Petition — Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n

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Supre-ne Court, U.S.

80-499 FILED

No. SEP 29 1980

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OctoseR TERM, 1980

Grorce R. WriiuiaMs, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vs.

Paciric Maritime AssociaTION, a non-profit corporation,

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S AND WAREHOUSEMEN’S

Union, an unincorporated association, an’

1.L.W.U. Loca No. 10,

_ Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARTHUR BRUNWASSER

COUNSEL OF RECORD

240 Stockton Street,

Third Floor

San Francisco, CA 94108

(415) 391-2203

Frep L. KurRLANDER

1255 Post Street, Suite 500

San Francisco, CA 94109

(415) 441-8284

Attorneys for Petitioners

BOWNE-PERNAU WALSH © 1045 SANSOME ST. ¢ S.F., CA 94115 © (415) 981-7882

>

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether or not a union breaches its statutory duty

to provide fair representation when it agrees to the dis-

charge of a large number of members of the collective

bargaining unit for work-related infractions which were

not the subject of a discharge penalty when the infractions

occurred during the previous four years of employment?

2. Whether or not a union breaches its duty to provide

fair representation when it agrees to the discharge of a

large number of members of the collective bargaining unit

for conduct which was not in violation of any provision

of the collective bargaining agreement or applicable work-

ing rules at any time during the ¢-.evious four years of

employment?

3. Whether or not a decision of the National Labor

Relations Board involving other persons similarly situ-

ated, but never subjected to judicial review, is entitled to

preclusive effect upon a later case in the courts for unfair

representation and breach of the collective bargaining

agreement?

4. Whether or not members of the collective bargaining

unit may be compelled to agree to the waiver of their rights

to fair representation and to be discharged only for good

cause as a condition of employment?

5. Whether or not the union and employer breach the

collective bargaining agreement when they jointly agree to

discharge a large number of members of the bargaining

unit without “good cause” and in violation of the past prac-

tices of the “common law of the shop”?

6. Whether or not the Court of Appeals abdicated i‘s

responsibility to make an independent review of the record

when it simply approved the findings of the District Court

which were merely xeroxed copies of the findings sub-

mitted by the prevailing parties?

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THE PARTIES

Petitioners are 51 individuals whose names are listed

in the margin.* Respondents are Pacific Maritime Asso-

ciation, a non-profit California corporation composed of

all or substantially all of the major stevedoring employers

on the Pacific Coast and in the Port of San Francisco. It is

an “employer” within the meaning of § 2(2) of the National

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).

Respondent International Longshoremen’s and Ware-

housemen’s Union is the certified collective bargaining

representative for all longshoremen employed by the mem-

bers of PMA and is recognized as such under § 2(5) of the

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (5).

Respondent ILWU Local No. 10 is the chartered local

affiliate of the ILWU for longshoremen working in the

Port of San Francisco.

*George R. Williams, William Jones, Paul May, Eathan Gums

Jr., Edgar J. Dunlap, Walter L. Robinson, Frank Nereu, Louis 7.

Lacy, Leroy J. Provost, Roger W. Fleeton, Robert E. Birks,

Anthony Melvin Jr., Oliver Geeter, Antonio S. Cafeteiro, Edward

Reed, Albert W. Roberts, Percy Fountain, William J. Hurst Jr.,

Willie C. Merritt, Mack Hebert, Manuel Neureu Jr., Arthur G.

Winters, Frank Giannino, Stanley L. Weir, Fred Hayes, Willie J.

Whitehead, Rhody Adams, Mario V. Luppi, Arthur L. Hughes,

Jeremia Richards, Cleo Love, Louis J. Richardson, Charles J. John-

son, Reginald W. Saunders, Willie Jenkins Jr., Willie D. Palmer,

Conway T. Hudson, John T. Leggett, Alfred Straughter, Thomas

Nisby, Timothy E. Carter, James U. Carter, Melvin Kennedy,

Henry Imperial, James Langford, Johnny J. Cherry, Ellis E.

Graves, James Green, Ulysses Hawkins, Theodore Tolliver, Law-

rence Johnson, and Herman Crawford.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions presented for review Sisssabliceien diac hersecpiaaiecsteglieda i

I hilar chic Sake bihe ea digeitpabeneeh toestlinseehic ii

CPERRBOIE: DONO i oncreccisecciccbececcsccssiies a a, 1

ER IG BE AO LAT AM See EY eae A 1

Statutory provisions involved -................c2.-sce0cee-e00 wee Ol

etetomemt OF tie GROG soins ese hierestlacesnpaictincidantons 2

A TO TA BIG cccesstterciecs tarrsiechierborinienthneatincaictaen 3

Re CRED aici! Erk eee OO eS Ft LS 4)

EIN. ics napsncak dhl ioads seishsniicnevgigslssoeboumbeomcanigstmessinaiibe 6

I aon oncidpnaniphaliveliiaaieabentics 7

TN MOGI, cashrusesbasncsbcpisiheosetechench Ubu inasaptsechibbanctasppaitasinhticteselaieees 9

A. Petitioners’ employment and the collective bar-

SE IND as cotchtaphescesitcceetentnnsinrenenvctiniciontbe 9

Se 8 | EES eR 10

Sy- PRR IINNE Siaitischeiesitetidaccossabjstncciercibsunlindaldcccaveins 10

hc OR IRIN siciaccnikcaiseinactciculsaiittinietceahiaesdnobincaltnaiise 11

aims OU Or a nee, 14

C. Petitioners’ deregistrations in 1963 ......00.0..00...... 18

canine 22

Reasons for granting the writ ..............0..0..:ccccccetscsceseseeeeeee 24

I. The court of appeals disregarded the teachings

of this court and needlessly contributed to the

existing conflicts among the circuits in fair rep-

PINE GUI siicctinpikechancnaiataid. scalarinicedas 25

?*

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III.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The union and employer cannot condition em-

ployment upon a waiver of the statutory right to

fair representation and the right to demand com-

pliance with the collective bargaining agreement

A decision of the National Labor Relations

Board cannot preclude the federal courts from a

full examination of petitioners’ claims ..................

The findings below are the result of obvious and

exceptional error, because the court of appeals

failed to make an independent review of the

I acsesedeteipictcacisitnenipnslenitbaguinchieadinnaiyanesustaenaptperaiiiness

Respondents breached the collective bargaining

agreement by deregistering petitioners without

“good cause” and in violation of the “Common

Be I I I in eda cach cactprtaovevcncnsatinlcowiensncde

ES i SRE CI OE NRL ES OE a

29

31

33

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, ete., 585 F.2d 210

(7th Cir. 1978) ....... nT Bi SE CS se IO

Auto Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965) .............. 31

Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630 (1967) 35

Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corporation, 349 U.S. 85

Page

30

h_ ) AREER et COTO A Pe Rael ia PEER 30

Boone v. Armstrong Cork Company, 384 F.2d 285 (5th

Che BOOED ath he enaeneniaebenie 39

Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d

Cir. 1968) cert. denied sub nom. International Ass’n

of Machinists v. Brady, 393 U.S. 1048 -............ 27, 28

Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d

SOD tT CO See bak bli 26

Day v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agr. Imple-

ment Workers of America, Local 36, 466 F.2d 83 (5th

CR RID iniecseccnrsiaciiipieermandisieenseilasenctidane bidinmnnstaaigilccini 38

Ekas v. Carling Nat. Breweries, Inc., 602 F.2d 664

(4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, ...... US. ......, 100 S.Ct.

BOI scisiovecpnvsosistas veiccinchacaiiaais sideline cen elites tieeiari celui eth 28

Electricians v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) 2000020... 25

Foust v. International Broth. of the Elec. Workers,

572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev’d in part on other

grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) ......-.....-ccceccsceresecsneeeeceeees 26

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Aire Prod. Co., 336

Ta ee IE Seenssinsenictnlndiininsiabinbimiaaiseaimmanlitcaten 35

Griffin v. International U., United Auto, etc., 469 F.2d

RBA COR Gas BF Ginn tances acidaadeeiecncs 25

v7

°.

vi

TaBLe or AuTHortities CrTep

Cases

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554

SRN witch iuctonsdelidasvc puiniaccdis ilbdigiacid pede ldaibiatine nasi eriinrtililinianaie 25

Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) -.....00002200..... 28, 35

J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)........ 30

Jones v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d

AES SSRI RBROR ASO WS Rvs SAA SR OR AABN E55 S 25

Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir.

SPAT eP SEAGER AAS eas) Ac ER CSS EOE SS MUON 26

Melendy v. United States Postal Service, 589 F.2d 256

eR I IEE ik datdeodaabasbieapieiibilabcestascnecneabewhocsdtebiniied 26

Pacific Maritime Ass’n (Johnson Lee), 155 NLRB

BMI iscpisSeoecinliaiaph alpaca eo sdlan ebaacsshaabionicaeunoabl 31, 32

Pacific Maritime Association v. N.L.R.B., 452 F.2d 8

RU dane 9

Petersen v. Rath Packing Company, 461 F.2d 312 (8th

Ra acliacnin senhiiehseitseiessphdsiestiaidssconsiateaisnplsibinahaleaposieaniat 26

Price v. International Bro. of Teamsters, 457 F.2d 605

EOUIE RM TRIED sok Bich snscchan-ssbilancencharabaccbcbibbcecctnterebesibebucinnsediicnict 28

Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel and El. Op. U. Loe.

