Appendix — Piambino v. Sylva
Supreme Court brief1980
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Supreme Court, U.S.
F a LED
Rb -39g SEP 3 1980
No. MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLER
in the
Supreme Court
of the
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
PETER PIAMBINO, et al.,
Petitioners,
US.
WILLIAM E. BAILEY, etal.
and DAVID SYLVA,
Respondents
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
APPENDIX
CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.
250 Catalonia Avenue,
Suite 601
Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Telephone: 305-445-3100
Carl H. Hoffman,
Counsel for Petitioners
David Hertzig,
Of Counsel
September 3, 1980
oemmeed
INDEX
Page
Order of the Court Below Denying Petitions for
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc ..........+++++++ A
Preliminary Injunction ...........eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees B
Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc ...... C
Opinion of the District Court ..........+-ee serene eens D
Opinion of the Court of Appeals ...........++seeeeeees E
Judgment of the Court Below .........sseeeeeeeeeeees F
APPENDIX A
United States Court of Appeals
FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
June 5, 1980
Gilbert F. Ganucheau
Clerk
TEL 504-589-6514
600 CAMP STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LA. 70130
TO ALL PARTIES LISTED BELOW:
NO. 76-3495, 77-2045 — Peter Piambino, et al v.
Wm. E. Bailey, et al
Dear Counsel:
This is to advise that an order has this day been entered
denying the petition( ) for rehearing, and no member
of the panel nor Judge in regular active service on the
Court having requested that the Court be polled on
rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 10) the petition( )
for rehearing en banc has also been denied.
See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for
issuance and stay of the mandate.
cc:
Very truly yours,
GILBERT E. GANUCHEAU,
Clerk
By H. E. Adams, Jr.
Deputy Clerk
Mr. J. Russell Pitto
Mr. Robert W. Humphreys
Mr. Stephen T. Knudsen
Mr. Marc M. Watson
Mr. Jerome M. Rosenblum
Mr. Edward L. Peck
Mr. Carl H. Hoffman
Mr. James H. Joseph
Mr. David Ferber
Mr. Ralph C. Ferrara
Mr. S. Lee Terry, Jr.
Mr. William A. Dietch
Ms. Evelyn Langlieb Greer
Mr. Michael R. Botwin
Mr. William C. Wolford
App. A-2
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
IN RE BESTLINE PRODUCTS
SECURITIES AND ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
MDL DOCKET 162-Civ-JLK
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff's
First Motion for Temporary Restraining Order dated
June 18, 1976. Pursuant to notice supplied to all parties
to this action and to the California Attorney General,
the New Jersey Attorney General, the Missouri Attorney
General, the Ohio Attorney General, the Wisconsin
Attorney General, the Penusylvania Attorney General,
the Texas Attorney General, the New York City
Department of Consumer Affairs, the Bank of America
and the Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Los Angeles, this matter was heard before the
Court on June 30, 1976. The following appearances were
made by counsel for the various parties:
Carl H. Hoffman
James H. Joseph
Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs
Herschel T. Elkins
Deputy Attorney General, Statevr California
App. B-1
William Hoeveler
Robert Paul
Counsel for Defendants, Richard Grillo, Melvin
Morgan and Janin, Morgan & Brenner
J. Russell Pitto
Counsel for Defendants, Bestline Products, Inc.,
Bestline Corp., James K. Hisler, Jerry G.
Brassfield, Oliver P. Colvin, David Soto, Norman
Miller and Richard Dumont
Mare M. Watson
Counsel for Defendants, Gordon Blaum, Edna
Blaum, James Herbert, Marvin Sternberg and
George Wunch
Having heard and considered the evidence, briefs
and oral argument submitted by the parties and the
California Attorney General, the Court finds:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On December 21, 1973, Defendant, Bestline
Products, Inc., (Bestline) entered into an “Agreement,
Instructions to Compliance Officer and Trust” with the
California Attorney General which was incorporated
into a “Modified Judgment” entered on December 21,
1973, by the California Superior Court for Los Angeles
County in Case No. C 2842. Pursuant to said “‘Modified
Judgment,” there was established a restitutionary plan
(California Plan) which provided for restitutionary
payments to (a) Bestline Distributors in the State of
California who became such after January 14, 1971, (b)
App. B-2
Bestline Distributors within and without the State of
California who are entitled to restitution pursuant to
any agreements reached between any other state or
political subdivision thereof or any federal department
or agency and Bestline, and (c) any other distributor (i)
as to whom Bestline approves their claim, or (ii) who has
received an arbitration award pursuant to a national
plan of arbitration, or (iii) pursuant to judgment. It
appears that the great majority of participants in the
California Plan became entitled to receive payments
thereunder by virtue of options (a) and (b) above. Very
few, if any, participants have actually obtained
judgment against Bestline on their own behalf. It is
noted that under option (c)(i) above all members of the
Plaintiff class would have been entitled to participate in
the California Plan from its inception had their claims
been approved by Bestline. In addition, under option
(c)(iii) above, all members of the Plaintiff class are
entitled to participate in the California Plan upon entry
of judgment on their behalf, without more.
As a part of the California Plan there was
established a trust wherein Bestline agreed to transfer
certain funds to the Bank of America, as trustee, for
subsequent distribution to persons who were determined
to be entitled to restitutionary payments in accordance
with the terms of the “Modified Judgment.” At the
present time, there are some 7,043 participants in the
California Plan who are entitled to such payments.
The ‘Agreement, Instructions to Compliance
Officer and Trust” included a schedule of payments to
be made by Bestline into the trust. Pursuant thereto,
Bestline is scheduled on or about June 30, 1976, to
transfer to the Bank of America for distribution shortly
App. B-3
Pine.
thereafter to participants in the California Plan the sum
of $500,000.00, or 50% of the pretax profits of Bestline,
-whichever is greater.
At the present time, in accordance with the terms of
the “Modified Judgment,” Bestline has available for
transfer to the Bank of America the sum of $500,000.00.
In anticipation of receiving this amount on June 30,
1976, the Bank of America has prepared some 7,043
checks in the average amount of $71.00 each for
distribution to the participants in the California Plan.
In connection with the preparation for such distribution,
the Bank of America has incurred expenses in the
approximate amount of $15,000.00, including the cost of
postage and envelopes addressed to each of the
California Plan participants.
The Participants in the California Plan are for the
most part persons who would have been entitled to
participate in this action as members of the Plaintiff
class had they not elected to participate in the
California Plan. In fact, it appears that a substantial
number of Bestline investors may have been faced with
the decision of electing to participate in either this
action or the California Plan to the exclusion of the
other.
The participants in the California Plan have
previously received payments thereunder in partial
restitution of the amounts paid by them to Bestline. As
of this date, a total of approximately $7,336,000.00 has
been so paid. However, no individual participant has
been repaid in full nor will any such participant be
repaid in full as a result of the payments scheduled to be
made from the $500,000.00 presently held by Bestline.
App. B-4
For the most part, the participants in the California
Plan have received only a small percentage of the total
repayment due to them.
On March 19, 1976, this Court determined that
Bestline is liable to the Plaintiff class under Section
12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff class will be entitled to final judgment against
Bestline as soon as the amount of damages is
determined. However, such determination will not be
accomplished for several months because of the
administrative deldy necessarily involved therein. It is
reasonably anticipated that each member of the
Plaintiff Class will be entitled to recover from Bestline a
sum in the approximate amount of $3,000.00 or more,
which amount is essentially the same as the recovery to
which each participant in the California Plan is entitled.
It should be emphasized that most if not all of the
participants in the California Plan are by definition
members of the Plaintiff class.
It appears that approximately 20,000 members of
the Plaintiff class may be entitled to recovery in this
action under Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.
However, Bestline has made no restitutionary payments
of any kind to the members of the Plaintiff class who
were not also participants in the California Plan.
Moreover, Bestline does not have sufficient assets to
satisfy the claims of the entire Plaintiff class, nor, for
that matter, does Bestline have sufficient assets to
satisfy the remaining claims of the California Plan
participants.
App. B-5
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court finds that it will be virtually impossible
to recoup the $500,000.00 which is scheduled for
payment to the Bank of America on June 30, 1976, once
this amount has been divided into small payments and
distributed to the participants in the California Plan.
Accordingly, if the other members of the Plaintiff class
are in any way entitled to receive any part of the
scheduled $500,000.00 payment, it is clear that the
Plaintiff class will suffer irreparable harm once the
scheduled payment is made and distributed.
Because this Court has previously determined that
Bestline is liable to the Plaintiff class for full restitution,
the members thereof will be entitled to recover an
amount equal to their total investment in Bestline. A
conservative estimate is that this amount will exceed
$60,000,000.00. Therefore, there is no likelihood that the
$500,000.00 presently under consideration will even
approach the total recovery due to the Plaintiff class. In
contrast, it is estimated that the total amount due to the
participants in the California Plan is approximately
$22,000,000, of which they have previously been repaid
approximately $7,336,000.00 pursuant to the terms of
the Plan. This Court has not been presented with any
facts which would establish that the participants in the
California Plan were entitled to a prior equity which
would preclude the other members of the Plaintiff class
from sharing with them on a pro rata basis in any
recovery from Bestline. To the contrary, it would appear
that whether any particular Bestline investor was
allowed to participate in the California Plan was merely
dependent upon his place of residence, the whims of
Bestline, or other matters over which the individual
App. B-6
investor exercised little if any real control. Under the
terms of the “Modified Judgment” it was Bestline alone
who had the complete, unilateral and unreviewable
power to designate the beneficiaries of the California
trust. i.e., the participants in the California Plan.
Accordingly, this Court concludes that it would be
inequitable to allow the California Plan participants to
continue to receive payments from Bestline where the
other members of the Plaintiff class were effectively
precluded from participating in the California Plan
because of matters outside of their control. Moreover, in
view of Bestline’s overwhelming liability to the Plaintiff
class, including the California Plan participants, and
Bestline’s comparatively weak financial condition, the
Court concludes that the sum of $500,000.00 presently
held by Bestline should be transferred to the registry of
this Court to protect the integrity thereof for the benefit
of the Plaintiff class.
It is therefore
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendants, Bestline Products, Inc. and
Bestline Corporation, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, attorneys, representatives, affiliates and all
persons in active concert or participation with them, are
hereby enjoined and restrained, pending further order of
this Court, from transferring any funds or other things of
value to the Bank of America, the California
Restitutionary Trust, or to any other person, firm or
corporation, except in the ordinary course of business for
value received.
2. Defendant, Bestline Products, Inc., shall
forthwith pay into the registry of this Court the sum of
$500,000.00 which is presently held by Bestline for the
June 30, 1976, payment under the California Plan.
3. Pending further order of this Court, the Clerk of
this Court is directed to deposit and hold in interest
bearing form any and all funds paid into the registry of
this Court pursuant to this order.
4. Within five (5) days from the date of this order,
Counsel for Bestline shall prepare a letter explaining to
the participants in the California Plan the relevant
terms of this order and its effect upon their expected
receipt of restitutionary payments. Said letter shall be
reviewed and approved by the California Attorney
General and lead counsel for the Plaintiff class. After
the letter is so approved, counsel for Bestline shall mail
a copy thereof to each participant in the California Plan
in the envelopes previously prepared by the Bank of
America for distribution of the June 30, 1976, payment.
5. The expenses incurred by the Bank of America
in preparation for distribution of the June 30, 1976,
payment shall be paid by the Clerk of this Court from
the funds paid into the registry of this Court pursuant to
this order.
6. The funds deposited into the registry of this
Court pursuant to this order and the interest received
thereon shall constitute security for the payment of such
App. B-8
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any
party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined
hereunder.
DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this
7th day of July, 1976.
/s/ James Lawrence King
~ JAMES LAWRENCE KING
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: all counsel
App. B-9
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NOS. 76-3495
77-2045
PETER PIAMBINO, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
US.
WILLIAM E. BAILEY, et al.
Defendants,
DAVID SYLVA,
Intervenor-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Florida
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
PETER PIAMBINO, et al.
CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.
Attorneys for Appellees
2660 AmeriFirst Building
One Southeast Third Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131
JAMES H. JOSEPH
JOSEPH & HERSHMAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellees
4970 United States Steel Bldg.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
App. C-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PI is visi saks coer vaianosvarcovens C-3
STATEMENT OF PACTS .........000cercecvees C-5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..............0005. C-10
ARGUMENT
This Action Created A Common Fund For
the Entire Plaintiff Class .................... C-11
(A) Most of the Settlement Proceeds were
Provided by Individual Defendants .... C-11
(B) No Class Member Should be Preferred
ND boca crureiacsss cepeceses C-13
(C) The California Class Lost No Rights
Because of This Action................. C-14
The Notice to the Class Was Not Inadequate. C-15
Sylva Has a Conflict of Interest Which
Precludes His Representation of the
Ne ny aR ep ee) ea hy a C-17
IN cg ere a le C-21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......ccccccccccce C-22
App. C-2
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 40(a) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Peter Piambino, et al., respectfully petition
this Court to grant a rehearing and reconsideration of
the Appeal in the above-entitled cause. In support of
this Petition, Plaintiffs represent to the Court as follows:
INTRODUCTION
Because this Court’s Opinion encompassed issues
and factual determinations not briefed by the parties to
this Appeal, many of the factual matters relevant to this
Petition for Rehearing were not before the court and
were not contained in the Appendix filed by Appellant.
Consequently, in this Petition the following symbols will
be used for reference to supporting factual data:
ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION
A Factual matter contained in Appendix
(followed by Appendix page reference).
R Factual matter of Record in lower court
but not included in Appendix (followed
by lower court’s docket entry reference).
S Factual matter supported by
substantial evidence which has not yet
been presented in the lower court
(followed by supplemental Appendix
page reference where applicable. The
symbol ‘‘X”’ will be used for materials
not contained in the Supplemental
Appendix).
App. C-3
The various categories of participants in this action
will be referred to as follows:
Plaintiff Class
California Class
Non-California
Class
Claimants
California
Claimants
Non-California
Claimants
All persons who were given
notice of this action.
All participants in the
California Restitutionary
Fund.
All persons who were given
notice of this action and were
not participants in the
California Restitutionary
Fund.
All persons who filed Proofs
of Claim in this action.
Participants in the
California Restitutionary
Fund who also filed Proofs of
Claim in this action.
All persons who filed Proofs
of Claim in this action and
who were not participants in
the California Restitutionary
Fund.
App. C-4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The settlement referred to by this Court as the
“Bestline Settlement” (slip op. p. 2949) involved
settlement with twenty-two (22) individual defendants
who were not involved in any respect in the California
Superior Court action. A,855; cf. A,883. The most
important of these additional defendants was
Defendant, Jerry G. Brassfield, who had personally
guaranteed certain terms of the ‘‘Bestline Settlement.”
A,537. Five of the individual settling defendants had
been defendants in the California Superior Court
Action, but they were not ordered to make restitution:
Only Bestline Corporation, Bestline Products, Inc., and
William E. Bailey were parties to the Modified
Judgment and the restitutionary provisions thereof.
A,88. Participation in the California Restitutionary
Program did not involve or require the release of the
twenty seven (27) individual settling defendants. A,295-
296.
The source of monies recovered pursuant to the
“Bestline Settlement” was as follows:
$900,000.00 withdrawn from a Swiss bank in favor
of John T. Dawson, Trustee. S,1. Mr. Dawson was
the personal attorney for various individual
defendants but did not make an appearance in this
action.
$300,000.00 drawn on the “Trustee Account” of
John T. Dawson. S,3,4.
$3,402.72 drawn on the account of Dawson, Maino,
Chapman, Mattern and Bishop. S,5,6.
App. C-5
$229,837.29 received from sale of Bestline property
in Illinois. S,7-9.
$491,636.59 transferred from the LaSalle Bank in
Chicago, Illinois. S,10.
