Petition — American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

Supreme Court brief1980

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Text

80-213

No.

IN THE

Supreme Cmert of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.

Petitioner,

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Of Counsel: JAMES A. MCKENNA, JR.

THOMAS N. FROHOCK

EVERETT H. ERLICK

RoBEerT J. KAUFMAN CARL R. RAMEY

; : DENNIS P. CORBETT

American Broadcasting McKENNA, WILKINSON &

Companies, Inc. ‘

1330 Avenue of the BITTNER

p Revere 1150 Seventeenth St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for American

August 13, 1980 Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

The decision in this case establishes significantly new

legal standards governing the use of broadcast time by

political candidates under Section 312(a)(7) of the

Communications Act of 1984, as amended. The question

presented is whether the construction placed on Section

312 (a) (7) by the court of appeals is contrary to the pur-

poses of the Communications Act, usurps the previously

recognized discretion of broadcast licensees in the area

of political programming, and violates fundamental First

Amendment principles.

PARTIES BELOW

Petitioner ABC was a petitioner in the proceedings be-

fore the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit, the court whose judgment is sought

to be reviewed. Other petitioners in the court of appeals

were CBS Inc. and National Broadcasting Company, Inc.

The Federal Communications Commission and the United

States of America were the respondents below. Carter/

Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. and National Asso-

ciation of Broadcasters were intervenors below.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..0.0.0n.n2...2.....-c.c.ccccscsceceeseoee

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES

SERRE RISES SYS ce OT eS Oe

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED

AN IMPORTANT STATUTORY QUESTION

WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS

ea ia i clean age digscnnsoudsbucjeossenssenen

II. THIS COURT SHOULD ALSO GRANT RE-

VIEW BECAUSE THE COURT OF AP-

PEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE ..W0W02000 0...

ERNIE ee

(iii)

17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

American Security Council Education Foundation

v. FCC, 607 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 100 S.Ct. 662, —— U.S. (1980) .... 13

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) —...000000000002.... 6

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democra-

tic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1978)...... 8, 9,

18, 21, 23

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 454

oe | Ei eae SE 5 ) RR Ccematyener Nap mee 20

Democratic National Committee v. FCC, 460 F.2d

891 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848

LSPA SRN OO Tee ae RD OY 2 LOO 13

Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v.

WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) .........022000..... 19

FCC Vv. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).. 20

Green V. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971)........ 13

Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1974)...... 19

Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92

I ce a a 20

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367

6, SS eis ak Mae ame BaD pyc ay Le GORE SOT Rep Noes ter BN 22

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-

SIONS:

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend-

RSE PRICE RRS Waar ocd OPEV eR Na ae passim

Communications Act of 1934, as amended:

Section 312(a) (7), 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) ....passim

Section 315(a), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) .....8, 9, 11, 14, 19

Section 315(b), 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) 0000... 8

Section 402(a), 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) ...0... 5

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.

No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) .............................. 6, 15

I Ml rm a 2

Bees Te I iia eich ceniaiacisdccnseaiorcccedlanddnas nents cals 5

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

117 Cona. Rec. 20028 (1971) .................................. 16

SS. 1, BE Cait, BO BOOR: CUITE) nnencccccncccccccsececosee 16

4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),

reprinted in [1972] U.S. CoDE Conc. & AD.

ny ee RONEN IES BA RE ee ard ie ee 9-10

S. REP. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),

reprinted in [1972] U.S. CopE Conc. & AD.

DT IY eae re ae eee On. a. 16

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND REPORTS:

Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 66 F.C.C.2d 968, ap-

plication for review denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 33

(1977), reconsideration denied, 67 F.C.C.2d

Ms NE ae age Ra 12-13, 15

Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) 2... 13

Hon. Dan Walker, 57 F.C.C.2d 799 (B’cast Bur.

ig | Ape OF RRB LO RANA CG Dy TE co i NR, 13

Hon. Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1314 (1976).. 12

Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838 (1974).......... 12

Humphrey for President Campaign, 34 F.C.C.2d

SE. + SRS REUNION aaah, St nase a ONC ec 11

Notice of Inquiry: Commission Policy in Enforc-

ing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications

Act, FCC 78-204, released March 22, 1978 (BC

PRIS Bs RD A ses cgtts e a ea” 8

Paul A. Talmey, 49 F.C.C.2d 678 (B’cast Bur.

GE ToC Serck MERY = ELA SA pe ON AT RUBLE 12

Report and Order: Commission Policy in Enforc-

ing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications

Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079 (1978) 0. 8, 10-11, 12

Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission

En Bane Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303

Ea AT GANS ree ra? ACERS ly CRAIN BNE V8 i 9

Rockefeller for Governor Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d

er aren Te OR cc 11,13

Rosenbush Advertising Agency, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d

WI MI pt ee re a a itt 9

Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602 (1978) ............... 11-12

Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Can-

didates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510

NUIIEE? scdietasbatidcnidicieesoataiibdden ei eae Za ll

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No.