No. 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972) 00022... 26, 27, 28

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) 2. eeeeeeee eens 35

Ruzicka v. General Motors Corporation, 523 F.2d 306

(6th Cir. 1975), reh. den., 528 F.2d 912 (1975) ........ 25, 26

Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) 00000000... 38

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192

CER) a cnncicarinesrenasosvesonssrsinentnbesnancnseveroucagtnogesnesiinenésnceesin 2, 3, 25

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CasEs

a, Page

Stewart v. Travelers Corporation, 503 F.2d 108 (9th —

| BEE AMIE RE Re ec MO. SO be RS RE WES ax 2S 33

U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S, 268 (1978) 2.0... eee eeeeeeeees 35

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf

Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) —....0..... 40

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) -............... 2, 25, 26, 32, 33

Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 384 F.2d 935 (9th

Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 ..00.0000.02.. 1, 22

Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 421 F.2d 1287 (9th

bE RDO SALA ETS AOE PON MRR CON READ METRO. FIRA AE

Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 617 F.2d 1321

IE shssicsdibabeaotidptbercmsins 1, 18, 19, 23, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 39

7%

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viii

TaBLeE or AutuHorities Crrep

Statutes

Page

28 U.S.C.:

Section 1254(1) ....... iabsisiedikyiicecsches titeieadhialaliieaal 1

I at 22

SUI SIE ht... 2. ented tsintnsnolingeibateaccaptattnesieieiie 22

Labor Management Relations Act:

y Bik Lek : feet 32

EES 2 Sea ere ae eee 32

SPRITES TERRA E ie ae Oe OEE 31

RRR aE ST CA IP TT 1, 22

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of

1959:

29 U.S. C. Section 114(a) ......... Aeacsinglakabiimiie 10

National Labor Relations Act, as amended:

SP EI A CMD citcinessscnhstncnsaliatisccrecestcenriutceasiag il

PEGE Lee tae eae ee ii

a 1

II sain ccsidia.sssescan sainscccnigisasebenhcininamalaiatia nas 1

NL I ae 1

RO OLE Me ee 1

Texts

6A Corbin on Contracts, § 1376, p. 21 (1962 ed.) ............ 30

Restatement (Second) of Judgments, §68.1 (Ten.

BRAUER FON Din SAPUUEE stkediciivtacn Glbtasleeniinmnatiaaikectiiad side 33

Summers, The Individual Employee’s Rights Under

the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair

Representation?, 126 U.Pa.L. Rev. 251, 273 (1977)... 24

No.

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

Octoser Term, 1980

Grorce R. WiiuraMs, et al.,

Petitioners,

VS.

Paciric Maritime AssociaTION, a non-profit corporation,

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S AND WAREHOUSEMEN’S

Unron, an unincorporated association, and

1.L.W.U. Locau No. 10,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE R. WILLIAMS, et al., petitioners, pray that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and

opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit entered against them in the above-entitled

case on February 8, 1980.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 617

F.2d 1321 (1980) and is reprinted in Appendix A. The

order of the Court of Appeals denying rehearing is unre-

ported and is reprinted in Appendix B. The findings of fact

and conclusions of law and judgment of the District Court

are unreported and are reprinted in Appendix C and D.

Prior to the rendition of the judgment sought to be re-

viewed, the Court of Appeals rendered two opinions in

previous appeals which are reported at 384 F.2d 935 (1967)

and 421 F.2d 1287 (1970).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit was entered on February 8, 1980. A timely peti-

tion for rehearing was filed on March 7, 1980 and there-

after denied on May 13, 1980. On July 9, 1980, Mr. Justice

Rehnquist extended the time for filing a petition for certi-

orari to and including September 29, 1980. This Court

has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of

Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves Sections 7, 8(d), 9(a) and 10(a) of

the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.

§$157, 158, 159 and 160, and §301(a) of the Labor-

Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §185. The

pertinent provisions thereof are set forth in full in Ap-

pendix E.

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2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a case brought against a union and an employer

for breach of the union’s duty to provide fair representa-

tion and for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.

It poses fundamental issues in a developing area of la-

bor law regarding the statutory duty of labor unions to

provide fair representation within the meaning of this

Court’s landmark case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville

R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) and its later evolution in the

decision of Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). It calls for

a realistic examination of the limits of the authority

granted by Congress to certified bargaining representa-

tives. It involves questions of enormous importance not

only to the general administration of our labor laws, but

also specifically to the thousands of working people, pri-

marily those like petitioners who are not eligible for union

membership, whose livelihoods are completely regulated

by collective bargaining agreements negotiated and ad-

ministered throughout the United States.

After four years of employment, petitioners were sum-

marily discharged by the joint action of their collective

bargaining representative and employer. Both the District

Court, after trial, and the Court of Appeals approved the

imposition of the capital punishment of industrial rela-

tions upon petitioners for conduct which was the subject

of only nominal fines or brief suspensions from work when

they occurred years earlier. The Ninth Circuit, while pay-

ing lip service to the decisions of this Court, brushed aside

the suggestion that the applicability of a discharge pen-

alty on a retroactive basis violated any concept of indus-

trial due process. It reached that conclusion because the

employees agreed, as a condition of accepting their jobs, to

allow the union and employer to revoke their employment

for “any other cause” in the years ahead. The opinion of

the Court of Appeals failed to give recognition to the

“common law of the shop” developed over the past 30 years

|

3

in the Pacific Coast longshore industry, where longshore-

men have always been given a second chance when they

committed infractions on the job. The opinion disregards

_ the admonition of Mr. Justice Murphy, who warned of the

possible unconstitutional delegation of authority inherent

in the very concept of allowing arbitrary conduct by a

collective bargaining representative. Steele v. Louisville

and Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. at 208-209 (Murphy, J. con-

curring opinion).

The Case in a Nutshell

The instant dispute arises in an industry where all de-

cisions about the hiring and firing of longshore employees

are made by both the union and employer acting through

joint committees. Longshore employment is obtained by

means of “registration” on a registration list maintained

jointly by the union and employer.

There are two classifications of registered, full-time

longshoremen in the Port of San Francisco, Class A and

Class B. Those regic‘ered in Class A are considered to

have “full registration”, are eligible for membership in

the union, Local 10 of the International Longshoremen’s

and Warehousemen’s Union, and have priority in being

dispatched to jobs from the central dispatch hall oper-

ated jointly by the union and the stevedoring companies,

Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”). Those registered

in Class B are considered to have “limited registration”,

are not eligible for union membership, and are dispatched

to jobs after all the Class A men have been dispatched.

All aspects of longshore employment in each port on the

Pacific Coast are administered by a Joint Port Labor Re-

lations Committee (“Port Committee”) composed of rep-

resentatives of the IL.WU and PMA.

Petitioners are 51 former Class B longshoremen in San

Francisco, who were registered in 1959 and, as with all

new employees in any industry, they were provided with

4

written and oral working rules. These rules provided that

they were required to devote their entire working efforts

to the industry and were to be physically present in the

dispatch hall 70% of each 30 day period when the dispatch

hall was open.The rules also provided that drinking on the

job was not allowed, and that each longshoreman was re-

quired to report his hours worked each calendar quarter

under a “low man out” system of dispatch (“LMO”) so that

available work opportunities could be equally distributed

among his fellow workers. Although neither the basic col-

lective bargaining agreement nor any rule adopted in the

Port of San Francisco specified any amount, petitioners

were also told that they would be required to pay $6.00 each

month to Local 10 as their “pro rata” or proportionate

share of the cost of operating the dispatch hall.

Each formal and informal working rule contained a

specific penalty for its infraction. If a man was found to

be intoxicated on the job, he would be suspended from work

for 30 days for the first incident and discharged or “de-

registered” for the second incident. If he made an error of

at least 10 hours in reporting his accumulated working

hours under the low man out dispatching procedure, he

would be suspended from work for 30 days for the first

offense and six months for the second offense. A third of-

fense would result in deregistration. Although not au-

thorized by either the basic collective bargaining agreement

or any local rule, petitioners were told that if a monthly

pro rata payment was late, there wouk! be a fine of $1.00

for each day of delinquency which was to be paid to the

union.

Four years later, on June 17, 1963, the ILWU and PMA

adopted standards to determine the promotion of the B men

to Class A. These promotion standards provided that only

those B men would be promoted who had not made 6 late pro

rata payments, had not been found guilty of intoxication on

any occasion and had not been guilty of a single low man out

5

violation. The discharge penalty was imposed for acts or

infractions that had occurred years earlier and for which

the penalties then in effect had already been paid. The pen-

alties on a graduated scale in effect during the preceding

four years of employment were disregarded. Those B men

who met the standards were advanced to Class A. The

others, including petitioners, were deregistered from the B

list. In effect, the standards for promotion became the

criteria for determining good standing. This new criteria

was applied to past conduct and petitioners were not pro-

vided an opportunity to meet that criteria to retain their

jobs.

These promotion standards were never again used to

determine who would be discharged. Immediately after pe-

titioners were deregistered, an entirely new group of 701

B men were registered. They were not required to meet the

standards used to deregister petitioners.

