Amicus Brief — Hodel v. Indiana

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No. 80-231 Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

————————————————

JAN 9 1961

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERIC

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcrToBer Term, 1980

CECIL D. ANDRUS, Secretary or THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

Appellants,

v.

STATE OF INDIANA, er At.,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Srates District Court

FOR THE SOUTHERN District or INDIANA

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND

AMICUS CURIAE

STEPHEN H. Sacus

Attorney General

Tuomas A. Deminc

Assistant Attorney General

Micuae J. Scisinico, II

Assistant Attorney General

Department of Natural Resources

Tawes State Office Building

Annapolis, Maryland 21401

(301) 269-2251

ey en

The Daily Record Co., Baltimore, MD 21202 Ao ba

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .......cccccccsccseccsccssceseceees

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. .....:.cccssccossccessccesscccssccccescees

ARGUMENT:

I. THOSE SECTIONS OF THE SUR-

FACE MINING CONTROL AND RE-

CLAMATION ACT OF 1977 WHICH

ATTEMPT TO REGULATE POST-

MINING LAND USE ASPECTS UN-

RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL

CONTROL ARE NOT WITHIN THE

COMMERCE CLAUSE AUTHORITY

OF CONGRESS, AND ARE VIOLA-

TIVE OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT

A. Once mining is completed, the sole

‘rational basis for Commerce

Clause jurisdiction lies in environ-

mental impacts on interstate com-

IN aie neitbienltes dicta eengievetisesssse

Many of the SMCRA post-mining

land use requirements bear no re-

lation to environmental protection,

and are therefore invalid as not

rationally adapted to the sole basis

for Commerce Clause jurisdiction

during this period .................:::000

The SMCRA post-mining land use

requirements, even if within the

Commerce power, are violative of

the Tenth Amendment as impair-

ments on an attribute of State

DOVOTNED soscscsrscccebsiccccsdtiecssassshocste

PAGE

13

15

Il.

Il.

THE SMCRA ABSOLUTE PROHIBI-

TIONS ON SURFACE COAL MINING

ARE NOT WITHIN THE COMMERCE

CLAUSE AUTHORITY OF CON-

GRESS, AND ARE VIOLATIVE OF

THE TENTH AMENDMENT ...............

FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS

IS VIOLATED BY THE CIVIL

PENALTY PROVISION OF SMCRA

WHICH REQUIRES THAT ALL

PROPOSED ASSESSMENTS BE PRE-

PAID IN ESCROW AS A CONDITION

PRECEDENT TO CONTESTING

EITHER THE PENALTY AMOUNT

OR THE UNDERLYING VIOLATION

COR Be GI actin cnsisnenencncsttnsivnticns

A. The escrow provisiqt constitutes a

substantial deprivation of private

EID sdtisncdcntntscntinientontiastideniecsseses

. There is no governmental interest

served by the SMCRA civil penalty

ESCTOW PYOVISION .............ccceeseeeeeeeees

. The informal “assessment confer-

ence” provided by the Office of

Surface Mining does not substitute

for the required Fifth Amendment

UMIIIIIIE stscacinssnsicecaceetpadbideilatianuenstorees

COO EERE EERE EEE HEHEHE HEHEHE HEHEHE ED

COREE EEE EEE EEE EERE EEE EERE EEE EEE HEHEHE EEE THEE EEE HEHEHE

PAGE

16

20

21

23

24

26

12

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Rea

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ......... 24

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1935) 9

United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259

Be Pe CD devise ecnstincinAichinanssiticbianagheailbdeopaipinanes 9

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972) ......... 21

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) .............. 21

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,

379 U.S. 241, 268 (1964) ........cccccccccsscssrrceseseees 9,11,18

In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation

Litigation, Civil Action 79-1144, 14 ERC

1083 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980) and Slip Opinion

(May 16, 1980), appeals pending, Nos. 80-

1810 et seq. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1980) ........... 14, 24

Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-304

1 ROREARERLES ESR, Serine he HY YOR arn Ooo 9,11

Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) ..............0..... 9

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975) ........ 20, 21, 24

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,

Be III reiicncipsucresncocbchcaassechrcceetenecaamnasetoiiigions ton 10,15

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.

Re UE ERE AR At Roe. 9

Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172

RUINED iscosaddonthactisbniocton, Sabisseastcssaitinee taeaei mcetens 9

Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495

SEINE cn se suinisopsocbied te sunintatneptehioclienichaieibeabeliomnbues 9

Sniadatch v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337

GIUIIIEE "on sccnnacdvstiniinnsckanpaliosund Atasibesansnacinachs Sincebtaatine 21

Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, Civ. No. 79-171-2 (S.D.

Iowa, Feb. 13, 1980) Slip Op. 18-19, appeal

poets, Pee ia ieccs isi eencesencecdeneion 20, 2a

iv

PAGE

U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940) .............0... 9,11

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.

I 16

Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n

v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980)

(probable jurisdiction noted, Nos. 79-1538 and

79-1596 (October 6, 1980)) .........ccccccceeeeeseeeeees 1, 3, 6,

10, 13, 20, 23, 25, 2a

Wickard y. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ............ 9,18

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975) 16

Constitution, Statutes and Regulations

United States Constitution:

Article I, Section 8 (Commerce Clause) passium

Fifth AMenGMeant ........ccccrccessesescrssoveseveees passium

TA DUROEIIIE, onc ccccrsesccccsesesscccesessvees passium

Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977

(Pub. L. 95-164), 92 Stat. 1290 [30 U.S.C.

SS EEE LEED DSC RRO ER TAIT 19

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

(Pub. L. 91-596), 84 Stat. 1590 [29 U.S.C.

I NO is csaxcitetaniehsRicosensibvohsinnsaopebegstiabsecs 19

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, (Pub. L. 95-87), 91 Stat. 447:

§ 101(b) (30 U.S.C. §1201(b)] 0... 10

$ 609 (80 U.S.C. § 1269] ..............scesseeseee 23

§ 510(c) [80 U.S.C. § 1260(c)] «0... eee 23

§ 510(d) (1) [30 U.S.C. § 1260(d) (1)] ..... 14

§ 515(b) (2) [30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (2)] ..... 13

§ 518(a) [30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)] ............0 22, 25

§ 518(c) [30 U.S.C. § 1268(c)] «0... cee 8, 20, la

§ 621 (80 U.S.C. $1271) .......cesscceseeeees 25

§ 522 (80 U.S.C. §. 1272) .........eessseseeees 16

Vv

PAGE

§ 522(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) & (5) [30 U.S.C.

