Appendix — Piambino v. Sylva

Supreme Court brief1980

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Text

Supreme Court, U.S.

F a LED

Rb -39g SEP 3 1980

No. MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLER

in the

Supreme Court

of the

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

PETER PIAMBINO, et al.,

Petitioners,

US.

WILLIAM E. BAILEY, etal.

and DAVID SYLVA,

Respondents

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

The United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

APPENDIX

CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.

250 Catalonia Avenue,

Suite 601

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Telephone: 305-445-3100

Carl H. Hoffman,

Counsel for Petitioners

David Hertzig,

Of Counsel

September 3, 1980

oemmeed

INDEX

Page

Order of the Court Below Denying Petitions for

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc ..........+++++++ A

Preliminary Injunction ...........eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees B

Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc ...... C

Opinion of the District Court ..........+-ee serene eens D

Opinion of the Court of Appeals ...........++seeeeeees E

Judgment of the Court Below .........sseeeeeeeeeeees F

APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

June 5, 1980

Gilbert F. Ganucheau

Clerk

TEL 504-589-6514

600 CAMP STREET

NEW ORLEANS, LA. 70130

TO ALL PARTIES LISTED BELOW:

NO. 76-3495, 77-2045 — Peter Piambino, et al v.

Wm. E. Bailey, et al

Dear Counsel:

This is to advise that an order has this day been entered

denying the petition( ) for rehearing, and no member

of the panel nor Judge in regular active service on the

Court having requested that the Court be polled on

rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 10) the petition( )

for rehearing en banc has also been denied.

See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for

issuance and stay of the mandate.

cc:

Very truly yours,

GILBERT E. GANUCHEAU,

Clerk

By H. E. Adams, Jr.

Deputy Clerk

Mr. J. Russell Pitto

Mr. Robert W. Humphreys

Mr. Stephen T. Knudsen

Mr. Marc M. Watson

Mr. Jerome M. Rosenblum

Mr. Edward L. Peck

Mr. Carl H. Hoffman

Mr. James H. Joseph

Mr. David Ferber

Mr. Ralph C. Ferrara

Mr. S. Lee Terry, Jr.

Mr. William A. Dietch

Ms. Evelyn Langlieb Greer

Mr. Michael R. Botwin

Mr. William C. Wolford

App. A-2

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

IN RE BESTLINE PRODUCTS

SECURITIES AND ANTITRUST

LITIGATION

MDL DOCKET 162-Civ-JLK

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff's

First Motion for Temporary Restraining Order dated

June 18, 1976. Pursuant to notice supplied to all parties

to this action and to the California Attorney General,

the New Jersey Attorney General, the Missouri Attorney

General, the Ohio Attorney General, the Wisconsin

Attorney General, the Penusylvania Attorney General,

the Texas Attorney General, the New York City

Department of Consumer Affairs, the Bank of America

and the Superior Court of the State of California,

County of Los Angeles, this matter was heard before the

Court on June 30, 1976. The following appearances were

made by counsel for the various parties:

Carl H. Hoffman

James H. Joseph

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs

Herschel T. Elkins

Deputy Attorney General, Statevr California

App. B-1

William Hoeveler

Robert Paul

Counsel for Defendants, Richard Grillo, Melvin

Morgan and Janin, Morgan & Brenner

J. Russell Pitto

Counsel for Defendants, Bestline Products, Inc.,

Bestline Corp., James K. Hisler, Jerry G.

Brassfield, Oliver P. Colvin, David Soto, Norman

Miller and Richard Dumont

Mare M. Watson

Counsel for Defendants, Gordon Blaum, Edna

Blaum, James Herbert, Marvin Sternberg and

George Wunch

Having heard and considered the evidence, briefs

and oral argument submitted by the parties and the

California Attorney General, the Court finds:

FINDINGS OF FACT

On December 21, 1973, Defendant, Bestline

Products, Inc., (Bestline) entered into an “Agreement,

Instructions to Compliance Officer and Trust” with the

California Attorney General which was incorporated

into a “Modified Judgment” entered on December 21,

1973, by the California Superior Court for Los Angeles

County in Case No. C 2842. Pursuant to said “‘Modified

Judgment,” there was established a restitutionary plan

(California Plan) which provided for restitutionary

payments to (a) Bestline Distributors in the State of

California who became such after January 14, 1971, (b)

App. B-2

Bestline Distributors within and without the State of

California who are entitled to restitution pursuant to

any agreements reached between any other state or

political subdivision thereof or any federal department

or agency and Bestline, and (c) any other distributor (i)

as to whom Bestline approves their claim, or (ii) who has

received an arbitration award pursuant to a national

plan of arbitration, or (iii) pursuant to judgment. It

appears that the great majority of participants in the

California Plan became entitled to receive payments

thereunder by virtue of options (a) and (b) above. Very

few, if any, participants have actually obtained

judgment against Bestline on their own behalf. It is

noted that under option (c)(i) above all members of the

Plaintiff class would have been entitled to participate in

the California Plan from its inception had their claims

been approved by Bestline. In addition, under option

(c)(iii) above, all members of the Plaintiff class are

entitled to participate in the California Plan upon entry

of judgment on their behalf, without more.

As a part of the California Plan there was

established a trust wherein Bestline agreed to transfer

certain funds to the Bank of America, as trustee, for

subsequent distribution to persons who were determined

to be entitled to restitutionary payments in accordance

with the terms of the “Modified Judgment.” At the

present time, there are some 7,043 participants in the

California Plan who are entitled to such payments.

The ‘Agreement, Instructions to Compliance

Officer and Trust” included a schedule of payments to

be made by Bestline into the trust. Pursuant thereto,

Bestline is scheduled on or about June 30, 1976, to

transfer to the Bank of America for distribution shortly

App. B-3

Pine.

thereafter to participants in the California Plan the sum

of $500,000.00, or 50% of the pretax profits of Bestline,

-whichever is greater.

At the present time, in accordance with the terms of

the “Modified Judgment,” Bestline has available for

transfer to the Bank of America the sum of $500,000.00.

In anticipation of receiving this amount on June 30,

1976, the Bank of America has prepared some 7,043

checks in the average amount of $71.00 each for

distribution to the participants in the California Plan.

In connection with the preparation for such distribution,

the Bank of America has incurred expenses in the

approximate amount of $15,000.00, including the cost of

postage and envelopes addressed to each of the

California Plan participants.

The Participants in the California Plan are for the

most part persons who would have been entitled to

participate in this action as members of the Plaintiff

class had they not elected to participate in the

California Plan. In fact, it appears that a substantial

number of Bestline investors may have been faced with

the decision of electing to participate in either this

action or the California Plan to the exclusion of the

other.

The participants in the California Plan have

previously received payments thereunder in partial

restitution of the amounts paid by them to Bestline. As

of this date, a total of approximately $7,336,000.00 has

been so paid. However, no individual participant has

been repaid in full nor will any such participant be

repaid in full as a result of the payments scheduled to be

made from the $500,000.00 presently held by Bestline.

App. B-4

For the most part, the participants in the California

Plan have received only a small percentage of the total

repayment due to them.

On March 19, 1976, this Court determined that

Bestline is liable to the Plaintiff class under Section

12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Accordingly, the

Plaintiff class will be entitled to final judgment against

Bestline as soon as the amount of damages is

determined. However, such determination will not be

accomplished for several months because of the

administrative deldy necessarily involved therein. It is

reasonably anticipated that each member of the

Plaintiff Class will be entitled to recover from Bestline a

sum in the approximate amount of $3,000.00 or more,

which amount is essentially the same as the recovery to

which each participant in the California Plan is entitled.

It should be emphasized that most if not all of the

participants in the California Plan are by definition

members of the Plaintiff class.

It appears that approximately 20,000 members of

the Plaintiff class may be entitled to recovery in this

action under Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.

However, Bestline has made no restitutionary payments

of any kind to the members of the Plaintiff class who

were not also participants in the California Plan.

Moreover, Bestline does not have sufficient assets to

satisfy the claims of the entire Plaintiff class, nor, for

that matter, does Bestline have sufficient assets to

satisfy the remaining claims of the California Plan

participants.

App. B-5

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court finds that it will be virtually impossible

to recoup the $500,000.00 which is scheduled for

payment to the Bank of America on June 30, 1976, once

this amount has been divided into small payments and

distributed to the participants in the California Plan.

Accordingly, if the other members of the Plaintiff class

are in any way entitled to receive any part of the

scheduled $500,000.00 payment, it is clear that the

Plaintiff class will suffer irreparable harm once the

scheduled payment is made and distributed.

Because this Court has previously determined that

Bestline is liable to the Plaintiff class for full restitution,

the members thereof will be entitled to recover an

amount equal to their total investment in Bestline. A

conservative estimate is that this amount will exceed

$60,000,000.00. Therefore, there is no likelihood that the

$500,000.00 presently under consideration will even

approach the total recovery due to the Plaintiff class. In

contrast, it is estimated that the total amount due to the

participants in the California Plan is approximately

$22,000,000, of which they have previously been repaid

approximately $7,336,000.00 pursuant to the terms of

the Plan. This Court has not been presented with any

facts which would establish that the participants in the

California Plan were entitled to a prior equity which

would preclude the other members of the Plaintiff class

from sharing with them on a pro rata basis in any

recovery from Bestline. To the contrary, it would appear

that whether any particular Bestline investor was

allowed to participate in the California Plan was merely

dependent upon his place of residence, the whims of

Bestline, or other matters over which the individual

App. B-6

investor exercised little if any real control. Under the

terms of the “Modified Judgment” it was Bestline alone

who had the complete, unilateral and unreviewable

power to designate the beneficiaries of the California

trust. i.e., the participants in the California Plan.

Accordingly, this Court concludes that it would be

inequitable to allow the California Plan participants to

continue to receive payments from Bestline where the

other members of the Plaintiff class were effectively

precluded from participating in the California Plan

because of matters outside of their control. Moreover, in

view of Bestline’s overwhelming liability to the Plaintiff

class, including the California Plan participants, and

Bestline’s comparatively weak financial condition, the

Court concludes that the sum of $500,000.00 presently

held by Bestline should be transferred to the registry of

this Court to protect the integrity thereof for the benefit

of the Plaintiff class.

It is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendants, Bestline Products, Inc. and

Bestline Corporation, their officers, agents, servants,

employees, attorneys, representatives, affiliates and all

persons in active concert or participation with them, are

hereby enjoined and restrained, pending further order of

this Court, from transferring any funds or other things of

value to the Bank of America, the California

Restitutionary Trust, or to any other person, firm or

corporation, except in the ordinary course of business for

value received.

2. Defendant, Bestline Products, Inc., shall

forthwith pay into the registry of this Court the sum of

$500,000.00 which is presently held by Bestline for the

June 30, 1976, payment under the California Plan.

3. Pending further order of this Court, the Clerk of

this Court is directed to deposit and hold in interest

bearing form any and all funds paid into the registry of

this Court pursuant to this order.

4. Within five (5) days from the date of this order,

Counsel for Bestline shall prepare a letter explaining to

the participants in the California Plan the relevant

terms of this order and its effect upon their expected

receipt of restitutionary payments. Said letter shall be

reviewed and approved by the California Attorney

General and lead counsel for the Plaintiff class. After

the letter is so approved, counsel for Bestline shall mail

a copy thereof to each participant in the California Plan

in the envelopes previously prepared by the Bank of

America for distribution of the June 30, 1976, payment.

5. The expenses incurred by the Bank of America

in preparation for distribution of the June 30, 1976,

payment shall be paid by the Clerk of this Court from

the funds paid into the registry of this Court pursuant to

this order.

6. The funds deposited into the registry of this

Court pursuant to this order and the interest received

thereon shall constitute security for the payment of such

App. B-8

costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any

party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined

hereunder.

DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this

7th day of July, 1976.

/s/ James Lawrence King

~ JAMES LAWRENCE KING

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: all counsel

App. B-9

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NOS. 76-3495

77-2045

PETER PIAMBINO, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

US.

WILLIAM E. BAILEY, et al.

Defendants,

DAVID SYLVA,

Intervenor-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Florida

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

PETER PIAMBINO, et al.

CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.

Attorneys for Appellees

2660 AmeriFirst Building

One Southeast Third Avenue

Miami, Florida 33131

JAMES H. JOSEPH

JOSEPH & HERSHMAN, P.C.

Attorneys for Appellees

4970 United States Steel Bldg.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

App. C-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PI is visi saks coer vaianosvarcovens C-3

STATEMENT OF PACTS .........000cercecvees C-5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..............0005. C-10

ARGUMENT

This Action Created A Common Fund For

the Entire Plaintiff Class .................... C-11

(A) Most of the Settlement Proceeds were

Provided by Individual Defendants .... C-11

(B) No Class Member Should be Preferred

ND boca crureiacsss cepeceses C-13

(C) The California Class Lost No Rights

Because of This Action................. C-14

The Notice to the Class Was Not Inadequate. C-15

Sylva Has a Conflict of Interest Which

Precludes His Representation of the

Ne ny aR ep ee) ea hy a C-17

IN cg ere a le C-21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......ccccccccccce C-22

App. C-2

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 40(a) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiffs-

Appellants, Peter Piambino, et al., respectfully petition

this Court to grant a rehearing and reconsideration of

the Appeal in the above-entitled cause. In support of

this Petition, Plaintiffs represent to the Court as follows:

INTRODUCTION

Because this Court’s Opinion encompassed issues

and factual determinations not briefed by the parties to

this Appeal, many of the factual matters relevant to this

Petition for Rehearing were not before the court and

were not contained in the Appendix filed by Appellant.

Consequently, in this Petition the following symbols will

be used for reference to supporting factual data:

ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION

A Factual matter contained in Appendix

(followed by Appendix page reference).

R Factual matter of Record in lower court

but not included in Appendix (followed

by lower court’s docket entry reference).

S Factual matter supported by

substantial evidence which has not yet

been presented in the lower court

(followed by supplemental Appendix

page reference where applicable. The

symbol ‘‘X”’ will be used for materials

not contained in the Supplemental

Appendix).

App. C-3

The various categories of participants in this action

will be referred to as follows:

Plaintiff Class

California Class

Non-California

Class

Claimants

California

Claimants

Non-California

Claimants

All persons who were given

notice of this action.

All participants in the

California Restitutionary

Fund.

All persons who were given

notice of this action and were

not participants in the

California Restitutionary

Fund.

All persons who filed Proofs

of Claim in this action.

Participants in the

California Restitutionary

Fund who also filed Proofs of

Claim in this action.

All persons who filed Proofs

of Claim in this action and

who were not participants in

the California Restitutionary

Fund.

App. C-4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The settlement referred to by this Court as the

“Bestline Settlement” (slip op. p. 2949) involved

settlement with twenty-two (22) individual defendants

who were not involved in any respect in the California

Superior Court action. A,855; cf. A,883. The most

important of these additional defendants was

Defendant, Jerry G. Brassfield, who had personally

guaranteed certain terms of the ‘‘Bestline Settlement.”

A,537. Five of the individual settling defendants had

been defendants in the California Superior Court

Action, but they were not ordered to make restitution:

Only Bestline Corporation, Bestline Products, Inc., and

William E. Bailey were parties to the Modified

Judgment and the restitutionary provisions thereof.

A,88. Participation in the California Restitutionary

Program did not involve or require the release of the

twenty seven (27) individual settling defendants. A,295-

296.

The source of monies recovered pursuant to the

“Bestline Settlement” was as follows:

$900,000.00 withdrawn from a Swiss bank in favor

of John T. Dawson, Trustee. S,1. Mr. Dawson was

the personal attorney for various individual

defendants but did not make an appearance in this

action.

$300,000.00 drawn on the “Trustee Account” of

John T. Dawson. S,3,4.

$3,402.72 drawn on the account of Dawson, Maino,

Chapman, Mattern and Bishop. S,5,6.

App. C-5

$229,837.29 received from sale of Bestline property

in Illinois. S,7-9.

$491,636.59 transferred from the LaSalle Bank in

Chicago, Illinois. S,10.

