Amicus Brief — Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
Supreme Court brief1981
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 80-581
In the Supreme Court) FE 25 1991
OF THE ALEXANDER L. STEVAs,
CLERK
United States _
Ocroser Term, 1980
Commonwealth Edison Company, Central Illinois Light Company,
Dairyland Power Cooperative, Detroit Edison Company, Inter-
state Power Company, Lake Superior District Power Company,
Lower Colorado River Authority/City of Austin, Minnesota
Power & Light Company, Northern States Power Com-
pany, Upper Peninsula Generating Company, Wisconsin
Power & Light Company, Decker Coal Company,
Peabody Coal Company, Westmoreland Re-
sources, Inc., and Western Energy Company,
Appellants,
against
State of Montana, Ted Schwinden, Governor of Montana, Helen J.
Feaver, Director of the State Department of Revenue, and Mau-
rice L. Brusett, Director of Administration and State Treasurer,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Montana
BRIEF OF THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
AMICUS CURIAE
Of Counsel: Joun E. THorson
Patricia B. Spracue Western Regional Counsel |
165 Post Street, Council of State
Fifth Floor Governments
San Francisco, CA 94108 165 Post Street,
(415) 986-3760 Fifth Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108
(415) 986-3760
Counsel of Record
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae
February, 1981
* BOWNE-PERNAU WALSH * 1045 SANSOME GT. © S.F., CA 84111 © (415) 801.7808
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The commerce clause does not nullify a severance tax
imposed by a sovereign State ...........---------s-ss-ssesesees
A.
The act of severance is an inherently local activ-
ity unrelated to the ultimate destination of the
natural resource in the stream of commerce ......
On its face, a severance tax such as Montana’s
satisfies the important concerns of commerce
Clause INGUITY ........--------cesceseeseeeeenensnsnsnseneneananennenens
1. The taxed activity has an inherent nexus
with the taxing state ...............------s:s-sseseeeseees
2. The severance tax is fairly apportioned ........
8. The severance tax is nondiscriminatory ....
4. The tax is rationally related to the services
rendered the taxpayer ..........------ssssseeessesees
II
The Montana severance tax has not been preempted
by federal law ............------++----
A. There has been no explicit preemption of the
B.
OF
Montana severance tax by federal statutes ........
The Montana severance tax does not frustrate
federal LAW ......------s-cssesesscesecesessesnenensnsssnensnensnenenenenns
Federal policies are not single-purpose ; indeed,
there are multiple policies concerning energy de-
' velopment, energy conservation, environmental
protection, land reclamation, and other purposes
12
13
13
14
15
li
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Ii
The court should exercise judicial restraint in this case 18
A. As a general principle, the court should defer
to the political branches of government for the
resolution of disputes concerning issues of fed-
eee REIS. iter es ee eee . 18
B. Were the commerce clause to apply to states’
severance taxes, such inquiry would bring upon
the judiciary a complex task of unmanageable
and immense proportions ...........-......-..--0---s-0+--s+-00- 22
1. The difficulty of developing an appropriate
I crite cies cliche catetiiecotatertiy aanselladalbdasioaerste 22
2. The difficulty of evaluating evidentiary mat-
ters 23
3. The difficulty of formulating an equitable
UN Si Ai on 24
IV
Application of the commerce clause to severance taxes
of states is prevented by sound principles of federal-
ism and the Tenth Amendment 26
A. Judicial invalidation of a nondiscriminatory
state tax on a uniquely local activity, in this
instance, the act of severance, would undermine
fundamental characteristics of our federal sys-
tem 26
B. Nullification of the Montana coal severance tax
would violate the Tenth Amendment .................. 28
OLED SION ATONE LEA DE ROME TAME: 30
iil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page
Alaska v. Artic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961) .................... 5, 11
Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141
IPED > cestoorsicessnosesnlsdasshenchiineostansiisounnapedenndpeannennehinsssecnaisattoe 13
Baldwin v. Fish & Game, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) .............. 8,9
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) -...---.--.--...----0-0-+ 8
Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340
US. 390 (1GGG) 0.2105. eS 5
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana, 615
P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980) ..................- 12,19
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)
I i ins daaibilabiaipsinetianerncitooreed 6, 7,12
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) ..........--------+0-++++ 30
Dean Milk v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) .................- 8
Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) ............-------0-0- 12
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922)... 4
H. P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
CY cscs sicnssnncnrncninaennsnranenainerinianimmainivinowansansionecs 2
Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) ........ 4)
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) ............-------- 8
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
ED) aici ceiccnnascnensessentsosoensonpppnatolnesessotonanetonsnensnscntecneccens 14
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) ............----.--------- 29
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1928) ...............- 20
Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., .... U.S. ...., 49
Rye Ee REA CRED sccesincih acc cnn cen cecnevcnsnneneenecinnncen 10, 11
iv
Tas.ie or AuTHorITiIES CITED
CasEs
Page
Mobil Oil v. Dubno, 492 F.2d 1004 (1980) ............2....... 13
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
chisinestitisinniistiiepanlicnibigenitanatgehaciaaiatia 28, 29, 30
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) .... 4,5
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (19438)... eee 9
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) ............ 9
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970) .................... 8
Post Oak Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 575 P.2d
COR CO ST esi ceinsccin scissile ee seen +
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) 19
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)..13, 15
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947) ........0...0.-2.2....-. 5, 8
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)... 9
Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
BI 9, eon FERS SESE Es RON HFN 7
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)... 2... 6
Constitution
United States Constitution:
pi | RE EERE 3, 26, 28, 29
Batitler lh, Beet DB iain Nise csc cestccnlscsicsnien nbndbbbbthedictas 4
Statutes
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. section 7402 ...........022....eceeeeeee. 13
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 189
i PRR PRET OY lee AO: a AL pe Ns 14
v
TaBLe OF AUTHORITIES CITED
STaTuTEs
Page
Mont. Code Ann. § 15-35-102(d) (1979) ..-......-eececee-eeees 16
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (Supp. II 1976) .........----------0-+- 16
Other Authorities
J. Choper, ‘‘The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review,’’ 86
Yale L.J. 1552 et seq. (1977) ...-....ccccseccereeeceeeeeenseees 18, 19
Article by R. Clawson, Billings Gazette (Jan. 1980) ..... 17
The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (Mentor Book Ed. 1961)
(A. Hamilton) -..........0:c.cccccecsesssseesesensnsesecessceneneanes 18, 26, 27
The Library of Congress Congressional Research Serv-
ice, Energy: Limiting the Coal Severance Taxes
(Issue Brief Number IB 80060, June 24, 1980) ............ 17
10 Nat. Resources Law, 717, 717-19 (1978) .........----++ 28
No. 80-581
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OcroBer TERM, 1980
Commonwealth Edison Company, Central Illinois Light Company,
Dairyland Power Cooperative, Detroit Edison Company, Inter-
state Power Company, Lake Superior District Power Company,
Lower Colorado River Authority/City of Austin, Minnesota
Power & Light Company, Northern States Power Com-
pany, Upper Peninsula Generating Company, Wisconsin
Power & Light Company, Decker Coal Company,
Peabody Coal Company, Westmoreland Re-
sources, Inc., and Western Energy Company,
Appellants,
against
State of Montana, Ted Schwinden, Governor of Montana, Helen J.
