Petition — Callow v. United States

8 0 o- 2 v4 v4 : | Supreme Court, U. $,*%

FILED

AUG25 1980

No.

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

GILBERT E. CALLOW, JR.,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

GILBERT E. CALLOW, JR.,

Petitioner, Pro-Se

1148 Chester St.

Aurora, Colo. 80010

Phone (303) 366-7725

aos niensinbibienetiaadaniniatiin’

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

GILBERT E. CALLOW, JR.,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. The Petitioner has been denied ‘‘equal protec-

tion and due process”’ of the law as required under

Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution

and the right ‘“‘to have assistance of Counsel for his

defense” as required by Amendment VI of the

United States Constitution. The record substan-

tiates that the Petitioner did not ‘‘voluntarily and in-

telligently elect” to proceed without Counsel. Faret-

ta v. California, 422 U.S. 806. The Trial court Judge,

prior to allowing the Petitioner to proceed pro-se,

failed to establish the educational background of

the Petitioner, failed to make any investigation of

the Petitioner as to his capability to provide an ade-

quate defense. The Trial court Judge throughout the

proceedings advised the Petitioner that he was not

“getting good legal advice’, yet the Court failed to

take any measures to secure adequate Legal

Counsel for the Petitioner.

The Petitioner did make an attempt to secure

Legal Counsel to represent him at the Tenth Circuit

Court of Appeals and in this appeal to the United

States Supreme Court. However, an excessive bond

of $50,000 was set by the Trial court. It was

necessary for the Petitioner to secure this bond with

his only major asset, his home. The Petitioner was

rendered absolutely destitute by the Court and was

unable to enter into any financial contract with

Legal Counsel to represent him.

After much effort, the Petitioner did secure Legal

Counsel. This Legal Counsel failed and refused to

present issues to the United States Supreme Court

that the Petitioner had requested and felt were

necessary for his defense. In two conferences with

this Legal Counsel he did not give any indication to

the Petitioner that these issues would not be includ-

ed in the ‘Petition’, and the first knowledge the

Petitioner had that they were not included was after

a typed copy of the ‘‘Petition’’ had been sent to the

United States Supreme Court. As a result of this

disagreement the Legal Counsei withdrew from the

case, without the consent of the Petitioner or the

Court, on August 18, 1980. The ‘Petition for Writ of

Certiorari”’ is required to be filed on August 25, 1980,

and the Petitioner is once again being forced to pro-

ceed without Legal Counsel.

2. The case before this court lacks the two essen-

tial ingredients for a “criminal conviction’, that of

‘‘Mens Rea and Actus Reas’”’. The Petitioner did not

intend to harm society and in fact did not harm

society. The exercise of a ‘Constitutional Right’

can not be construed as an intent to harm society.

The Supreme Court has ruled in Frothingham v.

Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, (1923) that taxes paid by any

One individual is ‘‘Infinitesimal’’ compared to the

whole. Therefore, the actions of the Petitioner did

not harm society. A criminal conviction cannot be

sustained in the absence of ‘‘Mens Rea and Actus

Rea’.

3. The charge of ‘‘Failure to File’ under 26 U.S.C.

7203, was negated by evidence presented when

Government admitted receiving forms filed by

Defendant, Appendix A, Exhibit 4 (1), TR of Jury

Trial, Page 23. The Government went on to assert a

tax it had been able to compute. U.S. v. Long, 618

F2d 74, (9th Cir. No. 78-2844, 5/1/80)

‘"...we begin with the premise that Long filed

tax forms resembling the facsimiles introduced

at the trial. The District Judge found the

Government had not met its burden of proving

the contrary; and this finding is not clearly er-

roneous...The 1|.R.S. could calculate

assessments from Long’s string of zeros just

as they could if Long had entered other

numbers. The resulting assessments might not

reflect Long’s actual tax liability, but some

computation was possible...” (emphasis added)

‘lf the I.R.S. had kept better records, the

Government might have proved by its lack of

any record of Long’s return that he failed to file

areturn. See U.S. v. Greenleaf, 517 F.2d 899, 903

(3rd Cir.) Cert. denied 423 U.S. 985 (1975). If the

Service had kept papers such as Long claimed

he filed, the government might have sustained

some other charge. It did not, nowever, prove

the failure to file that was charged in this case.”

In the instant case, the I|.R.S. was able to compute a

tax liability, which was asserted by the government.

4. There was insufficient evidence to sustain a

verdict of guilty. No evidence was presented involv-

ing Business Income or (loss), Capital Losses, Farm

losses and other losses that reduce ‘“‘Wage and Pen-

sion” income under the internal Revenue Code and

would render a return by the Petitioner unnecessary.

The Petitioner could not have falsified his W-4

when, in accordance with Section 3402 (n) (2) of the

Internal Revenue Code “‘he anticipated he would in-

cur no liability for income tax imposed under Sub-

title A for his current taxabie year’, and did in fact

file forms 1040 for the years in question substan-

tiating that he had incurred no tax liability for the

years in question in this instant case.

5. The jury must decide only the facts, not

the law as they have done in this instant case.

The Court must decide the law. The jury may

not have found the Petitioner guilty of “Willful

failure to file’ ana ‘“‘Falsifing a W-4” if the trial

court had not supplied the jury with instruc-

tions allegedly based on the Internal Revenue

Code without ruling upon the law prior to giving

the jury instructions. For example, in a convic-

tion of murder, it is proven to the jury, as fact,

that someone died. The jury then decides if the

death was from natural or unnatural causes, as

a matter of fact not law, and whether the accus-

ed caused the death, if by unnatural causes, as

a matter of fact not law. (A)However, in this ins-

tant case the jury decided whether the Peti-

tioner had committed the crime based on its

own interpertation of the Internal Revenue

Code, which is a matter of law not fact.

(A) ie.—The Court must first determine and

rule that

the Petitioner was required to file a return

before the jury can decide if Petitioner filed

said return, or was required to file said

return. No such ruling was made. ,

6. The trial court Judge acted outside of his

authority and jurisdiction by “ordering” a Colorado

State official to testify as to State tax matters ina

Federal action, without any foundation required as

to the statutory authority of the United States

Government to so inquire, or the propriety of the

state official to so disclose.

The record in this matter will reveal that the state

Official alluded to ‘‘state confidentiality statutes”

that prohibited divulgence ‘‘unless directed by the

Court.’’ Whereupon, without further inquiry:

iv

THE COURT: very well. You are directed to

disclose them.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

Nothing more was required as foundation. See Infra,

at Appendix A, Exhibit 4 (2).

This error is sufficient to overturn the conviction,

it was an abuse of discretion by the Court to admit

this evidence and this evidence constituted signifi-

cant prejudice.

