Respondents Brief — CBS v. Federal Communications Commission
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Nos. 80-207, 80-213 and 80-214
Iu thy Sayre Cont of the Wuited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
CBS INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. ~
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION AND THE UNITED STATES
WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
LOUIS F.. CLAIBORNE
Deputy Solicitor General
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO
Assistant to the Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20580
(202) 633-2217
ROBERT R. BRUCE
General Counsel
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG
Associate General Counsel
C. GREY PASH, JR.
LISA B. MARGOLIS
Attorneys
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
:
F
ee ee
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
No. 80-207
CBS INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
No. 80-213
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.,
PETITIONER
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
No. 80-214
NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION AND THE UNITED STATES
(I)
|
II
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion correctly determined that Section 312(a) (7) of
the Communications Act provides an affirmative right
of reasonable access to broadcast stations for indi-
vidual candidates seeking federal elective office.
2. Whether the Commission correctly determined
that petitioners failed to provide reasonable access
as required by Section 312 (a) (7).
3. Whether Section 312(a) (7), as applied by the
Commission, is consistent with the First Amendment.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SI EIEN, hai sisthin.saiSscipideinsinlenunpydbdchesisioydbdicligiiclaclccablelincdeionl
I ii das onic anatsepdtiionbmeriphbsbanaseiiakabiiecedeatdinnaiie
Statutory provisions involved -....................ccccceeseeseeeeeeees
Statement
The proceeding before the Commission ...................
The decision of the court of appeals ......................
Summary of argument .................cccccccsccccsseecceseesessceeesseeeees
Argument:
I.
II.
Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act
imposed on broadcasters a new obligation to
afford reasonable access to individual candidates
seeking federal elective office ...............cccccccccccccee
A. The language of Section 312(a) (7) is un-
EI REST IAG a POA ORO A a ed
B. The statutory scheme and legislative history
support a literal interpretation of Section
URINE LUD. ialaiichisncdesdcnecohaatnpetouinct eines sibanisdons
C. The Commission’s consistent administrative
construction, which has been brought to the
attention of Congress, confirms the appro-
priateness of a literal interpretation of Sec-
SIRENS CED cijasnpibiciSensebinthorpbatiiiliaesesiae either
D. This Court’s decision in CBS v. Democratic
National Committee does not call into ques-
tion the Commission’s interpretation of Sec-
POE MO LUD eictacocscee cell ccacedinestEle iibeecess
The Commission’s finding that the networks
failed to afford reasonable access is supported
by the record and is neither arbitrary nor ca-
SII esi dh ori mpnnse ecoenin hah dipedibaiee hie diy oueanceeas
10
18
19
19
23
82
37
41
7%
IV
Argument—Continued Page
III. Section 312(a) (7), as implemented by the Com-
mission, makes a significant contribution to
freedom of expression on issues of vital impor-
tance and does not impermissibly interfere with
broadcasters’ First Amendment rights .............. 55
A. The statute, as interpreted by the Commis-
sion, facilitates free expression by candi-
NN in es 57
B. The statute, as interpreted by the Commis-
sion, facilitates the right of voters to receive
information about political candidates .......... 60
C. The statute, as interpreted by the Commis-
sion, does not unduly restrict the discretion
OF DEORGORBUOES .nnccccccccccscccccncccesscssecccsecescersonsesees 62
COMMINUIID. sss cccdbsnuismainasaireabdndehibiduiebs tap iceesoe dlls tasdeussAeticil ci 71
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases:
Aaron Vv. SEC, No. 79-66 (June 2, 1980) 0000000000... 40
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., No. 78-1815 (June 2,
TUITE. echaiianiah dicta beibadieandaticiccadidcselgliesinbe sale besa tk piliuidp en 87
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 oo...cccccccccceceee 17, 41, 58, 59, 61
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412
TI ie a passim
CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, No. 79-521 (June 9,
PRES ARCEMIS, 25906775 RRP A BO IN Oe 20
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. BI dtiinsiseannie 23
Farmers Union v. WDAY, 860 U.S. 625 .....0.......... 24, 64
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 ............ 65
FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broad-
casting, 486 U.S. 776 ..........cccccccsececceseeseeneesees 42, 58-59, 64
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 488 U.S. 726 .......... 21, 64, 69
PCC V. Wai COe Uk BOB o. occysscccccrevecvetsccccccssdsccccse: 21
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 829 U.S, 228 oo... 42, 45
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 485 U.S
po ERBET ERE ARS FEET FT NETS OE RS Mere By SO 61
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555... 33
Vv
Cases—Continued Page
Garrison V. Louisiana, 879 U.S. 64 00... 61
Harrison v. PPG Industries, No. 78-1918 (May
nN aah 20
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
LEER STRAT ise a 20
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617... 89
Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC, No. 80-
1549 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1980) wooo. 53
NBC v. United States, 819 U.S. 190 ...0000000 42, 64
Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ Vv. FCC, 859 F.2d 994 ooo... ccc cence. 55
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 87 .0.0000000000 ow. 20
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 895 U.S. 367....passim
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 880 ........00...... 40
Rubin v. United States, No. 79-1018 (Jan. 21,
eRe NR REP Re The AI 9 SS 20
United States v. Bergh, 352 U.S. 40 0.0000. 37
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 258 ........... 19
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 ............ 15, 33
Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474.... 45
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer
Ns MII GIN. WII cnc eccadiccercsovesococteescewenateniitoce 69
Homes V. Musk, SB1 UB. 1 :......c..cccccecceccccecarccosececees 37
Administrative Decisions:
Ken Bauder, 62 F.C.C.2d 849 ooo. eceeecccccceseeeee 34
Lew Breyer, 81 F.C.C.2d 548 2000... ceccceeeceeteeeene 22
Frank Church, 87 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 2d 387 .......... 52
Enbane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2808...... 22
Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, reconsideration
denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, aff’d in relevant part,
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, cert. denied, 436 U.S.
IRON EAC 1 SRST OC OR SD PE CERAM CNTR 21
Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 888 2.000000... 46
Robert H. Hauslein, 89 F.C.C.2d 1064 (Broadcast
RPT AIA EeE Fe EL Ne DO 34
Labor Party, 67 F.C.C.2d 589 0.000000 34
Licensee Responsibility under Amendments to the
Communications Act made by the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 616...... 83, 60
VI
Administrative Decisions—Continued Page
Martin-Trigona, 66 F.C.C.2d 968 (Broadcast Bu- ~
reau), rev. denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 38, reconsid. de-
Sy ee SE 46
Memorandum Concerning Interpretation of Sec-
ond Sentence of Section 315(a), 40 F.C.C.2d
po _SHCTETIRTIRSS SEBO ACI ISN Ait a oR oC EN 22, 24
New Primer on Political Broadcasting and Cable-
casting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 .....00...0...-nn.e ccecccceeeeee passim
Report on Enforcing Section 312(a) (7), 68 F.C.C.
B.ED yrrlbes oR? 0 0 STs a ee NT passim
Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1814 ............ 46
Don C. Smith, 49 F.C.C.2d 678 ...........-cccccccccceeceeoeee 34, 45
Summa Corp., 48 F.C.C.2d 602 ...............-0000.-0-0:.---- 34
Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities By Can-
didates For Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510 ........ 22, 33,
34, 50, 54
WALB-TV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246 ......................... 46, 52
Constitution, statutes and regulations:
United States Constitution, First Amendment ..... passim
Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, Section 11, 66 Stat.
717 (amended by Federa! Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, Section 108 (a)
oR Pa SCRE aS cn a 25
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.:
Section 3(h), 47 U.S.C. 158(h) _........... 26
Section 4(i), 47 U.S.C. 154 (i) 0000... 2, 21, 42
Section 4(j), 47 U.S.C. 154(j) 0.00... 21, 42
Section 303(r), 47 U.S.C. 308(r) ................. 2,21, 42
Section 312(a) (7), 47 U.S.C. 312(a) (7) ...... passim
Section 8316, 47 U.S.C. S16 ................................ passim
Section 315 (a), 47 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 315 (a)... 31
Section 315(a), 47 U.S.C. 315(a) _.............. passim
Section 315(b), 47 U.S.C. 315(b) _........... 40
Communications Act Amendments of 1952, ch.
-- 879, 66 Stat. 717, Section 11, 47U.S.C. 315 (b).... 40
VII
Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued Page
Communications Act Amendment of 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-274, Section 2, 73 Stat. 557... 25
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
en I a 29
Section 108(a), 86 Stat. 4 ........................... 25
Sections 103-106, 86 Stat. 4-8... 41
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-448, Section 205 (b), 88
Ms MIU cabbies ee ue oa yt a 86
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, Section 18, 44 Stat.
2 DROSS DS RES I RE aD SE RES el 24, 26
Sk, Ry SBIR STIRS Re NV fy a 21, 69
vo TB SORTED INAS a aR Span eae 21
Oe Soares FORD os 53, 66
ae Seen Oe ED ee a 48
eR SENT a 6, 53
ene, ED 48, 53, 66
Miscellaneous:
Campaign Broadcast Reform Act of 1969: Hear-
ings on S. 2876 and others Before the Communi-
cations Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ............... 27-28
B. Cole, Television Today (1981) .......... 55
67 Cong. Rec. 12501-12505 (1926) ..... 25
116 Comg. Ree. 11598 (1970) .............. 28
117 Cong. Rec. 48150 (1971) ....0...... 58
117 Cong. Rec. 48168 (1971) ................... 58
318 Cong. Ree. 826 (1872)... 31
121 Cong. Rec. 6446 (1975) ........................... 36
121 Cong. Rec. 6454-6458 (1975) ...... 36
123 Cong. Rec. S186-S187 (daily ed. Jan. 10,
Lh SPER EATS Aa RE 37
124 Cong. Rec. S8879-S8881 (daily ed. June 8,
GEESE NS come ION A EI Eee ea 87
T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expres-
NE IPE taliiectibadvdctesnstiniiaisence cident 57-58, 59
VIII
Miscellaneous—Continued
Fairness Doctrine: Hearings on S. 2, S. 608, and
S. 1178 Before the Communications Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
Jot Beam, CROTB) cccccstecticcco
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: He earings
on S. 1, S. 882, and S. 956 Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
CSTD: scrresnaiiecscchoehie meaisab betes atla tcuiboabied teinaameatiomeim
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hear-
ings on S. 372 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
OBd Cong, 1st Bemis CUGTBY ccsccceccsornccnscccscniitinucses
First Amendment Clarification Act of 1978: Hear-
ing on S. 22 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d
Bane, CATED nicsinssccheisacetccceentiake eles eee
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1918, 78d Cong., 2d Sess.
CREO: iiss acencisiatiies Berea arei ee ana nl
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) a a ee
Oxford English Dictionary fh, BERRIES SEA
Political Broadcasting: Hearings on S. 1585,
S. 1604, S. 1858, and S. 1929 Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Conn, 200 Buais CI. cxcicinsosseovibidesccnbseemitioe ions
Political Broadcasting: Hearings on S. 204 and
Others Before the Communications Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong.,
26 Bene. CHE ethene ae
Political Broadcasting—1970: Hearings on H.R.
