Petition — Hospital Central Services Ass'n v. United States

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Supreme Court, U, ea

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CROGk Fire we

No. - |

ae DAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

HospriTAL CENTRAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Tuomas S. ZILLY

LANE, POWELL, Moss &

MILLER

Counsel for Petitioner

3800 Rainier Bank Tower

Seattle, WA 98101

Telephone: 223-7016

CRAFTSMAN @ MET PRESS c@@BO SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1) Whether a non-profit corporation, whose members

are all tax-exempt charitable hospitals within the meaning

of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of

1954, as amended, (the “Code” ), and whose only activity

is providing linen and laundry services to those tax-exempt

members, is a charitable organization within the meaning

of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore exempt

from taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code.

(2) Whether an organization, which is exempt from

taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code, is denied ex-

emption because of the later enactment of Section 501(e)

of the Code.

(3) Whether Section 501(e) of the Code is the ex-

clusive section under which tax-exempt hospitals may

jointly organize and operate a non-profit shared laundry

and obtain federal tax-exempt status.

‘i

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

Questions Presented for Review ...............-.csc-ce-0c0s0000--. i

ttn Nl DAT 5 ea ae 1

Ny | A Ue 2

Statutes and Regulations Involved ...................:.0c0c0000--- 2

Statement of Ge Ce... 5

Pare ccc in hcielctcsennccanneveteeen 8

Comet ...ciicrcei ee 17

Appendices:

Ai pepemte Boose rset scercinnceaoeee A-1l

Apprentices eet thceceicneesencnceccnceee. B-1

Pippen 0 icicle eetcaccn cose enocecenee C-1

TABLES OF AUTHORITY

Table of Cases

Associated Hospital Services, Inc. v. Commissioner,

74 T.C. No. 17 (May 6, 1980), appeal docketed,

No. 80-3596 (5th Cir. June 4, 1980) 00.00... 14

Chart Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D. D.C.

1979), appeal docketed, Nos. 80-1138 and 80-1339

(D.C. Cir. geil 14, 1080) 0 .............. 15

Children's Hospital Medical Center v. The Board of

Assessors, 353 Mass, 35, 227 N.E. 2d 908 (1967)...... 16

Coeur d Alene Country Club v. Viley,

64 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Idaho 1946) 20.2. 16

Community Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States,

43 AF.T.R. 2d 79-934, 79-1 US.T.C. § 9301

ry Mich. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1286

6th Cir, May 29, 1979) o.cccccccccecccccsesccsesseeccssssssoee 15

iii

Page

HCSC-Laundry v. The United -States of America,

473 F, Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd,

624 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980) .0.00.2....e eee 8, 9, 14, 15

Hospital Bureau of Standards & Sup. v. United States,

158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl, 1958) ....-...sseess00e0-e 9, 11, 12

Hospital Purchasing Service v. City of Hastings,

11 Mich. App. 500, 161 N.W.2d 759 (1968) ............ 16

Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services, Inc. v.

United States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978),

appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25,

1978) and No, 78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978)....9-10, 15

Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. v. United States,

. Es | Rt} e+ A’, } nee neineee 8, 9, 12, 14

Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc, v. United States,

SOB FD TER CRG, BTR) eke icscctiirnctineecse 11

United Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States,

384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974) ssc... 9, 11, 12, 15

United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962) .................. 10

United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963) cesses... 14

Virginia Professional Standards Review Foundation v.

Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164 (D. D.C. 1979) ........ 16

Statutes

Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04.050 ...................c-ccscssceececeeceees 7

Wash. Rev. Code § 84.36.0480 ..............0:sses.cceccscsorsneseeee 7

Lie Tk fe meme MEAD tea tes 2, 8, 9, 10

RR Fe fy PRRmmeberen anmnmner es: i, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 et seq.

OD Pas OAL Sciciccnnn cece nena 8

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (Internal Revenue Code

|) eae eem ete nt Haber Seles i, 2, 3, 4, 5 et seq.

BO USC. 5 TORS) cba cdcncae i, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 et seq.

OSC LANHAM) Ss 7, 8

iv

Page

EN RE Sea SMR ONE: LORE ne SS 9

I a rk 9

A 8 & PEER aE SIERO Oe 2

I a 7

Other Authority

BI RE Fi TAR COD le cttrcnicsccckedecicderesecesocmnsens 10

Conf. Rep. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted

in [1968] U.S. Code Cong, & Ad. News 2373, 2390.... 10

Rev. Rul. 54-305, 1954-2 C.B. 127 ooo... eeecseeseeseeseees 12

Rev. Rul. 69-160, 1969-1 C.B. 147 .0......eeecececeeeeeeeees 10, 12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1980

No. -

HospiraL CENTRAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

To The Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices

Of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Hospital Central Services Association, a Washington

non-profit corporation, by its attorneys, respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

filed July 21, 1980.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the District Court for the Western Dis-

trict of Washington dated August 8, 1977 in favor of

Hospital Central Services Association, is printed at pages

A-1 to A-13, infra, and reported at 40 A.F.T.R. 2d 77-5646;

77-2 USTC § 9601 (W.D. Wn. 1977). The Opinion of the

2

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-

versing the District Court was filed July 21, 1980 (No. 77-

3701), is printed at pages B-1 to B-3, infra, and is reported

at 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980). The Judgment of the

Court of Appeals filed July 21, 1980 is printed at page

C-1, infra, and is not officially reported.

JURISDICTION

The date of the Judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals sought to be reviewed is July 21, 1980 which is

also the date of its entry. Jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1),.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

(1) Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Title 26 United

States Code, Section 501 the pertinent portions of which

are as follows:

§ 501. Exemption from tax on corporations, certain

trusts, etc.

(a) Exemption from taxation.—An organization de-

scribed in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401 (a)

shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle un-

less such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.