§ 1272(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) & (5)) we. 16

§ 522(b) (4) & (5) and (e) (1), (2), (3) ..... 16

§ 522(e) (5) [30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (5)] ..7,17,18,19

$525 (30 U.S.C. § 1275) .............ccccccsssoees 25

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 7401 et seq. ...........04.. 20

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. ......... 20

Laws of Maryland, Chapter 740 (1980) .............. 3

Maryland Annotated Code, Natural Resources

Article, § 7-505(b) (2) (v) & (vi) wees 2,3,4

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations:

30 C.F.R. § 732.15(b) (7) ou... eccessccesseeees 24

Fe Wr is BD FRAMED sesedccetcssnccscoscnscsnseessns 18

Fe i es CE FUG) CBD vosisccisccescccccnascess 14

Fe GAA eh, PMO) ccccesatscsenccstesscccsersesns 24

Be ae III ei dhcdeincditeeenesscdsovsscvecsnnsenes 24

ee Mocs ES OU Uiek por ccssuncsancunosanadnpegedoes 24

Miscellaneous

Conditional Approval of Permanent Program

Submission from the State of Maryland

Under the Surface Mining Control and Re-

clamation Act of 1977, 45 Fed. Reg. 79340,

79345 (December 1, 1980), Finding 12.1 ....... 3,4

Fifty-Seventh Annual Report of the Maryland

SOTO AE IID Selleck chescsdccsieccccsccsceinsveiasivorsncees 2

Maryland Manual, 1979-80 .........cccccccccsccssssseeeeeees 2

Senate Report No. 95-128, 95th Cong., 1st Ses-

SRA MIL iso Rdedicsnnnochinanincs sonliiiceichonsavbscedadonbconntie 23

U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conserva-

tion Service Report entitled “Prime Farm-

lands of Garrett and Allegany Counties,”

prepared for the Maryland Bureau of Mines,

PUTTER Cershasaaseserdecahshamiebicescasnsan thideastphesoveds 4

No. 80-231

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBer TERM, 1980

CECIL D. ANDRUS, Secretary or THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

Appellants,

Vv.

STATE OF INDIANA, et At.,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED States District Court

FOR THE SOUTHERN District oF INDIANA

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND

AMICUS CURIAE

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The State of Maryland is vitally interested in the

instant proceeding before the Court, as well as the

companion Virginia action on the same basic issues.’

Maryland has regulated surface coal mining within its two

westernmost counties since the industry began there in

' Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n v. Andrus,

483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), probable jurisdiction noted,

Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1596 (October 6, 1980). Hereinafter cited as

Virginia Surface Mining.

2

the 1940’s. The initial statute was passed as an emergency

measure in a special session of the Legislature in Novem-

ber of 1947. Comprehensive permitting and bonding

requirements have been imposed from the beginning, and

the law has been updated on numerous occasions since

that time? The Maryland General Assembly thus has

evidenced its strong intent to regulate the industry so as

to ensure full environmental! control over all operations.

The Maryland coal industry is comparatively small on

the national scale. However, the industry is important to

the western Maryland counties, as it is typically in the

Appalachian Mountain area. For calendar year 1979, over

one thousand people were employed in Maryland directly

in coal production.’ In Garrett County, out of an estimated

total population of 26,400 persons, 813 were employed in

coal mining.‘ Over two million net tons of coal were

produced in western Maryland in 1979° mostly by small

operations.*®

Maryland believes that surface mining in the State can

be regulated effectively without causing smaii operators to

go out of business, and believes further that the State

government, rather than the federal government, is best

able to accomplish this goal. Accordingly, the state has

* Maryland’s statutes relative to surface coal mining are now

codified as Natural Resources Article, Title 7, Subtitle 5, Md.

Ann. Code.

* Fifty-Seventh Annual Report of the Maryland Bureau of

Mines, page 4. Total employment of 1,097 persons; not including

office, supervisory personnel, or independent truck haulers.

Surface mining accounts for 65% of the total figure.

* Annual Report, page 4. Total population from Maryland

Manual 1979-1980, page 484, issued by the Secretary of State.

* Annual Report, page 4. Total net tonnage of 2.7 million, 1.8

of which was taken by surface mining methods.

* Annual Report, pp. 6-13. Many permit holders in Maryland

employ less than 5 individuals, and most employ under 15

employees. Few permit areas are greater than 40 acres, and over

100 strip mining permits were involved in the production of the

1.8 million tons noted above.

3

applied for and obtained “conditional” approval of a

permanent regulatory program under the Surface Mining

Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (hereinafter

“SMCRA” or “the Act”).’? However, in so doing, Maryland

has been required to comport its laws and regulations

precisely to the provisions of SMCRA, and corresponding

regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the U.S.

Department of Interior. As indicated in this brief amicus

curiae, Maryland believes not only that several of these

requirements are inappropriate in this state, but that the

federal government lacks Constitutional authority to

impose them under penalty of preemption. It would appear

that the Constitutional questions of concern to Maryland

will be addressed by this @ourt in the present action, and

in the Virginia Surface Mining case.

The Secretary of the Interior has demonstrated little or

no regard for state judgment during the program approval

process. For example, Maryland strongly objected to the

absolute prohibitions on mining in certain areas required

by SMCRA, §522(e)(5) [30 U.S.C. §1272(e)(5)]. For

reasons more fully discussed in § iI below, the State finds

these prohibitions irrational in the absence of case-by-case

review. Rather than file suit immediately, Maryland first

proposed a means to cure these problems, by insertion of a

general waiver provision.’ This approach was totally

rejected by the Secretary, with no supporting rationale,

and the approval of the Maryland SMCRA Program is

* See, Conditional Approval of Permanent Program Submis-

sion from the State of Maryland Under the Surface Mining

Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 45 Federal Register

79430-79451 (December 1, 1980).

* 1980 Laws of Maryland, Chapter 740 enacted the prohibi-

tions but allowed a waiver if mining was “approved by the

owner or the appropriate jurisdictional agency, and the Depart-

ment [of Natural Resources].” Natural Resources Article, § 7-

505(b) (2) (v) and (vi), of the Annotated Code of Maryland.