13721, S. 3637 and Others Before the Subcomm.
on Communications and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ...............----ccccceeeeeeeee
Presidential Campaign Broadcasting Act: Hear-
ings on S. 3171 Before the Communications
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960)
Page
.. 86-37
34, 35
27
Ix
Miscellaneous—Continued Page
Projections—Predictions of Election Results and
Political Broadcasting (Sec. 315, Communica-
tions Act): Hearings on S. 1548 and Others Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st
CII Ces nee 27
Repeal of “Equal Time” Requirements: Hearings
on S. 6103 Before the Subcomm. on Commu-
nications of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
EES RE HIRE Re RS ear cave ee 36
S. 3171, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) 27
_ §. 1548, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967 RNS ae 27
S. 2876, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. ( ___ __. SR Aaeenton 27
S. 3637, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) 28
S. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 I a 28, 29
S. 882, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) 28, 29
S. 956, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 302 ( oe 28, 29
S. 1178, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (1975) 36
S. 22, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §3 (1977) 37
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) sabeeeicNiamansnanbentnceasoisnseerpeunsinsssiansngcurcipsoon 29, 31
S. Doc. No. 91-109, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) .... 28
S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ....passim
S. Rep. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ..... 29
S. Rep. No. 93-170, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) ..... 36
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1la-
68a) is reported at 629 F.2d 1. The decision of the
Federal Communications Commission (Pet. App. 69a-
109a) is reported at 74 F.C.C.2d 631. The Commis-
sion’s opinion and order denying reconsideration (Pet.
App. 110a-15la) ure reported at 74 F.C.C.2d 657.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on March 14, 1980. Petitions for rehearing filed by
petitioners in Nos. 80-213 and 80-214 were denied
on May 15, 1980. The petition for a writ of certiorari
in No. 80-207 was filed on August 11, 1980. The
petitions for a writ of certiorari in Nos. 80-213 and
80-214 were filed on August 18, 1980. The petitions
were granted on November 3, 1980. The jurisdiction
of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. 312(a) (7), provides:
The Commission may revoke any station license
or construction permit—
* * * for willful or repeated failure to allow
- reasonable access to or to permit purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
broadcasting station by a legally qualified can-
didate for Federal elective office on behalf of his
candidacy.
2. Section 315(a) of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. 315(a), provides in pertinent part:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is
a legally qualified candidate for any public of-
fice to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
(1)
2
equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station: Provided, that such licensee shall have
no power of censorship over the material broad-
cast under the provisions of this section. No
obligation is imposed under this subsection upon
any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate.
3. Section 4(i) of the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. 154(i), provides in pertinent part:
The Commission may perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such
orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may
be necessary in the execution of its functions.
4. Section 303(r) of the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. 303(r), provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
the Commission from time to time, as public con-
venience, interest, or necessity requires, shall—
* * * [mJake such rules and regulations and
prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not in-
consistent with law, as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this chapter * * *.
STATEMENT
The Proceeding Before the Commission
1. In early October 1979, the Carter-Mondale
Presidential Committee advised petitioners ABC,
CBS and NBC that it desired to purchase a thirty-
minute time period during “prime time” on one of
four alternative days—December 4, 5, 6, or 7, 1979.
The Committee explained that it needed the time to
present a documentary film setting forth the record of
President Carter and his administration during the
preceding three years. The requested time period co-
incided with President Carter’s scheduled announce-
3
ment of his candidacy for reelection. The request
also asserted that the 1980 campaign already had
commenced, as evidenced by forthcoming caucuses and
conventions and intensive media coverage (J.A. 35-
40). Petitioners ABC and NBC both refused to offer
any time in response to this request (J.A. 41-43).
Petitioner CBS offered to sell two five-minute pro-
gram segments, only one of which fell within “prime
time” (J.A. 44-45). The networks’ rejection of the
Committee’s request was based on their assertion that
it was too early in the presidential campaign to be-
gin selling time for political broadcasts, that any
sale would force them to sell time to a substantial
number of rival candidates, and that such sales would
result in disruption of their regularly scheduled pro-
gramming (J.A. 41-45, 52-93).
In view of the refusal of ABC and NBC to sell
the Committee any time, and the refusal of CBS to
sell time that responded to its request, the Committee
filed a complaint with the Federal Communications
Commission alleging that the networks had violated
the “reasonable access” requirement of Section 312
(a)(7) (J.A. 27). The Committee asserted, inter
alia, that (id. at 28-29) :
The prime time programming of all three net-
works is almost exclusively devoted to entertain-
ment programming for commercial purposes.
Each network on week nights (and Saturdays)
schedules six half-hour prime time periods and
eight on Sundays for a three network total of
132 per week or 528 per month.
* * * * *
* * * [T]he Committee is seeking to use the
[requested] half-hour program for an appear-
ance by the President shortly after he formally
declares his candidacy * * *. The proposed pro-
gram would stress the President’s record and
that of his administration. It is intended to set
4.
forth the basic case for renomination and thus
it was desirable to air the program shortly after
the announcement. It is planned to have the
television appearance coincide with more than
2,000 small-donor, grass roots fundraising gath-
erings in communities throughout the country.
* * *
The request of the Committee was made
nearly two months in advance of the air date in
order to ease the scheduling burden on the net-
works * * *, Also, the time requested was se-
lected so as not to interfere with the national
ratings sweep period which is so important to
network sales.
The Committee also asserted it had not made any
other requests for time, and, because of the expense
of such time, it would not likely make any such ad-
ditional requests in the near future (id. at 33). Fi-
nally, the Committee alleged that none of the reasons
advanced by the networks for their refusal to sell
the requested time was sufficient to justify their ac-
tions (id. at 29-32).
2. After considering the networks’ responses to
the Committee’s complaint (J.A. 52-93), the Com-
mission found that each network had acted unreason-
ably in responding to the request to purchase time
and that each therefore had failed to fulfill its obliga-
tions under Section 312(a)(7) of the Communica-
tions Act (Pet. App. 69a).
Initially, the Commission rejected the networks’
contention that it was “too early” in the presidential
campaign to begin selling time for political broad-
casts. The Commission identified numerous objective
facts that led to the conclusion that the presidential
campaign already was “in full swing” (Pet. App.
92a-94a).' The Commission therefore turned to a
1 The Commission relied on prior decisions establishing that
the point when a broadcaster must afford reasonable access
5
consideration of the reasonableness of the net-
works’ responses.
The Commission found that, in contravention of
its previously announced legal standards (see Report
on Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), 68 F.C.C.2d 1079,
1090 (1978)), the networks had applied “blanket”
policies in dealing with the request for time, rather
than-attempting in good faith to tailor their responses
to the particular request of the individual candidate
(Pet. App. 90a-101a). The Commission saw no evi-
dence that the networks, in their responses to the
Committee or in their pleadings, had given any con-
sideration at all to the candidate’s individual request.
By failing to offer any time that would coincide with
the President’s planned announcement of his candi-
dacy, NBC and ABC simply cut off the President’s in-
tended presentation to the public (ibid.). And by of-
fering only five minutes in prime time to allow tl
Committee to summarize the President’s record over
a three-year period, CBS ignored the Committee’s as-
sertion that this was “ ‘totally insufficient’ in amount
to present the ‘detailed and thoughtful’ picture of the
administration’s record envisioned by the Committee
** *” (id. at 100a).
In addition to finding that the networks failed to
make any reasonable attempt to tailor their responses
to the stated request of the candidate, the Commis-
sion also found that the networks’ reliance on counter-
vailing factors was lacking in support. While the
Commission acknowledged that broadcasters may
varies depending upon the nature of the particular campaign
(Pet. App. 88a-91a). The Commission previously had deter-
mined that “a presidential campaign may be in full swing
almost a year before an election.” Report on Enforcing Sec-
tion 312(a)(7), 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1091 (1978) (1978 Report
and Order).
6
take into account the likelihood of requests for reply
time from other candidates in determining whether
to grant access to a particular candidate, it found
that the danger of multiple requests in the present
case was remote. The Commission explained that,
in December 1979, it was unlikely that more than a
small percentage of candidates would soon become
“legally qualified” under the Commission’s rules, and
that, in any event, few candidates would “have the
financial resources necessary to purchase a half hour
of network prime time” (Pet. App. 96a).2 Accord-
ingly, the Commission concluded that the likelihood of
requests from multiple candidates did not justify the
networks’ denials (Pet. App. 95a-96a, 99a-101a).°
Finally, the Commission rejected the contention
that potential “programming disruption” justified the
denial of access in this case. While the Commission
acknowledged that disruption was a factor properly
to be considered (id. at 97a), it found the likelihood
of disruption to be minimal. The Commission ob-
served (id. at 98a): “the request for time was made
far in advance of the closing days of the campaign
and nearly two months prior to the broadcast date.
Furthermore, as the Committee has stated, ‘it gave
*A request for equal time under Section 815 of the Act
must be presented to the broadcaster within seven days by
a rival candidate who has qualified under the Commission’s
rules. 47 C.F.R. 78.1940(e). A half hour of prime time on
CBS costs between $172,000 and $186,000 (J.A. 171).
*In reference to CBS’s offer of 5 prime time minutes, the
Commission observed (id. at 100a-101a): “Even if all 18
major party candidates were entitled to equal treatment,
CBS’ policy would result in the mrp 65 prime time
minutes—a total of miniscule proportions when it is realized
that there are approximately 5400 minutes available in prime
time in a single month.”
7
the networks considerable leeway in providing avail-
abilities’ in that it listed four alternative dates for
the broadcast, and we recognize that the networks
in fact make frequent scheduling changes for their
own commercial purposes.”’
3. In a subsequent order denying reconsideration
of its original decision, the Commission rejected (Pet.
App. 118a-119a) the networks’ argument that Con-
gress intended Section 312(a)(7) merely to codify
prior Commission policy under the general “public
interest” standard.‘ The Commission pointed out that
it previously had considered and rejected that argu-
ment in its 1978 Report and Order.’ The Commission
also clarified the principles applicable in determining
when a campaign is underway and what amount of
* As discussed on pages 22-28, infra, the Commission’s “‘pub-
lic interest” policy, which applied to all political broadcasts
prior to the enactment of Section 812(a) (7), merely re-
quired broadcasters to make some time available for political
programming. No obligation rested on broadcasters to give
reasonable consideration to individual requests by candidates
for air time. This general duty to offer some political pro-
gramming applied without distinction to local, state and fed-
eral campaigns.
5 In the 1978 Report and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1088,
the Commission stated: ‘“‘We see no merit to the contention
that Section 312(a) (7) was meant merely as a codification of
the Commission’s already existing policy concerning political
broadcasts. There was no reason to commit that policy to
statute since it was already being enforced by the Commis-
sion. Moreover, Congress limited the applicability of the
‘reasonable access’ provision to candidates for Federal elective
office. The Commission’s [prior] policy made no specific dis-
tinction between those candidates and candidates for state
and local office. Therefore, it seems clear that Congress was
creating a different, additional obligation which was to apply
only to Federal candidates.”
8
consideration must be given by a broadcaster to a
candidate’s request for time.
The Commission explained that, in deciding when a
campaign has commenced—and therefore when it is
no longer reasonable for broadcasters to deny re-
quests for access on a blanket basis—the Commission
would consider all relevant evidence tendered by the
networks and the candidate. The Commission stated
that, since “[n]Jeither broadcasters nor candidates
bring a perspective of total objectivity * * * to ques-
tions of the initial applicability of Section 312(a)
(7),” determination of this threshold issue is an ap-
propriate subject for the Commission’s own “inde-
pendent evaluation * * * taking into account the po-
sition of the candidate and the networks as well as
other factors” (Pet. App. 124a).
In light of the networks’ apparent misunderstand-
ing of the original order’s discussion of candidate
needs, the Commission further explained the im-
portance of, and the limitations on, that consideration.
The Commission stated that the purpose for its focus
ov: the needs of individual candidates was to ensure
that broadcasters would give consideration to “each
request in its own specific context on a particularized
basis” (Pet. App. 126a).° The Commission empha-
sized that “the candidate’s particular request is by
no means conclusive of the question of how much time,
if any, is appropriate,” but rather is only one factor
to be considered in the weighing process (id. at 128a).
