Appellants Brief — Hodel v. Indiana

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Suprame VOU, US.

FILED

No. 80-231 idv 26 1980

&.

aun the Supreme Court of the Wuites States ——

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

CreciL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

STATE OF INDIANA, ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS

WADE H. McCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

SANFORD SAGALKIN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

PETER BUSCEMI

Assistant to the Solicitor General

PETER R. STEENLAND, JR.

MICHAEL A. McCorD

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

ju the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-231

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS *

Vv.

STATE OF INDIANA, ET AL.**

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The principal regulatory and enforcement provisions

of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

* Other defendants below and appellants in this Court are the

Director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and En-

forcement, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforce-

ment, the United States Department of the Interior, and the United

States of America.

** Other plaintiffs below and appellees here are the Governor of

Indiana, the Director of the Indiana Department of Natural Re-

sources, the Indiana Department of Natural Resources, the Indi-

ana Coal Association, Meadowlark Farms, Inc., AMAX Coal Com-

pany, Peabody Coal Company, and John A. Conlon.

(I)

II

1977, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1201 et seg., are contained in

Title V of the statute, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1251-1279.

Among the more important provisions in Title V are

those dealing with surface mining on prime farmland, the

handling and replacement of topsoil during and after

surface mining operations, the restoration of mined lands

to their approximate original contour, the designation

of certain lands as unsuitable for surface mining, and

the pre-mining administrative review of proposed post-

mining land uses. The questions presented in this case

are:

1. Whether the aforementioned provisions in Title V

of the Surface Mining Act exceed Congress’ power under

the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, of the

Constitution.

2. Whether the same provisions violate the Tenth

Amendment.

3. Whether the “prime farmland” and approximate

original contour provisions in Title V of the Surface

Mining Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment because they are arbitrary and capricious

or impermissibly discriminate among coal mine operators

in different states.

4, Whether the provisions in Title V concerning the

reclamation of prime farmlands after surface mining

and the designation of certain lands as unsuitable for

surface mining take private property without just com-

pensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

5. Whether Section 518(c) of the Act, which requires

a coal mine operator to deposit the proposed amount of a

civil penalty into an interest-bearing escrow account be-

fore seeking full administrative review, violates the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ry en FEE a LEIS SS ET IS Oe A rT:

POD oi siitcceccenstiipiianigusianissspitiihsinitbiallidlbitieibataslahediamtiditeenns

Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ..........

POINTS | iissticpnonssiianetpiceagarencintsisesiliecceahadninibigiaiashnaaaiints

RT GE CE esi sicessencenbcnines siacceaictiosndntndctitablecn

Argument:

I. The challenged provisions of Title V of the Sur-

face Mining Act do not exceed Congress’ power

under the Commerce Clause ...00000........0.00000000000---

II. The challenged provisions in Title V of the Act

do not violate the Tenth Amendment ..................

III. The prime farmland provisions and the approxi-

mate original contour requirement in Section

515(b) (8) of the Act do not violate the substan-

tive due process or equal protection guarantees

OF tine FIR) AMMOMGIORG oi accnc.cciccccccsccscscccccesesas

IV. The prime farmland provisions and Section 522

of the Surface Mining Act do not violate the

Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-

Io vistcs sirvccnsidacrdabsijn doicscibhesabactasnsaiaiedivadtaee seis

V. The civil penalty provisions in Section 518(c)

of the Act do not violate the Due Process

ID occicchchsiceisiclbicssccsdidiidiesodicseceinnraiaeee

I gis ccicibeunpehiptntaicainepehebaneitn eat er eee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 ....... oe

Curries V. Wallace, 806 U.S. 1. ........c..cccce-ccceccosceceeceese

Duke Power Co. Vv. Carolina Environmental Study

Cre, GD Ss BD Srcsctcvcctieiniicitn ee

10

20

25

29

36

37

27, 28

Cases—Continued Page

Ferguson Vv. Skrupa, 872 U.S. 726 .......................... 27

Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277.... 13

Graham V. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 ......000000..00...... 27

Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 .............. 27, 28

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379

Nee a thiapehcnuinhediatiuntnaieasigh 12

International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F. 2d

1884, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 982 .......................... 13

Katzenbach v. McClung, 879 U.S. 294 ..........0.0....... 14

Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 788 ........................ 13

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833.... 25

NLRB Vv. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 ................... belie 14

Nyquist v. Mauclet, 482 U.S. 1 ................ i. 27

Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 318 U.S. 508 ................ 8, 22

Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 ......0....000000..... 11,14

Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,

In re, No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980), ap-

peals pending, Nos. 80-1810 et seq. (D.C. Cir.

RPE STN ESTES ESRI aeerot ee Sener ree 24, 32

Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,

In re, 14 E.R.C. 1083 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980),

appeals pending, Nos. 80-1810 et seq. (D.C. Cir.

a aes 23, 32

Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704,

SU MEL UD PR, UR odes ccs rc eecsaatseomaecns 13

Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 648.... 15

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.

SSO Ts Akt 9 I Oo OR AROS PICEA pe 34

Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining

I a catia 24, 27

South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 .......... 22

Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 000000000000 15

Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, Civ. No. 79-171-1 (S.D.

Iowa Feb. 13, 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-49.. 29

Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, In re, 452

pa, ED CID Seep lp ee er eg 30

Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, In re, 456

F. Supp. 1301, aff’d and rev’d in part, 627 F.2d

PRE NSe NRMRERI ae URSERAET aals SU ea eae ee ARLEN 2

Cases—Continued Page

United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.

US sack tik cancels ‘coca Nladtaha is Lo ella aaiae adie Ualilindideaedaibenn 13

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 ............0....... 34

Usery V. Turner Elthorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1... 26

Vance V. Bradley, 440 U.S. 98 ..........8.............cc.e eee 28

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realiy Co., 272 U.S.

RRR Ne PR IAS Meir BUN RI BO SMCS) Se eee TD 21

Virginia Surface Mining ‘and Reclamation Ass’n

v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, probable jurisdic-

tion noted, Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1596 (Oct. 6,

BO sirius aerihaliavdinstbsebiscivadansdinaedbbaesabsreasunnsiabsnctivens 1, 29

Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 20... eeseesceeees 21

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 .................... 8, 11, 14, 22

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

United States Constitution:

ee a IE TP hate ee 1, 4, 10

Fifth Amendment ................ 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 27, 28, 29

a III veka es sicccersscidsacstacsdncceisasccmorsonsd passim

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1201 et seq. -...000000...... 1

Section 101(c), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1201(c).. 11

Section 101(g), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1201(g).. 11, 20

Section 101 (h), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1201 (h).. 11

Section 101(j), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1201(j).. 11

Section 102(f), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1202(f).. 12

Section 503, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258 ............ 4

Section 508, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258 ............ 8,4, 19

Section 508 (a) (2), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258

3 tS GRRE AOE ROG eae OE MONE Fe 17

Section 508(a) (2) (C), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I)

TIN UE TEE sess caetisec Aisle taecionecke 30, 32

Section 508 (a) (3), 80 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258

IR UE saieca xsencecheeatinendakeonigticaidinsn cbc 17

Section 508 (a) (4), 80 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258

RINY. pecdnitaaranAninincunpnaspbtasiabscssidtdcseametecaaia cas 17

Section 508 (a) (8), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258

1 IRR REL Me ROT E IANA IA ES Rati oar ete eT 17

VI

Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued Page

Section 508 (a) (10), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258

ON 7 Raa eA a OAM oR ee Diaey een. CF SR roar 17

Section 509, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1259 -.......... 30

Section 510(b) (1), 830 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1260

RIP IRIE dus tases ic acsechieceaseicahanncedeicioveeiiountashiesapatiaabinaniniss 17

Section 510(b) (2), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1260

RU cic id cln tancknraitchk setthrailaehnkeher meuerassalabannaies 17

Section 510(d) (1), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1260

I dns ies cit ens cnailaeeseaeebanide 2, 8, 29, 31, 32

Section 515(b) (8), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265

RUN PII ichchcels accosascecsnetinivepasbabdencisebbea’ 8, 8, 17, 18, 25, 26

Section 515(b) (5), 80 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265

(TREO RE RISA EOSTA Raye eeieiee hice Taba me 8, 7, 17,19

Section 515 (b) (7), 830 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265

CRG ira jstccsescvemisndniphetidbntepdbeechonbatansonmnsiacasnines 3

Section 515 (b) (19), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265

RSS AASEL TS CoRR Fehr RSE PRA SILO, ev 17

Section 515 (b) (20), 30 U. S. C. (Supp. I) 1265

RIE ECR ILE Se ESO ea ae Me ein AE 17

Section 515 (d), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265 (d).. 8

Section 518(c), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1268(c).. 4, 5, 6,

10, 20, 36

Section 519(c) (2), 830 U.S.C. (Supp. I), 1269

I Sasa as 3, 31, 32

Section 519(c) (3), 830 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1269

_ARSIRMERRW RSS RETRY 4, ORES ES ee oOo 23

Section 522, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272....3, 5, 6, 9, 10,