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”)

hereby petitions for a writ of certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit to review that court’s judgment of March 14,

1980, in CBS Ine. v. Federal Communications Commis-

sion, Nos. 79-2408, 79-2406, and 79-2407.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, not yet officially

reported, appears as Appendix A.! The opinions of the

1 Appendices A-G are contained in a separately bound

volume, submitted jointly by ABC and two other petitioners

—CBS Inc. (Docket No. 80-207, filed Aug. 11, 1980) and Na-

tional Broadcasting Company, Inc.

2

Federal Communications Commission are reported at 74

F.C.C.2d 631 (1979) and 74 F.C.C.2d 657 (1979) and

appear as Appendices B and C, respectively.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

March 14, 1980. Timely petitions for rehearing were de-

nied by the court of appeals on May 15, 1980 by an or-

der which appears as Appendix D. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves the First Amendment to the Con-

stitution of the United States, and Sections 312(a) (7)

and 315(a) and (b) of the Communications Act of

1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a) (7), 315(a) and

(b). These constitutional and statutory provisions are

set forth in Appendix G.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The focal point of this proceeding is Section 312 (a) (7)

of the Communications Act which authorizes the Com-

mission to revoke the license of a broadcast station for

“willful” or “repeated” failure to provide “reasonable

access” to federal candidates seeking to purchase broad-

cast time. The fundamental statutory and constitutional

issues flowing from the application of this important

statutory provision directly impact the activities of na-

tional broadcast networks, local stations (both commer-

cial and non-commercial), and political candidates at all

levels of the federal election process.

On October 11, 1979, President Carter’s media ad-

viser, Gerald Rafshoon, requested that ABC and the

3

other two major television networks offer the Carter/

Mondale Presidential Committee (the “Committee”’) a

30-minute paid program period between 8:00 p.m. and

10:30 p.m. EST during the period December 4 to 7,

1979." In response, ABC advised Mr. Rafshoon that it

could not comply with his request for one of the requested

early December air dates but that it expected to make

time available in early 1980.* Subsequently, ABC advised

the Committee and the Commission that it had deter-

mined to make time available, responsive to such can-

didate requests, commencing the first week in January.‘

On October 29, 1979 the Committee filed a complaint

with the Commission, alleging that the ABC, CBS and

NBC Television Networks had denied the Committee rea-

sonable access as required by Section 312(a) (7). ABC

and the other networks responded to the complaint, each

explaining the basis for its decision not to sell the Com-

mittee precisely what had been requested.

In two separate orders, a deeply divided Commission®

held that all three television networks had violated Sec-

tion 312(a) (7) by refusing to make available the time

requested by the Committee. The Commission also made

a number of far-reaching policy determinations appli-

2 App. A at Ba.

* App. A at 8a n.6. CBS responded by stating that it was

prepared to sell the Committee two five-minute segments

rather than the half-hour requested. App. A at 6a n.5. NBC

responded by declining the request in light of the early dates

requested and the number of candidates who might seek

“equal time.” App. A at 8a n.8.

* App. A at Ba.

® Both orders were by identical 4-8 votes, with the majority

consisting of the four Commissioners affiliated with the

Democratic Party.

4

cable to future “access” requests. Particularly influenc-

ing the Commission’s judgment was a belief that in pass-

ing upon the Committee’s request, the networks should

have given consideration to “the nature of the candidate’s

request” —i.e., President Carter’s “desire to set forth at

the outset of a national campaign a comprehensive state-

ment of views and to establish a framework for the or-

ganization and issues in the campaign.” °®

Chairman Ferris and Commissioners Fogarty, Brown

and Quello comprised the majority. Commissioners Lee,

Washburn and Jones dissented. In a separate statement,

Chairman Ferris and Commissioner Fogarty expressed

their view that “[flinding the moment in time when a

candidate for federal office becomes entitled to ‘reasonable

access’... is especially difficult.” 7

In dissent, Commissioner Lee stressed the far-reaching

nature of the decision, representing a major and unwise

change in the law.* Commissioner Washburn noted that

what the Commission was doing, in ruling that ABC’s

January offer was unreasonable, was finding that a 30-

day delay for the Committee’s program was sufficient

ground for the Commission to substitute its judgment

for a network judgment.* And Commissioner Jones said

that the facts of this case did not provide “a clear show-

ing that the networks [had] acted in an unreasonable

manner.” '°

On petitions for reconsideration by each of the three

networks, the Commission on November 28, 1979 again

674 F.C.C.2d at 650 n.33, App. B at 100a.

7 Id. at 651, App. B at 102a.

8 Jd, at 652-54, App. B at 108a-05a.

® 7d. at 653-54, App. B at 105a-07a.

10 Id, at 654, App. B at 107a.

5

ruled in favor of the Carter/Mondale Committee.”

Thereafter, all three networks petitioned the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit for review pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and

28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).

