Opposition — General Public Utilities Corporation v. Susquehanna Valley Alliance

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No. 80-382 oer 14 1980

MICHAEL RODAK, JR...

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, METROPOLITAN

EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT

COMPANY AND PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioners,

v.

SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY ALLIANCE, RONALD L. DAVIS,

BETTY TOMPKINS, BEVERLY M. HESS, AND

DOREEN E. SNELL,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF SUSQUEHANNA

VALLEY ALLIANCE, et al.

MICHAEL CHURCHILL ALBERT J. SLAP

Attorney of Record 1009 Black Rock Road

JUDITH A. DORSEY Gladwyne, Pennsylvania 19035

Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (215) 642-5740

1315 Walnut St., 16th fl.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 JEAN ROYER KOHR

(215) 735-7200 Minney, Mecum & Kohr

150 E. Chestnut St.

Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17602

(717) 299-5649

Counsel for Respondents

Le OE EE See RO eae

Table of Contents

ene GE MABETIOOTACLOS, ... occccccce

Counter-Statement of the Case....

Reasons for Denying the Writ.....

THE OPINION OF THE COURT

OF APPEALS DOES NOT

INTERFERE WITH THE NUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION'S

REGULATORY SCHEME AND DOES

NOT CONFLICT WITH THE

DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

AND OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL...

A. The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Is Not

Seeking Certiorari.......

B. No Court Has Held

Contrary to the

Ruling Below...... erry

C. Petitioners Seek to

Argue Factual Matters

Contrary to the

PEM EINE o 6 bb & Ae 6 600 6 60 me

Conclusion..... Retewh 66 be Bi ae Wa as

10

18

20

ii

Table of Authorities

Cases

City of Rochester v. Bond,

+ 9 (sa aes See) cvewke

16

Frank Mashuda v. Alleghen

Co., 2560 F.2g 241 (3a Cir.

1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 185

(1959), reh. denied, 361

8 BO Cee asa ek wk eee 49

Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc.

v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588

TRUCMCRARs DOT aes ee eneseee’ peaved,

Natural Resources Defense

Council v. Nuclear Regu-

sagery Commission, 606

F. 61 faeG Cis. gee oe

Scientists' Institute for

Public Information, Inc.

v. Atomic Energy Commission,

481 F.2d 1079 (D.c. Cir. 1979)..18

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, 435 U.S.

SEF (LOTE) cece ecees oer Tere 10,

Statutes

Administrative Orders Review

Act, 28 U.8 6. Of) rors & a

POCORN Bee etGl ibs sets ce dbadeeal

14,

ll,

17

bake

17

> ei |

Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.

§2011 Ct. SCG... eee eeereeereevees 3

SeCtion 2239. .ccccvccccsescves 17

Section 2239 (a) ..ccccccvccves 6, 13,

16

BSOCtion 2239:(B) occ eccccscness a ll,

. Federal Water Pollution

Control Act of 1977,

33 U.S.C. §1251 et. Seq......... 10,° 20

DOC ETOe DARE OL) bs 666s eee bans ae an

BOSCIOM LISS CD) bs on eee He 6 bee 3

National Environmental Policy

Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.

§4321 et. SEG... eseaeee scoseveesedy, LO,

No. 80-382

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION,

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, JERSEY

CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY ALLIANCE, RONALD L.

DAVIS, BETTY TOMPKINS, BEVERLY M. HESS,

AND DOREEN E. SNELL,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF SUSQUEHANNA

VALLEY ALLIANCE, et al.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 28, 1979, the nation's most

serious commercial nuclear accident began

at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,

Unit 2 (hereinafter TMI), releasing in ex-

cess of 10 million curies of radionuclides

2

into the environment and contaminating

950,000 gallons of water on site.

In mid-April, 1979, without notice or

any opportunity for public comment or re-

view either in the form of an environmen-

tal impact statement (hereinafter EIS) or

otherwise, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

sion (hereinafter NRC) approved a plan

proposed by the Petitioner utilities to

decontaminate the TMI reactor (Complaint,

437).

The first step in the process was to

be the partial decontamination and subse-

quent discharge into the Susquehanna River

of 245,000 gallons of intermediate-level

radioactive water. The NRC verbally ap-

proved the purchase and construction by

the utilities of a system known as EPICOR-

II for decontamination of that water.