The above monies were distributed! as follows:

$756,950.04 to 2,525 Non-California Claimants.

$422,673.68 to 1,807 California Claimants.

$375,000 to James H. Joseph, P.A. as attorneys fees.

$375,000 to Carl H. Hoffman, P.A. as attorneys fees.

On a percentage basis, response to the Notice in

this action by the California Class was more than double

the response by the Non-California Class. S,X. In

addition, the percentage response by the California

Class was substantially better than the response in each

of two similar class action cases where the notice was

held to be adequate. Comparative data relating to class

action participation is as follows:

Class Action Participation — Comparative Data

Bestline Bestline Bestline

Total Non-Calif

Calif Detroit*

Notices

Delivered 25,221 18,780 6,441 89,000

Proofs of

Claim filed 4,332 2,525 1,807 14,156

Percentage

Filing Proofs

of Claim 17% 13% 28% 15%

App. C-6

Korn**

667

122

18%

*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)

**Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972)

Bestline was not insolvent when it filed its Chapter

XI Bankruptcy Petition in the Northern District of

California in July, 1973, A,457. In fact, Bestline had

more than $27,(00,000.00 available for levy on execution

at that time. A,457. Although the avowed purpose of the

California Restitution Program may have been to keep

Bestline afloat to maximize restitution, Bestline had

sufficient assets in July, 1973 to provide immediate full

restitution for the California Class and the claimants in

this action as well. From all appearances, Bestline

principals urged this program as a part of a scheme to

escape liability and remove the major part of Bestline’s

assets into foreign countries. A,446-503. For example, at

the time of the “‘Bestline Settlement’’, Bestline was

insolvent and had been insolvent for a substantial

period of time prior thereto. A,456-460. The financial

condition of Bestline at various times significant to this

litigation was as follows:

App. C-7

Bestline Assets

Available

Bestline Cash For Levy

Date Event On Hand (A459) (A459)(A457)

6-13-73 California Superior Court

Trial Ends.

7-23-73 Bestline files bankruptcy

petition in N.D. California. $4,505,803 $27,052,207

7-25-73 California Superior Court

issues written judgment and

order

8-1-73 Defendant Brassfield gains

control of Bestline

11-?-73 Bestline receives $3,000,000

tax refund (R,1169) 1,920,340 13,110,232

12-21-73 Modified Judgment entered

and Bestline bankruptcy

withdrawn

1-31-74 First payment from

California Restitutionary

Fund 1,558,216 12,502,159

5-3-74 Multi-District Panel

transfers Bestline Cases to

S.D. Florida 513,916 3,605, 185

6-?-74 Bestline receives $4,000,000

tax refund (R,1169)

6-30-74 Second Payment from

California Restitutionary

Fund 55,227 2,426,675

6-30-76 §.D. Florida enjoins Bestline

from Bench 159,368 -0-

'The distribution amounts include some accrued interest and

therefore somewhat exceed the amount of monies recovered. There

presently remains undistributed approximately $24,000.00

App. C-8

At all times after June 30, 1976, Bestline was

insolvent and from an accounting standpoint had no

assets available for levy. A,456-460. Well prior to that

date, Bestline principals had removed Bestline’s assets

into foreign countries beyond the jurisdiction of the

California Superior Court or the Southern District of

Florida. A,446-503. Bestline’s real estate, consisting of a

warehouse in San Jose, California and a plant in Illinois

remained the only substantial assets subject to the

jurisdiction of any Court within the United States.

However, under the terms of the Modified Judgment,

property outside of the State of California was not

subject to acquisition by the California Attorney

General or receiver to be appointed in the event of a

default. A,89.

Shortly before the trial court issued the Preliminary

Injunction in June, 1976, the California Attorney

General admitted in open court that he was aware that

Bestline money was being used to pay the debts of

Golden Products, Inc., a defunct corporation which had

been operated by Defendant Brassfield prior to his

acquisition of Bestline on August 1, 1973. A,488-490;

A,474,475; A,274. Moreover, the California Attorney

General approved this practice. A,274-275. At the time

the Preliminary Injunction was issued, $1,176,553.48

had been removed from Bestline in this fashion alone.

A,475.

Millions of dollars, including an $8.5 million tax

refund, were also diverted from Bestline while the

California Attorney General and the Bestline ‘‘financial

officer” were supposed to be monitoring Bestline’s

operations. A,446-503; A,263-303. In fact, the Internal

Revenue Service is now seeking deficiencies in the

App. C-9

amount of $16,604,909.00 from Defendant Brassfield

arising out of his pyramid scheme operations. See

Brassfield v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service,

Tax Court Docket No. 338678.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Bestline never made a profit after entry of the

California Superior Court Modified Judgment and was

insolvent well prior to entry of the Preliminary

Injunction and at all times thereafter. There is no

evidence that Bestline would have continued to make

payments to the California Restitutionary Fund if the

Preliminary Injunction had not been entered in this

action.

The Bestline Settlement was primarily a settlement

with 27 individual defendants who had no obligation

under the California Superior Court judgment. These 27

individuals paid most of the money comprising the

Bestline Settlement. Moreover, the California Class had

no claim on Bestline’s assets outside of the State of

California. Therefore, this Court’s finding that this

litigation generated no common fund is not consistent

with the facts of this case.

Almost 2,000 California class members did not find

the Class Notice and Proof of Claim confusing. Sylva

himself was aware of the Notice and testified that he did

not believe the Notice was generally confusing. Each of

the witnesses offered by Sylva failed to file Proofs of

Claim for reasons other than misinterpretation of the

claim form.

App. C-10

As Trustee, Sylva was in a position to file Proofs of

Claim for all members of the California Class but failed

to do so. He was also in a position to notify all members

of the California Class of their rights in this action but

he failed to do so. All of the matters complained of by

Sylva arose out of his own failure to carry out his

fiduciary duties. Sylva is now unable to carry out his

fiduciary duties in this action because the course of

action urged by him would create irreconcilable

conflicts among the various members of the California

Class.

Under the terms of the Modified Judgment, any

Bestline Distributor could participate in the California

Restitutionary Fund if Bestline approved his claim.

Therefore, the Bestline settlement with the Plaintiff

Class resulted in the entire Plaintiff Class becoming

members of the California Class. Because Bestline is

now insolvent, any return of monies to Bestline will

most probably be distributed pursuant to involuntary

bankruptcy proceedings.

ARGUMENT

THIS ACTION CREATED A COMMON

FUND FOR THE ENTIRE PLAINTIFF CLASS

A. Most of the Settlement Proceeds were Provided by

Individual Defendants.

This Court held that the Bestline settlement must

be vacated because the California Class had an absolute

priority to the funds received in the settlement. Slip op.

App. C-11

p.2592. The basis of the priority is a finding of fact made

by the Panel that but for the injunction, the California

Class either (a) would have been paid the entire amount

scheduled pursuant to the Restitutionary Plan or, (b)

would have obtained, through a process of liquidation,

the funds from which the Bestline settlement was paid.

These findings are not consistent with the evidence in

this case.

Since the “Bestline settlement” was in fact a

settlement with 27 individual defendants as well as the

Bestline corporations, the source of the settlement funds

is of overriding importance. Any monies paid by the

individual defendants are not subject to claim by the

California Restitutionary Program since that program

did not involve or require the release of any of the 27

individual settling defendants.

In fact, $1,203,402.72 of the Bestline settlement

proceeds were provided by the individual defendants. In

this respect, it is significant that Sylva repeatedly

asserted in the trial court that he did not want to set

aside the Bestline settlement. A,781, 743. Consequently,

Sylva apparently does not contest the source of this

major portion of the settlement funds. The remaining

$721,473.00 is comprised of $491,636.00 transferred from

the La Salle Bank in Chicago pursuant to the July 7,

1976 Preliminary Injunction and $229,837.00 received

from the sale of Bestline Illinois property.

The California Modified Judgment provided that

the California receiver had access only to Bestline assets

within California. A,89-90. Consistent with this

territorial limitation, Sylva has not argued that he is

entitled to any interest in the Bestline property in

Illinois.

App. C-12

Sylva’s claim in the lower court was limited to the

$491,636.00 which was transferred to the Southern

District of Florida pursuant to the Preliminary

Injunction. A,736. At best, Sylva may argue that

Bestline intended to pay that amount into the

California Restitutionary Program although Bestline’s

intent hardly gives the California Court jurisdiction of

assets outside of the State of California. Moreover, most

of the $491,636.00, or some $422,673.00, has already

been returned to the California Claimants who filed

Proofs of Claim in this action. Therefore, at most,

Sylva’s claim is limited to the $68,968.00 difference

between the amount transferred pursuant to the

Preliminary Injunction and the amount actually

distributed to California claimants.

B. No Class Member Should be Preferred Over

Another.

California Claimants shared ratably in the

distribution of the settlement proceeds. Each California

Claimant was paid on the same basis as Non-California

Claimants: An adjusted claim was calculated by first

subtracting from the claimant’s expenditures any

profits made by him on sales and any prior

restitutionary payments received by him. The claimant

was then paid in the same ratio of the total settlement

proceeds as his adjusted claim bore to the adjusted

claims of all claimants.

The well-established rule for distribution of

settlement funds and treatment of class members is that

no class member is to be preferred over any other class

member. That was precisely the rule followed by lead

counsel in this action.

App. C-13

C. The California Class Lost No Rights Because of

This Action.

As discussed above, no more than $491,636.00 was

available to the California class through the California

Restitutionary Fund. Because the California class

members had previously waived their rights to pursue

any claims against Bestline, this court opined that it

might have been improper to have included members of

the California Class in this action. Slip. op. p.2962.

However, as discussed above, none of the 27 individual

settling Defendants had previously settled with the

California class. As to the Bestline corporations who had

already settled with the California class, Bestline’s

agreement to include the members of the California

class in the settlement despite their prior waivers is

hardly prejudicial to them.

At the time the California Superior Court entered

its judgment on July, 1973, the Bestline Corporations

had available for levy on execution the sum of

$27,052,207.00. A,456-457. At about this same time,

Bailey sold his interest in Bestline to Defendant

Brassfield. Slip. op. p.2928. Brassfield had not been a

party to the California Superior Court action (A,83) and

consequently he was not personally involved in the

Modified Judgment. After taking control, Brassfield

transferred to Switzerland and other foreign countries

essentially every liquid asset held by Bestline. See

A, 446-503. At the time of the settlement, Bestline had a

negative net worth. A,459; A446-503.

One wonders what the California Attorney General

and Sylva were doing when this was occurring. In fact,

the California Attorney General had full knowledge that

App. C-14

more than $1,000,000 was paid by Bestline to satisfy a

liability incurred by Defendant Brassfield when he was

not affiliated with Bestline. A,457, 474-475. This money

was paid into another California Restitutionary Plan

established by the California Attorney General for

distributors of Golden Products, Inc., a completely

different pyramid scheme operated by Defendant

Brassfield in competition with Bestline. A,475.

Additionally, the few assets which were available within

the jurisdiction of the California Restitutionary Plan

had been liquidated and transferred to other areas

outside the jurisdiction of the California Superior Court.

A, 446-503. In light of these facts, the Bestline settlement

was not unreasonable for the California Class or for the

Plaintiff Class as a whole.

THE NOTICE TO THE CLASS

WAS NOT INADEQUATE

The California Class consisted of 7,043 persons,

including 602 General Distributors. However, Sylva did

not claim these 602 General Distributors to be part of his

‘‘class’’ for purposes of intervention. A,776.

Consequently, only 6,441 members of the California

Class were eligible to receive notice of the Florida

action. Of this number, 1,807 California Class Members

filed Proofs of Claim in the Florida action. Accordingly,

at least 1,807 California Class Members did not find the

notice confusing. In fact, Sylva himself testified that the

number of people contacting him for clarification of the

notice was not sufficient to cause him to believe there

was a general problem of interpretation among all

members of the California Class. A,839.

App. C-15

Of the three witnesses offered by Sylva, one of

them, Norman Feinberg, testified that he did not file a

Proof of Claim form because of advice he had gotten

from three lawyers (A,808) and a notice that he believed

had been sent by Sylva about a year prior to receiving

the class notice. A,810-811. The other two witnesses,

Valentin Dominguez and Susie Rosenrot, both spoke

English with heavy accents and clearly would have

difficulty understanding any detailed document in

English. And even so, the reason for Mr. Dominguez’s

confusion was not the information contained in the

notice but rather a letter he had earlier received from

Bestline. A,814-15. The third witness, Susie Rosenrot,

wrote to Sylva and despite his advice that she submit a

claim form, she failed to do so. As stated by Ms.

Rosenrot:

Q. Didn’t [Sylva’s letter] say if you filled out

the claim form and filed it in Florida it

would not jeopardize your participation in

California?

A. That’s what he said. But you know I don’t

speak too good English, you know; so I

figure it was alright, you know.

A,829.

Also, while the notice to the class may appear

complex, it was essentially identical to notices

submitted in numerous other class actions. See 2

Newberg on Class Actions, pp. 297-1167.

App. C-16

The District Court specifically found that the

notice was adequate and constituted “Valid, due and

sufficient notice”. A,854. This finding was made after

the District Court had heard the testimony presented by

Sylva. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding may not be

set aside unless it is ‘‘clearly erroneous.” In view of the

contradictions in the witnesses testimony as well as the

similarity between the notice in this case and those

submitted in many other cases, it cannot be said that

the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous.

SYLVA HAS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

WHICH PRECLUDES HIS REPRESEN-

TATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CLASS

Although not argued by Sylva, this Court found

that Sylva in his capacity as Compliance Officer was in

fact a Trustee and consequently had a “direct,

substantial, and legally protectable interest’’ in these

proceedings. Slip. op. p. 2944. Nonetheless, Sylva had a

serious conflict that precluded his suitability to act in

such capacity in this case: A total of 1,807 Proofs of

Claim (40% of the total Proofs of Claim filed) were filed

by members of the California Class. The California

Class consisted of a total of 7,043 persons (slip op. p.

2935) of which 602 were General Distributors. A,755-756.

Despite his fiduciary duty, Sylva specifically disclaimed

these 602 General Distributors to be part of his ‘“‘class”

for purposes of intervention. A,776.

App. C-17

Sylva repeatedly represented in the trial court that

he did not want to set aside the settlement. A,781, 743.

But, Sylva had an irreconcilable conflict in his class of

6,441 persons (7,043 total minus 603 General

Distributors), 1,807 of whom were already entitled to

share in the settlement proceeds. His successful

intervention would only succeed in reducing the amount

of money the 1,807 would receive as claimants in the

Florida class. Of course, Sylva also had a conflict with

the 602 General Distributors who would receive nothing

if Sylva opted to merely share in the settlement

proceeds rather than regain for the California fund the

$491,636 transferred pursuant to the Preliminary

Injunction. But if this $491,636 were removed to the

California fund, the 1,807 persons who had filed Proofs

of Claim in the Florida action would be prejudiced since

the $491,636 would have to be divided among 7,043

persons in the California fund as opposed to 4,332

persons in the Florida action. This conflict was admitted

by Sylva in the trial court (A,747), but no solution was

offered.

Even if Sylva were somehow able to resolve this

conflict, it is noted that Sylva has not acted for the

benefit of his class. As a Trustee, Sylva should have filed

Proofs of Claim for all members of the California Class.

As a Trustee he not only had the right to do so, but the

obligation. Instead of doing this, Sylva elected to

intervene as a class representative under Rule 23, which

he clearly was not. Of course, there would have been no

attorney’s fees or compliance officer fees awardable if

Sylva merely filed the Proofs of Claim. However, there

was no proper reason for failure to file the Proofs of

Claim. Sylva indicated that the same claim form had

already been filled out and processed by him through

App. C-18

the Restitutionary Program so that no administrative

difficulty would have been involved in filing the Proofs

of Claim. A,768-769.

At leest as early as December 15, 1976, or shortly

thereafter, Sylva was aware that Proofs of Claim had

been submitted to participants in the California

Restitutionary Program. A,835. In fact, he answered

inquiries concerning the Proof of Claim and even

developed a form letter to deal with inquiries from

members of the California Class. A,835. If he in fact

believed that the notice was confusing to members of the

California Class, he should have at least supplied all of

them with a form letter urging them to participate. He

did not do this.