The above monies were distributed! as follows:
$756,950.04 to 2,525 Non-California Claimants.
$422,673.68 to 1,807 California Claimants.
$375,000 to James H. Joseph, P.A. as attorneys fees.
$375,000 to Carl H. Hoffman, P.A. as attorneys fees.
On a percentage basis, response to the Notice in
this action by the California Class was more than double
the response by the Non-California Class. S,X. In
addition, the percentage response by the California
Class was substantially better than the response in each
of two similar class action cases where the notice was
held to be adequate. Comparative data relating to class
action participation is as follows:
Class Action Participation — Comparative Data
Bestline Bestline Bestline
Total Non-Calif
Calif Detroit*
Notices
Delivered 25,221 18,780 6,441 89,000
Proofs of
Claim filed 4,332 2,525 1,807 14,156
Percentage
Filing Proofs
of Claim 17% 13% 28% 15%
App. C-6
Korn**
667
122
18%
*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)
**Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972)
Bestline was not insolvent when it filed its Chapter
XI Bankruptcy Petition in the Northern District of
California in July, 1973, A,457. In fact, Bestline had
more than $27,(00,000.00 available for levy on execution
at that time. A,457. Although the avowed purpose of the
California Restitution Program may have been to keep
Bestline afloat to maximize restitution, Bestline had
sufficient assets in July, 1973 to provide immediate full
restitution for the California Class and the claimants in
this action as well. From all appearances, Bestline
principals urged this program as a part of a scheme to
escape liability and remove the major part of Bestline’s
assets into foreign countries. A,446-503. For example, at
the time of the “‘Bestline Settlement’’, Bestline was
insolvent and had been insolvent for a substantial
period of time prior thereto. A,456-460. The financial
condition of Bestline at various times significant to this
litigation was as follows:
App. C-7
Bestline Assets
Available
Bestline Cash For Levy
Date Event On Hand (A459) (A459)(A457)
6-13-73 California Superior Court
Trial Ends.
7-23-73 Bestline files bankruptcy
petition in N.D. California. $4,505,803 $27,052,207
7-25-73 California Superior Court
issues written judgment and
order
8-1-73 Defendant Brassfield gains
control of Bestline
11-?-73 Bestline receives $3,000,000
tax refund (R,1169) 1,920,340 13,110,232
12-21-73 Modified Judgment entered
and Bestline bankruptcy
withdrawn
1-31-74 First payment from
California Restitutionary
Fund 1,558,216 12,502,159
5-3-74 Multi-District Panel
transfers Bestline Cases to
S.D. Florida 513,916 3,605, 185
6-?-74 Bestline receives $4,000,000
tax refund (R,1169)
6-30-74 Second Payment from
California Restitutionary
Fund 55,227 2,426,675
6-30-76 §.D. Florida enjoins Bestline
from Bench 159,368 -0-
'The distribution amounts include some accrued interest and
therefore somewhat exceed the amount of monies recovered. There
presently remains undistributed approximately $24,000.00
App. C-8
At all times after June 30, 1976, Bestline was
insolvent and from an accounting standpoint had no
assets available for levy. A,456-460. Well prior to that
date, Bestline principals had removed Bestline’s assets
into foreign countries beyond the jurisdiction of the
California Superior Court or the Southern District of
Florida. A,446-503. Bestline’s real estate, consisting of a
warehouse in San Jose, California and a plant in Illinois
remained the only substantial assets subject to the
jurisdiction of any Court within the United States.
However, under the terms of the Modified Judgment,
property outside of the State of California was not
subject to acquisition by the California Attorney
General or receiver to be appointed in the event of a
default. A,89.
Shortly before the trial court issued the Preliminary
Injunction in June, 1976, the California Attorney
General admitted in open court that he was aware that
Bestline money was being used to pay the debts of
Golden Products, Inc., a defunct corporation which had
been operated by Defendant Brassfield prior to his
acquisition of Bestline on August 1, 1973. A,488-490;
A,474,475; A,274. Moreover, the California Attorney
General approved this practice. A,274-275. At the time
the Preliminary Injunction was issued, $1,176,553.48
had been removed from Bestline in this fashion alone.
A,475.
Millions of dollars, including an $8.5 million tax
refund, were also diverted from Bestline while the
California Attorney General and the Bestline ‘‘financial
officer” were supposed to be monitoring Bestline’s
operations. A,446-503; A,263-303. In fact, the Internal
Revenue Service is now seeking deficiencies in the
App. C-9
amount of $16,604,909.00 from Defendant Brassfield
arising out of his pyramid scheme operations. See
Brassfield v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service,
Tax Court Docket No. 338678.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Bestline never made a profit after entry of the
California Superior Court Modified Judgment and was
insolvent well prior to entry of the Preliminary
Injunction and at all times thereafter. There is no
evidence that Bestline would have continued to make
payments to the California Restitutionary Fund if the
Preliminary Injunction had not been entered in this
action.
The Bestline Settlement was primarily a settlement
with 27 individual defendants who had no obligation
under the California Superior Court judgment. These 27
individuals paid most of the money comprising the
Bestline Settlement. Moreover, the California Class had
no claim on Bestline’s assets outside of the State of
California. Therefore, this Court’s finding that this
litigation generated no common fund is not consistent
with the facts of this case.
Almost 2,000 California class members did not find
the Class Notice and Proof of Claim confusing. Sylva
himself was aware of the Notice and testified that he did
not believe the Notice was generally confusing. Each of
the witnesses offered by Sylva failed to file Proofs of
Claim for reasons other than misinterpretation of the
claim form.
App. C-10
As Trustee, Sylva was in a position to file Proofs of
Claim for all members of the California Class but failed
to do so. He was also in a position to notify all members
of the California Class of their rights in this action but
he failed to do so. All of the matters complained of by
Sylva arose out of his own failure to carry out his
fiduciary duties. Sylva is now unable to carry out his
fiduciary duties in this action because the course of
action urged by him would create irreconcilable
conflicts among the various members of the California
Class.
Under the terms of the Modified Judgment, any
Bestline Distributor could participate in the California
Restitutionary Fund if Bestline approved his claim.
Therefore, the Bestline settlement with the Plaintiff
Class resulted in the entire Plaintiff Class becoming
members of the California Class. Because Bestline is
now insolvent, any return of monies to Bestline will
most probably be distributed pursuant to involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings.
ARGUMENT
THIS ACTION CREATED A COMMON
FUND FOR THE ENTIRE PLAINTIFF CLASS
A. Most of the Settlement Proceeds were Provided by
Individual Defendants.
This Court held that the Bestline settlement must
be vacated because the California Class had an absolute
priority to the funds received in the settlement. Slip op.
App. C-11
p.2592. The basis of the priority is a finding of fact made
by the Panel that but for the injunction, the California
Class either (a) would have been paid the entire amount
scheduled pursuant to the Restitutionary Plan or, (b)
would have obtained, through a process of liquidation,
the funds from which the Bestline settlement was paid.
These findings are not consistent with the evidence in
this case.
Since the “Bestline settlement” was in fact a
settlement with 27 individual defendants as well as the
Bestline corporations, the source of the settlement funds
is of overriding importance. Any monies paid by the
individual defendants are not subject to claim by the
California Restitutionary Program since that program
did not involve or require the release of any of the 27
individual settling defendants.
In fact, $1,203,402.72 of the Bestline settlement
proceeds were provided by the individual defendants. In
this respect, it is significant that Sylva repeatedly
asserted in the trial court that he did not want to set
aside the Bestline settlement. A,781, 743. Consequently,
Sylva apparently does not contest the source of this
major portion of the settlement funds. The remaining
$721,473.00 is comprised of $491,636.00 transferred from
the La Salle Bank in Chicago pursuant to the July 7,
1976 Preliminary Injunction and $229,837.00 received
from the sale of Bestline Illinois property.
The California Modified Judgment provided that
the California receiver had access only to Bestline assets
within California. A,89-90. Consistent with this
territorial limitation, Sylva has not argued that he is
entitled to any interest in the Bestline property in
Illinois.
App. C-12
Sylva’s claim in the lower court was limited to the
$491,636.00 which was transferred to the Southern
District of Florida pursuant to the Preliminary
Injunction. A,736. At best, Sylva may argue that
Bestline intended to pay that amount into the
California Restitutionary Program although Bestline’s
intent hardly gives the California Court jurisdiction of
assets outside of the State of California. Moreover, most
of the $491,636.00, or some $422,673.00, has already
been returned to the California Claimants who filed
Proofs of Claim in this action. Therefore, at most,
Sylva’s claim is limited to the $68,968.00 difference
between the amount transferred pursuant to the
Preliminary Injunction and the amount actually
distributed to California claimants.
B. No Class Member Should be Preferred Over
Another.
California Claimants shared ratably in the
distribution of the settlement proceeds. Each California
Claimant was paid on the same basis as Non-California
Claimants: An adjusted claim was calculated by first
subtracting from the claimant’s expenditures any
profits made by him on sales and any prior
restitutionary payments received by him. The claimant
was then paid in the same ratio of the total settlement
proceeds as his adjusted claim bore to the adjusted
claims of all claimants.
The well-established rule for distribution of
settlement funds and treatment of class members is that
no class member is to be preferred over any other class
member. That was precisely the rule followed by lead
counsel in this action.
App. C-13
C. The California Class Lost No Rights Because of
This Action.
As discussed above, no more than $491,636.00 was
available to the California class through the California
Restitutionary Fund. Because the California class
members had previously waived their rights to pursue
any claims against Bestline, this court opined that it
might have been improper to have included members of
the California Class in this action. Slip. op. p.2962.
However, as discussed above, none of the 27 individual
settling Defendants had previously settled with the
California class. As to the Bestline corporations who had
already settled with the California class, Bestline’s
agreement to include the members of the California
class in the settlement despite their prior waivers is
hardly prejudicial to them.
At the time the California Superior Court entered
its judgment on July, 1973, the Bestline Corporations
had available for levy on execution the sum of
$27,052,207.00. A,456-457. At about this same time,
Bailey sold his interest in Bestline to Defendant
Brassfield. Slip. op. p.2928. Brassfield had not been a
party to the California Superior Court action (A,83) and
consequently he was not personally involved in the
Modified Judgment. After taking control, Brassfield
transferred to Switzerland and other foreign countries
essentially every liquid asset held by Bestline. See
A, 446-503. At the time of the settlement, Bestline had a
negative net worth. A,459; A446-503.
One wonders what the California Attorney General
and Sylva were doing when this was occurring. In fact,
the California Attorney General had full knowledge that
App. C-14
more than $1,000,000 was paid by Bestline to satisfy a
liability incurred by Defendant Brassfield when he was
not affiliated with Bestline. A,457, 474-475. This money
was paid into another California Restitutionary Plan
established by the California Attorney General for
distributors of Golden Products, Inc., a completely
different pyramid scheme operated by Defendant
Brassfield in competition with Bestline. A,475.
Additionally, the few assets which were available within
the jurisdiction of the California Restitutionary Plan
had been liquidated and transferred to other areas
outside the jurisdiction of the California Superior Court.
A, 446-503. In light of these facts, the Bestline settlement
was not unreasonable for the California Class or for the
Plaintiff Class as a whole.
THE NOTICE TO THE CLASS
WAS NOT INADEQUATE
The California Class consisted of 7,043 persons,
including 602 General Distributors. However, Sylva did
not claim these 602 General Distributors to be part of his
‘‘class’’ for purposes of intervention. A,776.
Consequently, only 6,441 members of the California
Class were eligible to receive notice of the Florida
action. Of this number, 1,807 California Class Members
filed Proofs of Claim in the Florida action. Accordingly,
at least 1,807 California Class Members did not find the
notice confusing. In fact, Sylva himself testified that the
number of people contacting him for clarification of the
notice was not sufficient to cause him to believe there
was a general problem of interpretation among all
members of the California Class. A,839.
App. C-15
Of the three witnesses offered by Sylva, one of
them, Norman Feinberg, testified that he did not file a
Proof of Claim form because of advice he had gotten
from three lawyers (A,808) and a notice that he believed
had been sent by Sylva about a year prior to receiving
the class notice. A,810-811. The other two witnesses,
Valentin Dominguez and Susie Rosenrot, both spoke
English with heavy accents and clearly would have
difficulty understanding any detailed document in
English. And even so, the reason for Mr. Dominguez’s
confusion was not the information contained in the
notice but rather a letter he had earlier received from
Bestline. A,814-15. The third witness, Susie Rosenrot,
wrote to Sylva and despite his advice that she submit a
claim form, she failed to do so. As stated by Ms.
Rosenrot:
Q. Didn’t [Sylva’s letter] say if you filled out
the claim form and filed it in Florida it
would not jeopardize your participation in
California?
A. That’s what he said. But you know I don’t
speak too good English, you know; so I
figure it was alright, you know.
A,829.
Also, while the notice to the class may appear
complex, it was essentially identical to notices
submitted in numerous other class actions. See 2
Newberg on Class Actions, pp. 297-1167.
App. C-16
The District Court specifically found that the
notice was adequate and constituted “Valid, due and
sufficient notice”. A,854. This finding was made after
the District Court had heard the testimony presented by
Sylva. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding may not be
set aside unless it is ‘‘clearly erroneous.” In view of the
contradictions in the witnesses testimony as well as the
similarity between the notice in this case and those
submitted in many other cases, it cannot be said that
the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
SYLVA HAS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
WHICH PRECLUDES HIS REPRESEN-
TATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CLASS
Although not argued by Sylva, this Court found
that Sylva in his capacity as Compliance Officer was in
fact a Trustee and consequently had a “direct,
substantial, and legally protectable interest’’ in these
proceedings. Slip. op. p. 2944. Nonetheless, Sylva had a
serious conflict that precluded his suitability to act in
such capacity in this case: A total of 1,807 Proofs of
Claim (40% of the total Proofs of Claim filed) were filed
by members of the California Class. The California
Class consisted of a total of 7,043 persons (slip op. p.
2935) of which 602 were General Distributors. A,755-756.
Despite his fiduciary duty, Sylva specifically disclaimed
these 602 General Distributors to be part of his ‘“‘class”
for purposes of intervention. A,776.
App. C-17
Sylva repeatedly represented in the trial court that
he did not want to set aside the settlement. A,781, 743.
But, Sylva had an irreconcilable conflict in his class of
6,441 persons (7,043 total minus 603 General
Distributors), 1,807 of whom were already entitled to
share in the settlement proceeds. His successful
intervention would only succeed in reducing the amount
of money the 1,807 would receive as claimants in the
Florida class. Of course, Sylva also had a conflict with
the 602 General Distributors who would receive nothing
if Sylva opted to merely share in the settlement
proceeds rather than regain for the California fund the
$491,636 transferred pursuant to the Preliminary
Injunction. But if this $491,636 were removed to the
California fund, the 1,807 persons who had filed Proofs
of Claim in the Florida action would be prejudiced since
the $491,636 would have to be divided among 7,043
persons in the California fund as opposed to 4,332
persons in the Florida action. This conflict was admitted
by Sylva in the trial court (A,747), but no solution was
offered.
Even if Sylva were somehow able to resolve this
conflict, it is noted that Sylva has not acted for the
benefit of his class. As a Trustee, Sylva should have filed
Proofs of Claim for all members of the California Class.
As a Trustee he not only had the right to do so, but the
obligation. Instead of doing this, Sylva elected to
intervene as a class representative under Rule 23, which
he clearly was not. Of course, there would have been no
attorney’s fees or compliance officer fees awardable if
Sylva merely filed the Proofs of Claim. However, there
was no proper reason for failure to file the Proofs of
Claim. Sylva indicated that the same claim form had
already been filled out and processed by him through
App. C-18
the Restitutionary Program so that no administrative
difficulty would have been involved in filing the Proofs
of Claim. A,768-769.