7. The Trial Court Judge Fred M. Winner should

have recused himself when he, by his own admis-

sions and demonstration, thru the court records and

news media comments, has a definite bias towards

alleged protesters. Appendix A, Exhibit 6. A sworn

affidavit from two witnesses can be supplied the

Court that the Judge further has stated, that “one

thing | cannot stand is someone drawing funds from

the government and not paying taxes on these

funds’. The Petitioner did draw funds from the

government which he believed and still believes are

not subject to taxation, constitutionally, under the

Internal Revenue Code.

Throughout the trial the Judge continually re-

quired the Petitioner to establish grounds for his ob-

jections but failed to make the same requirement of

the United States Attorney. The Judge denied the

Petitioner equal protection of an allegedly neutral

court and judge.

In a country where its very system of government

is one designed to allow acitizen to make good faith

challenges to what he considers an abuse by that

V

government of his constitutional rights, this court

cannot sustain a conviction when a proven biased

Judge made the following statements in this instant

case:

|

“Well, very well, then, this case is one that

causes all of us grave concern. We have before

us here today a man who was in the parlance of

the media at this time a “doubledipper.” He is

drawing a military pension and he was working

for the government, yet he refuses to pay taxes

levied by that government. /f everyone took this

position, he would not be receiving his salary,

and indeed we would have anarchy in this coun-

try.

(emphasis added)

“You are working for the United States of

America, yet you defy the government of this

country.’

Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Page 11, Line 27.

“The sentence | am about to impose is much

harsher than the offense requires. | will tell you

here and now that if you will come to your

senses and disclose to the probation depart-

ment the information we are properly entitled to

receive; | will modify the sentence...... 2

Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Page 12, Line 5.

“but as long as you decide to defy the govern-

ment,....’”

Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Page 12, Line 29.

“In the event that you elect to appeal, the bond

On appeal will be $50,000 fully secured unless

vi

Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Page 9 Line 15.

you furnish the probation department with the

information it is rightly entitled to have.

lf, as and when you furnish the probation

department with that information, | will modify

and substantially modify the appellate

bond.....”

Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Page 13, Line 32.

“1 recommend to you now that you get a lawyer.

Perhaps you realize how much trouble you're in

now. Perhaps you realize that you need good,

competent legal advice because the sentence |

have imposed will mean, if it be affirmed, that

you are going to serve along time in prison, and

the government with all of its resources will

discover your assets. You’re not going to hide

them forever, so you might as well face up to

the fact that the day of reckoning has arrived.”

Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Page 14, Lines 29.

This Court must not sustain a conviction when a

biased Judge does not recognize a Constitutional

right to redress of grievances, without intimidation

by the Court, as guaranteed by Amendment 1, of the

United States Constitiution.

This Court must not sustain a conviction when a

biased Judge continually promised a reduction of

sentence and appeal bond, yet to date has failed to

reduce the sentence of the Petitioner, after the Peti-

tioner did give the probation department the infor-

mation it requested. He further failed to reduce the

excessive appeal bond and left the Petitioner

destitute and unable to secure “adequate Legal

Counsel”’.

vii

This Court must not sustain a conviction when a

biased Judge failed to establish the inability of the

Petitioner to represent himself, and failed to take

any measures to correct the situation.

This Court must not sustain a conviction when a

biased Judge does not understand that the primary

function of the Judicial Branch of Government is to

allow citizens to make good faith challenge and

“defy the function of government”.

8. This Court cannot sustain a conviction where

the Trial Court Judge admitted on record that he is

imposing a sentence harsher than is required. There

can be no doubt that Amendment VIII of the Con-

Stitution of the United States has been violated,

“The sentence | am about to impose is much

harsher than the offense requires......”

Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Page 12, Line 5.

Amendment Vill of the Constitution of the United

States clearly states:

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-

cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted.”

9. The instant case before this court was not

brought by indictment. This Court must not sustain

a conviction that resulted in fine and imprisonment

without an indictment, which must be had

regardless of the classification fo the crime.

“Constitutional provision that no person shall,

for any indictable offense be proceeded against

criminally by information, was not intended to

Vili

be limited to capital offenses and felonies but

applies also to more serious indictable

common-law misdemeanors and statutory

misdemeanors which the Legislature intends

should be indictable.”’

Commonwealth vs. Cano, 133 A.2d 800.

(Emphasis added)

The taxing power of the United States is a provi-

sion of the Constitution Article |, Section 8,

: therefore, an offense against the taxing power must

be within the meaning of ‘‘Infamous Crime” and

must be by indictment.

The term ‘‘capital or otherwise infamous crime’”’

has been defined by the United States Supreme

Court in Mackin v. United States, 117 US 384; Parkin-

son v. United States, 121 US 281; United States v.

DeWalt, 128 US 393; Medley Petitioner, 134 US 160,

169 and in Re Mills, 135 US 263, 267’ as the Court

stated in the matter of Peter J. Classen, 140 US 200

(1891),

“The purport of the rulings in those cases is,

that a crime which is punishable by imprison-

ment in the state prison or penitentiary, as is

the crime of which the defendant was con-

victed, is an infamous crime, whether the ac-

cused is or is not sentenced or put to hard

labor, and that, in determining whether the

crime is infamous, the question is, whether it is

one for which the statute authorizes the court

to award an infamous punishment, and not

whether the punishment ultimately awarded is

an infamous one.”

The Internal Revenue Code sections 7203 and

ix

7205 do authorize fine and imprisonment and

therefore this court must not sustain a conviction

where indictment was not had.

10. This Court must not sustain a conviction

where the Court assumed jurisdiction over Title 26,

of the United States Code, “Civil law’’ under the

Rules of Criminal procedure. Title 26 of the United

States Code has not been enacted as ‘‘positive law”

and therefore cannot be heard under the “Rules of

Criminal Procedure’’. See Title |, Section 204 of the

United States Code.

The Court has the power and the duty to nullify

those laws which do not support or which nullify the

Constitiution of the United States.

‘thus the particular phraseology of the Con-

Stitution (of the United States) confirms and

strengthens the principle supposed to be

essential to all written constitutions, that a law

repugnant to the constitution is void; and that

courts, as well as other departments, are bound

by that instrument...”

Marberry v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60:

(1803), at page 180.

‘...where rights secured by the Constitution of

the United States are involved there can be no

rule making or legislation which would

abrogate them...”

Miranda v. Arizona, 380 U.S. 436 (1966).

‘‘...it is the duty of the courts to be watchful for

the constitutional rights of the citizen against

stealthy encroachment thereon...”

Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1885), at 635.

x

11. This Court must not sustain a conviction

where the Petitioner was not shown to he subject to

the Administrative Code of Title 26, U.S.C. and such

a showing is required before the Petitioner can be

penalized for not adhering to its condition. Such

subjection to the Code must be shown to be know-

ing and voluntary by the Petitioner in order for him

to be placed under its conditions.

xi

INDEX

Questions Presented for Review

Decisions Below

Jurisdiction

ee oe nee eee ee sere ee 2

|

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..............0005 3

I oa amg A as gine oltre wird ack tree a8 e 8 ea ee 4

ot! re Torr a errr sees eee >

XII

CITATIONS

Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution .i

Amendment VI of the United States Constitution ..i

Faretta v. California, 442U.S.806................

Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, (1923) ....... ii

U.S. v. Long, 618 F2d 74, (9th Cir. No.

RR ae ann ii

Section 3402 (n) (2), Title 26,U.S.C............... iii

Amendment VIII of the United States

I os eink Ge v6 sk coe ec vii

Commonwealth v. Cano, 133 A.2d 800 ........... ix

Article |, Section 8 of the United States

I ie haath Sea ws cs ics kes ix

Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 384............ ix

Parkinson v. United States, 121 U.S. 281 ......... ix

United States v. DeWalt, 128U.S.393............ ix

Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160,169 ............ ix

PU OUEUE, TOM GPU I EE nce ct caccsaccccccscber ix

Peter J. Classen, 140 U.S. 200 (1891) ............ ix

Section 7203 and 7205, Title 26U.S.C. ........... ix

II Mg oe ae ee bb. y acacé wae x, xi

Fea TPT es WEG, Fa eevee ewe nes enes x

Marberry v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60, (1803) . .x

Miranda v. Arizona, 380 U.S. 436 (1966) ........... x

oo TS a x

Xiti

DECISIONS BELOW

Pertinent decisions below are:

1. Transcript of Sentencing by U.S. District Court,

District of Colorado.

2. Decision of U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th

Circuit, affirming the District Court proceedings.

3. Denial of Rehearing

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a).

Petition for Rehearing was denied on June 26,

1980.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit

issued its original opinion on May 22, 1980.

The Trial Judge, Fred M. Winner, announced his

sentence on January 4, 1980.

The Jury submitted its verdict on or about

December 5, 1979.

Petition for Enlargment of Time, together with a

$200.00 Docket Fee was lodged with this Court,

which issued its Order on July 21, 1980, extending

the time to August 25, 1980; in which to file Petition

for Writ of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Defendant was charged, by Information, with

violation of 26 U.S.C. 7203 for the years 1976 and

1977, and 26 U.S.C. 7205 for the years 1976, 1977 and

1978.

After preliminary proceedings, trial was had to

Jury with the Defendant appearing Pro Se, aided by

John E. Grandbouche, as lay counsel.

The Jury returned its verdict as to all five (5)

counts.

Defendant was sentenced to five (5) years, two to

run concurrent, in jail plus $20,000.00 fine, and an

appeal bond of $50,000.00 was established.

Defendant perfected his appeal to the 10th Circuit

Court of Appeals, which in due time affirmed the

judgment and sentence of the lower court.

Petition for Rehearing was timely filed and subse-

quently denied.

Petitioner brings his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The Government charged ‘“‘willful failure to file”’

income tax returns for the years 1975 and 1976, ad-

mitting that Defendant had filed certain returns

which the I.R.S. deemed not acceptable in form. The

forms filed by the Defendant followed the ‘‘Ander-

son” and “Tim Ogle” returns in form and content.

These documents were introduced and admitted in-

to evidence.

The Government also charged “...willfully, know-

ingly filed false withholding certificates (W4-E) with

his employer...”’.

The Defendant persisted throughout, with his ob-

jections as to the jurisdiction of the Court to act,

and as to the Consitutionality of the procedures

employed and/or permitted.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

l.

CONFLICT OF DECISIONS

The U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, issued its

decision No. 78-2844, May 1, 1980, entitled U.S.A. v.

Ronald M. Long, which recognized as a “return”, a

form filed which contained only zeros as con-

stituting “information relating to the taxpayer’s in-

come from which the tax can be computed.”

This decision seems to be in conflict with United

States v. Porth, 426 F2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert denied,

400 U.S. 824 (1970), holding:

“That a tax form that 'does not contain any in-

formation relating to the taxpayer’s income

from which the tax can be computed’ is not a

valid return under 26 U.S.C. 7203...”

ll.

DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND USUAL

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

In this case where the length of sentence (a total

of five (5) years, two to run concurrent); the size of

the fine ($20,000.00); and the amount of the Appeal

Bond ($50,000.00); all seem to be unusually large

3

and, by the admission of the sentencing judge, are:

‘“(T)he Sentence | am about to impose is much

harsher than the offense requires...”

It is submitted that this result is of that quality fre-

quently quoted such as to “shock the conscience”

of this court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Petitioner

respectfully requests that this Honorable Court will

grant the Writ to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August,

1980, in Denver, Colorado.

GILBERT E. CALLOW, JR.

Petitioner, Pro-Se

1148 Chester St.

Aurora Colo. 80010

Phone (303) 366-7725

APPENDIX “A”

INDEX

Exhibit 1- Transcript of Sentencing ............. 6

Exhibit 2 - Decision of 10th Circuit Court

f(s PPPOCETEST CREST ET 16

Exhibit 3 - Denial of Petition for Rehearing....... 22

Exhibit 4- Excerpt from Trial Record............ 23

Exhibit 6 - INIOFTIMION .. 00 ccc nascswnsecncn en 26

Exhibit 6 - News Articles from Denver Post

and Rocky Mountain News...........-....++48. 30

Exhibit 7 - General Provisions - Title 1,

Reet ee BEA, 2 nos code a kee we eee 32

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

GILBERT E. CALLOW, JR.

Defendant.

In the United States District Court for the

District of Colorado

Criminal Action No. 79-CR-521

Proceedings before the HONORABLE FRED M.

WINNER, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Colorado, commencing at or about

9:00 a.m., Friday, January 4, 1980, and continuing

thereafter, in Courtroom C502, United States Cour-

thouse, Denver, Colorado.

APPEARANCES

SUSAN ROBERTS, Assistant United States At-

torney, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff.

GILBERT E. CALLOW, appearing pro se.

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: This morning we have set 79-CR-521,

United States of America vs. Gilbert E. Callow, Jr.

The defendant has been heretofore tried and con-

victed by jury verdict of a violation of two counts

charging a violation of 26 United States Code, Sec-

tion 7203, and he has been convicted of three counts

EXHIBIT 1

6

charging a violation of 26 United States Code, Sec-

tion 7205.

The matter, as | have said, is before the Court for

sentencing. The defendant appeared at time of trial

pro se with the aid and assistance of two lay ad-

visors that | permitted to sit with him during the trial.

Defendant will please come forward and if either

of his advisors wish to come forward, they are

welcome to do so.

(Mr. John Grandbouche is present with the defen-

dant.)

THE COURT: now, if you will please stand there.

The advisor’s name, would you please state your

name for the record?

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: John Grandbouche.

