Appellees Brief — Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana

Supreme Court brief1981

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

ee Oe

No. 20-581

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1961

r’ 7

rw

ry

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, CENTRAL ILLINOIS

LIGHT COMPANY, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE, DE-

TROIT EDISON COMPANY, INTERSTATE POWER COMPANY,

LAKE SUPERIOR DISTRICT POWER COMPANY, LOWER COLO-

RADO RIVER AUTHORITY/CITY OF AUSTIN, MINNESOTA

POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, NORTHERN STATES POWER

COMPANY, UPPER PENINSULA GENERATING COMPANY, WIS-

CONSIN POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, DECKER COAL

COMPANY, PEABODY COAL COMPANY, AND WESTMORE-

LAND RESOURES, INC. and WESTERN ENERGY COMPANY,

Appellants,

— against —

STATE OF MONTANA, TED SCHWINDEN, GOVERNOR OF

MONTANA, ELLEN J. FEAVER, DIRECTOR OF THE STATE DE-

PARTMENT OF REVENUE, MORRIS L. BRUSETT, DIRECTOR

OF ADMINISTRATION AND STATE TREASURER,

Appellees.

fay

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

ry

Vv

APPEARANCES:

MIKE GREELY

Attorney General

Counsel of Record

MIKE McGRATH

Assistant Attorney General

MIKE McCARTER

Assistant Attornev General

State Capitol

Helena, Montana 59601

OF COUNSEL:

A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH, JR.

Sharp, Randolph & Green

Suite 501

1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Appellees

COCKLE PRINTING CO., 2311 Douglas St., Omaha 68102

i

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in dis-

missing the appellants’ claims in light of the provision

of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act affirmatively endors-

ing the right of the states to levy severance taxes and

determine the rate of those taxes.

2. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in con-

cluding that Montana’s coal severance tax did not impose

an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in light

of the unbroken line of precedents in this and other courts

sustaining such taxes over Commerce Clause challenges?

3. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in con-

cluding that Montana’s coal severance tax satisfied the

Commerce Clause requirement that a tax be fairly re-

lated to services provided by the state in light of the fact

that Montana has provided the taxpayers with “services

that inelude not only police and fire protection, but the

benefits of a trained work force and the advantages of

a civilized society [Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los

Angeles, 441 U.S. 484, 445 (1979)]?

4. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in con-

eluding that Montana’s severance tax, which is “imposed

bb

on each ton of coal produced in the state,” does not dis-

eriminate against interstate commerce?

5. Was the Montana Supreme Court correct in dis-

missing appellants’ federal preemption claims where those

claims were not based on any specifie statutory provision

but rather on an assertion that a general national aspira-

tion may preempt a state tax?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

See cena e Narn 1

tg Oe ty (| a 5)

I 5c ecsncicnhnlsacniapcentsieihaeleseimeniilaheniiaguanaatantinians 8

I. In Section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act

of 1920, Congress granted the states permission

to set severance tax rates as they saw fit. ................ 10

II. Settled Commerce Clause principles and sound

institutional considerations fully support the

Montana Supreme Court’s .dismissal of appel-

lants’ attack on the rate of Montana’s coal sever-

I ich ate ieetionessilsniicnslnetaneeestetesescmisnnanenlespiaadinan 15

IIJ. The state court properly dismissed appellants’

claims that the rate of Montana’s coal severance

tax frustrates broad national coal policies and

SRR are EER NDS Ne Ls Nana ND ASE ons aE 35

i ene Pee aa Peas at ERY ENP ee Be LC tM ED 46

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Alaska v. Arctie Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961) wu 000.19, 21

American Commuters, Ass’n. v. Levitt, 405 F. 2d

Se ee YO 0) fees ceildlinaneedaienaae . =

Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., — U. S. —, 100 S. Ct. 1932

(1980) Nis Nie td «a ote [EOD EE ION So ke ee

Bel Oil Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 1137 So. 2d

308, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 2 (1962) occ cccccssemseen 15

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages

Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S.

ey: Re REE iaecbitcdciictatigintidetneiaddaiaaie ae 24

Caskey Banking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117,

Spee MPUUIT. +: cstccialhatsnnpciciteceiasnianicaissasdiaciactaiatinaaedaededaaiad canara 19

Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood, 291 U. S. 584

2 | ER enee con eran DME Par eaeES WET EvER YON Gn sin Peary Pik a) 20

City of Pittsburgh v. Aleo Parking Corporation,

Re ik We tt CRD vec cee ecciccnies cade 6, 9, 31

Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triagle, 421 U. S. 100,

IPN Ucincediedicssocicniuchinesemsplediciniusctaneiadcaa tale rcarie eteacans 25

Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, — Mont. —,

GAD WP; De RT, DO CD cesses CMESAL en 5

Complete Auto Transit, Ine. v. Brady, 430 U. S.

E.R ER SERRE ANS OME Fr iA Meh I Br Ryn ne PPAF. 21, 22

Conley v. Gibson, 355 1. S. 41 (1957) once 5

Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Ine. v. Alabama, 393

A | , SMe ce

Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Ine., 405

Saf OE MRRIPWUOE wcsiicoenatceeesdeciicathuane isan anaGneenanaets 28

Department of Revenue v. Association of Washing-

ton Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750-51 (1978) ...... 25

Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Ine., 431 U. S. 265,

FR ak , 5 RRO CAEN Ache IS hy

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S.

yg | ) gee PE ey ALI ame A rR Ne OFTEN! SST 8, 40, 43

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages

Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,

EB . | ) r 23, 26

Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean,

I as hascneeingammnnebiicin 20

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824) ...... 44

Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. 8. 245

NE a ncaaenieenennienmtensstnioni 15, 16, 17, 18

Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) nn nescsssenssessesneene 41,42

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941) eee 41

Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927) ..... 15

Tin we Beasbarrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1GGL) nanan cineca en sseesee 14

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441

U. S. 434, 445 (1979) ...... HELTER eT 7, 23, 26, 46

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 480 U. 8S. 519 (1977) 0... 41

Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. 8. 40 (1934) .............. 32

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

IT Sg 45

McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940) ....45, 46

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F. 2d 537

(10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 8S. Ct.

OE Ea RC 16

Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U. S. 45, 48-

aE AE SR SR et 11

Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 8 (1933) ce A a

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pag 's

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445

i ee Mc SE: SED ides chtintccdadapacdcndteaecenicntecaicedenieacunl 44

Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S.

eo, Reeeamnnanes meen 5 eae lichliatie ratios 34

Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U. 8.

I ac ee 41, 42

New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin

W. poe; Ge U. BS. SG, 120-51 (i876) .......................... 41

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.

Schauffler, 308 U.S. 54, 57 (1938) 43

Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. 8. 416

1 REE I et rts i ee broke neat Rehr nthe Pr Pon Det et newts 18, 19, 30

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.

I a ci ee a 17

Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. 8. 172 (1928)... 15

Penn Dairies, Ine. v. Milk Control Commission of

Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (19438) nnn cessaeeee 44

Pike v. Bruce Church, Ine., 397 U. S. 137 (1970) oo... 19

Post Oak Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 575 P.

en See ee a ee ne 16

Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S.

rn IY oe es . 14

Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120

Ros See Ie, UIIUIOUD ccc ciisinncsaltegeaehdenbeeicdnaaaioaaadadeeninnes « WW

Southern Pacofie Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,

769 (1945) seers ol Meroe aha aes ee re Se . 14

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages

St. Louis & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U. 8S. 157,

| AC. GRAIG a rene, woes menos keen oer 25

Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 280 (1898) .nnccccccmocnveneen 25

Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U. 8. 5,

a ceiarnrenbesnaneninns 9, 44, 45

United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466

I ici hice tsensbasceesileeblebeteonteniseapianitaasstanantalion 9

Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303

Or, ek a id eieemntaninaoeny 30

Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U. S.

i go shaladenniiiiintieinioniihiontemsean 9

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100

Hee SB St ene 45

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ences 17,18

Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444

Ee EAE ae er ERR cso Sete em ee 25

STATUTES :

I SPC a SII <cscpreisseccisnnssipnicinenetiniitsiannensinnannenticios 1

I CR I ah cectsexscnnnsnpesnsnsnnlasecnicciiarneiebeiianoin 1

RI. URI TSI acciisalansiostcnmapenentingioieiennensialilenaniaiionnia 1, 29

a es I itscicectissiccennnctpeieeniisineneneenininn rota 21, 22

Section 32 of the Minerals Lands Leasing Act of

SEE Reomwme k R

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages

Ne ee TN

PUPPIES TR ei ic i Ss 6, 10, 36

Se a I ci ical cerestanseesnleunbeetattaiaia 37

Se re ri UR —

Ra a La 37

42 U.S.C. $6211 EVEN CEN EOE OTR, PAO NEN sith 37

42 U.S.C. $6212 cli tiglatasiilins siconsinhideet eile 37

42 U.8.C. $ G231 ot seq... utiisetdueeaed: aa

Re IE il siicinsrenssascsonemmebatbitibiitandamensls a

I, ——

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Montana Constitution, Article TX, 45 va at

U.S. Constitution, Article T, § 9 ........ te

U. S. Constitution, Article VI .......... a

D. Weiner, Reclaiming the West: The Coal Indus-

try and Surface-mined Lands (Inform, Ine..

oo SS Reaper oy Peis | 27

Hogan and Shelton, Interstate Tax Exportation

and State Fiscal Structures, 26 Nat. Tax J. 553

RUE RS Tie 00nd CO Nar eee A ART ee 32

K. Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land. 7

(1957) , EE LA ER

L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 391-400 (1977) 45

villi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

M. Gillis, Severance Taxes On Energy Resources

in the U. S. Growth and Change (Jan., 1979) ...........