Faced with public announcements by

Metropolitan ‘dison and the NRC that

3

imminent discharge of radioactive water

into the Susquehanna River was scheduled,

Respondents sent a 60-day notice of intent

to sue under the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act of 1977 (hereinafter the Clean

Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §1365(b) on May 23,

1979, and on May 25, filed a Complaint and

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.*

Respondents alleged that operation of the

decontamination system and discharge of

treated water into the Susquehanna River

would violate the Atomic Energy Act, 42

U.S.C. §2011 et. seg., andrelated regula-

tions; §301(f) of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §1311(f£); and the U.S. Constitution ;

and that the authorization of such activi-

ties without an EIS violated the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (herein-

after NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.

*Very shortly before the case at bar was filed,

the City of Lancaster, Pa. also filed suit, in Dis-

trict Court in the District of Columbia, to pro-

hibit the same discharge,

-*

On that same day, the NRC issued a

statement (a) ordering preparation of an

environmental assessment on use of EPICOR-

II; (b) forbidding the licensee to operate

EPICOR-II pending completion of the en-

vironmental assessment; (c) prohibiting

discharge of wastewater into the Susque-

hanna River pending completion of a sep-

arate environmental assessment concerning

such discharges; and (d) ordering a third

environmental assessment on decontamina-

tion and disposal of "high-level" waste-

water. Thus, although the NRC prohibited

the discharge of wastewater into the

river, it agreed only to undertake en-

vironmental assessments of alternatives

for certain isolated portions of the clean-

up. It refused to undertake a full EIS

that would include alternatives for long-

term disposal of highly radioactive resins

produced by EPICOR-II, alternatives for

disposal of damaged core material and dis-

posal of radioactive gases trapped in the

containment building on site.

On August 20, 1979, the NRC issued for.

comment its assessment, Use of EPICOR-II

at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, NUREG-0591l,

and confirmed its intention not to do a

comprehensive EIS.

On October 12, 1979, Judge Rambo of

the Middle District of Pennsylvania dis-

missed Respondents' complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. Re-

spondents immediately appealed the dismis-

sal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

On October 16, 1979, four days after

the District Court's dismissal, the NRC

issued an order to proceed with operation

of EPICOR-II.* The Commission stated

within the order that it was not an order

subject to §189(a) of the Atomic Energy

Act, 42 U.S.C. §2239(a). Petitioners'

Appendix (hereinafter Pet.App.), 55a-

56a.

On October 18, 1979, the Third Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals refused Respondents '

request that use of EPICOR-II be stayed

pending appeal, after the NRC stated that

storage space for untreated radioactive

water being generated was almost exhausted

and that no treated water would be dis-

chargec into the Susquehanna River.

*Upon issuance of NRC's order to proceed with

EPICOR-II, Respondents filed a Petition for Review,

No. 79-2800, in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,

as a protective measure, pending the outcome in

that court of the case at bar. Respondents’

Motion to Hold Petition for Review in Abeyance

Pending Disposition of Related Appeal was granted

on February 14, 1980.

On November 9, 1979, four days before

Oral argument in the Third Circuit on Respon-

dents' appeal, the NRC informed the Third

Circuit of its intention to prepare a pro-

grammatic EIS on the decontamination and

disposal of the radioactive wastes at TMI.

Though the NRC has moved forward on

preparation of an EIS, clean-up operations

have continued simultaneously; and Peti-

tioner utilities are now in the process

of constructing a system for decontamina-

tion of the remaining high-level radioac-

tive water generated by the accident.

They are also storing on Three Mile Is-

land highly radioactive resins, produced

from operation of EPICOR-II, because the

ultimate disposal of such resins_was_not

considered at the time approval for con-

struction and operation were given, and

because the NRC has not yet approved any

plan for such disposal.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The Opinion Of The Court Of Appeals Does

Not Interfere With The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission's Regulatory Scheme And Does

Not Conflict With The Decisions Of This

Court And Other Courts Of Appeal

A. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Is Not Seeking Certiorari

The Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit undertook in this case a careful

analysis of the proper functioning of

courts of appeal and district courts vis-

a-vis the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The fact that it is the utility company

responsible for the Three Mile Island ac-

cident petitioning herein, and not the

Agency charged with regulating the

utility, is a significant

commentary on whether the opinion unduly

disrupts the normal pattern of administra-

tive regulation. Evidently, the NRC was

not concerned enough about the "emascula-

tions," "floods," and "erosions" lamented

by the utility company to join in its pe-

tition.

Petitioners claim that the Third Cir-

cuit's opinion violates the judge-made

rule of exhaustion of administrative rem-

edies (this is not a case involving a

statutory exhaustion requirement) and that

the Court of Appeals has sidestepped the

exclusive review provision of the Atomic

Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2239(b), and the Ad-

ministrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C.

§2342(4), for certain "final orders."

