Appendix — Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.

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NO. 80-590

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United Stutes

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

GULF OFFSHORE COMPANY,

A DIVISION OF THE POOL COMPANY,

Petitioner

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,

Respondent

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals

For the Fourteenth Supreme Judicial

District of Texas

JOINT APPENDIX

FRANK CATON

Crain, CATON, JAMES & WOMBLE

3300 Two Houston Center

Houston, Texas 77010

(713) 658-2323

Counsel for Respondent

Cuartes D. KENNEDY Mobil Oil Corporation

BRADLEY A. JACKSON Joserpu D. JAMaIL

Royston, RAyzor, VICKERY JamalL, Kotius & MiItTHoFF

& WILLIAMS 3300 One Allen Center

3710 One Shell Plaza Houston, Texas 77002

Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 651-3000

(745) 224-8580 Counsel for Respondent

Counsel for Petitioner Steven Gaedecke

Alpha Law Brief Co., One Main Plaza, No. 1 Main St., Houston, Texas 77002

Petition for Certiorari filed October 14, 1980.

Certiorari Granted December 8, 1980.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chronological List of Important Dates (Substitute for

Lola ev ha nee pie eeadehe tee bees

First Amended Answer of Third Party Defendant Gulf

Offshore Company, A Division of the Pool Company ...

Requested Jury Instructions A, B & C of Third Party De-

fendant Gulf Offshore Company, A Division of the Pool

eae (dha cess dela eek aves inh vend onesie’

Court of Civil Appeals Judgment ...................0..

Court of Civil Appeals Notice of Overruling of Motion for

Cie. Seba Ihe kh bee <0 AX be AE Oe

Supreme Court of Texas Notice of Refusal of Application

ee as aad es deca si bE Rpbe aides oe ekee's

Supreme Court of Texas Notice of Overruling of Motion for

NE Udi wks cede dd 4s Oh ES REN K wee RE psn wae s

Page

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF IMPORTANT DATES

(SUBSTITUTE FOR DOCKET ENTRIES* )

11/20/1975

12/26/1975

1/ 8/1976

2/10/1977

2/16/1977

3/28/1977

9/ 8/1978

9/18/1978

9/21/1978

10/ 6/1978

Plaintiff Gaedecke’s Original Petition filed.

Original Answer of Defendant Mobil Oil

Corporation filed.

Original Answer of Defendants L.A. Levy,

Inc., and Arthur Levy Boat Service, Inc.,

filed.

Motion of Defendant Mobil Oil Corpora-

tion for Leave to File Third Party Com-

plaint and Third Party Complaint of De-

fendant Mobil Oil Corporation filed.

Motion of Defendant Mobil Oil Corpora-

tion for Leave to file Third Party Com-

plaint granted.

Answer of Third Party Defendant Gulf

Offshore Company, a Division of the Pool

Company filed.

Plaintiff Gaedecke’s First Amended Ori-

ginal Petition filed.

First Amended Answer of Third Party De-

fendant Gulf Offshore Company, a Divi-

vision of the Pool Company filed.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Com-

pany, a Division of the Pool Company’s

special exception as to jurisdiction over the

subject matter overruled.

First Amended Third Party Compaint of

Defendant Mobii Oil Corporation filed.

Original Answer of Defendant Offshore

Crews, Inc. filed.

* Prepared by counsel for Petitioner and approved by all other

counsel of record. Rule 30.1; Memorandum Re Printing Joint

Appendix 4.

10/ 6/1978

11/ 6/1978

11/ 9/1978

11/20/1978

14/22/1978

Motion for Summary Judgment of Third

Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Company,

a Division of the Pool Company filed.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore

Company, a Division of the Pool Com-

panys Motion for Summary Judgment

overruled.

Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation’s First

Supplemental Answer filed.

Motion of Defendant Mobil Oil Corpora-

tion regarding Rule 184A filed.

Case called for trial.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Com-

pany, a Division of the Pool Company’s re-

newed motion to dismiss for want of sub-

ject matter jurisdiction denied.

Plaintiff Gaedecke’s Motion to take a Non-

Suit as to Defendants L.A. Levy, Inc.,

Arthur Levy Boat Service, Inc. and Off-

shore Crews, Inc. granted.

Evidence concluded, all parties rested.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Com-

pany, a Division of the Pool Company’s

Motion for Instructed Verdict on ground

of lack of subject matter jurisdiction over-

ruled.

Charge to Jury prepared.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Com-

pany, a Division of the Pool Company’s

Requested Jury Instructions A, B and C

filed.

Jury returned verdict, which received, an-

nounced and filed by the Court.

11/27/1978

12/13/1978

12/18/1978

12/28/1978

1/17/1979

2/13/1979

3/15/1979

4/16/1979

12/12/1979

Plaintiff Gaedecke’s Motion for Judgment

filed.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Com-

pany, a Division of the Pool Company’s

Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Vere-

dicto filed.

Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation’s Motion

for Judgment filed.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Com-

pany, a Division of the Pool Company’s

Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Vere-

dicto overruled.

Judgment entered.

Third Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Com-

pany, a Division of the Pool Company’s

Original Motion for New Trial filed.

Amended Motion for New Trial of Third

Party Defendant Gulf Offshore Company,

a Division of the Pool Company filed.

Order Overruling Third Party Defendant

Gulf Offshore Company, a Division of the

Pool Company’s Amended Motion for

New Trial entered.

Appeal Bond filed.

Appeal docketed in the Court of Civil Ap-

peals for the Fourteenth Supreme Judicial

District of Texas upon filing of the record

consisting of the Transcript (2 volumes)

and the Statement of Facts (4 volumes and

1 folder of exhibits).

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals

for the Fourteenth Supreme Judicial Dis-

trict of Texas entered.

12/27/1979

1/ 9/1980

2/ 8/1980

. 6/18/1980

7/ 3/1980

7/16/1980

Motion for Rehearing in Court of Civil

Appeals filed.

Motion for Rehearing in Court of Civil

Appeals overruled.