Feaver, Director of the State Department of Revenue, and Mau-
rice L. Brusett, Director of Administration and State Treasurer,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Montana
BRIEF OF THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
AMICUS CURIAE
Consent for the filing of this amicus curiae brief has been
obtained by all the parties to this proceeding, and letters
indicating the consent of these parties to the filing of this
brief have been filed with the Clerk of the Court.
The Western Conference of the Council of State Govern-
ments, which comes before the Court as an amicus, is the
formal organization of state legislators from the thirteen
western states and three Pacific trust territories.’
The Western Conference (hereinafter also referred to as
“state legislators” or “state officials”) comes before the
Court in general support of the State of Montana and the
arguments made by her attorney general. The Western
Conference, however, respectfully wishes to bring to the
attention of the Court the arguments contained in this brief
for the following specific reasons:
1. State legislators have primary responsibility in
their states for the taxation of natural resources. Thus,
the Western Conference and its members have obvious
interests in the clarification of the federal constitu-
tional law as it pertains to the natural resources of
their states—including all non-coal energy minerals
and other minerals as well.
2. Members of the Western Conference also share a
common concern for the implications a decision of this
Court in the instant case might have for all types of
state taxation including gross receipts taxes, ad
valorem taxes, income taxes, and special taxes such
as transfer fees. For the Western Conference fears
that, once a court looks beyond the legal incidence of
any such tax to its ultimate economic incidence, all
forms of state taxation will be in jeopardy of the same
‘The membership of the Western Conference includes the States
of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming;
the Territories of American Samoa and Guam; and the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
s’ >
|
2
attack urged by the energy companies and utilities in
this case.
Beyond these specific concerns, however, these state offi-
cials wish to adress the Court on the implications this case
has for federalism. By a strained invocation of a vaguely
articulated national interest, appellants seek to nullify the
responsible attempts of a sovereign state to plan for and
meet the problems of its present and its future. These state
legislators stress that such an interpretation would ac-
complish only a fundamental shifting of power away from
the states and the people of these states and would thereby
destroy the concept of states as laboratories of experi-
mentation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. Commerce Clause. The Montana coal severance tax
is a valid exercise of the state’s sovereign power to tax in
furtherance of the health and welfare of its citizens. Scru-
tiny under applicable principles of commerce clause adju-
dication fully supports this conclusion. The tax applies to
an activity which takes place entirely within the State of
Montana: the severance of coal from the earth. Under this
Court’s cases, therefore, this tax presents no justifiable
commerce clause issues. Even assuming that the tax does
reach the level of commerce cause inquiry, it satisfies that
inquiry.
II. Preemption. There is no basis for a finding that
the Montana coal severance tax has been preempted. The
tax was enacted pursuant to the state’s police power. Great
deference should be given to state regulations which fur-
ther the health and welfare of its citizens. A preemption
challenge to a tax must be given careful scrutiny. None of
the statutes cited by the appellants explicitly preempt state
action in the field of severance taxation. The Montana tax
does not conflict with federal regulations in this field. The
3
tax at issue is neither explicitly nor implicitly preempted
by federal policies.
Ill. Desirability of Judicial Abstention. With knowl-
edge of the Montana severance tax and of the arguments
appellants make against it, Congress has not acted to im-
pose a ceiling on the rate of such taxes. This fact alone
should demonstrate the complex policy content of the issue
and caution the Court to avoid interposing itself in the
controversy. Additionally, it would be unmanageable for
the judiciary to undertake commerce clause review of such
taxes due to the difficulty of developing an appropriate
standard, the difficulty of evaluating evidentiary matters,
and the difficulty of formulating an equitable remedy.
IV. Tenth Amendment Considerations. Judicial inval-
idation of a state’s severance tax, especially in the name
of a vaguely articulated national policy, would do funda-
mental violence to original understandings of federalism.
The state power to tax and to spend in pursuit of well-
formulated plans to meet the present and future impacts
of energy development are integral governmental func-
tions. Rather than being nullified, these planning efforts
speak of the potential contemporary viability of states in
the federal system and should be honored as such.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE DOES NOT NULLIFY A
SEVERANCE TAX IMPOSED BY A SOVEREIGN
STATE
Since 1975, the sovereign state of Montana has imposed
a 30 percent tax on coal severance. Coal producers and
utilities are challenging this tax. They are not challenging
the state’s power to impose the tax; rather, they are chal-
lenging the amount of the tax. Appellants’ Brief at 49-50.
4
At issue is the constitutionality of Montana’s sovereign
taxing power under the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution, article I, section 8: “Congress shall
have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes.”
A. The Act of Severance is an Inherently Local Activity
Unrelated to the Ultimate Destination of the Natural
Resource in the Stream of Coinmerce
Many cases support the proposition that Montana’s tax-
ation of its coal does not rise to the level of commerce
clause scrutiny because the activity taxed, the severance
of coal, is an activity completely contained within the
State of Montana.
While the energy companies in this case have attempted
to cast doubt upon the ability of any local activity to be
beyond the reaches of the commerce clause, Appellants’
Brief at note * *, p. 23, the logic of a severance tax on just
such an activity is correct. As one court has indicated,
The excise tax is on the act of severance, and the
production, of an Oklahoma resource. Severance can
occur only once and in this state. The levy is prior
to entrance of any gas into interstate commerce and is
on all gas so severed and produced without regard to
subsequent entrance into either intra or interstate
commerce. (emphasis in original)
Post Oak Owl Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 575 P.2d 964,
967 (Okla. 1978). Thus, the severance tax applies regard-
less whether the coal fuels generators in Houston, warms
homes in New England, is used for rock gardens in Helena,
or is simply stored indefinitely 50 feet from the mine
mouth.
