

ter of previous date to Justice Arthur Cc.

Dwyer, J.S.C. (App. G, infra, p. lla).

(The letter was actually given to Justice

Dwyer's clerk, His Honor having remained in

his chambers, albeit Clearly visible and

within hearing distance of the ensuing ¢on-

versation. ]

Judge Dwyer's clerk immediately inquired

whether Petitioner would be appearing at

the "plenary hearing" set for March 2, 1978.

Petitioner informed him that his mother,

party~-plaintiff in Connor v. Flynn, was de-

ceased, that he did not intend to appear on

that date, that he would not be attending

any court hearings until Mrs. Connor's will

had been probated and Petitioner had legally

been substituted for her as party-plaintiff,

and that probate would be delayed by Peti-

tioner until her death certificate had been

corrected to conform with the true cause of

death, whatever that might eventually be de-

termined to be. ?

Judge Dwyer's clerk then attempted to

persuade Petitioner to attend the March 2,

1978 hearing, anyway, stating that "Mr.

Besser will be there." The clerk also re-

marked that the court already knew of Mrs.

Connor's death and that Judge Dwyer would

allow Petitioner to appear without being .

substituted as party-plaintiff, in view of

the fact that the court had permitted Peti-

tioner to appear on decedent's behalf over

the years in Connor v. Flynn, in spite of

the fact that Petitioner was neither an at-

torney nor a party to that litigation.

3 Under the terms of Mrs. Connor's Last

Will and Testament, Petitioner was bequeath-

ed decedent's interest in Connor v. Plynn.

Petitioner again replied that he would

not be appearing in court on March 2, 1978

and handed the aforementioned letter to the

clerk. (App. G, infra, p. lla). This let-

ter discusses the proper forum for filing a

Motion for Substitution of Parties in

Connor v. Flynn (R. 4:34-1b) and is signed

by Petitioner as Executor, with a copy to

Attorney Besser.

Petitioner did not appear in court on

March 2, 1978, for reasons aforesaid, and

On or about March 4, 1978 he received a let-

ter from the firm of Hannoch, Weisman, Stern

& Besser advising of the firm's intention to

bring an action "to secure letters of admin-

istration upon the Estate of Mary A. Connor."

(App. H, infra, p. 12a).

On March 21, 1978 Hannoch, Weisman, Stern

& Besser sent out a notice (without com-

plaint) entitled "Action for Letters of Ad-

ministration" whereon, alleging the status

of creditor, it announced that an applica-

tion would be made to the Chancery court on

May 22, 1978 for the appointment of an Admin-

istrator on the grounds that "you [have]

failed for more than 40 days from her death

to probate any Will or to make application

for Letters of Administration." (App. I,

infra, p. 13a).

Upon receipt of this notice, Petitioner

contacted Mr. E. Gilman Slingerland, Jr.,

Esq., Slingerland & Slingerland, Maplewood,

New Jersey, the attorney who had prepared

Mrs. Connor's will, and inquired whether

there was any specific time limit within

which that will had to be probated. Peti-

tioner was told by Mr. Slingerland that

there wasn't any, except, that by statute

(N.J.S.A. 3A:3-19) a will could not be pro-

bated within ten days following death.

Petitioner, in reliance upon R. 4:84-1(b)

and R. 4:99-1(b) and his previous written

and oral communications with the court ad-

vising of decedent Mary A. Connor's testacy

and the fact that Petitioner was appointed

Executor, did not appear in court on May 22,

10

1978 for Attorney Besser's application for

letters of (intestate) administration.

The court, however, despite its knowledge

of decedent's testacy and Petitioner's exec-

utorship, elected not to deny this counter-

feit application but to consider it unop-

posed, and entered judgment on May 26, 1978

granting le*ters of administration to Mr.

George Warren, Esq. (App. A, infra,pp. l,

2).

Petitioner declined to accept the valid-

ity of this Administrator's appointment and

commenced the within series of appeals.

Petitioner's first "due process" argument

for reversal of the Administrator's appoint-

ment was advanced in his brief filed with

the Appellate Division of the Superior Court

of New Jersey, and reads:

| The 25 May, 1978 Judgment ap-

pointing George Warren, Esq. as

administrator of the Estate of Mary

A. Connor is null and void ab initio

because said judgment was obtained

in violation of Appellant's consti-

tutional rights to due process of

law.

11

In his brief filed with the Appellate

Division, Petitioner's principal "due pro-

cess" argument was basically predicated on

the trial court's failure to proceed via

order to show cause (R. 4:67) on the Han-

noch application. The Appellate Division,

however, affirmed the judgment of the lower

court on the ground, inter alia, that it had

found "appellant's arguments for reversal to

be unpersuasive." (App. B, infra, p. 3a).

Petitioner then filed an appeal as of

right (R. 2:2-1) with the New Jersey Supreme

Court where, in addition to rearguing the

"due process" issue of the trial court's

failure to issue a show cause order, Peti-

tioner advanced the additional argument

that the Hannoch "notice" was defective in

its failure to allege decedent's intestacy.

By Order filed June 25, 1980, the appeal

was dismissed for "failure to state a sub-

stantial constitutional question as required

by R. 2:2-1(a)." (App. Cc, infra, p. 6a).