However, the Commission reiterated that a broadcaster
must attempt “to tailor his offer of air time to be as
* The Commission noted (id. at 185a) that “blanket deter-
minations,” of the kind found to exist here, “too easily allow
decisions based on [the] broadcaster’s own convenience or
economic interest * * *,”
9
reasonably responsive as possible (given countervail-
ing factors) to a particular candidate’s stated pur-
pose in seeking air time” (Pet. App. 128a). Thus,
while broadvasters are not expected to evaluate or
censor the subject matter of individual programs, to
“second guess’ the ‘policital’ wisdom * * * of longer
versus shorter formats,” or to assess the “candidate’s
subjective, personal, or immediate ‘political’ desires’’
(Pet. App. 127a), they should “consider the particu-
lar nature of the reyuest etrade so that ‘as much as
possible’ and ‘within reasonable limits’ airtime will be
responsive to the candidate’s needs” (Pet. App.
135a). In this case, the Commission explained, the
networks clearly had made no effort at all to be re-
sponsive to the candidate’s request (Pet. App. 137a-
139a).
Finally, the Commission stressed the importance of
a full explanation of the broadcaster’s reasons for
denying a candidate’s request. The requirement of a
full explanation is “essential to assuring that we do
give careful consideration, and appropriate deference,
to a broadcaster’s discretion [because] [w]e must
deal essentially with the broadcaster’s own reason-
ing” (Pet. App. 136a). In this case, it was not pos-
sible for the Commission to defer to the networks
because their explanation for their actions disclosed
that they failed to consider those factors that the
Commission previously had held must be considered
in evaluating candidate requests. See 1978 Report
and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C. 2d at 1090; Pet. App.
135a-139a particular, the networks’ refusals to
afford air time rested on the erroneous legal con-
clusion that Section 312(a)(7) imposed no obliga-
tion on them to consider and attempt to accommo-
date the particular request of the individual candi-
date.
10
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On petitions for review, the court of appeals unani-
mously affirmed the Commission’s ruling (Pet. App.
la-68a). With respect to the networks’ assertion
that Section 312(a)(7) merely “codified” the Com-
mission’s prior “public interest” policy, the court held
(Pet. App. 14a):
Our study of the plain language of Section 312
(a) (7) and our review of the legislative history
of the provision leads us to conclude that Sec-
tion 312(a) (7) did not merely codify prior FCC
policy and that it did create a new right of af-
firmative access for candidates to federal elec-
tive office.
The court explained (id. at 15a) that the literal text
of the statute “speaks in terms of individual candi-
dates—‘a legally qualified candidate’ seeking time to
advocate ‘his candidacy.’ By contrast, the Com-
mission’s policy before Section 312(a)(7) gave no
attention to individual candidates.” This change in
focus demonstrates that “Congress was doing some-
thing different in [Section 312(a)(7)] and supports
the view that the legislators were creating a new
right for individual candidates when they passed that
provision” (id. at 16a; footnote omitted).
The court of appeals also held that, in implement-
ing Section 312(a) (7), the Commission “articulated
reasonable standards designed to minimize govern-
mental intrusion into broadcasting and to maximize
respect for the editorial discretion of broadcasters,
while at the same time advancing the important stat-
utory purpose of candidate access” (Pet. App. 54a).
The court rejected the argument that determination
by the Commission of when statutory obligations
attach, 7.e., when broadcasters must begin affording
11
reasonable access, was improper (id. at 24a-29a). It
held that “determination of when statutory obliga-
tions attach is not an editorial decision * * * [but
rather] is purely a legal judgment * * * for which
the Commission is better suited than either broad-
casters or candidates” (id. at 28a-29a). Similarly, the
court found no basis for the contention that, in mak-
ing this decision, the Commission impermissibly in-
volved itself in the election process. It noted that
“[t]his would be true only if the Commission sought
to set a starting daie for the campaign, rather than
merely find that it ha[d] already begun” (id. at
27a). The court added that “[b]y confining the ap-
plicability of Section 312(a) (7) to a period when the
campaign is fully under way, the Commission has
limited the statute’s impact on broadcasters” (Pet.
App. 29a).
The court of appeals also reviewed the Commis-
sion’s requirement that broadcasters consider the in-
dividual requests of candidates, and concluded that
this requirement comported with the rule of reason
prescribed by Congress in Section 312(a)(7) (Pet.
App. 32a-41a). Applying this requirement, the court
agreed with the Commission that the networks had
failed to consider the particular request for air time
made by the Committee. The court held (id. at 39a-
40a) that all three networks had “displayed unrea-
sonable disregard for the relevant standards * * *
[in adopting] across-the-board policies [which] vio-
lated the longstanding mandate of the Commission
that, in addressing a request for access from a can-
didate for federal office, the broadcaster ha[s] to
tailor his response to the individual candidate.”
Finally, the court of appeals found no basis for
the contention that Section 312(a)(7), as imple-
mented by the Commission, unconstitutionally re-
12
stricts the editorial discretion of broadcasters (Pet.
App. 42a-47a). The court noted that Section 312
(a) (7) applies only to a narrow and clearly defined
class of beneficiaries—legally qualified candidates
for federal elective office. Moreover, the statute
grants access only for the prescribed purpose of ad-
vocating the candidate’s election to office, and statu-
tory obligations apply only during the political season
when the campaign is fully underway. The court also
noted that the Commission has articulated standards
to assist broadcasters in determining which requests
for access should be honored, and has limited its re-
view to a consideration of whether broadcasters
reasonably have applied those standards (id. at 46a).
In conclusion, the court of appeals emphasized (Pet.
App. 46a-47a; footnote omitted) :
The right of “use” granted to the candidate un-
der section 312(a)(7) does not confer on the
candidate any right to interfere with what the
broadcast journalist says or does on the air.
Similarly, the broadcast journalist may not de-
termine what the candidate says or does with the
limited amount of air time available to him.
Therefore, Section 312(a) (7) represents only a
congressional reallocation of the “use” of por-
tions of the airwaves from the licensee to the
candidate. The broadcaster’s exercise of journal-
istic discretion—his right to speak and editorial-
ize—is unimpaired. |
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tamm warned
against applying the statute to “favor[] one speaker
or viewpoint over another’\(Pet. App. 67a). Having
pointed out the need to avoid that danger, Judge
Tamm agreed that the statute, as implemented by the
Commission, was fully consistent with constitutional
requirements. Judge Tamm reached that conclusion
13
because “section 312(a)(7) makes a tremendous
positive contribution to the cause of freedom of ex-
pression” (Pet. App. 65a), because “we dare not for-
get that there is also a potential for evil in leaving
the question of access in the hands of private broad-
casting interests” (id. at 65a-66a), and because “the
Commission’s standards for implementing section
312(a) (7), as long as they are carefully followed, are
sufficient to save the statute from constitutional in-
firmity” (7d. at 67a).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
IL
The affirmative access provision prescribed by Con-
gress in 1972, 47 U.S.C. 312(a)(7), imposes on
broadcasters a duty to afford “reasonable amounts
of time” to “a legally qualified candidate” for federal
elective office, who seeks “use of a broadcasting sta-
tion” to advocate “his candidacy.” Repeated failure
to afford reasonable access to such a candidate—or
even a single episode of willful withholding—subjects
the broadcaster to sanctions. The literal terms of the
statute leave no room to doubt that Congress in-
tended to protect individual candidates against un-
reasonable denials of air time. Congress’ focus on “a”
candidate, seeking the “use” of “a broadcasting sta-
tion” to advocate “his candidacy,” shows plainly that
individual candidates were intended to have legally
protected rights. This new statutory obligation dif-
fers markedly from the Commission’s prior “public
interest” policy, which merely required broadcasters
to make some time available for political program-
ming, and which offered no protection of any kind to
individual candidates.
Construing the statute literally to afford affirma-
tive rights to individual candidates involves no break
14
with historical tradition. Since the inception of radio
regulation in 1927, Congress has treated political
broadcasting on a special basis. Individual candidates
traditionally have enjoyed the right to “use” broad-
cast stations to reply to their rivals. Broadcasters
never have had editorial control over the format or
content of such political broadcasts. Furthermore,
the general “public interest” obligation always has
required broadcasters to offer some political pro-
gramming, notwithstanding their contrary wishes.
The obligation created by Section 312(a)(7) is a
natural outgrowth of that requirement.
Events preceding the enactment of Section 312
(a) (7) demonstrate clearly that Congress intended to
expand candidate access to the airwaves. Between
1960 and 1971, numerous bills were proposed in Con-
gress that sought to alter the status quo and give
candidates a greater opportunity to broadcast their
views. And when, in 1972, Congress enacted Section
312(a)(7), it unambiguously stated the objective:
to “give candidates for public office greater access
to the media so that they may better explain their
stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and com-
pletely inform the voters.” S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d
Cong., lst Sess. 20 (1971). Far from contradicting
the literal terms of the statute, the legislative history
shows that Congress intended to expand candidate ac-
cess to broadcast stations and that it understood
that it was vesting individual candidates with affirm-
ative access rights.
Following its enactment, the Commission consist-
ently has interpreted Section 312(a)(7) to superim-
pose upon the general “public interest” requirement a
new obligation, which vests rights in individual can-
didates. That consistent administrative interpretation
is entitled to substantial judicial deference under
15
familiar principles. Moreover, the Commission’s views
have been explained to Congress and approved by
the Senate Subcommittee responsible for communica-
tions. Congress has considered complaints from
broadcasters about the operation of Section 312(a)
(7), but has declined to amend the statute or to dis-
turb the administrative contruction. Accordingly, def-
erence to the agency’s view is “particularly appro-
priate” because the “agency’s interpretation involves
issues of considerable public controversy, and Con-
gress has not acted to correct any misperception of
its statutory objectives.” United States v. Ruther-
ford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).
Although the networks rely heavily on this Court’s
decision in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 412 U.S. 94, 118-114 n.12 (1978), that case
did not consider or decide the question presented in
this case. In the course of its opinion, the Court had
occasion to contrast the treatment afforded political
candidates and private citizens under the Communi-
cations Act. In pointing out the differences between
the access granted to candidates and private citizens,
it referred to Section 312(a) (7) and stated generally
that it “essentially” codified prior law. The Court
did not state or imply that the new statute was in all
respects coextensive with prior doctrine, or that it
imposed no new duties or obligations.
IL
The Commission correctly determined that the
networks denied reasonable access in this case. Con-
trary to legal requirements clearly set forth in the
Commission’s earlier rulings under Section 312(a)
(7), the networks simply applied blanket, precon-
ceived policies and dismissed out of hand the candi-
date’s request for one half-hour of time during De-
cember 1979. The networks afforded the request no
16
individualized attention, and made no attempt to ac-
commodate the stated requirements of the candidate.
Moreover, the business justifications offered by the
networks for their withholding lacked any factual
basis. As the Commission expressly found, there was
no realistic possibility of a large number of requests
for equal time if the candidate’s request was honored,
and no claim of program disruption could logically be
predicated upon a request for air time made two
months in advance, which specified four alternative
days.
The Commission has reasonably exercised its au-
thority to interpret the statute and prescribe condi-
tions for its application by determining that access
rights do not vest until the campaign is fully under-
way. That interpretation benefits broadcasters. In
the absence of such a limiting interpretation, the
statute would apply whenever a legally qualified can-
didate demanded reasonable access. In determining
when a campaign is fully underway, the Commission
renders a legal judgment based on objective facts. It
does not review the contents of any program or ex-
ercise an “editorial” function. Nor does it trigger the
onset of the campaign; to the contrary, the Com-
mission’s determination is triggered by the existence
of substantial campaign activities, as evidenced by
objective, extrinsic facts.
The Commission did not exceed its authority by
requiring broadcasters to consider the individual re-
quests of candidates. The Commission has not in-
sisted that broadcasters attempt to second-guess the
requests of candidates, or pass judgment on the wis-
dom of their media strategy. Rather, it has required
broadcasters to consider the stated requests of can-
didates and attempt, in good faith, to accommodate
those requests with their own business concerns. This
17
requirement is aimed essentially at the situation pre-
sented in this case—in which the broadcasters dis-
missed out of hand the candidate’s request based on
preconceived, blanket policies. Such an approach, if
condoned, would permit broadcasters to decide uni-
laterally what may be said by candidates and when,
without attention to the particular media strategy
candidates believe to be best adapted to reaching their
intended audience.