At leest as early as December 15, 1976, or shortly
thereafter, Sylva was aware that Proofs of Claim had
been submitted to participants in the California
Restitutionary Program. A,835. In fact, he answered
inquiries concerning the Proof of Claim and even
developed a form letter to deal with inquiries from
members of the California Class. A,835. If he in fact
believed that the notice was confusing to members of the
California Class, he should have at least supplied all of
them with a form letter urging them to participate. He
did not do this.
It should be noted that Sylva’s position as Trustee
on behalf of a limited group is quite different from that
of Lead Counsel who had a fiduciary duty to treat all
class members equally. To encourage any particular
claimant or group of claimants to file Proofs of Claim
would prejudice the others. Consequently, it would have
been improper for Lead Counsel to suggest to Sylva that
he file Proofs of Claim even if Sylva had represented
that he was a Trustee for the members of the California
class — which he did not.
Plaintiffs are uncertain as to just what results Sylva
may be seeking in this Appeal: If the “Bestline
Settlement’? were disapproved, the 27 individual
settling defendants would be entitled to a refund of the
$1,203,402.74 paid by them. Similarly, Bestline would
be entitled to refund of the $229,837.29 received from
the sale of the Bestline property in Illinois and the
$491,636.59 transferred from the LaSalle Bank in
Chicago, Illinois. However, Bestline is and was
App. C-19
insolvent. Therefore, any three creditors, including any
three members of the Plaintiff Class, may petition for
Bestline’s involuntary bankruptcy thereby forcing
distribution of these funds among at least 9,568 persons
(7,043 California class members plus 2,535 Non-
California class members) resulting in an average per
capita distribution of $75 person. Of course this
calculation does not account for claims by general
creditors. In contrast, it is noted that the 1,807
California claimants who did file Proofs of Claim in this
action have received an average per capita distribution
of $233.90 which they would be required to disgorge if
the settlement were disapproved.
The California class members would be required to
file another Proof of Claim with the Bankruptcy Court
in order to participate in any bankruptcy distribution.
Consequently, it is probably not unrealistic to expect
the California claimants to be limited to the same
diligent 1,807 persons who filed Proofs of Claim in this
action. Therefore, it is most probable that any
disapproval of the Bestline Settlement will only result in
the loss of the $1,203,402.74 paid by the 27 individual
settling defendants with little reallocation of settlement
proceeds among the California class members.
On the other hand, if the Bestline Settlement were
approved on the condition that the California class
given be absolute priority to the monies obtained from
Bestline and the sale of Bestline’s property, regardless of
its location, the California class would not fare any
better: Under the terms of the Modified Judgment, any
Bestline Direct Distributor could participate in the
California Restitutionary Fund if Bestline approved his
claim. A,105. Bestline’s settlement with the Plaintiff
Class constituted approval of the Plaintiff Class claims
App. C-20
and thereby entitled the entire Plaintiff Class to become
members of the California Class. The result, again,
would be the distribution of $721,473.88 among 9,568
persons, resulting in the same average per capita
distribution of $75 per person. Of course, the California
Class would in this case be allowed to participate in the
proceeds received by the individual defendants. But
there remains a further consideration: As members of
the California Class the Plaintiff Class members were
entitled to participate in all distributions effected by
Sylva after Bestline’s approval of the settlement. At
least $250,000 was distributed by Sylva after such
approval. A,840-841. Therefore, the Non-California
Claimants in this action are entitled to receive an
additional average per capita distribution of at least
$26.12 from the California Restitutionary Fund
($250,000 divided by 9,568) for a total of $65,975.12.
Consequently, it is most doubtful that any real benefit
would accrue to any class member by restructuring the
settlement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs/Appellees,
Peter Piambino, et al. pray the Court for rehearing and
that on rehearing granted, this Court’s Opinion dated
February 6, 1980, be vacated and that the Court enter a
new Opinion affirming the District Court’s approval of
the Bestline settlement, or, in the alternative,
remanding this action for further findings of fact with
reference thereto.
CARL H. HOFFMAN, P. A.
By:
App. C-21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that an original and one copy
f the foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed or
delivered to each attorney of record this__ day of May,
1980.
CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.
Attorneys for Appellees,
Peter Piambino, et al.
2660 AmeriFirst Building
One Southeast Third Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131
By:
App. C-22
APPENDIX D
IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NOS. 76-3495
77-2045
PETER PIAMBINO, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Us.
WILLIAM E. BAILEY, et al.
Defendants.
DAVID SYLVA,
Intervenor-Appellant.
CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY FIFTH
CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 13.6.1
The undersigned, counsel of record for Appellees,
certifies that the following listed parties have an interest
in the outcome of this case. These representations are
made in order that the Judges of this Court may
evaluate possible disqualification or recusal pursuant to
Local Rule 13.6.1.
App. D-1
NAME
Peter Piambino
Joseph F. Kucklick
Marilyn Koslen
Robert M. Ernst
Michael J. Gardner
James D. Small
All persons who purchased or invested
in Director Distributorships during
the period from March 7, 1980
through August 10, 1973
Bestline Products, Inc.
Bestline Corporation
William E. Bailey
David L. Eastis
Jerry G. Brassfield
Robert Depew
Leo Diel
Charles Simmons
Larry D. Huff
Larry S. Huff
James Rohn
Towru Ikeda
App. D-2
INTEREST
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Members
of the
Plaintiff Class
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Steve C. Stern
James K. Hisler
Ralph Flynn
Martin Day
Norman Miller
Joseph Cotroneo
Richard Dumont
Saul Tave
Richard Lub
Jerry J. Weiss
Davis Soto
Keith Fox
Oliver P. Colvin
Tink Anderson
Frank Brendis
David T. Gibson
Gordon Blaum
Edna Blaum
Richard Grillo
Melvin Moran
Richard G. Kruse
Blair R. Egli
Neal Morehart
Peter Eiselstein
Bert Hardcastle
Alfred G. Moravec
Kenneth Davis
Norman Evans
Carroll Gentry
Robert E. Johnson
Robert L. Shell
C.D. St. Peter
James Herbert
Donald Omholt
App. D-3
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Sten Tallarida Defendant
Willie Larkin Defendant
Frank Conti Defendant
Andi Dias Defendant
Marvin Sternberg Defendant
E. J. Beckman Defendant
Kenneth Lutz Defendant
Edward Buck Defendant
John Wolfe Defendant
Robert Schuster Defendant
Robert Richards Defendant
William Gelfound Defendant
Lennart Osterman Defendant
Jan B. Bailey Defendant
Janin, Morgan & Brenner,
a partnership Defendant
Janin, Morgan & Brenner,
a corporation Defendant
Frank Interdonato Defendant
George Wunch Defendant
Robert Burke Defendant
Wisconsin Attorney General’s Office
New Jersey Attorney General’s Office
Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office
Missouri Attorney General’s Office
Texas Attorney General’s Office Californi
California Attorney General’s Office te perhee
New York Department of te ued
Consumer Affairs —
App. D-4
David R. Sylva Appellant
Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. Trustee,
California
Restitutionary
Programs
All persons eligible for distributions California
from the California Restitutionary Restitutionary
Program Program
CARL H. HOFFMAN
App. D-5
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL REQUIRED BY
FIFTH CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 16.1.2.2
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied
professional judgment, that the panel decision is
contrary to the following decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and of the
Supreme Court of the United States and that
consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure
and maintain uniformity of decisions in this Court:
Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc.,
549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977)
Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc.,
608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979)
Commander’s Palace Park v. Girard & Pastel
Corp.,
572 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978)
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790,
58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979)
Joiner v. City of Dallas,
488 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974)
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113,
31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972)
Machesky v. Bizzell,
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969)
App. D-6
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974)
Tampa Phosphate R. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line
R. Co.,
418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969)
United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 2051,
44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975)
Carl H. Hoffman
Attorney for Appellees
App. D-7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
re
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............seeeeees D-9
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............... D-12
STATEMENT OF COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ............. D-13
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS..............:. D-13
ARGUMENT
The Panel’s Decision Relating to the Anti-
Injunction Act is Contrary to the Tampa
Phosphate and Machesky Decisions ......... D-20
The Panel’s Decision Relating to the
Definition of a Security is Contrary to the
Koscot Interplanetary Decision .............. D-23
The Panel’s Decision Relating to Reversal of
the Bestline Settlement is Contrary to the
Established Law of this Circuit .............. D-28
nae sees sees eens bnees D-31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................5. D-32
App. D-8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: | Page
Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United States,
410 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1969) ..............05. D-30
Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation (In re),
607 F.26 167 (G4 Cir. 1979) .....cccccccceces D-28
Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc.,
549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) ..... D-23, D-24, D-26
Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc.,
608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979) .........cccceeee D-25
Commander’s Palace Park v. Girard & Pastel Corp.,
572 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978) .........ccceee. D-25
Complaint of Ithaca Corp.,
GOR FO GG Uae, 1GTG) cc cescdsvccesvnces D-31
Cotton v. Hinton,
559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977) .... D-28, D-29, D-31
Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153,
SR Breer rrr D-29
Davis v. United States,
422 F246 1130 (6th Cir. 1070) ....cccccccccess D-31
Dickens v. United States,
545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977) .............00ee D-29
App. D-9
Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A.,
577 F.2d 968 (6th Cir, 1978) .....cccccscvvees D-28
Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale,
506 F.2d 201 (6th Cir, 1978) ...cccccccccccnes D-23
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc.,
448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir, 1971) ......ceeeeeeeees D-29
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Kd.2d 808
UT keh nenbayerekedsneesedesevese D-265
Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital,
436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir, 1970) ........c cece eens D-31
| Joiner v. City of Dallas,
488 F.2d 519 (Sth Cir, 1974) .........5. D-22, D-23
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113,
AMEE RUUED ccocccccccccecceccnece D-22
Machesky v. Bizzel,
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir, 1969) ............000ee D-20
Miller v. Republic National Life Ins. Co.,
559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir, 1977) .......ceeeeeeees D-28
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
576 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir, 1978) .........0eeeeee D-28
Premier Corp. v. Serrano,
565 F.2d 1353 (6th Cir. 1977) .......ceseeeees D-31
App. D-10
SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc.,
556 F.2d 559 (2nd Cir, 1977) .....cceeeeeeees D-23
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir, 1973) cert. denied 414
US 821, 94S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973) ... D-23
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) .........5. D-23, D-24
SEC v. Wencke,
577 F.2d 619 (Oth Cir. 1978) ....ccccvccccvees D-21
Shale v. United States,
409 F.2d 412 (5th Cir, 1969) ........cceeeeeee D-30
S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States,
353 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1965) ........cceeeeeee D-30
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin,
360 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir, 1966) ...........eeeee D-20
Tampa Phosphate R. Co. v. Seaboard
Coast Line R. Co.,
418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir, 1969) .........ceeeeees D-20
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 US 837 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621
ERE VNAeeiens CARA OCRCa ROSES REDS Sedee Eb Roe D-24
Young v. Katz,
447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir, 1971) ........... D-28, D-30
App. D-11
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S, 100, 89 S.Ct. 1562,
23 L.Ed.2d 120 (196) ....ccsccseccevcevcees D-29
STATUTES:
27 U.S.C. $2283 .......... D-20, D-21, D-22, D-23
42 U.S.C. $1981 et seq. ........ceeeees D-22, D-23
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Pendulum Swings, 65 Geo.L.J. 891 (1977) D-25
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are raised on this Petition for
Rehearing en banc:
1. Whether the Panel’s decision relating to the
Anti-Injunction Act is contrary to the Tampa
Phosphate and Machesky decision.
2. Whether the Panel’s decision relating to the
definition of a security is contrary to the Koscot
Interplanetary decision.
3. Whether the Panel’s decision relating to
reversal of the Bestline Settlement is contrary
to the established law of this Circuit.
App. D-12
STATEMENT OF COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
The development of this case is adequately set forth
in the Panel’s Opinion appearing at 610 F.2d 1306.
However, Plaintiffs do not necessarily agree with the
Panel’s characterization of events. For example,
Plaintiffs disagree that Lead Counsel attempted to
“disrupt” the California restitution payments. 610 F.2d
at 1314. Rather, Lead Counsel properly sought to
protect the rights of the Plaintiff class whom they
represented, Likewise, Plaintiffs disagree that the
California class was treated differently from the
Plaintiff class as a whole. Quite to the contrary, special
attention was given to insure there was no distinction of
any kind in the treatment of the two groups. A,801.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The specific facts of this Appeal are for the most
part set forth in detail in the Panel’s Opinion appearing
at 610 F.2d 1306. However, the Panel’s Opinion should
be supplemented as follows:
The settlement referred to by the Panel as the
‘“Bestline Settlement” (610 F.2d at 1327) involved
settlement with twenty-two (22) individual defendants
who were not involved in any respect in the California
Superior Court action. A,855; cf. A,883. The most
important of these additional defendants was
Defendant, Jerry G. Brassfield, who had personally
guaranteed certain terms of the ‘‘Bestline Settlement.”
A,537. Five of the individual settling defendants had
been defendants in the California Superior Court
Action, but they were not ordered to make restitution:
App. D-13
Only Bestline Corporation, Bestline Products, Inc., and
William E. Bailey were parties to the Modified
Judgment and restitionary provisions thereof. A,88.
Participation in the California Restitutionary Program
did not involve or require the release of the twenty seven
(27) individual settling defendants. A,295-296.
The ‘‘Bestline Settlement’’ consisted of
$1,200,000.00 paid by the 27 individual settling
defendants, $230,000.00 received from the sale of
Bestline property in Illinois and $491,000.00 transferred
from the LaSalle Bank in Chicago pursuant to the
District Court’s Preliminary Injunction.
On a percentage basis, response to the notice in this
action by the “California Class’’ was more than double
the response by the ‘‘Non-California Class.” In addition,
the percentage response by the “California Class” was
substantially better than the response in each of two
similar class action cases where the notice was held to be
adequate. Comparative data relating to class action
participation is as follows:
Class Action Participation — Comparative Data
Bestline Bestline Bestline
Total Non-Calif Calif Detroit* Korn**
Notices
Delivered 25,221 18,780 6,441 89,000 667
Proofs of
Claim filed 4,332 2,525 1,807 14,156 122
Percentage
Filing Proofs
of Claim 17% 13% 28% 15% 18%
*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)
**Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972)
App. D-14
Bestline was not insolvent when it filed its Chapter
XI Bankruptcy Petition in the Northern District of
California in July; 1973. A,457. In fact, Bestline had
more than $27,000,000.00 available for levy on execution
at that time. A,457. In July, 1973, Bestline had
sufficient assets to provide immediate full restitution for
the California Class and the claimants in this action as
well. From all appearances, Bestline principals urged
the California Restitutionary Program as a part of a
scheme to escape liability and remove the major part of
Bestline’s assets into foreign countries. A,446-503.
Consequently, at the time of the “‘Bestline Settlement’,
Bestline was insolvent and had been insolvent for a
substantial period of time prior thereto. A,456-460. The
financial condition of Bestline at various times
significant to this litigation was as follows:
App. D-15
Bestline Assets
Available
Bestline Cash For Levy
Date Event On Hand (A459) (A459)(A457)
6-13-73 California Superior Court
Trial Ends.