The nature of this dispute is best illustrated by these

typical examples of the circumstances under which peti-

tioners were deregistered.

Pro Rata.

Petitioner Ulysses Hawkins worked for four years as a

longshoreman and did not violate a single rule adopted by

the Port Committee. Mr. Hawkins made the mistake of

listening to and relying upon ILWU officials who told him

that the only penalty for making his pro rata payments

late would be a $1.00 per day fine. In fact, the Port Com-

mittee had neither fixed the amount of pro rata nor the

penalty for its late payment and had not delegated that

authority to Local 10. Mr. Hawkins paid late nine times in

four years.’ He paid his fines to Local 10. Local 10 retained

the fines and, for 4 years made no complaint to the Port

Jommittee about his late payments. He was paid up and

1Ex. A (Ex. F, 4th page).

6

current with his pro rata shares and delinquency payments

in June 1963, when he was deregistered.

Intoxication.

On September 6, 1960, petitioner Ellis E. Graves was

found guilty by the Port Committee of being intoxicated

while on the job. The incident when the intoxication occur-

red was on July 22, 1960.* “n conformance with the rules

and penalties in existence at that time, he was suspended

from work for 30 days, commencing September 6, 1960.

Following his suspension, he returned to work and con-

tinued to remain working as a Class B longshoreman with

the knowledge, consent, agreement and permission of re-

spondents until June 17, 1963 when he was deregistered.

Thus his deregistration occurred almost three years after

the alleged intoxication incident and approximately two

and three quarter years after his suspension had been

completed. Up to and including June 17, 1963, the dereg-

istration date, no official of the ILWU or PMA had in-

formed Mr. Graves that he might lose his job because of

a single intoxication incident which occurred almost three

years earlier. In fact, in 1960, when he was convicted, the

Port Committee warned him that if he was found guilty

again he would be deregistered “in accordance with the

Class ‘B’ rules”.* He adhered to the warning and was never

again involved with intoxication and engaged in no serious

infractions of the rules which would have been grounds

for deregistration. He devoted almost three additional

years of his working life to the industry, believing he had

already paid his penalty, the only penalty in effect and

about which he had been told at the time of registration in

1959, when he was provided with copies of the intoxication

rule.*

"Ex. HC-4, p. 10.

‘Ex. HC-4, p. 10.

*Ex. N. reproduced in Appendix F, A-88.

“J

Low-Man-Out.

Petitioner Antonio Cafeterio worked four years as a

longshoreman and except for a single incident in those

four years, would have been advanced to Class A status.

On August 12, 1962, a Sunday, his registration number

was called by the dispatcher. Because of a rule of the dis-

patchers, B men were not required to be available for

dispatch on Sundays and were not required to penalize

themselves by adding hours to their accumulated time if

their registration number was called and they missed a dis-

patch.® This would have been the usual procedure under the

LMO rules.*® Mr. Cafeterio relied upon this “Sunday rule”.

On Sunday, August 12, 1962, he did not come to the dispatch

hall. His number was called; he was not there to take a dis-

patch, and he did not add any hours to his time when he

went to work the following day, Monday, August 13, 1962.

In 1963 the ILWU and PMA record checkers did not

give any recognition to the Sunday rule in Mr. Cafeterio’s

ease. They charged him with a missing a single dispatch

and claimed he violated the rules by 12 hours because of

his failure to penalize himself by adding hours to his

accumulated time. Assuming Mr. Cafeterio was mistaken

in his reliance on the dispatcher’s deviations from the

written LMO rules, he would have been penalized by a

30 day suspension for the first offence under the LMO

rules in existence in August 1962 when this incident oc-

curred. Under the LMO rules as they existed on the single

day of his infraction, he would have had an opportunity

to protect his job by avoiding a second and third viola-

tion. He did not have a single violation of any other work

rule on his record during his entire four years of employ-

ment. He did not violate the low man out rules by a single

hour on any day in four years on the waterfront other

°Ex. R. 773.

“Ex. N, Rule 10, A-87.

?-*,

8

than the day when he was charged with missing a dispatch.

He did not pay his pro rata late on a single occasion and

was never called before the Port Committee for an em-

ployer complaint. He was deregistered on June 17, 1963

for his first and only infraction on the job in four years.

Following their deregistrations, petitioners applied for

and obtained unemployment compensation, despite the

opposition of PMA. After extensive hearings before the

California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, the

referee concluded that it was “inherently impossible to

believe” that petitioners “could logically have been ex-

pected to anticipate that their acts would result in the loss

of their employment”.’

The membership of Local 10, too, concluded that the

deregistration penalty could not possibly have conformed

with the collective bargaining agreement. Less than three

weeks after the deregistrations, the membership of Local

10, upon recommendation of its President, adopted mo-

tions to instruct the union side of the Port Committee to

promote the B men who were deregistered for pro rata

and LMO violations to Class A registration and to simply

give the LMO violators “30 days off as per contract’”.’

There was no recommendation about a penalty for late pro

rata payments because the membership realized none was

provided in the contract. The employers’ side of the Port

Committee refused to go along with these recommendations,

the disagreement was taken to the next level of the griev-

ance procedure and was abandoned by those officials of

Local 10 who were instrumental in deregistering petition-

ers in the first place.’

"Ex. 7, p. 13. The referee’s opinion is reproduced in Appendix I

to this petition and the quoted observation appears at A-117.

8Ex. 15.

°Ex, 341.

9

The Details

A. Petitioners’ Employment and the Collective Bargain-

ing Agreement.

When petitioners began their employment with Pacific

Maritime Association in June and August 1959, as Class

“B” or limited registered longshoremen,” they were among

the 750 men selected out of some 9,000 who sought reg-

istration. Although neither the basic collective bargaining

contract document, the “Pacific Coast Longshore Agree-

ment” (“PCLA”) nor any of the work rules adopted by re-

spondents make any reference to union membership among

members of the bargaining unit, by custom and practice in

the Port of San Francisco, only Class A longshoremen

were and are eligible for membership in Local 10. The

terms “union membership” and “A registration” have been

and are used interchangeably in this Port.”

Petitioners, ineligible for membership in the union, had

no voice in the collective bargaining process throughout

their four years of employment. They could not vote

for or against any candidates for union office in Local

10 or the International; they could not participate in

the selection of the members of the various joint ILWU-

PMA committees or arbitrators, and thus were denied

Finding No. 1, R. 1491, A-29.

“Tr, 2218:22-2219:3 (i., Trial transcript, page 2218, line 22

through page 2219, line 3), 2226:9-14. “In order to be a longshore-

man, a member of Local 10, you must be an ‘A’ member, a regis-

tered A man.” Tr. 2224:12-13, Testimony of Odel Franklin, a union

member of more than 30 years and holder of many union offices.

Some locals of the ILWU permit B men to become union members.

However, Local 10 in San Francisco has never permitted B men

to become members and the International Union has done nothing

about this situation. Tr. 5586:19-5588:1. It is a discriminatory prac-

tice to give priority in dispatching to union members over non-union

workers. Pacific Maritime Association v. N.L.R.B., 452 F.2d 8 (9th

Cir. 1971). Hence, the necessity to classify longshoremen on a basis

other than union membership.

10

meaningful participation in both the collective bargaining

process and the contractual grievance procedure. They

could not vote to approve or reject, directly or indirectly,

the adoption of the various local work rules. Since they

were not members of the union, petitioners were not eligible

for the “bill of rights” of the Labor-Management Report-

ing and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §114(a).

B. The 1959 Working Rules.

In the course of longshore employment, working rules

adopted by the Port Committee are distributed to all

longshoremen. Printed rules are distributed in the dis-

patching hall, notices are published in Local 10 Bulletins

and meetings are conducted by ILWU officials. When

petitioners were registered in 1959, a B men meeting was

held July 10, 1959. This was an orientation meeting to

inform the 750 new.f¥ registered B men about the rules and

procedures applicable to their employment. At this meeting,

various documents were distributed to the B men explain-

ing the significant working rules involved in this litigation

and setting forth the applicable penalties for their

infractions :”

i. Intoxication.

The written rules provided that if a B man was found

guilty of being intoxicated on the job, the penalty for

the first offense was 30 days suspension and the penalty

for the second offense was mandatory deregistration.”

The penalties for B men for drunkenness were more strin-

gent than those applicable to A men. For the latter, the

first offense was punishable with a 15 day suspension,

the second offense with a 30 day suspension and succeed-

“Ex, N. A copy of this key exhibit is reprinted in Appendix F,

A-83.

187d., A-88.

11

ing offenses with a minimum 60 day suspension and the

maximum being discretionary.

ii. Pro Rata.

The B men were told by officials of both ! cal 10

and the International that they were required to make

a pro rata payment of $6.00 per month to Local 10 for

their share of the cost of operating the dispatching hall.

Payment was due on the last day of the month and a

$1.00 fine was assessed for each day of delinquency. The

B men were never informed, either orally or in writing,

by any official of the union, PMA or the Port Committee,

that they could be deregistered or otherwise penalized

for late payment of pro rata, other than the $1.00 delin-

quency fine.’* The only penalty that applied to B men

for the late payment of pro rata throughout the entire

period of their employment was the $1.00 a day fine."