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Rehear-

12

ing, which was denied on July 23, 1980

(App. D, infra, p. 7a).

Although the specific issue raised in

this Petition deals exclusively with the

validity of the trial court's May 26, 1978

judgment appointing an administrator for

the Estate of Mary A. Connor, it is perti-

nent to remark on the ensuing conduct of

the Administrator and his sponsor, Hannoch,

Weisman, Stern & Besser.

Following his appointment, and during

the pendency of Petitioner's various ap-

peals of that appointment in the New Jersey

courts, Administrator Warren continued to

administer the within estate -- in spite of

the fact that, under New Jersey probate law,

those appeals had the operative, legal ef-

fect of suspending his powers. Brown v.

Ryder, 42 N. J. Eq. 358, 7 A. 568 (Prerog.

Ct. 1886).

On September 23, 1989 the Administrator

actually procured the arrest of Petitioner,

who, in order to gain his release from a

13

4-day jail confinement, was compelled to

surrender both his mother's will and all

estate assets to the court.

For their efforts, Administrator Warren,

who was allowed to resign his office, and

the Hannoch firm, were awarded the collec-

tive total of $10,163.60 by the court, said

monies to be paid out of the Estate!

The Hannoch firm then proceeded to have

Petitioner "disqualified" from serving as

executor, securing the appointment of an

Administrator, C. T. A., in order to assist

that firm in its constant scheming to un-

lawfully remove monies from a court-admin-

istered trust fund, which constitutes a

principal estate asset.

xkekReik

[Petitioner's Affidavit attesting to the

truth of the matters contained in the with-

in Statement is attached hereto as Appendix

L, infra, p. 17a.]

14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The order of the New Jersey Supreme Court

which is the object of this Petition dis-

missed Petitioner's. appeal for "failure to

state a substantial constitutional question

as required by R. 2:2-l(a)." (App. C,

infra, p. 6a).

The U. S. Supreme Court in Green Bay v.

Patten Paper Co., 172 U. S. 58 (1898) held

that:

No particular form of words

Or phrases has ever been de-

Cclared necessary in which the

claim of federal rights must be

asserted and it is sufficient

if it appears from the record

that*such right was specially

set up or claimed in the state

court in such a manner as to

bring it to the attention of

the court. |

Id., at 58. Under this criteria, Petition-

er's claim asserting violation of his XIV

Amendment "due process" rights was set up

at the earliest possible opportunity, given

the circumstances of this case: in his

brief filed with the Appellate Division of

15

the Superior Court of New Jersey. (See:

Statement, infra, pp. 10-11). In his ap-

pellate brief Petitioner argued that his

"due process" rights were violated when the

trial court appointed an administrator for

the Estate of Mary A. Connor without issu-

ing a show cause order and complaint in the

matter under circumstances where the trial

court had prior knowledge that decedent had

died testate and that Petitioner was ap-

pointed executor. The decision of che ap-

pellate court (App. B, infra, p. 3a) simply

stated that it found this argument to be

"unpersuasive."

On further appeal to the New Jersey Su-

preme Court Petitioner reargued this issue

and added, as an additional ground for re-

versal, the argument that the Hannoch notice

of application for letters of administration

was "defective" because it was not predica-

ted on a claim of "intestacy." The appeal

being dismissed, for reasons aforesaid,

Petitioner applied for a rehearing, which

16

was denied. (App. D, infra, p. 7a).

A preliminary question to be answered in

this case is whether the two constitutional

questions posed are "substantial"?

Under New Jersey law, an appellant is

only entitled to a second appeal as of right

"where the record reveals a substantial ra-

ther than merely a colorable question aris-

ing under the federal or state constitutions

that has not been the subject of a conclu-

sive judicial determination." In re East

Windsor Mun. Util. Auth. v. Shapiro, 57 N. J.

169, 170 (1970). The constitutional points

raised must not be palpably insubstantial.

Tidewater Oil Co. v. Mayor and Council of

Cartaret, 44 N. J. 338, 342, 209 A.2d 105,

106 (1965).

The operative facts of the within case

establish that Petitioner was arbitrarily

deprived of the office of executor of his

late mother's estate not only on account of

the failure of the trial court to follow

17

its own rules but also by a misleading, and

probably fraudulent, "notice" prepared by

one of decedent's former attorneys.

Accordingly, the "due process" questions

arising herein, where Petitioner has been

deprived of his title and right to the of-

fice of executor, are substantial because,

under New Jersey law, said title and powers

. constitute a property right due to the fact

that "[a]n executor derives from the will

his title and authority respecting the de-

cedent's personalty on the instant of the

testator's death." Hill's Executor v.

Smalley, 25 N. J. L. 374 (Sup. 1856). Heyer

vy. Sullivan, 88 N. J. Eq. 165, 102 A. 248

(Sup. 1917), affirmed 88 N. J. Eq. 595,

103 A. 1052 (E. & A. 1918). Neilson v.

Russell, 76 N. J. L. 655, 659, 71 A. 286,

288, 19 L. R. A., N. S., 887, 131 Am. St.

Rep. 672 (E. & A. 1908).

The second part of New Jersey's "substan-

tial question" test is very easily answered

in this case. Neither of the specific con-

+

-

18

stitutional questions presented in this

case and reargued in this Petition for a

writ of certiorari has been the subject of

a prior conclusive judicial determination.

Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court's

reason for dismissing Petitioner's appeal

is in conflict with many decisions, dis-

cussed hereinafter, from other state courts

of last resort, as well as federal courts

of appeal, on the issue of what constitutes

procedural "due process" under the Four-

teenth Amendment.

a. Whether the appointment of

an estate Administrator, obtained

without issuance of an Order to

Show Cause, and under circumstan-

ces where the court possessed prior

knowledge that decedent had died

testate, and had a inted an exec-

utor, is void under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

The pertinent procedures governing an ap-

plication for letters of administration are

spelled out in the Civil Practice Rules list-

ed in the Rules Governing the Courts of the

19

State of New Jersey and, for purposes of

this Petition, R. 4:99-1(b) and R. 4:84-1(b).

R. 4:94-1(b) PROBATE ACTIONS: IN GENERAL,

Summary Actions provides that:

Actions in the Superior Court

relating to estates of decedents

* * * may be brought in summary

manner, if the court so orders.

Actions on notice * * * may be

tried and, except where these

rules otherwise direct, proceed-

ings may be taken as in an ac-

tion brought in a summary manner

under R. 4:67 * * * Nothing con-

tained in R. 4:80 to R. 4:99

shall affect the right of the

Superior Court to proceed in a

plenary manner in any action.

(emphasis added)

R. 4:84-1(b) provides that:

The Superior Court for good

cause or if a caveat is filed or

a dispute arises, may issue an

order to show cause why the pro-

bate or letters sought should

not be granted. The order to

show cause and the complaint may

be served as provided by R. 4:67-

ao 92 8 (emphasis added)

R. 4:99-1(b) gives to the trial divis-

ions of the Superior Court the option of

proceeding either in a summary or a plenary

20

manner in summary probate actions. If the

proceeding is to be summary, R. 4:99=1(b)

provides that it is to be brought under

R. 4:67, which rule states:

If the action is brought in a

Summary manner pursuant to R.

4:67-l(a), the complaint, veri-

fied by affidavit * * * may be

presented to the court ex parte

* * * [t]he court, if satisfied

with the sufficiency of the ap-

plication, shall order the de-

fendant to show cause why final

judgment should not be rendered

for the relief sought.

The reference to "plenary manner" in

R. 4:99-1(b) means, in common legal usage,

nothing less than a full trial. "'Plenary

suit' differs from ‘summary proceeding' in

that it proceeds on formal pleadings, for-

mal summons brings in parties; fime for

pleading and hearing is had, usually by ex-

amination of witnesses." Central Republic

Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721,

731 (Cc. C. A. Mo. 1932) °

In the within case, neither of the two

21

prescribed courses of action was followed

by the trial court. The Hannoch complaint

was presented to the court ex parte --

however it was never served upon any mem-

ber of decedent's family in accordance with

R. 4:99-1(b) or R. 4:84-1(b), which rules

Petitioner relied upon, to his detriment.

R. 4:84-1(b) would require the issuance

of a show cause order on the Hannoch appli-

cation because a "dispute" had arisen within

the meaning of that rule, as interpreted by

the New Jersey courts.

' In the matter of the Estate of William

Hadfield, Deceased, 70 N. J. Super. 483

(Union County Ct. 1961) involved a very sim-

ilar factual situation to the within case.

Hadfield concerned an application to set

aside a surrogate's judgment granting let-

ters of administration to an administrator.

In granting the application, the Union

County Court, Probate Division, held that

the surrogate had been deprived of juris-

22

diction to act because a "dispute" had a-

risen when the applicant, an attorney, ccn-

ferred with a probate clerk in the surro-

gate's office advising the clerk that he

"anticipated" receiving powers of attorney

from the heirs authorizing his appointment,

and the attorney confirmed the conversation

with a letter to the Surrogate:

Furthermore, the conference of

August 9, 1961 with the probate

clerk, and the letter of the same

date to the surrogate, created a

dispute in the surrogate court

within the meaning of R.R. 5:33

(a) (1). This dispute deprived the

surrogate of jurisdiction to make

any appointment at all. In re

Alexandravicus, supra. Accordingly,

the action of the surrogate will

be set aside.

Id., at 486. Therefore, given the Hadfield

interpretation of "dispute," Petitioner's

February 27, 1978 conversation with Chancery

Justice Dwyer's clerk, informing him of

Mrs. Connor's testacy, and the February 26,

1978 letter to the court, which Petitioner

signed as executor (See: Statement, infra,

23

pp. 6-8), are indistinguishable from the

type of occurrences which sufficed to create

the "dispute" in Hadfield, supra.

Accordingly, Petitioner's detions served

to notice a "dispute" within the meaning of

R. 4:84-1(b) and the trial court should not

have appointed an administrator without

first serving a show cause order and the

Hannoch complaint upon Petitioner and all

other members of decedent's family.

It is Petitioner's contention that a

show cause order was the maximum allowable

action that the trial court should have

taken on its review of the Hannoch applica-

tion for letters. In point of fact, given

the court's knowledge of decedent's testacy,

as well as Petitioner's executorship, this

application should have been denied by the

' court.