McLure, Economic Constraints on State and Lo-

cal Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 Nat. Tax

Fi Fe CR ecenicressicseenesniaseocsineictsaetiniitinnietniniitnsagntiionngniieti

MeLure, The Interstate Exportation of State and

Loca: Taxes: Estimates of 1962, 20 Nat. Tax. J.

De CI i icttintcecitnicinmeecpdneeerntierientneeneiiniartnndaenidniint

Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain 110-133

PIII = SiceipntcnLsecsiseacsacsecpsetneaehenhasientscaeinnaiaaiatnsabanialsshsiialaoninie

P. Hariman, State Taxation of Interstate Com-

Ey Re | aC eee

Shelton and Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Ex-

portation and Regional Energy Policies, 17 Nat.

a i | eae eee ee

Coal Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before

the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-

sources, 9th Cong., 2d Sess., 506 (1980) 0000000...

Coal Severance Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 6625

and H. R. 7163 before the Subcommittee on En-

ergy and Power of the House Comm. on Inter-

state and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d

Serene

President’s Commission on Coal, Coal Data Book,

62, 63, 66 (1978) eecucomoomnn Ciaran

President’s Commission on Coal, Report to the

IN i ih ad su sicstadicnreeenieestsaaplansdcccilibin

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: A Se-

lective Legislative Analysis, 13 Land & Water

L. Rev. 747, 800-12 (1978) 38

Montana Legislative Council, Fossil Fuel Taxation

INN NEE ON" aacisstecinceiticteiensouedecrhesablighcnmsbepcniciesiocneen 2

1977 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1245, 1510,

BENE. sidieninissnnens aibdiaicceelooisiatabuianteisipousieann aka 38

Montana Legislative Council, Statement To Accom-

pany The Report Of The Free Joint Conference

Committee On Coal Taxation (April 16, 1975) ........... 3

The Federalist No. 32 (A. Hamilton) 4-4

House Resolutions 45 and 93 and Senate Resolu-

tion 83, Laws of Montana (1974) pp. 1419, 1453

mE ee ca TsO, Fo caamanienpemaianieeisiehl 2

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Pub. L. 95-

Bi I PR EE shaccickccetdatenstetsheshccebioabcideinerahtsaane . of

The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975

fe OR | es | Same nee ne 37

Comptroller of Publie Accounts, State of Texas,

State and Local Taxes On Oil and Gas Produc-

tion: A Comparison of Texas, Louisiana, Okla-

homa, and New Merrco (1979) rreeecccsnrssssrccsesnscssssnnesessnseseeensees 4

Gates, History of Public Land Law Development

vip Be _ | Re a 11

NNN. SO, RS CRORE ticinicerecpehceereerenicreteaiccneiniotienerts 13

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Montana imposes a severance tax on “each ton of coal

produced in the state” based on the value and energy con-

tent of the coal and the method of extraction. Section 15-

35-103, MCA. The effective rate of tax is less than the

statutory rate because other taxes paid on production to

federal, state, and local governments are excluded in com-

puting the value of coal.' The tax applies equally to coal

consumed in Montana and coal destined for shipment out

of state.

Nature has graciously endowed the State of Montana

with a wealth of natural resources, including large de-

posits of low sulphur coal.? Throughout its history, Mon-

tana’s economy has depended upon the development of

those resources. In the words of one historian, “Nature,

not the evil designs of men, decreed that Montana be a

place with a colonial economy.” K. Ross Toole, Montana:

An Uncommon Land 7 (1957). As a result, Montana has

long suffered economic dislocations of boom and bust cy-

cles of mineral production, along with the scars left from

1 Section 15-35-103, MCA, provides that the value of the coal

is the contract sales price. Section 15-35-102 (1), MCA, de-

fines contract sales price as “the price of coal extracted and

prepared for shipment f.o.b. mine, excluding the amount

charged by the seller to pay taxes paid on production. . .”

a paid on production are defined in 4 15-35-102 (6),

CA.

2 The entire United States is rich in coal, with approximately

31% of the known recoverable coal in the world, represent-

ing a several hundred years supply. President’s Commission

on Coal, Report to the President (1980). Coal deposits are

found in 31 states and mined in 26. President’s Commission

On Coal, Coal Data Book, 62-63, 66 (1978). In 1977 Montana

Coal Production was 20 million tons, or 3% of the entire U. S.

production. Id. at 66-67, 89.

l

mining operations. Montana’s history with mining was

aptly described in the opinion of the court below:

Montana’s experience has shown that its mineral

wealth could be exhausted and exported with little left

in Montana to make up the loss of its irreplaceable re-

sources. Montana has been painfully educated about

the extreme economic jolts that follow when the mine

runs out, the oil depletes, or the timber saws come

still. We have a good many examples that teach us

what happens to our hills when the riches of our Treas-

ure State are spent. (J.S. 7a.)

Historically, Montana’s mining has principally involved

gold, silver, copper, and other metalliferous ores. Then

the 1970’s brought the prospect of a substantial expansion

of coal strip mining.

In 1974 the Montana Legislature adopted resolutions

seeking an interim study of taxation on coal production.‘

The interim study proposed several tax alternatives,’

and in 1975 the Montana legislature enacted the present

coal severance tax (Laws of Montana (1975), Ch. 525).

The actual rate of the tax was settled by conference com-

mittee. In its report to the legislature that committee

stated :

3 Montana historian K. Ross Toole gives a similar description in

Montana: An Uncommon Land 7 (1957): ‘““Montana’s growth

in one sense, has been a series of traumas. There has been

a strikingly consistent pattern which, appropriately enough,

conforms to the pattern of the land itself, For every pinnacle

there is an equally impressive declivity. For every sudden

rise, a sudden fall. Optimism has alternated almost monot-

onously with despair.”

4 House Resolutions 45 and 93 and Senate Resolution 83, Laws

of Montana (1974) pp. 1419, 1453, & 1683.

5 Montana Legislative Council, Fossil Fuel Taxation (December,

1974).

3

In setting the level of the tax, the conference commit-

tee looked at the needs to be met. The objectives were

to (a) preserve or modestly increase revenues going to

the general fund, (b) to respond to current social im-

pacts attributable to coal development, and (c) to in-

vest in the future, when new energy technologies re-

duce our dependence on coal and mining activity may

decline.”

Montana Legislative Council, Statement To Accompany

The Report Of The Free Joint Conference Committee On

Coal Taxation (April 16, 1975) [A copy has been filed

with the clerk of this Court]. Thus in enacting the tax,

the legislature carefully considered the legitimate needs

of the State of Montana, including the need for revenue for

the general support of government.

In 1976 the voters of Montana revealed their deter-

mination to reverse historical trends by overwhelmingly

adopting a referendum to amend the Montana Constitu-

tion to provide that fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds

from the tax be dedicated to a permanent trust fund. Mon-

tana Constitution, Art. IX, 45. The trust fund represents

a self-imposed savings account to pay for future costs of

unforeseen social and environmental impacts caused by

strip mining, as well as to assist in stabilizing the State’s

economic base when its resources are depleted or the min-

ing activity ceases.

Many states have severance taxes. The first such tax

was imposed by the State of Michigan in 1846,° and by

1979 thirty-three states had adopted some type of sever-

ance tax.’ Severance taxes are levied on oil, gas, coal,

6 United States Department of Agriculture, State Taxation of

Mineral Deposits and Production (1978).

7 Bureau of Census, State Government Tax Collections in 1979,

Table 3 (1980).

ET Ne ee

4

copper, potash, uranium, molybdenum, vermiculite, sulfur,

dolomite, sand, gravel, limestone, forest products, iron,

taconite and even salt. In terms of total state revenues,

severance taxes in 1979 represented 25.5% of total tax

collections for Wyoming; 22% for Louisiana; 21.1% for

Alaska; 18.5% for Oklahoma; 18% for Texas; and 13.5%

for Montana.®

When viewed as a tax on energy, Montana’s coal tax

rate compares favorably with the tax rates imposed on

oil and gas by Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and New Mex-

ico. A recent study undertaken by the State of Texas

for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 determined that the Texas

severance tax was 6.36 cents per million BTU’s of oil and

gas. The rates for a million BTU’s in Louisiana, Okla-

homa and New Mexico were 10.26, 8.13 and 7.76 cents re-

spectively.2 Montana’s tax per million BTU’s of coal was

approximately 7.11 cents.!°

The appellants—four (4) coal companies and several)

of their utility customers—have brought the present ac-

8 Id. Collections by the top ten states for 1979 were as follows:

1. Texas $1,025,550,000

2. Louisiana 511,589,000

3. Oklahoma 280,982,000

4. Alaska 173,685,000

5. New Mexico 159,431,000

6. Kentucky 154,017,000

7. Florida 91,901,000

8. Wyoming 87,419,000

9. Minnesota 71,263,000

10. Montana 53,919,000

9 Comptroller of Public Accounts, State of Texas, State and

Local Taxes On Oil and Gas Production: A Comparison of

Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico (1979)

10 See Coal Severance Taxes: Hearing on H. R. 6625 and H. R.

7163 before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the

House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th

Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1980).

5

tion seeking a declaration that the Montana coal severance

tax is excessive and unreasonable. They also seek a re-

fund of severance taxes paid under protest since the sec-

ond quarter of 1978. The real parties in interest are the

appellant coal companies, which conduct extensive strip

mining operations in Montana. These coal companies are

Montana taxpayers, and the tax is imposed on their local

activities. The various utilities join as plaintiffs based

upon appellants’ assertion that the coal companies pass

Montana’s tax through to their utility customers rather

than absorbing the tax."

The appellants have made numerous factual asser-

tions in their brief. Many of these factual statements are

irrelevant to the constitutional arguments presented here.