* * &

(c) List of exempt organizations.—The following

organizations are referred to in subsection (a):

* ©

(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund,

or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for

religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safe-

ty, literary, or educational purposes, . . . no part of the

net oe of which inures to the benefit of any pri-

vate shareholder or individual, no substantial part of

the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or

otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except

as otherwise provided in subsection (h) ), and which

does not participate in, or intervene in (including the

3

publishing or distributing of statements ), any political

campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.

* @ ©

(e) Cooperative hospital, service organizations.—

For purposes of this title, an organization shall be

treated as an organization organized and operated

exclusively for charitable purposes, if—

(1) such organization is organized and operated

solely—

(A) to perform, on a centralized basis, one or

more of the following services which, if performed

on its own behalf by a hospital which is an organi-

zation described in subsection (c)(3) and exempt

from taxation under subsection (a), would con-

stitute activities in exercising or performing the

purpose or function constituting the basis for its ex-

emption: data processing, purchasing, warehousing,

billing and collection, food, clinical, industrial en-

gineering, laboratory, printing, communications,

record center, and personnel (including selection,

testing, training, and education of personnel) ser-

vices; and

(B) to perform such services solely for two or

more hospitals each of which is—

(i) an organization described in subsection

(c)(3) which is exempt from taxation under sub-

section (a),

(ii) a constitutent part of an organization

described in subsection (c)(3) which is exempt

from taxation under subsection (a) and which, if

organized and operated as a separate entity, would

constitute an organization described in subsection

(c)(3), or

(iii) owned and operated by the United

States, a State, the District of Columbia, or a pos-

session of the United States, or a political subdivi-

sion or an agency or instrumentality of any of the

foregoing;

(2) such organization is organized and operated

on a cooperative basis and allocates or pays, within

812 months after the close of its taxable year, all

(2)

4

net earnings to patrons on the basis of services

performed for them; and

(3) if such organization has capital stock, all of

such stock outstanding is owned by its patrons.

For purposes of this title, any organization which,

by reason of the preceding sentence, is an organiza-

tion described in subsection (c)(3) and exempt

from taxation under subsection (a), shall be treated

as a hospital and as an organization referred to in

section 170(b) (1) (A) (iii).

Treasury Regulations Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)

provides in pertinent part:

(3)

(2) Charitable defined. The term “charitable” is

used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted

legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as

limited by the separate enumeration in section 501

(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall

within the broad outlines of “charity” as developed

by judicial decisions. .. .

Treasury Regulations Section 1.502-1(b) provides:

(b) If a subsidiary organization of a tax-exempt

organization would itself be exempt on the ground

that its activities are an integral part of the exempt

activities of the parent organization, its exemption

will not be lost because, as a matter of accounting

between the two organizations, the subsidiary derives

a profit from its dealings with its parent organization,

for example, a subsidiary organization which is op-

erated for the sole purpose of furnishing electric pow-

er used by its parent organization, a tax-exempt edu-

cational organization, in carrying on its educational

activities. However, the subsidiary organization is

not exempt from tax if it is operated for the primary

purpose of carrying on a trade or business which would

be an unrelated trade or business (that is, unrelated

to exempt activities) if regularly carried on by the

parent organization. For example, if a subsidiary or-

anization is operated primarily for the purpose of

urnishing electric power to consumers other than its

parent organization (and the parent’s tax-exempt sub-

sidiary organizations ), it is not exempt since such busi-

ness would be an unrelated trade or business if regu-

5

ry! carried on by the parent organization, Similarly,

if the organization is owned by several unrelated ex-

empt organizations, and is operated for the purpose

of furnishing electric power to each of them, it is not

exempt since such business would be an unrelated

trade or business if regularly carried on by any one

of the tax-exempt organizations. For purposes of this

paragraph, organizations are related only if they con-

sist of —

(1) A parent organization and one or more of its

subsidiary organizations; or

(2) Subsidiary organizations having a common

parent organization.

An exempt organization is not related to another ex-

empt organization merely because they both engage in

the same type of exempt activities,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a suit for refund of federal income

taxes paid for the taxable year 1974 on the grounds that

Petitioner is a charitable organization within the meaning

of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore exempt

from taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code.

Petitioner, Hospital Central Services Association (“HC-

SA”), a non-profit Washington corporation, was incorpor-

ated in 1966 and is organized and operated to provide

central linen and laundry services solely for its member

and associate member hospitals (“member”). Each mem-

ber hospital is a non-profit charitable hospital within the

meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore

exempt from taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code.

Petitioner's purposes, as set forth in its Agreement of As-

sociation, are solely charitable, scientific and educational

for the benefit of its members, Only hospitals which are

themselves charitable organizations within the meaning

of Section 501(c) (3) of the Code and exempt from taxation

6

are eligible to become members of HCSA. No net earnings

of HCSA have inured to the benefit of any private person,

firm or corporation, and in the event of dissolution, all of

Petitioner's assets are required to be distributed solely to

hospital members who are charitable organizations within

the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and there-

fore exempt from taxation under Section 501(a) of the

Code.

HCSA was organized to eliminate the requirement that

each hospital maintain its own laundry facility and to reduce

administrative problems and costs for member hospitals.

HCSA’s linen and laundry services are unique and have

been specifically designed to insure sanitary standards and

controls necessary for the member hospitals. HCSA is an

extension of each participating member hospital. It is

impossible for a hospital to discharge its purposes without

a laundry and linen service.

HCSA derives income from membership fees based on

the amount of services provided to the members. HCSA

maintains a linen inventory and processes approximately

eleven (11) million pounds of laundry per year for its

members, who represent approximately 2,000 hospital beds

in the Seattle area. The services performed by HCSA

have substantially reduced the overall cost of laundry and

linen services to member hospitals, thereby resulting in a

reduction in the overall cost of health care in Seattle,

Washington. HCSA estimates that through 1974 it saved

its members $1,992,250 in investment costs and approxi-

mately 39,000 square feet of operational space, Only offi-

cers, trustees and employees of member hospitals are eligi-

ble to be officers or trustees of HCSA. Petitioner has been

controlled and operated solely and exclusively for the

benefit of its member hospitals.