ITI.
As Judge Tamm observed (Pet. App. 65a), Section
312(a) (7), as interpreted by the Commission, “makes
a tremendous positive contribution to the cause of
freedom of expression.” It facilitates the First
Amendment right of each candidate “tirelessly to
advocate his own election.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 52 (1976). And it implements the First
Amendment right of voters in the viewing and listen-
ing audience to receive information necessary ‘to
make informed choices among candidates for office.”
Id. at 14-15. In the broadcast context, “[i]t is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
That principle has particularly great relevance in a
case such as this, which involves the right of viewers
and listeners to obtain information that is essential
to the proper functioning of representative govern-
ment.
In enacting Section 312(a) (7), Congress balanced
the First Amendment rights of candidates, voters, and
broadcasters. And it arrived at a fair accommodation
—it prescribed a right of “reasonable access.” The
enactment reflects the well-established legal principle
that broadcasters have no First Amendment right to —
“monopolize a radio frequency” to the exclusion of
18
political candidates (Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 389). Congress may require
a licensee to “share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obliga-
tions to present those views and voices which * * *
otherwise, by necessity, [would] be barred from the
airwaves” (ibid.). These principles strongly confirm
the constitutionality of Section 312(a)(7), as con-
strued by the Commission, which temporarily reallo-
cates the “‘use” of the frequency from the broadcaster
to the candidate,
The facts of this case show that the Commission
paid appropriate deference to the discretion of the
networks. It did not second-guess any attempt to
accommodate the needs of the candidate and it did
not reject any claim of business necessity resting on
a valid factual basis. It merely determined that the
conduct of the networks was unreasonable, since they
ignored the stated request of the candidate and of-
fered no tenable justification for their denial of ac-
cess. Despite this conduct, which contravened the
Commission’s long-standing interpretation of Section
312(a) (7), the Commission imposed no sanctions. It
merely directed the networks to state how they would
comply with the statute. The Commission has thus
applied the statute with sensitivity and restraint, and
there is no basis for speculating that it will do other-
wise in the future.
19
ARGUMENT
I, SECTION 312(a)(7) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
ACT IMPOSED ON BROADCASTERS A NEW
OBLIGATION TO AFFORD REASONABLE ACCESS
TO INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES SEEKING FED-
ERAL ELECTIVE OFFICE
Petitioners CBS and NBC contend that Section 312
(a) (7) merely codified policies developed by the Com-
mission under the public interest standard of the
Communications Act prior to 1971, and that it did
not impose any additional obligations on broadcasters
(CBS Br. 14-34; NBC Br. 37-49).”7. The plain lan-
guage of the statute, however, clearly shows that
Congress fashioned a new right of access for in-
dividual candidates seeking reasonable amounts of
broadcast time. Although it is unnecessary to look
beyond the statutory text to affirm the Commission
and the court of appeals in this case, we also demon-
strate below that their interpretation is supported
by the structure of the statute and its legislative his-
tory, as well as the Federal Communications Com-
mission’s consistent administrative construction.
A. The Language of Section 312(a)(7) is Unambiguous
In response to the networks’ arguments about the
intended seope of Section 312(a) (7), we submit that
“this is a case in which the meaning of [the] statute
may be determined by the admittedly old-fashioned
but nonetheless still entirely appropriate ‘plain mean-
ing’ canon of statutory construction.” United States
v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 258, 254 (1980). Giving the
7 ABC appears to take a different view. See ABC Pet. 7:
“Section 312(a) (7) confers on federal candidates a certain
limited right to broadcast time that licensees are obligated
to honor. This petition does not challenge that obligation.”
See also Pet. App. 22a.
7%
7%
20
words used by Congress “their ordinary, contem-
porary, common meaning” (Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)), there can be no doubt that
Congress imposed on broadcasters an obligation to
grant individual candidates for federal office a right
of reasonable access."
Section 312(a)(7) authorizes the Commission to
impose the sanction cf license revocation based on a
broadeaster’s willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reason-
able amounts of time “for the use of a broadcasting
station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal
elective office on behalf of his candidacy” (emphasis
supplied). Congress did not prescribe a duty merely
to provide some measure of political programming in
general. Congress focused on the individual candi-
date: “a legally qualified candidate” is given a right,
enforceable by government sanction, to a _ specific
“use” of “a broadcasting station” to advocate “his
candidacy.” *
8 While the briefs of the networks dwell at great length on
legislative history, they fail to come to grips with the literal
language of the statute itself. That approach ignores this
Court’s repeated admonition that “‘[t]he starting point in
every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself.’”’ International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) (citations omitted). “Absent a
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” CPSC
v. GTE Sylvania, No. 79-521 (June 9, 1980), slip op. 5. See
also Harrison V. PPG Industries, No. 78-1918 (May 27, 1980)
slip op. 138; Rubin v. United States, No. 79-1013 (Jan. 21,
1981), slip op. 6.
®In the present case, the Commission ruled on the candi-
date’s complaint alleging a violation of Section 312(a) (7).
The Commission’s adjudication of individual complaints and
21
Applying these statutory terms literally, it follows
that the Commission may impose the sanction of revo-
cation based on a single episode of “willful” failure
to afford a reasonable amount of air time to a can-
didate. And, if an unreasonable denial of air time
is “repeated”—that is, it occurs more than once—
the sanction of revocation may be imposed even in
the absence of a showing of willfulness. In short,
the statute focuses not only on the individual can-
didate, but also authorizes the Commission to impose
sanctions even in the case of a single instance of will-
ful withholding.”
its issuance of orders is in aid of its u:timate authority to
impose sanctions under Section 312(a)(7)—if sanctions
should prove to be necessary—and is consistent with its ex-
press authority to issue orders and prescribe conditions rea-
sonably necessary to enforce the statute. See 47 U.S.C. 154(i),
(j), 303(r); 47 C.F.R. 1.2, 1.89. See also FCC v. WJR, 337
U.S. 265, 282 (1949); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 3867, 372 n3 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation, 488 U.S. 726, 730 (1978). Broadcasters have urged
the Commission to act upon individual complaints in this
manner rather than awaiting renewal or revocation hearings.
See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 18 (1974), reconsidera-
tion denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff’d in relevant part,
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567
F.2d 1095, 1115-1116 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
926 (1978).
10 We do not suggest that the Commission should exercise
its authority to impose sanctions based on relatively isolated
or good faith violations of the statute. Indeed, the Commis-
sion never has imposed sanctions on any broadcaster based
on a violation of Section 312(a) (7). As discussed on pages
66-69, infra, the Commission has taken effective steps to mini-
mize the need for sanctions in this area. In this case, for
example, the Commission encouraged the parties to negoti-
ate their differences after it reiterated the applicable legal
standards (Pet. App. 10la & n.34). Moreover, after finding a
violation, it merely directed the networks to advise it of what
steps they would take to assure compliance (id. at 142a).
|
22
This specific statutory duty stands in marked con-
trast to the broadcaster’s more limited duty under the
general “public interest” policy. Under that policy,
broadcasters wishing to assure renewal of their li-
censes were expected, among other things, to make
judgments about the importance of particular cam-
paigns, and, on that basis, to decide which campaigns
and which candidates should be given air time. The
requirement was that some time be given to political
broadcasting, but no individual candidate could claim
a personal right of access in the absence of a broad-
cast by his rival, and no distinction was drawn be-
tween local, state, and federal elections.“ In sum,
unlike the general public interest policy, the express
terms of Section 312(a) (7) prescribe special access
rights for individual candidates.”
11See Enbanc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303,
2314 (1960); Memorandum Concerning Interpretation of
Second Sentence of Section 315(a), 40 F.C.C. 1088, 1093-1095
(1968) ; Lew Breyer, 31 F.C.C.2d 548 (1968) ; Use of Broad-
cast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office,
34 F.C.C.2d 510, 535-5388 (1972); 1978 Report and Order,
supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1088. As summarized in the Commis-
sion’s New Primer on Political Broadcasting & Cablecasting,
69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2286 (1978), Section 312(a) (7) “does
require [broadcasters] to permit [reasonable] access to all
candidates for Federal office if the candidates request it.”
The public interest standard, in contrast, permits broadcast-
ers to “use [their] judgment as to which races are most sig-
nificant and of greatest interest to the public, and refuse to
sell or give time for ‘uses’ of the station by candidates for
other offices.” Jd. at 2290 (footnote omitted).
12 The candidate’s right to protection against unreasonable
denials of air time is the converse of the broadcaster’s duty,
upon pain of government sanction, to afford reasonable ac-
cess to individual candidates. The candidate enforces the
right through the ordinary process of filing a complaint with
23
The plain terms of the statute further demonstrate
that Congress was not simply codifying the prior
“public interest” standard because the statute applies
only to candidates seeking “Federal elective office.”
The public interest standard, in contrast, applied to
candidates for all offices, and continues to govern
broadcaster obligations with respect to state and local
candidates. See New Primer on Political Broadcast-
ing and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2290. If
Congress had intended merely to codify the preexist-
ing public interest obligation, there would have been
no need to limit the statute to federal candidates; in-
deed, such a limitation would be inexplicable. Thus,
as the court of appeals pointed out (Pet. App. 16a),
the plain terms of the statute show that “candidates
in federal elections were being singled out for some-
thing beyond the amorphous right of access created
by the public interest doctrine.”
B. The Statutory Scheme and Legislative History Sup-
port a Literal Interpretation of Section 312(a)(7)
While the literal terms of Section 312(a)(7) are
so unambiguous as to suggest that “further inquiry
may be unnecessary” (Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)), an examination of the
statutory scheme and the legislative history strongly
the Commission. See New Primer on Political Broadcasting
and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2212-2215.
18 Congress did not extend the new obligation prescribed
under Section 312(a)(7) to state and local candidates be-
cause an individual right of access vested in those candidates,
as well as federal candidates, would have placed impractical
burdens on broadcasters. See Political Broadcasting—1970:
Hearings on H.R. 18721, S. 36387 and Others Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(7970).
24
reinforces the literal interpretation adopted by the
Commission and the court of appeals in this case.
1. In enacting Section 312(a)(7) in 1972 to pre-
scribe a right of access for individual federal can-
didates, Congress did not write on a clean slate. From
the very beginning of the regulation of radio and
television, Congress has regulated “uses” of the air-
waves by political candidates under a regime that dif-
fers from that applicable to broadcaster presentations
of public issues. As discussed on pages 22-23, supra,
the “public interest” standard has long imposed on
broadcasters a duty to provide access to some candi-
dates for political uses. And, since the enactment of
Section 18 of the Radio Act in 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat.
1170, Congress has required broadcasters to provide
an equal opportunity of reply to candidates after
their rivals make public appearances over the air-
waves. The equal opportunity doctrine, which today
is codified in 47 U.S.C. 315(a), has always imposed
on broadcasters a special duty to carry political pro-
gramming regardless of their editorial views and
with no censorship of the contents of the program-
ming allocated to political candidates. Thus, Congress
has prescribed that, in the field of political program-
ming, the candidate—and not the broadcaster—
would be the ultimate judge of program content.”
14 See Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 527-531
(1959). The right of candidates to be the ultimate judge
of what is presented was intended to be a safeguard against
abuses of editorial control by broadcasters. See id. at 529-
530. In thus divesting broadcasters of their usual editorial
control in the context of political broadcasting, Congress fully
recognized that it was imposing special obligations on them.
See Memorandum Concerning Interpretation of Second Sen-
tence of Section 315(a), supra, 40 F.C.C. at 1090 (discussing
the legislative history).