7-23-73 Bestline files bankruptcy
petition in N.D. California. $4,505,803 $27,052,207
7-25-73 California Superior Court
+4 issues written judgment and
order
8-1-73 Defendant Brassfield gains
control of Bestline
11-?-73 Bestline receives $3,000,000
tax refund (R, 1169) 1,920,340 13,110,232
: 12-21-73 Modified Judgment entered
and Bestline bankruptcy
withdrawn
1-31-74 First payment from
California Restitutionary
Fund 1,558,216 12,602,159
5-3-74 Multi-District Panel
transfers Bestline Cases to
S.D. Florida 513,916 3,605,185
6-?-74 Bestline receives $4,000,000
Le tax refund (R,1169)
6-30-74 Second Payment from
California Restitutionary
Fund 55,227 2,426,675
6-30-76 §.D. Florida enjoins Bestline
from Bench 159,268 -0-
App. D-16
At all times after June 30, 1976, Bestline was
insolvent and from an accounting standpoint had no
assets available for levy. A,456-460. Well prior to that
date, Bestline principals had removed Bestline’s assets
into foreign countries beyond the jurisdiction of the
California Superior Court or the Southern District of
Florida. A,446-503. Bestline’s real estate, consisting of a
warehouse in San Jose, California and a plant in Illinois
remained the only substantial assets subject to the
jurisdiction of any Court within the United States.
However, under the terms of the Modified Judgment,
property outside of the State of California was not
subject to acquisition by the California Attorney
General or receiver to be appointed in the event of a
default. A,89.
Shortly before the trial court issued the Preliminary
Injunction in June, 1976, the California Attorney
General admitted in open court that he was aware that
Bestline money was being used to pay the debts of
Golden Products, Inc., a defunct corporation which had
been operated by Defendant Brassfield prior to his
acquisition of Bestline on August 1, 1973. A,488-490;
A,474,475; A,274. Moreover, the California Attorney
General approved this practice. A,274-275. At the time
the Preliminary Injunction was issued, $1,176,553.48
had been removed from Bestline in this fashion alone.
A,475.
Millions of dollars, including an $8.5 million tax
refund, were also diverted from Bestline while the
California Attorney General and the Bestline “financial
officer’ were supposed to be monitoring Bestline’s
operations. A,446-503; A,263-303. In fact, the Internal
Revenue Service is now seeking deficiencies in the
App. D-17
amount of $16,604,909.00 from Defendant Brassfield
arising out of his pyramid scheme operations. See
Brassfield v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service,
Tax Court Docket No. 338678.
It should be noted that Plaintiffs do not agree that
the following statements by the Panel are consistent
with the facts of this case:
The Compliance Officer has kept himself abreast of the
litigation in Florida from its inception. 610 F.2d at 1323.
Not only did the District Court intend to liquidate
Besiline’s assets, but he intended to distribute the
proceeds only to class members ‘‘who have not
previously been admitted to participation in the
California restitutionary fund.” 610 F.2d at 1323.
At that time, the California fund had just made its
second payment, and many of the participants
undoubtedly were confused by this notice of yet another
lawsuit. 610 F.2d at 1324.
As has already been demonstrated, there was a distinct
probability that the confusing, if not deceptive, series of
notices guaranteed that no members of the California
group would appear at the hearing to protest the
settlement. 610 F.2d at 1325.
[T]he District Court also intended to appoint a receiver
with instructions to liquidate all of Bestline’s assets. 610
F.2d at 1326.
Bailey gave no consideration whatsoever for the release
of these claims. 610 F.2d at 1327.
App. D-18
This is demanded by the failure to assess the interests of
the two categories of the plaintiffs and whether the
settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable as to each.
610 F.2d at 1329.
Rather than execute their judgments and force Bestline
into bankruptcy, those 7,043 people chose to accept
smaller installment payments and to keep Bestline
afloat for the greater good of all concerned. 610 F.2d at
1329.
Therefore the members of the fund have been deprived
of over $600, on the average, to which they were entitled
as a result of their judgments against Bestline. 610 F.2d
at 1329.
The interest of these 7,043 people in protecting their
judgments has not been adequately recognized or
protected. 610 F.2d at 1329.
Furthermore, since those 7,043 people were already
entitled to such funds (up to $4,500,000 plus interest),
this litigation has generated no common fund from
which to pay attorneys’ fees and expenses. 610 F.2d at
1330.
If, however, Bestline would have defaulted on those
payments before now, the California class would still
have obtained Bestline’s assets through liquidation long
before this settlement. 610 F.2d at 1330.
While accepting generally the Panel’s description of
the facts of this case, Plaintiffs submit that the
foregoing findings are erroneous and inconsistent with
*
App. D-19
the evidence of record herein. These matters have been
addressed in Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing filed
concurrently herewith.
ARGUMENT
THE PANEL’S DECISION RELATING TO
THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT IS
CONTRARY TO THE TAMPA
PHOSPHATE AND MACHESKY
DECISIONS
The Panel’s analysis of the District Court’s issuance
of the Preliminary Injunction places significant
emphasis on the characterization of this action as a
private lawsuit. 610 F.2d at 1332-1334. The Panel’s
conclusion “that for private lawsuits the Securities
Exchange Act does not constitute an ‘expressly
authorized’ exception to 27 U.S.C. $2283” (610 F.2d at
1333), is in direct conflict with this Court’s holdings in
Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) and
Tampa Phosphate R. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.
Co., 418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969).
Both Machesky and Tampa Phosphate recognized
that §2283 is inapplicable in extraordinary cases where
an injunction against state court proceedings is the only
means to avoid grave and irreparable injury. In
addition, both cases held that a different result should
not obtain, when enforcement is sought by a private
party rather than by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 414 F.2d at 288; 418 F.2d at 394. This
Court cited with approval the case of Studebaker Corp.
v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), stating:
App. D-20
[I]n the opinion by Judge Friendly, the court
found that §2283 was not a bar to a private
action under the Securities and Exchange Act.
418 F.2d at 393.
Additionally, Plaintiffs would note that the Panel
calls attention to SEC v. Wencke, 577 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.
1978), 610 F.2d at 1332, a case which squarely approved
the district court’s enjoining state court action as an
exception to §2283. There the court observed:
Rather than a genuine attempt to preserve the
property for the corporation’s shareholders and
creditors, the state receivership was a
protective cloak for Wencke to throw over his
continued looting. Jd. at 622.
In view of the dissipation of assets in the California
Fund under the aegis of the California Attorney General
and Sylva, the removal of Brassfield’s protective cloak
accomplished by the Preliminary Injunction would
appear to take it outside of §2283. It should be
emphasized that shortly before issuing the Preliminary
Injunction, the trial court had heard the California
Attorney General acknowledge that more than
$1,000,000.00 had been paid by Bestline to satisfy a
liability incurred by Defendant Brassfield prior to his
affiliation with Bestline. A,457; 474-475. This money
was paid into another California restitutionary plan
established by the California Attorney General for
distributors of Golden Products, Inc., a completely
different pyramid scheme operated by Defendant
Brassfield in competition with Bestline. A,475. The
evidence before the trial court made it clear that neither
App. D-21
the California Attorney General nor Sylva were taking
any steps to prevent the systematic depletion of
Bestline’s assets which had been occurring up to the
time of the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction.
The Panel’s opinion is also in direct conflict with
this Court’s holding in Joiner v. City of Dallas, Texas,
488 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974), as well as the Supreme
Court’s holding in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538,.92,S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972). In
Joiner, plaintiffs sought to enjoin state condemnation
proceedings in order to protect their property rights. The
district court had ruled that an injunction against
pending state court proceedings would be barred by
§2283, reasoning that 42 U.S.C. $1981 et seq. did not
apply to property rights. Joiner v. City of Dallas, 329
F.Supp. 943, 944 (N.D.Tex. 1971). This Court affirmed,
447 F.2d 1403, and the Supreme Court, without opinion,
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
certain Supreme Court decisions. Joiner v. City of
Dallas, 412 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 2286, 36 L.Ed.2d 967
(1973). On remand this Court stated:
Second, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.
held that §1983 protects property rights as well
as personal liberties. The issue in Lynch was
whether, in light of the anti-injunction statute,
the District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin a
summary pre-judicial garnishment proceeding
permitted under Connecticut law but
challenged under the due process clause as it
applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court held that 42 U.S.C.A.
§1983 and 28 U.S.C.A. §1343 provided an
App. D-22
exception to the anti-injunction statute to
protect property rights as well as personal
liberties. Again, the Joiner decision was in
direct conflict with this holding. 488 F.2d at
520.
Plaintiff’s reliance on deprivation of property without
due process of law to come within the §1983 exception to
§2283 was summarily discounted (610 F.2d at 1332),
reminiscent of the first Joiner opinion and in direct
conflict with the later, correct Joiner decision. See also
Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d
291, 300 (5th Cir. 1979).
In view of the above considerations, Plaintiffs
submit that the district court properly entered the
Preliminary Injunction and that the Panel’s decision is
not reconcilable with the prior law of this Circuit.
THE PANEL’S DECISION RELATING TO
THE DEFINITION OF A SECURITY IS
CONTRARY TO THE KOSCOT
INTERPLANETARY DECISION
The Panel specifically found that there were two
distinct aspects of the distribution system set up by
Bestline, just as there had been in SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir. 1973) cert. denied 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38
L.Ed.2d 53 (1973); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 556 F.2d
559 (2d Cir. 1977) and Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. 1977). 610 F.2d at 1318. These two aspects
were described by the Panel as the “retail sales portion
of the business on one hand and the recruiting portion
App. D-23
on the other.” 610 F.2d at 1318. The Panel noted
however:
As is the case with most such pyramid sales
schemes, however, the lure of big profits came
not from the opportunity to sell Bestline’s
products to the consuming public but from the
opportunity to recruit others who would in turn
recruit or sell, 610 F.2d at 1310.
The Panel went on to conclude that “different
inferences could be drawn from the facts in the record as
to whether the Bestline Direct Distributorship Plan
could be separated into two parts” and that “different
inferences could be drawn from the facts in the record as
to whether anticipated profits were to come solely by
Bestline’s efforts, with no substantial personal effort on
the part of the ‘investor’.”” 610 F.2d at 1319. However,
this Court recognized in Bell v. Health-Mor, supra,
“that income oppomminity can be considered
independently of any sale of a product or service which
might have been made.” 549 F.2d at 346. Of course,
under the authority of Koscot and the other cases cited
by the Panel, the test is not whether anticipated profits
were to come “solely from Bestline’s efforts with no
substantial personal effort” by the Investor, but whether
Bestline was to provide the ‘‘essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.’’ See
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d at 483.
The Panel’s opinion conflicts with the
interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975) and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
App. D-24
U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979), that are
generally accepted by all commentators and Circuit
Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit. See
Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under the Federal Securities Laws; The Pendulum
Swings, 65 Geo.L.J. 891, 908 (1977). This court stated in
Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d
187 (5th Cir, 1979):
The key issue is whether the managerial efforts
are functionally essential or undeniably
significant to that profit, and it is irrelevant
that the investor does “nominal menial effort”
that affects profit. Jd. at 193.
Here, however, the Panel concluded that summary
judgment was improper because “there was evidence
that might lead the trier of fact to conclude that
Bestline intended to dispel (and dispelled) the belief
that it was promising profits with no expenditure of
effort.” 610 F.2d at 1319. This is simply inconsistent
with this Court’s finding in Cameron that “it is
irrelevant that the investor does ‘nominal menial effort’
that affects profit.”’
Additionally the Panel’s repeated emphasis on the
word solely in the Howey test (a word significantly
omitted by the Supreme Court in Forman) conflicts
with this Court’s pronouncement in Commander's
Palace Park v. Girard & Pastel Corp., 572 F.2d 1084 (5th
Cir, 1978):
App. D-25
In cases dealing with pyramid sales schemes or
referral sales agreements, we have modified
this test to allow that the promoter or the third
party need expend not the sole efforts, but only
the crucial efforts, to produce profits. Id, at
1086.
And in Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., supra, this Court
noted:
(T]he assumption that Howey requires that the
income be derived soley by the efforts of those
other than the investor [was] specifically
rejected, . .in Koscot. 549 F.2d at 346.
The shattering effect to the foundation of the Fifth
Circuit’s leadership on a question of such exceptional
importance in the evolution of securities law surely
renders this decision ‘“‘enbancworthy.”
The Panel specifically found that the Bestline
Direct Distributorships were ‘an integral part of its
multi-level distributorship system, a species of pyramid
sales schemes.” 610 F.2d at 1308. After finding that the
Bestline Direct Distributorship was a part of Bestline’s
pyramid sales scheme, the Panel acknowledged that this
Court specifically held in Koscot that a pyramid
distribution system is a security. 610 F.2d at 1316. A
reading of the Panel’s decision, however, would lead one
to believe that pyramid franchising schemes are no
longer securities in the fifth Circuit despite the Koscot
holding, and that it is necessary for victim of a pyramid
franchising scheme to prove there was “no substantial
effort by the investor.” 610 F.2d at 1320. In contrast, the
Koscot test related to the “undeniably significant ones,
App. D-26
those essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise.” 497 F.2d at 483.
The Panel found that the lure of “big” profits came
not from the opportunity to sell Bestline products to the
consuming public but from the opportunity ‘to recruit
others who would in turn recruit or sell. 610 F.2d at 1310.
However, it is clear that no reasonable investor would
seek out “small” profits. There can be no dispute as to
the inference that every reasonable investor would seek
out “big” profits rather than “small” profits thereby
eliminating any question of inference or fact in the case
at bar. Therefore, the District Court correctly found on
summary judgment that the Bestline Direct
Distributorship was a “security”’.
It is noted that the Koscot case consisted of an
outright reversal of the District Court’s findings that the
Koscot distributorship was not a security. Clearly, the
criteria for reversal of the District Court’s findings of
fact differ little from the criteria to be applied in favor of
the non-moving party upon motion for summary
judgment. Therefore, with Koscot for guidance, the
District Court in this case was plainiy justified in relying
upon the Koscot criteria for ertry of summary
judgment. However, the Panel’s decision reversing the
District Court brings into doubt the applicability of the
Koscot standards for future litigation.
App. D-27
THE PANEL’S DECISION RELATING TO
REVERSAL OF THE BESTLINE
SETTLEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE
ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS CIRCUIT
The standards governing approval of settlements in
class actions are well established in this circuit: Young
v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971); Miller v. Republic
National Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977);
Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1977); Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir.
1978); In re Beef Industry Anti-trust Litigation, 607 F.2d
167 (5th Cir. 1979). In the instant case, the trial judge in
fact adhered meticulously to these standards,
particularly in assessing “the interests of the two
categories of Plaintiffs and whether the settlement was
fair, adequate and reasonable as to each.” 610 F.2d at
1329. See A,801. The trial judge weighed the testimony
of witnesses, sifted through the evidence and heard
counsel’s arguments before determining that the
objections to the notice were meritless. The Panel’s
opinion is in direct conflict with this Court’s
pronouncement in Harrison v. Flota Mercante
Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978):
It is not our duty or right on appeal to sift
through the evidence and determine whether
we would have drawn the same inferences as
did the trier of fact and would have resolved
credibility determinations in a like fashion. Jd.
at 976.
However, the Panel was misled by Appellant into
making direct, and unfortunately erroneous, findings of
fact. The teachings of the Supreme Court are pertinent:
App. D-28
When attention has been focused on other
issues, or when the Court from which a case
comes has expressed no views on a controlling
question, it may be appropriate to remand the
case rather than deal with the merits of that
question in this Court. Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491
(1970).
This Court recognized in Cotton v. Hinton, supra,
that each case must be decided on its own facts and that
in determining whether a compromise is fair, adequate
and reasonable, the trial judge is essentially called upon
to do a balancing task. 559 F.2d at 1330. This Court has
often asserted that in reviewing approval of settlement
it has neither the right nor the duty to reach any
ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which
underlie the merits of the dispute. 559 F.2d at 1330. In
Cotton as well as the case at bar: “On appeal, the
objectors present the same objections to us as were
presented to and rejected by the trial judge.” 559 F.2d at
1332.
The appellate court’s function is to review cases; it
neither tries nor retries fact issues. Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct.
1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969); Hill York Corp. v.