It should be noted that Sylva’s position as Trustee

on behalf of a limited group is quite different from that

of Lead Counsel who had a fiduciary duty to treat all

class members equally. To encourage any particular

claimant or group of claimants to file Proofs of Claim

would prejudice the others. Consequently, it would have

been improper for Lead Counsel to suggest to Sylva that

he file Proofs of Claim even if Sylva had represented

that he was a Trustee for the members of the California

class — which he did not.

Plaintiffs are uncertain as to just what results Sylva

may be seeking in this Appeal: If the “Bestline

Settlement’? were disapproved, the 27 individual

settling defendants would be entitled to a refund of the

$1,203,402.74 paid by them. Similarly, Bestline would

be entitled to refund of the $229,837.29 received from

the sale of the Bestline property in Illinois and the

$491,636.59 transferred from the LaSalle Bank in

Chicago, Illinois. However, Bestline is and was

App. C-19

insolvent. Therefore, any three creditors, including any

three members of the Plaintiff Class, may petition for

Bestline’s involuntary bankruptcy thereby forcing

distribution of these funds among at least 9,568 persons

(7,043 California class members plus 2,535 Non-

California class members) resulting in an average per

capita distribution of $75 person. Of course this

calculation does not account for claims by general

creditors. In contrast, it is noted that the 1,807

California claimants who did file Proofs of Claim in this

action have received an average per capita distribution

of $233.90 which they would be required to disgorge if

the settlement were disapproved.

The California class members would be required to

file another Proof of Claim with the Bankruptcy Court

in order to participate in any bankruptcy distribution.

Consequently, it is probably not unrealistic to expect

the California claimants to be limited to the same

diligent 1,807 persons who filed Proofs of Claim in this

action. Therefore, it is most probable that any

disapproval of the Bestline Settlement will only result in

the loss of the $1,203,402.74 paid by the 27 individual

settling defendants with little reallocation of settlement

proceeds among the California class members.

On the other hand, if the Bestline Settlement were

approved on the condition that the California class

given be absolute priority to the monies obtained from

Bestline and the sale of Bestline’s property, regardless of

its location, the California class would not fare any

better: Under the terms of the Modified Judgment, any

Bestline Direct Distributor could participate in the

California Restitutionary Fund if Bestline approved his

claim. A,105. Bestline’s settlement with the Plaintiff

Class constituted approval of the Plaintiff Class claims

App. C-20

and thereby entitled the entire Plaintiff Class to become

members of the California Class. The result, again,

would be the distribution of $721,473.88 among 9,568

persons, resulting in the same average per capita

distribution of $75 per person. Of course, the California

Class would in this case be allowed to participate in the

proceeds received by the individual defendants. But

there remains a further consideration: As members of

the California Class the Plaintiff Class members were

entitled to participate in all distributions effected by

Sylva after Bestline’s approval of the settlement. At

least $250,000 was distributed by Sylva after such

approval. A,840-841. Therefore, the Non-California

Claimants in this action are entitled to receive an

additional average per capita distribution of at least

$26.12 from the California Restitutionary Fund

($250,000 divided by 9,568) for a total of $65,975.12.

Consequently, it is most doubtful that any real benefit

would accrue to any class member by restructuring the

settlement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs/Appellees,

Peter Piambino, et al. pray the Court for rehearing and

that on rehearing granted, this Court’s Opinion dated

February 6, 1980, be vacated and that the Court enter a

new Opinion affirming the District Court’s approval of

the Bestline settlement, or, in the alternative,

remanding this action for further findings of fact with

reference thereto.

CARL H. HOFFMAN, P. A.

By:

App. C-21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that an original and one copy

f the foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed or

delivered to each attorney of record this__ day of May,

1980.

CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.

Attorneys for Appellees,

Peter Piambino, et al.

2660 AmeriFirst Building

One Southeast Third Avenue

Miami, Florida 33131

By:

App. C-22

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NOS. 76-3495

77-2045

PETER PIAMBINO, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Us.

WILLIAM E. BAILEY, et al.

Defendants.

DAVID SYLVA,

Intervenor-Appellant.

CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY FIFTH

CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 13.6.1

The undersigned, counsel of record for Appellees,

certifies that the following listed parties have an interest

in the outcome of this case. These representations are

made in order that the Judges of this Court may

evaluate possible disqualification or recusal pursuant to

Local Rule 13.6.1.

App. D-1

NAME

Peter Piambino

Joseph F. Kucklick

Marilyn Koslen

Robert M. Ernst

Michael J. Gardner

James D. Small

All persons who purchased or invested

in Director Distributorships during

the period from March 7, 1980

through August 10, 1973

Bestline Products, Inc.

Bestline Corporation

William E. Bailey

David L. Eastis

Jerry G. Brassfield

Robert Depew

Leo Diel

Charles Simmons

Larry D. Huff

Larry S. Huff

James Rohn

Towru Ikeda

App. D-2

INTEREST

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

Members

of the

Plaintiff Class

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Steve C. Stern

James K. Hisler

Ralph Flynn

Martin Day

Norman Miller

Joseph Cotroneo

Richard Dumont

Saul Tave

Richard Lub

Jerry J. Weiss

Davis Soto

Keith Fox

Oliver P. Colvin

Tink Anderson

Frank Brendis

David T. Gibson

Gordon Blaum

Edna Blaum

Richard Grillo

Melvin Moran

Richard G. Kruse

Blair R. Egli

Neal Morehart

Peter Eiselstein

Bert Hardcastle

Alfred G. Moravec

Kenneth Davis

Norman Evans

Carroll Gentry

Robert E. Johnson

Robert L. Shell

C.D. St. Peter

James Herbert

Donald Omholt

App. D-3

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Sten Tallarida Defendant

Willie Larkin Defendant

Frank Conti Defendant

Andi Dias Defendant

Marvin Sternberg Defendant

E. J. Beckman Defendant

Kenneth Lutz Defendant

Edward Buck Defendant

John Wolfe Defendant

Robert Schuster Defendant

Robert Richards Defendant

William Gelfound Defendant

Lennart Osterman Defendant

Jan B. Bailey Defendant

Janin, Morgan & Brenner,

a partnership Defendant

Janin, Morgan & Brenner,

a corporation Defendant

Frank Interdonato Defendant

George Wunch Defendant

Robert Burke Defendant

Wisconsin Attorney General’s Office

New Jersey Attorney General’s Office

Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office

Missouri Attorney General’s Office

Texas Attorney General’s Office Californi

California Attorney General’s Office te perhee

New York Department of te ued

Consumer Affairs —

App. D-4

David R. Sylva Appellant

Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. Trustee,

California

Restitutionary

Programs

All persons eligible for distributions California

from the California Restitutionary Restitutionary

Program Program

CARL H. HOFFMAN

App. D-5

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL REQUIRED BY

FIFTH CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 16.1.2.2

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied

professional judgment, that the panel decision is

contrary to the following decisions of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and of the

Supreme Court of the United States and that

consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure

and maintain uniformity of decisions in this Court:

Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc.,

549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977)

Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc.,

608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979)

Commander’s Palace Park v. Girard & Pastel

Corp.,

572 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978)

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,

439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790,

58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979)

Joiner v. City of Dallas,

488 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974)

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,

405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113,

31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972)

Machesky v. Bizzell,

414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969)

App. D-6

SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,

497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974)

Tampa Phosphate R. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line

R. Co.,

418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969)

United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman,

421 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 2051,

44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975)

Carl H. Hoffman

Attorney for Appellees

App. D-7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

re

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............seeeeees D-9

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............... D-12

STATEMENT OF COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ............. D-13

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS..............:. D-13

ARGUMENT

The Panel’s Decision Relating to the Anti-

Injunction Act is Contrary to the Tampa

Phosphate and Machesky Decisions ......... D-20

The Panel’s Decision Relating to the

Definition of a Security is Contrary to the

Koscot Interplanetary Decision .............. D-23

The Panel’s Decision Relating to Reversal of

the Bestline Settlement is Contrary to the

Established Law of this Circuit .............. D-28

nae sees sees eens bnees D-31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................5. D-32

App. D-8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: | Page

Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United States,

410 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1969) ..............05. D-30

Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation (In re),

607 F.26 167 (G4 Cir. 1979) .....cccccccceces D-28

Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc.,

549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) ..... D-23, D-24, D-26

Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc.,

608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979) .........cccceeee D-25

Commander’s Palace Park v. Girard & Pastel Corp.,

572 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978) .........ccceee. D-25

Complaint of Ithaca Corp.,

GOR FO GG Uae, 1GTG) cc cescdsvccesvnces D-31

Cotton v. Hinton,

559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977) .... D-28, D-29, D-31

Dandridge v. Williams,

397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153,

SR Breer rrr D-29

Davis v. United States,

422 F246 1130 (6th Cir. 1070) ....cccccccccess D-31

Dickens v. United States,

545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977) .............00ee D-29

App. D-9

Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, S.A.,

577 F.2d 968 (6th Cir, 1978) .....cccccscvvees D-28

Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale,

506 F.2d 201 (6th Cir, 1978) ...cccccccccccnes D-23

Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc.,

448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir, 1971) ......ceeeeeeeees D-29

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,

439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Kd.2d 808

UT keh nenbayerekedsneesedesevese D-265

Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital,

436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir, 1970) ........c cece eens D-31

| Joiner v. City of Dallas,

488 F.2d 519 (Sth Cir, 1974) .........5. D-22, D-23

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,

405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113,

AMEE RUUED ccocccccccccecceccnece D-22

Machesky v. Bizzel,

414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir, 1969) ............000ee D-20

Miller v. Republic National Life Ins. Co.,

559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir, 1977) .......ceeeeeeees D-28

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,

576 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir, 1978) .........0eeeeee D-28

Premier Corp. v. Serrano,

565 F.2d 1353 (6th Cir. 1977) .......ceseeeees D-31

App. D-10

SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc.,

556 F.2d 559 (2nd Cir, 1977) .....cceeeeeeees D-23

SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,

474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir, 1973) cert. denied 414

US 821, 94S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973) ... D-23

SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,

497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) .........5. D-23, D-24

SEC v. Wencke,

577 F.2d 619 (Oth Cir. 1978) ....ccccvccccvees D-21

Shale v. United States,

409 F.2d 412 (5th Cir, 1969) ........cceeeeeee D-30

S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States,

353 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1965) ........cceeeeeee D-30

Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin,

360 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir, 1966) ...........eeeee D-20

Tampa Phosphate R. Co. v. Seaboard

Coast Line R. Co.,

418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir, 1969) .........ceeeeees D-20

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,

421 US 837 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621

ERE VNAeeiens CARA OCRCa ROSES REDS Sedee Eb Roe D-24

Young v. Katz,

447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir, 1971) ........... D-28, D-30

App. D-11

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

395 U.S, 100, 89 S.Ct. 1562,

23 L.Ed.2d 120 (196) ....ccsccseccevcevcees D-29

STATUTES:

27 U.S.C. $2283 .......... D-20, D-21, D-22, D-23

42 U.S.C. $1981 et seq. ........ceeeees D-22, D-23

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court

Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws:

The Pendulum Swings, 65 Geo.L.J. 891 (1977) D-25

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The following issues are raised on this Petition for

Rehearing en banc:

1. Whether the Panel’s decision relating to the

Anti-Injunction Act is contrary to the Tampa

Phosphate and Machesky decision.

2. Whether the Panel’s decision relating to the

definition of a security is contrary to the Koscot

Interplanetary decision.

3. Whether the Panel’s decision relating to

reversal of the Bestline Settlement is contrary

to the established law of this Circuit.

App. D-12

STATEMENT OF COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

The development of this case is adequately set forth

in the Panel’s Opinion appearing at 610 F.2d 1306.

However, Plaintiffs do not necessarily agree with the

Panel’s characterization of events. For example,

Plaintiffs disagree that Lead Counsel attempted to

“disrupt” the California restitution payments. 610 F.2d

at 1314. Rather, Lead Counsel properly sought to

protect the rights of the Plaintiff class whom they

represented, Likewise, Plaintiffs disagree that the

California class was treated differently from the

Plaintiff class as a whole. Quite to the contrary, special

attention was given to insure there was no distinction of

any kind in the treatment of the two groups. A,801.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The specific facts of this Appeal are for the most

part set forth in detail in the Panel’s Opinion appearing

at 610 F.2d 1306. However, the Panel’s Opinion should

be supplemented as follows:

The settlement referred to by the Panel as the

‘“Bestline Settlement” (610 F.2d at 1327) involved

settlement with twenty-two (22) individual defendants

who were not involved in any respect in the California

Superior Court action. A,855; cf. A,883. The most

important of these additional defendants was

Defendant, Jerry G. Brassfield, who had personally

guaranteed certain terms of the ‘‘Bestline Settlement.”

A,537. Five of the individual settling defendants had

been defendants in the California Superior Court

Action, but they were not ordered to make restitution:

App. D-13

Only Bestline Corporation, Bestline Products, Inc., and

William E. Bailey were parties to the Modified

Judgment and restitionary provisions thereof. A,88.

Participation in the California Restitutionary Program

did not involve or require the release of the twenty seven

(27) individual settling defendants. A,295-296.

The ‘‘Bestline Settlement’’ consisted of

$1,200,000.00 paid by the 27 individual settling

defendants, $230,000.00 received from the sale of

Bestline property in Illinois and $491,000.00 transferred

from the LaSalle Bank in Chicago pursuant to the

District Court’s Preliminary Injunction.

On a percentage basis, response to the notice in this

action by the “California Class’’ was more than double

the response by the ‘‘Non-California Class.” In addition,

the percentage response by the “California Class” was

substantially better than the response in each of two

similar class action cases where the notice was held to be

adequate. Comparative data relating to class action

participation is as follows:

Class Action Participation — Comparative Data

Bestline Bestline Bestline

Total Non-Calif Calif Detroit* Korn**

Notices

Delivered 25,221 18,780 6,441 89,000 667

Proofs of

Claim filed 4,332 2,525 1,807 14,156 122

Percentage

Filing Proofs

of Claim 17% 13% 28% 15% 18%

*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)

**Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972)

App. D-14

Bestline was not insolvent when it filed its Chapter

XI Bankruptcy Petition in the Northern District of

California in July; 1973. A,457. In fact, Bestline had

more than $27,000,000.00 available for levy on execution

at that time. A,457. In July, 1973, Bestline had

sufficient assets to provide immediate full restitution for

the California Class and the claimants in this action as

well. From all appearances, Bestline principals urged

the California Restitutionary Program as a part of a

scheme to escape liability and remove the major part of

Bestline’s assets into foreign countries. A,446-503.

Consequently, at the time of the “‘Bestline Settlement’,

Bestline was insolvent and had been insolvent for a

substantial period of time prior thereto. A,456-460. The

financial condition of Bestline at various times

significant to this litigation was as follows:

App. D-15

Bestline Assets

Available

Bestline Cash For Levy

Date Event On Hand (A459) (A459)(A457)

6-13-73 California Superior Court

Trial Ends.

7-23-73 Bestline files bankruptcy

petition in N.D. California. $4,505,803 $27,052,207

7-25-73 California Superior Court

+4 issues written judgment and

order

8-1-73 Defendant Brassfield gains

control of Bestline

11-?-73 Bestline receives $3,000,000

tax refund (R, 1169) 1,920,340 13,110,232

: 12-21-73 Modified Judgment entered

and Bestline bankruptcy

withdrawn

1-31-74 First payment from

California Restitutionary

Fund 1,558,216 12,602,159

5-3-74 Multi-District Panel

transfers Bestline Cases to

S.D. Florida 513,916 3,605,185

6-?-74 Bestline receives $4,000,000

Le tax refund (R,1169)

6-30-74 Second Payment from

California Restitutionary

Fund 55,227 2,426,675

6-30-76 §.D. Florida enjoins Bestline

from Bench 159,268 -0-

App. D-16

At all times after June 30, 1976, Bestline was

insolvent and from an accounting standpoint had no

assets available for levy. A,456-460. Well prior to that

date, Bestline principals had removed Bestline’s assets

into foreign countries beyond the jurisdiction of the

California Superior Court or the Southern District of

Florida. A,446-503. Bestline’s real estate, consisting of a

warehouse in San Jose, California and a plant in Illinois

remained the only substantial assets subject to the

jurisdiction of any Court within the United States.