7

HCSA is exempt from Washington state ad valorem real

and personal property taxes under Wash, Rev. Code § 84.-

36.040. It is further exempt from Washington state sales

tax pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04.050, which ex-

cludes from the terms “sale at retail” or “retail sale” all

“sales of laundry service to members of non-profit associ-

ations composed exclusively of non-profit hospitals.”

HCSA commenced this action in the District Court

seeking a refund of federal income taxes paid for the year

1974 and a declaratory judgment that it is a charitable or-

ganization within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) and

exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(a)

of the Code. Jurisdiction in the District Court was based

on 28 U.S.C, § 1346. HCSA moved for summary judgment

based on affidavits. The Government opposed the motion

but did not file any controverting affidavits. The facts in this

case are therefore not in dispute. The District Court grant-

ed judgment in favor of HCSA, holding that HCSA was

a charitable organization within the meaning of Section

501(c)(3) of the Code and thereby exempt from taxation

under Section 501(a) of the Code. The Ninth Circuit re-

versed the District Court by a per curiam decision holding

that under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, hospitals may

only create tax-exempt entities to perform services listed

in Section 501(e)(1)(A) of the Code, Laundry services

are not listed in Section 501(e)(1)(A) of the Code. HCSA

has never claimed to be exempt under Section 501(e) of

the Code. Rather, HCSA claims to be a charitable organi-

zation within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) and there-

fore exempt from taxation under Section 501(a) of the

Code.

8

ARGUMENT

The per curiam decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals in this case relied upon the Third Circuit decision

in HCSC-Laundry v. The United States of America, 62A

F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980), petition for certiorari filed Sep-

tember 2, 1980, 49 U.S.L.W. 3165 (No. 80-338). Both

decisions erroneously conclude that in 1968, when Con-

gress enacted Section 501(e) of the Code, as evidenced

by that Section’s legislative history, it thereby denied a

non-profit corporation, whose members are all tax-exempt

hospitals, from qualifying for tax-exempt status as a “chari-

table organization” under Section 501(c)(3). This con-

clusion is contrary to Section 501 of the Code and the de-

cision of the United States Court of Claims in Northern Cal.

Cent. Services, Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl.

1979), as well as numerous District Court and State Court

decisions. In addition, denial of tax-exempt status to joint

hospital shared laundries, such as Petitioner, will sub-

stantially increase the overall costs of health care services

in the United States.

HCSA is a non-profit corporation organized prior to

1968 when Congress enacted Section 501(e) of the Code.

HCSA is not formed a. a cooperative and has never claimed

to be an organization listed in Section 501(e)(1)(A) of

the Code. Rather, HCSA claims exemption under Section

501(a) of the Code. Section 501(a) of the Code exempts

the income of organizations described in Section 501(c)

from taxation. Organizations described in Section 501(c)

(3) of the Code include “. . . corporations . . . organized

for ... charitable . . . purposes, . . . no part of the net earn-

ings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-

holder, or individual .. . .” The purposes of HCSA are

9

“charitable” within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) and

it was organized and is operated exclusively for charitable

Section 501(a) of the Code, as it presently exists and as

it existed before 1968, provides:

Exemption from taxation.—An organization described

in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be

exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such

exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.

If HCSA is a charitable organization within the meaning

of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, its exemption may only

be denied under Sections 502 or 503 of the Code. It cannot

be denied exemption under Section 501(e). Had Congress

intended the result reached by the Third and Ninth Cir-

cuits, viz., that failure to qualify under Section 501(e) de-

nies an exemption under Section 501(a), Section 501(a)

would have been modified. Hospital Bureau of Standards &

Sup. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958);

United Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States, 384 F.

Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974). The effect of the Third Circuit

decision in HCSC-Laundry v. The United States of Ameri-

ca, supra, and the Ninth Circuit decision in Petitioner’s case,

is to prevent any charitable organization within the mean-

ing of Section 501(c)(3) that performs hospital services

jointly for more than one non-profit hospital from tax-ex-

empt status unless it is also listed in Section 501(e) of the

Code.

The legislative history of Section 501(e) does not sup-

port the conclusion that Section 501(e) is the exclusive sec-

tion under which Petitioner may claim tax-exempt status.

Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. v. United States, supra;

Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services, Inc. v. United

10

States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal dock-

eted, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and No. 78-

1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978). Rather, when Senators Carl-

son and Tydings co-sponsored a bill to add new subsection

(e) to Section 501 of the Code, Senator Tydings recognized

that the Internal Revenue Service would not grant tax-

exempt status to hospital service organizations and he ex-

pressed his intent of “correcting an unforeseen inequity.”

114 Cong. Rec. 8112 (1968). Section 501(e) was designed

to liberalize, rather than restrict, the classification of charities

under Section 501(c) (3). The Conference Report provides,

in part:

Section 109 of the conference substitute . . . adds a

new subsection to section 501 of the Internal Revenue

Code which, in effect, provides a tax exempt status for

certain cooperative hospitai service organizations. . . .

Conf. Rep. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 43 reprinted in

[1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad, News 2373, 2390 (1968-2

C.B. 801, 814). Congressional Reports indicate that laundry

services were intentionally omitted from Section 501(e) of

the Code. It does not follow, however, that the omission

of laundry services from Section 501(e) excludes Petitioner

from tax-exempt status if it is a charitable organization

within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.

The fact that the legislative history of Section 501(e)

indicates that Congress believed hospital laundry service

organizations, such as HCSA, were not exempt under Sec-

tion 501(a) is not material, Congressional interpretation

of existing law should be given no weight in this Court's

interpretation of that law. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S.

405 (1962). Moreover, the fact that the Internal Revenue

Service had issued Revenue Ruling 69-160, 1969-1 C. B.