Application to the Supreme Court of Texas

for Writ of Error filed.

Application for Writ of Error refused by

the Supreme Court of Texas with the nota-

tion “No Reversible Error”.

Motion for Rehearing in the Supreme

Court of Texas filed.

Motion for Rehearing in the Supreme

Court of Texas overruled.

FIRST AMENDED ANSWER OF THIRD PARTY

DEFENDANT GULI’ OFFSHORE COMPANY,

A D'VISION OF THE POOL COMPANY.

Filed: September 8, 1978. Ray Hardy, District Clerk,

Harris County, Texas. By M. Stuckey, Deputy.

[Transcript, pp. 38-42]

NO. 1,052,262

In The

DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

215th Judicial District

STEVEN GAEDECKE

Vv.

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, L. A. LEVY, INC.

and ARTHUR LEVY BOAT SERVICE, INC.

Vv.

GULF OFFSHORE COMPANY, A DIVISION

OF THE POOL COMPANY

FIRST AMENDED ANSWER OF

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT GULF

OFFSHORE COMPANY, A DIVISION

OF THE POOL COMPANY

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

Now comes GULF OFFSHORE COMPANY, A DI-

VISION OF THE POOL COMPANY, Third Party De-

fendant in the above numbered and styled cause of ac-

tion, and makes this its First Amended Answer to the

Third Party Petition of Mobil Oil Corporation, and would

respectfully show as follows:

By way of special exceptions, Third Party Defendant

would respectfully show as follows:

(a) Third Party Plaintiffs Petition fails to allege

a cause of action against Third Party Defendant

within the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court

because exclusive original jurisdiction of the subject

matter of the Third Party Plaintiff's cause of action

is vested in the United States District Court by virtue

of the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq.;

(b) Third Party Plaintiff’s Petition fails to allege

a cause of action against Third Party Defendant and

should therefore be dismissed with prejudice;

a cause of action against Third Party Defendant

because Defendant is Plaintiff's employer and the

provisions of the Longshoremen’s & Harbor Work-

ers’ Compensation Act and the Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act prohibit Third Party Plaintiff from

seeking indemnity from Third Party Defendant;

(d) Third Party Defendant specially excepts to

Paragraph 5 of the Third Party Plaintiffs Petition

in which it is alleged that Third Party Plaintiff is

entitled to indemnity from Third Party Defendant

“because of the negligence” of Third Party Defend-

ant, said allegations being vague, general and in-

definite, it not being alleged in said paragraph or

elsewhere in said Petition what acts, omissions, or

conduct of Third Party Defendant constituted neg-

ligence, and said allegations are, therefore, conclu-

sions of the pleader, and Third Party Defendant is

unable to determine the issues it must meet upon

trial hereof;

(e) Third Party Defendant specially excepts to

Paragraph 5 of Third Party Plaintiff's Petition in

which it is alleged that Third Party Plaintiff is en-

titled to indemnity from Third Party Defendant

because of Third Party Defendant’s “breach of its

warranty of workmanlike performance”, said allega-

tions being vague, general and indefinite, it not being

alleged in said paragraph or elsewhere in said Peti-

tion what acts, omissions, or conduct of Third Party

Defendant constituted a “breach of its warranty of

workmanlike performance”, and said allegations are,

therefore, conclusions of the pleader, and Third

Party Defendant is unable to determine the issues it

must meet upon trial hereof;

(f) Third Party Defendant specially excepts to

Paragraph 5 of Third Party Plaintiff's Petition in

which it is alleged that Third Party Plaintiff is en-

titled to indemnity from Third Party Defendant be-

cause of Third Party Defendant’s “breach of the

terms of the aforementioned Drilling Contract”, said

allegations being vague, general and indefinite, it

not being alleged in said paragraph or elsewhere in

said Petition what acts, omissions, or conduct of

Third Party Defendant constituted a “breach of the

terms of the aforementioned Drilling Contract,” and

said allegations are, therefore, conclusions of the

pleader, and Third Party Defendant is unable to

determine the issues it must meet upon trial hereof;

(g) Third Party Defendant specially excepts to

Third Party Plaintiff's allegations that it is entitled

to indemnity because of Third Party Defendant’s

“breach of the terms of the aforementioned contract”

said allegations being untrue on their face in that

Plaintiff has alleged that he was injured while on-

board a vessel owned by another Defendant and not

“while engaged in operations pursuant to a Drilling

Contract entered into between Third Party Plaintiff

Mobil Oil Corporation and Third Party Defendant

Gulf Offshore Company, A Division of the Pool

Company.”

Of which special exceptions, each being taken separ-

ately and apart from each other, Third Party Defendant

prays judgment of the Court together with costs.

Without waiving the foregoing special exceptions, but

still insisting upon the same, for further answer herein,

if any be necessary, Third Party Defendant denies each

and every, all and singular, the allegations contained with-

in the Third Party Petition and demands strict proof

thereof.

Il.

Without waiving the foregoing special exceptions and

defenses, but still insisting upon the same, for further

answer herein, if any be necessary, Third Party Defendant

would respectfully show that if Plaintiff were injured as

alleged, such injuries would be due solely to the Plaintiff's

own negligent acts and omissions or were directly and

proximately contributed to by Plaintiff's negligence, or,

alternatively, were due to an unavoidable accident.

IV.

Without waiving the foregoing special exceptions and

defenses, but still insisting upon the same, for further

answer herein, if any be necessary, Third Party Defend-

ant would respectfully show that if Plaintiff were injured

as alleged, such injuries were caused in whole or in part

by the negligent acts and omissions of a third party or

were directly and proximately contributed to by the acts

and/or omissions of a third person for whom Third Party

Defendant is not responsible.

Without waiving the foregoing special exceptions and

defenses, but still insisting upon the same, for further

answer herein, if any be necessary, Third Party Defendant

would respectfully show that it was the employer of Plain-

tiff and under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and

Longshoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,

Third Party Plaintiff is not entitled to seek indemnity

from Plaintiff's employer.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Third

Party Defendant prays that upon trial hereof, Third Party

Plaintiff take nothing and that Third Party Defendant go

hence without day, with its costs and such other and

further relief as it may be entitled to receive.