This Court has long recognized the local character of
the severance of coal, other resources, and other parallel
activities. The trilogy of older cases by this Court, Heisler
v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922), Oliver Iron
5
Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923), and Hope Na-
tional Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927), bespeak this
understanding. Despite appellants’ argument that this clar-
ity has tarnished over time, its validity was reaffirmed in
Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961), a case involv-
ing state taxation of a renewable resource activity. In that
case, Alaska imposed a license tax upon freezer ships which
processed salmon caught in Alaskan territorial waters and
then took the frozen salmon to Washington State to sell.
The owners of the freezer ships argued that they operated
in interstate commerce and that, therefore, Alaska had
exceeded its authority in imposing such 4 tax upon them.
This Court responded that the taxable event in question
was neither the catching nor the freezing of the fish per se
but prosecuting the business of freezer ships and other
floating cold storages.
In referring to Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947),
and Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord as dispositive, the
Court spoke about the incidence of the tax and its relation-
ship to the interstate market:
Here as there the tax is an occupation tax. Here as
there, the market for the product obtained locally is
interstate, the taking being a step in the process lead-
ing to an interstate market. In both the local product is
promptly loaded for interstate shipment. But in each,
there is a preliminary local business being conducted—
an occupation made up of a series of local activities
which the state can constitutionally reach.
Id. at 204.
Montana finds herself in just this same position—forced
to defend the assertion of its sovereign taxing power over
the severance of coal which takes place entirely within
Montana. Cf. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil &
Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) ; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,
274 U.S. 284 (1927). Yet, these state legislators are con-
fident that the Court will once again reaffirm the local
6
nature of severance and thereby demonstrate comity to the
states of this Nation in their legitimate exercise of their
taxing powers.
B. On its Face, a Severance Tax Such as Montana’s
Satisfies the Important Ooncerns of Commerce Clause
Inquiry
The act of severance is one which can fairly be called
intrastate. Even if this Court were to look beyond the taxed
activity itself to determine if there was an effect upon
interstate commerce, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), any identified effect would not necessarily be for-
bidden. The question then would be whether the burden on
interstate commerce clearly outweighs the state’s legiti-
mate purpose in regulating or taxing the activity.
This Court has provided a four part test to determine
whether such an impermissible burden exists. Complete
Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (rejecting the
proposition that the interstate commerce is immune from
taxation). The elements of the test are: (1) whether the
taxed activity has a nexus with the taxing state; (2)
whether the tax is fairly apportioned; (3) whether the
tax discriminates against interstate commerce; and (4)
whether the tax is fairly related to the benefits provided
the taxpayer. 430 U.S. at 279.
As the following indicates, the Montana severance tax,
on its face, satisfies each of these four criteria. More im-
portantly, a factual inquiry by a court would provide little,
if any, additional information to aid in the application of
this test. In this case, such inquiry soon leads to legal con-
clusions; thus, as a matter of law, Montana’s severance tax
fully satisfies the concerns behind the commerce clause.
1. The Taxed Activity has an Inherent Nexus with the
Taxing State
The act of severance in and of itself constitutes the
appropriate nexus with the taxing state. Severance of a
7
natural resource can only occur in one location; the Mon-
tana tax is applied solely to the coal mined within its state
borders, See Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250 (1938).
2. The Severance Tax is Fairly Apportioned
Related to the question of nexus with the taxing state is
the additional concern that the tax be fairly apportioned
between activities which take place within the taxing state,
subject to tax, and those activities which, because they take
place in another state, are beyond the state’s taxing power.
This second prong of the Brady test is satisfied due to the
fact that, since severance is an activity which can only take
place in Montana, no other state can legitimately. tax it.
3. The Severance Tax is Nondiscriminatory
The Montana severance tax does not discriminate against
interstate commerce in that the State applies this tax even-
handedly to all who sever coal regardless of its ultimate
destination. Severance of coal for local use is taxed at a
maximum of 30 percent as is coal destined for the inter-
state market. If the fact that more coal leaves the state
than remains can justify terming this tax burdensome on
interstate commerce, then such would also be the case with
various taxes on Washington’s timber, Alaska’s salmon,
California’s grapes, New York’s stock exchange transac-
tions, Florida’s tourist industry, and many other variants
of wealth, which due to the climate, geography, or accidents
of fortune originate in that particular state and are ex-
ported to others,
Over the years, states have pursued many types of
policies which, deliberately or not, have impermissably bur-
dened interstate commerce. Many of this Court’s cases have
given careful consideration to the limits the commerce
clause imposes on state legislation; and no single formula
has emerged which can be applied to all situations.
7%
>.
8
One test that has been applied was recently rearticulated
in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), quoting the
Court’s earlier decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S.
1387, 142 (1970):
“{ Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits... . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.” (Citations omitted)
Id. at 331.
The Montana taxing statute meets these criteria. It
regulates evenly and is directly related to legitimate state
purposes—funding the costs to the state of the coal mining
and the other services necessitated thereby.
A second approach of the Court has been to invalidate
state regulations that give preference to local activity over
interstate activity or prevent out-of-state business from
competing on an equal basis with domestic firms. See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) ; Dean Milk v. Madi-
son, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S.
137 (1970); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947) ; Bald-
win v. Fish & Game, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
The Montana tax is not designed to, nor does it achieve,
this prohibited effect. Montana does not prefer its residents
over nonresidents, benefit them over out-of-staters, protect
them against out-of-state competition, prevent their coal
from going wherever there is a willing buyer, or regulate
or exempt from regulation business based on its local or
interstate character. Thus, the Montana tax does not run
9
afoul of any of these concerns: out-of-state business is re-
quired to do no more than is equally expected of domestic
producers of coal.
A third major group of cases concerns challenges to state
regulations which attempt to curtail exportation of re-
sources or products. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221
U.S. 229 (1911); H. P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949). Thus, a state cannot isolate itself from
the economy of the nation; economic protectionism has been
held to be per se invalid. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978). Yet what is found to be protectionist may
depend upon the legitimacy of the state objectives in enact-
ing the particular regulation. For example, in Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), a California state agricultural
regulation fixing the price of raisins grown and sold in
California and shipped throughout the nation and the world
was upheld by the Court. The purpose—to maintain raisin
prices by restraining the competition of producers in the
sale of their crops—was found to be a legitimate function
of the state government; the means by which this purpose
was achieved, the raisin marketing program (price regula-
tion), was upheld to be a valid exercise of state power.