Pro rata payments and penalties were paid directly

to Local 10. The payments and penalties were identical in

amount to the union dues paid by members of Local 10,"

The relevant provision of the collective barganing agree-

ment relating to pro rata is as follows:

“§ 8,12

“Any longshoreman who is not a member of the

Union shall be permitted to use the dispatching hall

only if he pays his pro rata share of the expenses

related to the dispatching hall, the Labor Relations

Committee, ete. The amount of these payments and

the manner of paying them shall be fixed by the

Joint Port Labor Relations Committees.” (emphasis

added)

“Ex, 1, §§ 17.823, 17.8231, 17.8232, 17.8233, p. 60.

R, 676:14-32; Tr. 3031: 14-3033:5.

“Tr, 2277:11-19 (testimony of Odel Franklin, official of Local

10).

“Tr, 2213;22-2214:9 (testimony of Odel Franklin).

12

Throughout the entire period of petitioners’ employ-

ment, the Port Committee in San Francisco did not fix the

amount of pro rata payments, the manner of paying them

or the penalty for late payment. It did not authorize pay-

ment to be made directly to Local 10. Local 10 did not

account to either PMA or the Port Committee for the assess-

ments or penalties. The Port Committee never collected

any of the pro rata payments from the B men. There was

no Port Committee rule, formal or informal, with regard

to pro rata.”*

Within a few weeks of commencement of the trial in

1974, the staff of PMA searched the Port Committee

minutes and could not locate any notation setting the

amount of pro rata or any reference to the manner of

making payments, to whom the payments should be made,

and with what frequency they should be made.” There was

no limit on the number of times a B man could pay his pro

rata late throughout petitioners’ employment.” Not only

was there a lack of any rule authorizing or directing the

payment of pro rata to the union, but there was no provi-

sion in the collective bargaining agreement itself author-

izing or directing such payment.” The collective bargaining

agreement does not provide for fines or penalties for late

payment.” There is no evidence in the record that Local

10 ever officially adopted a motion or rule fixing the

amount of pro rata to be paid by B men or the penalty

for late payment.

Tr, 553:9-554:12, 554:21-25, 555:9-556:1 (testimony of Ralph

R. Holtgrave, senior PMA official in San Francisco during the

period of plaintiffs’ registration); Tr. 1073:23-1074:2, 1079:14-23,

1080:11-17 (testimony of John Trupp, an official of PMA).

Tr, 1074:3-1075:18.

*°Tr, 1081:18-1082.3.

*1Tr, 563: 17-564: 1.

Tr, 565:2-6.

13

Petitioners’ testimony that they received no notice or

warning that late payment of pro rata could result in

their deregistration was also corroborated by W. L.

Brown, a PMA official who was in charge of coordinating

the opposition of PMA to petitioners’ claims for unemploy-

ment compensation. The notes of the California Unemploy-

ment Insurance Appeals Board interviewer who spoke to

Mr. Brown about a petitioner deregistered for late pro

rata payments show:

“Misconduct eligibility—Mr. W. L. Brown stated in

telephone conversation that to his [i.e., Mr. Brown’s]

knowledge claimant never received any written notice

of the rule, nor was he ever warned that he could be

deregistered if he did not make timely payments.

Claimant paid his pro rata share of expenses. He

admits they were not always timely, but he paid fees

for untimeliness. In the absence of written notice or

warning it can not be shown that the claimant was

discharged for misconduct. The facts do not show

wilful or wanton disregard of the employer’s best

interest on part of claimant.’ (emphasis added).

The practice followed by respondents during petitioners’

employment in dealing with pro rata delinquencies by the

acceptance of late payments along with delinquency fines

without other consequences was entirely consistent with

the practice followed by Local 10 in processing dues

delinquents among its membership. The record contains

documented evidence of Class A longshoremen who were

delinquent as much as $1,100.00 in their union dues and

allowed to remain working.*

The effect of retroactively applying the new pro rata

penalty was that petitioners were prohibited from obtain-

*2Ex. 10-6, p. 21, lines 7-13.

24R, 1050-1053.

|

|

14

ing other full time employment as a condition of remain-

ing registered as B men for four years, were led to believe

that they were in full compliance with the applicable rules

(as they were), were discouraged from leaving the industry

to find new employment at the peak of their working lives,

only to be suddenly notified that they had violated a non-

existing rule a few years earlier which caused their deregis-

trations in June 1963, At that time, many of the petitioners

who were terminated because of their late payment of pro

rata, all of whom had paid their fines to Local 10, had not

been delinquent for as long as two and a half years prior to

their deregistrations.”

iii. Low-Man-Out.

The low man out system of dispatch under the PCLA

provides that longshoremen with the fewest number of

hours of employment in a given pay period are dispatched

to work ahead of those men who have worked a greater

number of hours. It is a means used to equalize work op-

portunity among longshoremen.” The dispatching proce-

dure was essentially as follows: each longshoreman signed

his work number or registration number and the accumu-

lated hours he had worked in a calendar quarter on a “sign-

in sheet”,”” the dispatchers transposed the information from

the numerous sign-in sheets to a “master dispatch sheet’

on the master dispatch sheets prepared each day (except

for Sunday and Monday when the same sheet was vsed),

the dispatchers placed longshoremen’s registration numbers

in groups opposite the accumulated hours’ figure represent-

*5Exs. 23, 24, 26, 30, 34, 36, 38, 39, FU-1, FU-2.

268.42. Dispatching of men and gangs shall be under the

principal of low-man low-gang, first-to-be-dispatched, except where

local dispatching rules provide otherwise for dispatching of special

skilled men and gangs. Ex. 1, p. 35.

27Ex. 432.

*®Exs, MD-1 through MD-77.

15

ing the total hours worked by each man in that group;

those men with the fewest hours of work were dispatched

ahead of those men who had a greater number of hours.

This was an honor system and if a longshoreman signed in

with fewer hours than he had actually worked, he would

gain an advantage over other men by obtaining an earlier

dispatch to a job. This was referred to as “signing in low”,

“dropping hours” and “chiseling.” If a man missed a, dis-

patch because he was not in the hall when his number was

called, this was called a “flop”, and he was required to

penalize himself by adding a certain number of hours to

his accumulated time.

The low-man-out rules bearing the date of May 27, 1959,

were distributed to the B men at the orientation meeting

conducted by officials of the union on July 10, 1959." With

respect to penalties, the LMO rules provided in pertinent

part:

‘Checks’ will be made each week and violators will

receive the following penalties:

First offense 30 days off

Second offense 6 months off

Third offense Cancellation of registration

* e e

These are the only and official rules on the low-

man-out system as revised by the Labor Relations

Committee up to December 30, 1958. If new rules or

changes are needed, they will be issued by the

Committee.

THERE ARE NO OTHER RULES” (emphasis

from original.)

The LMO rules were originally promulgated by the Port

Committee in 1951. (The panel erroneously believed the

Ex, N, 3d document, A-90.

*°Td., p. 3, A-95.

16

LMO system had been in effect since 1934. 617 F.2d at 1324,

A-3.) Except for minor changes and some clarifications,

they remained essentially unchanged in June, 1959. There

were no changes in the three-step penalties from 1951

through 1959." A “violation” was defined as chiseling

or dropping ten or more hours at the time a violation was

uncovered, even if the total number of hours was much

larger.”

The sudden change in LMO penalties for B men in 1963

was a complete departure from the existing LMO rules

and the past practices in administering those rules.

The three step penalty provisions were in existence

since the birth of the LMO dispatching system in 1951

and throughout petitioners’ four years of employment.

Without advance notice that the LMO penalties were to be

changed, the first violation was suddenly made sufficient

cause for cancellation of registration, The new penalty

was not applied prospectively to future conduct, but retro-

actively to conduct which had already occurred when the

penalty for the first violation was simply a thirty day sus-

pension from work. A PMA official testified that the Port

Committee merely changed the penalty for the first LMO

offense to deregistration from the 30 day suspension.”

The low man out system of dispatch is a complicated

one, as an examination of the LMO rules makes evident.

Although instituted in 1951, dispatchers during the period

of petitioners’ employment in 1959-63 were always asked

questions by longshoremen about the dispatching rules.

One dispatcher testified:

“ .. . Dispatchers were always asked questions by

longshoremen about the dispatching rules. Dispatchers

always got questions like ‘I flopped. Do I take six or

"Tr, 1047:4-25 (testimony of John Trupp, a PMA official).

“Tr, 1048:1-16.

“Tr. 1153:15-1154:6,

17

do I take the average?’ A lot of guys don’t know. We

got questions like that all the time.’”™

According to the union record checkers, arithmetical

errors were very common on the waterfront since the

institution of the LMO systera, not only among the B men,

but also among the A men.” John Trupp, an official of

PMA, corroborated the testimony of the union record

checkers :

“Down through the years, working with longshore-

men, and especially with the low-man-out rules, I’ve

met quite a large number of A men, who did not—

who did not understand the rules.”

The union record checkers recognized that men sometimes

drop an hour or two one day and then add the hours the

next day. This was treated as a mistake. Their guiding

principle was not to punish men for mistakes, but as stated

by one union official, “. . . to catch chiselers. We looked

for a pattern of chiseling.””