In any event Montana does not concede that appellants’

factual assertions are true, but rather asserts that the ap-

pellants can prove no set of facts in support of their claims

which would entitle them to relief, Commonwealth Edison

v. Montana, — Mont. —, 615 P. 2d 847, 849 (1980); Con-

ley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 (1957).

,,

Vw

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellants’ claims in this case are based entirely upon

assertions that the rate of Mcntana’s tax is too high and

that a Court is an appropriate and capable institution to

11 Recent studies prepared for the State of Montana show (as-

suming 100% Montana's tax is passed on to the consumer)

that the severance tax would account for only !/, of 1% to

2% of the residential consumer’s final utility bill. Coal

Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before the Senate Comm.

on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 448,

506 (1980).

6

determine just how much tax the state of Montana may

appropriately levy. These assertions run counter to this

Court’s repeated pronouncements that where the power to

tax exists, it is accompanied by the right to set the rate

of the tax. See City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Cor-

poration, 417 U. S. 379 (1974). The very nature of deter-

mining an appropriate rate of taxation is a legislative

function, and neither settled principles of Commerce Clause

adjudication nor Supremacy Clause analysis support ap-

pellants’ contention that the courts must review Montana’s

tax rate to determine whether it is “reasonable.”

A. Appellants’ contentions are initially foreclosed by

the terms of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which ex-

plicitly reserves to the states “the right to levy and collect

taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights,

property or assets of any lessee of the United States.” 30

U.S.C. §189. Through this section, Congress affirma-

tively endorsed the right of the states to determine ap-

propriate rates of taxation free from federal interference.

B. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed appel-

lants’ Commerce Clause claim on two independent grounds,

either of which is sufficient to sustain its decision.

First, the court followed the unbroken lines of prece-

dent in this and other courts dismissing Commerce Clause

attacks on state severance taxes. The sound principle un-

derlying these decisions is this: Not every state tax that

allegedly affects interstate commerce burdens it within the

meaning of the Commerce Clause. Under this principle,

non-discriminatory state severance taxes have never been

viewed as imposing a burden on interstate commerce. The

principle was right when it was first articulated; it is right

today; and it is not undermined by decisions relied upon

7

by appellants which expansively construe the power of

Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

Second, considering appellants’ Commerce Clause

claims on the assumption that this Court’s severance tax

decisions were not dispositive, the state court properly re-

jected appellants’ contentions that the levy is not fairly

related to benefits provided by the state and discriminates

against interstate commerce. In providing the taxpayers

with “services that include not only police and fire pro-

tection, but the benefits of a trained work force and the

advantages of a civilized society,” Japan Line, Ltd. v.

County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 445 (1979), Mon-

tana has satisfied the “fair relation” requirement enunci-

ated by this Court in its recent Commerce Clause opinions.

The tax similarly satisfies the requirement that it not dis-

criminate against interstate commerce; the tax, both on

its face and in practical effect, falls equally on coal con-

sumed in Montana and coal destined out of state.

C. The gravamen of appellants’ general preemption

claim, like the substance of their other claims, is that the

rate of Montana’s severance tax is too high. Appellants

concede that no federal statute or national policy pre-

cludes Montana from levying a severance tax on coal, but

allege that the rate frustrates “the basie thrust” of fed-

eral coal policy App. Br. 16.

Appellants fail to identify any federal statute or regu-

lation that conflicts with Montana’s tax. Congress has

never expressed an intention to limit the rate of coal sev-

erance taxes. Nor has it attempted to regulate the price

of coal or the many variables which increase coal costs.

The purported burden any tax may put on the achieve-

8

ment of a general policy which may have motivated Con-

egress in adopting specific legislation is too fragile a basis

to invalidate the sovereign power of a state to design its

tax structure. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437

U. S. 117 (1978).

D. Finally, institutional considerations strongly re-

inforce the state court’s judgment dismissing appellants’

Commerce and Supremacy Clause claims. As already noted

above, appellants’ case ultimately rests on their objection

to the rate of the Montana tax. Appellants are therefore

asking this Court to do what no court has ever done,

namely, to undertake its own investigation of social, eco-

nomic, aesthetic and regulatory values and establish an

appropriate rate of a state general excise tax. Such judg-

ments are plainly beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. If

they are to be made at all, they must be made by state

legislatures and Congress, the only bodies with both the

institutional resources and constitutional authority to make

them.

Ly

Vv

ARGUMENT

Appellants recognize, as they must, that states may

properly impose severance taxes on coal and that noth-

ing in the Constitution or any federal law prohibits such

tax measures.’? Appellants objection—and the basis for

each of their arguments in this court—is that the par-

ticular severance tax rate adopted by Montana is too high.

The extent to which Montana has overtaxed appellants

12 See App. Br. 20 n. *; J. S. 15; Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants in

the Court below 46-47; 52 n. 29; 79.

9

is a subject they do not address. Although we therefore

do not know whether appellants would find a rate of 25%,

20% or some other amount acceptable, their counsel has

informed both the Montana Supreme Court and Congress

that 15% would pose no problem.’ Appellants assert the

proper percentage should be determined by the judiciary.

The State of Montana disagrees. Appellants are ef-

fectively asking this court to reverse its consistent hold-

ing that the right to tax encompasses the right to deter-

mine the rate of the tax, see, e. g., Weston v. City Council

of Charleston, 27 U.S. 171, 174 (1829); City of Pittsburgh

v. Alco Parking Corporation, 417 U.S. 369 (1974); and

break with precedents which have rejected arguments sim-

ilar to those made here—that a non-discriminatory state

tax is nevertheless unconstitutional because it indirectly

falls on some constitutionally immune or protected sub-

ject or activity, see, e.g., United States v. City of Detroit,

355 U.S. 466 (1958); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Peniston,

85 U.S. 5, 30-31 (1873). It is the State’s position that

precedents rejecting similar challenges to state tax rates

should be followed; the “correct” rate of the severance

tax on coal is a subject for legislative, not judicial regu-

lation. Neither the Constitution nor any federal law re-

quires otherwise.

13 In oral argument to the Montana Supreme Court, counsel

for appellants conceded that a 15% rate would be accept-

able. This same concession was made to Congress. Coal

Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before the Sen. Comm.

On Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Congress, 2d Sess.

262 (1980) (testimony of William P. Rogers); Coal Severance

Taxes: Hearings on H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654, and H.R. 7163

Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House

Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 94 (1980) (tes-

timony of William P. Rogers).

10

Finally, respondents are aware of no state tax case

decided by this Court in which the Court’s decision was

based upon a factual inquiry into the amount or indirect

incidence of a tax or into the benefits furnished by the

State to the specific taxpayers. This Court should affirm

the decision of the Montana Supreme Court, which prop-

erly rejected Appellants’ invitation to undertake the con-

stitutionally unwarranted and judicially unmanageable

task of establishing the appropriate rate of a state tax

levied for the general support of government.

I. In Section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act

of 1920, Congress granted the states permission

to set severance tax rates as they saw fit.

It is rather ironic that in attacking the rate of Mon-

tana’s coal severance tax, appellants invoke the Mineral

Lands Leasing Act of 1920,'* 30 U.S.C. $181, et seq., a

statute that thoroughly undercuts each of their various

arguments in this Court. The Act confirms in the clear-

est possible terms that a state may impose severance

taxes on coal mined from federal land; that the appro-

priate severance tax rate is a matter for the state to de-

cide; and that the exercise of these state powers is en-

tirely consistent with federal law.

The Act contains a proviso that constitutes nothing

less than congressional permission for the states to enact

the type of taxing measures at issue in this case. Thus,

section 32 of the Act, 30 U.S.C. $189, provides:

14 Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437. Some of the Act's history is recounted

in the Court’s opinion in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., — U.S. —,

100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980).

11

That nothing in this Act shall be construed or held to

affect the rights of the States or the local authority

to exercise any rights they may have, including the

right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements,

output of mines, or other rights, property, or assets

of any lessee of the United States. (Emphasis sup-

plied.)

As the Court held more than fifty years ago, Congress in-

tended section 32 “to remove altogether from the field of

controversy, among other questions, ... the authority of

the states to impose taxes upon lessees in respect of their

property” regardless of the interest of the United States

in the leased land. Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268

U. S. 45, 48-49 (1925).

That Congress imposed no limits on the rates of state

severance taxes does not render section 32 “irrelevant,”

as appellants contend (App. Br. 48). The absence of any

such limitation is highly significant. As the history of this

section reveals, Congress ratified the power of the states

to impose severance taxes and deliberately used language

that would allow the states to do so at the rate they saw

fit. :

The withdrawal of most areas of federal coal and oil

lands by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William H.

Taft prompted efforts to adopt a comprehensive federal

leasing act for oil, gas and coal.'’ During the House de-

bate on an early version of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act

15 See generally, Gates, History of Public Land Law Develop-

ment 725-736 (1968); Peffer, The Closing of the Public Do-

main 110-133 (1951). After the first withdrawals, President

Roosevelt sent a message to Congress suggesting ‘that there

should be some provision for leasing coal, oil and gas rights.

...” 41 Cong. Rec. 450 (1906); 41 Cong. Rec. 2077 (1907).

12

(H.R. 16136, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914)), western Con-

gressmen expressed concern that under the bill the States

might be unable to tax the production of federal lessees.