American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680
(5th Cir. 1971); Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1977). As stated in Hill York:
[Wle must not be understood as even
intimating that we can engage in the fact-
finding process at the appellate level. 448 F.2d
at 691.
App. D-29
The settlement in Young v. Katz, supra, provided
that:
The various defendants to the suit would pay
plaintiffs’ attorney fees in a fixed amount,
subject to the approval of the court. Id. 447
F.2d at 434.
This was the precise arrangement in the instant case as
well. However, the Panel was “convinced that the
District Court fell into serious error when it approved
the attorneys’ fees proposed in the Bestline settlement.”
610 F.2d at 1328. This conviction was based on the order
entering final judgment which did not set forth fully the
basis of the Court’s finding “that the amount is
reasonable under the circumstances of this protracted
and complicated case.” A,855. Although it is not
apparent from the order, the record reveals that the
District Court did “address the issue of attorneys’ fees
under the standards of Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).” 610 F.2d at 1328.
However, the Panel ruled that “approval of the
settlement must be reversed on this ground.” 610 F.2d
at 1328. This ruling appears in direct conflict with the
consistent policy of this Court in cases where the record
was insufficient to ascertain the basis for the trial
judges’ findings of fact and conclusions of law, to
remand for the express purpose of enabling the District
Court to state its findings, or when necessary to make
further and more specific appropriate findings. S.S.
Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 545, 550 (5th
Cir. 1965); Shale v. United States, 409 F.2d 412, 413 (5th
Cir. 1969); Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United
States, 410 F.2d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1969); Davis v. United
App. D-30
States, 422 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1970); Hodgson uv.
Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1970); Premier Corp v. Serrano, 565 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.
1977); Complaint of Ithaca Corp., 582 F.2d 3, 4 (5th Cir.
1978).
As stated in Cotton:
Particularly in class action suits, there is an
overriding public interest in favor of settlement.
559 F.2d at 1331.
There is little doubt that the Panel’s opinion will
discourage settlement in complex class action suits. Added
to the many existing obstacles discouraging embarcation
on prolonged, tedious, expensive, time-consuming and
often unrewarding complex litigation in the area of
securities fraud class suits, discouragement of settlement
will surely toll the death knell of a desired and needed
social benefit. Thus, it would appear appropriate for the
Court to grant a rehearing en banc.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs/Appelles, Peter
Piambino, et al., respectfully request a rehearing of the
within appeal by this Court sitting en banc.
CARL H. HOFFMAN
App. D-31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that an original and one copy
of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed or
delivered to each attorney of record this
May, 1980.
BY:
day of
CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.
Attorneys for Appellees,
Peter Piambino, et al.
2660 AmeriFirst Building
One Southeast Third Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131
App. D-32
APPENDIX D
In re BESTLINE PRODUCTS SECURITIES
and Antitrust Litigation.
MDL No. 162-Civ-JLK.
United States District Court,
S. D. Florida.
March 19, 1976.
Action was brought by purchasers of direct
distributorships of defendants’ home and personal care
products to recover for alleged violations of federal
securities laws as well as for violations of various state
Blue Sky Laws and for common law, fraud and deceit.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on issue of
whether the distributorships were securities in the
nature of investment contracts within ambit of the
federal securities laws. The District Court, James
Lawrence King, J., held that fact that class plaintiffs
could not expect to receive a share of the proceeds from
the common enterprise unless they contributed some
effort was not inconsistent with existence of an
investment contract and that the distributorships were
investment contracts since they involved an investment
of money or tender of initial value, relationship among
the seller, distributors and others constituted a common
enterprise and there was a reasonable expectation that
an investment would lead to profits to be derived from
significant or essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts of others, which efforts affected the failure or
success of the common enterprise or venture.
App. D-33
|
>
Interlocutory summary judgment entered.
1. Securities Regulation — 22, 43
Multilevel sales organization may be subject to the
federal securities laws. Securities Act of 1933, $1 et seq.,
15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.; Securities Exchange Act of
1934, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §78a et seq.
2. Securities Regulation — 13, 42
Four essential elements must be found to be present
in any economic relationship to give rise to the existence
of an investment contract so as to bring such
relationship into the ambit of federal securities
regulation; such elements are: (1) An investment of
money, or tender of initial value; (2) in a common
enterprise or venture; (3) with a reasonable expectation
of profits; (4) to be derived from the undeniably
significant, or essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts of others which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise. Securities Act of 1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A.
§77a et seq.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq.,
15 U.S.C.A. §78a et seq.
3. Securities Regulation — 13, 42
Direct distributorships for sale or distribution to
consuming public of line of personal and home care
products were “investment contracts” within ambit of
federal securities laws where the distributorship
involved an investment of money or tender of initial
value, i.e., prepurchase of substantial quantity of the
product and sales aids, the relationship among the seller
App. D-34
of the distributorships, its corporate chain, distributors
and others, constituted a common enterprise or venture
and fortuity of the distributors’ investment collectively
was essentially dependent on the seller’s expertise.
Securities Act of 1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et
seq.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq., 15
U.S.C.A §78a et seq.
4. Federal Civil Procedure — 2543
In ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary jugment
district court was to draw all reasonable inferences
derivable from the facts favorably to the defendants.
Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
5. Securities Regulation — 13, 42
In determining whether direct distributorships of
home and personal care products constituted
‘investment contracts” within ambit of federal
securities laws, the business opportunity offered by
participation as a distributor was to be viewed through
the eyes of the class plaintiffs considering only such
facts as were available to them at time of their
individual investment decisions; essential inquiry in
determining whether entrepreneurial efforts of others
affected failure or success of the enterprise was
plaintiffs’ preinvestment expectations as to the nature
of their investments and whether reasonabie minds
could differ as to such expectations. Securities Act of
1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §78a et
seq.
App. D-35
6. Securities Regulation — 13, 42
Fact that one does not expect to receive a share of
proceeds from a common enterprise or venture unless he
contributes some effort is not inconsistent with
existence of an investment contract. Securities Act of
1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §78a et
seq.
James H. Joseph, Joseph & Hershman, P. C.
Pittsburgh, Pa., Carl H. Hoffman, Miami, Fla., for
plaintiff class.
J. Russell Pitto, Humphreys, Berger & Pitto, San
Jose, Cal., for defendants Bestline Products, Inc.,
Bestline Corp., Jerry Brassfield, Oliver P. Colvin, James
K. Hisler, Norman Miller and Richard Dumont.
Robert B. Hutchinson, Cotchett, Hutchinson &
Dyer, San Mateo, Cal., Gerald F. Richman, Frates,
Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Proenza & Richman, Miami,
Fla., for defendants William E. Bailey, Towru Ikeda and
Martin Day.
Paul, Landy, Beily & Yacos, William M. Hoeveler,
Knight, Peters, Hoeveler, Pickle, Niemoeller & Flynn,
Miami, Fla., for defendants Richard Grillo, Janin
Morgan & Brenner.
Marc W. Watson, Pettigrew & Bailey, Miami, Fla.,
for defendants Gordon Blaum, Edna Blaum and George
Wunch.
App. D-36
OPINION AND ORDER DETERMINING
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.
HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION
These proceedings constitute the third in a series of
complex cases to be transferred by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to a single forum for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings and
which involve Federal securities law claims by alleged
classes of private litigants against corporations claimed
to have engaged in the offer and sale to the public of
distributorships for their products, which
distributorships are alleged to be unregistered securities
in the nature of investment contracts or certificates of
interest in profit-sharing arrangements.’ Like its
predecessors, these proceedings also involve alleged
violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933 (hereinafter “Securities Act” and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter “Exchange
1On December 15, 1972, approximately 20 private actions,
followed by nearly 100 subsequent tag-along cases, which arose out
of the offer and sale by Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. and Dare To Be
Great, Inc., subsidiaries of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., of
multi-level distributorships were transferred pursuant to 28
U.S.C.A. §1407 to the Western District of Pennsylvania for
consolidated or coordinated pretrail proceedings. On April 6, 1973,
a dozen private actions followed by several dozen tag-along cases,
arising out of the offer and sale of multi-level distributorships by
Holiday Magic, Inc. and affiliated corporations were transferred to
the Northern District of California for the same purpose. The
Transfer Order in these proceedings was entered on April 29, 1974.
App. D-37
Act’), as well as violations of various state Blue Sky
laws and common law fraud and deceit.
The instant proceedings arise out of the offer and
sale by Bestline Products, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Bestline Corporation (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ‘“‘Bestline’’), of pre-purchase
Direct Distributorships contracts or agreements
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Direct Distributorships’’) for
the sale and distribution to the consuming public of its
line of personal and home care products. Most of the
individual actions consolidated in this judicie! district
assert that the Bestline Direct Distributorships are
securities in the nature of investment contracts or
certificates of interest in a profit-sharing arrangement,
and that they were offered, sold and distributed
unlawfully inasmuch as they were neither registered nor
accompanied by a prospectus filed in compliance with
the rules of the Securities & Exchange Commission.’
Each such action seeks rescission of the distributorship
agreements, as well as damages for fraud in connection
with the sale thereof, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Some 40,000 persons are alleged to have purchased or
invested in Bestline Direct Distributorships from late
1967 until August 10, 1973, in connection with which
such persons paid Bestline an aggregate sum of nearly
$120 million. Of those persons, less than 6,000 remain
active as Bestline distributors.
2The Defendants have never disputed that Bestline Direct
Distributorships were unregistered, or that their offer, sale and
distribution occurred by the means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, including the mails. Admissions to that effect
were made in response to the Piambino Plaintiffs’ First Request For
Admissions filed herein.
App. D-38
A multitude of Defendants are named in the
numerous suits, most of whom are present or former
officers, directors or controlling shareholders of Bestline,
or persons who held the field (as distinguished from
Home Office or Headquarters) positions of Assistant
Vice President, Regional Director and Area
Coordinator.’ Bestline’s officers, directors and
controlling shareholders are alleged to have controlled
and directed Bestline in its unlawful course of conduct,
and together with its field representatives are also
charged with aiding and abetting and participating in
the alleged unlawful conduct by implementing the
actual offer, sale and distribution of Bestline’s Direct
Distributorships throughout the country. In addition,
various lawyers and a law firm which served as
Bestline’s General Counsel are charged with aiding and
abetting the offer, sale and distribution of the Bestline
Direct Distributorships, as well as the alleged fraud in
connection therewith.
The original suit filed in this judicial district, and
the lead suit in the consolidated proceedings, was
brought by Florida residents Peter Piambino, Joseph F.
Kucklick, Marilyn Koslen, Robert M. Ernst and
Michael J. Gardner (hereinafter referred to as the
“Piambino Plaintiffs’) as a class action. On November
22, 1974, upon motion of the Piambino Plaintiffs, this
Court ordered that the Piambino case should proceed as
a class action on behalf of a class of Plaintiffs consisting
of all persons who purchased or invested in Direct
3Assistant Vice Presidents and Regional Directors, together
with Home Office officials, constitute what in Bestline’s parlance is
referred to as its ‘Corporate Team”’.
App. D-39
Distributorship contracts or agreements, or their
equivalents, who never qualified as General
Distributors, and who have not re-ordered products
from Bestline since May 22, 1974.‘
By stipulation between the Piambino Plaintiffs and
the Defendants, the latter of which sought to avoid
having notice of the pendency of the class action sent to
all 40,000 present and former distributors within the
Plaintiff class because of the alleged disruptive effect it
would have on Bestline’s on-going business, a Notice of
Pendency of Class Action was approved by this Court
and sent by First Class mail only to those 10,000
members of the Plaintiff class who purchased or
invested in Bestline Direct Distributorships after May 1,
1972, thereby embracing the calendar year preceding
the earliest of those lawsuits transferred to this judicial
district by the Judicial Panel on Miultidistrict
Litigation, and as to which persons the one-year
limitation on actions contained in Securities Act $13
‘General Distributors were excluded from the Plaintiff class
because, by definition, they were paid fees, bonuses, commissions
or rewards for successfully recruiting Direct Distributors and may
be alleged to be brokers or dealers with respect to the Bestline
Direct Distributorships, thereby creating a possible conflict of
interests within the Plaintiff class. Likewise, those Direct
Distributors who repurchased Bestline products within six months
preceding the class action order were excluded on the assumption
that such persons remain active as distributors and may have an
interest in Bestline’s financial survival which conflicts with that of
inactive Direct Distributors. Class members who previously
received refunds or were part of a restitution plan arrived at in
negotiations between Bestline and the Attorneys General of several
states were excluded for obvious reasons.
App. D-40
does not apply. All class members whose Securities Act
§12(1) claims were not thereby time-barred would be
entitled to the remedy of rescission if this Court
determined that the Bestline Direct Distributorships
were securities, while the nearl; 79,000 remaining class
members would be relegated to claims arising out of
alleged violations by the Defendants of the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and
the rules and regulations of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, as to which claims this Court denied class
status except insofar as they involve an adjudication of
whether the Bestline Direct Distributorships are
securities. It was also stipulated that upon any
determination by this Court that the Bestline Direct
distributorships constituted securities, the remaining
portion of the Plaintiff class would be notified of such a
ruling and would also be apprised of the effect thereof on
their individual rights, including their right to initiate
separate actions. In consideration of deferring notice to
the remaining 30,000 class members until after any such
ruling by this Court, the Defendants agreed to pay all
costs of the deferred notice, while the Piambino
Plaintiffs paid .he cost of preparing and mailing the
initial notice.
In March of 1975, this Court denied various
Motions to Dismiss the class action which raised
numberous objections to the Piambino Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint, as well as Motions For
Summary Judgment filed by several Defendants.® This
Court believed that the Motions For Summary
The disposition of the Motions to Dismiss and earlier Motions
For Summary Judgment is reported at CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep.
995,070 (S.D. Fla., March 21, 1975).
App. D-41
Judgment were at that time premature because of the
then undeveloped state of the record.
Thereafter, the parties engaged in nearly twelve
(12) months of extensive discovery. Thirteen separate
sets of Interrogatories were propounded to the various
Defendants and answered. Numberous Requests for
Admissions and accompanying Interrogatories were
served upon the Defendants and answered. Thirty-six
Depositivns on Oral Examination were taken which ran
to in excess of 4,500 pages, virtually all of which were of
Defendants in these proceedings during four week-long
sessions in San Francisco and San Jose, California,
Washington, D. C. and Miami, Florida. This member of
the Court personally presided over nearly three weeks of
said depositions with the permission of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in order to expedite
the completion of discovery and eliminate countless
motions by various parties to compel discovery. The
Interrogatories, Request For Admissions and
Depositions on Oral Examination of the parties and
witnesses extended to the furthest reaches of Bestline’s
operation, as well as businesses subsequently organized
or controlled by its present and former principals, and
many former Corporate Team members.
Upon completion of the aforesaid discovery, the
Piambino Plaintiffs moved this Court pursuant to
F.R.Civ.P. 56 to enter partial summary judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff class, and against the Defendants,
on the sole issue of whether the Bestline Direct
Distributorships are securities in the nature of
investment contracts. Although the Piambino Plaintiffs
have suggested several theories to reach the legal
conclusion that the Direct Distributorships constituted
App. D-42
securities within the meaning of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act, the only theory pursued by them in
support of their First Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment is based in substantial part upon an
application of the law expressed by the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon in Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 348 F.Supp. 766 (D.Or. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117,
38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1974), followed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Securities & Exchange Commission
v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974), and also followed by at least two District Courts
in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bull
Investment Group, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. 95,010
(D.Mass., March 10, 1975), and Securities & Exchange
Commission v. JET Travel Services, Inc., CCH
Fed.Sec.L.Rep. $95,317 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 29, 1975). All of
the foregoing cases applied the Federal securities laws to
multi-level sales organizations.
