Amicus Brief — Hodel v. Indiana
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No. 80-231 Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
————————————————
JAN 9 1961
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERIC
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcrToBer Term, 1980
CECIL D. ANDRUS, Secretary or THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,
Appellants,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, er At.,
Appellees.
On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Srates District Court
FOR THE SOUTHERN District or INDIANA
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND
AMICUS CURIAE
STEPHEN H. Sacus
Attorney General
Tuomas A. Deminc
Assistant Attorney General
Micuae J. Scisinico, II
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Natural Resources
Tawes State Office Building
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
(301) 269-2251
ey en
The Daily Record Co., Baltimore, MD 21202 Ao ba
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .......cccccccsccseccsccssceseceees
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. .....:.cccssccossccessccesscccssccccescees
ARGUMENT:
I. THOSE SECTIONS OF THE SUR-
FACE MINING CONTROL AND RE-
CLAMATION ACT OF 1977 WHICH
ATTEMPT TO REGULATE POST-
MINING LAND USE ASPECTS UN-
RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL ARE NOT WITHIN THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE AUTHORITY
OF CONGRESS, AND ARE VIOLA-
TIVE OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT
A. Once mining is completed, the sole
‘rational basis for Commerce
Clause jurisdiction lies in environ-
mental impacts on interstate com-
IN aie neitbienltes dicta eengievetisesssse
Many of the SMCRA post-mining
land use requirements bear no re-
lation to environmental protection,
and are therefore invalid as not
rationally adapted to the sole basis
for Commerce Clause jurisdiction
during this period .................:::000
The SMCRA post-mining land use
requirements, even if within the
Commerce power, are violative of
the Tenth Amendment as impair-
ments on an attribute of State
DOVOTNED soscscsrscccebsiccccsdtiecssassshocste
PAGE
13
15
Il.
Il.
THE SMCRA ABSOLUTE PROHIBI-
TIONS ON SURFACE COAL MINING
ARE NOT WITHIN THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AUTHORITY OF CON-
GRESS, AND ARE VIOLATIVE OF
THE TENTH AMENDMENT ...............
FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
IS VIOLATED BY THE CIVIL
PENALTY PROVISION OF SMCRA
WHICH REQUIRES THAT ALL
PROPOSED ASSESSMENTS BE PRE-
PAID IN ESCROW AS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO CONTESTING
EITHER THE PENALTY AMOUNT
OR THE UNDERLYING VIOLATION
COR Be GI actin cnsisnenencncsttnsivnticns
A. The escrow provisiqt constitutes a
substantial deprivation of private
EID sdtisncdcntntscntinientontiastideniecsseses
. There is no governmental interest
served by the SMCRA civil penalty
ESCTOW PYOVISION .............ccceeseeeeeeeees
. The informal “assessment confer-
ence” provided by the Office of
Surface Mining does not substitute
for the required Fifth Amendment
UMIIIIIIE stscacinssnsicecaceetpadbideilatianuenstorees
COO EERE EERE EEE HEHEHE HEHEHE HEHEHE ED
COREE EEE EEE EEE EERE EEE EERE EEE EEE HEHEHE EEE THEE EEE HEHEHE
PAGE
16
20
21
23
24
26
12
ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Rea
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ......... 24
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1935) 9
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
Be Pe CD devise ecnstincinAichinanssiticbianagheailbdeopaipinanes 9
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972) ......... 21
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) .............. 21
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 268 (1964) ........cccccccccsscssrrceseseees 9,11,18
In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, Civil Action 79-1144, 14 ERC
1083 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980) and Slip Opinion
(May 16, 1980), appeals pending, Nos. 80-
1810 et seq. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1980) ........... 14, 24
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-304
1 ROREARERLES ESR, Serine he HY YOR arn Ooo 9,11
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) ..............0..... 9
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975) ........ 20, 21, 24
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
Be III reiicncipsucresncocbchcaassechrcceetenecaamnasetoiiigions ton 10,15
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
Re UE ERE AR At Roe. 9
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172
RUINED iscosaddonthactisbniocton, Sabisseastcssaitinee taeaei mcetens 9
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495
SEINE cn se suinisopsocbied te sunintatneptehioclienichaieibeabeliomnbues 9
Sniadatch v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
GIUIIIEE "on sccnnacdvstiniinnsckanpaliosund Atasibesansnacinachs Sincebtaatine 21
Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, Civ. No. 79-171-2 (S.D.
Iowa, Feb. 13, 1980) Slip Op. 18-19, appeal
poets, Pee ia ieccs isi eencesencecdeneion 20, 2a
iv
PAGE
U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940) .............0... 9,11
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
I 16
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n
v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980)
(probable jurisdiction noted, Nos. 79-1538 and
79-1596 (October 6, 1980)) .........ccccccceeeeeseeeeees 1, 3, 6,
10, 13, 20, 23, 25, 2a
Wickard y. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ............ 9,18
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975) 16
Constitution, Statutes and Regulations
United States Constitution:
Article I, Section 8 (Commerce Clause) passium
Fifth AMenGMeant ........ccccrccessesescrssoveseveees passium
TA DUROEIIIE, onc ccccrsesccccsesesscccesessvees passium
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
(Pub. L. 95-164), 92 Stat. 1290 [30 U.S.C.
SS EEE LEED DSC RRO ER TAIT 19
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(Pub. L. 91-596), 84 Stat. 1590 [29 U.S.C.
I NO is csaxcitetaniehsRicosensibvohsinnsaopebegstiabsecs 19
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, (Pub. L. 95-87), 91 Stat. 447:
§ 101(b) (30 U.S.C. §1201(b)] 0... 10
$ 609 (80 U.S.C. § 1269] ..............scesseeseee 23
§ 510(c) [80 U.S.C. § 1260(c)] «0... eee 23
§ 510(d) (1) [30 U.S.C. § 1260(d) (1)] ..... 14
§ 515(b) (2) [30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (2)] ..... 13
§ 518(a) [30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)] ............0 22, 25
§ 518(c) [30 U.S.C. § 1268(c)] «0... cee 8, 20, la
§ 621 (80 U.S.C. $1271) .......cesscceseeeees 25
§ 522 (80 U.S.C. §. 1272) .........eessseseeees 16
Vv
PAGE
§ 522(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) & (5) [30 U.S.C.