19, 25, 35

Section 522(a), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(a).. 4,10,

17, 24, 25, 34, 35

Section 522(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272

i Oe 34

Section 522 (a) (2), 80 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272

a id 24

Section 522(a) (3), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272

OE CREE AMR rae | CN AE EL 25

Section 522(a) (5), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272

IE ohcdbivincisoknnihlarciosncciialespiteniaceatinenentstiaen 25

Section 522(a) (6), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272

(a) (6) .. sbessnaimionacs 35

VII

Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued Page

Section 522(c), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(c).. 4,10,

17, 24, 25, 35

Section 522(d), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(d).. 4,10,

17, 24, 25, 35

Section 522(e), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(e).. 4,19

Section 522(e) (4), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272

a a 4, 17, 25, 36

Section 522(e) (5), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272

NIN ‘eciicas eUensieiienitdislec didi bach dcisciodandobipionenided 4,17, 25, 36

Section 526(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1276

SRT LRRIE SARS SR SE Fe Sa eT ape 30

Section 701(20), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1291

RRR PRPS Rs CI AES ee RE 2

Te Re I I Sa icc baie 2

30 C.F.R. 701.5, 44 Fed. Reg. 15320 (1979) .......... 2

30 C.F.R. 716.7, 42 Fed. Reg. 62693-62694 (1977)... 2,29

30 C.F.R. 785.17(b) (8), 44 Fed. Reg. 15374

BNR IDEA EL Sp AAU ASST YD ND 32

30 C.F.R. 785.17(d) (1), 44 Fed. Reg. 15374

eed NRSC ie PAIS SE VEN AR ep SOO Cn 24

30 C.F.R. 823.11(c), 828.15(b) and (c), 44 Fed.

BE, GUAM RD CUD | rnsececnnctovcecheccesdcsadeccveccoe 23

Miscellaneous:

pe | eg Tb 5 | Reece ena en eee 15

tae aes ee, Beene... 15

123 Cong. Rec. 15720-15721 (1977) .............. 15

ae I Os Be. OD oc kvrseccce cei ccc ccscecsenccees 15

Bh. 5 eae eee 29

44 Fed. Reg. 15818-15319 (1979) 0.00. 2

OR eg, Senne En 2

45 Fed. Reg. 78482 (Nov. 25, 1980) 0.00000. 4

H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.

TORIC aR Let ee PEL Sie 18, 14,

16, 18, 19

Report of the Interagency Task Force on the Issue

of a Moratorium or a Ren on Mining in Prime

Agricultural Lands (1977) .......:...2..--.-..0ccc0000000--- 13

VIII

Miscellaneous—Continued

S. Rep. No. 95-128, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 50

ao NVR eR PEE San Oe Pe ee

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977: Hearings on H.R. 2 Before the Subcomm.

on Energy and the Environment of the House

Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Pts. II

and IV, 95th Cong., lst Sess. (1977) .............. 16,

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977: Hearings on S. 7 Before the Subcomm. on

Public Lands and Resources of the Senate

Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th

a IN I A II inchs iccsscoretersmaninseoneaibccrsaens

Page

18, 19

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the district court (J.S. App. la-44a)

is not yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The final order and judgment of the district court

(J.S. App. 45a-49a) was entered on June 10, 1980. The

Secretary of the Interior filed a notice of appeal to this

Court on June 16, 1980 (J.S. App. 50a-51a). The Court

noted probable jurisdiction on October 6, 1980. The ju-

risdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1252.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution,

the Fifth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution,

and the relevant portions of the Surface Mining Control

and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1201

et seq., are reprinted in J.S. App. 55a-68a.

STATEMENT

1. Like Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation

Ass’n V. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980),

probable jurisdiction noted, Nos. 79-1538 and 179-1596

(Oct. 6, 1980), this case involves a broad constitutional

challenge to numerous important provisions of the Sur-

face Mining Act. Because of geographical differences be-

tween Virginia and Indiana and the resulting differences

in the methods and effects of surface coal mining opera-

tions in the two states, many of the specific provisions

attacked in the present case are different from the “steep

slope” provisions that were the primary focus of plain-

tiffs’ complaint in Virginia Surface Mining. Plaintiffs’

legal theories in the two cases are virtually identical,

however.

(1)

2

The basic structure of the Surface Mining Act is de-

scribed in the Secretary’s brief in the Virginia case at

pages 2-7.1 The specific provisions of the Act challenged

by the State of Indiana and the other plaintiffs below

are listed in the district court’s opinion (J.S. App. 3a-

5a). A brief description of these provisions follows.

First, plaintiffs attack several sections of the Act re-

ferred to collectively as the “prime farmland” provisions.

These sections establish certain special requirements for

surface coal mining operations conducted on land that

qualifies as prime farmland under a definition promul-

gated by the Secretary of Agriculture and that has his-

torically been used as cropland within the meaning of

the Secretary of the Interior’s regulations. See Section

701(20) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1291(20).? In

particular, Section 510(d) (1) of the Act provides that

an application for a surface mining permit on prime

1A copy of the Secretary’s brief in Virginia Surface Mining has

been sent to plaintiffs in the present case.

2 Section 701(20) provides:

[T]he term “prime farmland” shall have the same meaning as

that previously prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture on

the basis of such factors as moisture availability, temperature

regime, chemical balance, permeability, surface layer compo-

sition, susceptibility to flooding, and erosion characteristics,

and which historically have been used for intensive agricultural

purposes, and as published in the Federal Register.

The Secretary of Agriculture’s definition is found at 7 C.F.R. Part

657, and is incorporated into the Secretary of the Interior’s perma-

nent regulations implementing the Surface Mining Act by 30 C.F.R.

701.5, 44 Fed. Reg. 15320 (1979). See also id. at 15318-15319

(defining “cropland”’), and 30 C.F.R. 716.7, 42 Fed. Reg. 62693-

62694 (1977), the interim regulation defining “prime farmland” for

purposes of the Act’s initial phase. The United States District

Court for the District of Columbia remanded the latter regulation

to the Secretary for reconsideration on grounds not directly rele-

vant here. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456

F. Supp. 1301, 1812 (1978), aff’d in part and rev'd in part on other

grounds, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Secretary has pro-

mulgated a proposed new regulation defining “prime farmland” for

purposes of the interim program. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33625 (1979).

3

farmland may be granted only if the mine operator can

demonstrate its “technological capability to restore such

mined area, within a reasonable time, to equivalent or

higher levels of- yield as nonmined prime farmland in

the surrounding area under equivalent levels of manage-

ment * * *.” The operator also must show that it can

“meet the soil reeonstruction standards” for prime farm-

land set forth in Section 515(b) (7). 380 U.S.C. (Supp.

I) 1260(d) (1), 1265(b) (7). Section 515(b) (7) gen-

erally requires that, if surface coal mining operations

are to be conducted on prime farmlands, the distinct

soil horizons must be separately removed, segregated,

stockpiled, and then properly replaced and regraded.

Furthermore, Section 519(c) (2) provides that, upon the

completion of mining activities on prime farmland, a

mine operator’s performance bond will be released only

on a showing that soil productivity “has returned to

equivalent levels of yield as nonmined land of the same

soil type in the surrounding area under equivalent man-

agement practices * * *.” 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1269(c)

(2).

In addition to the prime farmland provisions, plaintiffs

challenge a variety of more general sections in the Act

applicable uniformly throughout the country. These in-

clude Section 515(b) (3)’s requirement that mined land

be restored to its approximate original contour and the

command in Section 515(b) (5) that surface mine op-

erators remove topsoil separately during mining activi-

ties and preserve it for use during reclamation if it is

not to be replaced immediately on the backfill area of the

mining cut. 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265(b) (3), (5).3

Plaintiffs object generally to the provisions in Section

508 of the Act that require applicants for surface min-

ing permits to include in their application proposed

* Section 515(b)(3) states the approximate original contour

requirement applicable generally to surface mining operations;

plaintiffs in Virginia Surface Mining challenged the approximate

original contour provision in Section 515(d) of the Act, which is

applicable only to surface mining operations on steep slopes.

4

reclamation plans specifying the intended post-mining use

for the land involved and the method by which that use

will be achieved. 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258. Plaintiffs

also complain about Section 522 of the statute, which

provides that states wishing to assume primary regula-

tory authority over surface mining operations within

their borders during the permanent program phase must

establish and implement a planning and administrative

review procedure for determining whether particular

lands are unsuitable for some or all kinds of surface

mining. 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(a), (c), (d).*

Like the plaintiffs in Virginia Surface Mining, plain-

tiffs here also object to Section 522(e)’s general injunc-

tion against mining within 100 feet of roadways and

cemeteries or within 300 feet of public buildings, schools,

churches, public parks, or occupied dwellings. 30 U.S.C.

(Supp. I) 1272(e) (4) and (5). Finally, like the plain-

tiffs in Virginia Surface Mining, plaintiffs in the present

case raise a due process challenge to the procedure for

collecting proposed civil penalties under Section 518(c)

of the Act. 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1268(c).