In an opinion by Judge Bazelon, the court of appeals

affirmed the Commission’s action—finding, as a pre-

eminent matter, that Section 312(a) (7) created an af-

firmative right of access for individual candidates for

federal elective office. In the course of so ruling, the

decision established several new standards. First, it re-

jected broadcaster efforts to treat candidates uniformly

as to when to begin the sale of political time, stressing

instead the requirement of responding to the inherently

subjective “needs” of individual candidates pressing such

requests. Policies and practices of broadcasters that do

not operate in this individual fashion were rejected

as amounting to “across-the-board” prohibitions. Second,

the decision found that the question of when access be-

gins under Section 312(a) (7) depends on a finding of

when the campaign begins. In this regard, the decision

affirmed the Commission’s judgment that a finding of

when the campaign begins for these purposes is not a

matter of licensee discretion, but a “legal” determination

to be made by the Commission. Finally, the decision con-

cluded that although Section 312(a)(7) by its terms

74 F.C.C.2d 657, App. C.

"2 The Commission’s orders directing immediate compliance

were stayed by the court of appeals pending review. App.

A at 10a-lla. Morever, referring to developments connected

with the seizure of American embassy personnel in Iran,

the Carter/Mondale Committee subsequently indicated that

it no longer desired a 30-minute program availability during

the originally requested December 4-7, 1979 period. The Com-

mittee did, however, purchase a five-minute period from

CBS on December 4, 1979 and a 30-minute period from ABC

on January 6, 1980. App. A at lla.

ry

6

refers only to broadcast “stations,” the Commission was

“justified” in applying its requirements to unlicensed

networks.

Although unanimous in upholding the Commission’s

orders, the lower court was plainly troubled by the sensi-

tive nature of the issues and their potential impact.

Judge Tamm, concurring in the opinion, observed that

the Commission’s decision not only raised “grave first

amendment concerns” (App. A at 56a), but had come

“perilously close” to being unconstitutional.“ Judge

Bazelon noted that the majority “share[d] the first

amendment concerns expressed by Judge Tamm... .” ™

ABC filed a timely petition for rehearing and sug-

gestion for rehearing en bane which was subsequently de-

nied on May 15, 1980."

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision in this case represents the first judicial

interpretation of Section 312(a) (7) of the Communica-

tions Act of 1934.'* The construction placed on that

statutory provision by the court below gives the provision

a meaning that was unintended by Congress, that un-

duly restricts the discretionary judgment broadcasters

are permitted to exercise in allocating time to federal

candidates, and that impermissibly casts the Commission

18 App. A at 68a.

4 Td, at 47a n.117.

1’ Apps. D and E.

16 Section 312(a) (7) was enacted as part of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971, approved on February 7,

1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3. This Court has pre-

viously reviewed other provisions of the 1971 FECA. See

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

7

in the role of supervising political programming—i.e.,

deciding which candidates should be heard, to what ex-

tent and when. The fundamental question presented is

whether the Commission should be permitted to so deeply

intrude into this process—sitting as the ultimate arbiter

of when given political campaigns have begun and deter-

mining whether the “needs” of individual candidates have

been properly satisfied.

The statutory and constitutional questions presented

are critically important to radio and television stations

at all levels. The standards announced by the Commis-

sion and upheld by the court of appeals affect local sta-

tions and national networks with similar force. While

the facts of the instant case involve a Presidential can-

didate requesting national network time, the standards

announced necessarily apply to all broadcast stations in

all federal elections. This would involve not only na-

tional campaigns for the Presidency, but primary and

general elections in each state for all seats in the United

States Senate and House of Representatives.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN

IMPORTANT STATUTORY QUESTION WHICH

SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS COURT

The opinion below has in substance significantly al-

-tered the relationships of candidates, broadcasters and

the Federal Communications Commission in terms of how

broadcast time is to be allocated for political purposes.

In ABC’s view, Section 312(a)(7) confers on federal

candidates a certain limited right to broadcast time that

licensees are obligated to honor. This petition does not

challenge that obligation.

Rather, our petition is directed to the precise nature of

that right and that obligation, in the context of deciding

when broadcast access for political campaigning should

begin in federal elections. Even though the statute speaks

8

in qualified and general terms (i.e., “reasonable access”),

the court below has interpreted Section 312(a)(7) in

a manner that permits the Commission to effectively

mandate broadcast sales based on its own exclusive deter-

mination of when a political campaign has begun.

Set apart from the main political broadcasting provi-

sions,'’? Section 312(a)(7) is contained in a section of

the Communications Act that permits the Commission

to “revoke any station license or construction permit .. .

for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access

to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time

for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally quali-

fied candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his

candidacy.” 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7).

By its terms, we read Section 312(a) (7) as establish-

ing a general right of broadcast access for legally quali-

fied candidates for federal elective office. It conspicuously

fails to provide the terms and conditions of such access,

incorporating, instead, only a concept of reasonableness.