147 holding that an organization providing laundry and

11

other services exclusively to its tax-exempt member hos-

pitals was not exempt from taxation is not binding on this

Court. Revenue Rulings merely constitute an interpreta-

tion of the Internal Revenue Code by the Service and are

not binding on the courts. Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc.

v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971),

A brief history of the efforts of hospital laundry organi-

zations, which are owned exclusively by tax. exempt hos-

pitals, to gain federal tax-exempt status will demonstrate

the substantial conflict in decisions on this important ques-

tion of federal tax law. In Hospital Bureau of Standards &

Sup. v. United States, supra, the Court of Claims held that

a non-profit corporation, formed solely for the purpose of

purchasing and supplying hospital supplies to its tax-ex-

empt hospital members, was a charitable corporation with-

in the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and ex-

empt from taxation under Section 501(a). In 1968 Con-

gress enacted Section 501(e) of the Code to enlarge the

category of charitable organizations exempt under Section

501(a) of the Code. In 1974, United Hospital Services,

Inc. v. United States, supra, held that a central laundry

providing laundry services solely to its tax-exempt hospital

members was exempt under Section 501(a) of the Code.

United Hospital rejected the Government’s argument that

Section 501(e) was the exclusive basis for a hospital

laundry service organization to gain tax exemipuon. The

United Hospital court reasoned as follows:

The clearly expressed Congressional purpose be-

hind the enactment of Section 501(e) was to enlarge

the category of charitable organizations under Sec-

tion 501(c)(3) to include certain cooperative hospital

service organizations, and not to narrow or restrict the

reach of Section 501(c) (3). The latter section was not

12

modified by the legislation in any way, and the legis-

lation does not purport to take away charitable status

from a corporation which had already acquired it.

Insofar as this case is concerned, therefore, Section

501(e) is irrelevant.

384 F. Supp. at 781. The Government did not appeal the

United Hospital decision. Despite Hospital Bureau and

United Hospital, the Internal Revenue Service denied

exemption to Petitioner and other similar organizations.

These denials were based on the Government's contention

that such organizations are “feeder” organizations under

Section 1.502-1(b) and that such organizations do not

meet the requirements of Section 501(e) of the Code. See

Rev. Rul. 69-160, 1969-1 C. B. 147; Rev. Rul. 54-305,

1954-2 C. B. 127. Prior to 1980, that position had been

rejected by every court that considered this issue.

In the past 10 years there has been a substantial increase

in the number of central laundry organizations providing

services to their tax-exempt hospital members, It is esti-

mated that there are approximately 36 central hospital

laundry organizations owned and operated by non-profit

tax-exempt hospitals, providing service to over 175 hos-

pitals throughout the United States. The amount of poten-

tial federal income taxes and resulting hospital costs is sub-

stantial, As a result, numerous cases have generated con-

flicting decisions. These cases involve an important ques-

tion of federal tax law which has not been, but should be

settled by this Court.

In 1979 in Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. v. United

States, supra, the United States Court of Claims held that

a non-profit corporation, which provided shared laundry

services to its non-profit tax-exempt hospital members,

13

was a charitable organization within the meaning of Sec-

tion 501(c)(3) and exempt from taxation under Section

501(a) of the Code. The Court of Claims expressly re-

jected the Government's argument that the taxpayer must

qualify, if at all, unde: Section 501(e) of the Code. The

Court of Claims held as follows:

Section 501(e) provides an exemption for some co-

operative organizations which adhere to the require-

ments stated therein. We agree with plaintiff that the

intent of Congress in passing § 501(e) was to broaden

the class of organizations entitled to an exemption as

a “charitable organization,” not to narrow it, and that,

as to laundry services, it left the law as it was.

In considering § 501(e)’s history, it is necessary to

examine not only what Congress did do in 1968 when

it added that provision, but what it did not do. Pro-

ponents of the amendment argued that rigidities in

the law at that time, particularly the “feeder” pro-

vision of § 502, to be discussed below, discouraged the

formation of hospital service organizations, See 114

Cong. Rec. 8112 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tyd-

ings ). But nowhere in the legislative history of § 501(e)

is there a reference to an intent to amend §$ 501(c) (3),

or to alter the then-present interpretation. Indeed the

House Report specifically stated that § 501(e) was

to be an addition to § 501. H.Rep.No. 1533, 90th

Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-

min. News 1968, p. 2341.

_ ae

When Congress passed the present § 501(e) in

1968, though, it did exclude shared laundry services

from its list of exempt service organizations, but made

no attempt to alter Hospital Bureau of Standards’ in-

terpretation of § 501(c)(3) or that section’s applica-

bility to shared laundry services, despite the fact,

above mentioned, that the Congressmen were aware

of Hospital Bureau of Standards, and its holding. Thus,

the interpretation of § 501(c)(3) as rendered by this

court in Hospital Bureau of Standards remains intact.

The provision we interpreted was left untouched, while

14

other law was written to take care of other decisions

by the IRS with which Congress was dissatisfied.

591 F.2d at 623-4.

Northern Cal. Cent. Services, Inc. is in direct conflict with

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case and the

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in HCSC-Laundry

v. The United States of America, supra. The Third Cir-

cuit disagreed as follows:

In the most recent decision on comparable facts,

Northern California Central Services, Inc. v. United

States, supra, the Court of Claims adhered to its prior

decision in Hospital Bureau. After considering the ef-

fect of section 501(e), it concluded that the intent of

Congress was not to narrow the class of organizations

entitled to an exemption as a “charitable organization”

but to broaden that class, “and that, as to laundry

services, it left the law as it was.” Id. at 624. As noted

in our prior discussion, we believe the legislative his-

tory to show a contrary legislative intent than that

found by the Court of Claims.

624 F.2d at 435-36.

Because of the recurring importance of the issue and the

conflict between the Court of Claims, a court of co-equal

rank with the Circuit Courts, and two Circuit Courts, this

Court should grant certiorari. United States v. Zacks, 375

U.S. 59 (1963). This case presents appropriate reasons

for a review on writ of certiorari under Rule 17 of this

Court.