25
The distinct treatment afforded to political broad-
casting is highlighted by the fact that, both in 1927
and 1934, Congress specifically considered but firmly
rejected suggestions that the equal opportunity re-
quirement be extended to cover general public issue
programming as well as political broadcasts by can-
didates. See 67 Cong. Rec. 12501-12505 (1926) ; H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1918, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 49 (1934) ;
see also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94, 104-108 (1972).*
Thus, the pertinent feature of the historical back-
ground, against which Section 312(a)(7) was en-
acted, is Congress’ different treatment of general
broadcasting and political broadcasting. In contrast
to general programming, political programming al-
15 Events following the adoption of the 1934 Act also illus-
trate the distinctive treatment afforded to political broad-
casting. In 1952, Congress adopted a provision restricting the
rates that broadcasters could charge political candidates. Act
of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, Section 11, 66 Stat. 717 (amended
by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-
225, Section 103 (a) (1), 86 Stat. 4). In 1959, it acted promptly
to correct what it viewed as a misinterpretation of the equal
opportunities provision. See Political Broadcasting: Hearings
on S. 1585, S. 1604, S. 1858 and S. 1929 Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1-2 (1959). On
that occasion, when it adopted four exemptions to Section 315
for news-type programs (see 47 U.S.C. 315 (a) ), Congress de-
clared its intent to review regularly the operation of Section
315 and reqrired annual Commission reports on the applica-
tion of the statute as amended. Communications Act Amend-
ment of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, Section 2, 73 Stat. 557.
There is no other area of broadcast programming over which
Congress has exercised such thorough oversight and has so
pervasively regulated broadcaster discretion.
26
ways has been surrounded with special statutory ob-
ligutions. Under Section 315 and its predecessor,
broadcasters have been required, upon request, to
provide rival candidates with specific amounts of
time with no control over program content or for-
mat. Congress, therefore, rather than the licensee,
has allocated a substantial portion of the broadcast
frequency for political “uses.” In this context, the
prescription of a duty to afford “reasonable access”
to individual federal candidates was not a dramatic
change in statutory policy. Section 312(a)(7) rep-
resented only a limited extension of the contingent
right of access that Congress traditionally provided
for individual political candidates. It also represented
a natural evolution of the previously recognized ‘“‘pub-
lic interest”? requirement, which compelled broad-
casters to make some program time available in the
first instance for political candidates.”
2. The Commission’s literal interpretation of Sec-
tion 312(a)(7) is confirmed not only by the historic
approach of Congress to political programming, as
discussed above, but also by the events that preceded
enactment of Section 312(a) (7). Section 312(a) (7)
16—n reliance on 47 U.S.C. 153(h), petitioners argue that
they should not be deemed to be “common carriers.” See ABC
Br. 31 n.89; CBS Br. 17-19; NBC Br. 31. We agree that they
are not common carriers for the general public. They are, how-
ever, “special carriers” for political programming under pre-
scribed circumstances, and have been so ever since 1927. Un-
der Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1170,
and Section 315 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 315,
Congress has required broadcasters to relinquish “uses” of
their stations for political replies, has deprived broadcasters
of editorial control over those broadcasts, and has regulated
the rates they may charge.
27
represented the culmination of a legislative process
covering more than a decade. Following the 1959
amendments to Section 315 of the Act (see note 15,
supra), demands mounted in Congress for increased
media access for political candidates. In 1960, a bill
was introduced in the Senate that would have re-
quired television stations to make specific amounts of
free time available to presidential candidates. S.
3171, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). During hearings
on that bill, Senator Pastore expressed disapproval of
the policies of some stations that had refused re-
quests for political time. Presidential Campaign
Broadcasting Act: Hearings on S. 3171 Before the
Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 59-60 (1960). Subsequent hearings also fo-
cused on the Commission’s inability to protect indi-
vidual candidates seeking access. See Political Broad-
casting: Hearings on S. 204 and others Before the
Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-146 (1962) (re-
marks of Chairman Minow) (‘we do not presently
have authority to say to a station ‘you must put on
candidate X’”). Once again, in 1967, a bill that
would have required free access time for state and
local, as well as federal candidates, was proposed. S.
1548, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967). See Projections—
Predictions of Election Results and Political Broad-
casting (Sec. 315, Communications Act): Hearings
on S. 1548 and others Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th
Cong., lst Sess. 174-175 (1967). When that attempt
to fashion increased access rights failed, thirty-eight
Senators co-sponsored another bill (S. 2876, 91st
Cong., lst Sess. (1969) ), which would have required
that specific amounts of television time be sold to
Congressional candidates at discount rates. See Cam-
28
paign Broadcast Reform Act of 1969: Hearings on S.
2876 and Others Before the Communications Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong.,
lst Sess. 4-9 (1969) ; see also id. at 47-50 (remarks
of Chairman Hyde). In 1970, both houses of Con-
gress passed S. 3637, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), a
bill which, inter alia, would have regulated expendi-
tures for political broadcasts. As amended on the
floor of the Senate (116 Cong. Rec. 11593 (1970) ),
S. 3637 would have declared that “consistent with the
other needs of the community broadcast licensees
shall make a reasonable amount of time available for
legally qualified candidates for federal elective office
between the hours of 7:30 and 10:30 [P.M.].”
This bill was subsequently vetoed by the President
(S. Doe. No. 91-109, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ).
The subject of campaign reform was again taken up,
however, in 1971. Three bills were introduced in the
Senate—S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956—measures, which,
in different ways, were “intended to increase a can-
didate’s accessibility to the media * * *.” Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1,
S. 382, and S. 956 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
92d Cong., lst Sess. 2 (1971) (remarks of Senator
Pastore). S. 1 would have required each broadcaster
to “make available without charge the use of its facil-
ities * * * to candidates in a presidential election for
the offices of President and Vice President * * *” S. 1,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 202 (1971). Certain candi-
dates would have received free of charge “eight one-
half hour periods of prime time from each such sta-
tion and network * * *.” Ibid. S. 956, by contrast,
would have granted the Commission a broad power to
issue rules “to insure that all licensees make avail-
able to legally qualified candidates for public office
reasonable amounts of time for use of broadcasting
29
stations * * *.” S. 956, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 302
(1971).
Rather than adopting either S. 956 or S. 1, how-
ever, the Senate Commerce Committee and Rules and
Administration Committee approved S. 382, but in-
serted within it the language appearing today in Sec-
tion 312(a) (7).’’ As discussed on pages 19-23, supra,
the language deliberately chosen by Congress pre-
scribed a new obligation requiring broadcasters to
provide federal candidates with reasonable access to
the airwaves. In contrast to some of the bills pre-
viously considered by Congress (see pages 27-28,
supra), the language ultimately selected left no
doubt concerning the legislative intent to protect in-
dividual candidates.”
3. Although the contemporaneous commentary on
Section 312(a) (7) in the legislative history is limited,
that commentary also supports the view that Con-
gress sought to prescribe a new affirmative right
of access for candidates seeking federal elective office.
In summarizing one of the leading purposes of Title
I of the new statute—the title which contained Sec-
tion 312(a) (7)—Congress stated that it (emphasis
supplied) :
17 As reported in the Senate, the text of the new access pro-
vision was sweeping. It applied to “any legally qualified can-
didate on behalf of his candidacy.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580,
92d Cong., lst Sess. 22 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 3 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1971). The Conference Committee limited the provi-
sion only in one respect—by confining it to candidates seek-
ing federal elective office. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, supra, at
22.
18 Section 312(a) (7) was enacted as part of Title I of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
86 Stat. 3.
80
attempts to give candidates for public office
greater access to the media so that they may
better explain their stand on the issues, and
thereby more fully and completely inform
the voters.
S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 20. The Committee
plainly was referring to Section 312(a) (7) when it
recited the statutory purpose of affording “greater
access to the media” for political candidates. The
correlation between that purpose and the plain text
of Section 312(a)(7) is, we submit, obvious and
compelling.”
Subsequent portions of S. Rep. No. 92-96 further
establish that Congress understood that it was super-
imposing a new obligation on the prior “public in-
terest”? requirement. The Senate Report separately
describes the newly prescribed obligation,” and dis-
19 Petitioners assert that, because Section 312(a) (7) was
not specifically mentioned in conjunction with this statement
of purpose, and other portions of the statute were discussed by
the Committee shortly thereafter, it necessarily follows that
the statement of purpose has no relationship to Section 312
(a) (7). However, the short summary of statutory provisions
appearing on page 21 of the Senate Report obviously is not ex-
haustive. The Report’s subsequent, more detailed summary of
the provisions in Title I includes repeated references to Sec-
tion 312(a) (7). See S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 34, 38.
20 The Report states (id. at 34) :
[The new Section 312(a) (7)] provide[s] that willful or
repeated failure by a broadcast licensee to allow reason-
able access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for the use of his station’s facilities by a
legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on
behalf of his candidacy shall be grounds for adverse ac-
tion by the FCC.
Section 312(a)(7) sought to “emphasize” (id. at 28) the
duty to afford access to federal candidates by focusing on them
individually, rather than generally. Vesting candidates with
31
tinguishes it from the “general” public interest re-
quirement." Moreover, during floor debates on the
Conference Report that was submitted to the House,
it also was recognized that the new Section 312(a)
(7) imposed significant new obligations on broad-
casters and afforded rights to individual candidates.
See 118 Cong. Rec. 326 (1972) (remarks of Rep.
Keith).
The final, and in our view conclusive, piece of evi-
dence of legislative intent appears in Congress’ con-
temporaneous amendment of Section 315(a) of the
Act, 47 U.S.C. 315(a). That amendment was de-
scribed by the Senate Conference Committee as “a
conforming amendment” required by the enactment
of the new Section 312(a) (7). See S. Conf. Rep. No.
92-580, supra, at 22; accord, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-
752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971). The text of Sec-
tion 315(a), prior to the “conforming amendment,”
was as follows (47 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 315(a)):
No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to
allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
individual rights directly served the statutory purpose to
“enable all who seek such office to have a better opportunity
to do so” (id. at 26; emphasis added).
*1 The Report gives separate treatment to the general pub-
lic interest obligation previously recognized by the Commis-
sion (S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 34) :
The duty of broadcast licensees generally to permit the
use of their facilities by legally qualified candidates for
these public offices is inherent in the requirement that
licensees serve the needs and interests of the [commu-
nity] of license. The Federal Communications Commis-
sion has recognized this obligation * * *.
Congress intended that this “general” public interest require-
ment would “continue” to be enforced at three year intervals
in the license “renewal” context, not in license revocation
proceedings (id. at 28).
32
As a result of the conforming amendment, however,
Section 315(a) now contains an important qualifica-
tion (47 U.S.C. 315(a) (emphasis supplied) ) :
No obligation is imposed under this subsection
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station
by any such candidate.
It was necessary for Congress to qualify its state-
ment that there was “no obligation” to afford in-
dividual access—and to make it clear that that state-
ment applied only under Section 315(a)—precisely
because the newly enacted Section 312(a)(7) does
require broadcasters to afford individual access. In
short, as the court of appeals explained (Pet. App.
18a), “[i]f Section 312(a) (7) was merely intended
to codify pre-existing obligations and add the sanction
of revocation, no ‘conforming amendment’ to Section
315 would have been required.” ”
Thus, far from contradicting the literal terms of
Section 312(a)(7), the legislative history provides
additional support for the literal interpretation
adopted by the Commission and the court of appeals.
C. The Commission’s Consistent Administrative Con-
struction, Which Has Been Brought to the Atten-
tion of Congress, Confirms the Appropriateness of a
Literal Interpretation of Section 312(a)(7)
As this Court frequently has held, the construction
of a statute by those charged with its administration
“should be followed unless there are compelling indi-
22'The networks suggest (CBS Br. 30 n.70; NBC Br. 45
n.*) that Congress merely intended its amendment of Sec-
tion 315(a) to testore certain language appearing in the Stat-
utes at Large, but omitted from the United States Code. That
theory, however, has virtually no support in the legislative
history, and is contradicted by Congress’ explicit statement
that the amendment was a “conforming” amendment needed
to bring Section 315(a) into harmony with the newly enacted
Section 312(a) (7).