As this Court observed in Columbia Broadcasting System,

Inc. Vv. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94

(1973) [hereinafter cited as “CBS v. DNC”), the

amendment adopting Section 312(a) (7) was intended to

“essentially codif[y] the Commission’s prior interpreta-

tion of § 315(a) as requiring broadcasters to make time

available to political candidates.” 412 U.S. at 113-14 n.12

(citations omitted).

As the Commission itself has repeatedly acknowl-

edged,’* beyond its manifest language there is scant legis-

17See Sections 315(a) and (b) of the Communications

Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 315(a) and (b).

18 Notice of Inquiry: Commission Policy in Enforcing Seec-

tion 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, FCC 78-204,

released March 22, 1978 (BC Docket No. 78-102) ; Report and

Order: Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7)

of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1087 (1978)

{hereinafter cited as 1978 Report and Order].

9

lative history surrounding the enactment of Section 312

(a) (7). The absence of any legislative history elaborat-

ing upon this aspect of the statute, and the use of a

simple “reasonableness” standard, indicate that, as this

Court found in CBS v. DNC, Congress basically sought

to codify existing practice rather than to establish sig-

nificantly new standards or conditions.

Section 312(a) (7) was, in fact, enacted against a

long history of Commission practice that encouraged

broadcasters to offer political candidates the use of their

facilities. For instance, even though by its literal terms

Section 315 (a)—the political broadcasting centerpiece of

the Communications Act—does not grant an initial right

of access, but only affords “equal opportunities” once a

licensee permits a candidate to use a broadcasting sta-

tion, the Commission’s longstanding interpretive prac-

tice has been to encourage broadcast stations to make a

reasonable amount of time available for political broad-

casting purposes. Indeed, long before Section 312(a) (7)

was added to the administrative sanctions section of the

Communications Act, Commission policy held that it

would be contrary to a broadcaster’s overall public in-

terest responsibilities not to afford time to political can-

didates.”* It is in this sense, we submit, that Section

312(a)(7) essentially codified existing practice under

Section 315 (a).

1® Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc

Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960): Rosenbush

Advertising Agency, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 782. 788 (1971)

(licensees must take into account the “public interest consid-

eration of making their facilities effectively available to

candidates”’).

*” Further supporting this conclusion, the Senate Commit-

tee on Commerce commented on the new provision in a

manner that was clearly commendatory of then-existing Com-

mission practice:

[Footnote continued on page 10]

10

In a 1978 proceeding concerning enforcement of Sec-

tion 312(a) (7), the Commission, while disagreeing with

this Court’s finding that this provision merely codified

existing policy, nevertheless stopped short of adopting

new rules or explicit policy guidelines to replace its long-

standing practice of entrusting ongoing political pro-

gramming decisions to licensee discretion. It stated:

“Since the passage of Section 312(a)(7) as part of

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the

Commission’s policy has generally been to defer to

the reasonable, good faith judgment of licensees as to

20 [Continued]

“Section 101(c) was added in Committee. It amends

Section 312(a) of the Communications Act to provide

that willful or repeated failure by a broadcast licensee

to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of

reasonable amounts of time for the use of his station’s

facilities by a l[e]gally qualified candidate for Federal

elective office on behalf of his candidacy shall be grounds

for adverse action by the FCC.

“The duty of broadcast licensees generally to permit

the use of their facilities by legally qualified candidates

for these public offices is inherent in the requirement

that licensees serve the needs and interests of the com-

m[unities] of license. The Federal Communications Com-

mission has recognized this obligation in its Report

and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc

Programming Inquiry (1960).” 3S. REP. No. 92-96, 92d

Cong., lst Sess. 34 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.

CopE Conc. & AD. NEWS 1773, 1787 (emphasis added).

Even if it is conceded that Congress may have intended to

accomplish some purpose other than providing a new penalty

to underscore the obligation of broadcasters to provide time

to political candidates (as the foregoing report language sug-

gests), there is certainly no evidence in the legislative history

that Congress intended to have the Commission thrust itseif

into the timing of all federal campaigns and to assess the

broadcasters’ weighing of each candidate’s individual needs.

11

what constitutes ‘reasonable access’ under all the cir-

cumstances present in a particular case.” *4

Indeed, the most significant result of the 1978 pro-

ceeding was to reaffirm Commission reliance on licensee

discretion. If the Commission believed that Section 312

(a) (7) created or required new terms and conditions for

political broadcasting, it certainly took no action to im-

plement such additional obligatio. 3.

Significantly, neither the Commission nor the court

of appeals finds any meaningfui support in either legisla-

tive history or past decisions that would warrant such

a dramatic departure from the principle of licensee dis-

cretion. On the contrary, Section 312(a)(7) was

enacted against the backdrop of a deeply engrained Com-

mission policy that consistently afforded substantial dis-

cretion to broadcast licensees in both the political broad-

casting and analogous fairness doctrine areas.“ Thus,

in a policy statement issued in the immediate wake of

Section 312(a) (7)’s passage, the Commission announced

its intention to resolve political access claims under that

new provision by its traditional “test of reasonableness.”

Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates

for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 588 (1972). One year

later, in its first ad hoc interpretation of Section 312

(a) (7), the Commission elaborated upon the standard

it intended to follow under this provision:

211978 Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1079.

221t is particularly significant in this regard that even

under the “equal opportunities” provision of Section 315 (a)

of the Communications Act—which grants opposing legally

qualified candidates a right to equivalent response time—

the Commission has recognized licensee discretion in a variety

of important circumstances. Humphrey for President Cam-

paign, 84 F.C.C.2d 471 (1972); Rockefeller for Governor

Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d 649 (B’cast Bur. 1976).

12

“TW here a licensee’s judgments or policies under the

circumstances represent a reasonable, good-faith at-

tempt to accommodate both the right of Federal

candidates to fully inform the voters of their candi-

dacies and the interest of the public in programming

other than political broadcasts, this Commission will

be disposed to affirm such judgments and policies as

reasonably fulfilling the obligations of a licensee un-

der Section 312(a) (7).” *

In subsequent decisions, although cautioning licensees

against certain extreme policies—e.g., denying federal

candidates any program time in prime audience periods

at any time during the campaign™“—the Commission

specifically refused to recognize a candidate’s right to a

particular length of program time or to particular place-

ment on a licensee’s broadcast schedule.** In fact, in a

ruling directly contrary to the Commission’s ruling in this

case, and one that the court of appeals dismisses as mere

dictum (App. A at 26a n.59), the Commission’s Broad-

cast Bureau concluded that “[a] licensee’s discretion in

providing coverage of elections extends not only to the

type and amount of time to be made available to can-

didates, but to the date on which its campaign coverage

will commence.” Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 66 F.C.C.

2d 968, 969, application for review denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 33

(1977), reconsideration denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 743 (1978) .*¢

23 Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602, 604 (1973).

241978 Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1090.

25 See, e.g., Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838 (1974)

(licensee denials of a candidate’s request to program a four-

and-a-half hour telethon on a specified date in support of his

candidacy were held not unreasonable). See also Paw A.

Talmey, 49 F.C.C.2d 678 (B’cast Bur. 1974); Hon. Donald

W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1814 (1976).

26In denying the reconsideration request of the senatorial

candidate in that case, the Commission itself observed that

13

In sum, heretofore the Commissicn’s predominant pol-

icy under Section 812(a) (7) has mirrored its policy in

the political broadcasting area generally, * as well as

practices strongly adhered to by both the Commission and

the court of appeals in the analogous fairness doctrine

area **—namely, a standard of reasonableness that affords

substantial deference to licensee discretion.

The decisions below depart from these principles and

the plain meaning of the statute by shifting from the

broadcaster to the Commission the central role in deter-

mining the point in all federal election campaigns when

political time sales must commence. Rather than good

faith broadcaster determinations based on particular

campaigns applied uniformly to all candidates, the court

of appeals sanctions exclusive Commission determina-

tions based on individual candidate needs. In the lower

court’s view, the determination as to when Section 312

(a) (7) obligations attach is “purely a legal judgment”

(App. A at 28a), not involving editorial discretion.

“a candidate is not entitled to purchase any amount of broad-

cast time which he desires, at whatever time he wishes.” 67

F.C.C.2d at 746.

27 Rockefeller for Governor Campaign, 59 F.C.C.2d 649

(B’cast Bur. 1976); Hon. Dan Walker, 57 F.C.C.2d 799

(B’cast Bur. 1975).

*8 Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 8 (1974); Democratic

National Committee, v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d

323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; American Security Council Education

Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 100 S. Ct. 662, —— U.S. —— (1980).

*° The “standard” for determining when time sales must

begin is simply left to some form of initial “objective” Com-

mission analysis of campaign “indicia.” Until this official

“start of the election campaign,” it is observed that “no

request for time need be granted.” App. A at 54a. The

14

Under this scheme, broadcasters are effectively pre-

cluded from attempting to evaluate the impending cam-

paign as a whole by assessing and responding to the

needs of all candidates uniformly.” Instead, the focus

has been shifted to satisfying the individual needs of can-

didates’ pressing requests for time. In the process, the

decision below relegates to virtual obscurity such factors

as the number of potential candidates competing for air

time and the resulting degree of program disruption.

By requiring deference to an individual candidate’s

perceived “needs,” and by granting the Commission the

exclusive domain to determine when the campaign has

begun, the decision below effectively anoints the Commis-

sion as the ultimate decision-maker in all matters of po-

litical access. In this context, ABC’s good faith decision

to offer time for the 1980 Presidential campaign begin-

ing in early January, 1980, but not four weeks earlier,

is declared manifestly unreasonable—a process of second-

guessing broadcaster judgment that defies rational ex-

precise mechanism for resolving these matters in future cases

is by no means certain. Here, of course, the “standard” was

adopted after a complaint had been filed and the broadcasters

had responded. In the future, will an uncertain broadcaster,

faced with the first request for time in a given federal election

campaign, rush to the Commission for a declaratory ruling

on whether the campaign is in “full swing?” Will the Com-

mission issue such declarations based on “all relevant facts

and circumstances” (App. A at 54a) in literally hundreds of

federal congressional or senatorial elections?