The Tax Court has done little to quell what it has iden-

tified as the “long and stormy” tax history of hospital laun-

dry service organizations. In Associated Hospital Services,

Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. No. 17 (May 6, 1980), appeal

docketed, No. 80-3596 (5th Cir. June 4, 1980), the Tax

Court held that a laundry service organization owned and

operated by several tax-exempt hospitals was not tax ex-

empt based upon Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b) relating

15

to feeder organizations. This decision did not reach the

issue relating to Section 501(e) of the Code and is other-

wise of little value in light of the concurring opinions by

two judges and the two separate dissenting opinions by

four judges. Even the Tax Court majority felt “constrain-

ed by the weight of legislative history” to reject its in-

clination to hold the organization tax-exempt. This case is

now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.

All of the District Courts which have considered the

same issue have held that Section 501(e) is not exclu-

sive and that non-profit organizations such as HCSA

are charitable organizations within the meaning of Sec-

tion 501(c)(3) of the Code and therefore exempt from

taxation under Section 501(a) of the Code. United Hospital

Services, Inc. v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind.

1974); Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services, Inc.

v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978), ap-

peal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and

No. 78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978); Community Hospital

Services, Inc. v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R. 2d 79-934;

79-1 U.S.T.C. § 9301 (E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal docketed,

No. 79-1286 (6th Cir. May 29, 1979); Chart Inc. v. United

States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D. D.C. 1979), appeal docketed,

Nos. 80-1138 and 80-1339 (D.C. Cir. April 14, 1980);

HCSC-Laundry v. The United States of America, 473 F.

Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 428 (3d Cir.

1980) Pet. for Cert. filed September 2, 1980, 49 U.S.L.W.

3165 ( No. 80-338); HCSA v. United States, the instant case.

Similar issues are now pending in other District Courts ai.d

the Court of Claims.

Similarly, numerous state court decisions have concluded

that a non-profit corporation formed solely for the purpose

16

of providing services to its tax-exempt hospital members

is exempt from state real and personal property taxes. See,

e.g., Children’s Hospital Medical Center v. The Board

of Assessors, 353 Mass. 35, 227 N.E. 2d 908 (1967);

Hospital Purchasing Service v. City of Hastings, 11 Mich.

App. 500, 161 N.W.2d 759 (1968). HCSA was also granted

exemption from Washington state real and personal prop-

erty taxes after litigation. Aithough an exemption under

Section 501(a) of the Code does not depend upon state

law, federal courts have considered state court rulings to

determine the broad outlines of “charity”. Coeur d Alene

Country Club v. Viley, 64 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Idaho 1946).

Hospital laundry service is a sensitive matter. If not per-

formed with sufficient quality controls, it can be the means

of spreading diseases that hospitals hope to contain or cure.

Petitioner provides its member hospitals with linen and

laundry services at less cost and under more sanitary con-

ditions than other available laundries. Each non-profit

hospital could maintain its own laundry at a greater cost

and operate with tax-exempt status, Whether each hospital

washes the sheets itself or has that duty performed by a

separate organization should be of no tax significance. If

the activity is tax-exempt when conducted by the individ-

ual tax-exempt hospital, it does not become a non-exempt

activity simply because it is spun off to a central laundry

owned by the tax-exempt members. Shared laundry ser-

vices are an essential part of the cost containment efforts

favored by Congress in the area of health care services.

See Virginia Professional Standards Review Foundation

v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164 (D. D.C. 1979).

17

CONCLUSION

There now exists a conflict between the Court of Claims

and the Third and Ninth Circuits. The same issues are also

pending on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit,

(two cases) and the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia. Petitioner, and other similar entities, are chari-

table organizations within the meaning of Section 501(c)

(3) of the Code and exempt from taxation under Section

501(a). An organization exempt under Section 501(c) (3)

of the Code cannot be denied exeinption because of Section

501(e). The legislative history does not support the result

reached by the Ninth Circuit. This Court should grant

certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Circuit Courts

of Appeal and the Court of Claims in order to provide for

the uniform administration of the federal tax laws.

Respectfully submitted,

THomas §, ZILLY

LANE, POWELL, Moss &

MILLER

Counsel for Petitioner

Hospital Central Services

Association

A-1

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

HospiraAL CENTRAL SERVICES

ASSOCIATION, a nonprofit corporation, Civil No.

Plaintiff, C76-779M

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, =

Defendant.

FILED IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Western District of Washington

AUG. 8, 1977

Epcar SCOFIELD, Clerk

THIS MATTER comes on for consideration before the

undersigned Judge of the above-entitled Court upon cross-

motions for summary judgment. On May 9, 1977, the

plaintiff moved for summary judgment based upon the

records and files, its brief in support of the motion, its

answers to defendant's interrogatories, and the affidavits

of Frank Metheny, John A. Dare and George Stone. On

June 27, 1977, the defendant filed its “Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment” on the grounds

that “there exist genuine issues of material fact with respect

to plaintiff's theory of recovery herein which preclude the

granting of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.” Simul-

taneously, the defendant cross-moved for summary judg-

ment in its favor, pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, “on the grounds that no genuine issues

of material fact exist in respect of the defenses interposed

herein.” The defendant filed, unaccompanied by affidavits,

A-2

“Defendant's Brief In Support of Its Opposition to Plain-

tiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Its Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment,” to which plaintiff has since filed

a reply.

The following facts stand uncontradicted in the record.

Plaintiff Hospital Central Services Association (HCSA)

was incorporated on March 30, 1966, as a nonprofit Wash-

ington corporation by four hospitals, namely, Virginia Ma-

son Hospital Association; Sisters of Charity House of Provi-

dence; Northwest Memorial Hospital Association and West

Seattle General Hospital for the purpose of operating a

central hospital laundry facility, Shortly after the organiza-

tion of HCSA, Overlake Memorial Hospital and Children’s

Orthopedic Hospital Association joined HCSA. Effective

July 31, 1970, West Seattle General Hospital withdrew.

Subsequently, Swedish Hospital Medical Center became a

member of the Association. In addition, in 1971 Ballard

Community Hospital, and in 1974, Seattle General Hospital

became associate members of HCSA.