4

currently conditioned, inter alia, upon further legislation

to remove this waiver.’

Similarly, due to the large proportion of small operators

in Maryland, the civil penalty prepayment requirement

discussed in §III below will constitute a substantial

hardship in this state. A small business with fewer than

five employees rarely would have sufficient, excess work-

ing capital to be able to place the penalty amount into

escrow while contesting enforcement actions. However, the

Secretary has never relaxed his position that the SMCRA

escrow provision must be contained in the Maryland

Statute.” This provision has been enacted into law in

Maryland, but the enactment was accompanied by advice

of the Attorney General that the escrow requirement most

likely is unconstitutional.”

Maryland is also concerned that the prime farmland

provisions of SMCRA may adversely impact the industry.

These provisions require that, if prime farmland is re-

moved by surface mining, then upon restoration the area

must be used again for crop production of equal or greater

yield. In conjunction with the interim SMCRA program in

Maryland, it has been determined that approximately

20,000 acres of potential prime farmland exist in Garrett

County; with 9,000 acres in Allegany County.” Given the

* Conditional Approval, ibid n.6, Finding 12.1. As grounds for

this condition, the Secretary states simply that “alternatives are

not available to requirements of SMCRA.”

‘© Maryland was apprised of this position from the start of the

program development process, and consequently enacted the

escrow provision in the 1980 Legislative Session, Chapter 740,

§ 7-517(b) (4) of the Natural Resources Article of the Annotated

Code of Maryland.

"' See, Letter of May 21, 1980 from Attorney General Stephen

H. Sachs to Governor Harry Hughes, attached as Appendix A to

this Brief, pp. 1a-3a.

% U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service

Report entitled “Prime Farmlands of Garrett and Allegany

al prepared for the Maryland Bureau of Mines, April

5

totally inflexible SMCRA reclamation standard for such

land, it is quite possible that the state’s coal reserves

under prime farmlands will not be recovered. As discussed

in §I below, Maryland submits that the SMCRA prime

farmland requirements are not within Congressional

authority.

Maryland does not claim that the federal government

has no legitimate interest in regulating many aspects of

strip mining, particularly environmental impacts. How-

ever, SMCRA goes to remarkable extremes in attempting to

dictate pure land use aspects once mim ng has ceased, and

to absolutely prohibit strip mining in certain areas based

on Congressional notions of public health and safety

unrelated to interstate commerce. Provisions for prepay-

ment of civil penalties are harsh, redundant to bond

requirements, and very questionable in terms of due

process. Implementation of these provisions is forced on

the states under penalty of preemption, with no latitude

for state discretion based on knowledge of particular local

conditions. In so doing, this Act directly usurps traditional

powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amend-

ment.

The State of Maryland believes that Congress has in

this instance clearly overstepped its boundaries in our

system of government. If SMCRA is allowed to stand as

enacted, clear precedent will be established allowing

almost any aspect of state sovereignty to be overridden

upon the smallest Congressional finding, supportable or

not, that interstate commerce is marginally involved. In

this context, the interest of Maryland here goes beyond

any particular impact on the state’s mining industry.

Maryland believes that this case raises basic questions of

the remaining scope of state authority in our federal

system. We sincerely urge this Court to firmly rule

against these particular intrusions into state autonomy,

6

and generally to affirm the limits of Congressional

authority.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Maryland urges affirmance of the District Court deci-

sion in the instant case, as well as the decision of the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Virginia in Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation

Association v. Andrus. In support of its position, Maryland

respectfully submits that provisions of SMCRA properly

were held unconstitutional, as follows:

Post-Mining Land Use

SMCRA contains many provisions which mandate speci-

fic uses of restored lands for at least five years after all

coal removal. This has nothing to do with environmental

control of strip mining. Congress has simply decreed that

land, once strip mined, must be returned to an equal or

better economic use. In the case of prime farmland, the use

must be prime farmland and nothing else, possibly for a

ten year period after mining.

The State of Maryland submits that Congress has no

authority under the Commerce Clause to order that

private property be used for farming, whether it has been

strip mined or not, or that any other particular land use

must occur after strip mining. After removal of coal and

restoration of the land, the only interstate concerns

stemming from the fact that strip mining once occurred on

a piece of property are the residual environmental prob-

lems from the activity (acid run-off, to name the most

often cited danger). Only provisions rationally related to

these concerns may be enacted under the Commerce

Clause. Furthermore, if the Tenth Amendment holds any

remaining vitality, then the property owner must be able

to employ the land according to agricultural, commercial,

residential or whatever other uses are permitted under

7

state or local zoning authority. These choices may not be

assumed by Congress.

Absolute Prohibitions on Mining

SMCRA provides that under no circumstances may

mining occur “within 300 feet of any public building,

school, church, community or institutional building, public

park, or within 100 feet of a cemetery” § 522(e)(5) [30

U.S.C. §1272(e)(5)]. The restriction applies even if the

church, school, or other entity owns the property involved

and wishes to mine it. No waiver is permitted, and the

State of Maryland has been told expressly to eliminate its

statutory waiver provision in this area as a condition of

federal approval of the State SMCRA Program.

Maryland submits that there is no basis in the Com-

merce Clause for Congress to prevent a church from

mining on its own property, or to require states to

implement such an irrational provision under penalty of

preemption of state authority over all aspects of strip

mining. Furthermore, by enactment of this provision,

Congress has invaded an area of traditional State author-

ity over the health and welfare of its citizens, thereby

overstepping the bounds of Congressional authority estab-

lished by the Tenth Amendment.

Civil Penalty Prepayment

Finally, SMCRA contains an enforcement provision that

requires full prepayment of a proposed penalty into escrow

as a condition precedent to contesting either the penalty

amount or the underlying violation of a citation. Maryland

urges affirmance of the District Court decision in this

action that the escrow requirement violates the procedural

due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.

From a practical standpoint, there is no justification

whatsoever for civil penalty prepayment by strip mine

8

operators. Since all permits are fully bonded, there can be

no concern over collection of final assessments. Refusal to

pay would simply lead to permit revocation and forfeiture

of a far greater amount of money, plus loss of the right to

engage in future mining activities. Thus, Congress can

show no government interest at stake here, and the escrow

requirement should be rejected even if the due process

concerns were considered to be minimal.