2. The present case comprises two companion suits,

consolidated for all purposes. Both were filed in August

1978, the first by the State of Indiana and several of its

officials, and the second by the Indiana Coal Association,

coal mine operators, and others. Plaintiffs contended:

(1) that all the substantive statutory provisions de-

scribed above (1.e., all the provisions mentioned with the

exception of Section 518(c)) are beyond the scope of

the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce

under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution; (2) that

the same provisions violate the Tenth Amendment be-

cause they regulate land uses, thereby usurping an “in-

4 Note 9 of the Secretary’s brief in Virginia Surface Mining

describes generally the progress to date of the states’ submission

of proposed permanent regulatory programs under Section 503

of the Act and the Secretary’s response to those submissions.

Like that submitted by Virginia, the proposed program submitted

by Indiana was approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45

Fed. Reg. 78482 (Nov. 25, 1980).

5

tegral governmental function” traditionally reserved to

and performed by the states; (3) that the provisions

of the Act dealing with reclamation of prime farmlands

and restoration of mined lands to their “approximate

original contour” violate the substantive due process and

equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment be-

cause they impermissibly discriminate among mine op-

erators in different states; (4) that the prime farmland

provisions of the Act and Section 522’s provisions re-

garding the designation of certain lands as unsuitable

for surface mining take private property without just

compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and

(5) that Section 518(c)’s requirement that proposed

civil penalties be deposited into escrow as a condition

of full administrative review violates due process.

On April 18, 1979, a hearing was held on plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants’ mo-

tion to dismiss. At this one-day hearing, the parties pre-

sented several exhibits and affidavits in support of their

positions, and eight witnesses testified. Pursuant to a

stipulation (A. 48-50), the district court ultimately de-

cided the case on the merits without taking further evi-

dence. On June 10, 1980, the court issued an order

(J.S. App. 45a-49a) and opinion (J.S. App. la-44a) sus-

taining each of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the

Act as described above.®

The court adopted plaintiffs’ argument that various

sections of Title V of the Act exceed Congress’ power

under the Commerce Clause (J.S. App. 12a-19a), and

held that, in any event, the same provisions of the Act

violate the reserved rights of the states under the Tenth

Amendment (id. at 36a). In particular, the court ruled

that the portions of the Act dealing with prime farm-

lands, restoration of mined lands to their “approximate

original contour,” topsoil replacement, restriction of sur-

face mining in certain locations, and pre-mining review

5 The court’s opinion consists of “Findings of Fact and Con-

clusions of Law” adopted verbetim from the proposal submitted

by plaintiffs.

6

of post-mining land uses are unconstitutional (id. at 46a-

48a). The district court also concluded, on equal protec-

tion and substantive due process grounds, that the ap-

proximate original contour and prime farmland pro-

visions of the Act violate the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment (id. at 37a-39a). In addition, the

court held that the statutory requirement that mined

prime farmland be restored to equivalent levels of pro-

ductivity offends the Just Compensation Clause of the

Fifth Amendment (id. at 40a-42a). The court found an-

other unconstitutional taking in Section 522 of the Act,

which, with various exceptions, prohibits surface coal

mining within 100 feet of any cemetery or the “outside

right-of-way line of any public road,” or within 300 feet

of any public building, school, church, public park, or.

occupied dwelling, and establishes procedures for desig-

nating lands unsuitable for all or certain types of surface

coal mining (ibid.). Finally, the court ruled that the

civil penalty provisions in Section 518(c) of the Act

deny mine operators due process and are therefore in-

valid (id. at 48a-44a). The district court’s judgment

permanently enjoined enforcement of all the foregoing

provisions (J.S. App. 45a-49a).

The Secretary filed a notice of appeal to this Court

on June 16, 1980 (J.S. App. 50a-5la). On June 25,

1980, the district court denied the Secretary’s motion for

a stay pending appeal (J.S. App. 52a-53a). On July

2, 1980, Justice Stevens stayed the district court’s order

pending final disposition of this appeal (J.S. App. 54a).

The Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 6, 1980.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I

The numerous provisions of the Surface Mining Act

challenged by plaintiffs do not exceed Congress’ power

under the Commerce Clause. Although different portions

of the Act are disputed in this case, the Secretary’s

Commerce Clause arguments are essentially the same as

7

those already advanced in Virginia Surface Mining

(Br. 20-27).

The district court erred in invalidating the “prime

farmland” provisions on the basis of a judicial finding

that surface mining operations on prime farmlands

“have an infinitesimal or trivial impact on interstate

commerce.” Not only did this finding accord inadequate

deference to the contrary views of Congress, but it also

ignored the decisions of this Court establishing that the

amount of commerce affected by a particular activity

does not determine whether Congress legitimately may

regulate that activity under the Commerce Clause.

The district court further erred in concluding that a

wide variety of statutory provisions generally applicable

to all surface mining operations under the Act are not

rationally related to the congressional goal of removing

or minimizing the adverse effects of surface mining on

interstate commerce. The court arbitrarily confined the

legislative purpose of the Act to “the alleviation of water

or air pollution” and thus disregarded several other im-

portant objectives that Congress hoped to achieve in the

statute. In particular, the court failed to consider ade-

quately the congressional desire to preserve the productiv-

ity of land subject to surface mining and to protect life

and property in nearby communities from the hazards

created by surface mining operations. When the full

range of legislative goals is considered, the relationship

of the challenged statutory provisions to the protection

of interstate commerce becomes clear. Moreover, even

if the alleviation of water pollution is the only objective

considered, the district court was not justified in con-

cluding that statutory provisions such as the topsoil re-

placement requirement in Section 515(b) (5) of the Act

are unrelated to that goal.

II

The statutory provisions challenged by plaintiffs also

do not violate the rights reserved to the states under the

8

Tenth Amendment. The Secretary’s primary contentions

in this regard are stated in the Virginia Surface Mining

brief (Br. 28-38), and we rely on them here. The dis-

trict court erred both by assuming that control of land

use is a matter exclusively within the province of state

and local governments and by determining that the

Surface Mining Act is and was intended to be primarily

a land-use measure. This Court’s decisions establish that

federal legislation authorized by the Commerce Clause

does not offend the Tenth Amendment merely because it

may affect the use of land in particular states. See,

e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) ;

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Moreover,

the Surface Mining Act does not and was not intended

to control the use of land on a long-term basis. In most

cases, the Act seeks only to restore surface-mined land

to the condition it was in before mining began. Once

that is accomplished, the Act imposes no restrictions

whatever on the way in which land may be used.

III

The “prime farmland” provisions and the approximate

original contour requirement in Section 515(b) (8) of

the Act do not violate the substantive due process and

equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.

The mere fact that these provisions may have differing

impacts in different parts of the country does not show

that Congress acted irrationally or that it impermissibly

distinguished between one region and another. As the

district court observed in Virginia Surface Mining (79-

1538 J.S. App. 41a), “almost any form of economic reg-

ulation will affect some persons or interests more harshly

than others.” Legislation “adjusting the benefits and

burdens of economic life” comes to this Court with a

strong presumption of constitutionality, and persons

seeking to overturn such statutes bear a heavy burden

of showing that Congress acted improperly. Plaintiffs

have not carried that burden in this case. Various pro-

visions of the Act may affect certain areas more than

iia

9

they affect other areas, but that is because geographical

conditions are not constant throughout the country.

Congress, understandably, has determined that reg-

ulatory measures appropriate for steep-slope mines are

not necessarily suitable for “prime farmland” mines.

IV

Section 522 of the Act and the “prime farmland” pro-

visions requiring restoration of mined farmlands to the

productivity levels of unmined land in the same area

under equivalent levels of management do not take

private property without just compensation, in violation

of the Fifth Amendment. The majority of the Secre-

tary’s arguments concerning the taking question are

fully explicated in the Virginia Surface Mining brief

(Br. 39-60), and, once again, we rely on the discussion

there.

The district court’s invalidation of the “prime farm-

land” provisions appears to have been based in large

part on a misconstruction of the statute.: The court dis-

tinguished between “high levels of management” and

“basic levels of management” and concluded that mined

prime farmland could be restored to productivity at-

tained under “basic” management practices but not to

that achieved under “high” management practices.

These terms are not defined or even used in the relevant

statutory provisions, which require only that produc-

tivity comparisons between restored prime farmland and

unmined land in the surrounding area be conducted on

the basis of “equivalent” levels of management. The

court essentially defined “high levels of management” to

be those levels that would result in productivity beyond

that which can be achieved after surface mining; it then

held that the restoration requirements of the Act are

“technologically impossible” to satisfy in areas where

“high levels of management” have been employed. The

“prime farmland” provisions were not intended to be

interpreted in this artificial way, and the Secretary has

not applied them in the manner suggested by the district

10

court. Duly enacted statutes should not be stricken on

the basis of semantic manipulations that distort the reg-

ulatory purpose of Congress.

Nor do Sections 522(a), (c), and (d) of the Act take

property without compensation. These provisions merely

establish procedures for designating certain lands as

unsuitable for some or all types of surface mining dur-

ing the permanent program phase. No such designations

have yet been made under the Act, and plaintiffs there-

fore have not been affected by the statute in any way.

If plaintiffs wish to object, they should complain about

individual designations when made, not about the statute

that provides for the designation process. Section 522

contains several features designed to ameliorate harsh-

ness in particular circumstances, and it is impossible to

evaluate the effects of the statute until it is applied in a

concrete situation.