As a matter of law, it would appear that

because the trial court already knew that a

24

will existed, the judgment appointing an

(intestate) administrator is void ab initio.

"A grant of administration as in case of

intestacy, where the decedent left a valid

will which was not known of at the time,

but is afterward produced and probated, is

voidable only and not void ..." 33 c. J. S.

Executors and Administrators, §30 at 920

(1979). Impliedly then, according to

Corpus Juris Secundum, a grant of adminis-

tration where the decedent left a valid will

which was known of at the time of the ap-

pointment is void and ultra vires.

2 8 @

The failure to follow the rules in the

matter of the Hannoch application for letters

of administration on this estate establish

a serious abridgment of Petitioner's "due

process" rights.

The constitutional limitations in the XIV

Amendment and in the "due process" limita-

tions of the state constitution are designed

25

to safeguard fundamental rights of persons

and property against arbitrary and oppres-

sive state action. Washington Nat. Ins.

Co. v. Board of Review of N. J. Unemploy-

ment Compensation Commission, 1N. J. 545,

64 A.2d 443 (1949). "'[D]ue process of

law' means, in the due course of legal pro-

ceedings according to the rules and forms

which have been established for the pro-

tection of private rights..." (emphasis

added) Sinclair v. Sinclair, 196 Tenn. 538,

268 S.W.2d 573, 575 (1954). Accord: Dupuy

v. Tedora, 204 La. 560, 15 So.2d 886, 890

(1943). Dation v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Mich.

152, 22 N.W.2d 252, 258 (1946).

"Due Process quéetions under the Federal

Constitution may be presented either by

failure of the state to follow its own rules

or by state rules serving as a deprivation

of due process." Field v. Boyle, 503 F.2d

774 (C. C. A. I11. 1974). And "[w]lhere the

sovereign has established rules to govern

26

its own conduct it will be held to self-

imposed limitations on its own authority,

departure from which denies procedural due

process." Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065

(C. A. 4).

The operative facts herein establish

conclusively that the trial court substan-

tially departed from -- in fact, totally

failed to follow -- those court rules, R.

4:99-1(b) and R. 4:84-1(b), which govern

summary probate applications of this type.

Given the court's knowledge of deced-

ent's testacy and Petitioner's executor-

ship, the Hannoch application for letters

of admininistration should have been denied.

At the maximum, the court should have done

no more than issue a show cause order and

complaint, in accordance with R. 4:84-1(b).

For the Chancery court to proceed to

judgment, on a complaint filed ex parte,

under the circumstances of this case, not

only violated the aforesaid court rules

27

but also constituted an "arbitrary and

capricious" action, in violation of this

Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment "due

process" rights.

28

b. Whether a Notice of Applica-

tion for Letters of Administration

on a decedent's estate, not predi-

cated upon a statutory requirement

of “intestacy,” 1S void under the

Due Process Clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment?

The second "due process" issue addres-

sed in this Petition is whether the Hannoch

Notice for Letters of Administration (App. I,

infra, p.13a) constitutes a substantial com-

pliance with the controlling statute or

whether the process, itself, is so radically

defective that it amounts to no legal process

at all.

The test to determine the legal suf-

ficiency of a notice is that "[a] notice

must be clear, definite, and explicit, and

not ambiguous." Aris Gloves, Inc. v. U.S.,

188 F. Supp. 50 (Cust. Ct. 1960).. Accord:

Holly Development, Inc. v. Board of County

Comrs., 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 (1959).

"Clearness" has been defined by the

New Jersey Supreme Court to mean that "it

[the notice] should give the necessary in-

29

formation * * * the notice is not clear un-

less its meaning can be comprehended with-

out explanation." Frantz Equipment Co. v.

Anderson, 37 N. J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962).

Accord: In re Weeks, 4 F. Supp. 558, 560

(D. C. Texas 1933). (emphasis added).

The general rule is that where a

method of giving notice is prescribed by

statute, such method is exclusive and there

must be strict compliance with the statute.

Potter Title and Trust Co. v. Berkshire

Life Ins. Co., 156 Pa. Super. 1, 39 A.2d

268 (1944).

Where, however, the statute does not

prescribe a form of notice the issue then

becomes whether the notice given consti-

tutes a "substantial compliance" with the

statute, construed in the light of its in-

tent and purpose. Portage Shoe Mfg. Co. v.

Reich, 53 N. J. Super. 600, 148 A.2d 47

(1959). Accord: Tooele Meat & Storage Co.

v. Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965 (1913).

The pertinent and controlling statute

30

in this case is N.J.S.A. 3A:6-4 Letters of

Administration, which states:

If any person dies intestate,

administration of the personal es-

tate of such intestate shall be

granted to the surviving spouse of

such intestate, if he or she will

accept the same, and, if not, or

if there be no such person, then

to the next of kin of such intes-

tate, or some of them, if they or

any of them will accept the same,

and, if none of them will accept

the same, then to such other pro-

per person as will accept same.

If such intestate leaves no re-

lations justly entitled to the ad-

ministration of his personal es-

tate, or if his next of kin shall

not claim the administration within

40 days after the death of such in-

testate, the superior court or sur-

rogate's court may grant letters of

administration to any fit person

applying therefor. (emphasis added)

The legal distinction between a general

administrator and an executor is that the

former is appointed by the court where there

is an intestacy, whereas the latter is ap-

pointed by the will of the decedent. Holcomb

v. Coryell, 12 N. J. Eq. 289 (1857).