THE COURT: And would you like to make any

statements either in behalf of your client or in

mitigation or would you like to state any reason as

to why sentence should not be imposed? I’m asking

you, Mr. Grandbouche.

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: Oh, yes.

THE COURT: Would you like to?

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: Yes. | would like to have

been able to have defended this man.

THE COURT: Well, of course the law doesn’t per-

mit that.

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: | understand.

THE COURT: But | will permit you to make a state-

ment at this time if you care to.

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: Yes, | would like to make a

statement.

THE COURT: You go right ahead.

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: During the trial it was

brought out we were standing on jurisdiction as be-

ing Our main premise. He challenged the Court for

using civil procedures, and so forth, and we main-

tained that all the way through.

THE COURT: Of course, you may be able to make

them change their minds.

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: That’s what we would like

to do, sir.

THE COURT: All right, is there anything you’d like

to say in mitigation or as to why sentence should

not be imposed at this time?

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: | would like to say the

sentence should not be imposed due to the fact they

didn’t use the proper procedure.

THE COURT: That’s something the Court of Ap-

peals will have to pass on. Are there any others?

MR. GRANDBOUCHE: No, that’s our main

premise, that the separation of state powers will be

Our main argument all the way to the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Mr. Callow, is there anything you

wish to say as to why sentence should not be impos-

ed or anything you wish to say in mitigation or in

your own behalf.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor, | will appeal

the decision.

THE COURT: That’s perfectly all right with me.

THE DEFENDANT: And request a stay pending--

THE COURT: Oh, no.

THE DEFENDANT: (continuing) --pending the ap-

peal.

THE COURT: No. Anything else you wish to say?

THE DEFENDANT: Nothing. | believe I’m right in

my stand.

THE COURT: Well, very well, then, this case is one

that causes all of us grave concern. We have before

us here today a man who was in the parlance of the

media at this time a “‘doubledipper.” He is drawing a

military pension and he is working for the govern-

ment, yet he refuses to pay taxes levied by that

government. If everyone took his position, he would

not be receiving his military pension nor would he

be receiving his salary, and indeed we would have

anarchy in this country.

The defendant has stated to the probation depart-

ment, and | quote: ‘| cannot disclose any informa-

tion regarding my assets due to signing a trust con-

tract and should | so disclose any information |

9

would be liable.”’

| rather doubt the legal conclusion that you would

be liable to anyone for disclosing your trust contract

and your assets in connection with a criminal

presentence investigation. | don’t know whose ad-

vice you are relying on in arriving at that conclusion,

but all | can do is presume that since you refused to

disclose it, you have unlimited resources, and the

fine will be imposed on the basis of that presump-

tion.

You then go ahead in your written statement and

say: ‘I filed two Fifth Amendment returns because

of good faith challenge to protect my God given

rights and not incriminate myself by giving figures

that can easily be altered by anyone. No one. has a

tax liability at the beginning of a year and labor is

not taxable. Therefore, | have filed W-4E’s. The in-

come tax is voluntary compliance by the IRS’s own

books, and a graduated income tax is the second

planning of the communist manifesto; therefore, |

did not volunteer to have our nation go communist. |

did not in any way intend to undermine or overthrow

our government. Quite the contrary, most people lie,

cheat and steal on their tax returns. | chose to be

honest. The only way to save our freedom is to keep

bringing these issues of redress before the courts --

or when there is no redress in the court -- when they

refuse to decide Constitutional issues in favor of

“rubber stamping” the statutes and the IRS

statutes, irresponsible people take it to the streets.

The courts could stop all of this abuse of govern-

ment. The Congress has long since ceased to exist. |

tried writing letters to my Congressmen. Have you

written a letter to your Congressman lately? | went

to trial on separation of powers. | challenged the

10

jurisdiction for criminal prosecution. The only dif-

ference between this country and all the rest of the

world is -- separation of powers. | stand unreservedly

6n the LAW -- the courts see fit to violate that LAW

to feed a treacherous bastard of government called

the IRS.

“How anyone can live on the $750.00 allowance

per person allowed by the government in 1965,

which is now ten times higher because of the

government's own inflationary policies, is beyond

any thinking person's conception.

“When people think they are free and fear their

government, they are already in prison. | do not fear

a tyrant, | stand unreservedly on God's principle and

HIS universal laws -- | can do no other, whatever the

consequence.

“And finally, | am not a law breaker -- the govern-

ment and the court is. And to quote Abraham Lin-

coin: ‘We the people are rightful masters of both

Congress and the Courts -- not to overthrow the Con-

stitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the

Constitution.’”

‘“To sin by silence when they should protest

makes cowards of men.’”

Mr. Callow, you have along and honorable military

service for which your government is rewarding you

by a pension. You are working for the United States

of America, yet you defy the government of this

country. In evaluating the sentence to be given a

man, one of the cardinal things to be considered is

whether there is any indication of repentance. There

is not the slightest indication of repentance on your

11

part. You have taken the position that you will stand

by your defiance and that you will stand by it to the

extent that you will not even cooperate with the pro-

bation department in disclosing your assets.

You leave me no alternative. The sentence | am

about to impose is much harsher than the offense

requires. | will tell you here and now that if you will

come to your senses and disclose to the probation

department the information we are properly entitled

to receive, | will modify the sentence, but as long as

you elect to stand on advice which is contrary to the

decisions of the appellate court in this circuit and

every argument advanced by you and by your advisor

has been passed on by the appellate courts, every

argument has been rejected, you are asking through

a non-lawyer advisor for me to say the Court of Ap-

peals doesn’t know what it’s doing and for me to say

that your non-lawyer advisor is right and that the ap-

pellate courts are wrong. I'm not going to do that.

You are getting bad advice, but you have elected to

follow it. You have an easy way to get this sentence

modified, and that is to give the probation depart-

ment the information it is entitled to receive, but

unless and until you agree to go along and to do

that, reserving to yourself all rights of appeal, I'm

not asking that you waive that. I'm simply telling you

to give the probation department a copy of that trust

and a list of your assets. When you do that, then the

sentence will be modified, but as long as you decide

to defy the government, it is the judgment and

sentence of the Court that on Count | of the indict-

ment you be committed to the custody of the At-

torney General of the United States or his duly

authorized representative, to be by him imprisoned

for a period of one year, and that you be fined

$10,000.

12

On Count Il it is the judgment and sentence of the

Court that you be committed to the custody of the

Attorney General of the United States or his duly

authorized representative, to be by him imprisoned

for a period of one year, this sentence to be con-

secutive to the sentence imposed on Count |, and

that you be fined $10,000.

On Count Ill it is the judgment and sentence of

the Court that you be committed to the custody of

the Attorney General of the United States or his duly

authorized representative, to be by him imprisoned

for a period of one year. This sentence to be con-

secutive to the sentence imposed on Count II.