The present case is analogous. Montana has a valid state
interest in regulating the economic affairs of the state. No
one is in a better position than the Montana state govern-
ment to assess the economic needs and allocate the resources
of the state. They have done so in an even-handed, nondis-
criminatory manner. In the case at bar, as in Parker, a
legitimate state objective is being accomplished by nondis-
criminatory means—rationally and reasonably related to
the ends to be obtained.
Another Montana case involving a state license tax was
Baldwin v. Fish & Game, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), where in the
Montana State elk hunting licensing tax provisions were
upheld even though nonresidents were charged $225 to
hunt elk compared with a $9 service charge for Montanans.
10
Despite facial discrimination in favor of locals, the statu-
tory scheme was considered an economic means not un-
reasonably related to the preservation of a finite resouree—
a substantial regulatory interest of the state. The Court
reasoned that residents pay the cost of the elk hunting
program through their taxes; nonresidents should also
shoulder their share. Thus, discriminatory regulations have
survived constitutional challenge when a legitimate state
purpose is reasonably accomplished. It follows that Mon-
tana’s severance tax scheme, which is not discriminatory on
its face and utilizes the revenue for even more important
state purposes, fares very well under this line of reasoning.
Similar commerce clause and equal protection challenges
were rebuffed by this Court in a case decided earlier this
year. Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., .... U.S. ....,
49 U.S.L.W. 9111 (1981). In a reasonable attempt to cur-
tail the wasteful use of petroleum products in the produc-
tion of plastic containers, the Minnesota Legislature
enacted a statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic,
nonreturnable, nonrefundable containers but permitting
such sale in other kinds of nonreturnable, nonrefundable
containers. The state, perhaps even relying on erroneous
information, was balancing, in a manner only a legislature
can, the complex trade-offs inherent in any public policy
which encourages the use or protection of one resource over
another.
The commerce clause question was whether the statute
was basically a protectionist measure or whether it be fairly
viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns with
only incidental effects upon interstate commerce? This
Court answered:
Minnesota’s statute does not effect “simple protec-
tionism” but “regulates even-handedly” by prohibiting
all milk retailers from selling their products in plastic,
nonreturnable milk containers, without regard to
whether the milk, the Containers, or the sellers are
from outside the State.
*
1t
Since the statute does not discriminate between inter-
staie and intrastate commerce, the controlling question
is whether the incidental burden imposed on interstate
commerce by the Minnesota Act is “clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits” Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., supra, 397 U.S. at 142. We conclude that
it is not.
—? 2.8 02
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S.
117 (1978), .. . we stressed that the Commerce Clause
“protects the interstate market, not particular inter-
state firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regula-
tions.” A nondiscriminatory regulation serving sub-
stantial state purposes is not invalid simply because it
causes some business to shift from a predominantly
out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state in-
dustry. Only if the burden on interstate commerce
clearly outweighs the State’s legitimate purposes does
such a regulation violate the Commerce Clause. (cita-
tions omitted)
49 U.S.L.W. at 4115-16.
Appellants have argued that the tax is tailored to fall
on interstate commerce. Appellants’ Brief at 27. Rather,
the tax falls on interstate commerce only to the extent that
it is passed along by the appellants to their purchasers
and so on to the utility consumers. The State of Montana
did not decide where the coal was going or upon whose
shoulders the tax would ultimately come to rest; appellants
themselves did.
The fact that the coal subsequently enters interstate
commerce does not make the tax somehow tailored to fall
there. The same argument was made and rejected in Alaska
v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961). The Montana tax is
applied evenly regardless of the ultimate destination of
the coal: “The fact that the burden of a state regulation
falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself, es-
12
tablish a claim of discrimination against interstate com-
merce.” Exaxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978).
4. The Tax is Rationally Related to the Services Ren-
dered the Taxpayer.
No taxpayer can expect an accounting from his gov-
ernment as to the equivalence between the taxes he pays
and the benefits he receives from the government. Such an
accounting is not available both because of economic fu-
tility in any attempt to undertake such calculations and
because of the nature of government itself. Government
exists principally because it provides certain services,
often referred to as “public goods,” which, by their very
nature are not merchantable, cannot be priced, and cannot
be sold or exchanged through some market mechanism.
These are the benefits of a civilized society and an orderly
government, to which the Montana Supreme Court re-
ferred, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d
847, 856-57 (1980), and of which appellants make so light.
Additionally, Montana has and will provide to appel-
lants, their employees, and many of their shareholders
the more tangible benefits of schools, health services,
parks, transportation, police and fire protection, environ-
mental protection, and the numerous other services pro-
vided by contemporary government. Only the Montana
Legislature has the constitutional responsibility of under-
taking this complex calculus. By its very nature, the deci-
sion is a political one; and the judiciary should give great
deference to the political outcome that has been achieved.
Thus, the Montana severance tax completely satisfies
this, the fourth, criteria set forth in Complete Auto Transit
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
In summary, appellants are asking that the Montana’s
well-considered judgment as to its economic plans, needs,
and priorities be invalidated. In essence, they push for
further erosion of state and local decisionmaking and a
concomitant solidification of power at the national level.
13
For if the power to tax is in some way limited by other
authorities, is it not taken away? The commerce clause was
not meant to so substantially intrude on the sovereign
taxing power of the states.
II
THE MONTANA SEVERANCE TAX HAS NOT BEEN
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW
The commerce clause gives Congress power to regulate
what is concededly interstate commerce. Where there has
been federal legislation which neither permits nor prohibits
state laws in the field, the Court must determine as a mat-
ter of law whether the Congressional statutes authorize
or forbid the state action.
Preemption of state statutes by federal regulations can
occur in a number of ways. Explicit preemption occurs
when Congress has declared its intent to be the sole regu-
lator in the field. Preemption also exists where the state
and federal regulations conflict. And preemption is found
where the intent of Congress to regulate the entire field
can be ascertained—sometimes by the pervasiveness of
the federal regulations in the particular field. See Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).?