In fact, this prepayment scheme is a substantial intru-

sion under the Fifth Amendment. There can be no dispute

that property is actually taken in these circumstances, and

it is no answer to point to the possible return of the escrow

payment “with interest” (at 6% or the prevailing Treasury

rate). Cash flow is an important factor in any business,

and in many instances operators may be forced to borrow

money in order to contest a violation. Given the prime

interest rate at the date of this Brief (20% and climbing),

the escrow requirement is clearly illuminated for what it

is, a gross and substantial deprivation of property.

Under the Act, failure to place the entire amount of a

proposed penalty into escrow results “in a waiver of all

legal rights to contest the violation or the amount of the

penalty” §518(c) [30 U.S.C. §1268(c)]. The Act itself

contains no requirement for any type of hearing prior to

payment. Maryland submits that~there is patently no

government interest served by such a taking prior to a

hearing, and that the escrow requirement of SMCRA

should be struck by this Court as a violation of the due

p.ocess standards of the Fifth Amendment.

9

ARGUMENT

I.

THOSE SECTIONS OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND

RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977 WHICH ATTEMPT TO REGULATE

POST-MINING LAND USE ASPECTS UNRELATED TO ENVIRONMEN.-

TAL CONTROL ARE NOT WITHIN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AU-

THORITY OF CONGRESS, AND ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE TENTH

AMENDMENT.

At one time, it could be firmly stated that the power of

Congress to act under the Commerce Clause of the United

States Constitution extended only to actual interstate

activities, and not the means of producing goods which

were intended for such commerce. Production was not

commerce and, more specifically to this case, the mining of

coal was held not to be interstate commerce. Kidd v.

Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); United Mine Workers v.

Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921); Oliver Iron

Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1922); Carter v. Carter

Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1935). The more modern analysis

of Commerce Clause authority began when this Court

shifted its focus to whether the gctivity which Congress

desired to regulate affecte interstate commerce in a direct

or indirect manner. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295

U.S. 495 (1934). Next, the inquiry was said to be whether

a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce

existed such that control was needed to protect commerce

from burdens and obstructions. NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-

lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936). Following some further

refinement, U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940), a simple

“rational basis” test finally was adopted as the basis for a

proper exercise of the Commerce Clause power. Wickard v.

Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). It is fair to say that this test

still persists today, and that a federal statute may be

sustained under the Commerce Clause if there is a

“rational basis” for a finding by Congress that the

regulated activity affects interstate commerce, and

10

“reasonable” or “rational” means have been selected for its

regulation. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,

379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 US.

294, 303-304 (1964).

Despite such broadened deference for Congressional

authority under the Commerce Clause, the State of

Maryland urges that the rational basis test still represents

an enforceable limit to Congressional authority. The

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977

violates this limit in several of its provisions which

attempt to regulate land use. Maryland would submit in

the alternative that even if the SMCRA provisions can be

sustained under a pure Commerce Clause analysis, Con-

gress has exceeded the Tenth Amendment limits upon its

authority to intrude into areas of state sovereignty,

recognized by this Court in National League of Cities v.

Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

A. Once mining is completed, the sole rational basis for

Commerce Clause jurisdiction lies in environmental

impacts on interstate commerce.

As noted in the federal Government’s Brief in Virginia

Surface Mining, the primary rational basis for the Act is

to control environmental hazards from strip mining. (Br.

pp. 24-25.) The mining of coal is, of course, also identified

as a significant contributor to the Nation’s energy require-

ments, § 101(b) [30 U.S.C. § 1201(b)]. However, the nega-

tive environmental factors are the focus of the statute; the

law is not an effort to promote coal production.

Maryland submits that once mining is completed on a

particular permit area, the only remaining effect of the

mined lands on interstate commerce is continued environ-

mental impact resulting from changes in the land due to

the mining operation. Under the most liberal interpreta-

tion, the land is no longer being used in any manner

11

related to economic aspects of commerce. Thus, unless the

fact that land was once used for such purposes is sufficient,

there is no basis for continued Commerce Clause jurisdic-

tion to protect the free flow of goods.

In its Brief in this appeal, the federal Government

asserts that, aside from adverse environmental effects,

there are at least two other separate and independent

grounds for SMCRA Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Quot-

ing from pp. 12-13 of the Brief:

First, because coal produced from surface mines is a

commodity sold in interstate commerce, Congress

may act under the Commerce Clause to regulate the

conditions under which that commodity is produced.

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115, 122 (1941).

Second, because surface coal mining operations

adversely affect interstate commerce in agricultural

products and other commodities by diminishing land

productivity, Congress may exercise the Commerce

Clause to protect those aspects of interstate com-

merce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United

States, 379 U.S. 241, 256-257 (1964).

Maryland submits that these suggested Commerce Clause

grounds would, if sustained by this Court, virtually

eliminate any present restraint on Congressional author-

ity under the Commerce Clause.

The first ground is basically a self-serving restatement

of the evolved test for Commerce Clause jurisdiction,

absent the requirement that a rational basis must exist

between the identified impact on commerce, and the

means chosen to regulate it. Katzenbach v. McClung,

supra. However, this basis for Congressional authority

fails once mining is completed. After the coal has entered

interstate commerce, its continued status as a commercial

commodity cai: no longer rationally support Congressional

authority over the land which originally produced it.

r\

-.

12

The second ground proposed by Appellant would consti-

tute a vast expansion of even the current liberal test for

Commerce Clause jurisdiction. In essence, it suggests that

Congress may regulate any activity that reduces or

impairs land productivity. Following the logic of the

Government’s Brief at pp. 12-16, it is implied that

Congress could have banned strip mining entirely on

farmland simply upon a finding that some loss of crop

productivity results from surface coal mining operations.

Of course, SMCRA does not do this but, according to

Appellants, it does “[balance] the competing interests of

agriculture and surface coal mining. . . .” Brief p. 16. In

other words, Appellants argue, Congress has the power to

decide that a landowner, once engaged in farming, may

not switch to surface coal mining unless he can guarantee

that the full crop potential of the land will be restored."

State and local zoning decisions now control whether

land is used for industrial, agricultural, commercial,

residential, recreational or other purposes. A change from

one type of zoning to another may often favor one type of

interstate commerce over another. However, if this choice

alone establishes Congressional authority under the Com-

merce Clause then there is little if any state action not

within the preemptive power of the federal government.