However, under the terms of the Modified Judgment,

property outside of the State of California was not

subject to acquisition by the California Attorney

General or receiver to be appointed in the event of a

default. A,89.

Shortly before the trial court issued the Preliminary

Injunction in June, 1976, the California Attorney

General admitted in open court that he was aware that

Bestline money was being used to pay the debts of

Golden Products, Inc., a defunct corporation which had

been operated by Defendant Brassfield prior to his

acquisition of Bestline on August 1, 1973. A,488-490;

A,474,475; A,274. Moreover, the California Attorney

General approved this practice. A,274-275. At the time

the Preliminary Injunction was issued, $1,176,553.48

had been removed from Bestline in this fashion alone.

A,475.

Millions of dollars, including an $8.5 million tax

refund, were also diverted from Bestline while the

California Attorney General and the Bestline “financial

officer’ were supposed to be monitoring Bestline’s

operations. A,446-503; A,263-303. In fact, the Internal

Revenue Service is now seeking deficiencies in the

App. D-17

amount of $16,604,909.00 from Defendant Brassfield

arising out of his pyramid scheme operations. See

Brassfield v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service,

Tax Court Docket No. 338678.

It should be noted that Plaintiffs do not agree that

the following statements by the Panel are consistent

with the facts of this case:

The Compliance Officer has kept himself abreast of the

litigation in Florida from its inception. 610 F.2d at 1323.

Not only did the District Court intend to liquidate

Besiline’s assets, but he intended to distribute the

proceeds only to class members ‘‘who have not

previously been admitted to participation in the

California restitutionary fund.” 610 F.2d at 1323.

At that time, the California fund had just made its

second payment, and many of the participants

undoubtedly were confused by this notice of yet another

lawsuit. 610 F.2d at 1324.

As has already been demonstrated, there was a distinct

probability that the confusing, if not deceptive, series of

notices guaranteed that no members of the California

group would appear at the hearing to protest the

settlement. 610 F.2d at 1325.

[T]he District Court also intended to appoint a receiver

with instructions to liquidate all of Bestline’s assets. 610

F.2d at 1326.

Bailey gave no consideration whatsoever for the release

of these claims. 610 F.2d at 1327.

App. D-18

This is demanded by the failure to assess the interests of

the two categories of the plaintiffs and whether the

settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable as to each.

610 F.2d at 1329.

Rather than execute their judgments and force Bestline

into bankruptcy, those 7,043 people chose to accept

smaller installment payments and to keep Bestline

afloat for the greater good of all concerned. 610 F.2d at

1329.

Therefore the members of the fund have been deprived

of over $600, on the average, to which they were entitled

as a result of their judgments against Bestline. 610 F.2d

at 1329.

The interest of these 7,043 people in protecting their

judgments has not been adequately recognized or

protected. 610 F.2d at 1329.

Furthermore, since those 7,043 people were already

entitled to such funds (up to $4,500,000 plus interest),

this litigation has generated no common fund from

which to pay attorneys’ fees and expenses. 610 F.2d at

1330.

If, however, Bestline would have defaulted on those

payments before now, the California class would still

have obtained Bestline’s assets through liquidation long

before this settlement. 610 F.2d at 1330.

While accepting generally the Panel’s description of

the facts of this case, Plaintiffs submit that the

foregoing findings are erroneous and inconsistent with

*

App. D-19

the evidence of record herein. These matters have been

addressed in Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing filed

concurrently herewith.

ARGUMENT

THE PANEL’S DECISION RELATING TO

THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT IS

CONTRARY TO THE TAMPA

PHOSPHATE AND MACHESKY

DECISIONS

The Panel’s analysis of the District Court’s issuance

of the Preliminary Injunction places significant

emphasis on the characterization of this action as a

private lawsuit. 610 F.2d at 1332-1334. The Panel’s

conclusion “that for private lawsuits the Securities

Exchange Act does not constitute an ‘expressly

authorized’ exception to 27 U.S.C. $2283” (610 F.2d at

1333), is in direct conflict with this Court’s holdings in

Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) and

Tampa Phosphate R. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.

Co., 418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969).

Both Machesky and Tampa Phosphate recognized

that §2283 is inapplicable in extraordinary cases where

an injunction against state court proceedings is the only

means to avoid grave and irreparable injury. In

addition, both cases held that a different result should

not obtain, when enforcement is sought by a private

party rather than by the Securities and Exchange

Commission. 414 F.2d at 288; 418 F.2d at 394. This

Court cited with approval the case of Studebaker Corp.

v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), stating:

App. D-20

[I]n the opinion by Judge Friendly, the court

found that §2283 was not a bar to a private

action under the Securities and Exchange Act.

418 F.2d at 393.

Additionally, Plaintiffs would note that the Panel

calls attention to SEC v. Wencke, 577 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.

1978), 610 F.2d at 1332, a case which squarely approved

the district court’s enjoining state court action as an

exception to §2283. There the court observed:

Rather than a genuine attempt to preserve the

property for the corporation’s shareholders and

creditors, the state receivership was a

protective cloak for Wencke to throw over his

continued looting. Jd. at 622.

In view of the dissipation of assets in the California

Fund under the aegis of the California Attorney General

and Sylva, the removal of Brassfield’s protective cloak

accomplished by the Preliminary Injunction would

appear to take it outside of §2283. It should be

emphasized that shortly before issuing the Preliminary

Injunction, the trial court had heard the California

Attorney General acknowledge that more than

$1,000,000.00 had been paid by Bestline to satisfy a

liability incurred by Defendant Brassfield prior to his

affiliation with Bestline. A,457; 474-475. This money

was paid into another California restitutionary plan

established by the California Attorney General for

distributors of Golden Products, Inc., a completely

different pyramid scheme operated by Defendant

Brassfield in competition with Bestline. A,475. The

evidence before the trial court made it clear that neither

App. D-21

the California Attorney General nor Sylva were taking

any steps to prevent the systematic depletion of

Bestline’s assets which had been occurring up to the

time of the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction.

The Panel’s opinion is also in direct conflict with

this Court’s holding in Joiner v. City of Dallas, Texas,

488 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1974), as well as the Supreme

Court’s holding in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,

405 U.S. 538,.92,S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972). In

Joiner, plaintiffs sought to enjoin state condemnation

proceedings in order to protect their property rights. The

district court had ruled that an injunction against

pending state court proceedings would be barred by

§2283, reasoning that 42 U.S.C. $1981 et seq. did not

apply to property rights. Joiner v. City of Dallas, 329

F.Supp. 943, 944 (N.D.Tex. 1971). This Court affirmed,

447 F.2d 1403, and the Supreme Court, without opinion,

vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of

certain Supreme Court decisions. Joiner v. City of

Dallas, 412 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 2286, 36 L.Ed.2d 967

(1973). On remand this Court stated:

Second, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.

held that §1983 protects property rights as well

as personal liberties. The issue in Lynch was

whether, in light of the anti-injunction statute,

the District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin a

summary pre-judicial garnishment proceeding

permitted under Connecticut law but

challenged under the due process clause as it

applies to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment. The Court held that 42 U.S.C.A.

§1983 and 28 U.S.C.A. §1343 provided an

App. D-22

exception to the anti-injunction statute to

protect property rights as well as personal

liberties. Again, the Joiner decision was in

direct conflict with this holding. 488 F.2d at

520.

Plaintiff’s reliance on deprivation of property without

due process of law to come within the §1983 exception to

§2283 was summarily discounted (610 F.2d at 1332),

reminiscent of the first Joiner opinion and in direct

conflict with the later, correct Joiner decision. See also

Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d

291, 300 (5th Cir. 1979).

In view of the above considerations, Plaintiffs

submit that the district court properly entered the

Preliminary Injunction and that the Panel’s decision is

not reconcilable with the prior law of this Circuit.

THE PANEL’S DECISION RELATING TO

THE DEFINITION OF A SECURITY IS

CONTRARY TO THE KOSCOT

INTERPLANETARY DECISION

The Panel specifically found that there were two

distinct aspects of the distribution system set up by

Bestline, just as there had been in SEC v. Koscot

Interplanetary, Inc. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.

Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th

Cir. 1973) cert. denied 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38

L.Ed.2d 53 (1973); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 556 F.2d

559 (2d Cir. 1977) and Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d

342 (5th Cir. 1977). 610 F.2d at 1318. These two aspects

were described by the Panel as the “retail sales portion

of the business on one hand and the recruiting portion

App. D-23

on the other.” 610 F.2d at 1318. The Panel noted

however:

As is the case with most such pyramid sales

schemes, however, the lure of big profits came

not from the opportunity to sell Bestline’s

products to the consuming public but from the

opportunity to recruit others who would in turn

recruit or sell, 610 F.2d at 1310.

The Panel went on to conclude that “different

inferences could be drawn from the facts in the record as

to whether the Bestline Direct Distributorship Plan

could be separated into two parts” and that “different

inferences could be drawn from the facts in the record as

to whether anticipated profits were to come solely by

Bestline’s efforts, with no substantial personal effort on

the part of the ‘investor’.”” 610 F.2d at 1319. However,

this Court recognized in Bell v. Health-Mor, supra,

“that income oppomminity can be considered

independently of any sale of a product or service which

might have been made.” 549 F.2d at 346. Of course,

under the authority of Koscot and the other cases cited

by the Panel, the test is not whether anticipated profits

were to come “solely from Bestline’s efforts with no

substantial personal effort” by the Investor, but whether

Bestline was to provide the ‘‘essential managerial efforts

which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.’’ See

SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d at 483.

The Panel’s opinion conflicts with the

interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decisions in

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.

837, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975) and

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439

App. D-24

U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979), that are

generally accepted by all commentators and Circuit

Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit. See

Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions

Under the Federal Securities Laws; The Pendulum

Swings, 65 Geo.L.J. 891, 908 (1977). This court stated in

Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d

187 (5th Cir, 1979):

The key issue is whether the managerial efforts

are functionally essential or undeniably

significant to that profit, and it is irrelevant

that the investor does “nominal menial effort”

that affects profit. Jd. at 193.

Here, however, the Panel concluded that summary

judgment was improper because “there was evidence

that might lead the trier of fact to conclude that

Bestline intended to dispel (and dispelled) the belief

that it was promising profits with no expenditure of

effort.” 610 F.2d at 1319. This is simply inconsistent

with this Court’s finding in Cameron that “it is

irrelevant that the investor does ‘nominal menial effort’

that affects profit.”’

Additionally the Panel’s repeated emphasis on the

word solely in the Howey test (a word significantly

omitted by the Supreme Court in Forman) conflicts

with this Court’s pronouncement in Commander's

Palace Park v. Girard & Pastel Corp., 572 F.2d 1084 (5th

Cir, 1978):

App. D-25

In cases dealing with pyramid sales schemes or

referral sales agreements, we have modified

this test to allow that the promoter or the third

party need expend not the sole efforts, but only

the crucial efforts, to produce profits. Id, at

1086.

And in Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., supra, this Court

noted:

(T]he assumption that Howey requires that the

income be derived soley by the efforts of those

other than the investor [was] specifically

rejected, . .in Koscot. 549 F.2d at 346.

The shattering effect to the foundation of the Fifth

Circuit’s leadership on a question of such exceptional

importance in the evolution of securities law surely

renders this decision ‘“‘enbancworthy.”

The Panel specifically found that the Bestline

Direct Distributorships were ‘an integral part of its

multi-level distributorship system, a species of pyramid

sales schemes.” 610 F.2d at 1308. After finding that the

Bestline Direct Distributorship was a part of Bestline’s

pyramid sales scheme, the Panel acknowledged that this

Court specifically held in Koscot that a pyramid

distribution system is a security. 610 F.2d at 1316. A

reading of the Panel’s decision, however, would lead one

to believe that pyramid franchising schemes are no

longer securities in the fifth Circuit despite the Koscot

holding, and that it is necessary for victim of a pyramid

franchising scheme to prove there was “no substantial

effort by the investor.” 610 F.2d at 1320. In contrast, the

Koscot test related to the “undeniably significant ones,

App. D-26

those essential managerial efforts which affect the

failure or success of the enterprise.” 497 F.2d at 483.

The Panel found that the lure of “big” profits came

not from the opportunity to sell Bestline products to the

consuming public but from the opportunity ‘to recruit

others who would in turn recruit or sell. 610 F.2d at 1310.

However, it is clear that no reasonable investor would

seek out “small” profits. There can be no dispute as to

the inference that every reasonable investor would seek

out “big” profits rather than “small” profits thereby

eliminating any question of inference or fact in the case

at bar. Therefore, the District Court correctly found on

summary judgment that the Bestline Direct

Distributorship was a “security”’.

It is noted that the Koscot case consisted of an

outright reversal of the District Court’s findings that the

Koscot distributorship was not a security. Clearly, the

criteria for reversal of the District Court’s findings of

fact differ little from the criteria to be applied in favor of

the non-moving party upon motion for summary

judgment. Therefore, with Koscot for guidance, the

District Court in this case was plainiy justified in relying

upon the Koscot criteria for ertry of summary

judgment. However, the Panel’s decision reversing the

District Court brings into doubt the applicability of the

Koscot standards for future litigation.

App. D-27

THE PANEL’S DECISION RELATING TO

REVERSAL OF THE BESTLINE

SETTLEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE

ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS CIRCUIT

The standards governing approval of settlements in

class actions are well established in this circuit: Young

v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971); Miller v. Republic

National Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977);

Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1977); Pettway

v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir.

1978); In re Beef Industry Anti-trust Litigation, 607 F.2d

167 (5th Cir. 1979). In the instant case, the trial judge in

fact adhered meticulously to these standards,

particularly in assessing “the interests of the two

categories of Plaintiffs and whether the settlement was

fair, adequate and reasonable as to each.” 610 F.2d at

1329. See A,801. The trial judge weighed the testimony

of witnesses, sifted through the evidence and heard

counsel’s arguments before determining that the

objections to the notice were meritless. The Panel’s

opinion is in direct conflict with this Court’s

pronouncement in Harrison v. Flota Mercante

Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978):

It is not our duty or right on appeal to sift

through the evidence and determine whether

we would have drawn the same inferences as

did the trier of fact and would have resolved

credibility determinations in a like fashion. Jd.

at 976.

However, the Panel was misled by Appellant into

making direct, and unfortunately erroneous, findings of

fact. The teachings of the Supreme Court are pertinent:

App. D-28

When attention has been focused on other

issues, or when the Court from which a case

comes has expressed no views on a controlling

question, it may be appropriate to remand the

case rather than deal with the merits of that

question in this Court. Dandridge v. Williams,

397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491

(1970).

This Court recognized in Cotton v. Hinton, supra,

that each case must be decided on its own facts and that

in determining whether a compromise is fair, adequate

and reasonable, the trial judge is essentially called upon

to do a balancing task. 559 F.2d at 1330. This Court has

often asserted that in reviewing approval of settlement

it has neither the right nor the duty to reach any

ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which

underlie the merits of the dispute. 559 F.2d at 1330. In

Cotton as well as the case at bar: “On appeal, the

objectors present the same objections to us as were

presented to and rejected by the trial judge.” 559 F.2d at

1332.

The appellate court’s function is to review cases; it

neither tries nor retries fact issues. Zenith Radio Corp.

v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct.

1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969); Hill York Corp. v.

American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680

(5th Cir. 1971); Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886

(5th Cir. 1977). As stated in Hill York:

[Wle must not be understood as even

intimating that we can engage in the fact-

finding process at the appellate level. 448 F.2d

at 691.

App. D-29

The settlement in Young v. Katz, supra, provided

that:

The various defendants to the suit would pay

plaintiffs’ attorney fees in a fixed amount,

subject to the approval of the court. Id. 447

F.2d at 434.