The critical and operative word in

N.J.S.A. 3A:6-4, appearing no less than six

31

times, is "intestate" and Petitioner sub-

mits that any notice of application for

letters under N.J.S.A. 3A:6-4 must include

a claim of intestacy because "it is a neces-

Sary prerequisite to a grant of ordinary ad-

ministration on the estate of a decedent

that he should have died intestate."

33 C. J. S. "Executors and Administrators,"

§30, p. 920 (1979). "A grant of such admin-

istration necessarily involves, and is based

on, a finding or adjudication of intestacy..."

Id., at 920.

The Hannoch "notice" (App. I, infra, p.

13a) absolutely fails to assert decedent

Mary A. Connor's intestacy but, instead,

merely states as the grounds for the appli-

cation:

"you having failed for more

than 40 days from her death to

probate any will or to make ap-

plication for Letters of Admini-

stration." (App. I, infra, p.13a)

Neither of the two reasons stated in the

Hannoch notice is legally sufficient to serve

as a basis for the application because of the

32

fact that N.J.S.A. 3A:6-4 exclusively limits

the issuance of letters of administration to

situations where there is an intestacy.

Not only is there no New Jersey statute

that would require the probate of a will

within 40 days after death (Hannoch Reason

#1) but also a third party (a "fit" person)

may Only apply for letters where the dece-

dent's next-of-kin fail to apply "within

40 days after the death of such intestate..."

N.J.S.A. 3A:6-4. (Hannoch Reason #2) (em-

phasis added). The two reasons cited in

the Hannoch "notice" are therefore clearly

erroneous as a matter of law.

Consequently, the Hannoch notice does

not meet the test enunciated in Aris Gloves,

Inc., supra ["notice must be clear, definite

and explicit, and not ambiguous"], it does

not meet the standard defined in Frantz Equ-

ipment Company, supra ["it should give the

necessary information * * * the notice is

not clear unless its meaning can be compre-

33

hended without explanation"] and it does not

constitute "substantial compliance" with the

controlling statute, N.J.S.A. 3A:6-4, as re-

quired by Portage Shoe Mfg. Co., supra.

x ke

Respondent Hannoch, Weisman, Stern &

Besser's appellate brief contains a refer-

ence (Db 7-24) to the source of the form of

notice which was used by the firm in its ap-

plication, specifically citing to 8 N. J.

Practice, Clapp, Wills and Administration,

§2283 (1978).

Enclosed herewith as Appendix "J" is a

copy of the cited Clapp form. As can be

readily seen, it contains neither of the

reasons cited in the Hannoch notice but, in-

stead, refers solely to a decedent's "intes-

tacy." (App. g, infra, p. 15a)

The Hannoch strategem, of deleting the

word "intestate" from the Clapp form of

notice and inserting, in lieu thereof, the

words "you having failed for more than 40

34

days from her death to probate any Will or

to make application for Letters of Admini-

stration" was deliberately done in order to

mislead the parties on whom the notice was

served -- as a result of which this notice

is vitiated. See: Polizzotto v. D'Agostino,

170 La. 932, 129 So. 534, 536 (1930). In re

State Treasury Note Indebtedness, 185 Okla.

10, 90 P.2d 19, 22 (1939).

An exception to this rule would be found

where "surplusage" which did not mislead

Or prejudice, would not vitiate the notice.

Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Garett,

70 F.2d 969 (C.C.A. Okla. 1934). Wilson v.

City of Long Branch, 27 N. J. 360, 142 A.2a

837, cert. denied 358 U. S. 873 (1958).

The reasons advanced by the Hannoch firm,

however, do not qualify as surplusage per se.

They are not in addition to a claim of intes-

tacy, or, for that matter, any other reason.

They stand in this notice as the sole cited

grounds for the firm's application. However,

35

whether deemed "surplusage" or not, the

grounds cited in the firm's notice are

"misleading" and therefore the process it-

self is vitiated. Polizzotto v. D'Agostino,

supra, at 932.

Wherefore, the process, itself is defec-

tive under the aforementioned constitutional

"due process" standards, causing the "notice"

herein to be a legal nullity.

x keke

What the United States Supreme Court is

actually confronted with in the within Peti-

tion is a judgment appointing an estate ad-

ministrator that has been secured through

fraud -- because the Hannoch notice is fraud-

ulently misleading. See: Berkowitz v. Lyons,

98 N. J. L. 198, 119 A. 20 (1922). Not only

are the grounds for the firm's application

misleading, but also "wilfully made as to a

material fact for the purpose of inducing a-

nother to act-on them * * * to his injury."

Lyster v. Berberich, 3 N. J. Super. 78, 65 A.

36

2d 632 (App. Div. 1949).

To constitute a fraud, intent is a neces-

sary element. Luedeke v. Rosell, 115 N.J.L.

194, 178 A. 799 (1935). Cowley v. Smith,

46 N.J.L. 380, 50 Am. Rep. 432 (1884).

The operative facts of the within case

Clearly demonstrate the intent of the Hannoch

firm to employ deception and artifice for

the purpose of deliberately misrepresenting

material facts to Petitioner. How do we know

this? We know it because the complaint that

was filed by the Hannoch firm states on its

first page:

"1. On November 24, 1977

Mary A. Connor died intestate..."