Maryland respectfully submits that this Court should

soundly reject any such expansion of Congressional au-

thority.

') Of course, the unknown factor is for whose benefit the land

is being restored for farming. Neither Congress nor the states

can force the landowner to actually resume farming. Thus, he

could simply wait for whatever period SMCRA requires, and

then execute his intended use for the property. Or, worse for the

country, he might not allow the coal on his property to be mined

due to the resulting loss of control over the use of his land.

13

B. Many of the SMCRA post-mining land use require-

ments bear no relation to environmental protection,

and are therefore invalid as not rationally adapted to

the sole basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction

during this period.

In a general sense, environmenta! protection concerns

related to strip mining deal with control of water pollution

during the mining operation, restoration of the land to its

original contour, reseeding and revegetating, and preven-

tion of any future surface or subsurface adverse effects on

water. Many SMCRA provisions properly address these

concerns. However, there are several provisions through-

out the Act which dictate actual land use during the term

after mining in which regulatory authorities will deter-

mine whether proper reclamation has been accomplished.

The District Courts, in this action and in Virginia Surface

Mining, have identified several provisions of the Act

which are invalid for this reason. Maryland would empha-

size the following two sections as illustrative of the

constitutional infirmity.

First, the Act establishes land use per se as a specific

performance standard, § 5..(b)(2) [30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2)].

Although contained in a section entitled “Environmental

Protection Performance Standards”, it is obvious on the

face of the statute that the land use standard is totally

unrelated to environmental protection. The actual text

provides as follows:

(b) General performance standards shall be applic-

able to all surface coal mining and reclamation

operations and shall require the operation as a

minimum to

* * * * * *

(2) restore the land affected to a condition capable

of supporting the use which it was capable of

supporting prior to any mining, or higher or better

uses of which there is reasonable likelihood, so long

14

as such use or uses do not present any actual or

probable hazard to public health or safety or pose any

actual or probable threat of water diminution or

pollution, and the permit applicant declared proposed

land use following reclamation is not deemed to be

impractical or unreasonable, inconsistent with applic-

able land use policies and plans, involves unreason-

able delay in implementation, or is violative of

federal, state, or local law.

Second, in the case of prime farmland, the focus on land

use control is even more specific. The post-mining land use

can only be cropland, and equivalent or higher levels of

yield must be obtained. This is based on § 510(d) of the Act

[30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)] which provides as follows:

(d)(1) In addition .. ., if the area prwposed to be

mined contains prime farmland . . . the regulatory

authority shall. . . grant a permit to mine on prime

farmland if the regulatory authority finds in writing

that the operator has the technological capability to

restore such mined area, within a reasonable time, to

equivalent or higher levels of yield as non-mined

prime farmland in the surrounding area, under

equivalent levels of management... .

Federal regulations on this point leave no room for

flexibility, and have been sustained by the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia in the consoli-

dated review of all SMCRA regulations." It is doubtful

that any case can be made for demanding that cropland,

once mined, must be used again as cropland in order to

control interstate environmental impacts from the mining

' 30 C.F.R. § 785.17(d) (1), 44 Federal Register 15374 (March

13, 1979). The regulations state simply that “the approved

proposed postmining land use of these prime farmlands will be

cropland.” As held by Judge Flannery in reviewing this

requirement in Jn Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation

Litigation, Civil Action No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980), Slip.

Op. at p. 5:

“Section 510(d) (1) corroborates the imposition of an

additional requirement for mining on prime farmland: the

land must be reclaimed and used as crop land.”

15

operation.”* Thus, there is no rational connection from this

provision to the basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction

once mining activities have been completed.

The State of Maryland submits that these provisions, as

well as the others identified by the District Courts, are not

reasonably related to the prevention of environmental

effects after the conclusion of mining operations. Although

it may be reasonable to inquire into the intended post-

mining land use of strip mined area so as to determine

whether any such use might act to frustrate or impede

environmental protections measures, it is not within the

authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause to

require specific land uses as conditions precedent to

obtaining a strip mining permit.

C. The SMCRA post-mining land use requirements,

even if within the Commerce power, are violative of

the Tenth Amendment as impairments on an attri-

bute of State sovereignty.

The landmark case of National League of Cities v. Usery,

426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), holds that Commerce Clause

authority, if available, may not be exercised by Congress

in a manner so as to impair attributes of state sovereignty.

Land use planning and control is such an attribute of

state sovereignty.

As discussed above, if Congress need only point to the

loss of a particular type of commerce, due to a zoning

decision for example, to justify federal regulation, then

there is no practical limit to Commerce Clause jurisdic-

tion. Maryland submits that the Constitution does not

allow such an expansion of the Commerce Clause per se,

but that in any case, the Tenth Amendment stands as a

’* If anything, the opposite is true. As specifically held by the

District Court in this action, the prime farmland provisions

actually increase water pollution. Finding No. 8, J.S. App. at

16a.

16

bar to federal intrusion into pure land use decisions,

regardless of their indirect relation to commerce.

Land use planning and control is the means by which

states and local communities decide the nature of their

participation in our society: industrial or agricultural;

high or low population density; and hundreds of other

decisions on the basic character of an area. These deci-

sions, virtually by definition, result in changes to an area’s

impact on interstate commerce. If Congress can decide

that, for example, once a community is devoted to farming

it may not change since that would cause a drop in

agricultural productivity, then the federal government is

directly dictating how the people in that community must

make their living. Maryland submits that under our

system of government, such power is reserved solely to

states and local authorities who must daily answer to the

citizens they govern. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty

Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

508 n.18 (1975). The wisdom of this approach is obvious,

and should not be departed from in the name of strip mine

control, or any othér particular problem.

Il.

THE SMCRA ABSOLUTE PROHIBITIONS ON SURFACE COAL MIN.

ING ARE NOT WITHIN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AUTHORITY OF

CONGRESS, AND ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT.

A major feature of the Surface Mining Control and

Reclamation Act of 1977 is the designation of certain areas

as “unsuitable for surface coal mining”, in which surface

mining operations are banned outright, § 522 [30 U.S.C.

§ 1272]. As held by the District Court, where this section is

addressed to non-federal lands, it is outside of the

Commerce Clause and violates the Tenth Amendment."