On Count IV it is the judgment and sentence of

the Court that you be committed to the custody of

the Attorney General of the United States or his duly

authorized representative, to be by him imprisoned

for a period of one year, this sentence to be concur-

rent with the sentence imposed on Count III.

And on Count V it is the judgment and sentence of

the Court that you be committed to the custody of

the Attorney General of the United States or his duly

authorized representative, to be by him imprisoned

for a period of one year, this sentence to be concur-

rent with the sentence imposed on Count Ill.

Now, of course, as we all know and as you have

already told me, you have an absolute right to ap-

peal. That is aright that you may exercise, and if you

need any help in filing a notice of appeal, the clerk of

the court will be happy to assist you in filing the

notice of appeal.

In the event that you elect to appeal, the bond on

13

appeal will be $50,000 fully secured unless you fur-

nish the probation department with the information

it is rightly entitled to have.

lf, as and when you furnish the probation depart-

ment with that information, | will modify and

substantially modify the appellate bond, but as long

as you defy the courts, you’re going to have to find

out that the courts and the government of the United

States will fight back. This government cannot exist

if individuals can defy it, and that’s what you are try-

ing to do.

There will be a stay of execution granted in this

case until nine o’clock, January 7, 1980. If you have

not posted — if you have not filed your notice of ap-

peal by nine o’clock Monday morning and have not

supported it with the fully secured bond, you will

surrender to the United States Marshal’s Office here

in Denver to commence serving your sentence. If

prior to that time you change your mind and decide

to supply the probation department with the infor-

mation it is entitled to receive, you should appear

before me at 9:00 a.m., Monday morning for con-

sideration of modification of this sentence and for

consideration of modification of the appeal bond.

| have told you before, | tell you again, you havea

constitutional right to appear in this case without

benefit of counsel. You have elected to exercise that

right. | recommended to you before that you get a

lawyer. | recommend to you now that you get a

lawyer. Perhaps you realize how much trouble you’re

in now. Perhaps you realize that you need good,

competent legal advice because the sentence | have

imposed will mean, if it be affirmed, that you are go-

ing to serve a long time in prison, and the govern-

14

ment with all of its resources will discover your

assets. You're not going to hide them forever, so you

might as well face up to the fact that the day of

reckoning has arrived.

Now, do you have any questions?

THE DEFENDANT: None, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand this?

THE DEFENDANT: | understand.

THE COURT: All right, is there anything further?

We will be in recess.

(And these proceedings were concluded.)

REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE

|, ROBBIE GRIGGS, Certified Shorthand Reporter

and Official Reporter to this Court, do hereby certify

that | was present at and reported in shorthand the

proceedings in the foregoing matter; that thereafter

my shorthand notes were reduced to typewritten

form under by supervision, comprising the forego-

ing Official transcript; further, that the foregoing of-

ficial transcript is a full and accurate record of the

proceedings in this matter on the date set forth.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 27th day of |

February, 1980.

Robbie Griggs

Official Reporter

15

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

) Nos. 79-2197

V. ) &

) 80-1068

GILBERT E. CALLOW, JR., )

Defendant-Appellant. )

Appeals from the United States District Court

For the District of Colorado

(D.C. No. 79-00521(1))

Submitted on the briefs pursuant to Tenth Circuit

Rule 9:

Gilbert E. Callow, pro se.

Joseph F. Dolan, United States Attorney, and Susan

R. Roberts, Assistant United States Attorney,

Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BARRETT, MCKAY, and LOGAN, Circuit

Judges.

EXHIBIT 2

16

PER CURIAM

After examining the briefs and the appellate

record, this three-judge panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not be of

material assistance in the determination of these

appeals. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); Tenth Circuit R.

10(e). These causes are therefore ordered submitted

without oral argument.

Gilbert E. Callow was convicted by a jury of two

counts of willful failure to file a tax return in viola-

tion of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, and three counts of

fraudulently filing a false withholding exemption

certificate in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7205.1 Callow

thereafter was sentenced to one year of imprison-

ment and fined $10,000 on Count One: one year of

imprisonment and fined $10,000 on Count Two, this

sentence to be consecutive to the sentence impos-

ed on Count One; one year of imprisonment on

Count Three, this sentence to be consecutive to the

sentence on Count Two; one year of imprisonment

on Count Four, this sentence to be concurrent with

the sentence imposed on Count Three; one year of

imprisonment on Count Five, this sentence to be

concurrent with the sentence imposed on Count

Three. Callow appeals from these convictions. We

affirm.

Though often vigorously advised by the trial court

to retain counsel, Callow went to trial pro se and has

chosen to so proceed on appeal.

17

1. § 7203. Willful failure to file return, supply information, or

pay tax

Any person required under this title to pay any

estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regula-

tions made under authority thereof to make a

return...who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or

tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such

information, at the time or times required by law or

regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided

by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction

thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or im-

‘prisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the

costs of prosecution.

§ 7205. Fraudulent withholding exemption certificate or failure

to supply information

Any individual required to supply information to his

employer under section 3402 who willfully supplies false

or fraudulent information, or who willfully fails to supply

information thereunder which would require an inc, 2:ase

in the tax to be withheld under section 3402, shall...upon

conviction thereof, be fined not more than $500, or im-

prisoned not more than i year, or both.

Issues raised by Callow on appeal include the

following:

1. The district court lacked jurisdiction to cry the

case;

2. The district court should have recused itself;

3. Callow should have been charged by indictment,

rather than by information;

4. The governement failed to show that Callow was

required to file a tax return;

5. Evidence was admitted from the state of Col-

orado’s revenue records without a search warrant;

18

6. The sentence imposed is cruel and unusual

punishment;

7. The appeal bond set in the amount of $50,000 (ful-

ly secured) is unnecessarily harsh;

8. Callow was forced to reveal a private trust;

9. The government failed to show that Callow had

“intended” to harm society; and

10. The jury was allowed to decide “facts of law.”

Appellant also raised other procedural and

jurisdictional issues in a document entitled ‘Brief in

Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari.”’

The relevant facts follow. The record shows that

the government presented evidence showing that

Callow willfully did not file his tax return for the

years in question and that his income was such that

he was required to file a return. Evidence was also

presented to show that Callow had willfully and

knowingly filed a false withholding exemption cer-

tificate with his employer. Callow offered no

evidence to rebut the government's case against

him.

The main thrust of Callow’s argument on appeal is

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him for

the offenses charged. Callow essentially argues that

neither Congress nor the Constitution gives the

district court jurisdiction over the taxing power of

the United States. This argument is frivolous and

without merit. See United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d

248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 233 (1979);

United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied 400 U.S. 824 (1970).

Callow also asserts that the trial judge is so biased

against ‘tax protesters”’ that he should have recus-

19

ed himself. Callow supports this argument by referr-

ing to two articles in local newspapers which make

no reference to and have no bearing on Callow’s

case. Beyond these newspaper articles, appellant’s

displeasure with Judge Winner is that he sustained

government objections without requiring detailed

explanations.