A. fhere Has Been No Explicit Preemption of the Mon-
tana Severance Tax by Federal Statutes
There has been no explicit preemption of the Montana
coal severance tax by federal statutes; indeed, several
statutes speak to the contrary. For example, the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402, an act cited by appellants, en-
*Cases in which preemption has been found have shown a clear
Congressional! intent to preempt state regulations in the legislative
history of the Act. See, e.g., Mobil Oil v. Dubno, 492 F.2d 1004
(1980) (history of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act showed
an intent to preempt state regulations); Arizona Public Service Co.
v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979) (— invalidated a New Mexico en-
ergy tax on the privilege of generating energy within the state—).
14
courages cooperative activities by state and local govern-
ments. In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440 (1960), the Court held that local regulations were not
preempted by the Act; and, in fact, the intent of Congress
was to encourage state regulations complementary of the
purposes of the Act. What this Court said in Huron also
speaks well to the issues raised in this case:
[I]t must be borne in mind that the Constitution when -
“conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce,
... never intended to cut the states off from legislating
on all subjects relating to the health, life and safety of
their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly
affect the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a
great variety of ways, may affect commerce and per-
sons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it
within the meaning of the Constitution (citation
omitted)” .... State regulation based on the police
power, which does not discriminate against interstate
commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity,
may constitutionally stand. (citations omitted)
362 U.S. at 443. /
And, while appellants’ attempt to diminish the impor-
tance of section 32 of the federal Mineral Lands Leasing
Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. $189 (1976), it strains comprehen-
sion to ignore the clear recognition there afforded the states
in exercise of their taxing power.
B. The Montana Severance Tax Does Not Frustrate Fed-
eral Law
Appellants have urged that the Montana coal severance
tax is preempted by “national policies” with respect to the
production and use of coal. In support of their argument,
they simply cite numerous federal statutes. Appellants’
Brief at note *, p. 5.
Simple enumeration does not necessarily equal per-
vasiveness; and general recitations of national policy do
15
not indicate federal preemption of Montana’s policy to im-
pose a severance tax.
While the cited federal statutes deal with energy devel-
opment, conservation, and federal land and mining policy,
the Montana regulation of concern here is a state-imposed
tax on the severance of coal—an exercise traditionally con-
sidered to be part of a state’s broad police power. The
cornerstone of state government is the power to tax. There-
fore, no less than a clear and manifest intent on the part
of Congress must be shown in order to preempt the state’s
taxing function. In referring to the great deference so ac-
corded state police power, this Court has stated, “Congress
legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied (citation omitted) ... so we start with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Co., 331 U.S. at 230. No such clear and manifest
statement has been demonstrated so as to lead this Court
to nullification of Montana’s tax.
C. Federal Policies Are Not Single-Purpose; Indecd,
There Are Multiple Policies Concerning Energy De-
velopment, Energy Conservation, Environmental Pro-
tection, Land Reclamation, and Other Purposes
Maximization of coal production at all costs is not the
sole national policy. National policies in this area are not
single faceted; they are multipurposed. These laws reflect
the need to balance a variety of competing interests. For
instance, the federal coal management program attempts to
balance energy production goals with a concurrent interest
in maintaining social and environmental integrity. Coal
burning itself presents many environmental and health
hazards. Pertinent laws contain provisions for research and
development in these areas—provisions for reclamation and
protection of the environment. And, in fact, most all of the
Acts cited have some provision for state, local and regional
cooperation in these areas.
16
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seg. (Supp. II 1976), is an example
of how one statute can mandate multiple and potentially
conflicting goals. Some of the purposes of that statute
are to:
(a) establish a nationwide program to protect society
and the environment from the adverse effects of sur-
face coal mining operations;
(d) assure that surface coal mining operations are so
conducted as to protect the environment;
(e) assure that adequate procedures are undertaken
to reclaim surface areas as contemporaneously as pos-
sible with the surface coal mining operations;
(f) assure that the coal supply essential to the Nation’s
energy requirements, and to its economic and social
well-being is provided and strike a balance between pro-
tection of the environment and agricultural produc-
tivity and the Nation’s need for coal as an essential
source of energy; .... (emphasis added)
30 U.S.C. $1201.
One of the very things that Montana is trying to ac-
complish with its taxing policy is to implement compli-
mentary federal as well as state objectives while at the
same time to provide for the orderly growth of the coal
industry. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-102(d)
(1979). Montana has seen the sears left by uncontrolled
exploitation of a nonrenewable resource both in their state
and in the southeastern United States. The state has at-
tempted legislation which will complement federal policy,
insure stable growth for Montana, and avoid the pitfalls
of uncontrolled resource exploitation.
While attempting these purposes, Montana’s severance
tax rate still imposes only about the same or less of a bur-
den on other states than severance tax rates on oil or gas,
17
from the perspective of the consumer who uses the end
product. This is true for two reasons. First, coal in general
and western coal in particular is cheaper per BTU than oil
or gas. The national average cost per million BTU of coal
in December 1979 was $1.95, $3.95 for residential fuel oil
and $1.83 for natural gas. And second, while some products
of crude oil and natural gas are used in a fairly direct
manner, coal is used almost exclusively in power plants to
generate electricity. The cost of coal, therefore, in the end
product is small as compared to oil and natural gas prod-
ucts. Consequently, the impact of the severance tax is less.
The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service,
Energy: Limiting the Coal Severance Taxes (Issue Brief
Number IB 80060, June 24, 1980).
If the Montana severance tax is preempted by “national
energy policies,” what about other cost components of coal-
generated electricity? Transportation costs far outweigh
coal severance tax costs per BTU in the consumer’s utility
bill. Do Interstate Commerce Commission approved tariffs
thereby impermissibly frustrate Congress’ will? A dollar’s
worth of electricity sold to a Minnesota consumer includes
a four cent Minnesota sales tax, twice the amount of the
severance tax. Article by R. Clawson, Billings Gazette
(Jan. 1980). Would the Minnesota sales tax similarly be
subject to preemptive challenge?
The Montana coal severance tax has‘not been explicitly
preempted by federal legislation. Congress has not indi-
sated its intent to dominate the field of natural resource
everance taxation either implicitly or through a pervasive
scheme of tax regulation. Furthermore, the Montana coal
severance tax is not only no# in conflict with federal poli-
cies but, in fact, complements and furthers federal policies
in many areas by the use to which tax proceeds are put.