© Slip Opinion, pages 2 and 16 (J.S. App. 47a). Stricken

provisions are §§522(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) and (5) [80 U.S.C.

§§ 1272(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) and (5)]. Sections 522(b) and (e) (1), (2)

& (3) deal with federal lands or federally designated Parks,

— Areas, Trails, Wild and Scenic Rivers, and Historic

ites.

17

While urging this Court to affirm the District Court’s

decision in its entirety, Maryland would emphasize the

particular constitutional problems found in § 522(e)(5).

Subsection (e)(5) contains per se, absolute prohibitions

on surface coal mining. The full text of the statute is as

follows:

(e) After the enactment of this Act and subject to

valid existing rights no surface coal mining opera-

tions except those which exist on the date of enact-

ment of this Act shall be permitted—

* * * * * *

(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied

dwelling, unless waived by the owner thereof, nor

within three hundred feet of any public building,

school, church, community, or institutional building,

public park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.

From a policy standpoint, Maryland has no objection to the

right granted here for a property owner to prevent or allow

mining within 300 feet of his dwelling (although this

grant is no more within the power of Congress than are

the prohibitions in the remainder of the subsection, for the

Same reasons as discussed below). Maryland strongly

objects to the absolute prohibitions in § 522(e)(5). As

indicated in the Statement of Interest, Maryland first tried

to temper them by insertion of a general waiver. However,

this approach was rejected by the federal Office of Surface

Mining.

Maryland submits that the absolute prohibitions on

mining in SMCRA § 522(e)(5) are not rationally related to

interstate commerce, and that Congress therefore may not

preempt the state’s control over strip mining for failure to

enact these provisions. The Secretary offers no argument

to the contrary here, and states only that “[the prohibi-

tions] are plainly directed toward the purpose of ensuring

that the extraction of coal does not endanger life and

18

property in mining communities.” (Br. p. 19). This is not a

basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Wickard v. Fil-

burn, supra. Furthermore, the means selected here are not

rationally adapted to the identified problem. Heart of

Atlanta, supra.

A 300 foot buffer zone may offer some protection in some

circumstances, but why should a dwelling owner be able to

waive this requirement when a church or park may not.

Schools may not be open in the summertime, yet the

SMCRA prohibition still holds, Under OSM regulations,

“community or institutional buildings” include power

plants, water supply and sewage treatment buildings, and

historic buildings. 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(d), 44 Federal Regis-

ter 15342 (March 13, 1979). None of these may waive the

restriction, even if the buffer zone is owned by the party

itself. A cemetery may be long abandoned, or may have its

own internal buffer zone, but these factors are not allowed

to be cor.sidered by a state permitting agency. In short,

there is no ability to make an informed decision on the

actual need for safety-related permit conditions in particu-

lar circumstances. In some cases, more than 300 feet may

be required. Other circumstances may require no set-

backs; simple time-of-day or time-of-year restrictions may

suffice. Maryland submits that such decisions must be

made on a case by case basis, and that the absolute

prohibitions of SMCRA § 522(e)(5) fail the test of rational-

ity even assuming, arguendo, that such areas of regulation

are within Congressional authority.

For similar reasons as discussed above, the SMCRA

absolute prohibitions should also be considered violative of

the Tenth Amendment. The aspect of state sovereignity

being intruded upon here is the basic state authority over

the health and welfare of its citizens. Maryland submits

that there is no state attribute more fundamental, and

that any Congressional action taken purportedly under

19

the Commerce Clause may not usurp this function without

clear and compelling grounds rooted in interstate com-

merce. There are no such grounds for the SMCRA

§ 522(e)(5) absolute prohibitions.

As shown by the lack of arguments on this point in the

Secretary's Brief, there is really nothing that can be said

for §522(e)(5) except that it is obviously aimed at

protecting life and property. (Br. p. 19). However, this

section is not related to the life and property of the people

actually engaged in surface coal mining.” It is aimed at .

bystanders, many of whom might wish to be involved and

would profit from the operation.'* Maryland submits that,

to the extent such people need to be protected from

themselves by appropriate safety regulations, such actions

are peculiarly within state authority under the Tenth

Amendment. As in the case of land use decisions, the

wisdom of this approach is simply and clearly to leave

basic health and safety decisions in the hands of those

elected officials who must daily answer to the people they

govern.

" Admittedly, Congress may have some authority over the

health and safety of people producing products that enter

interstate commerce. See generally, Federal Mine Safety and

Health Act of 1977, Pub.L.No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290430 U.S.C.

§ 801 et seq]; and Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,

Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 [29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq].

“ As to those unwilling bystanders, there is little if any

connection between these people and interstate commerce so as

to sustain the Congressional action here in any balancing of the

federal and state interests involved. Simply being in the vicinity

of an activity related to interstate commerce is obviously not

sufficient to override the Tenth Amendment.

20

Il.

FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED BY THE CIVIL

PENALTY PROVISION OF SMCRA WHICH REQUIRES THAT ALL

PROPOSED ASSESSMENTS BE PREPAID IN ESCROW AS A CONDI-

TION PRECEDENT TO CONTESTING EITHER THE PENALTY

AMOUNT OR THE UNDERLYING VIOLATION OF A CITATION.

Maryland does not challenge the authority of Congress

to employ civil penalty provisions in conjunction with

enforcement actions under the Surface Mining Control and

Reclamation Act of 1977. The basic SMCRA requirements

here are quite similar to those used in other environmen-

tal statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean

Water Act. However, SMCRA contains a unique and

important additional requirement: any civil penalty pro-

posed by an administrative agency in conjunction with an

enforcement action must be prepaid in full by the operator

as a condition precedent to challenging the penalty

amount or the underlying violation. Section 518(c) [30

U.S.C. § 1268(c)|. Maryland is aware of no precedent for

this requirement.

The statute itsel’ contains no provision for any type of

hearing prior to the necessity to prepay civil penalty

assessments as a condition of challenging the enforcement

action. Obviously, this raises important questions of

procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment of the

Constitution. To date, all courts that have considered this

issue have rejected the SMCRA provision on this ground."

The present test for validity of such provisions involves

a balancing of the government interest involved versus the

private interest affected. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 US.