(emphasis added)

(App. K, infra, p. 16a)

This complaint, which was never served

upon Petitioner, or any other member of dece-

dent's family, is conclusive evidence that

the Hannoch firm was very much aware that

"intestacy" is a statutory requirement for

the issuance of letters of administration.

37

The next question that must be answered

is whether Petitioner acted on the mislead-

ing reasons stated in the Hannoch notice,

to his injury?

As heretofore related in the Statement

within, upon Petitioner's receipt of the

Hannoch notice he immediately contacted Mr.

E. Gilman Slingerland, Jr., Esq., the at-

torney who had prepared Mrs. Connor's will,

and inquired as to whether there was any

legal obligation on Petitioner's part to

probate his mother's will within 40 days,

as alleged by Hannoch, Weisman, Stern &

Besser. Mr. Slingerland replied that there

was no such requirement, excepting that a

will could not be probated within 10 days

after death. N.J.S.A. 3A:3-19.

"The fundamental requisite of due process

* * * is the opportunity to make an informed

choice whether to acquiesce or contest * * *"

Duff v. Sherlock, 432 F. Supp. 423 (D. C. Pa.

1977). Accord: Trinity Episcopal Corp v.

38

Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1084 (D.C.N.Y.

1974).

Petitioner consulted an attorney on the

principal reason asserted in the Hannoch

notice, and being informed of its legal in-

validity, elected to take no further action

[apart from his having already informed the

court of Mrs. Connor's testacy on February

27, 1980] with respect to an application

the court should have denied or, at the max-

imum, issued an order to show cause.

Petitioner therefore acted on the mis-

leading application of the Hannoch firm to

his injury, thus being fraudulently deprived

of the executorship to which he is entitled

and to which he has a right of appointment

under the terms of the Last Will and Testa-

ment of Mary A. Connor.

| Fraud perpetrated by means of a

judgment is no more entitled to im-

munity than a fraud perpetrated by

means Of a deed or mortgate * * *

that the forms of law have been

pursued is no protection in a court

of equity, if the result aimed at

and reached is fraud.

The Mechanics National Bank at Newark v.

39

Burnet Manufacturing Company, 33 Eq., 6

Stew. 487 (1881).

It has long been established that a

"court has inherent power to control its

own judgments to protect itself from the

fraud of litigants." Shammas v. Shammas,

9N. J. 321, 88 A. 2d 204 (1952). Also,

"(rjelief from a final judgment or order

for fraud upon the court may be allowed

under New Jersey rules regardless of whether

the fraud charged is denominated intrinsic

or extrinsic." Id., at 321.

Wherefore, the Hannoch "notice" of ap-

plication for letters of administration upon

the Estate of Mary A. Connor, being fraudu-

lent, and the Judgment appointing an admini-

strator, being predicated upon that fraud,

are both void as a matter of law.

40

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition

for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Onc <&

HN R. CONNOR, Pro se

21 September, 1980

la

APPENDIX A

JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT,

CHANCERY DIVISION, ESSEX COUNTY

Docket No. P-392-77

(Decided May 25, 1978)

In the matter of

THE ESTATE

OF

MARY A. CONNOR, DECEASED.

Before:

DWYER, Chancery Judge.

DWYER, Chancery Judge:

It appearing by the complaint of Hannoch,

Weisman, Stern & Besser, Esqs., that Mary A.

Connor, late of the County of Essex and

State of New Jersey, died on November 24,

1977, intestate; and it further appearing

that due notice of the application of the

plaintiff has been given to all of the com-

2a

petent adult next of kin entitled to admini-

stration upon the estate of the said intes-

tate, whose right thereto is prior or equal

to that of the plaintiff.

It is thereupon on this 25 day of May,

1978, adjudged that letters of administra-

tion upon the estate of the said Mary A.

Connor be granted to George Warren, Esq.,

upon his giving bond to the Superior Court

of New Jersey in the sum of $5,000.00, con-

ditioned according to law, and with sure-

ties to be approved by this court which a-

mount shall be received upon the filing of

the inventory.

/s/ ARTHUR C. DWYER,

J. me Ca

3a

APPENDIX B

OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION

Docket No. A-4484-77

(Decided September 24, 1979)

In the matter of

THE ESTATE

OF

MARY A. CONNCR, DECEASED.

Before:

MATTHEWS, Presiding Judge,

ARD and POLOW, Appellate Judges.

Per Curiam

Appellant Connor appeals from the May 25,

1978 final judgment entered in the chancery

division, Essex County, granting letters of

administration to George Warren, Esquire, up-

on the Estate of Mary A. Connor.

Assuming issuance of letters of administra-

tion on application of a creditor is a "final"

appealable judgment, we find appellant's argu-

4a

ments for reversal to be unpersuasive. Jur-

isdiction to grant letters of administration

in instances where there has been no prior

application within 40 days after death is

specified in N.J.S.A. 3A:6-4. See Clapp,

Wills and Administration, 3d ed. §§705, pp.