In response to the Piambino Plaintiffs’ First Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment, the principal
Defendants joined in their own Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment which sought dismissal of these
proceedings on the limited grounds that because the
Plaintiff class members received soap products from
Bestline in consideration of their investment, as a
matter of law no security can be found to exist.
The Piambino Plaintiffs contend that the
Defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
should be denied, and further submit that there is no
genuine issue as to the material facts relevant to the
entire issue of whether the Bestline Direct
App. D-43
Distributorships constitute securities in the nature of an
investment contract within the meaning of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and that partial
summary judgment on that issue should be entered by
this Court in favor of the Plaiz.‘iff class, and against the
Defendants. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we
agree.
APPLICABLE PRINCIPALS OF
FEDERAL SECURITIES AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW
[1] Since November 24, 1971, it has been clear
that multi-level sales organizations may be subject to
the Federal securities laws.* On that date, the Securities
& Exchange Commission (herein referred to as “the
Commission”) issued its Release No. 5211, entitled
“Applicability of the Securities Laws to Multi-Level
Distributorship and Pyramid Sales Plans”. 17 C.F.R.
931.5211. In that Release, the Commission advanced its
view that the Federal securities laws may be applicable
to certain multi-level sales organizations, and thereafter
commenced several successful enforcement actions
based upon that contention. Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348
F.Supp. 766 (D.Or. 1972), 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53
(1974); Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974);
6For an exhaustive discussion of the development of the
applicability of securities laws to multi-level distributorships and
pyramid sales plans, see Pyramid Schemes: Dare To Be Regulated
661 Geo.L.J. 1257 (1973).
App. D-44
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bull Investment
Group, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. {95,010 (D.Mass.,
Mar. 10, 1975); and Securities & Exchange Commission
v. JET Travel Services, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep.
{95,317 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 29, 1975).’
Before the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon in Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., supra, the leading and most-often cited authority
for determining what forms of economic relationships
constitute “investment contracts” within the meaning
of the Federal securities laws was the decision of the
Supreme Court in Securities & Exchange Commission
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90
L.Ed. 1244 (1946). In its opinion in the Howey case, the
Supreme Court stated that “. .. an investment
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third-party. . ..” 328 U.S. at 298-299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103,
90 L.Ed. at 1249.
After the decision in Howey, the Commission, as
well as the Courts which subsequently applied the law
announced therein, expressed their recognition that the
significant wording in the Howey definition of an
investment contract was not the word “solely’’, but
rather the word “‘efforts’’.
7All of the reported decisions involved multi-level sales
organizations.
App. D-45
The decision of the Oregon Court was the first to
apply the reasoning that the word “solely” in the Howey
decision did not relate to the quantum of the investor’s
efforts, but the relative quality of the efforts contributed
by the investor and the promoter, or a third person. The
reasoning of the Oregon Court was compelled by the
Howey Court’s earlier admonition that the definition of
a security ““. . . embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of money of others on the promise of
profits.” 328 U.S. at 299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103, 90 L.Ed. at
1250.
The Oregon Court accorded to the Howey test the
degree of flexibility originally contemplated by the
Supreme Court to effect the important remedial
purposes of the Federal securities laws, without plying
uncharted waters by adopting the approaches taken by
several state courts in the application of their Blue Sky
laws, or the reasoning of the Commission in Release No.
5211, which relied heavily upon such decisions.°®
The effort of the Oregon Court to apply the Howey
test to the Dare To Be Great multi-level sales scheme
devised by Florida promoter Glenn W. Turner was
subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and followed by the Fifth Circuit in Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
supra, which reversed the decision of the United States
8Likewise, the Supreme Court declined the invitation in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 2051,
44 L.Ed.2d 621, 43 U.S.L.W. 4792 (1975), to import the “risk
capital’’ theory into Federal securities jurisprudence.
App. D-46
2 Eee EOE ee
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
because that Court emphasized the quantum of the
investor’s efforts, rather than the relative quality
thereof, in evaluating another Turner scheme. In
affirming the decision of the Oregon Court, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
We hold. . . that the definition of securities
should be a flexible one, the word ‘solely’
should not be read as a strict or literal
limitation on the definition of an investment
contract, but rather must be construed
realistically. ...
* * ” ” *
We adopt a more realistic test, whether the
efforts made by those other than the investor
are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise. 474 F.2d at
482.
And in reversing the Georgia Court, the Fifth Circuit
held likewise. 497 F.2d at 485.
The direction charted by the Oregon Court, and
followed by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits in elaborating
upon the Howey test, received recent expression in
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
851-54, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2060-61, 44 L.Ed.2d 621, 632-33,
43, U.S.L.W. 4742, 4747 (June 17, 1975), wherein the
Court synthesized the law relating to investment
contracts and restated the Howey principle in the
following language: ‘The touchstone [of an investment
App. D-47
contract] is the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits
to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others [Emphasis added]’’. By focusing on the
quality of the efforts of others, the Supreme Court read
the word “solely” out of the Howey test, it having
become so much surplusage, thereby according to its
prior Howey decision the flexibility originally intended.
[2] A review of the decisions of the District and
Appellate Courts including the Supreme Court, in
recent cases applying the Howey-generated test for an
investment contract reveals four essential elements
which must be found to be present in any economic
relationship to give rise to the existence of an
investment contract, thereby bringing such
relationships into the ambit of Federal securities
regulation. Those elements are: (1) An investment of
money, or tender of initial value; (2) in a common
enterprise or venture; (3) with a reasonable expectation
of profits; (4) to be derived from the undeniably
significant, or essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts of others which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise.
_[8, 4] The Piambino Plaintiffs ask this Court to
measure the material facts developed in these
proceedings against a yardstick comprised of the
foregoing elements on an investment contract. Based
upon established principles of law applicable to
summary judgments under F.R.Civ.P. 56, they insis*.
and we agree, that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact with respect to the issue of whether the
Bestline Direct Distributorships constitute investment
App. D-48
contracts within the meaning of the Federal securities
laws. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368
U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). In so doing,
we draw all reasonable inferences derivable from such
facts favorably to the Defendants. United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176
(1962).
In applying the applicable principles of the Federal
securities laws and settled principles of summary
judgment law to the facts involved in these proceedings,
we note at the outset that virtually all of the facts of
record herein are contained in a multitude of responses
by the Defendants to discovery initiated by the
Piambino Plaintiffs. There are no independent
witnesses whose observations, knowledge or testimony is
relied upon by the Piambino Plaintiffs in support of
their First Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, and
virtually all of the facts material to the so-called
“securities issue’’ were elicited by the Piambino
Plaintiffs from the Defendants themselves through
reams of discovery documents, including lengthy
depositions, which touched upon virtually every aspect
of Bestline’s business.
The mere extensiveness of the record, however, as
well as the complexity of the facts and theories of law
involved in these proceedings, have been heavily relied
upon by the Defendants in opposing the Piambino
Plaintiffs’ First Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment. The Defendants argue that there is a
plethora of disputed facts which preclude this Court’s
determination of the securities issue by an interlocutory
summary adjudication.
App. D-49
ae».
Despite the extensiveness of the record, the volume
of facts contained therein, and the variety of far-
reaching inferences which the parties urge this Court to
draw therefrom, we have scrupulously limited this
summary disposition of the securities issue to a
consideration of only the material facts of record and the
inferences which may be reasonably drawn therefrom,
viewing all such facts and inferences in a light most
favorable to the Defendants. By this strict and careful
application of the standards required to be applied in
summary adjudications, the facts and inferences to be
considered to determine the Piambino Plaintiffs’ First
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment are
dramatically reduced in number and scope.
Based upon our detailed review of the record in
these proceedings, carried out in accordance with the
foregoing principles applicable to summary
adjudications, we hold that any specific factual
controversies which are asserted in these proceedings
involve facts which are immaterial to the issue of
whether Bestline’s Direct Distributorships constitute
investment contracts, or the components of that issue as
set forth hereinabove, either because any such facts are
irrelevant to the issue before this Court or because they
lack any uniformity of impact upon the class Plaintiffs.
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).
With the foregoing principles of law in view, we
hereby apply them to the material facts involved in
these proceedings.
App. D-50
BESTLINE’S GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT
Bestline’s business began in August of 1966 when
William E. Bailey and Jerry G. Brassfield (hereinafter
referred to as “Bailey” and ‘“Brassfield”, respectively),
two of the Defendants in these proceedings, joined forces
to organize a multi-level direct sales organization to sell
and distribute a line of bio-degradable soap products
previously developed by one William Boudreau, a
chemist. Prior thereto, Bailey and Brassfield had been
associated as distributors for Holiday Magic, Inc., a
multi-level direct sales company involved in the
distribution of cosmetic products, which itself later
became the object of numerous private and public suits
and regulatory action.
Bailey and Brassfield had been involved in multi-
level direct sales organizations prior to their Holiday
Magic experience. Both had participated in the
distribution of food supplements as part of the Nutri-
Bio organization, and Bailey, together with William
Penn Patrick, the founder of Holiday Magic, Inc., made
an unsuccessful prior joint effort to establish a similar
company in the corporate form of Ad-Mark, which later
became insolvent.
Bestline was a successful venture from its
inception. Led by Bailey and Brassfield, with the
assistance of other persons who had multi-level direct
selling experience, Bestline began the distribution of its
line of bio-degradable soap products through a fledgling
network of independent distributors who occupied
various levels of its multi-level sales organization.
App. D-51
Bestline grew rapidly and in October of 1968, in order to
share the ownership of the company with other loyal and
devoted participants in its direct sales program, Bailey
and Brassfield organized the Bestline Corporation and
sold their interest in Bestline Products, Inc. to the new
corporation for $10 million, also retaining majority
ownership of that new company, while admitting others
to minority ownership.
Until August of 1973, Bailey at all times remained
the chief executive officer and Chairman of the Board of
directors of Bestline, while Brassfield departed the
organization in 1970, either as a result of a dispute over
company policy or to seek greener pastures where he
could achieve his own brand of independence. Bestline
grew both in the number of distributors promoting and
distributing its products, as well as geographically, and
eventually was operating in all fifty states and several
foreign countries.
During Bestline’s growth and development, it
attracted the attention of various law enforcement
officials and regulatory agencies, including the Federal
Trade Commission. Early in its history, Bestline entered
into a consent decree with the Federal Trade
Commission wherein it agreed to cease and desist from
certain alleged unfair trade practices in connection with
the recruitment of new distributors, and responded
likewise to similar charges initiated by various state
Attorneys General. As a result occasional changes were
made in Bestline’s multi-level sales program claimed to
bring it into conformity with applicable state and
Federal laws. Whether it successfully did so it is not
within the province of this Court to determine, nor were
App. D-52
2 ee
the changes made material to the issues in these
proceedings.
In 1973, the Attorney General of the State of
California obtained a civil judgment against Bestline, as
well as certain individual Defendants herein, in the
amount of $11 million arising out of violations by
Bestline of California laws relating to deceptive trade
practices. The company promptly filed an Original
Petition under Chapter XI of the National Bankruptcy
Act and sought the protection of the Federal Courts, but
subsequently withdrew its petition after it successfully
negotiated with the California Attorney General an
arrangement to pay the $11 million judgment over a
number of years, and after Brassfield effected a
successful tender offer to acquire control of the
company. In connection therewith, Bailey resigned and
has remained retired from the business, while Bestline
ostensibly eliminated the objectionable features of its
multi-level direct sales plan and continues to do
business through several thousand distributors.
Despite Bestline’s travails, it grew to have some of
the earmarks of a successful national business
enterprise. Its initial meager line of cleaning agents and
home care products expanded to 16 such products by
March of 1972, six of which were manufactured in one or
both of Bestline’s manufacturing facilities in San Jose,
California and Elk Grove Village, Illinois. Each such
facility encloses in excess of 60,000 square feet, and the
company rented or leased other regional distribution
centers for its products. The remaining products were
manufactured by others for Bestline in accordance with
its specifications.
App. D-53
Bestline executives were transported throughout
the United States on corporate aircraft and Corporate
Team meetings sometimes took place on the company
yacht, or at its ranch in northern California. Indeed, at
its acme, Bestline’s chief executive officer, William E.
Bailey, recieved the Horatio Alger Award voted to
successful entrepreneurs who exemplify the “American
dream”’, which dream, coincidentally, Bestline claimed
to offer to prospective distributors.
Bestline’s officers’ individual annual compensation
ran into the hundreds of thousands, if not millidhs, of
dollars, and Corporate Team members experienced
annual earnings into six figures. By virtue of their
earnings they were eligible to be inducted into either the
“‘Chairman’s Club’’, or the ‘‘President’s Club’’,
depending upon the magnitude of their success, as well
as those of Bestline’s distributors who qualified, and
their status was constantly held out as an example to
Bestline’s network of independent distributors who were
exhorted to do likewise. Such “success stories’ were an
essential element in Bestline’s promotion of the business
opportunity offered by participation in its National
Marketing Plan.
THE BESTLINE NATIONAL
MARKETING PLAN
Central to Bestline’s success, as well as its past
legal problems, was its “National Marketing Plan”
which consisted of a network of independent
distributors who functioned at various levels in its
direct-sales organization.
App. D-54
For the most part, the Bestline National Marketing
Plan was implemented through a heirarchy of three
levels of independent distributors. Persons at the lowest
or middle level were denominated ‘‘Local
Distributors”,® while those at the second or middle level
were denominated “Direct Distributors”. Those at the
third and highest level of attainment were called
“General Distributors’. Neither the Local nor General
Distributorships are involved in these preceedings. Any
Bestline distributor could sell Bestline products
anywhere in the United States, without limitation.
The Local Distributor was never required by
Bestline to make any significant investment of money to
procure his position and to exercise the rights attendant
thereto.° The Local Distributor was eligible to sell
Bestline products to the consuming public at retail
prices and purchased them through his sponsoring
Direct Distributor at a discount, the difference being his
*Karly in Bestline’s history, the lowest level, later known as a
Local Distributorship, was characterized by two levels successively
denominated Sub-Distributor and Retailer. Ultimately recognizing
that the two levels were not functionally unique, Bestline
consolidated them into the single position of Local Distributor. Like
the Local Distributorship, neither of its predecessors are involved in
these proceedings.
The Local Distributor qualified as such by paying $5 annual
association dues. No product purchase was required.
App. D-55
=
or her commission.'! He could also recruit other Local
Distributors who could effect such sales for him
The Direct Distributor, on the other hand, was
required to pre-purchase a substantial quantity of
Bestline products and sales aids in order to qualify for
his position and to exercise the rights attendant
thereto.'2 Such rights included purchasing Bestline
products, in some cases, at a greater discount than the
Local Distributor,'? as well as the right to “build an
organization” of Local Distributors on whose selling
efforts he could earn a profit. Of greatest significance to
these proceedings, however, is the right vested in the
Direct Distributor to recruit other Direct Distributors
and thereby qualify to elevate himself to the position of
'The Local Distributor’s commission rate was progressive in
nature, ranging from 30% to 50%, depending upon his personal sales
during any calendar month. The Local Distributor received the 52%
discount (the same as that enjoyed by a pre-purchase Direct
Distributor) when his monthly sales exceeded $4,800. If he attained
$5,600 in sales, the Local Distributor became a Direct Distributor,
having ‘‘worked-in” to that position.
'2The actual dollar amount required to be paid to Bestline
varied from time to time, but averaged in excess of $3,000. The
range of variations is immaterial to the fundamental issues
involved in these proceedings.
‘The Direct Distributor purchased Bestline products at a
purported 52% discount rate.
App. D-56
%
General Distributor and to receive certain monetary
bonuses or rewards in connection therewith. '4
The General Distributorship could be attained only
by those persons who first qualified as Direct
Distributors and satisfied certain other requirements.
The General Distributor had the right to purchase
Bestline products at the greatest available discount,’
and to “build an organization” of Direct Distributors
and Local Distributors beneath him on whose selling
and recruiting efforts he could earn a profit.