V

For the reasons stated at some length in the Secre-

tary’s Virginia Surface Mining brief (Br. 67-71), the

civil penalty provisions in Section 518(c) of the Act do

not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment.

ARGUMENT

I

THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF TITLE V OF

THE SURFACE MINING ACT DO NOT EXCEED

CONGRESS’ POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE

CLAUSE

The district court ruled (J.S. App. 8a-19a) that ap-

proximately 21 different provisions in Title V of the

Surface Mining Act are unconstitutional because they

exceed Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause in

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. The court’s

decision in this regard was divided into two principal

parts. The court held first that the six “prime farm-

11

land” provisions * are “directed at facets of surface coal

mining which have no substantial and adverse effect on

interstate commerce” (J.S. App. 17a). For this reason,

the court said, the “prime farmland” provisions are not

“reasonably and plainly adapted to the legitimate end of

removing any substantial adverse effect on interstate

- commerce” (ibid.). With respect to the remaining sub-

stantive provisions under attack, which apply to surface

mining operations generally, the court did not suggest

that the impact of surface mining on interstate commerce

is insufficiently significant to justify congressional regu-

lation. Rather, the court assumed that surface mining’s

only significant effects on commerce involve water pollu-

tion or air pollution, determined that such adverse envi-

_.Yronmental effects are adequately treated elsewhere in the

Act, and, on that basis, concluded that all 15 of the gen-

erally applicable provisions challenged by plaintiffs are

“not means reasonably and plainly adapted to the legiti-

mate end of removing substantial adverse effects on

interstate commerce” (id. at 19a).

A. As the Secretary has argued in Virginia Surface

Mining (Br. 23), it is well-established that the Com-

merce Clause grants Congress plenary power not only to

regulate the use and protect the instrumentalities of

interstate commerce, but also to regulate activities affect-

ing such commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,

150-152 (1971) ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-

125 (1942). The statutory findings concerning the ways

in which surface mining affects interstate commerce are

summarized in the Virginia Surface Mining brief (Br.

20-21), and we do not repeat them here. See Sections

101(c), (g), (h), and (j) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. (Supp.

I) 1201(c), (g), (h), and (j). They reveal at least three

separate and independent grounds for congressional regu-

lation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations

under the Commerce Clause. First, because coal produced

—_

® The six provisions are listed and described at J.S. App. 9a-10a.

12

from surface mines is a commodity sold in interstate

commerce, Congress may act under the Commerce Clause

to regulate the conditions under which that commodity

is produced. /nited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115,

122 (1941). Second, because surface coal mining opera-

tions adversely affect interstate commerce in agricul-

tural products and other commodities by diminishing land

productivity, Congress may exercise the Commerce Clause

power to protect those aspects of interstate commerce.

See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379

U.S. 241, 256-257 (1964). Third, because surface mining

operations cause erosion and landslides, contribute to

floods and water pollution, and create dangerous condi-

tions for life and property in nearby communities, Con-

gress may act under the Commerce Clause to prevent

such adverse environmental effects from burdening inter-

state commerce.

The district court conceived the purposes of the Sur-

face Mining Act too narrowly and, in particular, ignored

Congress’ express intent to strike a balance between the

Nation’s need for coal and the need to protect the envi-

ronment and “agricultural productivity.” 30 U.S.C.

(Supp. I) 1202(f). The court also erred in failing to

accord appropriate deference to the congressional deter-

mination that surface mining on “prime farmlands” ad-

versely affects interstate commerce. The court’s finding

that such mining operations “have an infinitesimal or

trivial impact on interstate commerce” (J.S. App, 12a)

was the primary basis for its holding that the “prime

farmland” provisions are not authorized by the Commerce

Clause. But, as this Court frequently has explained,

reviewing courts may not reweigh the available evidence

and substitute their factual judgment for that on which

Congress has relied in enacting legislation. See the Sec-

retary’s brief in Virginia Surface Mining, at 47-48. Cer-

tainly it was wholly inappropriate for the district court

in the present case, after a one-day hearing, to adopt

verbatim the factual findings and legal conclusions pro-

posed by plaintiffs and, on that basis, to overturn the

13

considered judgment of an elected legislature, a judgment

reached only after a painstaking review of the available

data gathered from interested persons of all persuasions

during several years of intense legislative endeavor.’

The district court’s factual finding with respect to the

effects of prime farmland surface mining on interstate

commerce rests almost entirely on statistics derived from

the Report of the Interagency Task Force on the Issue

of a Moratorium or a Ban on Mining in Prime Agricul-

tural Lands (A. 51-64), which was submitted to the

House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in

April 1977, more than a month after completion of the

Committee’s hearings on the proposed surface mining

legislation and less than three weeks before issuance of

the Committee’s Report. See J.S. App. 12a-15a; H.R.

Rep. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). The Inter-

agency Report suggests only that a complete moratorium

or ban on the surface mining of prime farmland is in-

advisable as a matter of policy, and, indeed, Congress did

not enact any such ban. The Interagency Report does

not pretend to examine fully the impact of surface min-

ing on interstate commerce in agricultural commodities,

nor does it conclude that the impact is negligible or too

small to warrant federal involvement. As explained in

the Report of the House Committee, Congress followed

the recommendation of the Interagency Report, and re-

jected the Carter Administration’s proposal for a five-

7 Although we do not say that judicial adoption of proposed

findings submitted by the parties is in itself error, the practice

of adopting the entire submission of a single party, to the exclusion

of all else, has been repeatedly criticized by appellate courts (see,

e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-

657 & n.4 (1964) ; Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704,

731 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) ; Flowers v.

Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1284 (7th Cir. 1977); Leaf

v. United States, 588 F.2d 7338, 736 (9th Cir. 1978); International

Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1834, 1341 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) ), and it seems especially inappropriate

when used as a basis for holding a federal statute unconstitutional.

14

year moratorium on surface mining on prime farmlands,

specifically because testimony of Soil Conservation Service

officials indicated that mined prime farmlands could be

restored to their original productivity levels through com-

pliance with the prime farmland provisions now con-

tained in the Surface Mining Act. H.R. Rep. No. 95-218,

supra, at 184-185.

The district court purportedly was influenced by cer-

tain statistics in the Interagency Report comparing the

prime farmland acreage being disturbed annually by sur-

face mining to the total prime farmland acreage in the

United States (J.S. App. 14a). The Report states that

approximately 21,800 acres of prime farmland were being

disturbed annually by surface mining at the time of

the Report and that this acreage represented .006% of

the total prime farmland acreage in the Nation (A. 62).

This statistic and others derived from it, together with

similar comparisons for the State of Indiana, persuaded

the district court that interstate commerce is only mini-

mally affected by surface coal mining on prime farmlands

and therefore that Congress lacked power to enact the

“prime farmland” provisions.

This is not a viable ground for invalidating legislation

enacted under the Commerce Clause. The governing

standard is not the volume of commerce regulated by the

particular statute under review. As this Court has held,

“(t]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce

is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great

or small.” NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939).

The question therefore is not how much commerce is in- .

volved but whether Congress could rationally conclude

that the regulated activities will in fact have some impact

on interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, supra,

402 U.S. at 154-156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 USS.

294, 303-304 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, supra, 317

U.S. at 127-129. Here, the cumulative potential effect

of uncontrolled surface mining on prime farmlands

throughout the Nation is the critical factor to be con-

sidered, not some more narrowly drawn index focusing

15

on current crop production or the number of acres under

cultivation. As the Court said in Polish National Alliance

v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 648, 648 (1944), “[a]ppropriate for

judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is rep-

resentative of many others throughout the country, the

total incidence of which if left unchecked may well be-

come far-reaching in its harm to commerce.” See also

Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).8

Even accepting the Interagency Report’s statistics at

face value, at least 21,800 acres of prime farmland are

disturbed each year by surface mining. The Report fur-

ther indicated that the total prime farmland acreage that

might be affected by surface coal mining is approximately

7,000,000 acres. These data were presented to the full

Senate by Senator Percy during the floor debate preced-

ing passage of the Act. 123 Cong. Rec. 15713 (1977).

In addition, Senator Percy called the Senate’s attention

to the hearing testimony of Robert L. Masterson, zoning

administrator of Knox County, Illinois, who graphically

described the losses in agricultural productivity attribut-

able to surface mining operations in his county. Jd. at

15713-15716; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation

Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 Before the Subcomm. on

Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on En-

ergy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 775-811

(1977). See also 123 Cong. Rec. 15720-15721 (1977)

(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 15721 (remarks

of Sen. Stevenson). Similar evidence was presented dur-

ing the contemporaneous hearings before the House Com-

8 The Court in Stafford stated (258 U.S. at &21):

Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and

threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of inter-

state commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress

under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to

consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This

court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of

Congress in such a matter unless the relation of the subject

to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly non-

existent.

16

mittee (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977: Hearings on H.R. 2 Before the Subcomm. on En-

ergy and the Environment of the House Comm. on In-

terior and Insular Affairs, Pt. IV, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.