ROYSTON, RAYZOR, VICKERY

& WILLIAMS

By /s/ CHARLES D. KENNEDY

Charles D. Kennedy

Suite 3710

One Shell Plaza

Houston, Texas 77002

713/224-8380

Attorneys for Third Party

Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and copy of the First Amended

Answer of Third Party Defendant has been mailed to

attorneys for Third Party Plaintiff, Frank Caton, 3300

Two Houston Center, Houston, Texas 77002, and to

Plaintiff's attorney, Gus Kolius, 3300 One Allen Center,

Houston, Texas 77002, and to attorneys for Levy Boat

Service, Inc., Joseph D. Cheavens, Baker & Botts, One

Shell Plaza, Houston, Texas 77002, on this 8th day of

September, 1978.

/s/ W. C. QUILLIN

Of Royton, Rayzor, Vickery &

Williams

REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS A, B AND C OF

THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT GULF OFFSHORE COMPANY,

A DIVISION OF THE POOL COMPANY.

Filed: November 22, 1978. Ray Hardy, District Clerk, Harris

County, Texas. By R. Trinkle, Deputy.

{Transcript, pp. 198-199]

In The

DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

129th Judicial District

Requested Instruction No. fr

In connection with the damage issues, you are instructed that

any amounts allowed for:

da)

physical pain and mental anguish in the

future, and

loss of earning capacity in the future, and

loss of physical capacity in the future, and

medical and hospical care in the future,

must be such amounts as are the present value thereof, and reduced

to such present value by the use of an appropriate interest rate,

prevailing at the time and place of trial, at which money can

be safely and securely invested, and the balance shall be your

answer.

[Pr

REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO, ©

In considering the issues submitted by the Court

dealing with the question of amount of damages sustained by

Stephen Gaedecke, if any, you are instructed that you are

not to consider or speculate concerning future inflationary

trends or possible future increases in earnings due to

increases in productivity, chat is you shall not speculate

in projection of future damages, if any, about possible

future inflationary trends or possible depressions or about

possible future wage increases.

Requested Instruction No. C-

You are instructed that, as a matter of law, any award

made to the plaintiff in this case, if any is made, is not

income to the plaintiff within the meaning of the Federal

Income Tax Law. In determining damages sustained by plaintiff,

if any, you are to follow the instructions already given you

by this court in measuring those damages and in no een should

you either add to or subtract from that award on account of such

damages not being subject to federal income taxes.

TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT

Judgment Entered. Volume 1655, Page 767, General

Minutes District Courts, in and for Harris County, Texas.

(Transcript, pp. 237-240]

“NO. 1,052,262

In The

DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

129th Judicial District

STEVEN GAEDECKE

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, ET AL

GULF OFFSHORE CoO.,

A DIVISION OF THE POOL COMPANY

JUDGMENT

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of No-

vember, 1978, came on to be heard the above styled and

numbered cause, wherein Steven Gaedecke is Plaintiff,

Mobil Oil Corporation, Arthur Levy Boat Company,

Arthur Levy, Inc., and Offshore Crews, Inc. are Defend-

ants, and Mobil Oil Corporation is Third-Party Plaintiff,

and Gulf Offshore Co., A Division of the Pool Company

is Third-Party Defendant, and Employers’ National In-

surance Company is Intervenor, and came the parties

Plaintiff, Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiff, Third-Party

Defendant and Intervenor, and announced ready for trial.

Prior to the voir dire examination of the jury panel, Plain-

tiff, in open court, took a voluntary non-suit as to De-

fendants Arthur Levy Boat Company,. Arthur Levy, Inc.,

and Offshore Crews, Inc., and the Court having noted

said Non-Suit did by its Order dismiss the Defendants

Arthur Levy Boat Company, Arthur Levy, Inc., and

Offshore Crews, Inc. only. And came the jury consisting

of twelve good and lawful men and women consisting of

Catherine Mary Byrnes and eleven others who being duly

empaneled and sworn and having heard the pleadings,

evidence, stipulations and arguments of counsel, did on

the 22nd day of November, 1978, return in open court

their verdict as follows:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence

that Mobil Oil Corporation, at the time in question

and under the circumstances existing, failed to exer-

cise that degree of care that should have been exer-

cised by a reasonably prudent offshore platform

operator in one or both of the following:

1. In waiting until approximately 9:00 a.m. on

September 22, 1975, to evacuate the platform

in question?

To which the jury answered “yes”.

2. In the selecting of the method used to evacuate

Steven Gaedecke’s crew from the platform?

To which the jury answered “yes’.

If you have answered “yes” to either parts of Special

Issue No. 1, and only in that event, then answer

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2

Was such a proximate cause of the injuries suffered

by Steven Gaedecke?

To which the jury answered “yes’.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 3

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence would

fairly and reasonably compensate Steven Gaedecke

as a direct and natural result of the injuries he re-

ceived in the incident in question.

You will consider the following elements of damage,

if any, and none other:

(a) Loss of earnings which he has sustained in the

past;

(b) Loss of earning capacity which in reasonable

probability he will sustain in the future;

suffered in the past;

(d) Physical pain and mental anguish which in

reasonable probability he will suffer in the

future;

(e) Physical impairment he has sustained in the past;

(f) Physical impairment which in reasonable prob-

ability he will sustain in the future.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

To which the jury answered “$900,000.00”.

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 4

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence

that Steven Gaedecke’s injuries were incident to,

or resulted directly or indirectly from the work to

be performed by Gulf Offshore Company under its

contract with Mobil?

To which the jury answered “yes”.