Despite the formality of their separate designations,
Direct and General Distributorships are not
fundamentally unique or discrete entities. Although
they are separated by a differential of 8% in the
respective rates of discount at which they purchasey
Bestline products, both Direct and General Distributors
may sell directly to the consuming public, or through
Local Distributors on whose selling efforts they can earn
a profit. Yet the General Distributorship cannot be
\4In their Briefs, the Defendants criticize the Piambino
Plaintiffs for assimilating the Direct and General Distributorships
insofar as recruiting activities, and compensation therefor, are
involved. However, both positions involved the recruitment of new
Direct Distributors, the only difference being that the Direct
Distributor who successfully recruited two new Direct Distributors
received no remuneration therefor, because the two successive
recruitments merely qualified him to become a General Distributor.
Thereafter, successive recruitments accorded the distributor a
direct pecuniary benefit.
\'The General Distributor purchased products from Bestline at
a purported 60% discount.
App. D-57
attained independently from a Direct Distributorship,
i.e., a prospective distributor cannot enter the Bestline
National Marketing Plan at its highest level. He must
first become a Direct Distributor, even if only for a brief
period of time. The fundamental difference in character
between a General Distributor and a Direct Distributor
is largely based upon the fact that Ceneral Distributors
have successively recruited a requisite number of new
Direct Distributors to qualify as such, while Direct
Distributors have either not attempted to recruit new
Direct Distributors in requisite number, or have been
largely unsuccessful in any such attempts. In short, the
General Distributorship is to the Direct Distributorship
as a butterfly is to a caterpillar; the same being an
advanced state of maturity or development of the other.
Until January of 1970, a Bestline Direct Distributor
could qualify as a General Distributor by recruiting a
new pre-purchase Direct Distributor to replace himself
in his sponsoring General Distributor’s ‘‘organization”’,
and by paying to Bestline a $2,750 “release fee’,
ostensibly to release himself from his General
Distributor’s organization and to compensate that
General Distributor for the loss of commissions which he
would experience when the released Direct Distributor
left the releasing General Distributor’s organization to
head his own organization as a new General Distributor.
Bestline paid $2,250 of the $2,750 release fee to the rising
Direct Distributor’s former General Distributor who
recruited or sponsored the released Direct Distributor in
the first instance.
After January of 1970, the payment of release fees
was discontinued, and the upwardly-mobile Direct
Distributor could satisfy the requirements necessary to
App. D-58
rise to General Distributor by first recruiting a new
Direct Distributor to replace himself in his sponsoring
General Distributor’s organization, by generating sales
volume of $5,000 in a single month, '® and paying a $600
fee to Bestline for attendance at a so-called ‘General
Distributor’s School”. The additional requirements for
advancement which replaced the release fee, however,
fell far short of compensating for the income which the
release fee had accorded General Distributors.
The establishment of the Special Incentive Bonus
(SIB) plan responded to the need to fill the void left by
the abandonment of the release fee. Special Incentive
Bonuses were paid to General Distributors annually and
were determined on a progressive basis by the annual
sales volume in Bestline products for which the General
Distributor was responsible, directly or indirectly.
Because of its unique “profit-sharing” qualities
(Bestline referred to it as a profit-sharing plan), the
The requisite sales volume could be generated by simply
recruiting a second Direct Distributor for the sponsor’s own
organization, or by relying on either his own or his Local
Distributors’ retail sales, if any, or both. A later variation of the
process of becoming a pre-purchase Direct Distributor involved the
purchase of $500 of Bestline products directly from the Direct
Distributor’s sponsoring General Distributor, or his sponsor’s
sponsoring General Distributor if the sponsor is only a Direct
Distributor, and the balance of the pre-purchase requirement from
Bestline. Although no motivation is assigned to this variation, it
made it possible for a pre-purchase Direct Distributor to dispose of
his entire initial inventory in $500 increments to newly-recruited
Direct Distributors (after the first two such recruitments qualified
him as a General Distributor) thereby recouping his investment
without ever having to sell Bestline products to the consuming
public.
App. D-59
Special Incentive Bonus plan especially highlights the
distinctive feature of the Bestline National Marketing
Plan, which was, at every level, the payment of bonuses
or commissions to distributors based upon “product
movement” measured in “Refund Bonus Volume”
(RBV), a fictitious value assigned to Bestline products
upon which commissions and bonuses were computed.
Product movement effected by Local Distributors
was necessarily between the Local Distributor and his
customer. No commissions or bonuses were paid by
Bestline to the Local Distributor. The Local Distributor
purchased Bestline products from his sponsoring Direct
Distributor at a discount, and could sell them at
whatever price he chose, subject to contract restrictions,
but without any real control by Bestline over the retail
prices. Because Local Distributors make no initial
investment, either in product or otherwise, this aspect of
Bestline’s National Marketing Program does not run
afoul of the Federal securities laws, nor is it alleged by
the Piambino Plaintiffs to offend those laws.
Product movement effected by Direct and General
Distributors, however, is more complex. Inasmuch as
Direct and General Distributors are exhorted to “‘build
their organizations” by recruiting yet other distributors
who pre-purchase substantial quantities of Bestline
products, the commissions and bonuses paid in
connection with the substantial product movement from
Bestline into the hands of such new distributors
constitutes remuneration for the recruitment of others
into the Bestline National Marketing Plan. Although
the concept of “product movement” obscured any
distinction between the movement of Bestline products
App. D-60
into the hands of the consuming public as against
movement into the hands of distributors, or among
them, Bestline’s parlance made a distinction between
“retail” and ‘wholesale’ business. Retail business
involved precisely that, product movement into the
hands of the consuming public. Wholesale business, on
the other hand, involved product movement between
distributors, or from Bestline into the hands of new
distributors. The latter component of wholesale
business, of course, was generated by recruitment of
activities. Commissions and bonuses were paid on all
product movement generated by Bestline distributors
measured in RBV, without distinction between
wholesale or retail business. By creating the fictions of
“product movement’ and ‘wholesale business’’,
Bestline could state in its Business Opportunity Booklet
provided to prospective distributors that ‘‘No
compensation of any kind will be paid for the
solicitation or recruitment of others’’. This self-serving
declaration, however, relies upon those important terms
to put a gloss on the underlying recruiting or
“organization building’ transactions which, in fac’
generated the “product .movement”’ or ‘wholesale
business” on which commissions and bonuses were paid.
Every Bestline distributor, at whatever level, had a
“sponsor” to whose “organization” he was assigned,
even if the sponsor resided hundreds or thousands of
miles away. Each Direct Distributor Application
required an identification of the applicant’s
“sponsoring” distributor for the purpose of paying
commissions or bonuses on the product movement
generated by his recruitment. Bestline thereby
developed a complex system of accounting for the
App. D-61
responsibility for sponsorship of new distributors which
was ultimately computerized, and the hard-copy output
which recorded the payment of commissions and
overrides on product movement through the chain of
distributors was referred to in Bestline’s parlance as
“linkage reports’. Bestline’s computer also generated
3% and 8% ‘‘commission statements’”’ to its distributors,
from which data the company also paid the commissions
set forth therein.
Upon review of the foregoing facts, all of which were
elicited by the Piambino Plaintiffs from the Defendants
themselves, this Court discerns four different methods
by which Bestline distributors could profit from the
recruitment of new distributors. Those four methods
included: (1) the release fee; (2) the “standard”
commission; (3) the ‘‘override”’ commission; and (4) the
Special Incentive Bonus (SIB).
The release fee practice, which was abandoned in
1970, was the simplest method by which the Bestline
investor profited from the recruitment aspect of the
National Marketing Plan. As discussed previously, a
rising Direct Distributor was required to pay a $2,750 fee
to Bestline as a condition precedent to attaining the
status of a General Distributor. Bestline retained $500
and paid $2,250 to the Direct Distributor’s sponsoring
General Distributor. By this technique, Bestline
induced advancement from Direct Distributor to
General Distributor. The “‘release fee’, in effect, was a
deferred method of compensating one distributor for
sponsoring another distributor, subject only to the
condition that the recruiting and the recruited
distributors must ultimately become General
Distributors.
App. D-62
Because of the differential in the rates of discount
between General and Direct Distributors (60% and 52%,
respectively), each sponsoring General Distributor was
entitled to an 8% standard commission on “product
movement” to or through each Direct Distributor
sponsored by him, including the Direct Distributor’s
initial pre-purchase of Bestline products. The fact that
the Direct Distributor may reside hundreds or
thousands of miles away would not deprive his
sponsoring General Distributor of his vested right to
receive the 8% standard commission. In many cases, a
new pre-purchase Direct Distributor would request that
only half (or none) of an initial product inventory be
shipped to him. In such cases, it made no difference as
to the payment of the 8% standard commission on such
product movement. The General Distributor was still
entitled to receive the commission, and Bestline paid it,
even though the products may never have physically
moved at all.
In each case, Bestline accounted for all such
transactions, received the funds and disbursed the
commission payments to the beneficiaries of the
program.
In addition to the 8% standard commission,
Bestline offered and paid a 3% override commission to
the sponsor of a sponsoring distributor, i.e., the
distributor once-removed up the chain of distributors. !”
The sponsor of a sponsoring distributor was entitled to
\7The 3% override commission was discontinued by Bestline in
1972.
App. D-63
the 3% override commission solely by virtue of his initial
sponsorship of the sponsoring distributor, even though
he may have had no involvement in the subsequent
recruitment. As with the 8% standard commission, the
3% override commission was paid whether the product
was shipped or not.
The system of 3% override commissions was
likewise administered by Bestline, and payments were
remitted by the company on a monthly basis.
After the release fee feature of Bestline’s National
Marketing Plan was eliminated in 1970, the 8%
standard commission differential and the 3% override
commission remained as the sole inducement for the
Direct Distributor to rise to the General Distributorship
level. Bestline enhanced the attractiveness of advancing
to the General Distributorship position by
implementing the Special Incentive bonus (SIB) plan.
The SIB was represented by Bestline to be a profit-
sharing program.
SIB’s were paid on an annual basis to qualifying
distributors. The actual sum or sums of money paid was
determined on a progressive scale as a percentage of
product movement measured in RBV. The greater an
individual distributor’s annual RBV, the greater would
be his annual SIB expressed as a percentage of the total
annual RBV. Although annual RBV could consist of
product movement through the distributor to the
consuming public, it could also consist of product
movement to newly-recruited distributors. No
differentiation was made by Bestline, nor was any
attempt made to measure the quantity of Bestline
App. D-64
products which actually flowed to the consuming public
until the so-called “Cameo” program was developed in
1971 in response to criticism by regulatory agencies that
the Bestline National Marketing Plan resulted in
“garage loading” of its products in the possession of its
distributors.
The average RBV generated by the recruitment of a
new Direct Distributor, who later became a General
Distributor, was about $15,000.'° Whereas under the
discontinued release fee program a General Distributor
would be paid a 13% or $2,000 commission on a Direct
Distributor who subsequently advanced to the General
Distributor position, under the SIB program the General
Distributor had to account for at least $36,000 RBV to
be eligible for any commission at all. At that level, the
General Distributor’s commission would be 3.3% of his
RBV. However, if the General Distributor successfully
accounted for an annual RBV of $200,000, his
commission rate would escalate to 15% of RBV, or
$30,000. Thus, the General Distributor who recruited
thirteen new Direct Distributors in any given calendar
year would be in essentially the same position under the
SIB plan as in the discontinued release fee program.
Of course, the new SIB plan had the disadvantage
of making it necessary for the sponsoring General
Distributor to recruit a greater number of Direct
\'The figure is attained by aggregating the RBV of each pre-
purchase Direct Distributor’s initial product purchase and the
product movement, measured in RBV, generated by meeting all of
the requirements for advancement to the position of General
Distributor.
App. D-65
Distributors in order to receive the equivalent bonus
expressed either as a percentage of RBV or in dollars,
but it had the advantage of paying to a General
Distributor a commission for the recruitment of a new
Direct Distributor, even where the Direct Distributor
subsequently failed to advance to the General
Distributor level.
When the SIB plan is viewed in conjunction with
the requirement that an advancing Direct Distributor
recruit a new Direct Distributor to replace himself in his
sponsor’s “organization”, it appears that his sponsoring
General Distributor is credited with the RBV for the
ensuing product movement, and that all such RBV is
aggregated for the purpose of determining the
sponsoring General Distributor’s annual SIB. Hence,
the General Distributor can qualify for and be paid an
annual SIB based solely upon the recruiting efforts of
Direct Distributors in his organization who seek to
advance themselves to the position of General
Distributors, and who thereby seek to be elligible for the
“windfall” profits of the scheme. '®
The illustration carries the proposition to an extreme
conclusion. It is intended only to illustrate the point, and is not
relied upon in making disposition of the securities issue herein by
interlocutory summary adjudication. This Court has been
scrupulous to avoid drawing any inferences from the material facts
which assume that Bestline’s product movement was generated
primarily from recruitment, rather than retail sales, or vice versa.
The actual relationship between these two aspects of Bestline’s
National Marketing Plan, insofar as the respective emphasis
between them is concerned, is not a material issue herein.
App. D-66
In short, the abandonment of the release fee and the
substitution of the SIB plan changed nothing except the
form of the transaction. If anything, it removed from the
conditions precedent to the payment of such bonuses
any requirement that a General Distributor shepherd a
newly-recruited Direct Distributor through the
recruitments necessary to be accomplished by him to
advance to the General Distributorship position, further
eliminating, as a practical matter, any need for the
General Distributor to exert any efforts at all.
Based upon the foregoing analysis of the facts, it is
plain that the Direct and General Distributorships
possess at least two attributes of the four which are
necessary components of an investment contract. The
Direct Distributor, through his pre-purchase of Bestline
products, pays money to Bestline as a conditon
precedent to his ultimate eligibility as a General
Distributor to receive payments in the form of profit on
his investment. It is also undisputed that Bestline
managed the entire system of receiving, accounting for
and disbursing such profits. Bestline’s centralized
administration of its network of independent
distributors thereby also constitutes a significant
element of the participation of its distributors in a
“common enterprise or venture’, or the third of the four
necessary components of an investment contract.
In their countering Motion For Summary
Judgment, the principal Defendants maintain that
there is no genuine issue as to the fact that each pre-
purchase Direct Distributor received soap products and
sales aids in exchange for his or her investment in
Bestline, but argue that upon that fact alone an
App. D-67
investment of money is negated. The moving
Defendants thereby urge this Court to adopt a
mechanical and simplistic notion of the Federal
securities laws which prefers form over substance and
ignores the economic realities of the transaction in
Bestline Direct Distributorships.
Unquestionably, each member of the Plaintiff class
paid money to Bestline in consideration not only of the
quantity of Bestline products to be shipped to him (or
reserved for him), but as a condition precedent to be
eligible to act as a pre-purchase Direct Distributor,
including the exercise of all rights and privileges
attendant thereto. Whether the rights and privileges
attendant to a Bestline Direct Distributorship piggy-
backed with the product pre-purchased, or vice versa, is
immaterial to the disposition of these proceedings. The
fact is undisputed that in no way other than the pre- »
purchase of Bestline products” can a Plaintiff class
member be eligible to exercise the rights and privileges
2The possibility of a Local Distributor becoming a “work-in”
Direct Distributor was discussed previously at Note 11, infra. For
the purpose of this analysis, the pre-purchase and work-in methods
of attaining Direct Distributorship status are indistinct. Work-in
Direct Distributors are not members of the Plaintiff class by
definition. The former qualified by expending either his own or
borrowed funds to pre-purchase Bestline products in required
quantity, while the latter pre-sells in a single calendar month
essentially the same volume of Bestline products required to be pre-
purchased by the former. The point made is that the rights and
privileges of a Direct Distributorship were not offered by Bestline
separate and apart from the specified volume of product
movement, however, created. Such rights were neither “given
away”, nor sold for a separate consideration.