Representative Lenroot of Wisconsin took the lead in an-

swering western fears by pointing out that a “State can

tax the product of that mine [leased under the bill] just

such sum as it [the State] chooses.” 51 Cong. Ree. 15058

(1914). Later, referring to a Colorado company mining

coal on lands it owned, Rep. Lenroot and Rep. Mondell of

Wyoming engaged in the following colloquy:

Mr. Lenroot: * * *

* ** [M]uch has been said concerning the matter

of taxation and the denial of these States of taxes to

which they are entitled. Again, referring to the Colo-

rado Iron and Fuel Co., they do pay some taxes, it is

true, to the State of Colorado upon their lands; but

if those lands were under lease, the State of Colo-

rado would receive under this bill one half of the pro-

ceeds of these [federal] royalties, and in addition the

. state of Colorado could tax the output—every ton

of coal mined by the Colorado Iron and Fuel Co.—in

such sums as its legislature in its wisdom might choose

to impose.

Mr. Mondell:

Is the gentlemen sure—quite sure—as a legal

proposition that the State can tax the output of these

leased mines?

Mr. Lenroot:

T am absolutely certain. * * *

Mr. Mondell:

I am glad to have the gentleman’s opinion and

I hope he is right because this is our only hope under

this legislation.

51 Cong. Ree. 15064-65 (1914) (emphasis supplied).

13

Later in the debate, Representative Ferris, sponsor of the

bill and Chairman of the Public Lands Committee which

favorably reported the bill to the floor of the House, lent

his support to Representative Lenroot’s assurances, stat-

ing “[t]here is no doubt but that your legislature has the

authority to impose an excise tax that will catch every

pound of coal and every gallon of oil produced,” and that

this taxing authority was in addition to any royalty shar-

ing. 51 Cong. Rec. 15558 (1914).

Although the bill under consideration in the debate

recited above contained no express recognition of state

taxing power, this was remedied in the next Congress

when the House Committee on Public Lands offered an

amendment to the pending leasing bill. After minor

changes in the Committee’s proposal, the House adopted

the amendment, which contained language nearlv identical

to that ultimately enacted as section 32 of the Mineral

Lands Leasing Act of 1920.'*

In the House debate immediately preceding passage of

the 1920 Act, Representative Mondell again stressed that

the proviso affirmed state power to tax leasehold improve-

ments and mine output of federal lessees. 58 Cong. Rec.

7646 (1919). Despite protests that under the proviso the

16 The amendment adopted by the 64th Congress read:

Provided that nothing in this act shall be construed or

held to affect the rights of the States or other local au-

thority to exercise any rights which they may have to

levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of

mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessees.

53 Cong. Rec. 1122-1123 (1916). Representative Mann of

Illinois characterized the proposition that the states could

tax the property of lessees as one on which “we are all

agreed,” 53 Cong. Rec. 1122 (1912); the adoption of the

amendment reflected that view.

14

states would have the power to levy “burdensome taxes”

and thereby ruin lessees and render the leases of no value

(58 Cong. Rec. 7647 (1919) (remarks of Rep. McLaugh-

lin)), Congress passed section 32 without further changes.

Congress thus intended by section 32 to grant the

states permission to impose severance taxes on coal and

other minerals at the rate the states themselves deemed

appropriate.” Both proponents and opponents of section

32 agreed that the proviso had that purpose and effect.

The significance of section 32 to appellants’ argu-

ments’® in this Court is apparent. Since Congress has

granted express permission to the states to do precisely

what appellants protest—namely, exercise the plenary

power to set their own severance tax rates—it cannot be

said that the rate of a state severance tax may render the

tax unconstitutional.’®

For similar reasons, appellants’ Supremacy Clause

arguments must be rejected in light of section 32. Mon-

tana’s tax cannot be considered inconsistent with federal

law when Congress itself has ratified the state’s power

17 While section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act applies

only to taxation of federal lessees, it is inconceivable that

Congress intended to permit states greater authority to tax

federal lessees than other taxpayers.

18 The appellants continue to assert that the coal taxed by

Montana is federal coal, and thus belongs to the people of

the United States as a whole. What they ignore is that

through leases the federal government has sold its interests

in the coal and the people of the United States, through

royalties, will receive their fair rate of return. [See Opinion

below J. S. 27 (a).] |

19 See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 434-

36 (1946); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); see Southern

Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).

15

and authority to impose the tax and set the rate. While

appellants may believe that contemporary conditions war-

rant restrictions on the states’ authority, that is a matter

for Congress to decide. Until and unless Congress acts,’°

Montana is free to exercise the authority confirmed in

section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.

We therefore submit that section 32 is a sufficient

basis for rejecting each of appellants’ contentions regard-

ing Montana’s tax. In the discussion that follows we ad-

dress each of appellants’ Commerce and Supremacy Clause

arguments and discuss why, even aside from section 32,

those arguments must be rejected.

II. Settled Commerce Clause principles and sound in-

stitutional considerations fully support the Mon-

tana Supreme Court’s dismissal of appellants’ at-

tack on the rate of Montana’s coal severance tax.

A. The Decisions of This and Other Courts Repudi-

ating Commerce Clause Challenges to State Sev-

erance Taxes Reflect Wise and Established Prin-

ciples of Commerce Clause Adjudication and

Should Not Be Disturbed.

The arguments appellants raise are not new. For

nearly sixty years this Court and other courts have con-

sistently rejected Commerce Clause attacks on state sever-

ance taxes. See, e. g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260

U.S. 245 (1922) ; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.

172 (1923); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284

(1927); Bel Oil Corp. v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 1137 So. 2d

20 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425,

448-449 (1980); cf. United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466,

474 (1958).

16

308, appeal dismissed, 371 U. S. 2 (1962); Post Oak Oil

Co. v. State Tax Commission, 575 P. 2d 965 (Okla. 1978) ;

ef. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F. 2d 537 (10th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980). Con-

tending that a severance tax upon coal destined for ship-

ment to other states burdened interstate commerce, the

taxpayers i: Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra, ar.

gued, as appellants argue here, that:

Pennsylvania has a natural monopoly of anthracite

eoal in this country. That coal is a prime necessity

of life, especially in the northeastern States. Wighty

percent of such coal is shipped out of Pennsylvania

... [and the] intention at the time this act was passed

was so to use the natural monopoly which Pennsyl-

vania possesses as to compel the inhabitants of the

United States to pay a tax to Pennsylvania. (260

U. S. at 251-52.)

Despite these allegations the Court held that Pennsy]l-

vania’s tax on the local activity of severing natural re-

sources from the earth did not constitute a burden on

interstate commerce within the meaning of the Commerce

Clause.

Appellants make no effort to distinguish the present

ease from Heisler and its progeny. Instead, they argue

that times have changed, that the country now has a

pressing need to develop its energy resources, and that

Heisler rests on an outmoded analysis of the Commerce

Clause.

Appellant’s prediction of “grave practical conse-

quences to this nation” unless the rate of each state’s

severance tax is subject to judicial examination at a trial

completely ignores both inherent market limitations in

fixing tax rates and the role of Congress under the Com-

17

merce Clause. Appellants argue that the scope of con-

gressional power to regulate interstate commerce has ex-

panded considerably since the Court decided Heisler, how-

ever, they fail to recognize that as a result Congress has

ample authority to deal with severance tax rates on coal

if it should deem this necessary or appropriate.”!_ Rather

than a reason for overruling Heisler, the expansion of

congressional power is a reason for adhering to that de-

cision.

Citing cases such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel

Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317

U.S. 111 (1942), appellants argue that because Congress

could determine the appropriate limits of such tax rates,

the courts should do so. Appellants, however, have con-

fused the Commerce Clause’s affirmative grant of power

to Congress “to regulate Commerce. . . . among the sev-

eral States,” U.S. Const., Art. I, 49, cl. 3, with the nega-

tive implications of the Clause. This Court has consis-

tently recognized the substantial differences between Com-

merce Clause considerations bearing on the scope of

congressional power and those bearing on the limitations

on state power. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S.

1, 8 (1933).

Thus while appellants cite Wickard for the proposi-

tion that the Commerce Clause’s negative restraints have

been broadened by decisions expanding the scope of con-

gressional power (App. Br. 18, 21), the Court in Wickard

21 Congress, unlike the Court, has numerous options available.

It could, for example, prohibit the pass through of the tax

by coal companies; provide federal tax deductions to offset

the tax; or pass legislation giving the states an incentive to

reduce their taxes.

18

made exactly the opposite point. The Court observed

that the scope of congressional authority depended on an

inquiry into “what was ‘necessary and proper’ to the ex-

ercise by Congress of its granted power,” 317 U.S. at

121, whereas the point of reference for limitations on

state authority was the “concept of sovereignty .. . im-

plicit in the status of statehood.” Jd. Hence in deter-

mining whether Congress had the authority under the

Commerce Clause to regulate activities affecting inter-

state commerce, the Court in Wickard was not confined

by the holdings in cases such as Heisler, that state taxes

on those activities imposed no burden on interstate com-

merce. This was not because these cases were no longer

authoritative but rather because the considerations under-

lying the seope of congressional power under the Com-

merce Clause are of little aid in determining whether

state action burdens interstate commerce.” As the Court

recently observed:

[S]tatements . . . made in upholding the richts of

States to tax what was argued to be interstate com-

merece . .. are not used interchangeably as state-

ments of law where the issue is the power of Con-

gress to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The

restrictions imposed by the Commerce Clause stand-

ing alone may well be less than the preemptive reach

of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the

power. (Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S.

265, 282 n. 17 (1977).)

Appellants also contend that the Montana Supreme

Court’s adherence to Heisler contravenes Nippert v. City

22 To take the facts of Wickard itself, it can hardly be con-

tended that the existence of congressional power to regulate

the production of wheat grown for “home” consumption

warrants the inference that a state tax upon such consump-

tion imposes a burden on interstate commerce.

19

of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). See App. Br. 22.