At all times material since January 1, 1974, therefore, the

following nonprofit charitable hospitals were members of

HCSA:

Children’s Orthopedic Hospital and Medical Center

Northwest Memoral Hospital Association

Overlake Memorial Hospital Association

Providence Medical Center

Swedish Hospital Medical Center

Virginia Mason Hospital Association

In addition, Ballard Community Hospital and Seattle Gen-

eral Hospital are associate members.

Each member hospital and each associate member hos-

pital is a nonprofit hospital exempt from federal income

A-3

taxation under Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue

Code, and exempt from paying ad valorem real and per-

sonal property taxes in the State of Washington. Attached

as Exhibit A hereto is a true and correct copy of the oral

decision of Judge Robert M. Elston in the matter of Hos-

pital Central Services Association v. King County, Cause

No. 768034, rendered March 1, 1974 in the Superior Court

of the State of Washington in and for the County of King.

The HCSA laundry facility, which was completed in

1968, now processes the laundry needs and maintains a

linen inventory for its members at the present rate of

approximately eleven million pounds a year.

The processing, of the laundry is specifically designed

and controlled to insure sanitary standards. Soiled laundry

is not transported in a truck at the same time as clean

laundry. The carts used in the pickup and delivery of

laundry are made of fiberglass and are sanitized between

each pickup and delivery. Each truck is sanitized after

each delivery of soiled laundry to HCSA. The unloading

and loading of trucks occur on separate ends of HCSA’s

plant to reduce the risk of spread of bacteria. All clean

laundry being delivered to a hospital is covered with a

plastic cover to insure maintenance of a sanitary condition,

which cover is used only once and is disposed of after its

use. A positive-negative air-flow system is used at the

laundry to prevent the spreading of bacteria and infection

from the soiled laundry, which means that air flows only

from the area servicing clean laundry to areas servicing

soiled laundry and not vice versa.

HCSA derives income from membership fees based on

the amount of service actually provided; the amount of

charge per pound is set from time to time by the Board of

A-4

Trustees—each member of which is de jure also an officer,

trustee or employee of a member hospital—and is in an

amount which will cover the actual cost of operation,

including purchases of necessary equipment, and will pro-

vide for the amortization of a long-term bank loan. HCSA

only charges per pound amounts sufficient to meet said

annual operating costs. No net earnings from HCSA inure

to the benefit of any individual, and in the event of dissolu-

tion, all the assets of HCSA are required to be distributed

to organizations which are qualified as tax exempt under

Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as

amended,’

HCSA estimates that from incorporation through the

year 1974, it saved its member hospitals $1,992,250 in in-

vestment costs and approximately 39,000 square feet of

operational space. HCSA employs approximately 110 to

128 persons. The laundry is managed by a manager and a

managerial staff consisting of approximately nine persons.

On July 9, 1975, HCSA filed an application for recogni-

tion of Exemption from Federal Income Taxation, Form

1023, the Application for Recognition of Exemption was

denied by letter from the Internal Revenue Service dated

August 3, 1976. After reconsideration, by letter dated

September 17, 1976, the Internal Revenue Service affirmed

its ruling of August 3, 1976, denying exempt status to

the plaintiff.

In the manner required by law, HCSA filed its corporate

income tax for the year ending December 31, 1974 with the

Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, Ogden,

1. The Court has considered footnote 3 at page 9 of the defendant's

brief in support of its opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment.

A-5

Utah. HCSA paid a tax for the year 1974 in the amount of

$3,862. In 1975, HCSA had a net operating loss which it

carried back and all of the 1974 tax paid was recovered

except $178. As a result of Notice dated September 1, 1975,

HCSA paid a penalty of $96.55 and interest of $89.35 for a

total of $185.90 for the year ending December 31, 1974.

On or about August 25, 1976, HCSA filed its amended

income tax return to recover a refund of $178.00 for taxes

paid for 1974, To date the defendant has not acted with

respect to said claim for refund.

On or about August 25, 1976, HCSA filed its claim for

refund on Form 843, relating to the taxable year ending

December 31, 1974. On October 4, 1976, the District

Director of the Internal Revenue Service denied HCSA’s

claim for refund in the amount of $185.90.

The plaintiff brings this action to recover that amount

which it alleges was erroneously assessed and collected.

The root question presented here is whether HCSA is a

charitable organization within the meaning of Section

501(c)(3) and therefore exempt from taxation under

Section 501(a). Sub-issues presented are (1) whether

HCSA’s claimed status as a charitable organization is

defeated by operation of Section 501(e), which was

adopted in 1968, and (2) whether HCSA is prohibited from

exemption by operation of Section 502 by reason of being

a for-profit “feeder organization.”

The identical issues raised here by the motions for sum-

mary judgment, save and except for the defendant's claim

that material questions of fact exist with respect to plain-

tiff's theory of recovery, were addressed and decided in

United Hospital Services v. United States, 384 F. Supp.

A-6

776 (S.D. Ind., 1974), a case in which both sides agreed

to waive trial by jury and proceed on stipulated facts. The

stipulated facts in United Hospital were in all material

respects the same as the facts now before the Court. (See

defendant's qualified acceptance of the Statement of Facts

as presented in the plaintiff's brief in support of its motion

for summary judgment (Defendant’s Brief in Support of Its

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at

page 1.) )

The defendant launches a three-fold attack in support

of its motion for judgment and to defeat the counter-motion

of the plaintiff. First, the defendant contends that no for-

profit organization can qualify for tax exemption by hiding

under the skirts of § 501(c)(3). The defendant’s problem

is that he doesn't have the facts to go with that clearly valid

proposition.

HCSA, like the hospital services organization in United

Hospital, was incorporated under state law as a non-profit

corporation, organized and operated to provide services

which are essential to the functioning of the charitable

associations which are its members. The following un-

controverted, factual representations from the affidavit of

Mr. Metheny at pages 3 and 4 illuminate the purpose of

HCSA and its manner of operations.