Harry Bridges, International President of the ILWU,

recognizéd the industry practice of allowing longshoremen

leeway in adhering to these rules. He testified that the

first time a man was caught violating the LMO rules, he

was not even given the 30 day penalty but was simply

given a warning. The purpose of the warning was to give

the man an opportunity to change his conduct so that he

could save his job and be a good union person.”

The uncontradicted and unqualified testimony of the

dispatchers, union record checkers, PMA official John

*R. 955:5-8.

“Tr, 4468:21-4869: 12.

“Tr, 1787:21-24.

*'Tr, 4871: 20-4872:25.

“Tr. 5568: 14-5569: 20.

18

Trupp and I.L.W.U. International President Harry Bridges

stands in sharp contrast to the ad hominem comment of

the Court of Appeals that “an individual caught more than

once chiseling on an honor system does not present a con-

vincing portrait of one who will improve the work force.

This is particularly true where, as here, there was little

apparent chiseling in the entire group of Class B workers.”

617 F.2d at 1321, A-23. Unfortunately, the panel was ap-

parently more influenced by the makeweight arguments of

respondents than the realities of the workplace. If the

panel was correct, respondents’ officials were wrong. The

B men were given only a random record check of a single

30 day period in four years for LMO violations to deter-

mine who would be promoted and who would lose their

jobs. This hardly establishes that the remaining B men

were without blemishes over a four year period of

employment.

There was never a longshoremen, before or after 1963,

either Class A or Class B, who was deregistered for vio-

lating the LMO rules for the first violation in the amount

of 10 hours or more except for the B men who were dereg-

istered in June of 1963."

C. Petitioners’ Deregistrations in 1963.

In the Spring of 1963, respondents decided to promote

some B men to Class A and to deregister the others. The

standards appear only in summary form in the record and

provide, in pertinent part, that any Class B longshoreman

would be ineligible for advancement to Class A if he had

10 or more hours of low-man-out violations, had paid his

pro rata late eight or more times or six or more times

with an otherwise blemished record, or who had been the

subject of one employer complaint for intoxication.”

Tr, 1154:22-155:1.

*°617 F.2d at 1324, A-4, Ex. 408, reprinted in Appendix H.

19

On June 17, 1963, the Port Committee notified 448 Class

B longshoremen that they had been advanced to Class A

and notified 78 Class B longshoremen that they had been

deregistered.** The petitioners were among the deregis-

tered longshoremen who were deregistered for failure to

meet one or more of the standards.

Once the 1963 promotion standards were adopted, they

were applied to conduct which had already occurred and

a PMA official testified that there was nothing further that

the men could do to protect their jobs.** The conduct made

grounds for deregistration in 1963 was not grounds for

deregistration when the infractions occurred, but were

merely subject to nominal fines or short suspensions from

work. In the case of pro rata and intoxication, the fines

had already been paid and the suspensions imposed and

completed. All petitioners were in good standing as of

June 17, 1963. 617 F.2d at 1324, A-5.

The decision of the Port Committee on the merits of

petitioners’ violations of the standards was final under

the collective bargaining agreement in absence of disagree-

ment between the ILWU and PMA.“ After their dereg-

istration, petitioners were no longer eligible for longshore

employment.

Less than three weeks after petitioners were deregis-

tered by the Port Committee, the membership of Local

10 recognized that petitioners were not guilty of any

conduct warranting deregistration under the collective

bargaining agreement. The membership adopted two res-

olutions which were proposed by its President and adopted

overwhelmingly :

“1Ex, 11, Finding No. 81, R. 1514-15, A-53.

“Tr, 723:16-724:1.

*8Tr, 724:2-726:4.

“Tr, 757:16-24, 759:5-9; 617 F.2d at 1328, A-12.

20

President James Kearney made the following recom-

mendation which was overwhelmingly adopted as a

motion and instructions to the Union Side of the Lo-

cal Lahor Relations Committee: An additional motion

also carried:

M/S/C That all “B” Men Who Are on Appeal and

Who Have Not Been Promoted Solely Because of

Low-Man-Out Violations Shall Be Given 30 Days

Off As Per Contract and Promoted to “A” Reg-

istration.

M/S/C That the Labor Relations Committee Be In-

structed That All “B” Men Who Are on Appeal and

Have Not Been Promoted Solely Because of Pro-

Rata Violations Shall Be Re-Registered and Moved

to “A” Registration.”

Local 10 submitted its motions to the Port Committee,

where PMA took them under advisement. The Port Com-

mittee reconvened three days later with PMA’s attor-

ney present. When PMA disagreed with the Union’s mo-

tions, the disagreement was referred to the next step in

the contractual grievance procedure, the Area Labor Re-

lations Committee.“ With new officials acting in behalf of

the Union, the Union representatives disregarded the in-

structions of Local 10’s membership to treat petitioners

under the terms of the contract as it existed during peti-

tioners’ entire period of employment. Instead, they agreed

with PMA to allow the Port Committee to simply deter-

mine if petitioners had violated the 1963 promotional stan-

dards during the preceding four years.“

“Fx. 15.

“Ex. 261, pp. 13-14.

"Ex, 341.

21

In late 1963, many of the petitioners who were deregis-

tered for late payment of pro rata and LMO violations

applied for unemployment compensation. PMA filed objec-

tions and extensive hearings were held before a referee

of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.

After twenty-seven sessions of contested hearings,“ peti-

tioners obtained their unemployment insurance. Upon

review of the testimony of petitioners, PMA officials and

ILWU officials, when the facts were fresh in the recol-

lections of all parties, the referee wrote an opinion which

is reproduced in Appendix I to this petition. In pertinent

part, the referee concluded:

After analyzing all of the facts, it is inherently im-

possible to believe that the claimants [petitioners

before this Court] herein could logically have been

expected to anticipate that their acts would result

in the loss of their employment. In brief, the claim-

ants did not embark on a course of action which they

knew or should have known would result in the loss

of their employment. As a matter of fact, over the

years, a pattern of behavior was established which

was condoned and allowed by the employer, the union

and the joint Port Labor Relations Committee. This

pattern was such that violations were handled ac-

cording to the rules and provisions of the contract

and memorandums [sic] and each man continued as

a limited registration longshoreman.“

The promotional standards and penalties applied against

petitioners in June of 1963 were never again used as a

means for deregistering a Class B longshoreman. A new

group of 701 B men were registered by the Port Com-

mittee on October 4, 1963. For the very first time, the

Port Committee adopted a pro rata rule providing that

**The transcripts of these hearings are in the record as Exs. 10-3

through 10-24.

“Ex. 7, pp. 13-14, A-117-118.

°F x, 276.

22

each B man pay $8.00 monthly to the Port Committee

and that collection would be by payroll deduction." The

two step intoxication rule was readopted.” The LMO

rules were changed so that a B man would not be de-

registered unless he had erred in at least 16 hours within

a 30 day period.”

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Petitioners filed suit in the District Court against their

certified collective bargaining representative, the Interna-

tional Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union and its

San Francisco constituent local, Local 10, and their em-

ployer, Pacific Maritime Association to regain their jobs.

They prayed for promotion to Class A and/or reinstate-

ment in Class B, along with their resulting damages. Juris-

diction was invoked under Section 301(a) of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 and 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331(a) and 1337(a). They alleged the union breached

its duty to provide fair representation by agreeing to the

retroactive application of the discharge penalty, that the

employers joined in and collaborated with the union in

the breach of its duty, and that the deregistrations were

in conflict with the terms of the collective bargaining

agreement.”

51x, 275.

52F x, 274, p. 2.

58Tr, 1193:11-1195:15.

“The District Court originally granted summary judgment be-

cause, inter alia, it considered that the National Labor Relations

Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The Court of

Appeals reversed and ordered a trial. Williams v. Pacific Maritime

Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987.

Thereafter, the District Court dismissed individual union officials

who had been named as defendants and petitioners’ claims for

punitive and exemplary damages. This latter order was affirmed.

Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 421 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1970).

23

After a six month trial of the first phase of a bifur-

cated trial on the issue of liability only and the submission

of a 293 page stipulation of uniform testimony,” the Dis-

trict Court xeroxed and signed respondents’ proposed find-

ings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment

in their favor. The xeroxed findings and conclusions de-

termined that petitioners failed to exhaust internal con-

tractual remedies and that their deregistrations were not

the result of the union’s breach of its duty to provide fair

representation or breach of the collective bargaining agree-

ment.

The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court’s con-

clusion that petitioners were barred from pursuing their

claims because of their purported failure to exhaust inter-

nal contractural remedies. 617 F.2d at 1327-30, A-11-16. On

the merits, the panel considered petitioners’ four years of

full time employment to be a “trial period”. It found that:

there was no breach of the duty to provide fair represen-

tation or breach of the collective bargaining agreement

because petitioners knew tit they were to obey “all the

rules”; respondents had the authority to deregister Class

B longshoremen for “any other cause” which could be

defined in any way or manner decided by responden‘s at

the time of their choosing; petitioners agreed, as a con-

dition of obtaining a job when they signed their employ-

ment applications, that their registrations “may be revoked

in accordance with such agreements and such rules in

effect were hereafter to be agreed upon or adopted” by

respondents; and that the validity of the pro rata promo-

tion standard was established by the National Labor

Relations Board in a proceeding 14 years earlier involving

other devegistered B men. 617 F.2d at 1330-34, A-16-24.