§ 1272(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) & (5)) we. 16
§ 522(b) (4) & (5) and (e) (1), (2), (3) ..... 16
§ 522(e) (5) [30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (5)] ..7,17,18,19
$525 (30 U.S.C. § 1275) .............ccccccsssoees 25
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 7401 et seq. ...........04.. 20
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. ......... 20
Laws of Maryland, Chapter 740 (1980) .............. 3
Maryland Annotated Code, Natural Resources
Article, § 7-505(b) (2) (v) & (vi) wees 2,3,4
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations:
30 C.F.R. § 732.15(b) (7) ou... eccessccesseeees 24
Fe Wr is BD FRAMED sesedccetcssnccscoscnscsnseessns 18
Fe i es CE FUG) CBD vosisccisccescccccnascess 14
Fe GAA eh, PMO) ccccesatscsenccstesscccsersesns 24
Be ae III ei dhcdeincditeeenesscdsovsscvecsnnsenes 24
ee Mocs ES OU Uiek por ccssuncsancunosanadnpegedoes 24
Miscellaneous
Conditional Approval of Permanent Program
Submission from the State of Maryland
Under the Surface Mining Control and Re-
clamation Act of 1977, 45 Fed. Reg. 79340,
79345 (December 1, 1980), Finding 12.1 ....... 3,4
Fifty-Seventh Annual Report of the Maryland
SOTO AE IID Selleck chescsdccsieccccsccsceinsveiasivorsncees 2
Maryland Manual, 1979-80 .........cccccccccsccssssseeeeeees 2
Senate Report No. 95-128, 95th Cong., 1st Ses-
SRA MIL iso Rdedicsnnnochinanincs sonliiiceichonsavbscedadonbconntie 23
U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conserva-
tion Service Report entitled “Prime Farm-
lands of Garrett and Allegany Counties,”
prepared for the Maryland Bureau of Mines,
PUTTER Cershasaaseserdecahshamiebicescasnsan thideastphesoveds 4
No. 80-231
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctToBer TERM, 1980
CECIL D. ANDRUS, Secretary or THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,
Appellants,
Vv.
STATE OF INDIANA, et At.,
Appellees.
On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED States District Court
FOR THE SOUTHERN District oF INDIANA
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND
AMICUS CURIAE
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The State of Maryland is vitally interested in the
instant proceeding before the Court, as well as the
companion Virginia action on the same basic issues.’
Maryland has regulated surface coal mining within its two
westernmost counties since the industry began there in
' Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n v. Andrus,
483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), probable jurisdiction noted,
Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1596 (October 6, 1980). Hereinafter cited as
Virginia Surface Mining.
2
the 1940’s. The initial statute was passed as an emergency
measure in a special session of the Legislature in Novem-
ber of 1947. Comprehensive permitting and bonding
requirements have been imposed from the beginning, and
the law has been updated on numerous occasions since
that time? The Maryland General Assembly thus has
evidenced its strong intent to regulate the industry so as
to ensure full environmental! control over all operations.
The Maryland coal industry is comparatively small on
the national scale. However, the industry is important to
the western Maryland counties, as it is typically in the
Appalachian Mountain area. For calendar year 1979, over
one thousand people were employed in Maryland directly
in coal production.’ In Garrett County, out of an estimated
total population of 26,400 persons, 813 were employed in
coal mining.‘ Over two million net tons of coal were
produced in western Maryland in 1979° mostly by small
operations.*®
Maryland believes that surface mining in the State can
be regulated effectively without causing smaii operators to
go out of business, and believes further that the State
government, rather than the federal government, is best
able to accomplish this goal. Accordingly, the state has
* Maryland’s statutes relative to surface coal mining are now
codified as Natural Resources Article, Title 7, Subtitle 5, Md.
Ann. Code.
* Fifty-Seventh Annual Report of the Maryland Bureau of
Mines, page 4. Total employment of 1,097 persons; not including
office, supervisory personnel, or independent truck haulers.
Surface mining accounts for 65% of the total figure.
* Annual Report, page 4. Total population from Maryland
Manual 1979-1980, page 484, issued by the Secretary of State.
* Annual Report, page 4. Total net tonnage of 2.7 million, 1.8
of which was taken by surface mining methods.
* Annual Report, pp. 6-13. Many permit holders in Maryland
employ less than 5 individuals, and most employ under 15
employees. Few permit areas are greater than 40 acres, and over
100 strip mining permits were involved in the production of the
1.8 million tons noted above.
3
applied for and obtained “conditional” approval of a
permanent regulatory program under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (hereinafter
“SMCRA” or “the Act”).’? However, in so doing, Maryland
has been required to comport its laws and regulations
precisely to the provisions of SMCRA, and corresponding
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Interior. As indicated in this brief amicus
curiae, Maryland believes not only that several of these
requirements are inappropriate in this state, but that the
federal government lacks Constitutional authority to
impose them under penalty of preemption. It would appear
that the Constitutional questions of concern to Maryland
will be addressed by this @ourt in the present action, and
in the Virginia Surface Mining case.
The Secretary of the Interior has demonstrated little or
no regard for state judgment during the program approval
process. For example, Maryland strongly objected to the
absolute prohibitions on mining in certain areas required
by SMCRA, §522(e)(5) [30 U.S.C. §1272(e)(5)]. For
reasons more fully discussed in § iI below, the State finds
these prohibitions irrational in the absence of case-by-case
review. Rather than file suit immediately, Maryland first
proposed a means to cure these problems, by insertion of a
general waiver provision.’ This approach was totally
rejected by the Secretary, with no supporting rationale,
and the approval of the Maryland SMCRA Program is
* See, Conditional Approval of Permanent Program Submis-
sion from the State of Maryland Under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 45 Federal Register
79430-79451 (December 1, 1980).
* 1980 Laws of Maryland, Chapter 740 enacted the prohibi-
tions but allowed a waiver if mining was “approved by the
owner or the appropriate jurisdictional agency, and the Depart-
ment [of Natural Resources].” Natural Resources Article, § 7-
505(b) (2) (v) and (vi), of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
4
currently conditioned, inter alia, upon further legislation
to remove this waiver.’