319 (1975). As discussed below, Maryland submits that the

SMCRA escrow prepayment requirement is totally incap-

'" Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, Civ. 79-171-2 (S.D. Iowa, Feb. 13,

1980) Slip Op. 18-19, appeal pending, No. 80-49; and Virginia

Surface Mining.

21

able of satisfying this test, and should be rejected by this

Court as a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment.

A. The escrow provision constitutes a substantial dep-

rivation of private property.

It cannot be disputed that the private interests involved

here are deprivations of property protected by the Fifth

Amendment. Monetary takings prior to a hearing have

constituted the larger majority of the cases decided under

the principles at issue here.” In the circumstances of

SMCRA civil penalty prepayments, at least three substan-

tial impacts are possible.

First, at a minimum, even if an operator is successful in

challenging a civil penalty assessment, the law acts to

deprive him of the use.of his money for a significant period

of time. It is no answer to point to the possible return of

the escrow payment “with interest” (at 6% or the prevail-

ing Treasury rate). The need for working capital is a basic

requirement for efficient operation of any business. In-+a

state such as Maryland, where many operations are small

businesses, the prepayment requirement is an obvious

substantial hardship. In the case of Fuentes v. Shevin,”

this Court held that the Fifth Amendment right to be

heard exists prior to even a temporary, non-final depriva-

tion of property. At its best, the SMCRA escrow prepay-

* Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)

(garnishment of wages without prior hearing held unconstitu-

tional); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of

welfare benefits without prior hearing held unconstitutional):

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975) (termination of

disability benefits requires prior hearing — but not necessarily

a full evidentiary hearing).

*“ 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972). Replevin of household goods for

default of installment payments. Creditor was allowed to take

possession solely on his assertion of non-payment, backed by a

bond. Fact that goods would be returned if claim was invalid

held irre‘evant to Fifth Amendment hearing requirement.

22

ment scheme falls squarely within this holding, and

should be invalidated.”

Second, in addition to the automatic temporary depriva-

tion, the magnitude of SMCRA civil penalties makes it

clear that small operators may be forced to borrow money

in order to make escrow prepayments so as to challenge

violations. Given the prime interest rate at the date of

this Brief (20% and climbing), there can be no doubt that

the requirement to prepay proposed assessments can

result in a permanent deprivation of a company’s assets.

Maryland submits that this is undeniably an effect

prohibited by the Fifth Amendment in the absence of a

prior hearing.

Third, in some circumstances, it is possible for the

escrow prepayment requirement to result in the closing of

a mine. Although a mine operator may be convinced that

he has been improperly cited for a violation of the Act, he

may.be unable to prepay the assessments resulting from

continued operation past a compliance deadline (basic

assessment plus minimum of $750.00 per day mandatory

penalty after deadline). If the disputed violation relates to

the basic method of operation on the permit area, there is

no option but to cease mining until resolution of the legal

# Maryland is incredulous at the statement in Appellant’s

Brief on page 70 that: “The ‘refund-with-interest’ provision in

Section 518(c) ensures that operators who prevail on administra-

tive or judicial review will suffer no financial injury.” If all the

government need do is pay interest, then the Fifth Amendment

has indeed lost its effectiveness.

* SMCRA civil penalties may range up to $5,000 per

violation, with each day of continuing viciation being deemed a

separate violation §518(a) [30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)]. The federal

Office of Surface Mining itself has indicated that the average

penalty per violation is approximately $2,000.00, and that the

$750.00 per day penalty once a deadline for compliance has

passed can result “in clearly excessive amounts considering the

nature and effects of the underlying violations of the Act” 45

Fed. Reg. 5540 (Jan. 23, 1980).

’

23

issues. In this regard, the civil penalty prepayment

scheme shows a clear potential for drastic consequences.

This scenario is not hypothetical, but actually occurred

to the Black Creek Mining Company of Norton, Virginia,

as described by Judge Williams in striking the provision

at issue here in the companion case of Virginia Surface

Mining, J.S. App. 69a-70a. Given this effect, Maryland

submits that the escrow prepayment provision clearly

involves substantial private interests under the Fifth

Amendment.

B. There is no governmental interest served by the

SMCRA civil penalty escrow provision.

In contrast to the private interests at stake, there are no

governmental interests served by the escrow provision.

The notion that prepayment is needed “to avoid the

problem of non-collection of fines” is untenable in the

context of a fully bonded strip mine operation.” As

specifically required by SMCRA § 509 [30 U.S.C. § 1259]

all permits must be backed by bonds or other security

sufficient to complete properly the operation, but not less

than $10,000. Thus, any failure to pay a final assessment

would simply result in permit revocation and forfeiture of

the outstanding security. A further consequence of forfei-

ture is disqualification for future mining permits. § 510(c)

[30 U.S.C. § 1260(c)].

Given these protections, Maryland believes that the

perceived need by Congress for prepayment of civil

penalties could be rejected on its face by this Court.

However, under any consideration, it is clear that the

private interests impacted by this provision greatly out-

* Senate Report No. 95-128, 95th Cong., 1st Session, at page

59. Cited by Appellants in their Brief in Virginia Surface

Mining, page 70, incorporated by reference into this action at

page 36 of Appellants Brief.

24

weigh whatever strength lies in the government’s con-

cerns, and that the escrow provision fails the test of

Matthews v. Eldridge, supra, for a valid taking of property

without a hearing under the Fifth Amendment.

C. The informal “assessment conference” provided by

the Office of Surface Mining does not substitute for

the required Fifth Amendment hearing.

Although the Act itself contains no requirement for a

hearing of any kind prior to prepayment of proposed

penalties into escrow, the Secretary has attempted to cure

the constitutional defect here by providing an “assessment

conference” prior to payment.” Maryland doubts that

agency regulations, as a general matter, are ever suffi-

cient to moot a clear constitutional infirmity on the face of

a statute. However, this issue need not be reached in the

instant case since the adopted “assessment conference”

would not be sufficient even if contained in the statute.

The basic Fifth Amendment right has been described as

the right to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner.” Matthews, supra; Armstrong uv.

Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). The “time” need only be

before any deprivation, a test satisfied by the Secretary's

assessment conference. However, the conference does not

provide a hearing in a meaningful manner as required. At

most, the conference represents an opportunity to argue

for a lower assessment based on the rather exotic point

system established under the regulations.” There is no

independent, unbiased hearing examiner, and it is ex-

tremely doubtful that the assessment officer has the power

* 30 C.F.R. § 845.18; 44 Fed. Reg. 15463 (March 13, 1979).