276 and 280. In the words of N.J.S.A. 3A:

6-15, "it shall be the duty of any person

desiring original letters of administration,"

to make such application where decedent is

intestate. That no prior application was

made is undenied.

Although appellant claims to be in pos-

session of a will of decedent which names

him executor, he has rejected every effort

to have him produce such a document. The

duty of one who is designated executor and

in possession of a will, to produce it for

probate has been established since Day v.

Day, 3 N. J. Eq. 549 (Prerog. 1831). See

Ellicott v. Chamberlain, 38 N. J. Eq. 604

(E. & A. 1884) and Clapp, cited above, §116

Biss

5@2

at p. 204. Enforcement is provided by N.Jd.

S.A. 3A:3-23 and is carried out, as in this

case, by summary proceedings, In re Bracher's

Will, 60 N. J. Eq. 350 (Prerog. 1899), aff'd.

60 N. J. Eq. 449 (E. & A. 1900).

Affirmed.

6a

APPENDIX C

ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

Docket No. 16,613

(Decided June 24, 1980)

In the matter of

THE ESTATE

OF

MARY A. CONNOR, DECEASED.

Before:

WILENTZ, Chief Justice.

This matter having been duly considered

by the Court, it is ORDERED that the appeal

is hereby dismissed for failure to state a

substantial constitutional question as re-

quired by R. 2:2-1(a).

WITNESS, the Honorable Robert N. Wilentz,

Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 24th day of

June, 1980.

/s/ STEPHEN W. TOWNSEND,

Clerk.

7a

APPENDIX D

ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

Docket No. 16,613

(Decided July 21, 1980)

In the matter of

THE ESTATE

OF

MARY A. CONNOR, DECEASED.

Before:

WILENTZ, Chief Justice.

This matter having been duly presented

to the Court, it is ORDERED that the motion :

for rehearing is denied.

WITNESS, the Honorable Robert N. Wilentz,

Chief Justice, at Trenton, this 21st day of

July, 1980.

/s/ STEPHEN W. TOWNSEND,

Clerk.

8a

APPENDIX E

HANNOCH, WEISMAN, STERN & BESSER

Counsellors at Law

744 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

January 10, 1978

Honorable Arthur C. Dwyer

Superior Court of New Jersey

Hall of Records

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Re: Connor v. Flynn

Docket No. A-898-75

Dear Judge Dwyer:

In the above-entitled matter, which is

before Your Honor, there is unresolved an

application by various counsel for counsel

fees.

By judgment entered on October 28, 1975

by Judge Antell, fees were awarded (copy en-

closed herewith), but on May 11, 1977 that

judgment was reversed by the Appellate Divi-

sion for reasons set forth in its opinion,

also enclosed.

The matter thus has been remanded to the

trial court for a new plenary hearing.

There is no immediate urgency, but since

the monies paid to plaintiff pursuant to

various judgments below in the substantive

action are on deposit with the clerk of the

court, and drawing only nominal interest, I

would assume that she too, as well as coun-

sel, would like the matter resolved.

Accordingly, may I ask that Your Honor's

office procure the file in this matter and

9a

communicate with all parties with respect to

an appropriate hearing date. I believe that

1-1/2 days will be required.

I should also advise the court of one pro-

blem. In the past plaintiff has been "repre-

sented" by her son who is not a member of the

bar; while no one objected to this before the

Appellate Division, where the court was at

least able to confine the presentation to the

record and legal issues then before it, in my

opinion Mr. Connor's participation at the

trial court proceedings has contributed might-

ily to past difficulties. I will object a-

gainst his participation at any future hear-

ing, except in the capacity as a witness. I

would strongly urge the court to advise

plaintiff to obtain counsel or else be pre-

pared to represent herself.

Respectfully,

/s/ ALBERT G. BESSER

AGB/mn

Enclosures

cc: Fred Blackwell, Esq.

John J. Hanlon, Esq.

Mrs. Mary Connor

10a

APPENDIX F

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

Essex County Courts Bldg.

Newark, New Jersey

January 26, 1978

Albert G. Besser, Esq. Robert Cherry, Esq.

Hannoch, Weisman, Stern 152 Market Street

& Besser Paterson, N. J.

744 Broad Street 07505

Newark, N. J. 07102

Mrs. Mary A. Connor Fred Blackwell, Esq.

380 Wyoming Avenue 19129 Roman Way

Millburn, N. J. 07041 Gaithersburg, Md.

20760

John B. O'Neill, Esq.

Milton, Keane & Brady

40 Journal Square

Jersey City, N. J.

07306

Re: Connor v. Flynn

Dear Madam & Sirs:

The above-named cause has been remanded

to this court for a plenary hearing on the

question of counsel fees. This matter will

be heard on March 2, 1978, at 9:00 a.m.

Very truly yours,

/s/ ARTHUR C. DWYER, J.S.C.

ACD: ras

lla

APPENDIX G

380 Wyoming Avenue

Millburn, N. J. 07041

26 February, 1978

Justice Arthur C. Dwyer, J.S.C.

Superior Court of New Jersey Re: Connor

Essex County Courts Building Vv.

Newark, New Jersey 07102 Flynn

Dear Justice Dwyer:

Please be advised that a Motion for Sub-

stitution of Parties, under R.4:34-1l1(b), in

the above matter, is pending the resolution

of the matter of a correct death certificate

for Mary A. Connor.