Catherine Mary Byrnes

Verdict of the jury was received by the Court and filed

and entered of record on the minutes of the Court, and

the Court having considered the pleadings on file herein,

the verdict of the jury, the stipulations of the parties and

the proof adduced, and having considered Plaintiff’s Mo-

tion for Judgment, the Court is of the opinion that Plain-

tiff is entitled to have and recover of and from the De-

fendant Mobil Oil Corporation the sum of $900,000.00,

together with interest thereon at the rate of 9% per

annum from the date of entry of the Judgment until paid;

The Court is further of the opinion that out of such

amount recovered by the Plaintiff against Defendant Mobil

Oil Corporation, the Intervenor Employers’ National In-

surance Company should have and recover the sum of

$32,712.09;

The Court is further of the opinion that Plaintiff should

have and take nothing of and from the Defendants,

Arthur Levy Boat Company, Arthur Levy, Inc. and Off-

shore Crews, Inc.;

The Court is further of the opinion that Third-Party

Plaintiff Mobil Oil Corporation is entitled to and is

granted indemnity of and from Third-Party Defendant

Gulf Offshore Co., A Division of the Pool Company for

all sums, including interest and costs of court, that the

Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation is required to pay to

Plaintiff by the terms of this Judgment;

The Court having further heard arguments and having

read the briefs is of the opinion that the Law of Louisiana

does apply and hereby applies such law in this action;

It is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the

Court that Plaintiff Steven Gaedecke do have and recover

of and from the Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation the

sum of $900,000.00, together with interest thereon at

the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the entry of

Judgment until paid;

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the

Court that out of such amount recovered by the Plaintiff

against Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation, the Intervenor

Employers’ National Insurance Company do have and

recover the sum of $32,712.09;

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the

Court that Plaintiff has and takes nothing of and from

the Defendants, Arthur Levy Boat Company, Arthur Levy,

Inc. and Offshore Crews, Inc.;

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the

Court that Third-Party Plaintiff Mobil Oil Corporation

is hereby granted indemnity of and from Third-Party

Defendant Gulf Offshore Co., A Division of the Pool

Company for all sums, including interest and costs of

court, that the Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation is re-

quired to pay by the terms of this Judgment;

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that all

costs of court accrued herein be and are taxed against

the Defendant Mobil Oil Corporation for which execu-

tion may issue with same if not timely paid.

All relief not granted herein is denied.

SIGNED, RENDERED and ENTERED this 18th day

of December, 1978.

/s/ THOMAS J. STOVALL, JR.

Judge Presiding

APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:

JAMAIL AND KOLIUS

Attorneys for Plaintiff

FULBRIGHT AND JAWORSKI

Attorneys for Intervenor,

Employers’ National Insurance Company

CRAIN, CATON, JAMES & OBERWETTER

Attorneys for Defendant-Third-Party

Plaintiff, Mobil Oil Corporation

ROYSTON, RAYZOR, VICKERY & WILLIAMS

Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant,

Gulf Offshore Company, a Division of

the Pool Company

BAKER AND BOTTS

Attorneys for Defendants, Arthur

Levy Boat Company, Arthur Levy, Inc.

and Offshore Crews, Inc.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION

[Reported at 594 S.W.2d 496]

No. B2159

In The

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

For The

Fourteenth Supreme Judicial District of Texas

GULF OFFSHORE COMPANY,

A DIVISION OF THE POOL COMPANY,

Appellant

Vv.

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Appellee

Appeal from 129th District Court of Harris County

Affirmed, and Opinion filed December 12, 1979.

Appellant, Gulf Offshore Company, a Division of the

Pool Company, appealed from a judgment for indemnity

rendered in favor of appellee, Mobil Oil Corporation.

Appellant Gulf Offshore was a third party defendant be-

low and appellee Mobil was defendant and third party

plaintiff. Steven Gaedecke was plaintiff in the trial court.

Steven Gaedecke, an employee of third party defendant-

appellant Gulf Offshore, sued defendant-appellee Mobil,

and L. A. Levy, Inc., Arthur Levy Boat Service, Inc.

and Offshore Crews, Inc., for personal injuries sustained

on a vessel owned by Levy and chartered by Mobil.

Mobil later filed a third party complaint against Gulf

Offshore, alleging liability for indemnity pursuant to cer-

tain provisions in the contract for well completion opera-

tions which was executed by Gulf Offshore as the

contractor-indemnitor and Mobil as platform owner-

indemnitee.

Prior to trial, plaintiff Gaedecke settled with the Levy

defendants for a guaranteed recovery of $100,000.00

and proceeded to take a non-suit against them. Plaintiff

also reached agreement with defendant Mobil, that if

Mobil did not obtain incemnity from Gulf, plaintiff's

recovery against Mobil would be limited to $200,000.00

plus the compensation lien. Also present in the trial court

was intervenor, Employers’ National Insurance Company.

On September 22, 1975, plaintiff Gaedecke was safely

aboard the vessel Salton-Seahorse, having been evacuated

pursuant to the implementation of Mobil’s hurricane

evacuation plan. Defendant Mobil had arranged for the

vessel, owned and operated by Levy, to stand by for the

evacuation. Following preparation for evacuation, all

machinery was shut down, and after evacuation from the

platform of all but two platform workers employed by

Gulf Offshore by use of the crane, even its generator was

shut off. As the last two workers, the crane operator and

his helper, attempted to evacuate from the platform using

a rope to swing onto the deck of the Salton-Seahorse,

plaintiff heard some party yell down to him to go aft and

provide assistance. A large wave washed across the aft

area of the vessel where he had positioned himself and

plaintiff was swept along the deck of the vessel and ended

up against a pallet loaded with sand. Plaintiff Gaedecke

suffered injuries primarily to his back.

At trial in response to special issues, the jury returned

a verdict which found that defendant, Mobil Oil Cor-

poration, failed to exercise that degree of care that should

have been exercised by a reasonably prudent offshore

platform operator in waiting until approximately 9:00

a.m. on September 22, 1975, to evacuate the platform

and in the selection of the method used to evacuate the

crew from the platform; that such were a proximate cause

of the plaintiff’s injuries; that $900,000.00 would be a

sum which would fairly and reasonably compensate plain-

tiff for injuries suffered; and that plaintiff’s injuries were

incident to, or resulted directly or indirectly from, the

work to be performed by Gulf Offshore under its contract

with Mobil. The trial court entered judgment based on

the jury’s answers to the special issues and granted in-

demnity to Mobil from Gulf Offshore for $900,000.00

less the compensation lien of $32,712.09. Gulf Offshore

appeals from the judgment of indemnity.