33
cations that it is wrong, especially when Congress has
refused to alter the administrative construction.”
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381
(1969); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee, 412 U.S. 94, 121-123, 125, (1973); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-566, 568
(1980). Deference to the agency’s interpretation ‘“‘is
particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s
interpretation involves issues of considerable public
controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any
misperception of its statutory objectives.” United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).
These settled principles of statutory construction rein-
force the view that Section 312(a) (7) created a new
right of individual access for federal candidates.
Immediately following the enactment of Section
312(a) (7), and up until the present time, the Com-
mission consistently has construed the statute to im-
pose a new obligation on broadcasters to afford ac-
cess to individual federal candidates. The Commis-
sion repeatedly has determined that this obligation
extends beyond the prior public interest policy. See
Use of Broadcast & Cablecast Facilities by Candi-
dates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 535-538
(1972) (“1972 Policy Statement’) ; Licensee Respon-
sibility Under Amendments to the Communications
Act Made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516-517 (1974) (“1974 Public
Notice’) ; 1978 Report and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.
2d at 1088; New Primer on Political Broadcasting
and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2286, 2290.8
28 It is difficult to understand the basis for the networks’
attempt to fault the Commission (ABC Br. 33-37; CBS Br.
32-34) for inconsistency in construing the statute. In its first
published statement about the statute, the Commission made it
clear that Section 312(a)(7) imposes a new “specific re-
34
The Commission’s interpretation has been brought
to the attention of Congress and has been discussed
with approval by Senator Pastore, the Chairman of
the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
merce Committee. In 1973, the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Communications held hearings to review the
operation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973:
Hearings on S. 372 Before the Subcomm. on Commu-
nications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (“Hearings on S. 372”). As
the court of appeals pointed out (Pet. App. 19a),
Commission Chairman Dean Burch testified concern-
ing the Commission’s experience with Section 312(a)
(7) and supplied the Committee with its 1972 Policy
Statement, which had construed the statute “to im-
pose[] on the overall obligation to operate in the
public interest the additional specific requirement
that reasonable access and purchase of reasonable
amounts of time be afforded candidates for Federal
office.” See 34 F.C.C.2d at 538; Hearings on S. 372,
quirement” on broadcasters in addition to the general “public
interest” obligation and that blanket refusals to sell time to
candidates could not be countenanced. 1972 Policy Statement,
supra, 84 F.C.C.2d at 538. The Commission reiterated this
position in the 1974 Public Notice, supra, 47 F.C.C. 2d at 516-
517, and in the 1978 Report and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at
1088. The Commission’s rulings on individual complaints have
adhered to the same view of the statute from the beginning.
See, e.g., Robert H. Hauslein, 39 F.C.C.2d 1064, 1065 (Broad-
cast Bureau 1973) ; Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602, 603-605
(1973) ; Don C. Smith, 49 F.C.C.2d 678, 679-680 (Broadcast
Bureau 1974) ; Ken Bauder, 62 F.C.C.2d 849 (Broadcast Bu-
reau 1976) ; Labor Party, 67 F.C.C.2d 589 (1978).
24 Senator Pastore presided since 1959 over all of the Com-
munications Subcommittee Hearings dealing with candidate
access bills and was floor manager of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (see pages 27-28, supra).
35
supra, at 137. Chairman Burch also discussed in de-
tail the practical problems implicit in attempting to
decide whether, in a particular case, an individual
station has afforded reasonable access to a particular
candidate. Hearings on S. 372, supra, at 137. After
advising the Subcommittee of the Commission’s inter-
pretation of the statute and its experience in apply-
ing it, Chairman Burch stated: “We have brought
our approach to these problems in the form of the
1972 Public Notice to the attention of Congress. If
we have erred in some important construction, we
would, of course, welcome congressional guidance.”
Ibid. Senator Pastore replied (ibid.) :
Let me say this. We didn’t draw the provision
any differently than we did because when you be-
gin to legislate on guidelines, and on standards,
and on criteria, you know what you run up
against. I think what we did was reasonable
enough, and I think what you did was reasonable
enough as well.
I know it is a difficult problem to say what is
reasonable. You have to take everything into
consideration. You couldn’t cancel all other pro-
grams that the public might be interested in, just
to accommodate all the candidates.
Yet, on the other hand, there is the question
of giving sufficient time. In some instances, es-
pecially since there is a lowest unit rate, some
licensees have been rather reluctant to give ade-
quate time.
I would suppose that in cases of that kind, you
would get some compiaints.'”!
25 While the Commission and Senator Pastore expressed
their satisfaction with the operation of the new access provi-
sion, network officials complained about its intrusive effect.
CBS Vice Chairman Frank Stanton objected to the fact that
“section 312 grants rights to all legally qualified candidates
for Federal office * * *.”’ Id. at 190. Despite the complaints
86
Congress revisited the subject of federal election
campaign reform in 1974. The Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974, among other things,
repealed the expenditure limitations prescribed in
Title I of the 1971 legislation. See Pub. L. No. 93-
443, Section 205(b), 88 Stat. 1278. Although Section
312(a)(7) also had been enacted as part of Title I,
it was not altered by Congress and the administrative
construction of the statute was left undisturbed.”
of broadcasters, the Senate Commerce Committee approved
the Commission’s administration of Section 312 (a) (7). Chair-
man Burch assured the Committee that the Commission would
continue to consider “complaints on an ad hoc basis as actual
cases arise.” The Committee stated: “Your Committee be-
lieves that testimony submitted for the record by the Chair-
man of the FCC should allay any fears that the provisions of
section 312(a) (7) might work a hardship on a good faith
licensee or otherwise adversely surprise him.” S. Rep. No. 93-
170, 98d Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1973). See also id. at 7-8. Net-
work officials continued in subsequent years to object in Con-
gress that Section 312(a)(7) “unduly intrudes” upon edi-
torial discretion. First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977:
Hearings on S. 22 before the Subcomm. on Communications
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978). Still later, the House
Communications Subcommittee was advised of the manner in
which the Commission had interpreted Section 312(a) (7) in
the instant case and expressed no disapproval. See Repeal of
“Equal Time” Requirements: Hearings on H.R. 6103 Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42
(1980). Counsel for the subcommittee agreed with the view
that Section 312(a) (7) creates a right of access for individ-
ual federal candidates. Jd. at 43.
26 Since 1974, Congress has considered proposals to re-
peal Section 312(a)(7), but has declined to change the
statute or the administrative interpretation. See S. 1178, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. §2 (1975), introduced at 121 Cong. Rec.
6446, 6454-6458 (1975), hearings held, Fairness Doctrine:
Hearings on S. 2, S. 608, and S. 1178 Before the Communica-
37
In light of the consistent interpretation rendered
by the Commission and Congress’ continuing over-
sight of this widely discussed provision, ‘Congress’
failure to repeal or revise” Section 312(a)(7) “in the
face of such administrative interpretation [provides]
persuasive evidence that that intepretation is the one
intended by Congress.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11
(1965); accord, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
supra, 395 U.S. at 381; United States v. Bergh, 352
U.S. 40, 46-47 (1956); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., No.
78-1815 (June 2, 1980), slip op. 8-13.
D. This Court’s Decision in CBS v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee Does Not Call Into Question the
Commission’s Interpretation of Section 312(a) (7)
In support of their view that Section 312(a) (7)
did nothing more than merely restate the “public
interest” requirement imposed on broadcasters prior
to its enactment (see page 22, supra), the net-
works cite (ABC Br. 21-22; CBS Br. 14-15; NBC
Br. 37-40) this Court’s decision in CBS, Inc. v. Dem-
ocratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S. at 113-
114 n.12. In that case, the Court observed in a foot-
note discussion that Section 312(a)(7) had “essen-
tially codified” prior Commission policy. Once again,
however, the networks misapprehend the meaning of
the language in question. The Court in Democratic
National Committee did not say that Section 312 (a)
(7) imposed no new duties, and it did not imply that
tions Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); S. 22, 95th Cong, Ist Sess. §3
(1977), introduced at 123 Cong. Rec. S186-S187 (daily ed.
Jan. 10, 1977), 124 Cong. Rec. S8879-S8881 (daily ed. June 8,
1978), hearing held, First Amendment Clarification Act of
1977: Hearing on S. 22 Before the Subcomm. on Communi-
cations of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
38
Section 312(a)(7) was in all respects coextensive
with prior doctrine. The Court said that the statute
“essentially” codified prior doctrine,” which is cor-
rect in the sense that Section 312(a)(7) directly
evolved from, was consistent with, and was superim-
posed upon the predecessor public interest doctrine.
In addition to the fact that this Court qualified its
footnote observation as it did, the fact of overriding
importance is that the Court was not called upon, and
did not purport, to rule on the precise contours of the
obligation imposed by Section 312(a)(7). The is-
sue before the Court in Democratic National Commit-
tee was whether the Communications Act or the First
Amendment requires the Commission to force broad-
casters to accept paid editorial announcements from
the general public. 412 U.S. at 97. The Court held
that the Commission need not prescribe such a gen-
eral access obligation. Jd. at 121-132. The Court ob-
served “that no private individual or group” has a
right to command the use of the airwaves (id. at
113), and contrasted that situation with the right of
“political candidates” to receive air time (id. at 113-
114 n.12):
Very recently, Congress amended § 312(a) of
the 1984 Act to authorize the Commission to
revoke a station license for “willfull or repeated
failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the
use of a broadcasting station by a legally quali-
fied candidate for Federal elective office on be-
half of his candidacy.” * * * This amendment
essentially codified the Commission’s prior in-
terpretation of §315(a) as requiring broad-
casters to make time available to political candi-
dates.
27 The word “essentially” denotes some correspondence, not
an identical relationship. Its synonym is “substantially.” See
Oxford English Dictionary 296 (1933).
39
Thus, read in context, it is clear that the Court in-
tended merely to contrast the special treatment af-
forded “political candidates” under the Communica-
tions Act with the treatment afforded any “private
individual or group.” * The Court did not attempt to
decide the question presented in this case—whether
Section 312(a)(7) vests individual candidates with
an affirmative right of access.”
Finally, even if there were some discrepancy be-
tween the Court’s discussion of Section 312(a) (7) in
Democratic National Committee and the literal terms
28 As the court of appeals explained, the point of this Court’s
discussion in Democratic National Committee was that “one
limited class of speakers, political candidates, has a stronger
claim to the airwaves than do citizens at large” (Pet. App.
21a).
29 In its brief before this Court in Democratic National Com-
mittee (Br. 42-48 n.87), the Commission also referred to
Section 312(a)(7) as a form of codification of the prior
public interest standard. However, the point of the Commis-
sion’s discussion was simply that, with the exception of politi-
cal programming, Congress has not required broadcasters to
serve as common carriers. The Commission’s brief did not
purport to render an interpretation on the issue now before
the Court. Moreover, the relevant statement of administra-
tive views appears in the Commission’s formal interpreta-
tions, not in appellate briefs dealing with other issues. See
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627-628
(1971). As previously noted, the Commission’s consistent
interpretation of the statute—an interpretation beginning in
1972 and continuing to the present day—is that Section 312
(a) (7) imposed a new obligation on broadcasters to afford
individual access for federal candidates. As CBS recognized
in its brief filed in this Court in Democratic National Com-
mittee (Br. 30-31 n.72)}, Section 312(a) (7) “represents the
first time that Congress has created a specific individual right
to purchase broadcast time that does not depend upon a
previous use by opposing candidates.”