Nippert is one of a long line of cases involving fixed-fee

license taxes imposed on solicitation of orders for inter-

state sales.7 From the beginning, the Court has held

that solicitation of interstate sales is an integral part of

interstate commerce and that a tax upon such activity

imposes a burden on commerce. Robbins v. Shelby County

Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887). The Court, how-

ever, has been careful not to obliterate the distinction be-

tween taxes that do and taxes that do not burden inter-

state commerce. See, e.g., Caskey Banking Co. v. Vir-

ginia, 313 U.S. 117, 119 (1941).

Countless other decisions of this Court reflect the

settled principle on which the severance tax decisions are

based: Not every state tax that allegedly affects inter-

state commerce burdens it within the meaning of the

Commerce Clause, see, e.g., Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc.

v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969); Alaska v. Arctic Maid,

366 U.S. 199 (1961); Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia,

supra. The continued existence of this threshold re-

quirement—that a state tax must burden interstate com-

merce to justify an inquiry into the substantive criteria

for adjudicating Commerce Clause controversies—is dem-

onstrated by the Court’s opinion in Pike v. Bruce ¢ ‘hurch,

Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Court in Pike explicitly

addressed this “threshold contention” in the context of

23 Nippert itself involved a license tax upon “persons . . . en-

gaged in business as solicitors” measured by a fixed fee and

a percentage of gross receipts.

20

a challenged state regulation, Jd. at 140.24 Moreover, it

carefully distinguished two state tax cases that had re-

lied in part on previous severance tax decisions in con-

cluding that the levies at issue did not burden interstate

commerce. See Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v.

McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) and Chassanoil v. City of

Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934), discussed at 397 U.S.

at 141.

The court below thus correctly held that before under-

taking an inquiry into the tax’s validity under substan-

tive Commerce Clause criteria, a court must find that the

tax burdens interstate commerce within the meaning of

the Clause. Otherwise every allegation that a tax affects

interstate commerce would require an elaborate inquiry

under the Commerce Clause; no state tax would be free

from Commerce Clause attack; and any state taxpayer

could generate a substantial lawsuit merely by asserting

that the levy affects interstate commerce. This Court

has therefore recognized the necessity of drawing a line

between challenges to taxes that burden interstate com-

merce, which justify a further inquiry into whether the

burden is defensible, and challenges to taxes that do not

burden interstate commerce, which may be dismissed.

State severance taxes have never been viewed as im-

posing a burden on interstate commerce. The essentially

local nature of the activity taxed—the extraction of nat-

ural resources from the earth—and the remoteness of the

24 The Court’s holding on this point—that an order expressly

forbidding interstate bulk shipment burdens interstate com-

merce—was unexceptional. A more onerous burden on

interstate commerce is difficult to imagine.

21

activity from the stream of commerce,’’ have consistently

led this and other courts to conclude that Commerce

Clause attacks on such levies may be disposed of sum-

marily. Recent decisions of this Court continue to adhere

to this view. Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama,

supra; Alaska v. Arctic Maid, supra. Furthermore, this

Court’s repeated approval of its severance tax decisions

reflects the wise judgment that abandonment of them

could create judicial and administrative chaos and that

Congress, not the Judiciary, is the only body with con-

stitutional authority and institutional competence to de-

termine what limits, if any, should be imposed on the

rate of state severance taxes (see p. 34, infra).

B. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Satisfies This

Court’s Requirements That A Tax Be Fairly Re-

lated to Benefits Provided by the State and That

It Not Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce.

Although we submit that the Court’s severance tax

cases are dispositive of appellants’ Commerce Clause

claims, Montana’s coal severance tax also passes muster

under the substantive criteria the Court has articulated

25 Compare with Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430

U. S. 274 (1979).

26 Appellants seek to minimize the significance of the Court's

contemporary opinions that embrace the rule of the sever-

ance tax cases by arguing that the severance tax cases are

cited only for the proposition that taxpayers engaged in cer-

tain activities are not immune from taxation. App. Br. 20.

n.*. As a fair reading of Dunbar-Stanley and Arctic Maid

demonstrates, however, the severance tax cases were in-

voked for the broad proposition that they still support: A

tax on the extraction of natural resources does not burden

interstate commerce.

22

in recent opinions involving state tax controversies. The

Court has stated that it will sustain a tax against Com-

merce Clause challenge

[w]hen the tax is applied to an activity with a sub-

stantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly appor-

tioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-

merce, and is fairly related to the services provided

by the State. (Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,

supra, 274, 279 (1977).)

Applying these standards, the Montana Supreme Court

properly concluded that Montana’s coal severance tax was

fairly related to benefits provided by the state and did

not discriminate against interstate commerce.”’ J.S. 19a-

27a.

1. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Is Fairly Related

to the Benefits Provided Appellants by the State.

The state court’s determination that Montana’s coal

severance tax is fairly related to benefits provided by the

state is unassailable. Montana has provided the appel-

lants with unquantifiable benefits. It has provided them

with the benefits of fire and police protection; of an edu-

cated work force; of roads and waterways; an organized

government; an orderly system of laws and an economic

infrastructure and social machinery that are essential

preconditions to the conduct of modern business activity.

These benefits are of incalculable value and plainly satisfy

the consideration that a tax be fairly related to benefits

27 Appellants conceded below that the activities taxed have a

substantial nexus to the State and that the tax is fairly ap-

portioned to activities carried on there. Brief of Plaintiffs-

Appellants 52.

23

provided by the state. The Court’s statement in regard

to a California levy is dispositive here:

The tax... is “fairly related to the services pro-

vided by” California, services that include not only

police and fire protection, but the benefits of a trained

work force and the advantages of a civilized society.

(Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.

434, 445 (1979).)

See also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Reven-

ue, 100 8. Ct. 2109, 2122 (1980).

Appellants’ contend, however, that before consider-

ing the “fair relation” criterion a court must undertake

a detailed factual inquiry into the question whether the

market value of the benefits provided the taxpayers is

substantially equivalent to the amount of the tax im-

posed. They argue that a trial is necessary to determine

“whether a reasonable relationship exists” between the

amount of the tax and the “costs or benefits involved,”

including “the legitimate needs of Montana.” App. Br.

30-31. Appellants’ contention finds no support in the

relevant decisions of this Court or in sound principles of

constitutional adjudication.

The Court has never suggested that the “fair rela-

tion” criterion contemplates a detailed factual investiga-

tion into the value of particular state-provided benefits

or taxpayer-imposed costs to determine what particular

quantitative relationship they bear to the amount of a

general excise tax like Montana’s.”* Nor has the court

28 As indicated above (see p.3, supra) and as the Montana

Supreme Court explicitly held (J. S. 22a), the coal severance

(Continued on next page)

24

suggested that based upon a potentially monumental in-

quiry, the courts must then decide what is “fair.” This

Court knows what is apparent not only to every state

legislature, but to Congress itself.

[A] tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as

we have said, a means of distributing the burden of

the cost of government. The only benefit to which

the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that de-

rived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living

in an organized society, established and safeguarded

by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. ... Any

other view would preclude the levying of taxes except

as they are used to compensate for the burden on

those who pay them, and would involve the abandon-

ment of the most fundamental principles of govern-

ment—that it exists primarily to provide for the

publie good. A corporation cannot object to the use

of taxes which it pays for the maintenance of schools

because it has no children. ... This Court has re-

pudiated the suggestion, whenever made, that the

Constitution requires the benefits derived from the

expenditure of public moneys to be apportioned to

the burdens of the taxpayer, or that he can resist

the payment of the tax because it is not expended

for purposes which are not peculiarly beneficial to

him. (Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301

U.S. 495, 522-23 (1937).)

(Continued from previous page)

tax was “imposed for the general support of the govern-

ment.” Appellants originally took no issue with this con-

clusion (J. S. ii), although now they suggest that the levy is

not imposed for the general support of government because

some of the tax revenues will not be immediately expended.

App. Br. 30. While this contention is a non-sequitur, the

critical p oom for present purposes, which appellants do not

and indeed, cannot dispute, is that Montana’s tax is a levy

imposed for broad governmental needs such as environ-

mental protection and public education, 4 15-35-108, MCA,

as distinguished from a levy imposed as a charge for a spe-

cific state-provided service. See pp. 31-32, infra.

25

Accord, St. Louis € S.W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U.S. 157,

159 (1928); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 280 (1898) ;

American Commuters, Ass’n. v. Levitt, 405 F. 2d 1148,

1152-53 (1969). Thus, in rejecting a Commerce Clause

challenge to the application of Louisiana’s business priv-

ilege tax on an interstate pipeline company, the Court,

after adverting to the “fair relation” criterion, declared

that “[t]he simple but controlling question is whether the

state has given anything for which it can ask return.”

Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triagle, 421 U.S. 100, 109 (1975)

(quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,

444 (1940)). It concluded that the “powers, privileges,

and benefits” Louisiana had bestowed upon the pipeline

—namely, the benefits and privileges associated with its

ability to carry on business in corporate form—were suf-

ficient to justify the tax. 421 U.S. at 109. The Court

made no effort to ascertain the precise value of these

benefits to the taxpayer.

Similarly, in dismissing Commerce Clause objections

to the application of Washington’s business privilege tax

on gross receipts from stevedoring activities, the Court

summarily disposed of the taxpayer’s “fair relation” con-

tention with the remark that “[n]othing in the record sug-

gests that the tax is not fairly related to services and

protection provided by the State.” Department of Revenue

v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S.

734, 750-51 (1978). There is nothing to suggest that the

Court based its conclusion on a considered judgment that

the value of specific benefits provided by the state had

some particular quantitative relationship to the amount of

the tax. Indeed, as Justice Powell’s concurring opinion

observed, the Court’s conclusion that the “fair relation”

26

test was satisfied “cannot be questioned” since the taxpay-

ers “undoubtedly avail themselves of police and fire pro-

tection, as well as other benefits Washington offers its

local businesses.” Id. at 764.