App. D-68
which vest in a Bestline Direct Distributor. Those
rights, and the eligibility of the Plaintiff class members
to exercise them, are a basic and fundamental part of
the consideration for the transaction which forms the
economic relationship between Bestline and the
investor. Clearly, the Plaintiff class members did not
purchase thousands of dollars in Bestline products for
their own use or consumption, but for re-distribution to
either the consuming public or other distributors, or
simply to store in their garages while they devoted their
time to “building their organizations”, which, in
Bestline’s parlance, meant the recruitment of other
distributors.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
transaction between Best!ine and the Plaintiff class
members involved an investment of money, or tender of
initial value, and deny the principal Defendants’
Motion For Summary Judgment on that issue.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
BESTLINE NATIONAL
MARKETING PLAN
Bestline’s field organization, and its function, like
its centralized administrative or clearing-house services,
is an integral part of its National Marketing Plan.
Shortly after its inception, as its recruitment of new
distributors grew both numerically and geographically,
Bestline assembled a field organization to continue and
further expand its business. There eventually developed
a hierarchy of field positions responsible to the Vice
President in charge of sales in the Home Office or
corporate headquarters at San Jose, California.
App. D-69
Immediately under the Vice President, and directly
responsible to him, Bestline established the position of
Assistant Vice President. There were six Assistant Vice
Presidents who were assigned specific geographic
territories to supervise, usually consisting of seven to
nine states. Immediately beneath the Assistant Vice
Presidents in rank, Bestline established the position of
Regional Director, while persons were also assigned
specific smaller geographic territories to supervise,
usually consisting of a single state or part thereof. And
beneath the Regional Director in responsibility, Bestline
created the position of Area Coordinator, and sometimes
Assistant Area Coordinator. Each Area Coordinator
reported to a Regional Director, and was assigned to a
specific geographic territory to supervise, usually
consisting of several smaller medium-sized cities, or
parts of large ones. Their duties included organizing and
presenting Opportunity Meetings, conducting training
sessions for distributors, supplying data to Bestline’s
Home Office for its Corporate Calendar and
coordinating and effectuating company policy in the
field. Assistant Vice Presidents and Region Directors
were appointed and paid by Bestline, although they
could also continue to perform as distributors if they so
desired, and some did. Area Coordinators were
appointed by Bestline and paid through its Regional
Directors. The method of compensation of Bestline’s
field representatives changed from time to time, but
always included in substantial part a commission based
upon “product movement” within their assigned areas,
which, of course, included the movement of Bestline
products pre-purchased by newly-recruited Direct
Distributors.
App. D-70
Key Home Office officials, Assistant Vice
Presidents and Regional Directors, but not Area
Coordinators, came to be known as members of
Bestline’s ‘“‘Corporate Leam’’. Corporate Team
meetings were held monthly in a single location in the
United States, at which Home Office officials, and
sometimes legal counsel, reviewed existing company
policies with respect to the National Marketing Plan,
announced new policies, admonished the Corporate
Team to enforce all policies and generally motivated
each other. A consistent theme in Corporate Team
meetings was enforcing adherence to scripts provided by
Bestline for use at Opportunity Meetings to which
distributors invited guests to become acquainted with
the Bestline business opportunity as part of the
exhorted goal of each distributor to “build his
organization”, as well as adherence to the recommended
procedures by which prospects were introduced to
Bestline and its network of distributors, whether
through the device of “Opportunity Meetings” or
otherwise.
Like Koscot and Dare To Be Great,?! a key feature
of the Bestline National Marketing Plan was the
“Opportunity Meeting” which consisted of a gathering
of Bestline distributors and prospective distributors in a
hotel or motel meeting room, or any other suitable
meeting-place. The purpose and effect of the
Opportunity Meeting was the creation of an effective
vehicle by which distributors could “build their
organizations” by inviting prospective distributors to
21Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., supra; Securities & Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises Inc., supra.
App. D-71
receive a standardized presentation or introduction to
Bestline’s products and business opportunity. Although
the Opportunity Meetings may not have been the
exclusive vehicle utilized to introduce Bestline to
prospective distributors, it was by far the
overwhelmingly dominant method, the one
recommended by the company, and the most effective,
even though it had to be supplemented by the efforts of
individual distributors to consummate sales of new
Direct Distributorships in accordance with guidelines
promulgeted by Bestline.
Dozens, if not hundreds, of Opportunity Meetings
were conducted almost daily throughout the United
States. The time and place of each Opportunity
Meeting was relayed to Bestline’s Home Office through
its Corporate Team and assembled into a single
regularly-published and distributed ‘Corporate
Calendar” for use by its distributors. By means of this
vast network of standardized Opportunity Meetings, an
Omaha distributor could (and was encouraged to)
“build his organization” by referring friends in Seattle
or Miami to a convenient Opportunity Meeting in their
locale. And if the New York or Miami friend became a
pre-purchase Direct Distributor he was assigned to his
sponsor’s organization in Omaha, which sponsor would
receive the standard commission paid by Bestline on the
product movement from Bestline to the newly-recruited
distributor.
To insure uniformity at each of the thousands of
Opportunity Meetings, Bestline distributed scripts for
speakers to use at such meetings, as well as records, film
strips and a Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet to
App. D-72
be delivered to each prospective distributor. Assistant
Vice Presidents, Regional Directors and Area
Coordinators frequently conducted the Opportunity
Meetings, or at least attended them to insure adherence
to company policy. Bestline even employed a firm of
private detectives to report to it as to the adherence to
company policy at Opportunity Meetings, and
frequently required electronic recording of such
meetings for review by legal counsel.
In some areas the meetings were organized and paid
for by local “cooperatives” of distributors, usually with
the assistance of an Area Coordinator or Corporate
Team member. Co-op members paid dues which were in
turn allocated to the expense of conducting Opportunity
Meetings. A distributor who did not join the co-op, or
whose dues were not current, as a practical matter,
could still attend and bring a prospect for “his
organization”, but in some areas, at least, he would be
warned not to come back a second time if he was not a
member in good standing of the cooperative.
There is no genuine issue that the relationship
among Bestline, its Corporate Team members and Area
Coordinators, the cooperatives and the Bestline
distributors constituted a common enterprise or
venture, whether for the sale and distribution of
Bestline products to the consuming public, or for the
recruitment of new distributors, and we so hold.
THE INVESTORS’ EXPECTATIONS
The pressure point of the application of the
principles of Federal securities and summary judgment
law to the facts of these proceedings involves the
“reasonable expectations” of the class Plaintiffs with
respect to their investment in Bestline Direct
Distributorships, including the locus of the undeniably
significant or essential managerial or entrepreneurial
efforts resulting in the payment to them of a share of the
profits to be derived from the common enterprise or
venture.
The Defendants have strenuously argued that the
facts elicited from them in pretrial discovery
unquestionably reveal that the individual investor is the
locus of the undeniably significant or essential
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts necessary to the
success of the Bestline National Marketing Plan, and to
their individual financial success. They also contend
that no reasonable investor could expect or conclude
otherwise, thereby removing the Bestline National
Marketing Plan from the ambit of the Federal securities
laws. The Piambino Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
suggest that the undeniably significant or essential
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts required in
connection with the success of the Bestline National
Marketing Plan repose in Bestline and its Corporate
Team members, including Area Coordinators. In
support of their respective arguments, all of the parties
rely upon the extensive factual record relating to the
pre-investment presentations made to the class
Plaintiffs, as well as to the actual operation of the
Bestline National Marketing Plan viewed from a post-
App. D-74
investment standpoint, including a variety of inferences
derived therefrom.
[5] The parties’ reliance upon this broad range of
facts, however, is misplaced and creates a false or
illusory issue in these proceedings. It is not necessary to
a determination of the class Plaintiffs’ expectations for
this Court to consider such a broad range of facts and
inferences. The elemental inquiry is the class Plaintiffs’
pre-investment expectations as to the nature of their
investments in Bestline Direct Distributorships, and
whether reasonable minds can differ as to such
expectations.22 In short, the business opportunity
offered by participation as a distributor in Bestline’s
National Marketing Plan must be viewed through the
eyes of the class Plaintiffs, considering only such facts as
were available to them before they made their
individual investment decisions.
22Although these proceedings also involve extensive allegations
of misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in the
standardized presentations of Bestline’s business opportunity to
prospective investors, the Piambino Plaintiffs First Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment does not require this Court to
determine those issues. The existance of such misrepresentations
and omissions, however, may in no small measure account for the
diametrically opposed factual contentions of the parties with
respect to the operation of the Bestline National Marketing Plan
from a post-investment viewpoint. The Defendants rely heavily
upon their view of how the Bestline National Marketing Plan
operated, rather than how it was presented to the prospective
investors. This inquiry is necessarily limited to the pre-investment
presentations made to the Plaintiff class, because it was from those
presentations that the class Plaintiffs derived their expectations
with respect to their investment in Bestline Direct
Distributorships.
App. D-75
In this regard, it is only necessary that this Court
review the facts as to the mode and manner of
interesting class Plaintiffs in the business opportunity
offered by participation in Bestline’s National
Marketing Plan, and of presenting that business
opportunity to them, whether at Opportunity Meetings
or otherwise. In so doing, this Court looks not only to the
economic substance of the transactions in Bestline
Direct Distributorships, but equally to “... what
character the instrument is given. . . by the terms of
the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic
inducements held out to the prospect. In the
enforcement of an act such as this [Securities Act], it is
not inappropriate that promoters’ offerings be judged as
what they were represented to be”. Securities &
Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 352-353, 64 S.Ct. 120, 124, 88 L.Ed. 88, 94
(1943) [quoted approvingly in Securities & Exchange
Commission v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 387
U.S. 202, 211, 87 S.Ct. 1557, 1562, 18 L.Ed.2d 673, 679-
80 (1967) ]. In their joint brief, the Defendants accede to
the propriety of the foregoing approach and have urged
this Court to adopt a narrow scope of inquiry limited to
the various forms of Direct Distributorship agreements,
Direct Distributorship qualification forms, the Bestline
Business Opportunity Booklet, the Opportunity
Meeting scripts, and product and marketing films. Such
a limitation is appropriate, and this Court has restricted
itself to an analysis of those documents and things with
respect to this aspect of the securities issue,
notwithstanding arguments advanced by all parties to
these proceedings based upon a broader range of facts
which, for the foregoing reasons, are immaterial to the
issue.
App. D-76
By circumscribing the inquiry as aforesaid, and
confining it to the review of such material documents
and things, we find that there is no genuine issue as to
the fact of what representations were made to
prospective Bestline distributors through standardized
presentations based thereon, whether at formal or
informal meetings, or otherwise, although there is some
dispute as to random or spurious representations made
to the named Plaintiffs by other Bestline distributors
and Corporate Team members outside the context of
Bestline’s standardized presentations. In reaching this
conclusion, however, we have regarded as immaterial to
this summary adjudication of the securities issue any
testimony of the named Plaintiffs which is based upon
such random or spurious representations because such
representations lack any uniformity of impact on the
class Plaintiffs and also because in view of our finding,
they are surplusage. Such representations merely
reinforce expectations otherwise effectively created in
the minds of the reasonable investor by the
standardized pre-investment presentations.
There is no genuine dispute as to the fact that the
class Plaintiffs, as well as thousands of others, were
indiscriminately solicited to be exposed to the Bestline
business opportunity, without regard to their
backgrounds, education, training or individual abilities.
The Defendants concede as much, and suggest merely
that the quality of Bestline’s training program
adequately compensated for any lack of relevant
experience or education, and that ‘‘a person’s desire to
succeed and willingness to work far exceed any
App. D-77
educational or business background prior to Bestline.”’**
These persons, drawn “from all walks of life, ethnic
backgrounds, with varied educations, experience, ages
and religions”’,24 were then introduced to Bestline’s
business opportunity, either through the device of an
Opportunity Meeting, or some other formal or informal
presentation based upon guidelines promulgated by
Bestline in its Information Manual, from which
presentations they derived their expectations as to the
character of an investment in Bestline Direct
Distributorships.
The fact that some Bestline distributors may have
obtained “prospects” by advertising in ‘‘Help Wanted”
columns of local newspapers, by direct mail, or by
striking up conversations on street corners, or that they
may have intentionally refused to expisin the Bestline
business opportunity on such first contacts to heighten
the prospective investor’s “curiosity”, may betray the
motives of the Defendants in connection with the class
Plaintiffs’ fraud claims, but the use of such techniques
are not basic to a determination by this Court as to the
expectations created in the minds of the class Plaintiffs
as to the character of their investments in Bestline
Direct Distributorships. Similarly, zealousness at
Opportunity Meetings evidenced by out-pourings of
enthusiasm, speakers running or hurrying to the
rostrum, exuberant applause, chanting or singing, and
other conduct of a similar nature, may also bear upon
23Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet (all editions), p. 7.
“This phrase, in several variations, appears in all editions of
the Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet, as well as several times
in each Opportunity Meeting script.
App. D-78
the Piambinc-Plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud and high-
pressure salesmanship, but are immaterial to the basic
inquiry involved in this adjudication, thereby
differentiating it somewhat from the decision of the
Koscot and Turner Courts, which involved important
fraud questions. The elucidation in those decisions of
the high-pressure sales tactics of the promoters was
directed to the Commission’s claims of violations of the
antifraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. In
contrast, this Court is called upon only to resolve the
limited issue of whether there is any genuine controversy
as to the fact that Bestline’s pre-investment
standardized presentations, in their material aspects,
created in the class Plaintiffs’ minds the reasonable
expectation that an investment in Bestline Direct
Distributorships would lead to profits to be derived from
the undeniably significant or essential managerial or
entrepreneurial efforts of others which affect the failure
or success of the common enterprise or venture.
The apparent lack of sophistication of the class
Plaintiffs herein contrasts sharply with the decisions of
other Courts which have held that specific franchise
agreements involved therein were not investment
contracts within the meaning of the Federal securities
laws, and compares favorably with the decisions of those
Courts which have found otherwise. See e.g., Mr. Steak,
Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F.Supp. 64 (D.Colo.,
1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (River £ity
Steak was not an uninformed investor, but was
acquainted with the business it undertook, held not to
involve the offer and sale of an investment contract);
Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International, Inc., 348
F.Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla.1972) (controlling stockholder a
App. D-79
Beefy Trail had extensive background as a businessman
having owned and managed a retail department store,
had an interest in a construction business, together with
his attorney spent a considerable period of time
negotiating with Beefy King over the terms and
conditions of the ultimate purchase of a restaurant and
franchise wherein some of the decuments were drafted
by his attorney, and was employed as a consultant to
Beefy King actually working daily in its offices for a
period of time, held not to involve the offer and sale of
investment contract). In evaluating the impact of the
promoter’s offering on the expectations of the investor,
the investor’s experience, training and abilities have
always been considered an important starting point. In
some cases it has been the dispositive issue. In these
proceedings, we find that the Bestline National
Marketing Plan was a highly-organized nationwide
program addressed to the population at large, without
discrimination or qualification as to the sophistication
of the prospective investors.
There is no question that Bestline’s National
Marketing Plan held out to such investors the
expectation of profits to be derived from participation
therein. The lure of profits permeates Bestline’s meeting
scripts, literature and film strips which comprise its
standardized presentations to prospects for its
distributorships. Even a cursory review of those
materials reveals that an expectation of profits was not
only reasonably derivable therefrom, but that those
materials exclude any other reasonable expectation. We
are therefore constrained to conclude that there is no
genuine issue as to the fact that the class Plaintiffs were
led to expect that profits would be derived from an
App. D-80
investment in Bestline Direct Distributorships, and that
no reasonable investor could possibly conclude
otherwise. In view of this finding, the disposition issue
involv
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