Similarly, due to the large proportion of small operators
in Maryland, the civil penalty prepayment requirement
discussed in §III below will constitute a substantial
hardship in this state. A small business with fewer than
five employees rarely would have sufficient, excess work-
ing capital to be able to place the penalty amount into
escrow while contesting enforcement actions. However, the
Secretary has never relaxed his position that the SMCRA
escrow provision must be contained in the Maryland
Statute.” This provision has been enacted into law in
Maryland, but the enactment was accompanied by advice
of the Attorney General that the escrow requirement most
likely is unconstitutional.”
Maryland is also concerned that the prime farmland
provisions of SMCRA may adversely impact the industry.
These provisions require that, if prime farmland is re-
moved by surface mining, then upon restoration the area
must be used again for crop production of equal or greater
yield. In conjunction with the interim SMCRA program in
Maryland, it has been determined that approximately
20,000 acres of potential prime farmland exist in Garrett
County; with 9,000 acres in Allegany County.” Given the
* Conditional Approval, ibid n.6, Finding 12.1. As grounds for
this condition, the Secretary states simply that “alternatives are
not available to requirements of SMCRA.”
‘© Maryland was apprised of this position from the start of the
program development process, and consequently enacted the
escrow provision in the 1980 Legislative Session, Chapter 740,
§ 7-517(b) (4) of the Natural Resources Article of the Annotated
Code of Maryland.
"' See, Letter of May 21, 1980 from Attorney General Stephen
H. Sachs to Governor Harry Hughes, attached as Appendix A to
this Brief, pp. 1a-3a.
% U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service
Report entitled “Prime Farmlands of Garrett and Allegany
al prepared for the Maryland Bureau of Mines, April
5
totally inflexible SMCRA reclamation standard for such
land, it is quite possible that the state’s coal reserves
under prime farmlands will not be recovered. As discussed
in §I below, Maryland submits that the SMCRA prime
farmland requirements are not within Congressional
authority.
Maryland does not claim that the federal government
has no legitimate interest in regulating many aspects of
strip mining, particularly environmental impacts. How-
ever, SMCRA goes to remarkable extremes in attempting to
dictate pure land use aspects once mim ng has ceased, and
to absolutely prohibit strip mining in certain areas based
on Congressional notions of public health and safety
unrelated to interstate commerce. Provisions for prepay-
ment of civil penalties are harsh, redundant to bond
requirements, and very questionable in terms of due
process. Implementation of these provisions is forced on
the states under penalty of preemption, with no latitude
for state discretion based on knowledge of particular local
conditions. In so doing, this Act directly usurps traditional
powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amend-
ment.
The State of Maryland believes that Congress has in
this instance clearly overstepped its boundaries in our
system of government. If SMCRA is allowed to stand as
enacted, clear precedent will be established allowing
almost any aspect of state sovereignty to be overridden
upon the smallest Congressional finding, supportable or
not, that interstate commerce is marginally involved. In
this context, the interest of Maryland here goes beyond
any particular impact on the state’s mining industry.
Maryland believes that this case raises basic questions of
the remaining scope of state authority in our federal
system. We sincerely urge this Court to firmly rule
against these particular intrusions into state autonomy,
6
and generally to affirm the limits of Congressional
authority.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Maryland urges affirmance of the District Court deci-
sion in the instant case, as well as the decision of the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia in Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association v. Andrus. In support of its position, Maryland
respectfully submits that provisions of SMCRA properly
were held unconstitutional, as follows:
Post-Mining Land Use
SMCRA contains many provisions which mandate speci-
fic uses of restored lands for at least five years after all
coal removal. This has nothing to do with environmental
control of strip mining. Congress has simply decreed that
land, once strip mined, must be returned to an equal or
better economic use. In the case of prime farmland, the use
must be prime farmland and nothing else, possibly for a
ten year period after mining.
The State of Maryland submits that Congress has no
authority under the Commerce Clause to order that
private property be used for farming, whether it has been
strip mined or not, or that any other particular land use
must occur after strip mining. After removal of coal and
restoration of the land, the only interstate concerns
stemming from the fact that strip mining once occurred on
a piece of property are the residual environmental prob-
lems from the activity (acid run-off, to name the most
often cited danger). Only provisions rationally related to
these concerns may be enacted under the Commerce
Clause. Furthermore, if the Tenth Amendment holds any
remaining vitality, then the property owner must be able
to employ the land according to agricultural, commercial,
residential or whatever other uses are permitted under
7
state or local zoning authority. These choices may not be
assumed by Congress.
Absolute Prohibitions on Mining
SMCRA provides that under no circumstances may
mining occur “within 300 feet of any public building,
school, church, community or institutional building, public
park, or within 100 feet of a cemetery” § 522(e)(5) [30
U.S.C. §1272(e)(5)]. The restriction applies even if the
church, school, or other entity owns the property involved
and wishes to mine it. No waiver is permitted, and the
State of Maryland has been told expressly to eliminate its
statutory waiver provision in this area as a condition of
federal approval of the State SMCRA Program.
Maryland submits that there is no basis in the Com-
merce Clause for Congress to prevent a church from
mining on its own property, or to require states to
implement such an irrational provision under penalty of
preemption of state authority over all aspects of strip
mining. Furthermore, by enactment of this provision,
Congress has invaded an area of traditional State author-
ity over the health and welfare of its citizens, thereby
overstepping the bounds of Congressional authority estab-
lished by the Tenth Amendment.
Civil Penalty Prepayment
Finally, SMCRA contains an enforcement provision that
requires full prepayment of a proposed penalty into escrow
as a condition precedent to contesting either the penalty
amount or the underlying violation of a citation. Maryland
urges affirmance of the District Court decision in this
action that the escrow requirement violates the procedural
due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
From a practical standpoint, there is no justification
whatsoever for civil penalty prepayment by strip mine
8
operators. Since all permits are fully bonded, there can be
no concern over collection of final assessments. Refusal to
pay would simply lead to permit revocation and forfeiture
of a far greater amount of money, plus loss of the right to
engage in future mining activities. Thus, Congress can
show no government interest at stake here, and the escrow
requirement should be rejected even if the due process
concerns were considered to be minimal.