The Ninth Cireuit essentially concluded that petitioners

agreed, as a condition of employment, to allow respondents

*®R. 670.

24

to remove them from their jobs at any time for any reason.

In reaching this conclusion, the panel failed to take any no-

tice of the past collective bargaining practices of the

industry during the previous 30 years and decided that

the applicable penalties for infractions of the working

rules in existence for four years of petitioners’ employ-

ment were of no consequence.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit departed from

the teachings of this Court and created needless conflicts

with the decisions of other circuits. The panel failed to

recognize that the unfair representation opinions of this

Court turn on the concept of industrial due process. Put

another way, they involve simple fairness. In situations

where certain conduct has been tolerated in the past, any

possible definition of fairness requires that a change of

policy not be imposed until after the employer gives notice

that future violations will not be tolerated. See Summers,

The Individual Employee’s Rights Under the Collective

Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126

U.Pa.L. Rev. 251, 273 (1977). The Court of Appeals dis-

regarded this fundamental principle.

The Ninth Circuit also overlooked the distinction be-

tween petitioners’ separate claims for promotion to Class A

and alternatively for reinstatement in Class B. Their claim

that it was unfair to apply a promotion standard as a dis-

charge standard was almost totally overlooked. The panel

apparently saw nothing wrong with an automatic over-

night change in status from four years of good standing

to a dischargeable status.

The “common law of the shop” in the Pacific Coast mari-

time industry has long provided for giving a longshore-

man a second chance when he violates a rule of the job.

The graduated penalties adopted by respondents recog-

nized this tradition. The Court of Appeals did not accord

al

25

any respect to this tradition as it completely abrogated

its duty to make an independent examination of the record.

I. The Court of Appeals Disregarded the Teachings of

this Court and Needlessly Contributed to the Existing

Conflicts Among the Circuits in Fair Representation

Cases.

In Steele v. Louiseville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,

202 (1944), this Court held that a labor organization

“chosen to represent a craft, is to represent all its members,

the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and

not against those whom it represents”. The opinion went

on to compare the duty imposed upon the statutory collec-

tive bargaining representative to equally protect the inter-

ests of members of the craft with the duty imposed by the

Constitution upon the legislature to provide equal protec-

tion to the interests for whom it legislates. Ibid. In Vaca v.

Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967), the Court further defined

the duty, by then extended beyond the overt form of racial

discrimination involved in Steele, as barring “arbitrary

conduct” in the collective bargaining process and in the

enforcement of the resulting contract. From its initial

recognition, “the duty of fair representation has stood as a

bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against indi-

viduals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the

provisions of federal labor law.” /d., 386 U.S. at 177. The

policy enunciated in Steele and Vaca was repeated and

reaffirmed most recently in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,

Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976) and Electricians v. Foust,

442 U.S. 42, 46-47 (1979).

The courts of appeals have generally adhered to the

“arbitrary” standard in unfair representation cases, Griffin

v. International U., United Automobile, etc., 469 F.2d 181,

183 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Jones v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 495

F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974); Ruzicka v. General Motors

Corporation, 523 F.2d 306, 309-10 (6th Cir. 1975), rehear-

26

ing denied, 528 F.2d 912 (1975); Retana v. Apartment,

Motel, Hotel and El. Op. U. Loc. No. 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023

(9th Cir. 1972). The Third Circuit continues to interpret

the rule of Vaca as requiring that the union act with a bad

faith motive. Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957,

961 (3d Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit also demands a

showing of intentional, invidious conduct, and holds that

“The plaintiff must show that the union’s conduct was

intentional, invidious, and directed at that particular em-

ployee.” Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524

F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1975); Melendy v. United States

Postal Service, 589 F.2d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1978).

The Eighth Circuit made an effort to provide further

guidance on the standard of fair representation under

Vaca, and considers “arbitrary and capricious” to mean

“an act done withovt principle or an act not done according

to reason and judgment” and requiring judgment “on the

basis of whether the act complained of is reasonable or

unreasonable under the circumstances.” Foust v. Inter-

national Broth. of the Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 714

(10th Cir. 1978), rev’d in part on other grounds, 442 U.S.

42 (1979). It also holds that where the union makes no

effort to evaluate individual capabilities of members of the

bargaining unit, there could be a violation of the union’s

duty to provide fair representation. Petersen v. Rath Pack-

ing Company, 461 F.2d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 1972).

The crucial element in petitioners’ breach of duty claim

is that they were not told the specific penalties to be ap-

plied in case of infractions of the rules and certainly would

not have accepted their employment if they knew they

were required to maintain a perfect record in order to keep

their jobs. The Ninth Circuit apparently saw nothing

wrong with such a requirement. Surprisingly, in a case de-

cided prior to the case at bench, another panel of the Ninth

Circuit determined that a breach of duty occurred when

the union failed to explain the rights and duties under

27

the contract to members of the bargaining unit, even

though the complained of action did not involve breach of

a specific provision of the collective bargaining agreement.

Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel and El. Op. U. Loc. No.

14, supra, 453 F.2d at 1023. The Third Circuit, in a

case strikingly similar to the case at bench, held that the

union breached its duty where it failed to advise the plain-

tiff of the exact penalty which could be imposed for not

paying an increase of $9.75 in his union dues over a period

of three months, so that he could act to prevent these oc-

currences in the future and to take all necessary steps to

protect his job. Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401

F.2d 87, 99 (3d Cir. 1968) cert. denied sub nom. Interna-

tional Ass’n of Machinists v. Brady, 393 U.S. 1048.

While purporting to apply the “bad faith or arbitrari-

ness” standard (617 F.2d at 1330, A-17), the panel

actually departed from it. The panel did not point to any

explicit evidence that petitioners were told they could lose

their jobs for the first LMO or intoxication offense, either

at the time the incidents occurred or at any time thereafter.

It was equally unable to find any evidence that any peti-

tioner, or any one else on the waterfront among labor

or management, considered late payment of pro rata to

be a discharge offense. There is no dispute about the au-

thority of the union and employer to establish criteria to

determine eligibility for promotion. Even if the 1963 pro-

motion standards were fair and reasonable for that pur-

pose, they would not be a fair and reasonable basis for

discharging those employees who were not promoted.

Discharge “for cause” means for commission of acts to

the extent that they bear a prescribed discharge penalty.

No such prescribed penalty appears anywhere in the rec-

ord of this case until June 17, 1963.

The panel’s decision is in direct conflict with the prin-

ciples of fairness underlying the fair representation de-

cisions of the Court as well as the application of that

28

principle in the Third Circuit case of Brady v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc. and the Ninth Circuit’s own decision in

Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel and El. Op. U. Loc.

No. 14.

The Ninth Circuit held in the instant case that the con-

tract could be amended and adversely affect the rights of

petitioners. This precise conclusion was the view of the

concurring opinion in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,

353-55 (1964) but was rejected by the majority of the

Court. The Ninth Circuit also placed itself in conflict with

the Third Circuit when it held that petitioners’ rights under

the collective bargaining agreement could be modified by

creating dischargeable offenses where none existed previ-

ously. In Price v. International Bro. of Teamsters, 457

F.2d 605, 610 (3d Cir. 1972), the Court interpreted the

congressional policy of our labor laws to have the “implicit

assumption” that “absent appropriate amendment of the

labor contract, there could be no changes in the agreement

that would abrogate rights contained in it. While modifica-

tion could add to or explain provisions, it could not take

away any rights already there.” Although in conflict with

the majority opinion in Humphrey v. Moore and the Third

Cireuit view, the opinion of the Ninth Circuit appears to

conform with that of the Fourth Circuit where it was held

that the union and employer may modify an agreement

and thereby effect vested rights. Ekas v. Carling Nat.

Breweries, Inc., 602 F.2d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.

dented, ...... USS. ......, 100 S.Ct. 669.

Fundamental fairness requires that employees be al-

lowed to rely on existing working rules until changed.

Only prospective application of new penalties would be

compatible with any concept of industrial due process.

The rights involved arise from federal law and must be

applied uniformly. The authority of unions and employers

to adversely affect these rights in the course of collective

bargaining should be clarified by this Court.

29

II. The Union and Employer Cannot Condition Employ-

ment Upon a Waiver of the Statutory Right to Fair

Representation And The Right To Demand CompLance

With the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

In support of its recognition of the unlimited authority

of a bargaining representative to assist in terminating

workers at their whim for “any other cause”, the Court

of Appeals could locate two sources in the mammoth record

of this case. The first was Section 9(a)(xi) of the docu-

ment adopted by respondents entitled the “1958 Memoran-

dum of Rules Governing Registration and Deregistration

of Longshoremen in the Port of San Francisco.” This latter

document provided that a Class B longshoreman may be

deregistered “for cause” by the Port Committee “in ac-

cordance with such rules or uniform procedures as may be

established or followed by the Committee if the Committee

finds ... any other cause”. The second was a section in the

employment application signed by petitioners in 1959,

where each applicant acknowledged that Class B registra-

tion would “be subject to agreements between the PMA

and ILWU ... and to rules with respect to registration

and deregistration established by said party; I understand

that . . . registration may be revoked im accordance with

such agreements and such rules now in effect or hereafter

to be agreed upon or adopted .. .” 617 F.2d at 1331-32,

A-19-20 (emphasis by the Court). It takes little imagina-

tion to see the potential for abuse inherent in these powers

respondents sought to delegate to themselves.