Defendant Mobil and third party defendant Gulf Off-

shore entered into contract number 1159, which con-

cerned oil well completion operations to be performed

by Gulf Offshore on defendant Mobil’s platform wells

‘situated in Grande Isle, Block 95, offshore of the State

of Louisiana. Section 15 set out the provisions made con-

cerning insurance and indemnity:

15. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY:

15.1 At any and all times during the term of this

agreement, Contractor agrees to maintain in force

and submit evidence of insurance equal to or in

excess of the requirements detailed in Exhibit B

attached hereto and made a part hereof.

15.2 All insurance shall be carried in a company

Or companies acceptable to Mobil and shall be

maintained in full force and effect during the term

of this agreement, and shall not be canceled [sic],

altered, or amended without ten (10) days prior

written notice having first been furnished Mobil.

Upon request Mobil shall be furnished certified

copies of all such insurance policies.

15.3 In the event Contractor is a self-insurer and

Mobil has consented to Contractor’s being a self-

insurer as to any one or more of the risks as to

which coverage is required, evidence of such con-

sent must be in writing and approved by a repre-

sentative of Mobil authorized to enter into such

consent agreement.

15.4 Contractor shall protect, indemnify and save

Mobil Harmless against any and all claims, de-

mands and causes of action of every kind and

character arising in favor of any person, including

both Mobil’s and Contractor’s employees, on ac-

count of personal injuries or death, or damage to

property occurring, growing out of, incident to,

or resulting directly or indirectly from, the work

to be performed by Contractor hereunder, whether

such loss, damage, injury or liability arises from

or is contributed to by the negligence of Mobil

or its employees, and whether due to imperfection

of any material furnished by Mobil, or the prem-

ises themselves or any equipment thereon, whether

latent or patent, or for any other cause whatso-

ever; and for damages for infringement of any

patent as more particularly set forth in Paragraph

23 hereof.

Appellant’s first point of error addresses the threshold

question of the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of

Texas to entertain causes of action filed pursuant to the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331-

1356 (1979). There is no dispute as to the applicability

of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to this case.

43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1) (1975), in effect at the time

of this accident, states that:

The Constitution and laws and civil and political

jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the

subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf

and to all artificial islands, and all installations and

other devices permanently or temporarily attached

to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the

purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing

resources therefrom, or any such installation or other

device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose

of transporting such resources, to the same extent

as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of

exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a state.

The section of the Act in effect in this case, 43 U.S.

C.A. § 1333(b) (1975), governing jurisdiction specifies

that:

The United States district courts shall have ori-

ginal jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising

out of or in connection with any operations con-

ducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose

of exploring for, developing, removing or transport-

ing by pipeline the natural resources, or involving

rights to the natural resources of the subsoil and

seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and proceed-

ings with respect to any such case or controversy

may be instituted in the judicial district in which any

defendant resides or may be found, or in the judicial

district of the adjacent State nearest the place where

the cause of action arose.

We note that nowhere in this section does the word

“exclusive” appear. Appellant argues that the Act vests

exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter of the plain-

tiff's main cause of action and the indemnity action in

federal district court. We do not read 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333

(b) (1975) so as to oust our state courts of subject

matter jurisdiction in this case.

No authoritative case law, either state or federal, has

resolved the issue of the exclusivity of federal court juris-

diction over actions filed pursuant to the Outer Contin-

ental Shelf Lands Act. In Fluor Ocean Services, Inc. v.

Rucker Company, 341 F.Supp. 757 (E.D. La. 1972),

and Borne v. Tenneco Oil Company, et al., 1973 A.M.C.

388 (E.D. La. 1972), Judge Rubin held that the Act

conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the U.S. district courts

for causes of action arising out of operations conducted

on the outer Continental Shelf and further held in Fluor

that the intent of Congress was to make such operations

subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the

federal government. We disagree for the reasons stated

in the foregoing paragraph. We also note that in the

penultimate paragraph of the opinion in Fluor, Judge

Rubin merely found that the federal district court had

original jurisdiction.

Judge Rubin wrote that as a matter of policy, “. . . in

an area where the federal government had exerted ex-

clusive sovereignty, such as the outer Continental Shelf,

a single federal forum would be more appropriate than

multiple state forums to decide disputes that arise there.”

Fluor Ocean Services, Inc. v. Rucker Company, supra at

760. We do not believe this to be necessarily so. The Act

provides that the Constitution and laws of the United

States govern the outer Continental Shelf, 43 U.S.C.A.

§ 1333(a)(1) (1975), and where applicable and not

inconsistent with this Act or with federal laws, the laws

of the adjacent state are declared to be the law of the

United States regarding the outer Continental Shelf. 43

U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(2) (1975). The end result would

be an application of the same laws no matter where the

forum was located, whether state or federal.

Following Fluor is the recent decision of Friedrich v.

Whittaker Corporation, 467 F.Supp. 1012 (S.D. Tex.

1979). Here Judge Sterling recognized that the holding

in Fluor, which acknowledged that such jurisdiction was

original, did not necessarily include exclusive. Judge

Sterling dismissed the case in Friedrich on other grounds,

noting that a prompt authoritative resolution of the issue

of original or exclusive jurisdiction by a federal appellate

court would be welcomed. Friedrich v. Whittaker Cor-

poration, supra at 1015. Nonetheless, Friedrich held that

federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims

arising out of accidents on fixed oil rigs in areas covered

by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Jd. at 1014.