In fact, this prepayment scheme is a substantial intru-
sion under the Fifth Amendment. There can be no dispute
that property is actually taken in these circumstances, and
it is no answer to point to the possible return of the escrow
payment “with interest” (at 6% or the prevailing Treasury
rate). Cash flow is an important factor in any business,
and in many instances operators may be forced to borrow
money in order to contest a violation. Given the prime
interest rate at the date of this Brief (20% and climbing),
the escrow requirement is clearly illuminated for what it
is, a gross and substantial deprivation of property.
Under the Act, failure to place the entire amount of a
proposed penalty into escrow results “in a waiver of all
legal rights to contest the violation or the amount of the
penalty” §518(c) [30 U.S.C. §1268(c)]. The Act itself
contains no requirement for any type of hearing prior to
payment. Maryland submits that~there is patently no
government interest served by such a taking prior to a
hearing, and that the escrow requirement of SMCRA
should be struck by this Court as a violation of the due
p.ocess standards of the Fifth Amendment.
9
ARGUMENT
I.
THOSE SECTIONS OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977 WHICH ATTEMPT TO REGULATE
POST-MINING LAND USE ASPECTS UNRELATED TO ENVIRONMEN.-
TAL CONTROL ARE NOT WITHIN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AU-
THORITY OF CONGRESS, AND ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE TENTH
AMENDMENT.
At one time, it could be firmly stated that the power of
Congress to act under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution extended only to actual interstate
activities, and not the means of producing goods which
were intended for such commerce. Production was not
commerce and, more specifically to this case, the mining of
coal was held not to be interstate commerce. Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921); Oliver Iron
Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1922); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1935). The more modern analysis
of Commerce Clause authority began when this Court
shifted its focus to whether the gctivity which Congress
desired to regulate affecte interstate commerce in a direct
or indirect manner. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295
U.S. 495 (1934). Next, the inquiry was said to be whether
a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
existed such that control was needed to protect commerce
from burdens and obstructions. NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936). Following some further
refinement, U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940), a simple
“rational basis” test finally was adopted as the basis for a
proper exercise of the Commerce Clause power. Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). It is fair to say that this test
still persists today, and that a federal statute may be
sustained under the Commerce Clause if there is a
“rational basis” for a finding by Congress that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, and
10
“reasonable” or “rational” means have been selected for its
regulation. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 US.
294, 303-304 (1964).
Despite such broadened deference for Congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause, the State of
Maryland urges that the rational basis test still represents
an enforceable limit to Congressional authority. The
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
violates this limit in several of its provisions which
attempt to regulate land use. Maryland would submit in
the alternative that even if the SMCRA provisions can be
sustained under a pure Commerce Clause analysis, Con-
gress has exceeded the Tenth Amendment limits upon its
authority to intrude into areas of state sovereignty,
recognized by this Court in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
A. Once mining is completed, the sole rational basis for
Commerce Clause jurisdiction lies in environmental
impacts on interstate commerce.
As noted in the federal Government’s Brief in Virginia
Surface Mining, the primary rational basis for the Act is
to control environmental hazards from strip mining. (Br.
pp. 24-25.) The mining of coal is, of course, also identified
as a significant contributor to the Nation’s energy require-
ments, § 101(b) [30 U.S.C. § 1201(b)]. However, the nega-
tive environmental factors are the focus of the statute; the
law is not an effort to promote coal production.
Maryland submits that once mining is completed on a
particular permit area, the only remaining effect of the
mined lands on interstate commerce is continued environ-
mental impact resulting from changes in the land due to
the mining operation. Under the most liberal interpreta-
tion, the land is no longer being used in any manner
11
related to economic aspects of commerce. Thus, unless the
fact that land was once used for such purposes is sufficient,
there is no basis for continued Commerce Clause jurisdic-
tion to protect the free flow of goods.
In its Brief in this appeal, the federal Government
asserts that, aside from adverse environmental effects,
there are at least two other separate and independent
grounds for SMCRA Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Quot-
ing from pp. 12-13 of the Brief:
First, because coal produced from surface mines is a
commodity sold in interstate commerce, Congress
may act under the Commerce Clause to regulate the
conditions under which that commodity is produced.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115, 122 (1941).
Second, because surface coal mining operations
adversely affect interstate commerce in agricultural
products and other commodities by diminishing land
productivity, Congress may exercise the Commerce
Clause to protect those aspects of interstate com-
merce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 256-257 (1964).
Maryland submits that these suggested Commerce Clause
grounds would, if sustained by this Court, virtually
eliminate any present restraint on Congressional author-
ity under the Commerce Clause.
The first ground is basically a self-serving restatement
of the evolved test for Commerce Clause jurisdiction,
absent the requirement that a rational basis must exist
between the identified impact on commerce, and the
means chosen to regulate it. Katzenbach v. McClung,
supra. However, this basis for Congressional authority
fails once mining is completed. After the coal has entered
interstate commerce, its continued status as a commercial
commodity cai: no longer rationally support Congressional
authority over the land which originally produced it.
r\
-.
12
The second ground proposed by Appellant would consti-
tute a vast expansion of even the current liberal test for
Commerce Clause jurisdiction. In essence, it suggests that
Congress may regulate any activity that reduces or
impairs land productivity. Following the logic of the
Government’s Brief at pp. 12-16, it is implied that
Congress could have banned strip mining entirely on
farmland simply upon a finding that some loss of crop
productivity results from surface coal mining operations.
Of course, SMCRA does not do this but, according to
Appellants, it does “[balance] the competing interests of
agriculture and surface coal mining. . . .” Brief p. 16. In
other words, Appellants argue, Congress has the power to
decide that a landowner, once engaged in farming, may
not switch to surface coal mining unless he can guarantee
that the full crop potential of the land will be restored."
State and local zoning decisions now control whether
land is used for industrial, agricultural, commercial,
residential, recreational or other purposes. A change from
one type of zoning to another may often favor one type of
interstate commerce over another. However, if this choice
alone establishes Congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause then there is little if any state action not
within the preemptive power of the federal government.