Petitioners conveniently overlook the

fact that the Third Circuit upheld the ex-

clusive review provision for claims aris-

ing under the Atomic Energy Act where it

10

applied and that the issues at stake here

involve claims of activities illegal under

the National Environmental Policy Act,

the Clean Water Act, and the Con-

stitution.

Petitioners' analysis of these issues

lumps all types of cases, fact situations,

and orders together and attempts to invoke

the mantle of nuclear power [Petitioners'

Brief for Certiorari (hereinafter Pet .Br.)

at 8] as a way to prevent the arsenal of

remedies available to a district judge

from being brought to bear upon such ac-

tivities.

B. No Court Has Held Contrary to the

Ruling Below

Petitioners' brief asserts that the

Third Circuit's opinion is contrary to

‘Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

435 U.S. 519, 526-27(1978), Grand Canyon

11

Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588

(10th Cir. 1974), and City of Rochester v.

Bond, 603 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Pet.

Br. at id.

Nothing in Vermont Yankee stands for

the proposition that “review of the ade-

quacy of NRC compliance with NEPA in li-

censing actions lies solely in the courts

of appeals pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2239(b)

and 28 U.S.C. §2342." Pet. Br. at 10.

Indeed there was no discussion in the

opinion of that issue. Vermont Yankee was

fundamentally concerned with courts impos-

ing procedures on rulemaking proceedings.

Furthermore, the two cases are poles

apart factually. This case involved pro-

tecting citizens from a threatened dis-

charge of radioactive waste ito their

drinking water supply, in the absence of

any formal administrative action, licen-

sing proceeding, any other hearing, or

7%

*?

12

pursuant to an EIS. In contrast, Vermont

Yankee involved a remand by the Circuit

Court after a licensing process that had

been going on since 1969 and "an incred-

ibly extensive review" that had involved

Over two weeks of hearings and books of

transcripts. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at

aT

Because Vermont Yankee was not con-

cerned with the role of district courts

in reviewing NEPA violations, it cannot

possibly be at odds with the Third Cir-

cuit opinion.

The suggested conflict with opinions

by the circuit courts is no more real.

Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500

F.2d 588, (10th Cir. 1974), involved a

rather abstract disagreement over admin-

istrative policy regarding the operation

of the Glen Canyon Dam, i.e., (1) whether

intermittent flows from the dam

violated an implied contract

13

with the tour operators; and (2) whether

the National Environmental Policy Act,

42 U.S.C.§4321 et seq., required prepara-

tion of an EIS for continued operation of

the dam.

Glen Canyon Dam had been constructed

prior to the passage of NEPA,and therefore

the federal agencies which had been sued

had not even considered NEPA in their

decision-making. As Judge Seth stated,

he and the plaintiffs in the case could

only speculate on the position the Depart-

ment of Interior might take on the re-

quirement for an EIS. Thus he character-

ized the problem before him as "one of

ripeness." Id. at 590.

In the present case, there was no need

to speculate as to the NRC's position on

the requirements of NEPA. That statute,

passed ten years prior to the accident at

TI, was totally ignored by the NRC until

i

14

its announcement of May 25, 1979. Even

then it stated its intention to do a se-

ries of environmental assessments on three

aspects of the clean-up, rather than a

comprehensive EIS. Not until four days

before oral argument in the Third Circuit

and after commitment to significant clean-

up activities did the agency commit itself

to doing a full EIS to evaluate those very

commitments. See Opinion below, Pet.App.

at 18a.

In City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d

927 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the Court was again

faced with a facility (a 600-foot radio

antenna tower) that was already built. A

formal administrative hearing and two in-

formal public hearings provided an ade-

quate administrative record for the Ap-

peals Court to review. In rejecting the

City of Rochester's belated efforts to re-

open a Federal Aviation Administration and

LS

Federal Communications Commission "no haz-

ard" determination, the Court relied pri-

marily on the fact that the determination

was a reviewable order. As Judge Wilkey

points out: "[I]f ... there exists a spe-

cial statutory review procedure, it is or-

dinarily supposed that Congress intended

that procedure to be the exclusive means

of obtaining judicial review in those

cases to which it applies. City of Roch-

ester, 603 F.2d at 931 (emphasis added).

The case at bar differs from City of

Rochester in both respects. First, there

was no administrative record for the

Appeals Court to review in this case.

Secondly, as the NRC itself admits, its

October 1979 order to Metropolitan Edison

regarding operation of the decontamination

equipment was not a final order covered by

§189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.

§2239(a). Pet.App., 55a-56a. It was

16

therefore not covered by the exclusive re-

view provision of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

§2239(b).* It is within Congress' purview

to create an exclusive statutory review

provision for certain types of administra-

tive orders and not for others. This is

precisely what Congress has done in the

Atomic Energy Act. Unlike the Court in

City of Rochester, Petitioners would have

this Court sweep into the exclusive re-

view provision every NRC action, inaction,

and order, no matter under which section

of the Act it issues.