One Louisiana decision, Gravois v. Travelers Indemnity

Company, 173 So.2d 550 (La. Ct. App.), writ ref’d,

247 La. 1016, 175 So.2d 301 (1965), has also faced

the issue of the exclusivity of federal court jurisdiction

under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The major-

ity opinion, holding for exclusive federal court jurisdic-

tion under the Act, drew a vigorous dissent. We follow

the dissent in Gravois in two respects by holding that our

state courts may take cognizance of an action asserted

under this Act irrespective of the fact that the incident

giving rise thereto occurred within the federally defined

limits of the outer Continental Shelf, and secondly, that

our state courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff's

claims irrespective of which law must be applied in the

determination thereof. Gravois v. Travelers Indemnity

Company, 173 So.2d at 556, 559.

43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(b) (1975) of the Outer Contin-

ental Shelf Lands Act was amended and renumbered in

1978 to 43 U.S.C.A. § 1349(b)(1) (1978) and now

reads in pertinent part as follows:

. . . the district courts of the United States shall

have jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising

out of, or in connection with (A) any operation

conducted on the outer Continental Shelf or which

involves exploration, development, or production of

the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer

Continental Shelf, or which involves rights to such

minerals, or (B) the cancellation, suspension, or

termination of a lease or permit under this sub-

chapter. Proceedings with respect to any such case

or controversy may be instituted in the judicial dis-

trict in which any defendant resides or may be found,

or in the judicial district of the State nearest the

place the cause of action arose.

The word “original” was omitted in the 1978 version. We

find this omission significant in that it further supports

our holding that the Act neither intended nor required

sole original or exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.

Point of error one is overruled.

In its second point on appeal, appellant Gulf Offshore

contends that its Motion for Judgment Non Obstante

Veredicto was improperly overruled because the jury

verdict upon which the judgment of indemnity in favor

of defendant Mobil was predicated, was the product of

fraud and colliusion by attorneys for plaintiff and Mobil,

and Mobil, therefore, is precluded from obtaining in-

demnity as a matter of law. A motion for judgment non

obstante veredicto is proper “. . . if a directed verdict

would have been proper... .” TEx. R. Civ. P. 301.

In determining whether the trial court erred in refus-

ing to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, the inquiry is whether there is any evidence of

probative force to support the verdict of the jury. City

of San Augustine v. Roy W. Green Company, 548 S.W.

2d 467, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1977, writ ref’d

n.r.e.). In determining whether there is any evidence of

probative force to support the verdict, we are required

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

party against whom the motion is sought and every

reasonable intendment deducible from the evidence is

to be indulged in that party’s favor. Id. at 472.

Based on the record, we fail to see how the jury’s

verdict in the instant case could be construed to be the

product of fraud and collusion between counsel for plain-

tiff and counsel for Mobil. All parties were represented

in trial by highly competent attorneys; all the agreements,

the legality of which is uncontested, were disclosed prior

to trial in the presence of the trial judge and duly re-

corded by the court reporter. Counsel for appellant Gulf

Offshore was given ample opportunity to question the

attorneys for the plaintiff and appellee Mobil at that time.

Attorneys engaged in the trial of cases have heavy

responsibilities, and must have latitude in making tactical

decisions as how to best represent their clients within the

bounds of propriety. General Motors Corporation v.

Hebert, 501 S.W.2d 950, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston

[lst Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Under these facts,

where appellee Mobil was unable to reach agreement

with appellant Gulf Offshore on the issue of indemnity,

it is understandable that counsel for Mobil would co-

operate with counsel for plaintiff to limit Mobil’s potential

liability in the event Mobil did not obtain indemnity from

Gulf Offshore. Point of error two is overruled.

Points of error three, four, five and six complain of the

lack of evidence to support the judgment for contractual

indemnity given the language in Section 15.4 of the

contract. Section 15.4 states in pertinent part:

Contractor [Gulf Offshore] shall protect, indemnify

and save Mobil Harmless against any and all claims,

demands and causes of action of every kind and

character arising in favor of any person, including

both Mobil’s and Contractor’s employees, on account

of personal injuries . . . occurring, growing out of,

incident to, or resulting directly or indirectly from,

the work to be performed by Contractor hereunder,

whether such loss, damage, injury or liability arises

from or is contributed to by the negligence of Mobil

or its employees...

Appellant Gulf Offshore contends that the plaintiff’s in-

juries were not incident to or the result of Gulf Offshore’s

work to be performed under the contract with Mobil.

We find sufficient evidence in the record to support

the jury’s answer to special issue four which inquired

whether or not plaintiff's injuries were incident to, or

resulted directly or indirectly from, the work to be per-

formed by Gulf Offshore under its contract with Mobil.

Plaintiff’s own testimony that it was the normal thing to

do to assist the last two Gulf Offshore employees off the

platform even though an evacuation was in progress and

that it was customary to help other Gulf Offshore em-

ployees in the regular course of their work was uncon-

troverted. The evidence elicited regarding the work opera-

tions on the platform justifies the jury’s answer that the

injuries suffered by the plaintiff were incident to, or re-

sulting directly or indirectly from the work required.

These points of error are overruled.

In points of error seven, eight and nine, appellant Gulf

Offshore contends that Louisiana law, applied as con-

trolling federal law in this case, and Texas law prohibit

contractual indemnity between an oil company and a

contractor unless there is insurance coverage or alterna-

tively, that any liability for indemnity should be limited

to the amount of insurance required by the contract.

Furthermore, appellant by relying on Tex. Rev. Civ.

STAT. ANN. art. 2212b (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) urges

that the public policy of the State of Texas prohibits con-

tractual indemnity unless covered by insurance and then

only to a maximum ceiling of $300,000.00.

43 US.C.A. § 1333(a)(2) (1975), in effect at the

time of this accident, states that:

To the extent that they are applicable and not

inconsistent with the subchapter [Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331-1356 (1979)]

or with other federal laws and regulations of the

Secretary [of the Interior] now in effect or here-

after adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each

adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter adopted,

amended, or repealed are declared to be the law of

the United States for that porition of the subsoil

and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and

artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon,

which would be within the area of the State if its

boundaries were extended seaward to the outer

margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the

President shall determine and publish in the Federal

defining each such area. All of such applicable laws

shall be administered and enforced by the appropri-

ate officers and courts of the United States...