Maryland respectfully submits that this Court should
soundly reject any such expansion of Congressional au-
thority.
') Of course, the unknown factor is for whose benefit the land
is being restored for farming. Neither Congress nor the states
can force the landowner to actually resume farming. Thus, he
could simply wait for whatever period SMCRA requires, and
then execute his intended use for the property. Or, worse for the
country, he might not allow the coal on his property to be mined
due to the resulting loss of control over the use of his land.
13
B. Many of the SMCRA post-mining land use require-
ments bear no relation to environmental protection,
and are therefore invalid as not rationally adapted to
the sole basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction
during this period.
In a general sense, environmenta! protection concerns
related to strip mining deal with control of water pollution
during the mining operation, restoration of the land to its
original contour, reseeding and revegetating, and preven-
tion of any future surface or subsurface adverse effects on
water. Many SMCRA provisions properly address these
concerns. However, there are several provisions through-
out the Act which dictate actual land use during the term
after mining in which regulatory authorities will deter-
mine whether proper reclamation has been accomplished.
The District Courts, in this action and in Virginia Surface
Mining, have identified several provisions of the Act
which are invalid for this reason. Maryland would empha-
size the following two sections as illustrative of the
constitutional infirmity.
First, the Act establishes land use per se as a specific
performance standard, § 5..(b)(2) [30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2)].
Although contained in a section entitled “Environmental
Protection Performance Standards”, it is obvious on the
face of the statute that the land use standard is totally
unrelated to environmental protection. The actual text
provides as follows:
(b) General performance standards shall be applic-
able to all surface coal mining and reclamation
operations and shall require the operation as a
minimum to
* * * * * *
(2) restore the land affected to a condition capable
of supporting the use which it was capable of
supporting prior to any mining, or higher or better
uses of which there is reasonable likelihood, so long
14
as such use or uses do not present any actual or
probable hazard to public health or safety or pose any
actual or probable threat of water diminution or
pollution, and the permit applicant declared proposed
land use following reclamation is not deemed to be
impractical or unreasonable, inconsistent with applic-
able land use policies and plans, involves unreason-
able delay in implementation, or is violative of
federal, state, or local law.
Second, in the case of prime farmland, the focus on land
use control is even more specific. The post-mining land use
can only be cropland, and equivalent or higher levels of
yield must be obtained. This is based on § 510(d) of the Act
[30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)] which provides as follows:
(d)(1) In addition .. ., if the area prwposed to be
mined contains prime farmland . . . the regulatory
authority shall. . . grant a permit to mine on prime
farmland if the regulatory authority finds in writing
that the operator has the technological capability to
restore such mined area, within a reasonable time, to
equivalent or higher levels of yield as non-mined
prime farmland in the surrounding area, under
equivalent levels of management... .
Federal regulations on this point leave no room for
flexibility, and have been sustained by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in the consoli-
dated review of all SMCRA regulations." It is doubtful
that any case can be made for demanding that cropland,
once mined, must be used again as cropland in order to
control interstate environmental impacts from the mining
' 30 C.F.R. § 785.17(d) (1), 44 Federal Register 15374 (March
13, 1979). The regulations state simply that “the approved
proposed postmining land use of these prime farmlands will be
cropland.” As held by Judge Flannery in reviewing this
requirement in Jn Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, Civil Action No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980), Slip.
Op. at p. 5:
“Section 510(d) (1) corroborates the imposition of an
additional requirement for mining on prime farmland: the
land must be reclaimed and used as crop land.”
15
operation.”* Thus, there is no rational connection from this
provision to the basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction
once mining activities have been completed.
The State of Maryland submits that these provisions, as
well as the others identified by the District Courts, are not
reasonably related to the prevention of environmental
effects after the conclusion of mining operations. Although
it may be reasonable to inquire into the intended post-
mining land use of strip mined area so as to determine
whether any such use might act to frustrate or impede
environmental protections measures, it is not within the
authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause to
require specific land uses as conditions precedent to
obtaining a strip mining permit.
C. The SMCRA post-mining land use requirements,
even if within the Commerce power, are violative of
the Tenth Amendment as impairments on an attri-
bute of State sovereignty.
The landmark case of National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), holds that Commerce Clause
authority, if available, may not be exercised by Congress
in a manner so as to impair attributes of state sovereignty.
Land use planning and control is such an attribute of
state sovereignty.
As discussed above, if Congress need only point to the
loss of a particular type of commerce, due to a zoning
decision for example, to justify federal regulation, then
there is no practical limit to Commerce Clause jurisdic-
tion. Maryland submits that the Constitution does not
allow such an expansion of the Commerce Clause per se,
but that in any case, the Tenth Amendment stands as a
’* If anything, the opposite is true. As specifically held by the
District Court in this action, the prime farmland provisions
actually increase water pollution. Finding No. 8, J.S. App. at
16a.
16
bar to federal intrusion into pure land use decisions,
regardless of their indirect relation to commerce.
Land use planning and control is the means by which
states and local communities decide the nature of their
participation in our society: industrial or agricultural;
high or low population density; and hundreds of other
decisions on the basic character of an area. These deci-
sions, virtually by definition, result in changes to an area’s
impact on interstate commerce. If Congress can decide
that, for example, once a community is devoted to farming
it may not change since that would cause a drop in
agricultural productivity, then the federal government is
directly dictating how the people in that community must
make their living. Maryland submits that under our
system of government, such power is reserved solely to
states and local authorities who must daily answer to the
citizens they govern. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
508 n.18 (1975). The wisdom of this approach is obvious,
and should not be departed from in the name of strip mine
control, or any othér particular problem.
Il.
THE SMCRA ABSOLUTE PROHIBITIONS ON SURFACE COAL MIN.
ING ARE NOT WITHIN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AUTHORITY OF
CONGRESS, AND ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT.
A major feature of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 is the designation of certain areas
as “unsuitable for surface coal mining”, in which surface
mining operations are banned outright, § 522 [30 U.S.C.
§ 1272]. As held by the District Court, where this section is
addressed to non-federal lands, it is outside of the
Commerce Clause and violates the Tenth Amendment."
© Slip Opinion, pages 2 and 16 (J.S. App. 47a). Stricken
provisions are §§522(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) and (5) [80 U.S.C.