This was the precise arrangement in the instant case as

well. However, the Panel was “convinced that the

District Court fell into serious error when it approved

the attorneys’ fees proposed in the Bestline settlement.”

610 F.2d at 1328. This conviction was based on the order

entering final judgment which did not set forth fully the

basis of the Court’s finding “that the amount is

reasonable under the circumstances of this protracted

and complicated case.” A,855. Although it is not

apparent from the order, the record reveals that the

District Court did “address the issue of attorneys’ fees

under the standards of Johnson v. Georgia Highway

Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).” 610 F.2d at 1328.

However, the Panel ruled that “approval of the

settlement must be reversed on this ground.” 610 F.2d

at 1328. This ruling appears in direct conflict with the

consistent policy of this Court in cases where the record

was insufficient to ascertain the basis for the trial

judges’ findings of fact and conclusions of law, to

remand for the express purpose of enabling the District

Court to state its findings, or when necessary to make

further and more specific appropriate findings. S.S.

Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 545, 550 (5th

Cir. 1965); Shale v. United States, 409 F.2d 412, 413 (5th

Cir. 1969); Bay Sound Transportation Co. v. United

States, 410 F.2d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1969); Davis v. United

App. D-30

States, 422 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1970); Hodgson uv.

Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.

1970); Premier Corp v. Serrano, 565 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.

1977); Complaint of Ithaca Corp., 582 F.2d 3, 4 (5th Cir.

1978).

As stated in Cotton:

Particularly in class action suits, there is an

overriding public interest in favor of settlement.

559 F.2d at 1331.

There is little doubt that the Panel’s opinion will

discourage settlement in complex class action suits. Added

to the many existing obstacles discouraging embarcation

on prolonged, tedious, expensive, time-consuming and

often unrewarding complex litigation in the area of

securities fraud class suits, discouragement of settlement

will surely toll the death knell of a desired and needed

social benefit. Thus, it would appear appropriate for the

Court to grant a rehearing en banc.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs/Appelles, Peter

Piambino, et al., respectfully request a rehearing of the

within appeal by this Court sitting en banc.

CARL H. HOFFMAN

App. D-31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that an original and one copy

of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed or

delivered to each attorney of record this

May, 1980.

BY:

day of

CARL H. HOFFMAN, P.A.

Attorneys for Appellees,

Peter Piambino, et al.

2660 AmeriFirst Building

One Southeast Third Avenue

Miami, Florida 33131

App. D-32

APPENDIX D

In re BESTLINE PRODUCTS SECURITIES

and Antitrust Litigation.

MDL No. 162-Civ-JLK.

United States District Court,

S. D. Florida.

March 19, 1976.

Action was brought by purchasers of direct

distributorships of defendants’ home and personal care

products to recover for alleged violations of federal

securities laws as well as for violations of various state

Blue Sky Laws and for common law, fraud and deceit.

Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on issue of

whether the distributorships were securities in the

nature of investment contracts within ambit of the

federal securities laws. The District Court, James

Lawrence King, J., held that fact that class plaintiffs

could not expect to receive a share of the proceeds from

the common enterprise unless they contributed some

effort was not inconsistent with existence of an

investment contract and that the distributorships were

investment contracts since they involved an investment

of money or tender of initial value, relationship among

the seller, distributors and others constituted a common

enterprise and there was a reasonable expectation that

an investment would lead to profits to be derived from

significant or essential managerial or entrepreneurial

efforts of others, which efforts affected the failure or

success of the common enterprise or venture.

App. D-33

|

>

Interlocutory summary judgment entered.

1. Securities Regulation — 22, 43

Multilevel sales organization may be subject to the

federal securities laws. Securities Act of 1933, $1 et seq.,

15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.; Securities Exchange Act of

1934, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §78a et seq.

2. Securities Regulation — 13, 42

Four essential elements must be found to be present

in any economic relationship to give rise to the existence

of an investment contract so as to bring such

relationship into the ambit of federal securities

regulation; such elements are: (1) An investment of

money, or tender of initial value; (2) in a common

enterprise or venture; (3) with a reasonable expectation

of profits; (4) to be derived from the undeniably

significant, or essential managerial or entrepreneurial

efforts of others which affect the failure or success of the

enterprise. Securities Act of 1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A.

§77a et seq.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq.,

15 U.S.C.A. §78a et seq.

3. Securities Regulation — 13, 42

Direct distributorships for sale or distribution to

consuming public of line of personal and home care

products were “investment contracts” within ambit of

federal securities laws where the distributorship

involved an investment of money or tender of initial

value, i.e., prepurchase of substantial quantity of the

product and sales aids, the relationship among the seller

App. D-34

of the distributorships, its corporate chain, distributors

and others, constituted a common enterprise or venture

and fortuity of the distributors’ investment collectively

was essentially dependent on the seller’s expertise.

Securities Act of 1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et

seq.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq., 15

U.S.C.A §78a et seq.

4. Federal Civil Procedure — 2543

In ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary jugment

district court was to draw all reasonable inferences

derivable from the facts favorably to the defendants.

Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

5. Securities Regulation — 13, 42

In determining whether direct distributorships of

home and personal care products constituted

‘investment contracts” within ambit of federal

securities laws, the business opportunity offered by

participation as a distributor was to be viewed through

the eyes of the class plaintiffs considering only such

facts as were available to them at time of their

individual investment decisions; essential inquiry in

determining whether entrepreneurial efforts of others

affected failure or success of the enterprise was

plaintiffs’ preinvestment expectations as to the nature

of their investments and whether reasonabie minds

could differ as to such expectations. Securities Act of

1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.; Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §78a et

seq.

App. D-35

6. Securities Regulation — 13, 42

Fact that one does not expect to receive a share of

proceeds from a common enterprise or venture unless he

contributes some effort is not inconsistent with

existence of an investment contract. Securities Act of

1933, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §77a et seq.; Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, §1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. §78a et

seq.

James H. Joseph, Joseph & Hershman, P. C.

Pittsburgh, Pa., Carl H. Hoffman, Miami, Fla., for

plaintiff class.

J. Russell Pitto, Humphreys, Berger & Pitto, San

Jose, Cal., for defendants Bestline Products, Inc.,

Bestline Corp., Jerry Brassfield, Oliver P. Colvin, James

K. Hisler, Norman Miller and Richard Dumont.

Robert B. Hutchinson, Cotchett, Hutchinson &

Dyer, San Mateo, Cal., Gerald F. Richman, Frates,

Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Proenza & Richman, Miami,

Fla., for defendants William E. Bailey, Towru Ikeda and

Martin Day.

Paul, Landy, Beily & Yacos, William M. Hoeveler,

Knight, Peters, Hoeveler, Pickle, Niemoeller & Flynn,

Miami, Fla., for defendants Richard Grillo, Janin

Morgan & Brenner.

Marc W. Watson, Pettigrew & Bailey, Miami, Fla.,

for defendants Gordon Blaum, Edna Blaum and George

Wunch.

App. D-36

OPINION AND ORDER DETERMINING

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION

These proceedings constitute the third in a series of

complex cases to be transferred by the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation to a single forum for

coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings and

which involve Federal securities law claims by alleged

classes of private litigants against corporations claimed

to have engaged in the offer and sale to the public of

distributorships for their products, which

distributorships are alleged to be unregistered securities

in the nature of investment contracts or certificates of

interest in profit-sharing arrangements.’ Like its

predecessors, these proceedings also involve alleged

violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities

Act of 1933 (hereinafter “Securities Act” and the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter “Exchange

1On December 15, 1972, approximately 20 private actions,

followed by nearly 100 subsequent tag-along cases, which arose out

of the offer and sale by Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. and Dare To Be

Great, Inc., subsidiaries of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., of

multi-level distributorships were transferred pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A. §1407 to the Western District of Pennsylvania for

consolidated or coordinated pretrail proceedings. On April 6, 1973,

a dozen private actions followed by several dozen tag-along cases,

arising out of the offer and sale of multi-level distributorships by

Holiday Magic, Inc. and affiliated corporations were transferred to

the Northern District of California for the same purpose. The

Transfer Order in these proceedings was entered on April 29, 1974.

App. D-37

Act’), as well as violations of various state Blue Sky

laws and common law fraud and deceit.

The instant proceedings arise out of the offer and

sale by Bestline Products, Inc., a wholly-owned

subsidiary of Bestline Corporation (hereinafter

collectively referred to as ‘“‘Bestline’’), of pre-purchase

Direct Distributorships contracts or agreements

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Direct Distributorships’’) for

the sale and distribution to the consuming public of its

line of personal and home care products. Most of the

individual actions consolidated in this judicie! district

assert that the Bestline Direct Distributorships are

securities in the nature of investment contracts or

certificates of interest in a profit-sharing arrangement,

and that they were offered, sold and distributed

unlawfully inasmuch as they were neither registered nor

accompanied by a prospectus filed in compliance with

the rules of the Securities & Exchange Commission.’

Each such action seeks rescission of the distributorship

agreements, as well as damages for fraud in connection

with the sale thereof, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Some 40,000 persons are alleged to have purchased or

invested in Bestline Direct Distributorships from late

1967 until August 10, 1973, in connection with which

such persons paid Bestline an aggregate sum of nearly

$120 million. Of those persons, less than 6,000 remain

active as Bestline distributors.

2The Defendants have never disputed that Bestline Direct

Distributorships were unregistered, or that their offer, sale and

distribution occurred by the means or instrumentalities of

interstate commerce, including the mails. Admissions to that effect

were made in response to the Piambino Plaintiffs’ First Request For

Admissions filed herein.

App. D-38

A multitude of Defendants are named in the

numerous suits, most of whom are present or former

officers, directors or controlling shareholders of Bestline,

or persons who held the field (as distinguished from

Home Office or Headquarters) positions of Assistant

Vice President, Regional Director and Area

Coordinator.’ Bestline’s officers, directors and

controlling shareholders are alleged to have controlled

and directed Bestline in its unlawful course of conduct,

and together with its field representatives are also

charged with aiding and abetting and participating in

the alleged unlawful conduct by implementing the

actual offer, sale and distribution of Bestline’s Direct

Distributorships throughout the country. In addition,

various lawyers and a law firm which served as

Bestline’s General Counsel are charged with aiding and

abetting the offer, sale and distribution of the Bestline

Direct Distributorships, as well as the alleged fraud in

connection therewith.

The original suit filed in this judicial district, and

the lead suit in the consolidated proceedings, was

brought by Florida residents Peter Piambino, Joseph F.

Kucklick, Marilyn Koslen, Robert M. Ernst and

Michael J. Gardner (hereinafter referred to as the

“Piambino Plaintiffs’) as a class action. On November

22, 1974, upon motion of the Piambino Plaintiffs, this

Court ordered that the Piambino case should proceed as

a class action on behalf of a class of Plaintiffs consisting

of all persons who purchased or invested in Direct

3Assistant Vice Presidents and Regional Directors, together

with Home Office officials, constitute what in Bestline’s parlance is

referred to as its ‘Corporate Team”’.

App. D-39

Distributorship contracts or agreements, or their

equivalents, who never qualified as General

Distributors, and who have not re-ordered products

from Bestline since May 22, 1974.‘

By stipulation between the Piambino Plaintiffs and

the Defendants, the latter of which sought to avoid

having notice of the pendency of the class action sent to

all 40,000 present and former distributors within the

Plaintiff class because of the alleged disruptive effect it

would have on Bestline’s on-going business, a Notice of

Pendency of Class Action was approved by this Court

and sent by First Class mail only to those 10,000

members of the Plaintiff class who purchased or

invested in Bestline Direct Distributorships after May 1,

1972, thereby embracing the calendar year preceding

the earliest of those lawsuits transferred to this judicial

district by the Judicial Panel on Miultidistrict

Litigation, and as to which persons the one-year

limitation on actions contained in Securities Act $13

‘General Distributors were excluded from the Plaintiff class

because, by definition, they were paid fees, bonuses, commissions

or rewards for successfully recruiting Direct Distributors and may

be alleged to be brokers or dealers with respect to the Bestline

Direct Distributorships, thereby creating a possible conflict of

interests within the Plaintiff class. Likewise, those Direct

Distributors who repurchased Bestline products within six months

preceding the class action order were excluded on the assumption

that such persons remain active as distributors and may have an

interest in Bestline’s financial survival which conflicts with that of

inactive Direct Distributors. Class members who previously

received refunds or were part of a restitution plan arrived at in

negotiations between Bestline and the Attorneys General of several

states were excluded for obvious reasons.

App. D-40

does not apply. All class members whose Securities Act

§12(1) claims were not thereby time-barred would be

entitled to the remedy of rescission if this Court

determined that the Bestline Direct Distributorships

were securities, while the nearl; 79,000 remaining class

members would be relegated to claims arising out of

alleged violations by the Defendants of the anti-fraud

provisions of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and

the rules and regulations of the Securities & Exchange

Commission, as to which claims this Court denied class

status except insofar as they involve an adjudication of

whether the Bestline Direct Distributorships are

securities. It was also stipulated that upon any

determination by this Court that the Bestline Direct

distributorships constituted securities, the remaining

portion of the Plaintiff class would be notified of such a

ruling and would also be apprised of the effect thereof on

their individual rights, including their right to initiate

separate actions. In consideration of deferring notice to

the remaining 30,000 class members until after any such

ruling by this Court, the Defendants agreed to pay all

costs of the deferred notice, while the Piambino

Plaintiffs paid .he cost of preparing and mailing the

initial notice.

In March of 1975, this Court denied various

Motions to Dismiss the class action which raised

numberous objections to the Piambino Plaintiffs’

Second Amended Complaint, as well as Motions For

Summary Judgment filed by several Defendants.® This

Court believed that the Motions For Summary

The disposition of the Motions to Dismiss and earlier Motions

For Summary Judgment is reported at CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep.

995,070 (S.D. Fla., March 21, 1975).

App. D-41

Judgment were at that time premature because of the

then undeveloped state of the record.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in nearly twelve

(12) months of extensive discovery. Thirteen separate

sets of Interrogatories were propounded to the various

Defendants and answered. Numberous Requests for

Admissions and accompanying Interrogatories were

served upon the Defendants and answered. Thirty-six

Depositivns on Oral Examination were taken which ran

to in excess of 4,500 pages, virtually all of which were of

Defendants in these proceedings during four week-long

sessions in San Francisco and San Jose, California,

Washington, D. C. and Miami, Florida. This member of

the Court personally presided over nearly three weeks of

said depositions with the permission of the Judicial

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in order to expedite

the completion of discovery and eliminate countless

motions by various parties to compel discovery. The

Interrogatories, Request For Admissions and

Depositions on Oral Examination of the parties and

witnesses extended to the furthest reaches of Bestline’s

operation, as well as businesses subsequently organized

or controlled by its present and former principals, and

many former Corporate Team members.

Upon completion of the aforesaid discovery, the

Piambino Plaintiffs moved this Court pursuant to

F.R.Civ.P. 56 to enter partial summary judgment in

favor of the Plaintiff class, and against the Defendants,

on the sole issue of whether the Bestline Direct

Distributorships are securities in the nature of

investment contracts. Although the Piambino Plaintiffs

have suggested several theories to reach the legal

conclusion that the Direct Distributorships constituted

App. D-42

securities within the meaning of the Securities Act and

the Exchange Act, the only theory pursued by them in

support of their First Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment is based in substantial part upon an

application of the law expressed by the United States

District Court for the District of Oregon in Securities &

Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,

Inc., 348 F.Supp. 766 (D.Or. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476

(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117,

38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1974), followed by the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals in Securities & Exchange Commission

v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.

1974), and also followed by at least two District Courts

in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bull

Investment Group, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. 95,010

(D.Mass., March 10, 1975), and Securities & Exchange

Commission v. JET Travel Services, Inc., CCH

Fed.Sec.L.Rep. $95,317 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 29, 1975). All of

the foregoing cases applied the Federal securities laws to

multi-level sales organizations.