40
of the provision (as discussed on pages 19-23, supra)
it is obvious that the plain meaning of the statute
would be controlling. As the Chief Justice, writing
for the Court in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 341 (1979), recently observed, “the language
of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though
we were dealing with the language of a statute.”
Accordingly, while a paraphrase of the statute was
useful for purposes of the Court’s discussion in
Democratic National Committee, there is no substi-
tute for a literal application of the language of
Section 312(a) (7) in resolving the question of statu-
tory interpretation presented in this case.*
8° The networks also argue that, because the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act’s general goals included shortening cam-
paigns and reducing their costs, the statute should not be con-
strued literally to vest candidates with individual access
rights, particularly in the early phase of a campaign (ABC
Br. 23-24; CBS Br. 31; NBC Br. 46-47). However, “if the
language of a provision * * * is sufficiently clear in its context
and not at odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary
to examine the additional considerations of ‘policy’... that
may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of
the statute.” Aaron v. SEC, No. 79-66 (June 2, 1980), slip op.
14-15. Thus, “generalized references” to the “purposes” of
the Act do not warrant a departure from its literal text. In
any event, the Commission’s interpretation does not conflict
with those general purposes. The statute achieves the goal
of encouraging shorter campaigns by limiting application of
the economically beneficial “lowest unit charge” provision to
a relatively short time period. See 66 Stat. 717, as amended,
47 U.S.C. 315(b) ; S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 28. That same
provision lowers campaign costs by reducing charges for air-
time (to a greater degree than prior law) during the period
when most political broadcasts occur. Total campaign expen-
ditures were also controlled by the statute, as originally en-
41
II. THE COMMISSION’S FINDING THAT THE NET-
WORKS FAILED TO AFFORD REASONABLE AC-
CESS IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND IS
NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS
As we have explained above, Section 312(a) (7)
prescribed a new obligation, requiring broadcasters
“to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase
of reasonable amounts of time” by individual can-
didates seeking to advocate their candidacies for fed-
eral office. Thus, Congress has prescribed a rule of
reason and it has charged the Commission with re-
sponsibility for enforcing it. Neither candidates
seeking time, nor broadcasters opposing their re-
quests, possess final authority in cases of disagree-
ment to declare what is “reasonable.” ™
Like the ‘public interest” standard enforced by
the Commission, the rule of reason prescribed in Sec-
tion 312(a)(7) imposes on the Commission a duty
of interpretation. And Congress has vested the Com-
mission with ample power to render interpretations,
acted, through expenditure limitations. See Pub. L. No. 92-
225, Sections 103-106, 86 Stat. 4-8. See also page 36, supra.
In sum, there is no support whatsoever for the proposition
that Congress intended a cramped construction of Section 312
(a) (7) to curtail the length of campaigns or their costs. And
there certainly is no indication that Congress meant to vest
in the networks unilateral power to truncate federal political
campaigns for the ostensible purpose of promoting campaign
brevity and economy. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57
(1976), noting that “the people—individually as citizens and
candidates * * * must retain control over the quantity and
range of debate * * * in a political campaign.”
31 As previously noted, the Commission expects that, in the
great majority of cases, broadcasters and political candidates,
applying the Commission’s standards in good faith, will nego-
tiate disagreements about access without Commission inter-
vention.
42
to prescribe conditions, and to issue orders necessary
to enforce the statute. See 47 U.S.C. 154(i), (j),
303(r). The Commission’s interpretations under
Section 312(a)(7) are entitled to substantial judicial
deference unless arbitrary or capricious. FCC v.
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 793-797, 810-811, 814 (1978); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 380-
381; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-219,
224-225 (1943); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223,
229 (1946).
The networks do not dispute the Commission’s au-
thority to interpret Section 312(a)(7) or to issue
orders thereunder (Pet. App. 28a). They do, how-
ever, assert that certain of the standards prescribed
by the Commission fail to implement statutory objec-
tives and intrude unduly on their discretion (ABC
Br. 25-37; CBS Br. 34-40; NBC Br. 17-84). In
making these contentions, they must sustain a
weighty burden. For, as this Court repeatedly has
recognized, the Commission is the expert agency in
the field of broadcast regulation, and its views are
entitled to great respect by the judiciary. CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S.
at 102-103, 122-123, 131-132. Broad discretion in pre-
scribing such standards is essential if the Commis-
sion is to “remain in a posture of flexibility to chart
a workable ‘middle course’ in its quest to preserve a
balance between the essential public accountability
and the desired private control of the media.” Jd. at
120. The networks’ burden in challenging the Com-
mission’s standards is particularly weighty since
those standards have been reviewed and approved by
a unanimous court of appeals, which found not only
that they were not “arbitrary or capricious,” but also
that “the standards employed in the orders under
43
review here represent a very reasonable effort at im-
plementing Section 312(a) (7)” (Pet. App. 42a).
1. The Commission’s standards establish the ground
rules for evaluating requests for access under Section
312(a)(7). In a nutshell, the standards are as fol-
lows. Broadcasters enjoy complete discretion to with-
hold air time prior to the commencement of a cam-
paign. However, once a campaign has commenced,
as evidenced by objective factors, broadcasters must
give reasonable and good faith attention to requests
for air time from candidates for federal elective of-
fice. This requires that they consider each request
on an individualized basis. Thus, if a candidate
wishes to concentrate limited resources for a single
half-hour presentation, rather than several five min-
ute presentations, the broadcaster must consider the
stated request and attempt to tailor its response as
much as possible to accommodate the request. Broad-
casters need not, however, ignore their own legitimate
concerns. In making their response, they may con-
sider the likelihood of requests for time from rival
candidates under Section 315 of the Act and the
magnitude of foreseeable program disruption. Broad-
casters may not, however, invoke these considera-
tions as pretexts for denying time and serving their
own convenience. They must cite a realistic danger
of substantial program disruption or of an unduly
large number of requests for equal time. Moreover,
broadcasters must explain their reasons for denying
time or presenting a limited counter-offer, so that
the Commission may determine whether they have
considered the relevant factors. If, in fact, broad-
casters have considered the relevant factors, and
have acted reasonably and in good faith, their de-
cision will be approved even if the Commission itself
would have analyzed the question differently in the
44
first instance. But if they simply have adopted
“across the board policies,” and have not even at-
tempted to respond to the particular request of the
candidate, their denial will not be approved. These,
in substance, are the relevant guidelines established
by the Commission under Section 312(a)(7). See
Pet. App. 86a-10la; 123a-139a; 1978 Report and
Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1089-1091, 1094. Far
from being patently irrational, it is difficult to per-
ceive how a rule of reason analysis in this area
could operate without such principles, or their near
equivalents.
Applying these principles to the facts of this par-
ticular case, the Commission found that the presi-
dential campaign was fully underway in December
1979 (Pet. App. 88a-94a). It further found that
NBC and ABC, by dismissing out of hand the Presi-
dent’s request and refusing to offer any time, had
applied “blanket,” preconceived policies and had not
made a good faith attempt to tailor their response
to the candidate’s stated request (id. at 9la, 99a,
125a, 128a-129a, 131la-188a, 137a-188a). Likewise,
CBS completely ignored the candidate’s particular re-
quest when it offered only five minutes to carry a
previously prepared one-half hour documentary film,
intended to comprehensively summarize the Presi-
dent’s record over three years (id. at 99a-101a, 129a-
131a). Thus, the networks’ denial of the request for
air time rested on a mistaken interpretation of Sec-
tion 812(a)(7). By enforcing blanket policies, and
by refusing to consider the candidate’s request on an
individual basis, the networks disregarded the stat-
ute’s requirements as clearly set forth in the Com-
mission’s 1978 Report and Order, supra.
The candidate’s request for air time, moreover, en-
tailed no realistic danger of program disruption. The
45
request was made more than two months before the
intended date of broadcast; the requested half hour
could be placed in any time slot in prime time over a
four day period; the four day period was selected to
avoid affecting network ratings; the candidate of-
fered to pay the normal commercial rate; and the
candidate had not previously requested.time and an-
ticipated no further requests in the foreseeable fu-
ture (Pet. App. 97a-98a; J.A. 29-33, 204-205). Fur-
thermore, the networks had no reasonable basis for
fearing a significant number of requests for equal
time from rival candidates as the Commission ex-
pressly found (Pet. App. 95a-96a; J.A. 209-210, 97-
98). Finally, although some of the networks sought
to justify their actions after the fact by reference
to the desires of the candidate, they failed to explain
how they had taken the particular request into ac-
count and how they had attempted to accommodate it
(Pet. App. 129a-133a, 187a).* Under these circum-
stances, the Commission had no alternative but to
find that reasonable access had been denied.”
82 The foregoing is only a brief summary of the elements
of the Commission’s “reasonable access” analysis. As noted
in FCC v. WOKO, Inc., supra, 329 U.S. at 229, “the fact that
we might not have made the same determination on the same
facts does not warrant a substitution of judicial for adminis-
trative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to
the latter.” See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 491 (1951). A more extensive discussion of the
Commission’s application of its standards to the facts of this
particular case appears in the Commission’s brief in the court
of appeals at 50-91.
838 The facts of this case differ substantially from those in
the earlier cases on which the networks rely. In Don C. Smith,
49 F.C.C.2d 678 (Broadcast Bureau 1974), the Broadcast Bu-
reau determined that a counter-offer of a half-hour in prime
46
2. The networks nonetheless protest (ABC Br. 24,
37-39; NBC Br. 17-21; CBS Br. 36-39) that the Com-
mission should not have any role to play in determin-
ing when the campaign commences.” The networks
time was reasonable, even though the time slot differed from
that requested by the candidate. Contrary to CBS’ assertion
(Br. 39), the Broadcast Bureau did not “sustain[]” a counter-
offer of “five-minute program periods in response to a re-
quest for a half hour.” Similarly, in Donald W. Riegle,
59 F.C.C.2d 13814 (1976), the broadcaster made a responsive
counter-offer, extending five minute segments outside of prime
time as well as thirty-minute segments and spots within prime
time. Likewise, in Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838
(1974), and WALB-TYV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246 (1976), all of
the licensees agreed to sell substantial amounts of time during
the “prime time” period.
34 In its 1978 Report and Order, the Commission established
that “a licensee’s obligation to afford reasonable access” does
not attach until the campaign is in “full swing.” See 68
F.C.C.2d at 1091. The Commission left no room to doubt that
it would make determinations of this kind. Jd. at 1091-1092,
1094. The Commission’s willingness to determine when the
campaign commences in cases of disagreement is not incon-
sistent with the Martin-Trigona rulings upon which all peti-
tioners rely. See 66 F.C.C.2d 968 (Broadcast Bureau), review
denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 33 (1977), reconsideration denied, 67
F.C.C.2d 748 (1978). That case emphasized that “‘the licensee,
and ultimately the Commission, must look to the circum-
stances of each particular case to determine when it is rea-
sonable for a candidate’s access to begin as well as the amount
and types of access which are reasonable” (id. at 746 n.4; em-
phasis added). See also New Primer on Political Broadcast-
ing and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2288 (“The ques-
tion of * * * when access should apply * * * will be determined
by the Commission on a case by case basis.”’).
NBC suggests (Br. 19-20) that it is somehow more appro-
priate for the regulated parties—private broadcasters—to
determine for themselves when their own access obligations
attach than it is for a government body to make such a de-
termination. That view can hardly be squared with Congress’
47
fail to recognize that the Commission’s determination
serves to narrow the statute’s coverage. The statute,
on its face, potentially extends access rights to every
“legally qualified candidate for Federal elective of-
fice.” The Commission has done nothing more than
establish a limiting condition—intended to give sub-
stance to the concept of “reasonable access”—by hold-
ing that access rights do not vest until the campaign
is fully underway. The statute could, of course, have
been construed to vest rights in any federal candi-
date as soon as he becomes “legally qualified’? under
the Commission’s rules, without regard to the stage
of the campaign.” By prescribing a condition limit-
ing Section 312(a)(7) to the campaign period, the
Commission has confined its impact on broadcasters
and has established a reasonable guidepost to govern
negotiations between candidates and broadcasters,
thereby minimizing the necessity for governmental
intervention.”
prescription that unreasonable denials of air time, as adjudi-
cated by the Commission, subject broadcasters to sanctions.