§§ 1272(a), (c), (d), (e) (4) and (5)]. Sections 522(b) and (e) (1), (2)
& (3) deal with federal lands or federally designated Parks,
— Areas, Trails, Wild and Scenic Rivers, and Historic
ites.
17
While urging this Court to affirm the District Court’s
decision in its entirety, Maryland would emphasize the
particular constitutional problems found in § 522(e)(5).
Subsection (e)(5) contains per se, absolute prohibitions
on surface coal mining. The full text of the statute is as
follows:
(e) After the enactment of this Act and subject to
valid existing rights no surface coal mining opera-
tions except those which exist on the date of enact-
ment of this Act shall be permitted—
* * * * * *
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied
dwelling, unless waived by the owner thereof, nor
within three hundred feet of any public building,
school, church, community, or institutional building,
public park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.
From a policy standpoint, Maryland has no objection to the
right granted here for a property owner to prevent or allow
mining within 300 feet of his dwelling (although this
grant is no more within the power of Congress than are
the prohibitions in the remainder of the subsection, for the
Same reasons as discussed below). Maryland strongly
objects to the absolute prohibitions in § 522(e)(5). As
indicated in the Statement of Interest, Maryland first tried
to temper them by insertion of a general waiver. However,
this approach was rejected by the federal Office of Surface
Mining.
Maryland submits that the absolute prohibitions on
mining in SMCRA § 522(e)(5) are not rationally related to
interstate commerce, and that Congress therefore may not
preempt the state’s control over strip mining for failure to
enact these provisions. The Secretary offers no argument
to the contrary here, and states only that “[the prohibi-
tions] are plainly directed toward the purpose of ensuring
that the extraction of coal does not endanger life and
18
property in mining communities.” (Br. p. 19). This is not a
basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Wickard v. Fil-
burn, supra. Furthermore, the means selected here are not
rationally adapted to the identified problem. Heart of
Atlanta, supra.
A 300 foot buffer zone may offer some protection in some
circumstances, but why should a dwelling owner be able to
waive this requirement when a church or park may not.
Schools may not be open in the summertime, yet the
SMCRA prohibition still holds, Under OSM regulations,
“community or institutional buildings” include power
plants, water supply and sewage treatment buildings, and
historic buildings. 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(d), 44 Federal Regis-
ter 15342 (March 13, 1979). None of these may waive the
restriction, even if the buffer zone is owned by the party
itself. A cemetery may be long abandoned, or may have its
own internal buffer zone, but these factors are not allowed
to be cor.sidered by a state permitting agency. In short,
there is no ability to make an informed decision on the
actual need for safety-related permit conditions in particu-
lar circumstances. In some cases, more than 300 feet may
be required. Other circumstances may require no set-
backs; simple time-of-day or time-of-year restrictions may
suffice. Maryland submits that such decisions must be
made on a case by case basis, and that the absolute
prohibitions of SMCRA § 522(e)(5) fail the test of rational-
ity even assuming, arguendo, that such areas of regulation
are within Congressional authority.
For similar reasons as discussed above, the SMCRA
absolute prohibitions should also be considered violative of
the Tenth Amendment. The aspect of state sovereignity
being intruded upon here is the basic state authority over
the health and welfare of its citizens. Maryland submits
that there is no state attribute more fundamental, and
that any Congressional action taken purportedly under
19
the Commerce Clause may not usurp this function without
clear and compelling grounds rooted in interstate com-
merce. There are no such grounds for the SMCRA
§ 522(e)(5) absolute prohibitions.
As shown by the lack of arguments on this point in the
Secretary's Brief, there is really nothing that can be said
for §522(e)(5) except that it is obviously aimed at
protecting life and property. (Br. p. 19). However, this
section is not related to the life and property of the people
actually engaged in surface coal mining.” It is aimed at .
bystanders, many of whom might wish to be involved and
would profit from the operation.'* Maryland submits that,
to the extent such people need to be protected from
themselves by appropriate safety regulations, such actions
are peculiarly within state authority under the Tenth
Amendment. As in the case of land use decisions, the
wisdom of this approach is simply and clearly to leave
basic health and safety decisions in the hands of those
elected officials who must daily answer to the people they
govern.
" Admittedly, Congress may have some authority over the
health and safety of people producing products that enter
interstate commerce. See generally, Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, Pub.L.No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290430 U.S.C.
§ 801 et seq]; and Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 [29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq].
“ As to those unwilling bystanders, there is little if any
connection between these people and interstate commerce so as
to sustain the Congressional action here in any balancing of the
federal and state interests involved. Simply being in the vicinity
of an activity related to interstate commerce is obviously not
sufficient to override the Tenth Amendment.
20
Il.
FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED BY THE CIVIL
PENALTY PROVISION OF SMCRA WHICH REQUIRES THAT ALL
PROPOSED ASSESSMENTS BE PREPAID IN ESCROW AS A CONDI-
TION PRECEDENT TO CONTESTING EITHER THE PENALTY
AMOUNT OR THE UNDERLYING VIOLATION OF A CITATION.
Maryland does not challenge the authority of Congress
to employ civil penalty provisions in conjunction with
enforcement actions under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977. The basic SMCRA requirements
here are quite similar to those used in other environmen-
tal statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act. However, SMCRA contains a unique and
important additional requirement: any civil penalty pro-
posed by an administrative agency in conjunction with an
enforcement action must be prepaid in full by the operator
as a condition precedent to challenging the penalty
amount or the underlying violation. Section 518(c) [30
U.S.C. § 1268(c)|. Maryland is aware of no precedent for
this requirement.
The statute itsel’ contains no provision for any type of
hearing prior to the necessity to prepay civil penalty
assessments as a condition of challenging the enforcement
action. Obviously, this raises important questions of
procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. To date, all courts that have considered this
issue have rejected the SMCRA provision on this ground."
The present test for validity of such provisions involves
a balancing of the government interest involved versus the
private interest affected. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 US.
319 (1975). As discussed below, Maryland submits that the
SMCRA escrow prepayment requirement is totally incap-
'" Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, Civ. 79-171-2 (S.D. Iowa, Feb. 13,
1980) Slip Op. 18-19, appeal pending, No. 80-49; and Virginia
Surface Mining.