80 Weighing individual candidate needs is, in fact, the very

antithesis of treating candidates in the same election uni-

formly or as a group. It is also directly contrary to the

political broadcasting tradition embodied in Section 315 (a) re-

quiring that all candidates be treated on an equivalent or uni-

form basis once broadcast facilities have been used for politi-

cal appearances (i.e., the “equal opportunities” concept).

15

planation and conflicts with deeply embedded past

precedent.**

While the legislative history of Section 312(a) (7)

is admittedly sparse, it is nevertheless clear that in en-

acting the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Con-

gress sought to reduce campaign costs, and that one

means it envisioned as achieving that end involved

shorter media campaigns. Thus, in commenting on the

creation of the 60- and 45-day periods prior to general

and primary elections, respectively, for the applicability

of the “lowest unit rate provision,” Senators Prouty,

Cooper and Scott noted that “[e]veryone agrees that

81 In a rather remarkable “defense” of licensee discretion

in these circumstances, the lower court remarked that “a

counter-offer of 15 minutes as opposed to a half-hour” might

have been acceptable or reasonable. App. A at 37a. Putting

aside the separate difficulties and uncertainties a broadcaster

would face in attempting to maintain a legal position (under

the standards of this case) that a candidate’s expressed needs

could be satisfied by a lesser amount than the candidate con-

tinued to request, the court’s suggestion merely highlights

the artificial and inherently subjective nature of the required

decisional process under the Commission’s new standards. It

also shows the real absence of licensee discretion when the

ultimate determination is left to agency or judicial resolution

of what is or is not reasonable based on only slight factual

differences. Would 15 minutes indeed have been reasonable

here and 30 minutes not if the Committee had continued to

press for 30 minutes before the Commission? Was the first

week of January unreasonable, but the first week of De-

cember perfectly reasonable? Was ABC, therefore, only un-

reasonable by a matter of three or four weeks? Would the

result have been different (as in the Martin-Trigona case,

supra) if the candidate were someone other than an incum-

bent President or a major party candidate? The mind boggles

at the fine lines the Commission and the courts will be re-

quired to draw in the future.

16

political campaigns tend to be too long. We are hopeful

that the 45- and 60-day provisions will encourage shorter

campaigns.” * In failing to address these purposes, the

court of appeals decision not only contributes to the

frustration of such legislative goals, it highlights the dis-

torted different course the Commission’s actions actually

sanction. In other words, not only have clear legislative

goals been thwarted, Section 312(a) (7) has been inter-

preted in a manner that is conspicuously inconsistent

with the legislative scheme generally and past practice

and analogous rulings in the political broadcasting area

specifically.*

Finally, by interpreting Section 312(a) (7) in the man-

ner indicated, the court of appeals greatly accentuates a

host of constitutional problems, a subject matter we turn

to in the next section.

82S. REP. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1971),

reprinted in [1972] U.S. CoDE CONG. AND Ap. NEws 1821,

1855. See also 117 CONG. REc. 29028 (1971), where Senator

Pastore remarked that Section 312(a) (7) required the sale

of a “reasonable amount of time” but did not permit candi-

dates to “inundate . . . broadcasting.”

38 It should also be noted that Section 312(a)(7) was

adopted after Congress had also considered but rejected

proposals that would have set aside specific broadcast time

periods for political campaigning. For instance, S. 1, con-

sidered by Congress contemporaneously with the bill which

became the Federal Campaign Act of 1971, would have re-

quired each broadcast station and each network to make free

prime time available to Presidential and Vice Presidential

candidates. The bill specified the amounts of time, limited

the program periods to half-hour segments, and specified

the days prior to an election that the program time could be

used. The bill would have required broadcasters to begin

providing time approximately eight weeks before the Presi-

dential election. S. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1971).

27

II. THIS COURT SHOULD ALSO GRANT REVIEW

BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DE-

CIDED AN IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL IS-

SUE

The interpretation given Section 312(a)(7) by the

court of appeals indisputably intrudes upon licensee dis-

cretion and broadcaster First Amendment rights (a re-

quirement to schedule a program against a broadcaster’s

will is an intrusion—even if regarded as a permissible

one). Similarly, the standards specifically sanctioned un-

der the construction adopted by the lower court involve

highly sensitive political considerations—a point em-

phasized by Judge Tamm:

“The Commission, through its implementation of sec-

tion 312(a) (7), has come perilously close to falling

into the chasm of impermissible government action.”

App. A at 68a.