The Court’s most recent observations that the “fair

relation” criterion will be satisfied if the state provides

the taxpayer with “the benefit of a trained work force,

and ‘the advantages of a civilized society,’” Exxon Corp.

v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, supra, 100 S. Ct. at

2122; Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, supra,

441 U.S. at 445, further demonstrate that a trial with an

elaborate factual investigation is unnecessary to resolve

the “fair relation” issue.”? Appellants’ contrary position

is an invitation to transform the courts into legislative

committees to hold hearings into whether a certain tax

rate is “fair” and allow taxpayers to attempt to quantify

what benefits they receive from the State. But appel-

lants do not suggest how a court is to value the benefits

of police and fire protection, the elaborate network of

roads and waterways, or the orderly system of laws that

Montana provides them. We are not told how a court is

to measure in dollar terms the value of a trained work

force or the economic infrastructure and social machinery

that are essential preconditions to the conduct of modern

business activity. One can only guess by what standard

a court should assess costs imposed on Montana as a re-

sult of the loss of aesthetic values, the increases in crime,

alcoholism, and divorce, and the exhaustion of a nonrenew-

29 Montana’s position is even stronger if one compares the

nature of the contacts with the State in those cases with the

strip mining activity conducted in this case.

27

able resource that constitutes the state’s economic base.

How can a court measure in dollar terms the costs of en-

vironmental degradation that are presently unknown and,

indeed, unknowable? If appellants’ coal-mining activities

destroy Montana’s underground aquifers, in which much

of the state’s scarce water supply flows, it will literally

destroy the lifeblood of Montana society. The impact ap-

pellants’ activities will have is not something that can

presently be determined° The only certainty is that

after the last ton of coal is mined and the last dollar of

severance tax is paid, Montana will have to deal with these

and a host of other problems that the coal companies leave

in their wake.*!

The State vigorously disputes appellants’ self-serving

assertion that there is “unlikely” to be a “serious dis-

pute” over the “fair relation” issue should the matter be

remanded for trial (App. Br. 31). But to require the

State of Montana to demonstrate the present and future

benefits it furnishes appellants would surely precipitate

attacks on the “fairness” of the various revenue measures

of other states. According to appellants’ Commerce Clause

theory, an allegation by a taxpayer that © state is “ex-

porting” its tax burden entitles the taxpay. to a trial on

whether the tax is “fairly related” to benefits provided

by the state App. Br. 29-31. Since every state in the

30 See generally, D. Weiner, Reclaiming the West: The Coal

Industry and Surface-mined Lands (\Inform, Inc., N. Y., N. Y.

1980).

31 Montana is wisely setting aside in trust a part of its sever-

ance taxes so that future generations will not have to bear

the cost of these burdens without the possibility of assist-

ance from the very activity which created them.

28

country “exports” its tax burden to some extent,*? there

would be no end to “fair relation” challenges to state

revenue measures. No doubt Texas, which appears here

as an amicus, will soon be defending the fairness of its

own severance taxes on oil and gas, which are substan-

tially equivalent to Montana’s tax on coal when the levies

are compared on equivalent units of energy, see pp. 4-5,

supra.

Nor will taxpayers by any means be confined to sever-

ance taxes in mounting “fairness” challenges to state rev-

enue measures. New York’s tax on stock transfers which

falls heavily on out-of-staters, Florida’s tax on hotel and

motel receipts*’ which falls largely on tourists, and Michi-

gan’s taxes on the automobile industry** which are passed

on to consumers nationwide, are all vulnerable to the

charge that the state is attempting to tailor its taxes to

fall largely on non-resident consumers. Indeed, even gen-

eral income and sales taxes would be subject to such an

attack.’’

Finally, appellants rely on several cases in which the

Court has allegedly undertaken a detailed factual inquiry

into the “fair relation” question in adjudicating the valid-

ity of a state tax. See App. Br. 32 citing, e. g., Evans-

32 See McLure, The Interstate Exportation of State and Local

Taxes: Estimates of 1962, 20 Nat. Tax J. 49 (1967).

33 N. Y. Tax Law § 270 et seq. (McKinney 1966, Supp. 1980-81).

34 See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 424 U.S.

318 (1977).

35 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 212.03 (1980).

36 E. g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 208.1 et seq. (Supp. 1980-81).

37 See McLure, supra, note 22.

29

ville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972).

Every one of these cases, however, involved a fee that

was designed and defended as a specific charge imposed

by the state for the use of state-owned or state-provided

transportation facilities or services. These “user charges”

are assessed as reimbursement for specific quantifiable

services furnished by the government to the user, not for

general revenue purposes. Highway use taxes and similar

levies “are not true revenue measures and... the con-

siderations applicable to ordinary tax measures do not

apply.” P. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Com-

merce, 20 n. 72 (1953). They are “rather of the nature of

a rent charged by the State, based upon its proprietary

interest in its public property ...” 7d. at 122. It may well

be appropriate in cases involving such fees to inquire into

the relationship between the amount of the fee and the

specific service or benefit for which the fee is charged.

The holdings of those cases, however, have no bearing on

the validity of a general excise tax, such as the coal sever-

ance tax, which is neither designed nor defended as a

quid pro quo for a particular service or benefit rendered

by the state.

2. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Does Not Discrimi-

nate Against Interstate Commerce and Is Not

‘‘Tailored’’ to Fall on Residents of Other States.

Montana’s coal severance tax is “imposed on each ton

of coal produced in the state.” Section 15-35-1038, MCA.

The levy is nondiscriminatory on its face. It applies to

all coal extracted in the state; it applies without regard to

the ultimate destination of the coal—whether inside or out-

side the state; and it applies without regard to the nature

30

of the enterprise extracting the coal—whether local or inter-

state. No claim is or can be made that the coal severance

tax explicitly discriminates against interstate commerce.

It is true, of course, that the Commerce Clause forbids

taxes which, though nondiscriminatory on their face, by

their practical operation discriminate against interstate

commerce. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra.

Montana’s coal severance tax cannot reasonably be charac-

terized as such a levy, however. The degree to which either

local or interstate business shoulders the burden of the tax

is determined according to the amount or value of the coal

extracted and not according to any distinction—in prin-

ciple or in practice—between local and interstate com-

merce. Coal consumed in Montana is not treated differ-

ently than coal destined out-of-state. Appellants have

never contended otherwise, and appellants’ concession that

Montana may properly tax coal at some lower rate con-

tradicts their assertion that the tax is discriminatory.

To the extent that appellants’ claim of discrimination

is predicated on the fact that the coal in question is trans-

ported out-of-state so that the tax burden allegedly falls on

out-of-state consumers, it fails to state a claim under the

Commerce Clause. The states do not discriminate against

interstate commerce—nor do they improperly “tailor” their

taxes to fall on residents of other states—when they de-

mand from those consuming local resources payment for

the costs imposed on and benefits provided by the state

with respect to the extraction of these resources. Inter-

state commerce, this Court has frequently held, must pay

its way. See e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev-

enue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).

ee

31

By conceding that Montana has power to impose a coal

severance tax on their activities (App. Br.6), appellants

have conceded that the tax is not by its nature illicitly dis-

criminatory or “tailored.” Their theory is that it becomes

so only when the rate gets too high. Appellants’ discrimin-

ation and “tailored tax” claims are rooted in their con-

tention that the tax is “excessive” (J.S. i) and that inter-

state commerce is therefore being made to pay more than

its way, which merely restates their argument that the coal

severance tax is not fairly related to benefits provided by

the state. Because the “fair relation” criterion is met in

this case (see pp. 24-32, supra), it cannot plausibly be

argued that interstate commerce is paying more than its

way.

C. Sound Institutional Considerations Reinforce the

Conclusion That Appellants’ Commerce Clause

Claims Were Properly Dismissed.

As we have indicated, the heart of appellants’ case is

“that the tax is excessive in amount and thereby violates

the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitu-

tion.” (J.S. i, App. Br.6). By appellants’ reasoning there

must be some rate at which the tax would pass constitu-

tional muster, and it is the task of the courts to ascertain

that rate.

The judiciary, however, has never undertaken the task

that appellants would thrust upon it—the determination

of the appropriate rate of a general excise tax. Indeed,

whenever taxpayers have invited this Court to become

embroiled in controversies over the amount of a general

excise tax, it has steadfastly declined to do so. See, e.g.,

City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369

32

(1974) and cases cited therein; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,

292 U.S. 40 (1934). While many of the cases repudiating

challenges to taxes on the basis of their amount involved

the Due Process Clause, their reasoning is applicable to

Commerce Clause challenges as well.** The Court’s deci-

sions are predicated on the fundamental consideration—

ignored by appellants here—that the determination of the

proper rate of a tax is quintessentially a legislative judg-

ment beyond the pale of judicial competence.

The Court’s recognition that determining the proper

rate or amount of a state tax is not a judicial function,

reflects sound institutional considerations. If courts were

saddled with the responsibility of determining the ap-

propriate amount of a tax, based on an inquiry into the

quantitative relationship between the tax burden and the

costs and benefits involved, they would become entangled

in issues which they are institutionally ill-equipped to re-

solve. Given the inherent limitations of a court’s own re-

sources and the judicial process, a court is simply incap-

able of putting a dollar value on ecological damage, social

disruption, and the loss of am economic base. Courts would

also be required to struggle with the elusive question of

the economic incidence of the tax to determine whether a

taxpayer who alleges that he is paying an “excessive” tax

is actually bearing the tax burden.*®

—

38 See P. Hartman, State Taxation of interstate Commerce 19

(1953).