21
able of satisfying this test, and should be rejected by this
Court as a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment.
A. The escrow provision constitutes a substantial dep-
rivation of private property.
It cannot be disputed that the private interests involved
here are deprivations of property protected by the Fifth
Amendment. Monetary takings prior to a hearing have
constituted the larger majority of the cases decided under
the principles at issue here.” In the circumstances of
SMCRA civil penalty prepayments, at least three substan-
tial impacts are possible.
First, at a minimum, even if an operator is successful in
challenging a civil penalty assessment, the law acts to
deprive him of the use.of his money for a significant period
of time. It is no answer to point to the possible return of
the escrow payment “with interest” (at 6% or the prevail-
ing Treasury rate). The need for working capital is a basic
requirement for efficient operation of any business. In-+a
state such as Maryland, where many operations are small
businesses, the prepayment requirement is an obvious
substantial hardship. In the case of Fuentes v. Shevin,”
this Court held that the Fifth Amendment right to be
heard exists prior to even a temporary, non-final depriva-
tion of property. At its best, the SMCRA escrow prepay-
* Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(garnishment of wages without prior hearing held unconstitu-
tional); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits without prior hearing held unconstitutional):
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975) (termination of
disability benefits requires prior hearing — but not necessarily
a full evidentiary hearing).
*“ 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972). Replevin of household goods for
default of installment payments. Creditor was allowed to take
possession solely on his assertion of non-payment, backed by a
bond. Fact that goods would be returned if claim was invalid
held irre‘evant to Fifth Amendment hearing requirement.
22
ment scheme falls squarely within this holding, and
should be invalidated.”
Second, in addition to the automatic temporary depriva-
tion, the magnitude of SMCRA civil penalties makes it
clear that small operators may be forced to borrow money
in order to make escrow prepayments so as to challenge
violations. Given the prime interest rate at the date of
this Brief (20% and climbing), there can be no doubt that
the requirement to prepay proposed assessments can
result in a permanent deprivation of a company’s assets.
Maryland submits that this is undeniably an effect
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment in the absence of a
prior hearing.
Third, in some circumstances, it is possible for the
escrow prepayment requirement to result in the closing of
a mine. Although a mine operator may be convinced that
he has been improperly cited for a violation of the Act, he
may.be unable to prepay the assessments resulting from
continued operation past a compliance deadline (basic
assessment plus minimum of $750.00 per day mandatory
penalty after deadline). If the disputed violation relates to
the basic method of operation on the permit area, there is
no option but to cease mining until resolution of the legal
# Maryland is incredulous at the statement in Appellant’s
Brief on page 70 that: “The ‘refund-with-interest’ provision in
Section 518(c) ensures that operators who prevail on administra-
tive or judicial review will suffer no financial injury.” If all the
government need do is pay interest, then the Fifth Amendment
has indeed lost its effectiveness.
* SMCRA civil penalties may range up to $5,000 per
violation, with each day of continuing viciation being deemed a
separate violation §518(a) [30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)]. The federal
Office of Surface Mining itself has indicated that the average
penalty per violation is approximately $2,000.00, and that the
$750.00 per day penalty once a deadline for compliance has
passed can result “in clearly excessive amounts considering the
nature and effects of the underlying violations of the Act” 45
Fed. Reg. 5540 (Jan. 23, 1980).
’
23
issues. In this regard, the civil penalty prepayment
scheme shows a clear potential for drastic consequences.
This scenario is not hypothetical, but actually occurred
to the Black Creek Mining Company of Norton, Virginia,
as described by Judge Williams in striking the provision
at issue here in the companion case of Virginia Surface
Mining, J.S. App. 69a-70a. Given this effect, Maryland
submits that the escrow prepayment provision clearly
involves substantial private interests under the Fifth
Amendment.
B. There is no governmental interest served by the
SMCRA civil penalty escrow provision.
In contrast to the private interests at stake, there are no
governmental interests served by the escrow provision.
The notion that prepayment is needed “to avoid the
problem of non-collection of fines” is untenable in the
context of a fully bonded strip mine operation.” As
specifically required by SMCRA § 509 [30 U.S.C. § 1259]
all permits must be backed by bonds or other security
sufficient to complete properly the operation, but not less
than $10,000. Thus, any failure to pay a final assessment
would simply result in permit revocation and forfeiture of
the outstanding security. A further consequence of forfei-
ture is disqualification for future mining permits. § 510(c)
[30 U.S.C. § 1260(c)].
Given these protections, Maryland believes that the
perceived need by Congress for prepayment of civil
penalties could be rejected on its face by this Court.
However, under any consideration, it is clear that the
private interests impacted by this provision greatly out-
* Senate Report No. 95-128, 95th Cong., 1st Session, at page
59. Cited by Appellants in their Brief in Virginia Surface
Mining, page 70, incorporated by reference into this action at
page 36 of Appellants Brief.
24
weigh whatever strength lies in the government’s con-
cerns, and that the escrow provision fails the test of
Matthews v. Eldridge, supra, for a valid taking of property
without a hearing under the Fifth Amendment.
C. The informal “assessment conference” provided by
the Office of Surface Mining does not substitute for
the required Fifth Amendment hearing.
Although the Act itself contains no requirement for a
hearing of any kind prior to prepayment of proposed
penalties into escrow, the Secretary has attempted to cure
the constitutional defect here by providing an “assessment
conference” prior to payment.” Maryland doubts that
agency regulations, as a general matter, are ever suffi-
cient to moot a clear constitutional infirmity on the face of
a statute. However, this issue need not be reached in the
instant case since the adopted “assessment conference”
would not be sufficient even if contained in the statute.
The basic Fifth Amendment right has been described as
the right to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Matthews, supra; Armstrong uv.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). The “time” need only be
before any deprivation, a test satisfied by the Secretary's
assessment conference. However, the conference does not
provide a hearing in a meaningful manner as required. At
most, the conference represents an opportunity to argue
for a lower assessment based on the rather exotic point
system established under the regulations.” There is no
independent, unbiased hearing examiner, and it is ex-
tremely doubtful that the assessment officer has the power
* 30 C.F.R. § 845.18; 44 Fed. Reg. 15463 (March 13, 1979).