While the other members of the panel stated that “[t]he

majority shares the first amendment concerns expressed

by Judge Tamm, and welcomes the admonition regarding

agency conduct that is embodied in his concurring opin-

ion” (App. A at 47a n.117), the fact remains that a

clearly political matter was decided by an agency split

along party lines in favor of an incumbent President

of the same party as the majority Commissioners. It

is difficult to perceive a more dangerous example of, as

Judge Tamm remarked, “nonneutral government deci-

sionmaking”™ aggravating already significant First

Amendment tensions.

Despite an attempt by the court of appeals to place

this case within the mainstream of past political broad-

% App. A at 56a.

18

casting rulings,® the newly diminished licensee role and

the heightened Commission involvement required by the

decision greatly exacerbate constitutional concerns. As

we have demonstrated (pp. 11-15 supra), the substantial

discretion afforded broadcasters under all preexisting

standards [including those specifically applying 312 (a)

(7)] has been virtually eviscerated here. Of equal sig-

nificance, the discretion previously resting with licensees

has been transformed into a new dictatorial role for the

Commission in the partisan political process. This role

is fundamentally at odds with the concept of a free press

and the principle of licensee discretion embedded in the

Cominunications Act.

In CBS v. DNC, this Court emphasized that although

the singular character of broadcasting provides a condi-

tion in which some limited governmental regulation is at

times constitutionally proper, the need for such regula-

tion must always be balanced against the importance of

permitting broadcasters to make their editorial choices

freely:

“The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927,

the model for our present statutory scheme, [cita-

tion omitted], reveals that in the area of discussion

of public issues Congress chose to leave broad jour-

nalistic discretion with the licensee.” *

The same statutory scheme that awards broadcasters

editorial discretion and prohibits government censorship

85 For instance, at one point the lower court dismissed the

constitutional contentions of the networks by, inter alia, sug-

gesting that “[t]he interference with editorial discretion

seems no more or less” here than under the longstanding

Commission interpretation of the obligation of broadcasters

to provide time to political candidates as a group under the

general public interest standard. App. A at 42a-43a n.102.

86 412 U.S. at 106.

19

of program content also—in the special area of political

broadeasting—recognizes that a political candidate’s use

of broadcast facilities should be undertaken without li-

censee interference. Thus, in a unique and limited re-

versal of the general statutory pattern, Section 315 (a)

of the Communications Act prohibits any censorship of

broadcast material in which a legally qualified candidate

appears. On its face, this provision is intended to sep-

arate broadcasters and the regulatory agency from the

partisan political process; and to permit political can-

didates to convey the political message they wish to con-

vey without interference.*’

The decision below seriously threatens the neutral role

that broadcasters and the government should maintain in

candidate decisions regarding how broadcast facilities

are used for political purposes. It does so by delegating

to the Commission the “editorial” judgment of when a

certain kind of political program must commence; and

by premising that decision on a standard—the needs and

political objectives of individual candidates—that places

broadcasters (to the extent any discretion is left) and

the government (in exercising an ultimate oversight

function) in the prohibitive role of deciding to inau-

gurate broadcast campaigning based on an examination

** See Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v.

WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 528 (1959) where this Court ex-

plained that the no-censorship clause in Section 815(a) re-

flected a “deep hostility to censorship either by the Commis-

sion or by a licensee” over political discussion by legally

qualified candidates. See also Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887,

890 (9th Cir. 1974), where, in a different but analogous con-

text, the Commission and a different court of appeals recog-

nized the need to restrict the Commission’s role in such mat-

ters in order to avoid “highly subjective judgments [by the

agency] concerning the content, context, and potential politi-

cal impact of a candidate’s appearance.”

20

of the motivations, needs, interests and purposes of in-

dividual candidates.

By focusing on the needs of individual candidates, as

opposed to the needs of candidates in general in an over-

all campaign, the lower court decision distorts the process

and places both the Commission and broadcast licensees

in the dangerous position of effectively favoring one can-

didate over another. The prospect of a politically-

appointed government agency judging the active status

of a given campaign aud deciding the precise point at

which campaign appearances must begin raises issues

that go to the heart of the First Amendment.** As Judge

Tamm emphasized in his concurring opinion, the inherent

political sensitivity of requests for access under Section

812(a) (7) “raises the serious danger of nonneutral gov-

ernment action favoring one speaker or viewpoint over

another.” ** The highly charged circumstances of this

case, involving a complaint by an incumbent President

seeking reelection, highlight this danger of favoritism.”

As Judge Tamm further observes, “members of the Fed-

eral Communications Commission may well have more

than a passing interest in the outcome of federal elec-

88 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 488 U.S. 726, 745-46

(1978) where Mr. Justice Stevens emphasized that “it is a

central tenet of the First Amendment that the government

must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.” See also

Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

8° App. A at 67a.