16-31, 78-92, 159-172, 235-260 (1977) ), and the commit-

tee report referred to this testimony in summarizing the

origins of the “prime farmland” provisions. The report

stated (H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, at 184):

The Committee heard testimony from citizens and

local officials of Illinois and Indiana requesting that

special attention be given in the bill to the protec-

tion of prime agricultural lands. Working with of-

ficials of the Soil Conservation Service, the “om-

mittee added a number of provisions to H.R. 2 de-

signed to insure the proper reconstruction of soil

strata within those areas classified as prime agricul-

tural lands.

Taken together, the evidence before Congress was

more than sufficient to support a rational legislative find-

ing that surface coal mining operations on prime farm-

land substantially affect the production of agricultural

commodities and thus affect interstate commerce.*® The

Surface Mining Act and its legislative history reflect a

careful balancing of the competing interests of agricul-

ture and surface coal mining, and the legislative ac-

commodation should not be disturbed on the basis of a

one-day hearing in the district court.

B. Apart from the “prime farmland” provisions, the

district court also ruled that several important Surface

Mining Act provisions of general applicability are beyond

® Notwithstanding the commentary in the district court’s opinion

(J.S. App. 14a), it is irrelevant to the present case that the federal

government has in the past paid farmers not to grow crops on

certain lands. Such subsidies serve an independent purpose with

respect to the pricing of agricultural commodities and, more im-

portant, they keep the affected lands out of production only tempo-

rarily, thereby helping to maintain or improve the soil’s productive

capacity. Unregulated surface coal mining, by contrast, can be

expected to cause long-term or irreversible soil damage.

17

the scope of the Commerce Clause power.’ In this re-

gard, the court did not quarrel with the proposition that

surface mining operations affect interstate commerce; it

declared simply that the measures adopted by Congress

are not rationally related to the concededly legitimate

goal of protecting commerce from adverse effects at-

tributable to surface mining (J.S. App. 18a-19a). This

holding, too, is incorrect.

All of the provisions invalidated by the district court

are reasonably calculated to further the legitimate con-

gressional goals of preserving the productive capacity of

mined lands, minimizing the adverse environmental con-

sequences that can result from surface mining or inade-

quate reclamation of mined lands, and protecting the

public from health and safety hazards that may be

created by surface mining. For example, the approximate

10 The stricken provisions are:

(a) Section 515(b) (3), requiring restoration of surface mined

land to its approximate original contour;

(b) Section 515(b) (5), requiring separate removal, segregation,

and ultimate replacement of topsoil on surface mined land;

(c) Sections 522(a), (c), (d), (e)(4) and (5), requiring

permanent regulatory programs under the Act to establish pro-

cedures for the designation of particular lands as unsuitable for

surface mining, and restricting surface mining within a specified

radius of certain buildings, parks, and cemeteries;

(d) Sections 508(a) (2), (3), (4), (8), and (10), stating re

quirements for reclamation plans to be submitted as part of

permit applications under the permanent regulatory program, in-

cluding descriptions of the pre-mining use of the affected land,

the proposed post-mining use, and the methods by which the pro-

posed use will be achieved;

(e) Sections 510(b) (1) and (2), the general provisions govern-

ing approval or disapproval of permit applications under the perma-

nent program, invalidated to the extent that they entail regulatory

authority review of proposed post-mining land uses; and

(f) Sections 515(b) (19) and (20), requiring revegetation of

mined lands and maintenance of such revegetation for a five- or

ten-year period after the completion of mining, invalidated to the

extent that they may incorporate a requirement of compliance

with a post-mining land use plan approved by the regulatory

authority.

18

original contour requirement in Section 515(b) (3) is

designed to avoid the continuing harm that can be caused

by unreclaimed mining cuts or cuts that have been im-

properly restored." As the 1977 Senate report concluded,

If surface mining and reclamation are not done

carefully, significant environmental damage can re-

sult. In addition, unreclaimed or improperly re-

claimed surface coal mines pose a continuing threat

to the environment, and at times are a danger to

public health and safety, public or private property.

S. Rep. No. 95-128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1977). See

also id. at 83; H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, at 78, 80,

93.2

11 A representative of the United States Army Corps of Engineers

testified in the 1977 House hearings that more than 4,400,000 acres

of land in the United States have already been disturbed by

surface mining and that 1,900,000 of those acres have not been

reclaimed. 1977 House Hearings, supra, Pt. II, at 69.

12 Even if the district court had been correct in its apparent

assumption that the sole purpose of the Surface Mining Act is

“the alleviation of water or air pollution” that may be caused by

surface mining operations (see J.S. App. 19a), the court would

still have been wrong in its conclusion that the statutory provisions

challenged by plaintiffs bear no rational relation to the achievement

of this legislative goal. Although the provisions here at issue do

not include all the statutory measures intended to help minimize

and control water and air pollution resulting from surface mining

(see id. at 17a-18a), they do contribute to that end. The approxi-

mate original contour and topsoil replacement requirements, for

example, are designed to prevent erosion and sedimentation and

thus to help preserve water quality. Among the remedial actions

specifically recommended to the House Committee by the United

States Army Corps of Engineers for the prevention of further

adverse surface mining effects on the Nation’s water resources

was the “[slegregation and preservation of topsoils during, or

preceding, mining operations * * * [in order} to provide soil condi-

tions conducive to rapid revegetation after mining * * *.” 1977

House Hearings, supra, Pt. II, at 86.

The district court’s conclusion that the challenged statutory

provisions are not “reasonably and plainly adapted to removing

any substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce” (J.S.

19

Congress had a similar purpose in enacting the various

provisions in Section 508 of the Act, which require ap-

plicants for surface mining permits under the permanent

program to inform the regulatory authority of the in-

tended post-mining use for the land involved and the way

in which that use will be achieved. The provisions are

designed to permit the regulatory authority to ascer-

tain, before mining begins, whether the prospective mine

operator has adequately considered the fate of the land

after mining is completed and whether the operator has

the technological capability to restore the land in the way

proposed.

The relevance of the topsoil replacement requirement

in Section 515(b) (5) to the legislative purpose of pre-

serving the productivity of mined land is self-evident.

See H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, at 106-109; 1977 House

Hearings, supra, Pt. II, at 86; A. 182 (affidavit of

geologist Allen O. Perry). Similarly, Section 522(e)’s

restrictions against surface mining near churches, schools,

parks, public buildings, and occupied dwellings are

plainly directed toward the purpose of ensuring that the

extraction of coal does not endanger life and property

in mining communities. Section 522’s further require-

ment that permanent state regulatory programs include

procedures for the designation of other locations, on a

case-by-case basis, as unsuitable for surface mining serves

the same end.

App. 19a) is apparently based solely on conclusory assertions by

plaintiffs or witnesses testifying on their behalf. For example,

Glenn L. Kaffenberger, an employee of AMAX Coal Company, one

of the plaintiffs in this case, was asked on direct examination

whether, in his opinion, the approximate original contour require-

ment is related to the control of water pollutants; he replied,

“No” (A. 147). Testimony of this kind is not a sufficient basis

for a judicial holding that remedial measures adopted by Congress

after careful consideration are not rationally related to the legiti-

mate legislative purpose of protecting aspects of interstate com-

merce from the dangers caused by surface coal mining.

20

Congress sought to make certain that the production

of coal for interstate commerce would not come at the

expense of agriculture, the environment, or public safety.

Injury to any of the latter interests would have a de-

leterious effect on interstate commerce. Moreover, Con-

gress’ determination that federal intervention is neces-

sary in this area was based in part on a desire to ensure

that mine operators in states adhering to high perform-

ance and reclamation standards would not be disadvan-

taged in competition with their counterparts in states

with less rigorous regulatory programs. See 30 U.S.C.

(Supp. I) 1201(g). The statutory provisions overturned

by the district court advance these legitimate goals of

Congress and thus are rationally related to the protection

of commerce from the adverse impact of surface mining

operations.

II

THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS IN TITLE V OF

THE ACT DO NOT VIOLATE THE TENTH AMEND-

MENT

The district court held that all the statutory provisions

challenged by plaintiffs (except for Section 518(c)) vio

late the Tenth Amendment because they “constitute dis-

placement, regulation and altering of the management

structure and operation of the traditional area of State

sovereignty or integral governmental function of land

use planning and control” (J.S. App. 35a). The court’s

conclusion apparently was heavily influenced by its find-

ings that the coal-producing counties in Indiana are de-

pendent upon the surface coal mining industry for their

financial well-being, that the Act discriminates against

surface coal mining in favor of underground coal min-

ing, and that the Act therefore may have the effect cf

shifting coal mining operations from surface mining in

Indiana to underground mining in Illinois or Kentucky

(id. at 23a-25a).

The district court’s Tenth Amendment ruling is incor-

rect for the same reasons that the similar decision in

21

Virginia Surface Mining is erroneous. The deficiencies

in the legal arguments embraced by the two district

courts are discussed in the Secretary’s brief in Virginia

Surface Mining (Br. 28-38), and we rely on that dis-

cussion here. We add a few additional comments focused

more particularly on the lower court’s opinion in this

case.