* 30 C.F.R. § 845; 44 Fed. Reg. 15461 (March 13, 1979). OSM
regulations which would have required states to use the same
system have been remanded. § 732.15(b) (7) and § 840.13(a). Jn
Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, Civil
Action No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. 1980), 14 ERC 1083, 1089 (February
26, 1980), and Slip Opinion pp. 56-57 (May 16, 1980).
25
to reduce any proposed penalty to zero. Where a cesdation
order has been issued under § 521 of the Act [30 U.S.C.
$1271], some atnount of civil penalty is mandated by
§ 518(a) (30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)]. This, in these instances, the
Secretary cannot correct the statutory scheme of prepay-
ment prior to an adjudication on the underlying
violation.” In no case is a sufficient hearing held on the
amount of a penalty without prepayment.”
In summary, there is no regulation or argument adv-
anced by the Secretary which cures the basic violation of
Fifth Arieridment due process inheretit in the SMCRA
civil penalty prepayment requirement. All reviewing
courts to date have stricken this novel provision on Fifth
Amendment grounds, and this Court should affirm the
District Courts’ decisions on this issue.
”“ The Secretary argues that a hearing on the fact of a
violation may be obtained under § 525 without regard to §518
escrow prepayment (in apparent contradiction to the plain
meaning of §518(c)). Virginia Surface Mining, Br. pp. 68-69.
This may be possible, but is strictly a matter of timing. Since
proposed assessments are required by § 518(c) within 30 days of
a notice or order, and prepayment within 30 days thereafter, a
maximum of 60 days is available to adjudicate the violation.
(The Secretary can issue a proposed assessment earlier than 30
days from the notice and thus shorten the period accordingly.)
However, under § 525, the Secretary has 30 days to decide cases
arising under cessation orders, and more if he grants temporary
relief fromi the order. There are no deadlines for standard
violation notices. In short, it is fair to assume that few operators
will obtain a decision on an alleged violation prior to the
deadline for escrow prepayment of a proposed civil penalty.
* On page 69 of the Secretary’s Brief in Virginia Surface
Mining, it is expressly acknowledged that:
Accordingly, if a mine operator wishes to contest the
amount of a proposed penalty as well as the fact of the
underlying violation, it [sic] must seek review under
Section 518, and prepayment of the penalty into escrow is a
precondition of that review.
26
CONCLUSION
The District Court’s decision was correct in all respects
and, accordingly, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN H. Sacus
Attorney General
Tuomas A. DEMING
Assistant Attorney General
Micuae. J. Scipinico, II
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Natural Resources
Tawes State Office Building
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
(301) 269-2251
JANUARY 1981
la
APPENDIX A
Offices of
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Room 104
Legislative Services Building
90 State Circle
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
301-269-3786
May 21, 1980
Honorable Harry Hughes
Governor of Maryland
State House
Annapolis, Maryland 21404
Re: Senate Bill 975
Dear Governor Hughes:
We have reviewed Senate Bill 975 for constitutionality
and legal sufficiency and, although we have no objection to
the bill becoming law, we must point out a serious
constitutional question raised by one of its provisions.
Senate Bill 975, among other things, attempts to
conform Maryland’s strip mining laws to the Federal
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328. In so doing, the bill amends § 7-
517(b)(4) of the Natural Resources Article to provide for a
civil penalty scheme patterned after 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c). In
essence, this amendment provides that a person adversely
affected by a proposed civil penalty assessment imposed
after the issuance of cease and desist order or notice of
noncompliance may request an adjudicatory hearing on
the questions before the Department of Natural Resources.
However, “at the time of the request the full amount of the
penaliy must be paid over to the Secretary for placement
in an escrow account pending completion of administrative
2a
and judicial review of the assessment.” § 7-517(b)(4). In
addition, this provision states:
Failure to forward the full amount to the Secret-
ary within 30 days of an assessment order shall result
in a waiver of all legal rights to contest the amount of
the penalty or the underlying violation. If it is
eventually determined that no violation occurred, or
the amount of the penalty is reduced, the Secretary
shall remit within 30 days the appropriate amount to
the person, with interest at the rate of 6 percent.
In our view, this penalty prepayment provision may offend
due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Substantial penalties,
which may exceed $5,000 per day for each violation, can be
imposed on a suspected violator before he can contest
either the violation or the amount of the penalty. More-
over, in our view, such a deprivation of property is not
remedied by the fact that the money is placed in escrow
and may be returned in the future with interest. Although
such a scheme may very well deter violation of the strip
mining laws, it also may force settlement and deter
appeals regardless of the merits. In addition, it would
appear to strike hardest at the less wealthy operators. The
federal penalty provision, along with other features of the
federal act, are the subject of constitutional challenge in
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., Inc. v.
Anderson, ___ F. Supp. ——, No. 78-0224-B (N.D. Va.,
Jan. 3, 1980), jurisdictional statement filed __ U.S. __,
No. 79-1596 (April 11, 1980)' and Star Coal v. Anderson,
____ F. Supp. —__,, No. 79-1712 (S.D. Iowa, preliminary
injunction issued Feb. 13, 1980).
The Department of Natural Resources has been advised
that all states must duplicate the penalty prepayment
' Also, at issue in that case is the constitutionality of absolute
restrictions on mining within certain distances of public and
private places and of absolute requirements that all violations
be corrected within 90 days. Because S.B. 975 adds these
provisions to State law, but with some moderating features, we
do not believe they are facially unconstitutional.
3a
provision in their laws to obtain federal approval of their
strip mining enforcement program. If Maryland’s program
does not contain this feature, it may be disqualified, with
the result being that the federal government will enforce
federal law in Maryland, including the prepayment penal-
ty scheme. For these reasons, we urge that the bill be
signed so that these provisions will be enforced by State
officials sensitive to the constitutional questions raised by
the legislation.
Very truly yours,
Stephen H. Sachs
Attorney General
SHS:RAZ:ss
cc: Honorable Fred L. Wineland
Judson P. Garrett, Jr., Esq.
F. Carvel Payne
Honorable Harry J. McGuirk
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.