Montana attempts only to exercise its sovereign powers
to tax and spend. The tax is rationally related to legitimate
state public power objectives; and, absent more than a
7%
18
recitation of general national policies, the Montana coal
severance tax should be accorded a strong presumption of
constitutionality.®
III
THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE JUDICIAL RE.
STRAINT IN THIS CASE
A. As a General Principle, the Court Should Defer to the
Political Branches of Government for the Resolution
of Disputes Concerning Issues of Federalism
A leading proponent of judicial restraint concerning
constitutional issues respecting the ultimate power of the
national government vis-a-vis the states has argued:
The functional, borderline question posed by feder-
alism disputes is one of comparative skill and effec-
tiveness of government levels: in a word, an issue of
practicability. Whatever the [judiciary’s] special com-
petence in adjudicating disputes over individual rights,
when the fundamental constitutional issue turns on the
relative competence of different levels of government
to deal with societal problems, the courts are no more
inherently capable of correct judgment than are the
companion branches.
J. Choper, “The Scope of National Power Vis-i-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review,” 86 YALE
L.J. 1552, 1556 (1977).* Such deference to Congress con-
“But it will not follow from this doctrine (the Supremacy
Clause) that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant to
its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary
authorities of the smaller societies (here the States), will become
the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpa-
tion, and will deserve to be treated as such.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 33, at 204 (Mentor Ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
‘Choper would also argue that judicial review would be appro-
priate “over challenges to state encroachments on national power.”
“The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensa-
bility of Judicial Review,” 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1577 (1977). His
concerns there enumerated, id. at 1585-86, are not relevant in the
instant case. We have argued generally that taxpayers such as
19
cerning the validity of the Montana severance tax rate
should follow in this case.’
Several decisions of this Court suggest the wisdom of
judicial restraint when complex issues of political power
and sovereignty present thernselves before the Court. In
these instances, this restraint is justified as a “consider-
ation due to the judgment of other repositories of consti-
tutional power concerning the scope of their authority”
and “inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising
especially from its largely negative character and limited
resources of enforcement... .” Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947). Thus, in a decision in
which the Court was faced with a judicial claim by a state
that a Congressional statute had encroached upon its
appellants can have an effective political presence in the taxing
state. More specifically, as the Montana Supreme Court adequately
demonstrated, appellants, vocalizing their interpretation of Con-
gress’ national energy policy, have been active in Montana state
politics. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 857
(Mont. 1980). These same companies have been forceful in bring-
ing these same issues to the attention of Congress. During the last
session of Congress, representatives of numerous coal companies
and utilities testified at hearings on bills to place a ceiling on state
coal severance taxes. Witnesses included representatives of many
of the appellants: for instance, Commonwealth Edison Co., Decker
Coal Co., and Detroit Edison Co. And, in spite of appellants’ dire
warnings by such witnesses as to how Congress’ desires for energy
independence are threatened by the Montana tax, Congress re-
mained silent.
‘While Choper would suggest that states are proticted, through
the structuring and political processes of the Congress and the
Presidency, from excesses of the national government against the
sovereign prerogatives of the states, Choper, supra note 3, at 1600,
this Amicus is reluctant to concede to the desirability of judicial
deference in all federalism disputes. Even with the numerous re-
straining mechanisms available to states in the Congress, id. at
1560-77, a state cr region of states might conceivably be victims of
unrestrained nationalism supported by a vast majority of the states
who might not possess the unique value of concern to the sole
state or region of states. In such instances, this Amicus would seek
recourse to the courts for redress of this encroachment.
20
power, the Court responded that its own power under
article III extends only to proceedings of a justiciable
character :
In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff State
is brought to the naked contention that Congress has
usurped the reserved powers of the several States by
the mere enactment of the statute, ... and it is plain
that that question, as it is thus presented, is political,
and not judicial in character, and therefore is not a
matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial
power.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 483 (1923). Sim-
ilarly, these state legislators argue that, when Congress
has shown no preemptive intent, similar deference be given
to their actions.
The Congress must be imputed with knowledge during
the last five years of Montana’s tax and of the arguments
the energy companies have made concerning its validity.
Indeed, these views were presented before Congress dur-
ing the last session, and several of appellants were active
in support of legislation curtailing such taxes. The follow-
ing is certain: with full knowledge of purported difficulties
with the severance tax, Congress has not seen fit to act.
While no party to this action or court could presume
to divine the governing intent of Congress in its actions
(or, in this case, its failure to act), numerous sound policy
arguments might be advanced to explain Congress’ re-
luctance to strike out at the Montana tax. Inaction may
well be explained by the success of the formal involvement
of individual state delegations in the Congressional pro-
cess and by the state government backgrounds of many
members of Congress who might well have interpreted
severance tax limitation as threatening damage to their
own conception of the federal scheme.
Congressional restraint might also be explained by a
shared belief among many of its members that the Mon-
21
tana tax, rather than frustrating Congressional energy pol-
icy, actually serves that policy well. If the tax increases
the price of Montana coal in comparison to the price of
coal produced in other states, this result may serve to
encourage the development of coal resources in other states
and to avoid over-accelerated development in and reliance
upon the resources of one state. Congress may well have
been impressed by the thoughtful and inventive plans of
the state to allocate the tax revenues in mitigation of the
present social impacts of energy development and the cer-
tain impacts that will accompany the inevitable end of
coal mining in that state. Such state action lessens the need
for federal impact assistance. Rather than an indication
of “resource profiteering” to be vindicated, members of
Congress may well consider the Montana tax and trust
as a model to be left standing and, indeed, emulated in
other States.
Thus, the argument of the energy companies as to some
disruption of the national energy scheme has failed on two
grounds. First, as a matter of the law of preemption, supra
at 17 et seq., these appellants have failed to show either
explicit or substantial frustration of some well-articulated
and coherently developed single energy policy. Second, in
this section, we have seen that, despite long-term knowl-
edge of the supposed evils inflicted upon the appellants by
the state, Congress has not seen fit to curtail the Mon-
tana tax. While many plausible explanations for such inac-
tion can be advanced, this Amicus cautions the Court
against the self-serving attempts at Congressional mind-
reading in which appellants have carelessly engaged.
Rather, it is enough for this Court to take cognizance of
the simple fact that, for whatever reason, Congress has
not acted; and this fact alone should support the general
principle of judicial deference in this case.
One argument of appellants is that potential excesses of
a high tax which is exported to other states is unrestrained
by the political forces of the taxing state. That is to say,
~~
22
there is no local constituency to restrain an excessively
high tax.