It is clear to this court that federal law, and decisions

interpreting those laws, apply in this instance, and where

there are no such laws or decisions, this court shall apply

the laws and decisions of the State of Louisiana. The

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act makes it clear that

federal law, supplemented by state law of the adjacent

state, when not inconsistent with applicable federal law,

is to be applied to the drilling rigs as artificial islands as

though they were federal enclaves in an upland state.

Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 395

U.S. 353, 355 (1969). It is evident that federal law is

exclusive in its regulation of this area, and that state law

is adopted only as surrogate federal law. Id. at 357.

In Day v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company,

353 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1973), a motion for sum-

mary judgment was presented to the federal district court

regarding interpretation of a contract containing an in-

demnity agreement similar to the one in our case, The

contract before that court provided minimum limits of

$300,000.00 for insurance coverage of contractual lia-

bilities and indemnities assumed by the contractor cover-

ing all claims “incident to, arising out of, in conection

with, or resulting from the activities of Subcontractor, its

employees and agents . . . or in connection with the work

to be performed, services to be rendered, or materials

to be furnished, under this contract .. .” Jd. at 1351.

Plaintiff Day was working on a fixed platform located

on the outer Continental Shelf. As he passed by a com-

pressor, it suddenly exploded, injuring him.

Louisiana law was applied in Day as surrogate federal

law to interpret the contract. The court held that while

Louisiana courts have read such an indemnity agreement

narrowly, the agreement must be given effect according

to the intention of the parties. Jd. at 1352. Judge Rubin

did not limit his interpretation to any one of the phrases

in the indemnity agreement, e.g. “arising out of” and “in

connection with.” Instead, taking the contract as a whole

the court held that it was the intention of the parties to

require indemnity against all risks of harm with insurance

coverage and that such an indemnity agreement would

be upheld.

We disagree with respect to the position taken by ap-

pellant Gulf Offshore that indemnity agreements are not

enforceable under Louisiana law without insurance cover-

age. This issue was not reached in Day as insurance

coverage was undisputably provided pursuant to the con-

tract in that case. In the two cases cited by appellant,

Dickerson v. Continental Oil Company, 449 F.2d 1209

(Sth Cir. 1971), and Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and Ex-

ploration Company, 512 F.2d 817 (Sth Cir. 1975), the

limits of liability for the indemnitors in both cases were

limited to the amounts of insurance coverage provided in

the respective contracts. Unlike the facts before us, in

neither case was there any dispute as to the limits of

liability contracted for or that insurance coverage was in

fact obtained.

The record in this case does not reflect any proof as

to the existence of insurance obtained to protect against

the risks assumed by appellant Gulf Offshore or any

limits of liability agreed to by the parties in their con-

tract. During the trial, appellee Mobil tendered into

evidence certain documents identified as the contract

executed by appellant Gulf Offshore and appellee Mobil,

without any objections from appellant Gulf Offshore.

Later, appellant Gulf Offshore discovered an Exhibit

B was unattached to the contract admitted into evidence.

In a post-trial proceeding, appellant sought to have the

exhibit made a part of the record. The unattached exhibit

allegedly stated what the limits of liability were. Having

made no objection to the offer of the contract at trial,

appellant has waived any complaint concerning the ex-

clusion of the exhibit. The trial court in the post-trial

proceeding properly excluded the exhibit from the record

since it was evidence on a controversial matter. State

v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966), cert. den.,

386 U.S. 944 (1967); Tex. R. Civ. P. 270. For these

reasons, we overrule as well appellant’s alternative as-

sertion that its liability for contractual indemnity should

be limited to $100,000.00, that being the limit of liability

allegedly required by the contract.

Tex. Rev. Civ. STaT. ANN. art. 2212b (Vernon Supp.

1978-1979) declares indemnity provisions in agreements

pertaining to wells for oil, gas, or water, or mines for

other minerals, where there is negligence attributable to

the indemnitee, void and unenforceable as against the

public policy of the State of Texas, except if the parties

agree in writing, that such indemnity obligation will be

supported by liability insurance furnished by indemnitor,

and then only to the limits of insurance agreed to be

furnished.

We hold that this provision has no application to the

instant case. Applying federal law pursuant to the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act and Louisiana law as sur-

rogate federal law, where not inconsistent with federal

law, the indemnity agreement in this case does not fail

as against the public policy of the State of Louisiana

irrespective of the existence or non-existence of insurance.

Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company, 512

F.2d at 826; Dickerson v. Continental Oil Company, 449

F.2d at 1221. Following Justice Guittard in Mamlin v.

Susan Thomas, Incorporated, 490 S.W.2d 634, 636-37

(Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1973, no writ), we hoid that

the Texas concept of public policy cannot prevail against

the national policy enunciated in a federal act as declared

by Congress in matters within its power. Points of error

seven, eight and nine are overruled.

Appellant Gulf Offshore next urges error in the align-

ment of parties prior to the assignment of peremptory

challenges and in the failure to equalize the challenges

among the parties, thereby depriving appellant of a fair

trial. Plaintiff Gaedecke was awarded twelve peremptory

challenges and appellant Gulf Offshore and appellee

Mobil were each awarded six peremptory challenges.

The granting of peremptory challenges depends on

whether the interests of the parties within the meaning

of Tex. R. Civ. P. 233 are, at least in part, antagonistic

in a matter that the jury is to be concerned with. Perkins

v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. 1974). Tex. REv.

Civ. StaT. ANN. art. 215la (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979)

requires the trial court, after alignment of the parties

to equalize the number of peremptory challenges.

The record on appeal consists of a partial statement

of facts, the jury voir dire having been omitted. Antago-

nism between plaintiff and appellee Mobil was shown by

the pleadings and none of the pre-trial concessions

changed that. The record does not reflect in any manner

how appellant was injured by the jury selection process.