Reduced to its essentials, the district court’s decision

proceeds according to the following syllogism:

Major premise: Land use control and planning is

a governmental function reserved exclusively to the

states under the Tenth Amendment.

Minor premise: The Surface Mining Act is and

was intended to be a federal land use control and

planning measure.

Conclusion: The Surface Mining Act violates the

Tenth Amendment.

The court simply assumes the correctness of the major

premise and devotes most of its efforts to demonstrating

the undisputed proposition that the Surface Mining Act

will have some effect on the way land is used in coal

mining areas. The major premise is erroneous, how-

ever, and, despite the district court’s efforts to prove the

contrary, the Surface Mining Act is not a land use

measure after the fashion of the zoning ordinances typi-

cally enacted by state or local governments.

There is no authority for the district court’s unsup-

ported view that land use control and planning is a

governmental function reserved exclusively to the states

under the Tenth Amendment. Although this Court has

recognized that regulation of private land use is within

the inherent police powers of the states and their political

subdivisions (see, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

508 n.18 (1975) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,

272 U.S. 365 (1926)), the Court has never held that

such powers are exclusive or that the federal government

may not regulate private activities that affect interstate

22

commerce if such regulation has any effect on land use.

On the contrary, when a congressional enactment is

properly directed toward the promotion or protection of

interstate commerce, it is immaterial for Tenth Amend-

ment purposes that the enactment may also have an

impact on land use control and planning. See, e.g., South

Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677-678 (1st Cir.

1974) (upholding a regulation under the Clean Air Act

that imposed more stringent parking restrictions than

the relevant local zoning ordinance).

If this were not the case, Congress’ powers under the

Commerce Clause would be severely restricted. For ex-

ample, a federal water control project authorized under

the Commerce Clause may have a substantial effect on

state and local land» use plans; it may determine the

course of future land development in an entire region

and may result in the inundation of many acres of land

contrary to the desires of state and local planners. Un-

der the district court’s reasoning, this significant inter-

ference with state and local land use objectives would

presumably violate the Tenth Amendment. Similar con-

tentions were long ago rejected by this Court, however,

in Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 318 U.S. 508, 534-535

(1941), which held that a federal water project did not

contravene the Tenth Amendment merely because it in-

terfered with state water development plans. To cite

another example, at least since Wickard v. Filburn, su-

pra, it has been clear that Congress is authorized under

the Commerce Clause to regulate the quantity of agri-

cultural commodities that private parties may produce

on their land. Even though such regulation plainly af-

fects land use, the Tenth Amendment does not pose any

obstacle to such congressional action.

In any event, any actual effects on land use resulting

from the challenged provisions in Title V of the Surface

Mining Act are temporary and merely incidental to the

primary purposes of the statute. The Act’s provisions

apply to an operator only until the required perform-

i i a Ri i

23

ance bond for a mining operation has been released, and

that release occurs as soon the Act’s reclamation require-

ments have been satisfied. See Section 519(c) (3), 30

U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1269(c) (3). Contrary to the sugges-

tions in the district court’s opinion (e.g., J.S. App. 30a),

the Act does not mandate that mined lands actually be

used for any specific purpose after reclamation is com-

pleted. The Act is concerned with the land’s condition

and its long-term productive capacity, not the actual use

to which an owner may choose to put the land immedi-

ately following reclamation. Although the Act encour-

ages the farming of prime farmlands following reclama-

tion, it does not require such use."* Once the reclama-

8 The Act itself does not explicitly require that a mine operator

actually grow row crops on mined prime farmlands during the

reclamation period. The Secretary, however, promulgated regula-

tions that impose such a requirement for a portion of the reclama-

tion period. 30 C.F.R. 823.11(c), 823.15(b) and (c), 44 Fed. Reg.

15451-15452 (1979). These regulations were based on a deter-

mination by the Secretary that some growing of row crops is neces-

sary to restore the soil productivity of prime farmlands to pre-

mining levels and to permit an accurate assessment of whether

the productivity has in fact been restored. Notwithstanding this

dual justification for the necessity of the regulations if the statu-

tory restoration requirements are to be effectively enforced, the

regulations were recently remanded to the Secretary by the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, which concluded

that the Act did not authorize the Secretary to require the grow-

ing of row crops and that soil productivity could be measured by

other means. Jn re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litiga-

tion, 14 E.R.C. 1083, 1106 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), appeals pending,

Nos. 80-1810 et seg. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1980).

The validity of the Secretary’s prime farmland regulations is,

of course, immaterial in this case. Assuming arguendo that the

Act requires the short-term growing of row crops during the

reclamation period, this is no different from other measures de-

signed to restore the land’s condition, such as regrading, seeding,

or fertilizing. The district court in the District of Columbia

rejected both statutory and Tenth Amendment challenges to that

portion of the Secretary’s prime farmland regulations which re-

quires that “cropland” be designated as the immediate post-mining

24

tion bond is released, a state is free to exercise its full

panoply of regulatory powers over the mined lands.

As the Secretary has argued in Virginia Surface Min-

ing (Br. 88), the possibility that an otherwise valid

federal] statute may have some identifiable adverse im-

pact on a state or local economy is not sufficient to es-

tablish a Tenth Amendment violation. Likewise in the

present case, it is irrelevant whether the challenged

surfaee mining provisions will result in a shift of coal

mining activity from Indiana to underground mines in

Illinois or other states. Congress, in exercising its Com-

merce Clause powers, is not restrained by the fact that

the impact of a law may fall more heavily on one state

than another. Secretary of Agricuiture v. Central Roig

Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950).

Finally, the district court also decided that Sections

522(a), (c), and (d) of the Act violate the Tenth

Amendment (J.S. App. 47a). This ruling is especially

puzzling. The stricken subsections merely provide that

states wishing to assume primary regulatory authority

over surface coal mining during the permanent program

phase must establish a procedure for the designation of

individual parcels of land as unsuitable for all or certain

types of surface coal mining operations, if a proper

showing to that effect is made at a public hearing.* The

use for prime farmland. See 30 C.F.R. 785.17(d)(1), 44 Fed.

Reg. 15374 (1979). The court observed that “the restrictions upon

the post-mining use of prime farmland apply only to the point of

bond release.” In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Liti-

gation, Civ. No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980), slip op. 5-6 &

n.5, appeals pending, Nos. 80-1810 et seg. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1980).

14 Lands must be designated as unsuitable for surface mining

if the regulatory authority finds, on the basis of a petition and

the related written submissions and hearing, that the reclamation

required by the Act is not “technologically and economically feasi-

ble.” Section 522(a) (2), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(a) (2). Lands

may be designated as unsuitable for some or all types of surface

mining if the regulatory authority determines that the mining

activity in question would (i) be incompatible with state or local

25

provisions in question do not purport to prescribe the

uses to which particular lands can be put; they merely

create a procedural mechanism for presenting and eval-

uating claims that particular lands should not be sub-

jected to all or some types of surface mining. Further-

more, Section 522(a) (5) provides that unsuitability de-

terminations “shall be integrated as closely as possible

with present and future land use planning and regula-

tion processes at the Federal, State, and local levels.”

The designation process does not become operative until

the Act’s permanent program phase, and, in the absence

of any showing that the decisions reached under this

process will unreasonably interfere with comprehensive

state or local land use planning, the statutory provisions

cannot be said to threaten the states’ “separate and in-

dependent existence.” See National League of Cities v.

Usery, 426 U.S. 838, 851 (1976).

III

THE PRIME FARMLAND PROVISIONS AND THE

APPROXIMATE ORIGINAL CONTOUR REQUIRE-

MENT IN SECTION 515(b)(3) OF THE ACT DO NOT

VIOLATE THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OR

EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE

FIFTH AMENDMENT

According to the district court (J.S. App. 37a-38a),

the lack of variance procedures applicable to the prime

farmland provisions and the limitation of permissible

land use plans, (ii) adversely affect fragile or historic lands, (iii)

adversely affect renewable resource lands, or (iv) affect natural

hazard lands so as to substantially endanger life or property.

Section 522(a) (3), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(a) (3).

Sections 522(a), (c), and (d) of the Act were not specifically

challenged in the Virginia Surface Mining litigation, although the

district court’s order purports to invalidate and enjoin all of Sec-

tion 522, not just the surface mining restrictions in Sections

522(e) (4) and (5). See note 24 in the Secretary’s brief in Vir-

ginia Surface Mining.

26

variances from the approximate original contour require-

ment in Section 515(b) (3) to mining on mountaintops

and steep slopes impermissibly discriminate against op-

erators and states in the Midwest, where there are sig-

nificant coal reserves located under prime farmland and

few or no steep slopes or mountaintops. In addition, the

court said (id. at 39a), the prime farmland and ap-

proximate original contour provisions themselves are so

“irrational, arbitrary and capricious” that they “con-

stitute a deprivation of substantive due process in vio-

lation of the Fifth Amendment.”

We challenge these conclusions. Economic legislation

such as the Surface Mining Act carries with it a pre-

sumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a

showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. Duke Power

Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S.