In making this argument, however, appellants over-sim-
plify the political system in which taxation policy is for-
mulated. Appellants are not isolated taxpaying entities
whose interests are subjected to the whim of the home state.
Appellants are not the victims of a home court advantage.
These energy companies have sophisticated attorneys, ex-
perts, and governmental affairs staffs who influence the
development of state policies. More importantly, these com-
panies have Montana employees, shareholders, and con-
tractors who are all citizens of the State, have a stake
in its economic and social health, and have access to the
political process in which these taxation decisions are made.
B. Were the Commerce Clause to Apply to States’ Sever-
ance Taxes, Such Inquiry Would Bring upon the Judi-
ciary a Complex Task of Unmanageable and Immense
Proportions
For the Court to adjudge the Montana tax as an impedi-
ment to interstate commerce would invite litigation of
numerous economic issues surrounding state taxation. Much
of this litigation would end up before this Court for review
as to the correctness of the application of constitutional
principles by lower courts.
This is not a simplistic caution that an adverse ruling
would “open the floodgates of litigation.” Rather, the cau-
tion is to suggest that the difficulties of seulpturing an
adequate standard, of undertaking sufficient factfinding,
and of developing an equitable remedy all argue strongly
against the Court interposing itself deeply in this complex
economic field. The following delineates these caveats :
1. The Difficulty of Developing an Appropriate
Standard
By what standard would the Court consider state taxa-
tion of its natural resources as resulting in an unac-
23
ceptable burden on interstate commerce? Two threshold
values might be used to trigger further inquiry: (a) taxa-
tion at a certain rate or beyond; or (b) instate consump-
tion of the taxed good at a certain level or less.
At first glance, each standard might promise to be work-
able. A coal tax at x percent or more would be inherently
suspect, as would in-state consumption of x percent or less.
Yet, when placed in a total economic context, both stand-
ards would prove unmanageable. While a 50 percent tax on
coal would seem high for a state having diverse mineral
wealth, is it similarly suspect in a state having no other
mineral wealth or, for that matter, no other real wealth
at all?
Similarly, a threshold of 10 percent or less instate con-
sumption of the taxed commodity might seem a legitimate
gauge for judicial concern. What if the producing state
lacks the industrial infrastructure to make use of the
resource? What if consumption and population patterns
periodically change that proportion? How effective and
credible is a standard that has the same erratic movement
as the Dow Jones averages?
Neither standard promises the stability or predictability
that is legitimately expected of a rule of law. State legisla-
tures would be hard pressed to structure a tax given these
uncertainties.
2. The Difficulty of Evaluating Evidentiary Matters
Were an adequate constitutional standard formulated by
the Court, its application by trial courts to the complex
economic realities would present another dimension of dif-
ficulties. If the standard were framed in terms of the
benefits provided the taxpayer by the state, the question
would be how close to an equilibrium between the amount
of tax and the benefits provided would be sufficient. Could
the tax revenue and value of benefits vary by 10 percent,
20 percent, 50 percent? Is a fictitious entity, such as a cor-
24
poration, the only beneficiary? Or does the summation of
benefits include employees, shareholders, suppliers, con-
tractors?
And, while states have been given discretion to fashion
different ‘evels of taxation for different goods and com-
modities, the inequities between the taxation of coal, as one
energy resource, and oil and gas, as similar energy re-
sources, might be too much to be allowed to continue.
While the actual rate of tax on coal might be higher (as it
is in Montana) than oil and gas, the rate, in terms of
BTU’s of energy, is quite similar.* Does that similarity
validate the coal ‘ax or does it constitutionally call into
question the validity of all severance taxes? And, by what
other equally valid dimensions or characteristics might the
variety of severance taxes be compared? Does the validity
of the tax also depend on how much can be shifted forward
to the consumer; or how much it adds, in relation to freight
and processing, to the total price?
3. The Difficulty of Formulating an Equitable Remedy
A difficulty also results when one contemplates an ade-
quate remedy to redress appellants’ supposed grievances.
While these appellants concede the constitutionality of a
state severance tax and challenge only the rate of the tax,
this concession can be of little help to the judiciary in the
resolution of the case.
Appellants indicate that they have paid unc -r protest
$135 million as a result of Montana’s tax, and the total
collections from appellants and other coal producers simi-
larly situated is estimated to be $150 million as of July 1,
1980. Data of Montana Legislative Council.
What equitable remedy can a court fashion in this in-
stance? One possibility would be to declare the tax invalid
and order the return to the producers »%f all collection
“See text at 23.
25
made under protest; but this result would unjustly enrich
the producers and seriously prejudice the state in terms of
the impacts of coal mining since the effective date of the
tax.
Thus, absent a judgment returning all tax collections to
the energy companies, this Court or the trial court would
have to fashion a rate for the tax reasonable in light of
commerce clause considerations. One manner by which a
court could determine such reasonableness would be on the
basis of the costs accruing to the States as a result of
mining so as to satisfy appellants’ argument of equiva-
lence.
Does a court really want to undertake the extensive
microeconomic analysis that inquiry would entail? What
special political or economic insight can this Court or the
trial court claim to aid in the development of this reason-
able tax rate? Can this standard of reasonableness be
applied to all coal mining in the Rocky Mountain States?
In the West? Throughout the nation? Must the Court look
to the content of Congressional proposals, though unsuc-
cessful, to limit the tax? If such Congressional guidance is
sought, is not that inquiry alone sufficient justification for
judicial abstention from determining the rate?
Presuiming a rate of reasonableness could be calculated,
and revenues beyond the yield of that rate had been col-
lected, who are the proper recipients of the refund? If the
refunds were made to the de jure taxpayers, would we be
surprised to find these energy companies arguing different
theories of economic incidence to thereby defeat the claims
of utilities and consumers in other states? Would a court
have to assume jurisdiction over all these persons to
assure fair distribution of this refund? Do not these dif-
ficulties of fashioning a sufficient and just remedy further
reinforce the desirability of judicial abstention in this
case?
26
IV
APPLICATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO SEV-
ERANCE TAXES OF STATES IS PREVENTED BY
SOUND PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM AND THE
TENTH AMENDMENT
A. Judicial Invalidation of a Nondiscriminatory State Tax
on a Uniquely Local Activity, in this Instance, the
Act of Severance, Would Undermine Fundamental
Characteristics of our Federal System
In view of the fact that this case has found its way to
this most important forum, the fundamental nature of
this Union must again be stressed: the national govern-
ment is one of limited, though often, concurrent powers.