Appellant assigns as error the refusal of four requested

special issues which inquire about appellee Mobil’s neg-

ligence as vessel-charterer of the Salton-Seahorse. Appel-

lant contends that favorable answers to these special issues

could have established the negligence of Mobil as vessel-

charterer being the sole cause of plaintiff's injuries, there-

by precluding contractual indemnity against appellant

Gulf Offshore. 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) (1978) precludes

liability of an employer by agreement directly or in-

directly for injuries to an employee caused by the negli-

-gence of a vessel.

We do not find any evidence in the record nor do the

pleadings reveal that the issue of sole cause was raised.

TEx. R. Civ. P. 279 requires that when a case is sub-

mitted upon special issues, only those controlling issues

made by the written pleadings and the evidence shall be

submitted. There was evidence from which the jury could

have found appellee Mobil negligent as a fixed platform

operator or as a vessel-charterer. Given the jury’s answers

to the special issue actually submitted, finding Mobil

negligent in the capacity as fixed platform operator, the

result would not have changed. We find no error in the

refusal to submit the requested issues.

In its last three points of error, appellant attacks the

refusal to submit tendered instructions prohibiting con-

sideration by the jury of inflationary trends or increases

in productivity as factors affecting awards for future wage

loss, the inapplicability of federal income taxes and the

reduction of any fuiure damage award to present value

by the use of an appropriate interest rate prevailing at

time of trial.

The trial court properly refused to permit the jury from

considering evidence as to inflationary trends as an ele-

ment of damages for future wage loss. Davis v. Hill

Engineering Company, 549 F.2d 314 (Sth Cir. 1977);

Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Company, 510 F.2d 234

(Sth Cir.) (en banc), cert. den., 423 U.S. 839 (1975).

Increases in productivity were not proper for consideration

by the jury. Davis v. Hill Engineering Company, 549

F.2d at 335. Davis, Johnson, and another case cited by

appellant, Blue v. Western Railway of Alabama, 469

F.2d 487 (Sth Cir. 1972), cert. den., 410 U.S. 956

(1973), do not hold that appellant would be entitled to

an affirmative instruction prohibiting the jury’s considera-

tion of these factors. Furthermore, the record before us

gives no indication that the jury in fact considered in-

flationary trends or increases in productivity in calculat-

ing the damages award.

Johnson vy. Penrod Drilling Company, 510 F.2d at

236-37, specifically prohibits consideration by the jury

by evidence or instruction, of the impact of income taxes

in the calculation of a proper award for loss of future

wages.

Davis, Johnson and Blue permit a trial court to admit

evidence pertaining to the reduction of the award for

future damages, to present value by the use of an appro-

priate interest rate prevailing at the time and place of

trial. We hold that this was adequately provided for in

the damage issue which was actually submitted and which

inquired: “What sum of money, if any, if paid now cash

” would reasonably compensate plaintiff Gaedecke.

Davis, Johnson, and Blue do not hold that appellant would

be entitled to an instruction solely directing the jury to

apply an appropriate interest rate to reduce to present

value any sum awarded for future damages. Points of

error twelve, thirteen and fourteen are overruled.

Having carefully reviewed all the points of error and

the authorities cited in the briefs, we accordingly affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

/s/ Felix Salazar, Jr.

Justice

Judgment rendered, and Opinion filed December 12, 1979.

Panel consists of Associate Justices Coulson, Salazar and

Junell.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS JUDGMENT

NO. B-2159

In The

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

For The

Fourteenth Supreme Judicial District of Texas

GULF OFFSHORE COMPANY

A DIVISION OF THE POOL COMPANY

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, ET AL

“This cause, being an appeal from the judgment ren-

dered by the court below and entered on December 28,

1978, came on to be heard on the transcript of the record,

and the same being inspected, because it is the opinion

of this Court that there is no error in the judgment, it

is therefore considered, adjudged and ordered that the

judgment of the court below be affirmed in all things.

It is further ordered that the appellant, Gulf Offshore

Company, a division of the Pool Company, and its surety,

Western Surety Company, pay all costs incurred by

reason of this appeal. It is further ordered that this de-

cision be certified below for observance.”

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

NOTICE OF OVERRULING OF MOTION

FOR REHEARING

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

Civil Courts Building

14th Supreme Judicial District

Houston, Texas 77002

January 9, 1980

Hon. Charles D. Kennedy

Hon. Bradley A. Jackson

Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams

Suite 3710

One Shell Plaza

Houston, Texas 77002

Hon. Frank Caton

Hon. Gary L. Marks

Crain, Caton, James & Oberwetter

3300 Two Houston Center

Houston, Texas 77002

Hon. Joseph D. Jamail

Hon. Gus Kolius

Hon. John B. Neibel

Hon. Nat B. King

Jamail & Kolius

3300 One Allen Center

Smith at Dallas Streets

Houston, Texas 77002

Re: B2159—Gulf Offshore Company, a division of the

Pool Company v. Mobil Corporation, et al, from

Harris

Gentlemen:

Please be advised that on this date in the above cause

the Court OVERRULED appellant’s motion for rehear-

ing.

Also, please be advised that application for writ of

error, if any, must be submitted on or before Friday,

February 8, 1980.

Respectfully,

/s/ THELMA MUELLER

Thelma Mueller, Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

NOTICE OF REFUSAL OF APPLICATION

FOR WRIT OF ERROR

CLERK’S OFFICE—SUPREME COURT

Austin, Texas

June 18, 1980

Dear Sir:

You are hereby notified that the Application for Writ

of Error in the case of B-9169, GULF OFFSHORE CO.,

A DIVISION OF THE POOL COMPANY v. MOBIL

OIL CORPORATION ET AL was this day refused. No

reversible error.

Very truly your,

GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

NOTICE OF OVERRULING OF MOTION

FOR REHEARING

CLERK’S OFFICE--SUPREME COURT

Austin, Texas

July 16, 1980

Dear Sir:

You are hereby notified that the Motion for Rehearing

in the case of B-9169, Gulf Offshore Company

Mobile Oil Corp et al.

was this day OVERRULED.

Very truly yours,

GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.