No one explained to any of the petitioners that by

signing the employment application and agreeing to their

deregistration for “any cause” or “any other cause”, they

would waive their rights to have the ILWU provide them

with fair representation, to demand that respondents com-

ply with the collective bargaining agreement, or any other

legal rights to which they were entitled.” The applications

SR, 676, 6-13, 685:21-31.

30

were mass-produced by the thousands and submitted to

petitioners on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. There is no ex-

plicit reference to changing the work rules and penalties

without prior notice, or to applying a discharge penalty

where none existed previously. Petitioners did not agree, in

advance, to surrender their jobs for the first infractions of

the LMO or intoxication rules or the nonexistent pro rata

rule.

This Court long ago held that individual contracts of

employment could not be construed as a “waiver of rights”

under a collective bargaining agreement. J. J. Case Co. v.

Labor Board, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944). At most, the

employment applications were contracts of adhesion which

are carefully scrutinized by the courts for the purpose of

avoiding provisions found to be unconscionable or the

result of over-reaching. 6A Corbin on Contracts, § 1376,

p. 21 (1962 ed.) The Court has recognized that contracts

contrary to public policy are invalid. Bisso v. Inland

Waterways Corporation, 349 U.S. 85, 90 (1955). Since the

waiver of statutory rights as a condition of. employment

would be contrary to national labor policy at a minimum

and ambiguous at most, any such waiver would have to be

construed against respondents and the interpretation

adopted by the Court of Appeals.

Only one other court appears to have dealt with a union

requirement that an employee maintain an absolutely clean

record. In Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, etc., 585 F.2d

210, 218 (7th Cir. 1978), the Court considered it to be a

breach of duty to provide fair representation where the

union required the plaintiff to sign a statement asking for

reinstatement on condition that there be “irretrievable

termination” of his employment if he made any error in

checking freight for a period of one year. This should be

contrasted with the finding of the District Court and

accepted by the Court of Appeals in the present case that

petitioners knew they were required to maintain “an

absolutely clean record” in order to retain their jobs.”

**Finding No. 34, R. 1500, A-39.

31

III. A Decision of The National Labor Relations Board

Cannot Preclude The Federal Courts From A Full

Examination Of Petitioners’ Claims.

The panel declined to consider the uncontradicted evi-

dence that the pro rata rule was nothing more than an

informal practice and that it was invoked in such a way

as to deregister a large number of B men for reasons

unauthorized by any contractual provision of the collective

bargaining agreement. Rather than resolving this crucial

issue on its substantive merits, i.e., did the application of

this promotional standard deprive petitioners of fair rep-

resentation and did it result in breach of the collective

bargaining agreement, the Court of Appeals simply re-

ferred to an earlier decision of the National Labor Rela-

tions Board which held that “. . . it is not irrational or

capricious to believe that one who is lax in meeting his

obligations to his fellows to share the costs of the dispatch-

ing hall may not develop into a conscientious and reliable

worker. Pacific Maritime Ass’n (Johnson Lee), 155 NLRB

1231, 1234 (1955).” 617 F.2d at 1333, A-23.

The federal courts are not and should not be precluded

from examining an issue resolved by the Board years ear-

lier when different legal principles and standard applied.

The Johnson Lee case involved five other Class B longshore-

men who were deregistered with petitioners. After the filing

of unfair labor practice charges, a complaint issued, findings

were made by a trial examiner and later reversed by the

Board. Review of the Board’s final order was not sought

in the Court of Appeals by the charging parties as autho-

rized vy § 10(f) of the Labor Management Relations Act,

29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Auto Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205,

210 (1965).

The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the NLRB decision poses

a grave risk of frustrating the basic purposes underlying

the fair representation doctrine. The Board’s decision was

not concerned with whether or not there was a breach of the

duty to provide fair representation, but simply with

whether or not there was an unfair labor practice with

32

respect to the pro rata standard. The Board did not con-

sider any claim of breach of contract. As stated by the

union attorhey during the course of proceedings before the

trial examiner, the sole issue was whether or not the pro

rata standard was in conflict with §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)

of the LMRA: :

“We are not here concerned with a general cause of

action that might or might not exist some place else.

The statutory scheme we are concerned with relates

to discrimination if tt exists for the purpose of en-

couraging or discouraging membership in a union or

participation in union activities.

This is so elementary, that the Trial Examiner is so

familiar with it, I don’t have to burden the point.”

(Emphasis added).

The standard applied by the Board was entirely different

from that invoked by the courts in fair representation cases.

The decision and order of the NLRB was concerned with

the “true purpose or real motivation” of the union. 155

NLRB at 1233. The Board referred to the pro rata stan-

dard as a “credit standard” and considered that “ a per-

son’s credit standing which reflects upon his character,

may well be reasonably related to his performance as

a responsible employee”. 7d. at 1234. Assuming that an

unfair labor practice is exactly the same type of unlawful

conduct as breach of the statutory duty to provide fair

representation, there has been a profound change in the

law subsequent to the Board’s decision. It is no longer

necessary to establish the “true purpose or real motiva-

tion” of the union. A complaining party need not estab-

lish that the conduct of the union was a pretext for an

improper motive. Vaca v. Sipes held that the standard

applied in fair representation cases is with whether or

not the union’s conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory or in

bad faith. 386 U.S. at 190.

88x, J, 29:7-17.

33

Consideration of a person’s “credit standing” was only

a legal argument and not a matter having a factual basis,

for any consideration of a B man’s “credit standing” was

unknown to Ralph R. Holtgrave, senior PMA official in San

Francisco at the time the promotion standards were

adopted in 1963.° Recognition of an employee’s “credit

standing” as a condition to maintaining employment would

be contrary to public policy. See Stewart v. Travelers

Corporation, 503 F.2d 108, 113, 114 (9th Cir. 1974).

Finally, even if the issues decided by the NLRB and

presented by petitioners in the case at bench were identical,

traditional rules of collateral estoppel would not apply.

The proceedings before the trial examiner extended over

a period of only three days while the case at bench had

a six months trial, a 293 page stipulation of uniform testi-

mony and approximately 1,000 exhibits. Petitioners were

not parties to the Board proceedings and did not partici-

pate in them. Their potential remedy before the Board

was uncertain in 1963 and they presented many issues in

court which were not presented to the Board. More impor-

tantly, there has been a change in the legal standard of

fair representation brought about by this Court’s decision

in Vaca v. Stipes. All of these factors militate against

applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Restatement

(Second) of Judgments, § 68.1 (Ten. Draft No. 1, 1973).

IV. The Findings Below Are The Result of Obvious and

Exceptional Error, Because The Court of Appeals

Failed to Make An Independent Review of the Record.

The panel’s opinion gives every indication that it failed

to make an independent review of the record which is

remarkably free of conflict. Perhaps the basic misunder-

standing of the record by the panel was its consideration

of petitioners as “provisional” or “probationary workers”.

617 F.2d at 1330, A-17. Petitioners were not temporary,

casual, provisional or probationary workers of any kind.

‘*°Ty, 569:9-73:1.

34

None of the joint ILWU-PMA committees considered them

to be anything other than full time, registered longshore-

men, and there is no document which described them with

the labels fixed by the panel.

PMA officials would hardly agree with the Court of Ap-

peals. One PMA witness testified that Class B longshore-

men were considered full time employees.” They were

sometimes required to be available for work in the dis-

patching hall seven days a week. Respondents did not per-

mit B men to obtain other employment and they could not

moonlight while on the registration list.“ Four years of

employment under these conditions flies directly in the face

of any “probationary” or “provisional” characterization of

petitioners’ status.

The Court of Appeals went on to state its observation

that the “record establishes, moreover, that even before

the 1963 standards for admission to Class A status were

negotiated, the appellants [petitioners before this Court]

understood that the actions for which they ultimately were

deregistered constituted misconduct ... warnings to long-

shoremen not to engage in such misconduct abound in the

record”, 617 F.2d 1332, A-21. The Court was dead wrong

about the record. Petitioners were not deregistered for

“misconduct” but for failure to satisfy the explicit promo-

tion standards. There is no evidence in the record that

Class B longshoremen received any “warnings” that they

would lose their jobs for a single violation of the working

rules incorporated into the promotion standards. A senior

PMA official testified that in this case, to be deregistered,

a man had to be disqualified under one of these standards."

General misconduct, however defined elsewhere, was not

involved in the loss of petitioners’ jobs.

This Court has recognized that it may review findings of

fact under the “two court rule” if there is “a very obvious

Tr, 1836; 22-24.

“Ty, 1837:5-1838:1.

*Ty, 518: 12-17; 521:9-522:12.

35

and exceptional showing of error”. Graver Tank & Mfg.

Co. v. Linde Aire Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949);

Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630, 635 (1967).

Unlike the trial judge in the Graver Tank case, the district

judge in the case at bench did not write a “careful and

succinet opinion”. Despite this difference, the Court may,

and has, reviewed factual determinations where war-

ranted. U.S. v. Ceccolini, 485 U.S. 268, 2738, 279-80 (1978).