* 30 C.F.R. § 845; 44 Fed. Reg. 15461 (March 13, 1979). OSM

regulations which would have required states to use the same

system have been remanded. § 732.15(b) (7) and § 840.13(a). Jn

Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, Civil

Action No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. 1980), 14 ERC 1083, 1089 (February

26, 1980), and Slip Opinion pp. 56-57 (May 16, 1980).

25

to reduce any proposed penalty to zero. Where a cesdation

order has been issued under § 521 of the Act [30 U.S.C.

$1271], some atnount of civil penalty is mandated by

§ 518(a) (30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)]. This, in these instances, the

Secretary cannot correct the statutory scheme of prepay-

ment prior to an adjudication on the underlying

violation.” In no case is a sufficient hearing held on the

amount of a penalty without prepayment.”

In summary, there is no regulation or argument adv-

anced by the Secretary which cures the basic violation of

Fifth Arieridment due process inheretit in the SMCRA

civil penalty prepayment requirement. All reviewing

courts to date have stricken this novel provision on Fifth

Amendment grounds, and this Court should affirm the

District Courts’ decisions on this issue.

”“ The Secretary argues that a hearing on the fact of a

violation may be obtained under § 525 without regard to §518

escrow prepayment (in apparent contradiction to the plain

meaning of §518(c)). Virginia Surface Mining, Br. pp. 68-69.

This may be possible, but is strictly a matter of timing. Since

proposed assessments are required by § 518(c) within 30 days of

a notice or order, and prepayment within 30 days thereafter, a

maximum of 60 days is available to adjudicate the violation.

(The Secretary can issue a proposed assessment earlier than 30

days from the notice and thus shorten the period accordingly.)

However, under § 525, the Secretary has 30 days to decide cases

arising under cessation orders, and more if he grants temporary

relief fromi the order. There are no deadlines for standard

violation notices. In short, it is fair to assume that few operators

will obtain a decision on an alleged violation prior to the

deadline for escrow prepayment of a proposed civil penalty.

* On page 69 of the Secretary’s Brief in Virginia Surface

Mining, it is expressly acknowledged that:

Accordingly, if a mine operator wishes to contest the

amount of a proposed penalty as well as the fact of the

underlying violation, it [sic] must seek review under

Section 518, and prepayment of the penalty into escrow is a

precondition of that review.

26

CONCLUSION

The District Court’s decision was correct in all respects

and, accordingly, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN H. Sacus

Attorney General

Tuomas A. DEMING

Assistant Attorney General

Micuae. J. Scipinico, II

Assistant Attorney General

Department of Natural Resources

Tawes State Office Building

Annapolis, Maryland 21401

(301) 269-2251

JANUARY 1981

la

APPENDIX A

Offices of

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Room 104

Legislative Services Building

90 State Circle

Annapolis, Maryland 21401

301-269-3786

May 21, 1980

Honorable Harry Hughes

Governor of Maryland

State House

Annapolis, Maryland 21404

Re: Senate Bill 975

Dear Governor Hughes:

We have reviewed Senate Bill 975 for constitutionality

and legal sufficiency and, although we have no objection to

the bill becoming law, we must point out a serious

constitutional question raised by one of its provisions.

Senate Bill 975, among other things, attempts to

conform Maryland’s strip mining laws to the Federal

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30

U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328. In so doing, the bill amends § 7-

517(b)(4) of the Natural Resources Article to provide for a

civil penalty scheme patterned after 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c). In

essence, this amendment provides that a person adversely

affected by a proposed civil penalty assessment imposed

after the issuance of cease and desist order or notice of

noncompliance may request an adjudicatory hearing on

the questions before the Department of Natural Resources.

However, “at the time of the request the full amount of the

penaliy must be paid over to the Secretary for placement

in an escrow account pending completion of administrative

2a

and judicial review of the assessment.” § 7-517(b)(4). In

addition, this provision states:

Failure to forward the full amount to the Secret-

ary within 30 days of an assessment order shall result

in a waiver of all legal rights to contest the amount of

the penalty or the underlying violation. If it is

eventually determined that no violation occurred, or

the amount of the penalty is reduced, the Secretary

shall remit within 30 days the appropriate amount to

the person, with interest at the rate of 6 percent.

In our view, this penalty prepayment provision may offend

due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution. Substantial penalties,

which may exceed $5,000 per day for each violation, can be

imposed on a suspected violator before he can contest

either the violation or the amount of the penalty. More-

over, in our view, such a deprivation of property is not

remedied by the fact that the money is placed in escrow

and may be returned in the future with interest. Although

such a scheme may very well deter violation of the strip

mining laws, it also may force settlement and deter

appeals regardless of the merits. In addition, it would

appear to strike hardest at the less wealthy operators. The

federal penalty provision, along with other features of the

federal act, are the subject of constitutional challenge in

Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., Inc. v.

Anderson, ___ F. Supp. ——, No. 78-0224-B (N.D. Va.,

Jan. 3, 1980), jurisdictional statement filed __ U.S. __,

No. 79-1596 (April 11, 1980)' and Star Coal v. Anderson,

____ F. Supp. —__,, No. 79-1712 (S.D. Iowa, preliminary

injunction issued Feb. 13, 1980).

The Department of Natural Resources has been advised

that all states must duplicate the penalty prepayment

' Also, at issue in that case is the constitutionality of absolute

restrictions on mining within certain distances of public and

private places and of absolute requirements that all violations

be corrected within 90 days. Because S.B. 975 adds these

provisions to State law, but with some moderating features, we

do not believe they are facially unconstitutional.

3a

provision in their laws to obtain federal approval of their

strip mining enforcement program. If Maryland’s program

does not contain this feature, it may be disqualified, with

the result being that the federal government will enforce

federal law in Maryland, including the prepayment penal-

ty scheme. For these reasons, we urge that the bill be

signed so that these provisions will be enforced by State

officials sensitive to the constitutional questions raised by

the legislation.

Very truly yours,

Stephen H. Sachs

Attorney General

SHS:RAZ:ss

cc: Honorable Fred L. Wineland

Judson P. Garrett, Jr., Esq.

F. Carvel Payne

Honorable Harry J. McGuirk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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