In response to the Piambino Plaintiffs’ First Motion

For Partial Summary Judgment, the principal

Defendants joined in their own Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment which sought dismissal of these

proceedings on the limited grounds that because the

Plaintiff class members received soap products from

Bestline in consideration of their investment, as a

matter of law no security can be found to exist.

The Piambino Plaintiffs contend that the

Defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

should be denied, and further submit that there is no

genuine issue as to the material facts relevant to the

entire issue of whether the Bestline Direct

App. D-43

Distributorships constitute securities in the nature of an

investment contract within the meaning of the

Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and that partial

summary judgment on that issue should be entered by

this Court in favor of the Plaiz.‘iff class, and against the

Defendants. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we

agree.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPALS OF

FEDERAL SECURITIES AND

SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW

[1] Since November 24, 1971, it has been clear

that multi-level sales organizations may be subject to

the Federal securities laws.* On that date, the Securities

& Exchange Commission (herein referred to as “the

Commission”) issued its Release No. 5211, entitled

“Applicability of the Securities Laws to Multi-Level

Distributorship and Pyramid Sales Plans”. 17 C.F.R.

931.5211. In that Release, the Commission advanced its

view that the Federal securities laws may be applicable

to certain multi-level sales organizations, and thereafter

commenced several successful enforcement actions

based upon that contention. Securities & Exchange

Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348

F.Supp. 766 (D.Or. 1972), 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53

(1974); Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot

Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974);

6For an exhaustive discussion of the development of the

applicability of securities laws to multi-level distributorships and

pyramid sales plans, see Pyramid Schemes: Dare To Be Regulated

661 Geo.L.J. 1257 (1973).

App. D-44

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Bull Investment

Group, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. {95,010 (D.Mass.,

Mar. 10, 1975); and Securities & Exchange Commission

v. JET Travel Services, Inc., CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep.

{95,317 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 29, 1975).’

Before the decision of the United States District

Court for the District of Oregon in Securities &

Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,

Inc., supra, the leading and most-often cited authority

for determining what forms of economic relationships

constitute “investment contracts” within the meaning

of the Federal securities laws was the decision of the

Supreme Court in Securities & Exchange Commission

v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90

L.Ed. 1244 (1946). In its opinion in the Howey case, the

Supreme Court stated that “. .. an investment

contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a

contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person

invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to

expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a

third-party. . ..” 328 U.S. at 298-299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103,

90 L.Ed. at 1249.

After the decision in Howey, the Commission, as

well as the Courts which subsequently applied the law

announced therein, expressed their recognition that the

significant wording in the Howey definition of an

investment contract was not the word “solely’’, but

rather the word “‘efforts’’.

7All of the reported decisions involved multi-level sales

organizations.

App. D-45

The decision of the Oregon Court was the first to

apply the reasoning that the word “solely” in the Howey

decision did not relate to the quantum of the investor’s

efforts, but the relative quality of the efforts contributed

by the investor and the promoter, or a third person. The

reasoning of the Oregon Court was compelled by the

Howey Court’s earlier admonition that the definition of

a security ““. . . embodies a flexible rather than a static

principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the

countless and variable schemes devised by those who

seek the use of money of others on the promise of

profits.” 328 U.S. at 299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103, 90 L.Ed. at

1250.

The Oregon Court accorded to the Howey test the

degree of flexibility originally contemplated by the

Supreme Court to effect the important remedial

purposes of the Federal securities laws, without plying

uncharted waters by adopting the approaches taken by

several state courts in the application of their Blue Sky

laws, or the reasoning of the Commission in Release No.

5211, which relied heavily upon such decisions.°®

The effort of the Oregon Court to apply the Howey

test to the Dare To Be Great multi-level sales scheme

devised by Florida promoter Glenn W. Turner was

subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, and followed by the Fifth Circuit in Securities

& Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,

supra, which reversed the decision of the United States

8Likewise, the Supreme Court declined the invitation in

United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 2051,

44 L.Ed.2d 621, 43 U.S.L.W. 4792 (1975), to import the “risk

capital’’ theory into Federal securities jurisprudence.

App. D-46

2 Eee EOE ee

District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

because that Court emphasized the quantum of the

investor’s efforts, rather than the relative quality

thereof, in evaluating another Turner scheme. In

affirming the decision of the Oregon Court, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

We hold. . . that the definition of securities

should be a flexible one, the word ‘solely’

should not be read as a strict or literal

limitation on the definition of an investment

contract, but rather must be construed

realistically. ...

* * ” ” *

We adopt a more realistic test, whether the

efforts made by those other than the investor

are the undeniably significant ones, those

essential managerial efforts which affect the

failure or success of the enterprise. 474 F.2d at

482.

And in reversing the Georgia Court, the Fifth Circuit

held likewise. 497 F.2d at 485.

The direction charted by the Oregon Court, and

followed by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits in elaborating

upon the Howey test, received recent expression in

United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,

851-54, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2060-61, 44 L.Ed.2d 621, 632-33,

43, U.S.L.W. 4742, 4747 (June 17, 1975), wherein the

Court synthesized the law relating to investment

contracts and restated the Howey principle in the

following language: ‘The touchstone [of an investment

App. D-47

contract] is the presence of an investment in a common

venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits

to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial

efforts of others [Emphasis added]’’. By focusing on the

quality of the efforts of others, the Supreme Court read

the word “solely” out of the Howey test, it having

become so much surplusage, thereby according to its

prior Howey decision the flexibility originally intended.

[2] A review of the decisions of the District and

Appellate Courts including the Supreme Court, in

recent cases applying the Howey-generated test for an

investment contract reveals four essential elements

which must be found to be present in any economic

relationship to give rise to the existence of an

investment contract, thereby bringing such

relationships into the ambit of Federal securities

regulation. Those elements are: (1) An investment of

money, or tender of initial value; (2) in a common

enterprise or venture; (3) with a reasonable expectation

of profits; (4) to be derived from the undeniably

significant, or essential managerial or entrepreneurial

efforts of others which affect the failure or success of the

enterprise.

_[8, 4] The Piambino Plaintiffs ask this Court to

measure the material facts developed in these

proceedings against a yardstick comprised of the

foregoing elements on an investment contract. Based

upon established principles of law applicable to

summary judgments under F.R.Civ.P. 56, they insis*.

and we agree, that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact with respect to the issue of whether the

Bestline Direct Distributorships constitute investment

App. D-48

contracts within the meaning of the Federal securities

laws. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368

U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). In so doing,

we draw all reasonable inferences derivable from such

facts favorably to the Defendants. United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176

(1962).

In applying the applicable principles of the Federal

securities laws and settled principles of summary

judgment law to the facts involved in these proceedings,

we note at the outset that virtually all of the facts of

record herein are contained in a multitude of responses

by the Defendants to discovery initiated by the

Piambino Plaintiffs. There are no independent

witnesses whose observations, knowledge or testimony is

relied upon by the Piambino Plaintiffs in support of

their First Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, and

virtually all of the facts material to the so-called

“securities issue’’ were elicited by the Piambino

Plaintiffs from the Defendants themselves through

reams of discovery documents, including lengthy

depositions, which touched upon virtually every aspect

of Bestline’s business.

The mere extensiveness of the record, however, as

well as the complexity of the facts and theories of law

involved in these proceedings, have been heavily relied

upon by the Defendants in opposing the Piambino

Plaintiffs’ First Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment. The Defendants argue that there is a

plethora of disputed facts which preclude this Court’s

determination of the securities issue by an interlocutory

summary adjudication.

App. D-49

ae».

Despite the extensiveness of the record, the volume

of facts contained therein, and the variety of far-

reaching inferences which the parties urge this Court to

draw therefrom, we have scrupulously limited this

summary disposition of the securities issue to a

consideration of only the material facts of record and the

inferences which may be reasonably drawn therefrom,

viewing all such facts and inferences in a light most

favorable to the Defendants. By this strict and careful

application of the standards required to be applied in

summary adjudications, the facts and inferences to be

considered to determine the Piambino Plaintiffs’ First

Motion For Partial Summary Judgment are

dramatically reduced in number and scope.

Based upon our detailed review of the record in

these proceedings, carried out in accordance with the

foregoing principles applicable to summary

adjudications, we hold that any specific factual

controversies which are asserted in these proceedings

involve facts which are immaterial to the issue of

whether Bestline’s Direct Distributorships constitute

investment contracts, or the components of that issue as

set forth hereinabove, either because any such facts are

irrelevant to the issue before this Court or because they

lack any uniformity of impact upon the class Plaintiffs.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot

Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).

With the foregoing principles of law in view, we

hereby apply them to the material facts involved in

these proceedings.

App. D-50

BESTLINE’S GROWTH AND

DEVELOPMENT

Bestline’s business began in August of 1966 when

William E. Bailey and Jerry G. Brassfield (hereinafter

referred to as “Bailey” and ‘“Brassfield”, respectively),

two of the Defendants in these proceedings, joined forces

to organize a multi-level direct sales organization to sell

and distribute a line of bio-degradable soap products

previously developed by one William Boudreau, a

chemist. Prior thereto, Bailey and Brassfield had been

associated as distributors for Holiday Magic, Inc., a

multi-level direct sales company involved in the

distribution of cosmetic products, which itself later

became the object of numerous private and public suits

and regulatory action.

Bailey and Brassfield had been involved in multi-

level direct sales organizations prior to their Holiday

Magic experience. Both had participated in the

distribution of food supplements as part of the Nutri-

Bio organization, and Bailey, together with William

Penn Patrick, the founder of Holiday Magic, Inc., made

an unsuccessful prior joint effort to establish a similar

company in the corporate form of Ad-Mark, which later

became insolvent.

Bestline was a successful venture from its

inception. Led by Bailey and Brassfield, with the

assistance of other persons who had multi-level direct

selling experience, Bestline began the distribution of its

line of bio-degradable soap products through a fledgling

network of independent distributors who occupied

various levels of its multi-level sales organization.

App. D-51

Bestline grew rapidly and in October of 1968, in order to

share the ownership of the company with other loyal and

devoted participants in its direct sales program, Bailey

and Brassfield organized the Bestline Corporation and

sold their interest in Bestline Products, Inc. to the new

corporation for $10 million, also retaining majority

ownership of that new company, while admitting others

to minority ownership.

Until August of 1973, Bailey at all times remained

the chief executive officer and Chairman of the Board of

directors of Bestline, while Brassfield departed the

organization in 1970, either as a result of a dispute over

company policy or to seek greener pastures where he

could achieve his own brand of independence. Bestline

grew both in the number of distributors promoting and

distributing its products, as well as geographically, and

eventually was operating in all fifty states and several

foreign countries.

During Bestline’s growth and development, it

attracted the attention of various law enforcement

officials and regulatory agencies, including the Federal

Trade Commission. Early in its history, Bestline entered

into a consent decree with the Federal Trade

Commission wherein it agreed to cease and desist from

certain alleged unfair trade practices in connection with

the recruitment of new distributors, and responded

likewise to similar charges initiated by various state

Attorneys General. As a result occasional changes were

made in Bestline’s multi-level sales program claimed to

bring it into conformity with applicable state and

Federal laws. Whether it successfully did so it is not

within the province of this Court to determine, nor were

App. D-52

2 ee

the changes made material to the issues in these

proceedings.

In 1973, the Attorney General of the State of

California obtained a civil judgment against Bestline, as

well as certain individual Defendants herein, in the

amount of $11 million arising out of violations by

Bestline of California laws relating to deceptive trade

practices. The company promptly filed an Original

Petition under Chapter XI of the National Bankruptcy

Act and sought the protection of the Federal Courts, but

subsequently withdrew its petition after it successfully

negotiated with the California Attorney General an

arrangement to pay the $11 million judgment over a

number of years, and after Brassfield effected a

successful tender offer to acquire control of the

company. In connection therewith, Bailey resigned and

has remained retired from the business, while Bestline

ostensibly eliminated the objectionable features of its

multi-level direct sales plan and continues to do

business through several thousand distributors.

Despite Bestline’s travails, it grew to have some of

the earmarks of a successful national business

enterprise. Its initial meager line of cleaning agents and

home care products expanded to 16 such products by

March of 1972, six of which were manufactured in one or

both of Bestline’s manufacturing facilities in San Jose,

California and Elk Grove Village, Illinois. Each such

facility encloses in excess of 60,000 square feet, and the

company rented or leased other regional distribution

centers for its products. The remaining products were

manufactured by others for Bestline in accordance with

its specifications.

App. D-53

Bestline executives were transported throughout

the United States on corporate aircraft and Corporate

Team meetings sometimes took place on the company

yacht, or at its ranch in northern California. Indeed, at

its acme, Bestline’s chief executive officer, William E.

Bailey, recieved the Horatio Alger Award voted to

successful entrepreneurs who exemplify the “American

dream”’, which dream, coincidentally, Bestline claimed

to offer to prospective distributors.

Bestline’s officers’ individual annual compensation

ran into the hundreds of thousands, if not millidhs, of

dollars, and Corporate Team members experienced

annual earnings into six figures. By virtue of their

earnings they were eligible to be inducted into either the

“‘Chairman’s Club’’, or the ‘‘President’s Club’’,

depending upon the magnitude of their success, as well

as those of Bestline’s distributors who qualified, and

their status was constantly held out as an example to

Bestline’s network of independent distributors who were

exhorted to do likewise. Such “success stories’ were an

essential element in Bestline’s promotion of the business

opportunity offered by participation in its National

Marketing Plan.

THE BESTLINE NATIONAL

MARKETING PLAN

Central to Bestline’s success, as well as its past

legal problems, was its “National Marketing Plan”

which consisted of a network of independent

distributors who functioned at various levels in its

direct-sales organization.

App. D-54

For the most part, the Bestline National Marketing

Plan was implemented through a heirarchy of three

levels of independent distributors. Persons at the lowest

or middle level were denominated ‘‘Local

Distributors”,® while those at the second or middle level

were denominated “Direct Distributors”. Those at the

third and highest level of attainment were called

“General Distributors’. Neither the Local nor General

Distributorships are involved in these preceedings. Any

Bestline distributor could sell Bestline products

anywhere in the United States, without limitation.

The Local Distributor was never required by

Bestline to make any significant investment of money to

procure his position and to exercise the rights attendant

thereto.° The Local Distributor was eligible to sell

Bestline products to the consuming public at retail

prices and purchased them through his sponsoring

Direct Distributor at a discount, the difference being his

*Karly in Bestline’s history, the lowest level, later known as a

Local Distributorship, was characterized by two levels successively

denominated Sub-Distributor and Retailer. Ultimately recognizing

that the two levels were not functionally unique, Bestline

consolidated them into the single position of Local Distributor. Like

the Local Distributorship, neither of its predecessors are involved in

these proceedings.

The Local Distributor qualified as such by paying $5 annual

association dues. No product purchase was required.

App. D-55

=

or her commission.'! He could also recruit other Local

Distributors who could effect such sales for him

The Direct Distributor, on the other hand, was

required to pre-purchase a substantial quantity of

Bestline products and sales aids in order to qualify for

his position and to exercise the rights attendant

thereto.'2 Such rights included purchasing Bestline

products, in some cases, at a greater discount than the

Local Distributor,'? as well as the right to “build an

organization” of Local Distributors on whose selling

efforts he could earn a profit. Of greatest significance to

these proceedings, however, is the right vested in the

Direct Distributor to recruit other Direct Distributors

and thereby qualify to elevate himself to the position of

'The Local Distributor’s commission rate was progressive in

nature, ranging from 30% to 50%, depending upon his personal sales

during any calendar month. The Local Distributor received the 52%

discount (the same as that enjoyed by a pre-purchase Direct

Distributor) when his monthly sales exceeded $4,800. If he attained

$5,600 in sales, the Local Distributor became a Direct Distributor,

having ‘‘worked-in” to that position.

'2The actual dollar amount required to be paid to Bestline

varied from time to time, but averaged in excess of $3,000. The

range of variations is immaterial to the fundamental issues

involved in these proceedings.

‘The Direct Distributor purchased Bestline products at a

purported 52% discount rate.