In the case of United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507

(10th Cir. 1979), we recently considered a tax pro-

tester’s challenge to Judge Winner’s impartiality.”

Gigax, 605 F.2d at 512. We determined that Gigax, as

well as a careful review of the record, had failed to

point to any circumstances in the trial itself which

indicated bias or even the appearance of bias on

behalf of the district judge who tried the case. /d.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this

appeal and we can find no circumstance where

Judge Winner's impartiality might be reasonably

questioned. Furthermore, Callow has failed to point

to any part of the record which would indicate any

bias on the part of the trial court. Judge Winner did

not abuse his judicial discretion in not recusing

himself.

Callow next contends that he should have been

charged by indictment rather than by information.

Callow premises this argument on language in the

fifth amendment of the United States Constitution,

which provides that: ‘‘[NJo person shall be held to

answer for acapital, or other infamous crime, unless

on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury....”’

Under Rule 7(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure

“TAjn offense which may be punished by imprison-

ment for a term exceeding one year ... shall be pro-

secuted by indictment.... Any other offense may be

20

prosecuted by indictment or by information.”’

Even though the cumulative effect, of the five

counts with which appellant was charged,

presented the possibility of imprisonment for more

than one year, each of the courts is a separate of-

fense constituting a misdemeanor and punishable

by imprisonment of not more than one year. Such of-

fenses may be prosecuted by information. See

United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979); United States

v. Russell, 585 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1978); United

States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1978);

United States v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750, 752-753 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975).

We have considered all other issues raised by ap-

pellant and reject them as legally insubstantial. See

United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 278 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied, 100 S.Ct. 233 (1979). See also, United States

v. Hudler, 605 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1979); United States

v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979); United States

v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,

400 U.S. 824 (1970).

A review of the record satisfies us that Callow

received a fair trial. As we have disposed of this case

upon the merits, any outstanding motions filed in

either of these consolidated cases, Nos. 79-2197

and 80-1068, are hereby denied as moot. The judg-

ment of the district court is affirmed.

21

Before Honorable James E. Barrett, Honorable

Monroe G. McKay and Honorable James K. Logan,

Ciruit Judges, United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

Planitiff-Appellee, )

vs. ) Nos. 79-2197

GILBERT E. CALLOW, JR., ) and 80-1068

Defendant-Appellant. )

This matter comes on for consideration of the ap-

peltant’s petition for rehearing. After consideration

the petition for rehearing is denied.

HOWARD K. PHILLIPS, Clerk

EXHIBIT 3

22

EXCERPT FROM TRIAL RECORD

And what about 118-A through -C?

His amended return for 1975.

And 120-A through -X?

These are documents for 1976 and 1977.

Well, is 1977 123-A through -0?

Yes, it is.

o> py FF @

Okay. What do you mean ‘‘documents”’?

A. There was not enough information for us to

process these as an income tax return, so they are

just documents.

Q. All right. The entire package that you have

mentioned as far as the lettering of 120-A through -X,

and 123-A through -0, is the entire package what is

contained in the return which is filed?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you previously testified that the

transcript of accounts for years 1976 and 1977 in-

dicated that no return was filed, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Okay. Now, would you explain for us the status

of each of those documents for 1976 and 1977?

EXHIBIT 4 (1)

23

A. On the 1976 the taxpayer did not furnish any in-

formation to compute a tax liability or any informa-

tion to process it as a tax return. He objected to

everything, and all he did was send us the form 1040

with no information on it other than he was pro-

testing.

24

obtain them?

A. Okay. | was requested by subpoena to obtain

the docui 3nts. They are records that are kept in our

Department. One thing | should mention is that | am

not allowed to divulge the contents of these

documents unless directed by the Court because of

the state confidentiality statutes.

MISS ROBERTS: All right. Your Honor, | believe

the witness is referring to a Colorado Revised

Statute under which Court Order is required in order

for him to testify about relevant documents, and |

would request--

THE COURT: What is the nature of the document?

MISS ROBERTS: State returns and transcript of

account.

THE COURT: Very well. You are directed to

disclose them.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

Q. (By Miss Roberts) Mr. Muncie, do the records

that you have, each one of those exhibits pertain to

an account or returns of Gilbert Callow, Jr.?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. And do they indicate an address of 1148

Chester?

A. Yes, all the documents reflect that address.

Q. Now, pertaining to Exhibit series 111-A and -B,

is that adocument that was prepared in your office?

EXHIBIT 4 (2)

25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CRIMINAL CASE

Plaintiff, ) No. 79-CR-521

) INFORMATION

Vv. ) 26 U.S.C. §§ 7203

)

GILBERT CALLOW, JR., ) and 7205

Defendant. )

COUNT |

The United States Attorney charges that:

During the calendar year 1976, the defendant,

GILBERT CALLOW, JR., who was a resident of the

State and District of Colorado, had received a gross

income of $16,070.64; that by reason of such income

he was required by law, following the close of the

calendar year 1976 and on or before April 15, 1977, to

make an income tax return to the District Director of

Internal Revenue for the Internal Revenue District of

Colorado at Denver, in the State and District of Col-

orado, or to the Director, Internal Revenue Service

Center, Western Region, Ogden, Utah, stating

specifically the items of his gross income and any

deductions and credits to which he was entitled;

that well knowing all of the foregoing facts,

GILBERT CALLOW, JR. did wilfully and knowingly

fail to timely make said income tax return to the said

District Director of Internal Revenue, to the said

Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, or

to any other proper officer of the United States, all in

violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section

7203.

EXHIBIT 5

26

COUNT Il

The United States Attorney further charges that:

During the calendar year 1977, the defendant,

GILBERT CALLOW, JR., who was a resident of the

State and District of Colorado, had received a gross

income of $17,619.37; that by reason of such income

he was required by law, following the close of the

calendar year 1977 and on or before April 15, 1978, to

make an income tax return to the District Director of

Internal Revenue for the Internal Revenue District of

Colorado at Denver, in the State and District of Col-

orado, or to the Director, Internal Revenue Service

Center, Western Region, Ogden, Utah, stating

specifically the items of his gross income and any :

deductions and credits to which he was entitled;

that well knowing all of the foregoing facts,

GILBERT CALLOW, JR. did wilfully and knowingly

fail to timely make said income tax return to the said

District Director of Internal Revenue, to the said

Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, or

to any other proper officer of the United States, all in

violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section

7203.