In view of my mother's death, should not

the motion for substitution, at least with

respect to A-898-75 [versus A-2853-74, which

is pending in Chancery Division], be made

in the Appellate Division?

I would further advise the court that

Attorney Cherry is neither a party to any

of the Connor v. Flynn proceedings nor does

he represent either the Estate of Mary Ellen

Flynn or the Estate of Mary A. Connor.

Very truly yours,

/s/ John R. Connor,

Executor

cc: Besser

O'Neill

Cherry

Blackwell

12a

APPENDIX H

HANNOCH, WEISMAN, STERN & BESSER

Counsellors at Law

744 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

March 3, 1978

Mr. Thomas B. Connor

380 Wyoming Avenue

Millburn, New Jersey 07041

Re: Estate of Mary A. Connor

Dear Mr. Connor:

This is to advise you that we are bring-

ing an action to secure letters of admini-

stration upon the Estate of Mary A. Connor.

The object of this inquiry is to give you

notice of the action so that you might ap-

pear and apply for letters, if that is your

wish.

In connection with our action, please ad-

vise the names and addresses of your child-

ren and the names, addresses and ages of

each of your grandchildren.

Enclosed is a stamped return envelope

for your convenience in replying.

Very truly yours,

/s/ ASHLEY STEINHART

/le

Enclosure

13a

APPENDIX I

HANNOCH, WEISMAN, STERN & BESSER

744 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

(201) 621-8800

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

CHANCERY DIVISION: ESSEX

COUNTY

Civil Action

In the matter of the Estate: ACTION FOR LETTERS

i _ OF ADMINISTRATION

MARY A. CONNOR, Deceased osinianees

TO: Thomas B. Connor, widower, and Thomas B.

Connor, Jr., John R. Connor, Robert L. Connor,

Carol Moken, next of kin and heirs of Mary A.

Connor, deceased:

You are hereby notified that Hannoch, Weis-

man, Stern & Besser, a creditor of Mary A.

Connor, late of the County of Essex, will on

May 22, 1978, at 10:00 A.M. make application

to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hall of

Records, Newark, New Jersey, for the appoint-

ment of some fit person as administrator of

the estate of the said Mary A. Connor, you

having failed for more than 40 days from her

death to probate any Will or to make applica-

tion for Letters of Administration.

l4a

Hannoch, Weisman, Stern &

Besser, Attorneys Pro se

By_/s/ ASHLEY STEINHART

A Member of the Firm

DATED: Newark, New Jersey

March 21, 1978

15a

APPENDIX J

8 New Jersey Practice, Clapp, Wills and Ad-

Ministration §2283 (1978)

(FORM)

ESSEX COUNTY SURROGATE'S COURT

In the Matter of the Estate)

NOTICE OF APPLI-

of ) CATION FOR LET-

TERS OF ADMINI-

JOHN JONES, Deceased ) STRATION

To: Richard Jones, one of the next of kin of

John Jones, Deceased:

You Are Hereby Notified that on ’

the day of , 19 , at 9 A.M.

I shall apply to the Surrogate of the County

of Essex at his office in the Hall of Records,

Room 206, Market and High Streets in the City

of Newark, for the grant to William Jones,

of letters of administration upon the estate

of John Jones, late of the City of Newark

in the County of Essex and State of New Jer-

sey, who died on or about the day of

, 19__, intestate.

Dated: Newark, N.J.

P an:

A.B.

Attorney for William Jones

l6a

APPENDIX K

Set out below is an excerpt from the com-

plaint filed by Hannoch, Weisman, Stern &

Besser in the within matter.

HANNOCH, WEISMAN, STERN & BESSER

Counsellors at Law

744 Broad Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

CHANCERY DIVISION-ESSEX COUNTY

DOCKET NO.

In the Matter of

The Estate : Civil Action

of : VERIFIED COMPLAINT

IN ACTION FOR

Mary A. Connor, Deceased.: ADMINISTRATION

Plaintiff, Hannoch, Weisman, Stern & Bes-

ser, Esqs., with offices at 744 Broad Street,

Newark, New Jersey 07102, by way of complaint,

says:

lL. On November 24, 1977, Mary A. Connor

died intestate, domiciled at 380 Wyoming Ave-

nue, in the Town of Millburn, County of Es-

sex and State of New Jersey.

" 17a

APPENDIX L

John R. Connor, Pro se

380 Wyoming Avenue —

Millburn, New Jersey 07041

(201) 762-5587

In the matter of

THE ESTATE : Civil Action

OF 3 AFFIDAVIT

MARY A. CONNOR, DECEASED.

State of New Jersey)

) SS:

County of Camden )

a

Personally appeared before me, John R.

Connor, who, first being duly sworn, upon

-his oath, deposes and says that:

1. I have read the facts set forth in

the Statement to my Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari, dated September 21, 1980, and

I aver, of my own knowledge, that such

facts are true and correct.

Fas

(Signature of Affiant)

Signed and sealed tr day 7 elober

before me this eensna 1980

gh

Me vig a ee er

Notary Public

State of New Jersey

MARIA F. PEPIAK

NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY

My Commission Expires Mas, 19, 1983