(a) Each of the member hospitals is represented

by its administrator or assistant administrator on the

Board of Trustees of HCSA, and each member hospital

participates in the overall policy of HCSA and col-

lectively they absolutely control the operations of

HCSA, which are a necessary part of the operations

of the member hospitals.

(b) Each of the member hospitals participates in the

actual operations of HCSA with respect to the plan-

ning, accounting and finance, quality control and

A-7

standardization. A special Linen Advisory Committee

makes recommendations concerning purchasing and

processing specifications and has developed special

procedures for linen utilization and distribution.

(c) All members directly receive the benefit of

standardization and centralization, without profit to

any third party, in that the price each member hospital

is charged for the laundry service includes only the

costs of operation, retirement of debt, and new equip-

ment purchases.

The plaintiff estimates that HCSA activities from its

incorporation through 1974 have saved its members

$1,992,250 in investment costs alone and has provided

services at cost. HCSA has never offered its services to any-

one or any business other than its members. The fact that a

nonpublic and non-tax-exempt hospital (West Seattle Gen-

eral Hospital ) was a member of HCSA from 1966 to 1970,

and was serviced by HCSA during that period is not ma-

terial to the plaintiff's claim for exemption under Section

501(c)(3) for the year 1974.

Under the foregoing facts, defendant’s attack on HCSA

as a for-profit or “feeder” organization must of necessity

fail. Furthermore, the foregoing facts compel the Court to

conclude that HCSA is a charitable organization under

Section 501(c)(3) and therefore exempt from taxation

under Section 501(a). So to find is to reject the defendant’s

second argument, to wit, that the plaintiff, as a “coopera-

tive” hospital service organization, can qualify as tax ex- ;

empt, if at all, only under Section 501(e) of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1954. In rejecting that argument, the

Court adopts the reasoning of the United Hospital opinion,

which reached the same conclusion.

Finally, the defendant contends, in opposing the plain-

tiffs motion for judgment on its claim as a matter of law,

a,

A-8

that a crucial fact, stipulated to in United Hospital, and

“heavily” relied upon therein, is missing here, namely, that

“no commercial laundry in the area was able or willing to

provide specialized laundry service to the hospitals.” The

defendant takes the position that because the record is

silent in this respect, there remains a material issue for

trial with respect to the plaintiff's claim for a refund in the

case at bar. Specifically, the defendant’s argument reads as

follows at page 8 of its brief:

Plaintiff may thus well be “competing unfairly with

ordinary, taxed business entities,’ an important con-

cern of the court in United Hospitals [sic], 384 F.

Supp., at page 780.

That representation based on a silent record falls entirely

short of the response which is required of an adverse party

when a motion for summary judgment is made and sup-

ported as provided in Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e)

requires that the adverse party, by affidavits or as other-

wise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

The fact that the plaintiff does not compete with com-

mercial laundries is not disputed in the present record.

It being the opinion of the Court that for the reasons

discussed above the plaintiff is entitled to the summary

judgment prayed for, NOW, THEREFORE,

IT IS ORDERED and DECREED that the motion of the

defendant for summary judgment be and ihe same is hereby

DENIED, and

IT IS ORDERED and DECREED that the motion of

the plaintiff for summary judgment be and the same is

hereby GRANTED, and

A-9

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that

judgment be entered against the defendant in favor of the

plaintiff for the recovery of interest and penalty taxes in the

amount of $185.90 which was erroneously assessed and

collected for the year ending December 31, 1974.

Counsel for the plaintiff shall present to the Court an

appropriate judgment in accordance with this Order.

DATED this 8th day of August 1977.

s/s WALTER T. MCGovERN

Chief United States District Judge

Exhibit A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

HospiTAL CENTRAL SERVICES

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 768034

Kinc County, a legal subdivision of

the State of Washington,

Defendant.

ORAL OPINION

Hon. Rospert M. Eston

March 1, 1974

THE COURT: I appreciate the materials that have

been presented, the helpful briefs, the affidavit of Mr.

Carney, the exhibits that have been attached. This is the

kind of case that it comes as no surprise to hear a sugges-

A-10

tion that no matter what the ruling is, it will be appealed.

That seems almost inherent in the nature of it.

Because of that, I want to say I have considered both

briefs, the affidavit of Mr. Carney, the exhibits that have

been attached to the plaintiff's brief, and the documents

contained in the clerk’s file, and would ask that when an

order is prepared on the decision, that the order on sum-

mary judgment specify those documents I have relied upon

in reaching my decision.

The Barlow case makes it very clear that the statute is

not to be enlarged by judicial construction. The statute,

RCW 84.36.040, grants an exemption from taxation for

hospitals, and this exemption is in derogation of the gen-

eral public interest to have property remain on the tax

rolls, so that this exemption must be strictly construed.

Judicial interpretation cannot enlarge the exemption and

that it the basic consideration when there is a claim for

exemption.

In this case one of the arguments made is that because

the Hospital Central Services Association is a separate

corporation and in law having a separate entity because of

that, that this means that it does not qualify for an exemp-

tion because the exemption is limited to hospitals and not

to some separate corporations which might perform services

or supply materials for hospitals.

My conclusion is that the nature of the association is not

something that would extend the exemption statute by

applying it to the association, The association is owned by

the member hospitals. All member hospitals are charitable

organizations. No aspect of the Association’s activities is

devoted to anything other than servicing and furnishing

A-11

supplies for the member hospitals. No aspect of the Associa-

tion’s activities is directly or indirectly for the benefit of any

other than a charitable hospital.

It is, I think, clear in 84.36.040 that the last paragraph

of that statute does cover this situation in a general way

when it provides that a hospital within the meaning of

this section includes any portion of the hospital building

or other buildings in connection therewith used as a neces-

sary home or as a residence for persons engaged or em-

ployed in the operation of the hospital or operated as a

portion of the hospital unit.