COUNT Ill

The United States Attorney further charges that:

On or about October 18, 1976, in the State and

District of Colorado, GILBERT CALLOW, JR., a resi-

dent of Colorado, who during the calendar year 1976

was receiving retirement income from Retired Pay

Operations, Air Force Accounting and Finance

Center of Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, United

States Department of the Air Force, wilfully and

27

knowingly filed a false withholding exemption cer-

tificate (W4-E) with his employer, wherein he falsely

stated that he incurred no liability for federal income

tax for the calendar year 1975, and anticipated no

liability for federal income tax for 1976, whereas he

then and there well knew that he had incurred an in-

come tax liability for calendar year 1975 and he

would incur a liability for federal income tax for

1976, all in violation of Title 26, United States Code,

Section 7205.

COUNT IV

The United States Attorney further charges that:

On or about March 29, 1977, in the State and

District of Colorado, GILBERT CALLOW, JR., a resi-

dent of Colorado, who during the calendar year 1977

was employed at the Commissary at Fitzsimons

Army Medical Center, in Colorado, wilfully and

knowingly filed a false withholding exemption cer-

tificate (W4-E) with his employer, wherein he falsely

stated that he incurred no liability for federal income

tax for 1976, and anticipated no liability for federal

income tax for 1977, whereas he then and there well

knew that he had incurred an income tax liability for

calendar year 1976 and he would incur a liability for

federal income tax for 1977, all in violation of Title

26, United States Code, Section 7205.

COUNT V

The United States Attorney further charges that:

On or about April 24, 1978, in the State and

District of Colorado, GILBERT CALLOW, JR., a resi-

dent of Colorado, who during the calendar year 1978

28

was employed at the Commissary at Fitzsimmons

Army Medical Center, in Colorado, wilfully and

knowingly filed a false withholding exemption Cer-

tificate (W4-E) with his employer, wherein he falsely

) stated that he incurred no liability for federal income

tax for 1977, and anticipated no liability for federal

income tax for 1978, whereas he then and there well

knew that he had incurred an income tax liability for

calendar year 1977 and he would incur a liability for

federal income tax for 1978, all in violation of Title

26, United States Code, Section 7205.

JOSEPH DOLAN

United States Attorney

by: SUSAN R. ROBERTS

Assistant United States Attorney

"}4N0D jesapaj

ul Zuipuad ase sased 13)S9}01d-xe} Sf jnogy

: "13}

“U9 ayLS XBL By] We Jou YSnoynye “uo!NjSUOD

9Y) Ul SsUyD e WYBNe} sey Osye ay yey) pres 1a}Siog

‘9822 Siy Wosj UMOP days JoUUIAA JEU) BuLyse Uy

*JQUID UOIVEULIOFU] IYLIIS Xe] ay}

Je UONNNSUOD *S"f) BY) UI SsejD e WYdNe) xedIH

ye} PsaAsesqo osye JauuIM “uOoIUIdO sIy Uy

“Sae]jop

XB} Uji pred st Aueyes sty “quawysedaq $321Atas

[e190 37°}S ay) JO BaAojdtua Ue Se LY) VL} DY)

JO MIA ul Apyeidadsa ‘snoadesjNo pue duryooys

St JOIABYIQ S,XeSI pozZisa}eIeYyD JOUUIM

“Buolm st

S2Xe} 1194) Burked you 105 pel 0} S203 1949 auo ou

JY} UONUIJUOD JIay) BY) S$19}S9}0I1d Ke} MOYS 0}

xeZI5) Jo ajdwiexa ue Zuiyew Sem ay pres JOUUTM

‘yeadde siy Zuipuad puog uo paseaje2 aq pjnon

dy JoIVIYM BuipseZos Burseay v ye pur Zuioua)

‘UdS SIy jC JINOD Ul XEFIH popuewitsdas JOUUIA,

_ smp4spyyiM abpnl asno jsajoid xp]

xe) awoout Aue Aue Aed 0} aaey},upmom

dy JEU) JiNsse 0} pepveu Jaquinu ayy ‘suondwaxa

IZ paulle|d xesid “wW0} AUIpjOyYM-xe} siy UO

UOI}EWOsUT ButAyisyey JO paydiauod sem xesi5y

“Are

-NiQ2_J Ul dul} OOS$ Pue UOsTId UI Jea4 UO jo WN

-IXBW 2 0} JaUUIM Ag PaoudjUas sem OY *xeZI5H

‘Y URWJON Ja¥LJ}S Xe} JO JUIIU}eII) STY Ag $.13}S2}

id xe} ysurede pasipnfaid pue paseiq jjeswiy

uaaoid pey JouulA ye) pandse “gz ‘1a}SIag

"YdSTEW “d Pseyoty adpne¢ yy

‘Sid "SQ 0} Aepsany poudisseas sem ased ayy

*J0UJIAOZ JO} DEPIpued Aysey eay, ‘Ja}SIag AOY

JO UOS VY} SI JI}SI9q “W40} XE} BuIppoytpin siy uO

suoijdwiaxa 6 Pawleld dy yey) padayje st pf “uoy)

“BW JOJUT XB} BuLAytspey YIM passeyo St Jajsiag

*$19}S0}01d xe} ySurede poseiq Juiaq jo

aBpnf ayy pasnd2e J9)}Sjaq 19}j8 *Ju}SIag *] uoyd

-3}$ 49}S89}01d xB} JO VSeD Jy) WO) UMBIPIIM

Sey JQUUIA, “W P44 dpe 79149SIG “SN PD

'0}0°) “vonUDQ 'g/41 '9 [Udy "sin

SMN WO|LINOW Aydoy - gE '

EXHIBIT 6

30

‘aq im Aaus0j}e sty oym Aep

“Sony, yxou Aq WIY WOJUT 0} 12}SI9d plo}

pue ‘og Aejy 40} ajep jet) & jas Yosjeyy

"yosyep “d Pleyoy aspne yoiysiq, “SN

0} ase Vy} peudisse pue Aepseny seo

J9}S19g ay} woJy UMOpP peddajs J3UUTA,

“XeZI) pio} Jouuly, ,,“dotape snoau

-0113 ,$J9}S9}01d xe} ay) 0} pred aq uOT}UD}

-ye jt ,Jtef 0} S203 Jaca auo ou, yey} SjUdUT

-gounouue dijqnd oy} ul apew aq 0} aArYy

0} Bulod st u0tjd91109 & yey} BdI}OU VAIS

0} awod sey aw ayy jeu} yuUIy] J,,

"11n09

PUsiq jeJapay JaAueq 94} UI saseod

jeutwitd J3}Sso}01d-xe} SG] yNoge ase aJ9y}

}eYy} pewJojul usoq pey oy ples J9UUIA,

Japs0 94} Ul jel) pe}0U OSTV UALSIAd

, WIG JO sanouddessip oyM duo Aq Allies

plvay 3q ued ased sly je} }QNOp snotas

sey juepuajop ‘Ayayoe sty; jo jeaoid

<drsip siy poyeoipul sey Jouuly aipne

JjQVUOIOY Ij} SY,, “PIES 19jS19,7 , “UONLIOT

yeu} Je JOU YeNoy} ‘UYI;NJIVSULOD Se8}L}g po

-}lUs) BY} UI SsejO © yYYSNe) Osye dary J.,

‘Jajua,) uoneUl

-10JU[ BYLIIS XVY dy} Ye UOIN}NsUo,) “S°,)