59, 83 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,

428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). One who would establish that

such a congressional enactment is arbitrary or irrational

bears an extremely heavy burden. Vance v. Bradley,

440 U.S. 93, 97, 111 (1979). A court may not substi-

tute its judgment for that of Congress merely because

it believes that Congress was “unwise in not choosing

a means more precisely related to its primary purpose.”

Id. at 109. See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining

Co., supra, 428 U.S. at 19.

Here, the district court’s opinion provides no factual

or legal basis for concluding that the provisions in ques-

tion are arbitrary or irrational. The district court failed

to mention, and the plaintiffs failed to present, any con-

erete factual situation in which the prime farmland or

approximate original contour provisions have been ap-

plied to a mining operation so as to cause an irrational

result. By invalidating these important portions of the

Act under the rubric of “substantive due process,” the

district court effectively behaved as a superior legislative

body, judging the wisdom of the policy determinations

27

made by Congress. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427

U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 USS.

726, 730 (1963). This it is not permitted to do.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the provisions

in question impose a greater burden on mine operators

in midwestern states, that is no basis for striking them

down as unconstitutional. A claim of arbitrariness or

irrationality cannot be founded merely upon a statute’s

lack of uniform geographic impact. Secretary of Agri-

culture v. Central Roig Refining Co., supra, 338 U.S. at

616; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1989). As this

Court explained in Central Roig Refining (338 U.S. at

616; citations omitted) :

Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements

of geographic uniformity. * * * Congress may devise

* * * a national policy with due regard for the

varying and fluctuating interests of different regions.

The district court misapprehended the applicable stand-

ard for determining whether the challenged provisions

impermissibly discriminate among mine operators in dif-

ferent areas. The court thought that, in order for the

statute to survive review under the Fifth Amendment,

“there must be an overriding national interest justifying

such difference in treatment, and there must be ‘a legiti-

mate hasis for presuming that the rule was actually in-

tended to serve that interest?” (J.S. App. 38a). The

lone decision cited by the district court as the source of

this standard of review is inapposite, however.

Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), in-

volved a challenge to a Civil Service Commission regula-

tion that classified aliens as ineligible for civil service

employment. This Court’s decisions have established that

classifications based on alienage must be reviewed under

a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Nyquist

v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Graham v. Richardson,

403 U.S. 365 (1971), and the cases there cited. Aliens,

by reason of their status as non-citizens, are surely more

likely to find themselves at a disadvantage than are

28

persons living in Indiana, solely by reason of their ad-

dress. Moreover, as the Court was careful to stress in

Mow Sun Wong (426 U.S. at 105-116), that case in-

volved the review of an administrative measure not man-

dated by either Congress or the President. The Court’s

decision invalidating the regulation was based in large

part on the view that the various national interests ad-

vanced in defense of the regulation were not within the

competence or responsibility of the Civil Service Com-

mission to evaluate and pursue.

Here, by contrast, we are concerned with economic

regulatory legislation enacted by Congress. Coal mine

operators in Indiana are not a disadvantaged group, and

Congress possesses both the responsibility and the compe-

tence for adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic

life throughout the Nation. In such circumstances, a re-

viewing court should not overturn the considered judg-

ment of the legislature unless “the varying treatment of

different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achieve-

ment of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the

court] can only conclude that the legislature’s actions

were irrational.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97

(1979) ; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, 427 U.S. at

303. The district court therefore erred in applying the

more rigorous standard derived from Mow Sun Wong.

The short answer to plaintiffs’ discrimination complaint

is that the characteristics of surface mining operations

vary with geography, and geographical conditions are not

the same in all affected states. Cungress has determined

that measures appropriate for steep-slope mines are not

necessarily desirable in flatter terrain and prime farm-

land areas. That is surely a rational distinction for

Congress to draw, and the fact that a particular state

has more of one kind of mining operation than another

does not establish discrimination in violation of the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.**

15Two other district courts have rejected substantive due

process and equal protection challenges to the Surface Mining

29

IV

THE PRIME FARMLAND PROVISIONS AND SEC-

TION 522 OF THE SURFACE MINING ACT DO NOT

VIOLATE THE JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE OF

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

A. The district court ruled that three of the six

“prime farmland” provisions take private property with-

out just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amend-

ment. One of these three provisions requires that, as a

condition of obtaining a “prime farmland” surface min-

ing permit, mine operators demonstrate their capability

to restore the land, within a reasonable time after the

completion of mining, to at least the productivity levels

of “non-mined prime farmland in the surrounding area

under equivalent levels of management * * *.” Section

510(d) (1), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1260(d) (1)."° A second

Act. In Virginia Surface Mining, the district court held that the

Act does not violate the equal protection principle merely because

it may have a disproportionate economic effect on steep-slope

mining regions such as southwest Virginia. 483 F. Supp. at 435-

436 (79-1538 J.S. App. 4la-42a). The court observed that “almost

any form of economic regulation will affect some persons or inter-

ests more harshly than others.” Jd. at 436 (79-1538 J.S. App.

4la). Similarly, in Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, Civ. No. 79-171-2

(S.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 1980), appeal pending on other grounds,

No. 80-49, the district court ruled that the Surface Mining Act

does not offend the Constitution by regulating only the surface

mining of coal and not the surface mining of other minerals. 80-49

J.S. App. 19a-21a.

16 Section 510(d) (1) provides that the requirement of a showing

of technological capability to restore prime farmland to the pro-

ductivity levels of non-mined lands shall apply to all permits issued

after the date of the Act, August 3, 1977. For this reason, the

Secretary of the Interior concluded that Congress intended the

“prime farmland” provisions tc apply during the interim, as well

as the permanent, phase of the regulatory program. The Secre-

tary’s statutory interpretation is reflected in his interim regulations

(see 30 C.F.R. 716.7, 42 Fed. Reg. 62661, 62693 (1977) ), and this

construction of the Act was sustained by the United States Dis-

30

of the three provisions requires that mine operators ac-

tually complete such restoration in order to obtain release

of their performance bonds for “prime farmland” proj-

ects. Section 519(c) (2), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1269(c)

(2).7 The third “prime farmland” provision attacked as

a taking is simply a reporting requirement that directs

mine operators to include in reclamation plans filed as

part of “prime farmlana” permit applications a statement

of the premining productivity of the land, specifying “the

average yield of food, fiber, forage, or wood products

* * * obtained under high levels of management.” Sec-

tion 508 (a) (2) (C), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1258(a) (2) (C).

The district court held (J.S. App. 41a) that these three

provisions effect an unconstitutional taking of property

because, in the covrt’s view,

it is technologically impossible to reclaim prime

farmland in a postmining period so that equal or

higher levels of yield under high levels of manage-

ment practice can be achieved.

The district court’s decision that the “prime farmland”

provisions violate the Just Compensation Clause is in-

correct for several reasons. As in Virginia Surface Min-

ing, plaintiffs’ taking claims did not focus on any par-

ticular properties to which the challenged provisions have

been applied, and the district court did not base its ruling

on the denial of a surface mining permit for specific

prime farmland operations proposed by plaintiffs. As in

Virginia Surface Mining, the district court did not accord

trict Court for the District of Columbia in In re Surface Mining

Regulation Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327, 336 (1978). This aspect

of the district court’s decision was not appealed to the D.C. Circuit,

and the applicability of the prime farmland provisions during the

interim regulatory phase is not at issue in the present litigation.

Under Section 526(a)(1) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1276

(a) (1), judicial review of the Secretary’s implementing regula-

tions may be had only in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia.

17 Performance bonds are required for all surface mining permits

under the Act. See Section 509, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1259.

31

proper deference to the congressional determination that

particular regulatory measures, adopted after lengthy

legislative deliberations, are both feasible and desirable.

On the contrary, the district court in the present case

appeared to assume (J.S. App. 40a) that the prime farm-

land provisions could be sustained only if the Secretary

came forward with academic studies demonstrating that

mined lands can in fact be restored to the productivity

levels of non-mined lands in the surrounding area. As in

Virginia Surface Mining, the district court failed to

follow this Court’s precedents regarding the showing nec-

essary to establish a taking of private property within the

meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The court did not con-

sider other beneficial uses remaining available for prime

farmland that may not be surface-mined, nor did it

acknowledge the legislature’s broad discretion to prevent

noxious uses of property. All of these deficiencies are

discussed in some detail in the Secretary’s brief in Vir-

ginia Surface Mining (Br. 39-60), and we rely primarily

on that discussion. We address one additional point con-

cerning the “prime farmland” provisions.

In arriving at its “finding” that the required restora-

tion of prime farmlands is “technologically impossible,”

the district court adopted plaintiffs’ rhetorical labels for

the description of different land management practices

and, aS a consequence, misconstrued the statute. Sec-

tions 510(d) (1) and 519(c)(2) of the Act contem-

plate restoration of the productivity of mined prime

farmlands to levels of yield equivalent to those attained

on “nonmined land of the same soil type in the surround-

ing area under equivalent management practices” (em-

phasis added). In their submission of proposed findings

of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, plain-

tiffs referred to two “levels of management” that could

be applied to prime farmlands: “high” levels and “basic”

levels. The district court assumed that, under the Act,

mined prime farmland must be restored to a productivity

level equivalent to that of unmined land under “high

levels of management,” whenever such “levels of manage-

ment” are the prevailing practice in the surrounding

32

area. The court then concluded that, although mined

land can be restored to the productivity of unmined land

under “basic levels of management,” restoration to pro-

ductivity under “high levels of management” is impossi-

ble.