The laundry involved here that is operated by the As-

sociation is operated as a portion of the hospital unit and

I do not think it violates that concept to have that associa-

tion operate as a portion of six hospital units as distin-

guished from one hospital unit. I do not think the fact that

it serves multiple hospitals makes it any less a hospital op-

eration than if it served simply one individual hospital.

Its scope of operation is larger and the effect of serving

six hospitals and having sometimes to make independent

decisions with respect to some incidental differences that

might arise I do not think is fatal to its operation, the con-

cept of its operation as a part of the hospital unit. It has

been set up to comply as completely with the requirements

of charitable institutions as it can be, both with respect to

the property that it has and the distribution of that prop-

erty upon its ceasing to exist. There is apparently sub-

stantial reliance by the State Board of Tax Appeals on the

fact that 96 per cent of the garments and linens laundered

by the Association are owned by the Association and the

Association then makes a charge to the member hospitals

A-12

in the form of rent as the State Board of Tax Appeals has

indicated.

I frankly do not appreciate the significance of that fact

as derogating in any way from the fact that the Association

operates as a part of a hospital unit in furnishing exclusive-

ly laundry or laundry-type services or supples.

The Association owns the garments and linens that are

laundered. The Association is owned by the member hos-

pitals. And so the member hospitals, in effect, own the

garments and linens if there were to be a cessation of ac-

tivities, for example, by the Association. It almost sounds

like a paraphrase of Gertrude Stein, “A rose is a rose is a

rose.” The garments are garments of the Association which

is owned by the hospitals and so forth.

The Barlow case, my reading of it—and I do not suggest

that there might not be different interpretations of this

case; it probably presents a good opportunity for an appel-

late court to make whatever clarification it wishes with re-

spect to it—but my reading of the Barlow case is that the

emphasis is upon the use rather than the formality of struc-

ture or format of the entity.

The use here is strictly a hospital use. There is the matter

of performing hospital laundry services, period, and as I

have indicated before, I do not think that the fact that this

is being done for more than one hospital changes that as-

pect.

I do not think, therefore, that it is an extension of an

exemption to say that an association that has been set up

for the sole purpose of performing only hospital laundry

functions, limited strictly to doing this for charitable hos-

pitals, is extending that exemption in any way. It is simply

A-13

recognizing that the Association is doing a hospital func-

tion and doing it for a number of hospitals, presumably but

not determinatively on a more efficient basis for the hospi-

tals.

Therefore, my conclusion is that the plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment must be granted. The defendant's mo-

tion for summary judgment must be denied. In view of that

ruling I do not think it is necessary to determine the ques-

tion of equitable estoppel.

If counsel will prepare an order, then, based on the rul-

ing. Thank you again for your presentations.

(End of proceedings. )

B-1

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HospiraL CENTRAL SERVICES

ASSOCIATION, a nonprofit corporation, No. 77-3701

Appellee, D.C. No.

V. C76-779M

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OPINION

Appellant.

FILED

July 21, 1980

RicHARD H. Deane, Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeals

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Walter T. McGovern, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and submitted April 8, 1980

Before: GOODWIN and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges,

and WILLIAMS,” District Judge

PER CURIAM

Hospital Central Services Association, a nonprofit Wash-

ington Corporation which operated a laundry, paid income

taxes for 1974 and, after exhausting its administrative reme-

dies, sued under § 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code

for a refund. The district court held the association to be

a tax-exempt charity and granted the refund, The govern-

ment appeals, contending that § 501(c)(3) does not ex-

tend to hospital laundry services like those involved here.

*The Honorable Spencer Williains, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

B-2

The identical issues were recently before the Third Cir-

cuit in HCSC-Laundry v. United States of America, No.

79-2286 (3rd Cir. June 6, 1980). There, as here, a group of

charitable hospitals had formed a nonprofit corporation in

order to effect economies of scale that could not be realized

if each hospital were to install and staff its own laundry.

There, as here, the laundry services were performed for

the tax-exempt hospitals that had created the corporation.’

There, as here, the district court held that because a chari-

table hospital could operate its own laundry without im-

pairing its exemption under § 501(c) (3), it should be able

to pool its laundry facilities (and its exemptions ) with other

hospitals and thus confer tax exemption upon the new

entity.

A group of charitable § 501(c) (3) hospitals may jointly

create and own a tax-exempt entity under § 501(e)(1)(A)

to perform certain functions: e.g., computer service, pur-

chasing, warehousing, laboratory, printing, billing and col-

lecting, and other services listed in § 501(e)(1)(A) of the

Code. The issue is whether, under § 501(c)(3), the hos-

pitals may create tax-exempt entities to perform services

not listed in § 501(e)(1)(A).

After a careful examination of the legislative history of

§ 501(e)(1)(A) and of established legal principles which

we need not repeat here, the Third Circuit held that Con-

gress had intentionally omitted laundry services from the

list of commercial services for which charitable hospitals

could form jointly-owned entities that would be tax-exempt.

1. The taxpayer in the case at bar may not strictly qualify under

§ 501(e) (1) (B) because, at the time it was organized, it served a hospital

that did not then qualify for exemption under § 501(c) (3). We need not

reach this question, however, as the case tums on the meaning of

§ 501(e) (1) (A).

B-3

Whether the legislative decision to favor the commercial

laundry industry by removing a tax advantage from com-

petitors was a wise or equitable decision is obviously not

a judicial question. On the only judicial question—the

meaning of the tax law—we agree with the Third Circuit

for the reasons stated in its opinion.

heversed.

C-1

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HospiTaL CENTRAL SERVICES

ASSOCIATION, a nonprofit corporation, No. 77-3701

Appellee, \ DC CV 76-779

V. WTM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JUDGMENT

Appellant.

FILED IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Western District of Washington

July 21, 1980

Jor R. Romans, Clerk

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington (Seattle).

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Transcript of

the Record from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington (Seattle), and was duly

submitted.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment

of the said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby is

reversed,

Costs in this court in favor of the appellant and against

the appellee.

Costs:

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT $227.45

TOTAL $227.45

Filed and entered July 21, 1980.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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