ay} ut ssejd e yysne, xvtty Jey) pajeys

pey pue Jajsojoid xv},, e Ss! XUDI) 7)

pase pey ‘pz Yyoiejy peep JapsJo ue

Ul ‘JaUUTAY EY] pa}OU ‘ase siy WO) UNOP

dajs JouulAy yeyp Cuiyse Ul “JajSiod

‘uaes

sey 3y ,,SnovJeljnoO jysOw!,, IY} eSbo SI

Suyjed ‘yanod wi xvs) poINjoe| JOuUlAy

‘uostid ut Jva4 au0

WNWIXRUW 9Y} 0} WIY PIUSJUVS JQUOT\

‘Cig] JOJ Soxe} DWOU OU pied ay 4Ly)

YNSIT WYy YPIN suLOZ Xe} sty Dursylsyey

ju yyUOW jyse[ PazdAUOD seM xXeTI)

xvBIN

‘y UeWION ‘4a}Saj0Jd xe} = Pa}I1AUL.

JOUUTAL YOIYM BZuULINP ased 7ANOI [esodpsj

Jayjivd ue Ul yaplAd sem, aoipnfoid

puv seiq,, 9) JVHL GQanouv all

‘Wy ysuiese ,vdipnfyad pe

seiq jeudsted,, JO vsneoeg vsty siy wolj

Jjaswiy daOWA JaUUTA, PII Idpne jot)

WY} Popuewop Ja}slaqg JIDuNOA ayy

“JOUJZAOZ 10} J]ep

-pued Ajleg bay ‘12}s1aq Aoy ‘sayjey sty

£q poturdwuivdse Avpsany, 74N0D ys]

‘SN JoauxT ul Polvadde ‘gz “s9}sldf

urw yey] 0} Pays 7.Usew oy Woy

SUOIUWOXD GH POUTL]D Aponte JI}stod

"Ulauy BurppoyyM xe}-gwoout s,dafojdiua

F-AY @ yo party Apuajnpnesy sadsvyd-

JUMUUIVAOT Vyy OM Ad]slaqg “J UsYydo)S

yO Ve) BYP UL pagoPpins s9VeUL OL

‘QPL SLA UOTJBSNIDL 3U}

Joye asvd eC wos) MaIpyyIa Ispn{ 9yL

‘agjyepipueas jeuolyeuseqna

Opesojoy eB JO UOS ay} Aq ,,S10}S9}01g

Xe}., pogaye ysuivse seig jo Avpsan}

pasnooe sea odpnf yinod jeiepa V

JIM EIS 180g JaAua]

ZLVYUNNVd GUVAMOH Ad

9sD5 XD], Ul SMDAPUAA sbpne

B61 ‘Siedy “PEM

1SOd 43AN30 3His 9Z

SVIG SWIVID INVGN3430

31

EEL IKis SH “ai “Lt beep 1 § ar im 2 ae bergelcemEsties yy oF api

eee ; “SC

WIS EN NGL CGE ed OL @ aay os “Pez sane ‘ep PR TQM HE EE OL

SLE 3s th et “Z ades “1 § re Bete ee Ml EL | tases [RING “BE ALi

COLL UEIS Sl Seek ST Mes CL ECL GN Ld Sijeues subsoieg “KE OTE

[St IMIS 92 “TURE

‘2ades CL 8 BE IS Pat Seotes parsezin oq) jo soy pak ap the ape

c6L WIS VO LF O58 Toil Gk CINE WY sauoMe CG ope

MEO IIS VOLS F Livi “9 “gent OL FOV lwy--paRny [BuOtTX “Ze ene

“}B1N Ps. | ‘T 4 “pFt9 “yo ‘ET ‘= aunt wy ointp ‘ij iRt apure pues tsBloIpas B” >4 ed PLN

GHS OBIS CL SUSE “LS “ANY CT § tet oN oT aay SfRMUSEEE Es OU

EN BIS TOE § OH ON “SEL eT oun Joy sanpecogy pat) pus SOWITD “SL 81.

TES 38IN O86 Cidt $ OL WILL ‘Eee og “Tad 9160 “6I

WO Papusue sw Soy 38Is 19 “ET § “I6e “YO “Ltt “oe sap wy—spyaistdo,) “71 ACL

“CHE UBIS £9 ‘TE §$ “EBS “GO ‘SRL F Joy ley— paensy jswoD “FL SLL

GOL JRiy SY NCL 9 RN Ig IJny joy—snsu) ‘EL apy

Se VWs oh S60 8 AON LOD BCT PLL “Seeds “Dang—soidnasyuay CEE ai

Li8is VOL L$ LEOT 9 “9ChL ‘OL Jay loy—seo104 powsy ‘OL sfLL

‘6u9 UBIS 19 “LT § S6E “YO “LESL Ge AINE loy—ueneB.iYqIy ‘6B AICTE

COS IBIS OS “(FILOS JLT PUL ‘OlE-Sh Lng “ZL “9

8UNPf PAPastiR s¥# “9FQ IIS LOE § ‘Ose “YO “LEBL ‘VE AINE wy--spuoy Lyemny “9 aLy

SLE IBIS OS

[ $ ‘geet “9 Ides “Ree gs “rung sestopiuryg pak uonRezusasy) yuauns 08) OG APILE

. ‘19 In 19 1 §

“ONE ON CLE COE AINE lY F8IKIS Ot) Due “jue. AOL) JO Rey “[Beyg PUB ARLY “fF QL

9 38Is CU OL § FRY “YW “Stil “Ch vung Joy—-juepIsazyy on “E opty,

Eto 38s INL § SNe WO LEST “OS AINE JOY suvtsiwOLy [eseurs) “1 apy

= SET te eee 3 JPSFIIUNUD SIDE By Ly

MERE Qatpised OPT Pei usa] PAB APO SARIS Pei | aya Zo Saggy Burworjas ayy

Bw PAbeOg SY LLL epee) s4sMin poy y

Ssuouijdding pak sapo.) Jo Uo yw TwIqQurlo.y Jo JOMIsiqD puw sepris

PO | 8. Jo SURE BYL JO aouapIAe s¥ sjUatiepddny pu sapo.y “fFOm §

SEINSRATd EIS ANY GZdo)

VIHW VION AO LOIWLSIG *SLNAWATdd IS

GNV SG.LVIs G4LIN.Y AO SAW TAO AN0)—¢ YUALAIVHD

FOZ 8 I SNOISIAOUd TYUANAD

EXHIBIT ‘7

32