#0 In failing to act upon Judge Tamm’s concerns, the court

below also ignored its own teachings in Columbia Broadcast-

ing System, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

There, the same court observed that an FCC decision favoring

an incumbent President and disregarding an earlier agency

precedent “raise[d] serious questions concerning the require-

ment of governmental neutrality in the area of the First

Ainendment.” Jd. at 1034.

21

tions, particularly presidential contests.” ** Moreover,

“there is some evidence that the Commission has, on oc-

casion, been subjected to direct political pressure,” #

The principle of neutral decisionmaking emphasized

by Judge Tamm and articulated by decisions of this

Court * is seriously threatened by the new standards laid

down in this case—standards that stress the individual

needs of candidates and make the determination as to

when federal election campaigns begin for purposes of

broadcast time sales a “legal” judgment of the Commis-

sion. As Judge Tamm notes, unlike the regulatory ap-

proaches under the fairness doctrine that were upheld

by this Court in Red Lion,“ the form of Commission

*! App. A at 63a (footnote omitted).

#2 Td. at 64a n.16. While ABC advances no suggestion that

such pressure was exerted in this case, a framework never-

theless exists that would seem to call for extreme caution

and agency insulation, rather than loose standards that

actually depend on agency value judgments of essentially

subjective factors. As Judge Tamm further observed:

“As the present case suggests, the campaign for the

Presidency itself is likely to be the most important

occasion for the application of section 812(a)(7). The

President and his party obviously have a strong interest

in the outcome of a presidential election, particularly if

the President himself is a candidate for reelection, and,

by the time the campaign begins, the incumbent Presi-

dent will have appointed several (if a first-term Presi-

dent) or perhaps all (if a second-term President) of the

sitting Commissioners. Even if a Commissioner makes

every effort to remain impeccably neutral, it is nonethe-

less possible, especially in presidential campaigns, that

his partisan and politica) affiliations might subconsciously

influence his decisionmaking.” App. A at 64a.

48 See cases cited in note 88 supra. See also CBS v. DNC,

412 U.S. at 117 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).

“* Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 367 ( 1969).

r%

22

review sanctioned under Section 312(a)(7) permits

agency review and implementing orders even though the

broadcaster has made no initial choice in the presenta-

tion of particular program material. In contrast, here:

“The danger of government nonneutrality under

section 312(a)(7) is exacerbated by the Commis-

sion’s emphasis, in its standards governing the right

of access, on the ‘individual needs’ of the candidate.

Whether and to what extent a candidate is entitled

to broadcast access depends on a weighing of his

‘individual needs’ against the other relevant consid-

erations detailed by the Commission. This evaluation

may lead to a determination, for example, that a

candidate requesting a half hour for a particular

purpose may instead be entitled to only fifteen min-

utes, see [App. A at 37a]; another candidate, on

the other hand, may be found entitled to the full

half hour that he seeks.

“Thus, without regard to any prior broadcast

coverage of opposing candidates, an agency of the

federal government is authorized to decide, based in

significant part on the candidate’s ‘individual needs,’

whether and to what extent a given political can-

didate is entitled to be heard on the nation’s

airwaves.” *

45 App. A at 62a-63a. Judge Tamm’s own solution to

avoiding these profound difficulties was to approach the

analysis of the “individual needs” factor by “focus[ing]

solely on the candidate’s needs as stated by the candidate”

—“both at the broadcaster level and before the Commission

on review.” App. A at 67a-68a (emphasis in original). How-

ever, if broadcasters are not required to evaluate or weigh

each candidate’s needs, the standard would appear to be

meaningless, since any candidate requesting broadcast time

obviously regards such a request as necessary to his “needs.”

At the same time, if broadcasters and the Commission in re-

viewing such requests are, in fact, required to perform a

political weighing process, maintaining a neutral role in the

political process becomes virtually impossible.

23

In sum, in failing to recognize the dangers of inter-

jecting the Commission too deeply into the editorial proc-

ess when political candidates request broadcast time, the

decision in this case violates important constitutional

principles. A scheme that so completely transfers deci-

sions as to “whether and to what extent a given political

candidate is entitled to be heard on the nation’s airwaves”

also conflicts with this Court’s concerns in CBS v. DNC

that the Commission should avoid being drawn “into a

continuing case-by-case determination of who should be

heard and when.” 412 U.S. at 127.

Accordingly, the myriad of important constitutional

principles endangered by the decision in this case provide

further support for review by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for certiorari

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel: JAMES A. MCKENNA, JR.

THOMAS N. FROHOCK

EVERETT H. ERLICK CARL R. RAMEY

ROBERT J. KAUFMAN

American Broadcasting DENNIS P. CORBETT

MCKENNA, WILKINSON &

Companies, Inc. KITTNER

“—. a of the 1150 Seventeenth St., N.W.

x Washington, D.C. 20036

New York, NY 10019 (202) 861-2600

Counsel for American

August 13, 1980 B-oadcasting Companies, Inc.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition — American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission · 449 U.S. 950 | Frix