39 See, e.g., Hogan and Shelton, Interstate Tax Exportation

and State Fiscal Structures, 26 Nat. Tax J. 553 (1973); McLure,

(Continued on next page)

33

This Court’s consistent position that such issues are

not judicially cognizable does not mean that there are no

restraints on Montana’s power to set its own tax rates or

that taxpayers aggrieved by the rate of a state tax affect-

ing interstate commerce have no avenue for relief. While

a court is an inappropriate forum for determining the rate

of a tax, a legislative body is fully capable of making such

a determination. And in the context of the present con-

troversy, it is Congress that has the ultimate responsibility

to contend with Montana’s coal severance tax rates, if it

sees fit to do so.

Congress, in fact, has been focusing abundant atten-

tion on national energy policy in general and on the very

issues that divide the parties here. Legislation directed

specifically at the problem appellants seek to have this

Court resolve was introduced in the Ninety-Sixth Con-

gress; hearings at which appellants fully presented their

views were held on the proposed legislation; and the

legislation was approved by the House Subcommittee on

(Continued from previous page)

Economic Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy

Resources, 31 Nat. Tax J. 257 (1978); McLure, supra note 32;

Shelton and Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Exportation

and Regional Energy Policies, 17 Nat. Res. J. 261 (1977).

40 S. 2695, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H. R. 7163, 96th Cong.,

2d Sess. (1980); H. R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.

6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).

41 Coal Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before the Senate

Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1980); Coal Severance Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 6625,

H. R. 6654 and H.R. 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy

and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).

34

Energy and Power.” Similar legislation has already been

introduced this session. S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

It is therefore apparent that Congress is fully aware

of and involved in the conflict that only the legislative

branch is capable of resolving. In recent years, Congress

has shown itself willing to legislate in the state tax field

when, in its judgment, state tax legislation threatened to

impose a burden on interstate commerce. Armed with

the extensive information provided by its hearings and by

staff research, Congress can make an informed political

judgment as to whether a rate limitation or other action to

offset state severance taxes is warranted. As this Court

has frequently recognized, the resolution of such issues

has been committed by the Constitution to the legislative

branch. See, e.g., Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,

437 U.S. 267, 280 (1975).

42 Report Bulletin No. 12, Prentice Hall State and Local Taxes

(All States Unit) (Sept. 16, 1980).

43 See 15 U.S.C. § 381 et seq. (1976) (limiting states’ power

to tax income from interstate commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 391

(1976) (prohibiting states from imposing electrical energy

taxes discriminating against out-of-state purchasers); 15

U. S. C. § 78bb (d) (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing

stock transfer taxes when the only nexus between the state

and the transaction is the presence of the transfer agent);

49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing

user charges in connection with the carriage of persons in

air commerce). 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1978) (pronibiting

states from taxing railroad property more heavily than other

industrial and commercial property); Motor Carrier Act of

1980, Pub. L. 96-296 § 31, 94 Stat. 793 (to be conified at 49

U.S. C. § 11503a) (prohibiting states from taxing, motor car-

rier property more heavily than other industrial and com-

mercial property.)

35

III. The state court properly dismissed appellants’

claims that the rate of Montana’s coal severance

tax frustrates broad national coal policies and

goals.

Appellants’ Supremacy Clause claims, like their Com-

merce Clause claims, are in substance an attack on the

rate of Montana’s coal severance tax. Appellants concede

that no federal law or policy prevents Montana from levy-

ing some kind of coal severance tax (App. Br. 6), but assert

that Montana’s tax is preempted on the ground that the

rate of the tax is purportedly repugnant to “the basic

thrust of federal policy,” App. Br. 16, 46-47.

Appellant’s preemption claims are subject to the same

fundamental objections that have already been raised:

Congress has affirmatively approved the authority of the

States to determine severance tax rates and, in any event,

the determination of the proper rate or amount of a tax

is a state prerogative and a legislative not a judicial func-

tion. Even if Congress had not adopted affirmative legis-

lation endorsing the state’s right to set severance tax rates,

see pp. 11-16, swpra, it is inappropriate for a court to in-

validate a state tax solely on the ground that the rate is

too high. No court has ever held a tax preempted on that

basis.

Moreover, appellants have seriously misconstrued the

nature and effect of national policies concerning coal.

Their assertion that the rate of a state tax may be pre-

empted because it increases the cost of some federally

favored activity finds no support in settled principles of

preemption analysis.

36

A. Montana’s Coal Severance Tax Does Not Frustrate

the Purposes and Policies Embodied in the Fed-

eral Legislation Cited by Appellants.

Appellants’ Count II preemption claim is based on a

selective reading of national energy legislation, through

which they have attempted to carve out an alleged policy

regarding western coal. Although appellants have cited

numerous federal statutes dealing with coal and energy

in general (App. Br.5, note*) nowhere do they contend

that the Montana Coal Severance Tax is preempted by

any specific provision of any of these acts. In fact, con-

gressional action in the area of coal policy has been spe-

cific and limited, and there is nothing in existing legisla-

tion to suggest that Congress either intended to limit state

taxes on coal or to elevate any policy encouraging coal

use to preeminence over other policies which may reduce

its use or increase its cost. To the contrary, congres-

sional action reflects a continued solicitude for state tax

powers and for other state and national policies that may

compete with coal policy.

Section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,

30 U.S. C. § 189, supra, expressly endorses the authority

of states to impose mineral severance taxes. A similar

acknowledgment appears in section 601, Title VI, Power

Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95-

620, 92 Stat. 3289), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8401, which

provides for federal financial assistance in areas suffer-

ing adverse economic consequences from coal development.

In determining an impact area’s need for federal assist-

ance, the section requires that other state and local re-

sources shall be taken into consideration, “including sev-

erance tax revenue ... to the state and local governments

37

which are associated with the increase in coal . . . develop-

ment activities ...” Jd. (emphasis supplied).

Congress has adopted very specific and limited means

for encouraging coal development and use. The Energy

Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (Pub. L. 94-163, 89

Stat. 871) adopts incentives for development of under-

ground coal mines, 42 U.S.C. §6211; makes provision

for export restrictions, 42 U.S.C. § 6212; and provides

for the creation of strategic coal and other fossil fuel re-

serves, 42 U.S.C. § 6231 et seq.

Congressional action in other areas recognizes the

eontinued importance of competing national policies de-

spite their potentially adverse impact upon the produc-

tion, cost and use of coal. Miners of coal, low sulfur and

high sulfur alike, are neither exempt from costly environ-

mental and strip mining regulations, see 30 U.S.C. § 1251

et seq., nor from health and safety requirements under

the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C.

§ 801 et seq., even though these requirements may increase

the cost of coal. The Surface Mining Control and Recla-

mation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., reflects a

congressional preference for underground coal mining be-

cause of its limited environmental impact and demon-

strates that Congress is perfectly willing to countenance

an increase in the costs of coal production, in Montana

and elsewhere.

Furthermore, regional economic concerns continue to

predominate over any broad, unitary coal policy. For

example, in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Pub.

L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685), Congress required “application of

the best technological system of continuous emission re-

38

duction” for all new stationary sources, including those

burning low sulfur coal. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. The legis-

lative history of this requirement reveals congressional

dissatisfaction with the use of low sulfur western coal to

meet air emission standards and reflects a congressional

intention to (1) reduce reliance upon western coal, and

(2) promote expanded use of high sulfur eastern and mid-

western coal. By requiring the best technologically feas-

ible reduction of sulfur emission with respect to low sulfur

coal, Congress abolished the then prevalent practice of

burning untreated low sulfur coal to meet air emission

standards and thereby increased the cost of burning low

sulfur coal in the hope of making eastern high sulfur coal

more competitive in the market place, spurring the eastern

coal economy, and reducing national reliance upon low

sulfur western coal. 1977 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News

1245, 1510, 1575.

With a similar purpose, Congress granted state gov-

ernors, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the

President authority to prohibit a major fuel burning sta-

tionary source “from using fuels other than locally or re-

gionally available coal or coal derivatives to comply with

implementation plan requirements” upon a finding that

such action “is necessary to prevent or minimize signifi-

eant or regional economic disruption or unemployment.

...’ Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-

95, § 122, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7425.4

44 See generally The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: A

Selective Legislative Analysis, 13 Land & Water L. Rev. 747,

800-12 (1978).

39

In sum, the specific provisions of federal coal legisla-

tion define the contours of national policy in this domain.

These provisions belie the existence of “a national intent

to maximize the production and use of western low sul-

phur coal” (App. Br. 38) at the expense of other consid-

erations. They contain no provision that even remotely

reflects an intent to limit the amount of a state severance

tax. Instead, as the court below properly concluded, the

“basic thrust” of federal policy is to accommodate the

diverse concerns of the nation, the regions, and states,

even though the resulting costs including those which might

be attributable to state severance taxes, may increase the

price of coal. See J. S. 33a-34a.

B. Under Settled Principles of Preemption Analysis,

the Asserted National Policies on Which Appel-

lants Rely Cannot, as a Matter of Law, Invalidate

a State Tax.

45 There is no certainty that the Montana tax is or need be

passed on in whole or even in part to consumers. See M.

Gillis, Severance Taxes On Energy Resources in the U.S.,

Growth and Change (Jan., 1979). Moreover, even if Con-

gress were to limit state severance tax rates, the limitation

would have little impact on the cost of coal. The tax is only

a small fraction of the ultimate cost of coal generated energy.