App. D-56

%

General Distributor and to receive certain monetary

bonuses or rewards in connection therewith. '4

The General Distributorship could be attained only

by those persons who first qualified as Direct

Distributors and satisfied certain other requirements.

The General Distributor had the right to purchase

Bestline products at the greatest available discount,’

and to “build an organization” of Direct Distributors

and Local Distributors beneath him on whose selling

and recruiting efforts he could earn a profit.

Despite the formality of their separate designations,

Direct and General Distributorships are not

fundamentally unique or discrete entities. Although

they are separated by a differential of 8% in the

respective rates of discount at which they purchasey

Bestline products, both Direct and General Distributors

may sell directly to the consuming public, or through

Local Distributors on whose selling efforts they can earn

a profit. Yet the General Distributorship cannot be

\4In their Briefs, the Defendants criticize the Piambino

Plaintiffs for assimilating the Direct and General Distributorships

insofar as recruiting activities, and compensation therefor, are

involved. However, both positions involved the recruitment of new

Direct Distributors, the only difference being that the Direct

Distributor who successfully recruited two new Direct Distributors

received no remuneration therefor, because the two successive

recruitments merely qualified him to become a General Distributor.

Thereafter, successive recruitments accorded the distributor a

direct pecuniary benefit.

\'The General Distributor purchased products from Bestline at

a purported 60% discount.

App. D-57

attained independently from a Direct Distributorship,

i.e., a prospective distributor cannot enter the Bestline

National Marketing Plan at its highest level. He must

first become a Direct Distributor, even if only for a brief

period of time. The fundamental difference in character

between a General Distributor and a Direct Distributor

is largely based upon the fact that Ceneral Distributors

have successively recruited a requisite number of new

Direct Distributors to qualify as such, while Direct

Distributors have either not attempted to recruit new

Direct Distributors in requisite number, or have been

largely unsuccessful in any such attempts. In short, the

General Distributorship is to the Direct Distributorship

as a butterfly is to a caterpillar; the same being an

advanced state of maturity or development of the other.

Until January of 1970, a Bestline Direct Distributor

could qualify as a General Distributor by recruiting a

new pre-purchase Direct Distributor to replace himself

in his sponsoring General Distributor’s ‘‘organization”’,

and by paying to Bestline a $2,750 “release fee’,

ostensibly to release himself from his General

Distributor’s organization and to compensate that

General Distributor for the loss of commissions which he

would experience when the released Direct Distributor

left the releasing General Distributor’s organization to

head his own organization as a new General Distributor.

Bestline paid $2,250 of the $2,750 release fee to the rising

Direct Distributor’s former General Distributor who

recruited or sponsored the released Direct Distributor in

the first instance.

After January of 1970, the payment of release fees

was discontinued, and the upwardly-mobile Direct

Distributor could satisfy the requirements necessary to

App. D-58

rise to General Distributor by first recruiting a new

Direct Distributor to replace himself in his sponsoring

General Distributor’s organization, by generating sales

volume of $5,000 in a single month, '® and paying a $600

fee to Bestline for attendance at a so-called ‘General

Distributor’s School”. The additional requirements for

advancement which replaced the release fee, however,

fell far short of compensating for the income which the

release fee had accorded General Distributors.

The establishment of the Special Incentive Bonus

(SIB) plan responded to the need to fill the void left by

the abandonment of the release fee. Special Incentive

Bonuses were paid to General Distributors annually and

were determined on a progressive basis by the annual

sales volume in Bestline products for which the General

Distributor was responsible, directly or indirectly.

Because of its unique “profit-sharing” qualities

(Bestline referred to it as a profit-sharing plan), the

The requisite sales volume could be generated by simply

recruiting a second Direct Distributor for the sponsor’s own

organization, or by relying on either his own or his Local

Distributors’ retail sales, if any, or both. A later variation of the

process of becoming a pre-purchase Direct Distributor involved the

purchase of $500 of Bestline products directly from the Direct

Distributor’s sponsoring General Distributor, or his sponsor’s

sponsoring General Distributor if the sponsor is only a Direct

Distributor, and the balance of the pre-purchase requirement from

Bestline. Although no motivation is assigned to this variation, it

made it possible for a pre-purchase Direct Distributor to dispose of

his entire initial inventory in $500 increments to newly-recruited

Direct Distributors (after the first two such recruitments qualified

him as a General Distributor) thereby recouping his investment

without ever having to sell Bestline products to the consuming

public.

App. D-59

Special Incentive Bonus plan especially highlights the

distinctive feature of the Bestline National Marketing

Plan, which was, at every level, the payment of bonuses

or commissions to distributors based upon “product

movement” measured in “Refund Bonus Volume”

(RBV), a fictitious value assigned to Bestline products

upon which commissions and bonuses were computed.

Product movement effected by Local Distributors

was necessarily between the Local Distributor and his

customer. No commissions or bonuses were paid by

Bestline to the Local Distributor. The Local Distributor

purchased Bestline products from his sponsoring Direct

Distributor at a discount, and could sell them at

whatever price he chose, subject to contract restrictions,

but without any real control by Bestline over the retail

prices. Because Local Distributors make no initial

investment, either in product or otherwise, this aspect of

Bestline’s National Marketing Program does not run

afoul of the Federal securities laws, nor is it alleged by

the Piambino Plaintiffs to offend those laws.

Product movement effected by Direct and General

Distributors, however, is more complex. Inasmuch as

Direct and General Distributors are exhorted to “‘build

their organizations” by recruiting yet other distributors

who pre-purchase substantial quantities of Bestline

products, the commissions and bonuses paid in

connection with the substantial product movement from

Bestline into the hands of such new distributors

constitutes remuneration for the recruitment of others

into the Bestline National Marketing Plan. Although

the concept of “product movement” obscured any

distinction between the movement of Bestline products

App. D-60

into the hands of the consuming public as against

movement into the hands of distributors, or among

them, Bestline’s parlance made a distinction between

“retail” and ‘wholesale’ business. Retail business

involved precisely that, product movement into the

hands of the consuming public. Wholesale business, on

the other hand, involved product movement between

distributors, or from Bestline into the hands of new

distributors. The latter component of wholesale

business, of course, was generated by recruitment of

activities. Commissions and bonuses were paid on all

product movement generated by Bestline distributors

measured in RBV, without distinction between

wholesale or retail business. By creating the fictions of

“product movement’ and ‘wholesale business’’,

Bestline could state in its Business Opportunity Booklet

provided to prospective distributors that ‘‘No

compensation of any kind will be paid for the

solicitation or recruitment of others’’. This self-serving

declaration, however, relies upon those important terms

to put a gloss on the underlying recruiting or

“organization building’ transactions which, in fac’

generated the “product .movement”’ or ‘wholesale

business” on which commissions and bonuses were paid.

Every Bestline distributor, at whatever level, had a

“sponsor” to whose “organization” he was assigned,

even if the sponsor resided hundreds or thousands of

miles away. Each Direct Distributor Application

required an identification of the applicant’s

“sponsoring” distributor for the purpose of paying

commissions or bonuses on the product movement

generated by his recruitment. Bestline thereby

developed a complex system of accounting for the

App. D-61

responsibility for sponsorship of new distributors which

was ultimately computerized, and the hard-copy output

which recorded the payment of commissions and

overrides on product movement through the chain of

distributors was referred to in Bestline’s parlance as

“linkage reports’. Bestline’s computer also generated

3% and 8% ‘‘commission statements’”’ to its distributors,

from which data the company also paid the commissions

set forth therein.

Upon review of the foregoing facts, all of which were

elicited by the Piambino Plaintiffs from the Defendants

themselves, this Court discerns four different methods

by which Bestline distributors could profit from the

recruitment of new distributors. Those four methods

included: (1) the release fee; (2) the “standard”

commission; (3) the ‘‘override”’ commission; and (4) the

Special Incentive Bonus (SIB).

The release fee practice, which was abandoned in

1970, was the simplest method by which the Bestline

investor profited from the recruitment aspect of the

National Marketing Plan. As discussed previously, a

rising Direct Distributor was required to pay a $2,750 fee

to Bestline as a condition precedent to attaining the

status of a General Distributor. Bestline retained $500

and paid $2,250 to the Direct Distributor’s sponsoring

General Distributor. By this technique, Bestline

induced advancement from Direct Distributor to

General Distributor. The “‘release fee’, in effect, was a

deferred method of compensating one distributor for

sponsoring another distributor, subject only to the

condition that the recruiting and the recruited

distributors must ultimately become General

Distributors.

App. D-62

Because of the differential in the rates of discount

between General and Direct Distributors (60% and 52%,

respectively), each sponsoring General Distributor was

entitled to an 8% standard commission on “product

movement” to or through each Direct Distributor

sponsored by him, including the Direct Distributor’s

initial pre-purchase of Bestline products. The fact that

the Direct Distributor may reside hundreds or

thousands of miles away would not deprive his

sponsoring General Distributor of his vested right to

receive the 8% standard commission. In many cases, a

new pre-purchase Direct Distributor would request that

only half (or none) of an initial product inventory be

shipped to him. In such cases, it made no difference as

to the payment of the 8% standard commission on such

product movement. The General Distributor was still

entitled to receive the commission, and Bestline paid it,

even though the products may never have physically

moved at all.

In each case, Bestline accounted for all such

transactions, received the funds and disbursed the

commission payments to the beneficiaries of the

program.

In addition to the 8% standard commission,

Bestline offered and paid a 3% override commission to

the sponsor of a sponsoring distributor, i.e., the

distributor once-removed up the chain of distributors. !”

The sponsor of a sponsoring distributor was entitled to

\7The 3% override commission was discontinued by Bestline in

1972.

App. D-63

the 3% override commission solely by virtue of his initial

sponsorship of the sponsoring distributor, even though

he may have had no involvement in the subsequent

recruitment. As with the 8% standard commission, the

3% override commission was paid whether the product

was shipped or not.

The system of 3% override commissions was

likewise administered by Bestline, and payments were

remitted by the company on a monthly basis.

After the release fee feature of Bestline’s National

Marketing Plan was eliminated in 1970, the 8%

standard commission differential and the 3% override

commission remained as the sole inducement for the

Direct Distributor to rise to the General Distributorship

level. Bestline enhanced the attractiveness of advancing

to the General Distributorship position by

implementing the Special Incentive bonus (SIB) plan.

The SIB was represented by Bestline to be a profit-

sharing program.

SIB’s were paid on an annual basis to qualifying

distributors. The actual sum or sums of money paid was

determined on a progressive scale as a percentage of

product movement measured in RBV. The greater an

individual distributor’s annual RBV, the greater would

be his annual SIB expressed as a percentage of the total

annual RBV. Although annual RBV could consist of

product movement through the distributor to the

consuming public, it could also consist of product

movement to newly-recruited distributors. No

differentiation was made by Bestline, nor was any

attempt made to measure the quantity of Bestline

App. D-64

products which actually flowed to the consuming public

until the so-called “Cameo” program was developed in

1971 in response to criticism by regulatory agencies that

the Bestline National Marketing Plan resulted in

“garage loading” of its products in the possession of its

distributors.

The average RBV generated by the recruitment of a

new Direct Distributor, who later became a General

Distributor, was about $15,000.'° Whereas under the

discontinued release fee program a General Distributor

would be paid a 13% or $2,000 commission on a Direct

Distributor who subsequently advanced to the General

Distributor position, under the SIB program the General

Distributor had to account for at least $36,000 RBV to

be eligible for any commission at all. At that level, the

General Distributor’s commission would be 3.3% of his

RBV. However, if the General Distributor successfully

accounted for an annual RBV of $200,000, his

commission rate would escalate to 15% of RBV, or

$30,000. Thus, the General Distributor who recruited

thirteen new Direct Distributors in any given calendar

year would be in essentially the same position under the

SIB plan as in the discontinued release fee program.

Of course, the new SIB plan had the disadvantage

of making it necessary for the sponsoring General

Distributor to recruit a greater number of Direct

\'The figure is attained by aggregating the RBV of each pre-

purchase Direct Distributor’s initial product purchase and the

product movement, measured in RBV, generated by meeting all of

the requirements for advancement to the position of General

Distributor.

App. D-65

Distributors in order to receive the equivalent bonus

expressed either as a percentage of RBV or in dollars,

but it had the advantage of paying to a General

Distributor a commission for the recruitment of a new

Direct Distributor, even where the Direct Distributor

subsequently failed to advance to the General

Distributor level.

When the SIB plan is viewed in conjunction with

the requirement that an advancing Direct Distributor

recruit a new Direct Distributor to replace himself in his

sponsor’s “organization”, it appears that his sponsoring

General Distributor is credited with the RBV for the

ensuing product movement, and that all such RBV is

aggregated for the purpose of determining the

sponsoring General Distributor’s annual SIB. Hence,

the General Distributor can qualify for and be paid an

annual SIB based solely upon the recruiting efforts of

Direct Distributors in his organization who seek to

advance themselves to the position of General

Distributors, and who thereby seek to be elligible for the

“windfall” profits of the scheme. '®

The illustration carries the proposition to an extreme

conclusion. It is intended only to illustrate the point, and is not

relied upon in making disposition of the securities issue herein by

interlocutory summary adjudication. This Court has been

scrupulous to avoid drawing any inferences from the material facts

which assume that Bestline’s product movement was generated

primarily from recruitment, rather than retail sales, or vice versa.

The actual relationship between these two aspects of Bestline’s

National Marketing Plan, insofar as the respective emphasis

between them is concerned, is not a material issue herein.

App. D-66

In short, the abandonment of the release fee and the

substitution of the SIB plan changed nothing except the

form of the transaction. If anything, it removed from the

conditions precedent to the payment of such bonuses

any requirement that a General Distributor shepherd a

newly-recruited Direct Distributor through the

recruitments necessary to be accomplished by him to

advance to the General Distributorship position, further

eliminating, as a practical matter, any need for the

General Distributor to exert any efforts at all.

Based upon the foregoing analysis of the facts, it is

plain that the Direct and General Distributorships

possess at least two attributes of the four which are

necessary components of an investment contract. The

Direct Distributor, through his pre-purchase of Bestline

products, pays money to Bestline as a conditon

precedent to his ultimate eligibility as a General

Distributor to receive payments in the form of profit on

his investment. It is also undisputed that Bestline

managed the entire system of receiving, accounting for

and disbursing such profits. Bestline’s centralized

administration of its network of independent

distributors thereby also constitutes a significant

element of the participation of its distributors in a

“common enterprise or venture’, or the third of the four

necessary components of an investment contract.

In their countering Motion For Summary

Judgment, the principal Defendants maintain that

there is no genuine issue as to the fact that each pre-

purchase Direct Distributor received soap products and

sales aids in exchange for his or her investment in

Bestline, but argue that upon that fact alone an

App. D-67

investment of money is negated. The moving

Defendants thereby urge this Court to adopt a

mechanical and simplistic notion of the Federal

securities laws which prefers form over substance and

ignores the economic realities of the transaction in

Bestline Direct Distributorships.

Unquestionably, each member of the Plaintiff class

paid money to Bestline in consideration not only of the

quantity of Bestline products to be shipped to him (or

reserved for him), but as a condition precedent to be

eligible to act as a pre-purchase Direct Distributor,

including the exercise of all rights and privileges

attendant thereto. Whether the rights and privileges

attendant to a Bestline Direct Distributorship piggy-

backed with the product pre-purchased, or vice versa, is

immaterial to the disposition of these proceedings. The

fact is undisputed that in no way other than the pre- »

purchase of Bestline products” can a Plaintiff class

member be eligible to exercise the rights and privileges

2The possibility of a Local Distributor becoming a “work-in”

Direct Distributor was discussed previously at Note 11, infra. For

the purpose of this analysis, the pre-purchase and work-in methods

of attaining Direct Distributorship status are indistinct. Work-in

Direct Distributors are not members of the Plaintiff class by

definition. The former qualified by expending either his own or

borrowed funds to pre-purchase Bestline products in required

quantity, while the latter pre-sells in a single calendar month

essentially the same volume of Bestline products required to be pre-

purchased by the former. The point made is that the rights and

privileges of a Direct Distributorship were not offered by Bestline

separate and apart from the specified volume of product

movement, however, created. Such rights were neither “given

away”, nor sold for a separate consideration.