A mistaken view by the Court of Appeals of the evidence

in the record is recognized as a proper circumstance to

allow this Court to reconsider the record where there is no

evidence to support critical findings. Rose v. Mitchell, 443

U.S. 545, 569-72 (1979). The Court did not hesitate to

make an independent determination of the sufficiency of

the evidence to support the jury verdict in Humphrey v.

Moore, 375 U.S. at 348-51. This is a minimum requirement

in fair representation cases.

The panel’s confusion about the record is best illus-

trated by its comments on pro rata. It completely mis-

read the record when it said: “Longshoremen were

admonished several times against late payment or nonpay-

ment of pro rata charges, most notably in letters sent to

each worker applying for Class B status.” 617 F.2d at

1332, A-21. The fact of the matter is that there is abso-

lutely nothing in the record to indicate the Class B

longshoremen were admonished at all against late pay-

ment under the nonexistent pro rata rule. Those peti-

tioners deregistered for late payment of pro rata lost

their jobs for late payment, not nonpayment. The panel’s

reference to “letters sent to each worker applying for

Class B status” refers to Exhibit CL, reproduced in Ap-

pendix G to this petition, and provides in pertinent part

that “failure to make such [pro rata] payments .. .” may

be grounds for deregistration. But none of the petitioners

before this Court were deregistered or penalized in any

way during their four years of employment for failure

to make pro rata payments, The uncontradicted testimony

. » |

36

of PMA officials is in direct conflict with the panel’s in-

terpretation of the “letters sent to each worker applying

for Class B status”. John Trupp, an official of PMA, testi-

fied that he could find nothing in those letters which spe-

cified that a Class B longshoreman could be deregistered

for late payment of pro rata. He further testified that the

petitioners who were charged with violating the nonex-

istent pro rata rule were deregistered for late payment,

not nonpayment.” W. L. Brown, another PMA official,

stated that petitioners never received written notice or

any kind of warning that they could be deregistered for

late payments.

We have already referred to the motions of the mem-

bership of Local 10 indicating that the membership knew

nothing about the deregistration penalty for late pay-

ment of pro rata. There is simply no evidence in the vast

record of this case to even suggest that petitioners or any-

one else on the waterfront in San Francisco knew that any

late payments could cost a longshoreman his job.

Perhaps the most explicit explanation of what petition-

ers were. told about pro rata was the explanation of peti-

tioner Cleo Love, who had an opportunity to explain this

very point to Harry Bridges, International President of

the ILWU during a grievance hearing:

Mr. Love: ... There’s one more question. I’d like

for someone to tell me why they accept the money and

take my job for the same thing that I’m supposed to

be paying for. Once you pay that penalty, you are

clear. Then years later I lose the same job that they

say I paid the penalty for.”

tine . @eroge @

Mr, Bridges: Were you ever present at a Special B

men’s meeting that you were asked to attend and was

called officially by the Local and they advised all B

men to show up?

“Tr, 1824:;25-1826: 12.

“Ex. 10-6, p. 21, lines 7-13.

*SEx. AL, 54:3-8.

37

Mr. Love: Yes, I was.

Mr. Bridges: How many of them?

Mr. Love: I think we had only two or three. I

was at each one of them.

Mr. Bridges: Do you recall me at those meetings

telling the B men that their records were being

watched and they would count against them eventu-

ally.

Mr. Love: Yes, I do. If you notice my record,

I don’t have a black mark on my record. They can’t

_ say I was drunk on the job, talking nasty to the boss,

refuse to work, not anybody. You can’t find anything

on the record.

Mr. Bridges: At those meetings I talked to the B

men about what could eventually count against them to

be an A man. Do you recall me talking about them being

promoted?

Mr. Love: Yes.

Mr. Bridges: Do you recall anything I said about

paying the costs of the hiring hall?

Mr. Love: Yes, I do.

Mr. Bridges: You don’t recall that I indicated or

said that people who didn’t pay this it would count

against them eventually?

Mr. Love: Yes. You said that people that didn’t pay

it would count against you. I’m not one of the guys

that didn’t pay. But I paid late. And you didn’t say in

any of your talks to us that paying late we would lose

our jobs. You said that people that don’t pay it would

count against you”. (emphasis added)

Mr. Ernst [Attorney for PMA]: Anything more?

We should try to take care of those three clerk cases,

Los Angeles—Seattle, if we can.”

@ ® °

Mr. Love: Well, there’s no rule in the contract that

says you'll lose your job for late payments.

Mr. Bridges: The rules in the hiring hall are made

at the Local.

Mr. Love: All I know, Mr. Bridges, is that rules

that we seen in the office over there, what the officials

said, and the officials never said that you would lose

661d., 55:18-56:22,

38

your job for late paying dues. You lose your job if you

don’t pay your dues. (Emphasis added)

Mr. Bridges: If you were talking about a license

tag, you eventually lose your license to drive even

though you pay fines and so forth. If you get enough

traffic violations, you know that you lose your license

and insurance. There are a lot of people without in-

surance. It’s like truck drivers without a license to

drive. They can’t work either.

Mr. Love: Like you say, they lose their license. They

don’t take it away permanently. They may give 30 days

suspension. What they did here is they took the job

completely with no suspension—no nothing.”

Mr. Bridges did not respond,.and respondents did not

produce a single witness or a single piece of evidence to

contradict Mr. Love. As pointed out above, two PMA

officials actually corroborated his testimony. The panel

made a grievous error in its reading of the record.

V. Respondents Breached the Oollective Bargaining

Agreement By Deregistering Petitioners Without

“Good Cause” and in Violation of the “Common Law

of the Shop”.

In conceding arbitrary authority to the PMA and ILWU

to discharge a member of the bargaining unit for an

amorphous “any other cause” and in disregarding the

“common law of the shop”, the Ninth Circuit placed yet

another part of its decision in conflict with the decisions of

other circuits as well as this Court.

The jurisdiction of federal courts to hear claims of indivi-

dual employees for breach of collective bargaining agree-

ments was finally determined in Smith v. Evening News,

371 U.S. 195 (1962). Where an employee is not at fault,

he cannot be disciplined, and a discharge for cause means

“good cause”. Day v. United Automobile, Aerospace &

Agr. Implement Workers of America, Local 36, 466 F.2d

83, 90-92 (6th Cir. 1972). The District Court found that the

ILWU-PMA contract provided that a B man could be de-

*"Id., 59:4-21.

39

registered by respondents at their sole discretion “for any

cause”. An almost identical contention was rejected by

the Court in Boone v. Armstrong Cork Company, 384 F.2d

285, 291 (5th Cir. 1967) :

“Tt is true that whatever rights an employee subject

to a collective bargaining agreement possesses limit-

ing his employer’s right to discharge him must find

their source in the agreement, [citations] but a restric-

tion on an employer’s right to discharge at will may

be implied.” (emphasis supplied).

Throughout petitioners’ four years of employment, they

were in good standing, as conceded by the Court of Ap-

peals. 617 F.2d at 13824, A-5. Throughout these four years,

they had committed no infractions warranting dismissal

under any of the terms of the basic agreement or appli-

cable working rules. If “good cause” is an implied condi-

tion of the collective bargaining agreement, then the de-

registrations of petitioners were in violation of the con-

tract because there was no “good cause” for terminating

them. However, only if “any other cause” is to be recog-

nized as authorizing a new form of discipline to be imposed

many years after the infractions occurred, do the de-

registrations of petitioners not violate the contract.

The common law of the shop of this industry during the

past 30 years never authorized deregistering a longshore-

man unless there was a specific contractual provision or

working rule authorizing that harsh penalty at the time

the infractions occurred. This aspect of the common law

of the shop was recognized by the two motions of Local 10

calling for petitioners to be disciplined only “as per con-

tract” and thereafter reinstated and registered in Class A.

The practices of the PMA and ILWU in administering

the various provisions of the contract and working rules

constitute part of the collective bargaining agreement.

*8Finding No. 23, “In keeping with the nature of the status of the

limited registration Class B longshoremen, the contract provided

that he could be deregistered for any cause.” R. 1497, A-36.

sf

40

Lax enforcement of the rules, graduated penalties and

understandings of human frailties have long character-

ized Pacific Coast longshore employment. Harry Bridges,

International President of the I.L.W.U. and its leader for

over 30 years, told the trial court that a longshoreman

was only given a warning for the first low man out vio-

lation.” John Trupp, a longtime official of PMA, told the

trial court that the custom in the industry was to give rule

violators a second chance for being intoxicated on the

job” and for low man out violations.” The penalty infor-

mation provided to petitioners was part and parcel of this

tradition. It was ignored by Court of Appeals.

“(T]he industrial common law, the practices of the

industry and of the shop—is equally a part of the col-

lective bargaining agreement although not expressed

in it.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &

Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).

Violation of the common law of the shop constitutes

violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The

Ninth Circuit declined to follow this well established

principle.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, a writ of certiorari shovid

issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Ninth

Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR BRUNWASSER

Frep L. KurRLANDER

Attorneys for Petitioners

September 23, 1980

Tr, 5568: 14-5569: 20.

Tr, 1833:10-14.

"Tr, 1834:23-25.

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