The cost of transporting coal far exceeds the amount of the

tax; that cost recently drew criticism from the President's

Commission on Coal, which found that the Interstate Com-

merce Commission had established rate guidelines allow-

ing railroads a “7%” premium for coal traffic, a premium

which is intended to ‘subsidize other traffic moving at less

than full costs. * * *,’”” Staff Findings 20 (1980). Capital costs

for coal fired generators are three to five times the cost of

- oil and gas fired generators. President’s Commission on

Coal, Coal Data Book 54-55 (1980). Operating costs, a fair

profit for the utility company, and the taxes of the consum-

ing state must also be added.

40

Even assuming that it were possible to extract from

the welter of statutes’ cited by appellants a broad na-

tional policy to encourage the use of western coal and

federal coal, such a policy provides no basis under estab-

lished preemption doctrine for invalidating state legis-

lation. Contrary to appellants’ contention, state laws are

not preempted by the “basic thrust” of a “national pur-

pose” or “overall federal policy,” App. Br. 16, 36, 39, 46-

47. The Court made that point clear in Exxon Corp. v.

Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), by sum-

marily rejecting a contention similar to that made here,

namely, that a broad, general national policy favoring

“free competition” can preempt a state regulatory scheme.

The claim advanced by appellants in Exxon was that a

state statute prohibiting producers or refiners of petro-

leum products from operating retail service stations in

the state was invalid because it interferred with a na-

tional policy favoring “free competition.” Because the

contention was strikingly similar to the one advanced by

appellants herein, this Court’s response hears quotation:

Appellants point out ... the . . . basic national pol-

icy favoring free competition, and argue that the

Maryland statute “undermines” the competitive bal-

ance that Congress struck between the Robinson-

46 Appellants also rely on “official pronouncements by the

President and members of his Cabinet,” App. Br. 36. What-

ever the import of these pronouncements, they are of scant

relevance to this case. It is federal legislation, not speeches

1 the President or his appointees, that preempts state law.

The various “official’” and often irreconcilable pronounce-

ments that emanate daily from Executive Branch personnel

and shift dramatically from administration to administration,

do not constitute “Laws of the United States,’’ U.S. Const.

Art. VI, cl. 2, and cannot be the basis for judicial invalida-

tion of a state statute under the Supremacy Clause.

41

Patman and Sherman Acts. This is merely another

way of stating that the Maryland statute will have

an anticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a

conflict between the statute and the central policy

of the Sherman Act—our “charter of economic lib-

erty.” . .. Nevertheless, this sort of conflict cannot

itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating

the Maryland statute. For if any adverse effect on

competition were, in and of itself, enough to render

a state statute invalid, the States’ power to engage

in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.

(437 U.S. at 133-134.)

Accord, New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin

W. Fox, 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978).

While the Court’s preemption decisions do not lend

themselves to easy generalizations, Hines v. Davidowitz,

312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), they reveal that no state law,

much less a state tax law has been struck down on the

basis of general national policies of the sort that under-

lie appellants’ claim here. Findings of preemption have

uniformly been predicated upon specific rights, require-

ments, and regulatory schemes enacted into law by Con-

gress, or by specific administrative regulations adopted

pursuant to such laws.

The cases appellants invoke for the proposition that

a broad national policy may itself be the predicate for

preempting a state law do not support their contention.

Sce Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977);

Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235

(1967) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), cited at App.

Br. 39-40. Two of the cases, Nash and Hill, involved con-

flicts between state legislation and the National Labor

Relations Act, “a comprehensive code passed by Congress

42

to regulate labor relations in activities affecting inter-

state and foreign commerce.” Nash, 389 U.S. at 238. In

each case, the state law was preempted because it inter-

ferred with a specific right conferred by Congress under

this “comprehensive code.’*?7 No case has held that a

broad national policy or aspiration may be the basis for

preempting a state statute. The reference in many of

this Court’s preemption opinions to the “policies,” “pur-

poses,” and “objectives” underlying particular statutes

has never been a substitute for a determination that the

enactments themselves. -the “Laws of the United States,”

U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2—would be substantially frus-

trated by the state legislation at issue. Interpretation of

those “laws” may, of course, be influenced by the policy

underlying them, but the policy itself is not a law.

The preemption issue raised by appellants was prop-

erly disposed of without a trial. Whether or not there

are “Laws of the United States” with preemptive impli-

cations for coal severance taxes is a question that a court

can and should resolve. The Court does not need the

“testimony of regulators, administrators, and expert wit-

nesses” (App. Br. 40-41) to resolve that issue. Indeed,

appellants’ claim that such testimony is necessary merely

47 In Nash, it was the right of an employee to file an unfair

labor practice complaint that was infringed by a state statute

which denied unemployment benefits to persons exercis-

ing such right. In Hill, it was the right of employees to

select their own collective —e agents which was cur-

tailed by the state statute requiring licensure of union busi-

ness agents and prohibiting new citizens and convicted

felons from acting as collective bargaining agents. In Jones,

federal standardized product labeling requirements were

held to preempt state labeling requirements based upon

different standards.

43

reflects their mistaken belief that such matters as a for-

mer Energy Secretary’s remarks before a trade associa-

tion bears on whether Montana’s coal severance tax is

contrary to “the Supreme Law of the Land.” See App.

Br. 36, n.** Nor does the question of whether a broad

national policy can be used as the basis for preempting

a state law require a trial. This is clearly an issue of

law which a Court may properly dispose of upon a mo-

tion to dismiss, see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry

Dock Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U.S. 54, 57 (1938) and was

treated as such by the Court in Eaaxon, supra.®

C. A Proper Appreciation of the Central Role of State

Tax Power in the Federal System Precludes Pre-

emption of a State Tax Solely on the Ground that

the Increased Costs Associated with the Tax In-

directly Affect Implementation of Federal Poli-

cies.

Assuming that the existence of a broad national pol-

icy to encourage the production of western coal or of

some unarticulated compromise in the Mineral Lands

Leasing Act (App. Br. 46) could form the predicate for

a preemption claim, appellants’ case boils down to the

proposition that a state tax may be preempted because

of the indirect economic impact that the amount of the

tax may have upon some federally favored activity. No

state tax has ever been invalidated on this basis, and an

-

48 The State would agree with appellants that a trial would be

necessary to resolve the issue whether Montana’s tax frus-

trates a national policy to encourage the use of western coal

if the Court determines as a matter of law that there is such

a policy and that such a policy can form the basis of a pre-

emption claim.

At

appreciation of the central role of state tax power in

the federal system suggests that no state tax should be.

As this Court has always recognized, the states’

“power of taxation is indispensable to their existence,”

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824), and

thus to the federal scheme that the framers created, see

e.g., The Federalist No. 32 (A. Hamilton). Moreover, the

exercise of state tax power has traditionally been re-

garded as compatible with the exercise of federal power.

See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199. Just last term

the Court observed that “concurrent federal and state

taxation of income, or course, is a well-established norm.”

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,

448 (1980). Furthermore, while a state tax may increase

the costs of engaging in particular activity, unlike a state

regulation, it prescribes no mode of conduct in an area

in which Congress may have adopted rules of its own.

For these reasons, the economie burden imposed by

a state tax should not, in and of itself, be a basis for

federal preemption of state tax legislation. Every tax,

after all, imposes increased costs on the person, prop-

erty, or activity subject to the levy. Union Pacific R.R.

Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5, 30-31 (1873) and see Penn

Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania,

318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943). Elementary economics teaches

that such costs may reduce the demand for the goods or

services taxed, and to that extent any state tax arguably

threatens to “frustrate” federal law. Yet to allow such

“frustration” to be a basis for preemption of a state

tax is wholly inconsistent with the Court’s recognition

that state tax power is critical to the states’ independent

45

existence and is generally compatible with concurrent ex-

ercises of federal power.

The Court’s preemption decisions involving state tax-

ation have never recognized the contention which appel-

lants advance here, and indeed have consistently rejected

it when presented. L.g., Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Pen-

iston, supra. Moreover, with one exception, this Court

has invalidated a state tax on preemption grounds only

where the tax was directed at the federal government it-

self, its instrumentalities, or its special wards, the Indian

Tribes. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4

Wheat.) 316 (1819) and other cases cited by appellants

at App. Br. 41. These cases involve considerations dis-

tinct from those encountered in the usual preemption con-

troversy and provide little guidance for preemption analy-

sis generally. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,

100 8. Ct. 2578, 2583 (1980) ;*° L. Tribe, American Consti-

tutional Law 391-400 (i977). The single case in which

the Court invalidated a state tax on general preemption

grounds was McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414

(1940), where the Court struck down a state tax upon

sales of imported fuel which had been delivered as ships’

stores to vessels engaged in foreign commerce. Two crit-

ical factors readily distinguish the controversy there from

the instant case. First, Congress itself had withdrawn

the fuel in question from federal taxation, 309 U.S. at

423, and second, the case involved foreign commerce, an

49 The Court in White Mountain observed: “The unique his-

torical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally un-

helpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian

tribes those standards of preemption that have emerged

in other areas of the law.” 100 S. Ct. at 2583.

46

area in which the primacy of federal interests warrants

special consideration that may override state legislation

that is otherwise unobjectionable. Japan Lines, Ltd. v.

County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 4384, 444-51 (1979).

McGoldrick does, however, share one characteristic with

other preemption cases involving state taxes which serves

to distinguish it from the instant controversy: There was

no suggestion that the rate of the tax figured in the

Court’s determination that it was inconsistent with fed-

eral legislation.

a ,

-_~O——

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the

Montana Supreme Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

MIKE GREELY

Attorney General

Counsel of Record

MIKE McGRATH

Assistant Attorney General

MIKE MceCARTER

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

State of Montana

State Capitol

Helena, Montana 59601

OF COUNSEL:

A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH, JR.

Sharp, Randolph & Green

Suite 501

1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Appellees

February, 1981

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.