The presumptions inherent in the system favor action and
competence of each sovereign within its sphere.
While the Constitution attempted to remedy many of
the fundamental failures (especially in terms of commerce
among the states) of the earlier Articles of Confederation,
none of the documents surviving and resulting from that
historic Convention in any way support the result the
energy companies urge here: the invalidation of a nondis-
criminatory tax on a discretely local activity.
What available historic documents do disclose is directly
to the contrary. Given the 190 year interval between the
writing of The Federalist Papers and the origin of this
case, how much clearer guidance could those authors have
provided this Court in consideration of the instant case
than the following:
Suppose, by some forced construction of its authority
(which, indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the federal
legislature ... should undertake to abrogate > land
tax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not
be... evident that this was an invasion of that
concurrent jurisdiction in respect to this species of
tax, which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist
in the State governments? If there ever should be a
doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due
27
to those reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their
animosity to the plan of the convention, have labored
to envelop it in a cloud calculated to obscure the
plainest and simplest truths. (emphasis added)
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Mentor Book Ed.
1961) (A. Hamilton).
Publius continues in his commentary to characterize this
“compound republic” as consisting of parallel sovereigns,
each entitled to the supremacy of its laws within its proper
sphere. Specifically, concerning the power of States to tax
in areas also subject to Congressional exercise of its
enumerated powers, he indicates :
Though a law, therefore, for laying a tax for the use
of the United States would be supreme in its nature
and could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a
law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a
tax laid by the authority of a State (unless upon im-
ports and exports) would not be the supreme law of
the land, but a usurpation of power not granted by
the Constitution. As far as an improper accumulation
of taxes on the same object might tend to render the
collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual
inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect
of power on either side, but from an injudicious exer-
cise of power by one of the other in a manner equally
disadvantageous to both. . . . (emphasis in original)
If these admonitions were so clear as to the interrela-
tionship of the two sovereigns concerning the same gov-
ernmental function, to-wit: taxation; can any one reason-
ably suggest that the state taxing power is of any less
stature when confronted with an interpretation of the com-
merce clause?
These conceptions of federalism are not simply antiques
surviving to a new and different age. The political and
economic value of such decentralized decisionmaking has
been recognized by contemporary authors. Thus,
28
if efficiency were the principal objective, national en-
ergy policy could best be effectuated by the consoli-
dation of the regulatory function at the federal level.
Equally important considerations argue against such
consolidation. The impact of energy policy decisions
upon the quality of life may be significant. Such de-
cisions well may be better left at the state level where
pronounced local concerns can be accommodated or
some suitable compromise developed. State govern-
ments may be more prepared to accept their own mis-
takes than the mistakes of the federal government. In
the long term, the different decisions made at the state
level may result, through a trial and error process, in
the identification of the most appropriate course of
action which a centralized, and hence less diverse, sys-
tem might discover only belatedly, if at all. Jt may be
more important to preserve the values of federalism
than to create a symmetrical and efficient energy regu-
latory mechanism. (emphasis added)
10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 717, 717-19 (1978).
B. Nullification of the Montana Coal Severance Tax
Would Violate the Tenth Amendment
It should come as no surprise to the Court that these
state legislators believe a reversal of the Montana Supreme
Court’s decision would place the federal judiciary at the
threshold of substantial interference with the “integral
governmental functions” protected by this Court’s decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
And, while commentators have faulted the Court for the
potential ambiguity in the scope of this guarantee, there
can be no doubt that, if state sovereign powers are to be
protected in any case by the penumbra of National League
of Cities, they are to be protected in this case.
National League of Cities suggests two criteria for de-
termining whether a state governmental function is pro-
29
tected by the Tenth Amendment against the potential ap-
plication of federal power under the Commerce Clause.
These criteria are whether the threatened activities are im-
portant activities or whether those activities are tradition-
ally undertaken by state and local governments. In the
former category, policy, fire, and other public safety func-
tions are mentioned. By this Court overruling Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), the implication is that educa-
tional and health services also have protection. Traditional
governmental activities, those not typically provided by the
private sector, add sanitation and parks and recreation
services to the list. The unifying standard seems to be
those “activities [that] are typical of those performed by
the state and local governments in discharging their dual
functions in administering the public law and furnishing
public services.” 426 U.S. at 851.
Both the taxing and spending powers of the state are
threatened in this action, and no other challenge could be
so disruptive of the state’s sovereign authority. The ability
of the elected state legislators to enact a nondiscriminatory
tax on a typically local activity would always remain sub-
ject to review by a federal court on some theory of uncon-
stitutionality (e.g., the allegation of discrepancy between
the amount of taxes paid and benefits received).
The implications for the state spending power are equally
frightening. Reviewing the failures of earlier mining booms
in Montana, the present generation of state officials sought
to avoid those pitfalls. Its elected officials chose to dedicate
the proceeds of the severance tax for present and future
benefit. A trust of constitutional stature was created by
the voters to provide a replacement source of wealth for
when the coal plays out. Rather than the soiled schemes of
“resource profiteers,” this planned approach toward devel-
opment demonstrates rational choices and the highest level
of responsibility that could be desired of our public officials.
In so acting, the state has diminished its economic reliance
30
on federal assistance and indicates that one state, rather
than deferring to Washington for a solution, has sought to
master its own fate. Thus, to paraphrase this Court, if
Congressional action or the commerce clause may be used
to eliminate such a responsible exercise of basic state gov-
ernmental powers of taxing and spending, “we think there
would be little left of the States’ ‘separate and independent
existence.’” 426 U.S. 851 (1976), quoting Coyle v. Okla-
homa, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued in this Brief, the Western Con-
ference, representing the state legislators of the Western
States and territories, respectfully urges the Court to
affirm the decision of the Montana Supreme Court and, in so
doing, reaffirm the traditional principles of federalism in
which state governments need and do play a vital part.
Respectfully submitted,
Of Counsel: Joun E. THorson
Patricia B. Sprague Western Regional Counsel
165 Post Street, Council of State
Fifth Floor Governments
San Francisco, CA 94108 165 Post Street,
(415) 986-3760 Fifth Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108
(415) 986-3760
Counsel of Record
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae
February, 1981
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.