The District of Columbia Circuit's

decision in Natural Resources Defense

Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979) was

*Presumably, therefore, the oral approval given

in April of 1979 to construct EPICOR-II was also

not a reviewable order under §189(a).

17

Similarly premised on the fact that there

was a "final order" with an administra-

tive record ripe for review. "[T]here is

no dispute that NRC's decision consti-

tutes a 'final order' under 28 U.S.C.

§2342 and 42 U.S.C.§2239." Id. at 1265.

In the Three Mile Island case, the re-

spondents and NRC both dispute the. exis-

tence of a final order under 42 U.S.C.

§2239.

There is no conflict between a rule

which states that NEPA and other issues

may be raised in agency proceedings and,

if made part of a statutorily reviewable

order, must be raised in the appeals

court, with the ruling below that affords

Respondents the opportunity to correct

illegal agency action in district court

prior to the existence of a statutorily

reviewable order and record and where it

is unlikely that such a reviewable order

i

18

will be forthcoming. Opinion below, Pet.

App., 14a-20a; See, Scientists' Institute

for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic

Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.c.

Cary BSF 2)

C. Petitioners Seek to Argue Factual

Matters Contrary to the Complaint

Courts have traditionally recognized

exceptions to the judicially-created ex-

haustion doctrine. Exceptions include

circumstances where "the challenged

agency action presents a clear and unam-

biguous violation of statutory or consti-

tutional rights, ... when resort to ad-

ministrative procedures is 'clearly shown

to be inadequate to prevent irreparable

injury,' ... or when exhaustion is fu-

tile." Pet. App., p. 26a-27a. (Citations

omitted. )

In this case, the factual conditions

necessary for all three exceptions were

19

pleaded in the Complaint. Where, as here,

the District Court dismissed the action

without a hearing, the reviewing court

must take the allegations in Respondents'

Complaint as true for the purposes of ap-

peal. Frank Mashuda v. Allegheny Co.,

256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360

U.S. 185 (1959), reh. denied, 361 U.S.

855 (1959).

Respondents' Complaint asserts clear

and unambiguous violations of statutes

and the Constitution (Complaint, {'s 79,

99, 112, 113), that resort to the NRC pro-

cedure would have been futile (Complaint,

44), and that Respondents were imminently

threatened with irreparable injury (Com-

plaint, q's 22, 84, 106). Contrary as-

sertions in Petitioners' brief are appro-

priate for hearing by the District Court,

r%

i

20

and not for argument in this Court.*

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the de-

cision of the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit is not in conflict with any

decision of this Court nor “35 2c in

*The Clean Water Act count provides a blatant

example of Petitioners' attempt to have the bene-

fit of their own version of the facts. After

first suggesting that it should not be the Court

but the NRC which must necessarily ascertain whe-

ther the water to be disposed of after processing

will in fact be "high-level radioactive waste

within the meaning of Section 301(f) of the Clean

Water Act..." (Pet. Br. at 12), they then assert

on page 13:

Since, as indicated above, the waste-

water to be discharged here is of a type

subject to the exclusive regulatory jur-

isdiction of the NRC under the Atomic

Energy Act, it is, as this Court stated

in Train, ‘beyond the reach' of the Clean

Water Act...,

21

conflict with the other Circuits and,

therefore, the Court should deny the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER

OF PHILADELPHIA

By

MICHAEL CHURCHILL

Attorney of Record

JUDITH A. DORSEY

1315 Walnut St, 16th Fl.

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 735-7200

ALBERT J. SLAP

1009 Black Rock Road

Gladwyne, PA 19035

(215) 642-5740

JEAN ROYER KOHR

Minney, Mecum & Kohr

150 E. Chestnut St.

Lancaster, PA 17602

(717) 299-5649

Counsel for Respondents

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the llth day

of October, 1980, three copies of the

foregoing Brief in Opposition of Susque-

hanna Valley Alliance, et al., were served

by deposit in the United States mail,

first class, postage prepaid, upon the

following:

Mark Augenblick, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

1800 "M" Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

Solicitor General

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Stephen F. Eilperin, Esq.

Solicitor

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

1717 "H" Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20555

William M. Cohen, Esq.

Land and Natural Resources Division

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Carlon M. O'Malley, Jr.

U.S. Attorney

Middle District of Pennsylvania

U.S. Post Office Building

Scranton, Pennsylvania 18501

MICHAEL CHURCHILL

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