The difficulty with all this, of course, is that the terms

“high levels of management” and “basic levels of man-

agement” are not defined either in the statute or in the

district court’s opinion. Indeed, the terms do not even

appear in either Section 510(d) (1) or Section 519(¢) (2),

the two operative prime farmland provisions.** Those

18 Section 508 (a) (2) (C) is the only statutory provision that uses

the term “high levels of management.” The subsection provides

that reclamation plans accompanying permit applications must

contain information concerning the pre-mining productivity of

the land under “high levels of management.” The provision does

not define “high levels of management,” however, and it does not

- indicate whether the term is to be contrasted with “low,” “basic,”

“good,” or “average” levels of management or with some other

standard. The term “basic levels of management” is not found in

the Act at all.

We note for the Court’s information that among the permanent

regulations promulgated by the Secretary was one describing the

required contents of reclamation plans for prime farmlands. Such

plans were to contain, inter alia, a statement of current estimated

yields under a “high level of management.” The regulation pro-

vided that these estimates were to be used as a “predetermined

target level for determining success of revegetation.” 30 C.F.R.

785.17(b) (8), 44 Fed. Reg. 15374 (1979). This regulation was

based on the language of Section 508(a)(2)(C). However, the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in re-

viewing the regulation, ruled that the Act requires only that the

reclamation plan provide information regarding pre-mining yields

under high levels of management and does not authorize the use

of such information as a standard of comparison for determining

the success of post-mining revegetation in all circumstances. The

court emphasized that, under Sections 510(d) (i) and 519(c) (2),

restoration capability (at the permit application stage) and restor-

ation success (at the bond release stage) must be measured on the

basis of “equivalent” levels of management. Jn re Permanent Sur-

face Mining Regulation Litigation, Civ. No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. May

16, 1980), slip op. 4-5, appeals pending, Nos. 80-1810 et seq. (D.C.

Cir. Aug. 26, 1980). Accordingly, the court remanded the regula-

tion to the Secretary.

33

provisions state only that productivity comparisons be-

tween mined land after restoration and unmined land

in the surrounding area must be based on “equivalent”

levels of management. The statute does not specify what

constitutes equivalence for purposes of the Act. Evidence

presented in the district court showed that the terms

“high levels of management” and “basic levels of man-

agement” have no universally accepted meaning.”

In essence, plaintiffs and the district court have inter-

preted the Act to make the statutory reclamation re-

quirements, by definition, impossible to satisfy. Although

the ambiguous term “high levels of management” was

not expressly defined in the court’s opinion, the court in

effect defined it as that level of management which will

make it “technologically impossible’ for operators to

restore prime farmland to the necessary level of produc-

tivity. The court thus construed the statute to produce

In particular, Dr. Donald E. McCormack, Director of the Soil

Survey Interpretations Division of the United States Soil Conserva-

tion Service, testified that “application of these kind [sic] of terms

has been very provincial in the United States” (A. 157 ). He stated

that, although the Soil Conservation Service has established a defi-

nition of “average” and “high” levels of management for its com-

puter purposes, it has no definition for the term “basic levels of

management” (ibid.). According to Dr. McCormack, the term

“basic levels of management” has not been defined for national

purposes and apparently is a term primarily used in Illinois (id.

at 157-158). Dr. William W. McFee, an agronomy professor, testi-

fied that the term “high level of management, of course, is difficult

to define. But it’s usually accepted as being the type of management

employed by a certain percentage of the operators in that area”

(A. 1386). Mr. Alten F. Grandt, Director of Reclamation for Pea-

body Coal Company, stated that the terms “high levels of manage-

ment” and “basic levels of management” are scientific terms

within the agricultural community (A. 142), but he provided no

definition of the terms. Furthermore, Mr. Grandt testified that

“high levels of productivity” are equivalent to “levels of produc-

tivity that could be obtained under basic levels of management”

(ibid.). The overall impression created by a review of the testi-

mony in the district court is that considerable uncertainty exists

concerning the meaning of the terms on which the court relied in

invalidating the prime farmland provisions.

34

an absurd result, one that surely was not intended by

Congress. Duly enacted legislation should not be over-

turned on such a tenuous basis. Reviewing courts should

interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems, not

to create them. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization

Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974) ; United States v.

Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960).

Moreover, the evidence presented to the district court

fully supports the proposition that the restoration of

prime farmland required by the Act is technologically

possible.” And, even if there were no existing evidence

or studies conclusively showing that mined prime farm-

lands could be restored to the required levels of produc-

tivity, that alone would not establish that it is impos-

sible to meet the Act’s requirements. The prime farm-

land provisions are “technology-forcing” measures in the

sense that Congress wanted the surface mining industry

to develop as rapidly as possible whatever technology

is needed to achieve the desired result. In the absence

of a specific factual situation involving a thorough but

unsuccessful good-faith effort to meet the Act’s require-

ments, there is no basis for a judicial conclusion that

the requirements cannot reasonably be met.

B. The district court also held that Sections 522(a),

(c), and (d) of the Act are unconstitutional because they

“provide a procedure to prevent the removal of coal

thereby destroying the mineral interest” (J.S. App. 4la).

The court provided no support of any kind for its

decision.

20 See Def. Exhs. A, B, F, and G (A. 105-108, 121-122, 127-129) ;

the testimony of Dr. Donald E. McCormack (A. 157); the Inter-

agency Report (A. 57-59); and the testimony of Alten F. Grandt,

Director of Reclamation for Peabody Coal Company (A. 143-144).

See also the letter from John A. Conlon, one of the plaintiffs, in

which Mr. Conlon states that “the coal industry is quite capable

of returning all surface mine[d] land to pre-mine productivity

levels. In some instances, actual improvements have been noted”

(A. 110).

85

Again, the plaintiffs’ challenge to these provisions was

purely hypothetical; they did not allege or show that

the procedures for designating areas as unsuitable for all

or certain types of surface mining had ever been ap-

plied to them. In fact, Sections 522(a), (c), and (d),

by their own terms, are not effective until the Act’s

permanent program phase becomes operative. See Section

522(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(a) (1). Since no

permanent regulatory program has yet been implemented

in Indiana, plaintiffs could not have made such a showing.

Even if an actual controversy had been presented, the

district court’s ruling totally ignores the clear language

and limited effect of the challenged provisions. Sections

522(a), (c), and (d) merely establish a procedure for

designating areas as unsuitable for surface mining. The

actual decisions whether a particular area, or any areas

at all, should be so designated are to be made by the

regulatory authority in the permanent program. The ap-

propriate focus for an aggrieved mine operator’s com-

plaint should be such individual designation decisions,

not the statute that by itself does nothing more than

make such designations possible. In addition, the district

court did not mention that, under Section 522(a) (6) of

the Act, the designation procedure does not apply to lands

on which surface coal mining was being conducted on the

date of enactment or “where substantial legal and fi-

nancial commitments in such operation were in existence

prior to January 4, 1977.” The district court also failed

to weigh the fact that any designation of unsuitability

under Section 522 may be limited to certain types of

surface mining and leave other types unaffected. In

short, the court’s ruling that Sections 522(a), (c), and

(d) violate the Just Compensation Clause is an ill-

considered judgment, adopted directly from plaintiffs’

submission, and not the product of any independent ex-

amination of the statutory provisions, their method of

operation, or their effect on the litigants before the

court.

36

The district court’s further decision (J.S. App. 42a)

that Sections 522(e) (4) and (5) of the Act take pri-

vate property by restricting surface coal mining in the

immediate vicinity of roads, cemeteries, parks, churches,

schools, public buildings, and occupied dwellings is iden-

tical to the ruling in Virginia Surface Mining regard-

ing these provisions (79-1538 J.S. App. 56a-57a). The

Secretary’s brief in Virginia Surface Mining argues (Br.

52-58) that these narrowly defined restrictions do not

violate the Just Compensation Clause. The contentions

made there are equally applicable here.

V

THE CIVIL PENALTY PROVISIONS IN SECTION

518(c) OF THE ACT DO NOT VIOLATE THE DUE

PROCESS CLAUSE

The district court’s procedural due process ruling with

respect to the constitutionality of Section 518(c) of the

Act merely follows the decision on the same issue in

Virginia Surface Mining. The Secretary’s arguments on

this point are fully stated in his brief in Virginia Sur-

face Mining (Br. 67-71). We add only the observation

that plaintiffs here, like their counterparts in Virginia

Surface Mining, have made no showing that they were

ever assessed civil penalties under the Act, much less

that the statutory prepayment requirement was ever

applied to them or that it caused them injury.

37

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

SANFORD SAGALKIN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

PETER BUSCEMI

Assistant to the Solicitor General

PETER R. STEENLAND, JR.

MICHAEL A. McCorp

Attorneys

NOVEMBER 1980

W ou. Ss. Government PRINTING OFFICE; 1980 333640 171

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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