App. D-68

which vest in a Bestline Direct Distributor. Those

rights, and the eligibility of the Plaintiff class members

to exercise them, are a basic and fundamental part of

the consideration for the transaction which forms the

economic relationship between Bestline and the

investor. Clearly, the Plaintiff class members did not

purchase thousands of dollars in Bestline products for

their own use or consumption, but for re-distribution to

either the consuming public or other distributors, or

simply to store in their garages while they devoted their

time to “building their organizations”, which, in

Bestline’s parlance, meant the recruitment of other

distributors.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the

transaction between Best!ine and the Plaintiff class

members involved an investment of money, or tender of

initial value, and deny the principal Defendants’

Motion For Summary Judgment on that issue.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

BESTLINE NATIONAL

MARKETING PLAN

Bestline’s field organization, and its function, like

its centralized administrative or clearing-house services,

is an integral part of its National Marketing Plan.

Shortly after its inception, as its recruitment of new

distributors grew both numerically and geographically,

Bestline assembled a field organization to continue and

further expand its business. There eventually developed

a hierarchy of field positions responsible to the Vice

President in charge of sales in the Home Office or

corporate headquarters at San Jose, California.

App. D-69

Immediately under the Vice President, and directly

responsible to him, Bestline established the position of

Assistant Vice President. There were six Assistant Vice

Presidents who were assigned specific geographic

territories to supervise, usually consisting of seven to

nine states. Immediately beneath the Assistant Vice

Presidents in rank, Bestline established the position of

Regional Director, while persons were also assigned

specific smaller geographic territories to supervise,

usually consisting of a single state or part thereof. And

beneath the Regional Director in responsibility, Bestline

created the position of Area Coordinator, and sometimes

Assistant Area Coordinator. Each Area Coordinator

reported to a Regional Director, and was assigned to a

specific geographic territory to supervise, usually

consisting of several smaller medium-sized cities, or

parts of large ones. Their duties included organizing and

presenting Opportunity Meetings, conducting training

sessions for distributors, supplying data to Bestline’s

Home Office for its Corporate Calendar and

coordinating and effectuating company policy in the

field. Assistant Vice Presidents and Region Directors

were appointed and paid by Bestline, although they

could also continue to perform as distributors if they so

desired, and some did. Area Coordinators were

appointed by Bestline and paid through its Regional

Directors. The method of compensation of Bestline’s

field representatives changed from time to time, but

always included in substantial part a commission based

upon “product movement” within their assigned areas,

which, of course, included the movement of Bestline

products pre-purchased by newly-recruited Direct

Distributors.

App. D-70

Key Home Office officials, Assistant Vice

Presidents and Regional Directors, but not Area

Coordinators, came to be known as members of

Bestline’s ‘“‘Corporate Leam’’. Corporate Team

meetings were held monthly in a single location in the

United States, at which Home Office officials, and

sometimes legal counsel, reviewed existing company

policies with respect to the National Marketing Plan,

announced new policies, admonished the Corporate

Team to enforce all policies and generally motivated

each other. A consistent theme in Corporate Team

meetings was enforcing adherence to scripts provided by

Bestline for use at Opportunity Meetings to which

distributors invited guests to become acquainted with

the Bestline business opportunity as part of the

exhorted goal of each distributor to “build his

organization”, as well as adherence to the recommended

procedures by which prospects were introduced to

Bestline and its network of distributors, whether

through the device of “Opportunity Meetings” or

otherwise.

Like Koscot and Dare To Be Great,?! a key feature

of the Bestline National Marketing Plan was the

“Opportunity Meeting” which consisted of a gathering

of Bestline distributors and prospective distributors in a

hotel or motel meeting room, or any other suitable

meeting-place. The purpose and effect of the

Opportunity Meeting was the creation of an effective

vehicle by which distributors could “build their

organizations” by inviting prospective distributors to

21Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary,

Inc., supra; Securities & Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner

Enterprises Inc., supra.

App. D-71

receive a standardized presentation or introduction to

Bestline’s products and business opportunity. Although

the Opportunity Meetings may not have been the

exclusive vehicle utilized to introduce Bestline to

prospective distributors, it was by far the

overwhelmingly dominant method, the one

recommended by the company, and the most effective,

even though it had to be supplemented by the efforts of

individual distributors to consummate sales of new

Direct Distributorships in accordance with guidelines

promulgeted by Bestline.

Dozens, if not hundreds, of Opportunity Meetings

were conducted almost daily throughout the United

States. The time and place of each Opportunity

Meeting was relayed to Bestline’s Home Office through

its Corporate Team and assembled into a single

regularly-published and distributed ‘Corporate

Calendar” for use by its distributors. By means of this

vast network of standardized Opportunity Meetings, an

Omaha distributor could (and was encouraged to)

“build his organization” by referring friends in Seattle

or Miami to a convenient Opportunity Meeting in their

locale. And if the New York or Miami friend became a

pre-purchase Direct Distributor he was assigned to his

sponsor’s organization in Omaha, which sponsor would

receive the standard commission paid by Bestline on the

product movement from Bestline to the newly-recruited

distributor.

To insure uniformity at each of the thousands of

Opportunity Meetings, Bestline distributed scripts for

speakers to use at such meetings, as well as records, film

strips and a Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet to

App. D-72

be delivered to each prospective distributor. Assistant

Vice Presidents, Regional Directors and Area

Coordinators frequently conducted the Opportunity

Meetings, or at least attended them to insure adherence

to company policy. Bestline even employed a firm of

private detectives to report to it as to the adherence to

company policy at Opportunity Meetings, and

frequently required electronic recording of such

meetings for review by legal counsel.

In some areas the meetings were organized and paid

for by local “cooperatives” of distributors, usually with

the assistance of an Area Coordinator or Corporate

Team member. Co-op members paid dues which were in

turn allocated to the expense of conducting Opportunity

Meetings. A distributor who did not join the co-op, or

whose dues were not current, as a practical matter,

could still attend and bring a prospect for “his

organization”, but in some areas, at least, he would be

warned not to come back a second time if he was not a

member in good standing of the cooperative.

There is no genuine issue that the relationship

among Bestline, its Corporate Team members and Area

Coordinators, the cooperatives and the Bestline

distributors constituted a common enterprise or

venture, whether for the sale and distribution of

Bestline products to the consuming public, or for the

recruitment of new distributors, and we so hold.

THE INVESTORS’ EXPECTATIONS

The pressure point of the application of the

principles of Federal securities and summary judgment

law to the facts of these proceedings involves the

“reasonable expectations” of the class Plaintiffs with

respect to their investment in Bestline Direct

Distributorships, including the locus of the undeniably

significant or essential managerial or entrepreneurial

efforts resulting in the payment to them of a share of the

profits to be derived from the common enterprise or

venture.

The Defendants have strenuously argued that the

facts elicited from them in pretrial discovery

unquestionably reveal that the individual investor is the

locus of the undeniably significant or essential

managerial or entrepreneurial efforts necessary to the

success of the Bestline National Marketing Plan, and to

their individual financial success. They also contend

that no reasonable investor could expect or conclude

otherwise, thereby removing the Bestline National

Marketing Plan from the ambit of the Federal securities

laws. The Piambino Plaintiffs, on the other hand,

suggest that the undeniably significant or essential

managerial or entrepreneurial efforts required in

connection with the success of the Bestline National

Marketing Plan repose in Bestline and its Corporate

Team members, including Area Coordinators. In

support of their respective arguments, all of the parties

rely upon the extensive factual record relating to the

pre-investment presentations made to the class

Plaintiffs, as well as to the actual operation of the

Bestline National Marketing Plan viewed from a post-

App. D-74

investment standpoint, including a variety of inferences

derived therefrom.

[5] The parties’ reliance upon this broad range of

facts, however, is misplaced and creates a false or

illusory issue in these proceedings. It is not necessary to

a determination of the class Plaintiffs’ expectations for

this Court to consider such a broad range of facts and

inferences. The elemental inquiry is the class Plaintiffs’

pre-investment expectations as to the nature of their

investments in Bestline Direct Distributorships, and

whether reasonable minds can differ as to such

expectations.22 In short, the business opportunity

offered by participation as a distributor in Bestline’s

National Marketing Plan must be viewed through the

eyes of the class Plaintiffs, considering only such facts as

were available to them before they made their

individual investment decisions.

22Although these proceedings also involve extensive allegations

of misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in the

standardized presentations of Bestline’s business opportunity to

prospective investors, the Piambino Plaintiffs First Motion For

Partial Summary Judgment does not require this Court to

determine those issues. The existance of such misrepresentations

and omissions, however, may in no small measure account for the

diametrically opposed factual contentions of the parties with

respect to the operation of the Bestline National Marketing Plan

from a post-investment viewpoint. The Defendants rely heavily

upon their view of how the Bestline National Marketing Plan

operated, rather than how it was presented to the prospective

investors. This inquiry is necessarily limited to the pre-investment

presentations made to the Plaintiff class, because it was from those

presentations that the class Plaintiffs derived their expectations

with respect to their investment in Bestline Direct

Distributorships.

App. D-75

In this regard, it is only necessary that this Court

review the facts as to the mode and manner of

interesting class Plaintiffs in the business opportunity

offered by participation in Bestline’s National

Marketing Plan, and of presenting that business

opportunity to them, whether at Opportunity Meetings

or otherwise. In so doing, this Court looks not only to the

economic substance of the transactions in Bestline

Direct Distributorships, but equally to “... what

character the instrument is given. . . by the terms of

the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic

inducements held out to the prospect. In the

enforcement of an act such as this [Securities Act], it is

not inappropriate that promoters’ offerings be judged as

what they were represented to be”. Securities &

Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,

320 U.S. 344, 352-353, 64 S.Ct. 120, 124, 88 L.Ed. 88, 94

(1943) [quoted approvingly in Securities & Exchange

Commission v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 387

U.S. 202, 211, 87 S.Ct. 1557, 1562, 18 L.Ed.2d 673, 679-

80 (1967) ]. In their joint brief, the Defendants accede to

the propriety of the foregoing approach and have urged

this Court to adopt a narrow scope of inquiry limited to

the various forms of Direct Distributorship agreements,

Direct Distributorship qualification forms, the Bestline

Business Opportunity Booklet, the Opportunity

Meeting scripts, and product and marketing films. Such

a limitation is appropriate, and this Court has restricted

itself to an analysis of those documents and things with

respect to this aspect of the securities issue,

notwithstanding arguments advanced by all parties to

these proceedings based upon a broader range of facts

which, for the foregoing reasons, are immaterial to the

issue.

App. D-76

By circumscribing the inquiry as aforesaid, and

confining it to the review of such material documents

and things, we find that there is no genuine issue as to

the fact of what representations were made to

prospective Bestline distributors through standardized

presentations based thereon, whether at formal or

informal meetings, or otherwise, although there is some

dispute as to random or spurious representations made

to the named Plaintiffs by other Bestline distributors

and Corporate Team members outside the context of

Bestline’s standardized presentations. In reaching this

conclusion, however, we have regarded as immaterial to

this summary adjudication of the securities issue any

testimony of the named Plaintiffs which is based upon

such random or spurious representations because such

representations lack any uniformity of impact on the

class Plaintiffs and also because in view of our finding,

they are surplusage. Such representations merely

reinforce expectations otherwise effectively created in

the minds of the reasonable investor by the

standardized pre-investment presentations.

There is no genuine dispute as to the fact that the

class Plaintiffs, as well as thousands of others, were

indiscriminately solicited to be exposed to the Bestline

business opportunity, without regard to their

backgrounds, education, training or individual abilities.

The Defendants concede as much, and suggest merely

that the quality of Bestline’s training program

adequately compensated for any lack of relevant

experience or education, and that ‘‘a person’s desire to

succeed and willingness to work far exceed any

App. D-77

educational or business background prior to Bestline.”’**

These persons, drawn “from all walks of life, ethnic

backgrounds, with varied educations, experience, ages

and religions”’,24 were then introduced to Bestline’s

business opportunity, either through the device of an

Opportunity Meeting, or some other formal or informal

presentation based upon guidelines promulgated by

Bestline in its Information Manual, from which

presentations they derived their expectations as to the

character of an investment in Bestline Direct

Distributorships.

The fact that some Bestline distributors may have

obtained “prospects” by advertising in ‘‘Help Wanted”

columns of local newspapers, by direct mail, or by

striking up conversations on street corners, or that they

may have intentionally refused to expisin the Bestline

business opportunity on such first contacts to heighten

the prospective investor’s “curiosity”, may betray the

motives of the Defendants in connection with the class

Plaintiffs’ fraud claims, but the use of such techniques

are not basic to a determination by this Court as to the

expectations created in the minds of the class Plaintiffs

as to the character of their investments in Bestline

Direct Distributorships. Similarly, zealousness at

Opportunity Meetings evidenced by out-pourings of

enthusiasm, speakers running or hurrying to the

rostrum, exuberant applause, chanting or singing, and

other conduct of a similar nature, may also bear upon

23Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet (all editions), p. 7.

“This phrase, in several variations, appears in all editions of

the Bestline Business Opportunity Booklet, as well as several times

in each Opportunity Meeting script.

App. D-78

the Piambinc-Plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud and high-

pressure salesmanship, but are immaterial to the basic

inquiry involved in this adjudication, thereby

differentiating it somewhat from the decision of the

Koscot and Turner Courts, which involved important

fraud questions. The elucidation in those decisions of

the high-pressure sales tactics of the promoters was

directed to the Commission’s claims of violations of the

antifraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. In

contrast, this Court is called upon only to resolve the

limited issue of whether there is any genuine controversy

as to the fact that Bestline’s pre-investment

standardized presentations, in their material aspects,

created in the class Plaintiffs’ minds the reasonable

expectation that an investment in Bestline Direct

Distributorships would lead to profits to be derived from

the undeniably significant or essential managerial or

entrepreneurial efforts of others which affect the failure

or success of the common enterprise or venture.

The apparent lack of sophistication of the class

Plaintiffs herein contrasts sharply with the decisions of

other Courts which have held that specific franchise

agreements involved therein were not investment

contracts within the meaning of the Federal securities

laws, and compares favorably with the decisions of those

Courts which have found otherwise. See e.g., Mr. Steak,

Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F.Supp. 64 (D.Colo.,

1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (River £ity

Steak was not an uninformed investor, but was

acquainted with the business it undertook, held not to

involve the offer and sale of an investment contract);

Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International, Inc., 348

F.Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla.1972) (controlling stockholder a

App. D-79

Beefy Trail had extensive background as a businessman

having owned and managed a retail department store,

had an interest in a construction business, together with

his attorney spent a considerable period of time

negotiating with Beefy King over the terms and

conditions of the ultimate purchase of a restaurant and

franchise wherein some of the decuments were drafted

by his attorney, and was employed as a consultant to

Beefy King actually working daily in its offices for a

period of time, held not to involve the offer and sale of

investment contract). In evaluating the impact of the

promoter’s offering on the expectations of the investor,

the investor’s experience, training and abilities have

always been considered an important starting point. In

some cases it has been the dispositive issue. In these

proceedings, we find that the Bestline National

Marketing Plan was a highly-organized nationwide

program addressed to the population at large, without

discrimination or qualification as to the sophistication

of the prospective investors.

There is no question that Bestline’s National

Marketing Plan held out to such investors the

expectation of profits to be derived from participation

therein. The lure of profits permeates Bestline’s meeting

scripts, literature and film strips which comprise its

standardized presentations to prospects for its

distributorships. Even a cursory review of those

materials reveals that an expectation of profits was not

only reasonably derivable therefrom, but that those

materials exclude any other reasonable expectation. We

are therefore constrained to conclude that there is no

genuine issue as to the fact that the class Plaintiffs were

led to expect that profits would be derived from an

App. D-80

investment in Bestline Direct Distributorships, and that

no reasonable investor could possibly conclude

otherwise. In view of this finding, the disposition issue

involv

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