Congress not only placed the question of reasonable access
in the hands of the Commission, but gave it explicit enforce-
ment powers to assure that broadcasters would comply with
their responsibilities.
85 As NBC points out (Br. 23), several candidates in the
1980 presidential race announced their candidacies very early.
The Commission’s interpretation reduces the problems caused
by such early announcements since, under the Commission’s
interpretation, a candidate cannot invoke access rights merely
by announcing his candidacy and becoming legally qualified.
If they desire, broadcasters may refuse to sell time to candi-
dates before the campaign is in full swing.
86 ABC misses the point in suggesting that the Commission
will be required to issue “declarations” as to when a campaign
has begun “in literally hundreds of federal congressional or
48
In the present case, the Commission made an inde-
pendent evaluation of the status of the presidential
campaign based on facts proffered by both the candi-
date and the networks (Pet. App. 91la-94a).* The
Commission then rendered ‘a legal judgment” resting
on that objective evidence (Pet. App. 28a). The Com-
mission did not make an “editorial’”’ decision, or other-
wise evaluate program content or choice of material.*
Instead, the Commission determined, based on ample
extrinsic evidence, that the campaign was fully under-
way and therefore that it no longer was reasonable
senatorial elections * * *.” ABC Br. 37 n.49. By establishing
standards to govern negotiations between candidates and
broadcasters, the Commission has reduced the likelihood that
it will be involved in case-by-case adjudication of complaints.
37 The networks repeatedly characterize the Commission’s
decision as somehow triggering the campaign (NBC Br. 19;
CBS Br. 36-37; ABC Br. 14, 17, 37-39, 48). As the court
below pointed out, however, the Commission did not set a
starting date for the campaign; it found from an abundance
of objective evidence that it was already in full swing: “the
Commission’s determination of when the statutory obligations
attach does not control the electoral process. To the contrary,
the determination is controlled by the process” (Pet. App.
27a).
88 The Commission is experienced in assessing the level of
campaign activity, since that is essential in applying some of
its own longstanding rules. See 47 C.F.R. 73.1940 (a) (5), (f).
CBS compares (Br. 35 n.83) this determination to determi-
nations involved in applying the “fairness doctrine.” How-
ever, application of the “fairness doctrine” requires review of
program materials to ascertain if controversial issues have
been presented and if opposing viewpoints have been ex-
pressed. In contrast, determining the commencement of a
campaign requires only a consideration of extrinsic evidence
relating to the existence of campaign activities in the relevant
geographical area.
49
to completely foreclose candidates from access to the
airwaves.”
3. The networks also contend that the Commission
has acted arbitrarily by requiring them to consider
candidate requests on an individual basis once the
campaign commences (NBC Br. 21-27; CBS Br. 37-
40; ABC Br. 39-41). However, there is nothing irra-
tional about construing a statute which focuses on
specific candidate requests for “use” of broadcast
facilities as requiring individualized treatment. This
does not compel the broadcaster to render a value
judgment about the particular request, to second-
guess the candidate or his media strategy, or to specu-
late about the ultimate utility of the requested time
to the campaign. The Commission requires a good
faith consideration of the individual request sclely to
assure that the broadcaster actually takes into ac-
count the stated requirements of the candidate and at-
tempts to accommodate the request to the extent fea-
sible. “[C]onsideration of the candidate’s needs
should manifest itself in a ‘specific—rather than
blanket—response to the individual request [which
affords] greater assurance * * * that the candidate’s
interests cannot be ignored in the balancing process’ ”
89 the Commission recognized in its 1978 Report and
Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1091, “each campaign is unique
with respect to the controversiality and importance of the
issues involved, the public interest in the race, and the amount
of campaigning done by the candidates.” Thus, while some
campaigns “may be limited to a short concentrated period,”
a “presidential campaign may be in full swing almost a year
before an election.” The Carter-Mondale Committee requested
broadcast time approximately eleven months before the gen-
eral election and eight months before the Democratic conven-
tion.
50
(Pet. App. 36a). After all, candidates are the im-
mediate beneficiaries of the statute, and they are
granted reasonable “use” of broadcast facilities to
advocate their own “candidacy.” The Commission
did not abuse its authority by determining that spe-
cific requests from candidates should be accommo-
dated to the extent practicable, since any other ap-
proach would permit their individual campaign strate-
gies simply to be “ignored.”
The networks also argue (ABC Br. 15, 37, 39;
CBS Br. 5, 6-7, 12, 21, 40; NBC Br. 238-25) that
attention to individual needs prevents them from
adopting an “evenhanded” or “uniform” policy in
dealing with candidate requests. The networks are
correct in asserting that they may not adopt a blanket
policy of this kind.** It is not the purpose of Section
#0 NBC argues (Br. 22-23) that consideration of candidate
requests on an individual basis is “meaningless” unless the
broadcaster is allowed to itself “assess or weigh each candi-
date’s needs.” There is no merit to this assertion. Under the
Commission’s analysis, the candidate’s stated needs are not
to be second-guessed, but rather are to be taken account of
along with the broadcaster’s own valid concerns—multiplicity
of requests and program disruption. The Commission’s ap-
proach thus precludes the adoption of blanket policies that
permit a broadcaster to overlook the particular request made
by the candidate.
*1 Broadcasters may, however, attempt to arrive at an over-
all policy in this area through agreement with candidates.
The Commission repeatedly has urged broadcasters to contact
candidates and attempt to arrive at such an accommodation.
See Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities By Candidates
for Public Office, supra, 34 F.C.C.2d at 586: “One conceivable
method of trying to act reasonably and in good faith might
be for licensees, prior to an election campaign for Federal
offices, to meet with candidates in an effort to work out the
problem of reasonable access for them on their stations.” In
this case, the Commission stated: ‘we believe that good faith
51
312(a)(7) to limit candidates to uniform time ra-
tions dispensed mechanically by broadcasters. Indeed,
since candidates often have differing needs and strate-
gies for reaching the public and articulating their
views, a blanket policy may intentionally or uninten-
tionally favor one candidate versus another. The risk
of such favoritism is reduced by the guarantee of
reasonable access’ to the individual candidate. Other
statutory provisions are aimed at equality of a care-
fully prescribed kind. Congress enacted Section 315
of the Act to permit an opposing candidate to re-
spond to any initial political use of the airwaves,
if a request for equal time is promptly made. The
contingent equal opportunities requirement thus has
a complementary role to play, but it does not super-
sede the affirmative “reasonable access” requirement
of Section 312(a)(7) (Pet. App. 68a n.22).
In this connection, it is important to distinguish
the operation of the equal opportunities provision,
as enacted by Congress, and the uniform treatment
concept proposed by the networks. Section 315 of the
Act does not apply to any initial grant of access. It
merely provides that, if access is granted, rival can-
didates may, if they choose, purchase an equivalent
amount of time. This benefits the rival candidate
without curtailing the right of the original candidate
to present his views. The networks in this case, by
contrast, propose a different scheme. They claim the
right to determine in advance and on a unilateral
basis how much time to afford all candidates for
federal office and when to offer such time. They assert
the right to adopt a blanket policy limiting, for ex-
negotiations are to be preferred and urge that course” (Pet.
App. 10la n.84)—a course that the networks refused to
follow.
:
52
ample, all candidates to five minutes of air time at a
particular stage of the campaign, even though one
candidate may desire a half hour segment and his
rival may desire several five minute segments. Thus,
they would arrogate to themselves authority to deter-
mine how much broadcast exposure each candidate
may have, regardless of his or her particular media
strategy. It was not irrational for the Commission to
reject that view of Section 312(a) (7).
The networks also misleadingly suggest that the
only dispute in this case concerns whether the individ-
ual candidate should have the right to insist on a half-
hour in December rather than January—and express
bewilderment that they could be found to have be-
haved unreasonably by merely offering an alterna-
tive time slot (ABC Br. 6 n.11, 21 n.23, 41; NBC Br.
29 n. *; CBS Br. 4 n.9). These arguments are con-
spicuously devoid of any reference to the record. In
fact, ABC stated before the Commission only that it
would begin to sell some time (although it did not
say in what amount or in what part of the day) on
some undisclosed date in January (J.A. 41, 58). NBC
merely represented that it would begin selling time at
some unspecified date in the future (J.A. 42, 60 n. *).
As previously noted, the preconceived policy of CBS
allowed only one five minute time segment in prime
time. Thus, the Commission was not faced with a rec-
ord in which the networks had made specific, respon-
sive counter-offers.** If such counter-offers had been
#2 Compare WALB, TV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246, 1248
(1976) (broadcaster’s refusal to grant request for five-hour
block of time to presidential candidate was not unreasonable
when counter offer of one-half hour was made); Frank
Church, 37 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 337 (1976) (broadcaster re-
fusal to grant request for one-half hour of time to presiden-
tial candidate was unreasonable when counter-offer of only
53
made, the Commission’s decision may well have been
different. Indeed, the complaint may never have been
filed.
4. The Commission emphasized in its orders in
this case that the factors to be considered in evaluat-
ing Section 312(a)(7) requests—e.g., likely multi-
plicity of claims for reply time and significant pro-
gram disruption—are factors bearing on the broad-
caster’s needs and interests. The only countervailing
factor that the Commission required broadcasters to
consider in the balance was the candidate’s stated
requirements. The networks nonetheless contend in
this Court that the Commission has “eviscerated’’
broadcaster discretion and precluded a fair evalua-
tion of their legitimate needs (ABC Br. 14; NBC Br.
29-30 n.*; CBS Br. 38). In making this assertion,
the networks simply ignore the fact that they never
have offered any good reason for rejecting the request
of the Committee.
The networks wholly failed to demonstrate any rea-
sonable prospect of a large number of requests for
equal time if they honored the request made by the
Committee.** On the record in this case, the Commis-
five minutes was made). No request for time need be honored
under Section 312(a) (7), of course, unless the candidate is
willing to pay for that time. See Kennedy for President
Committee v. FCC, No. 80-1549 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1980),
slip op. 36.
48 There were approximately a dozen major candidates at
the relevant time who might have made requests for equal
time (Pet. App. 92a). However, only candidates for the
Democratic nomination, who were legally qualified under the
Commission’s rules, and who requested time within seven
days, would be entitled to “equal opportunities” under Section
815(a). See 47 C.F.R. 73.1940(a), (e), (f); New Primer on
Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d
54
sion reasonably concluded that the networks’ claims
of multiple requests for equal time were “specula-
tive and unsubstantiated at best” (Pet. App. 138a).
Likewise, no issue of “program disruption” ever
arose on this record.“ No colorable claim of disrup-
tion could be predicated on the sale of a single half-
hour to a political candidate, requested two months in
advance. This is particularly true where, as here,
the candidate specified no particular slot within the
prime time range and selected four alternative days.”
at 2218. Moreover, economic realities also stood in the way
of any significant number of such requests in December 1979,
either tinder Section 315(a) or 312(a)(7). The cost of a
half hour of prime time was then as much as $186,000, and
President Carter alone had qualified for federal matching
funds (J.A. 171, 209 n.*). Further, the networks never
claimed to have contacted any rival candidates to determine
their likely responses (Pet. App. 126a, 188a). Finally, subse-
quent events confirmed the reasonableness of the Commis-
sion’s finding that there was no realistic danger of an out-
pouring of such requests. President Carter ultimately suc-
ceeded in purchasing five minutes of time from CBS in De-
cember and thirty minutes of time from ABC in January
(Pet. App. lla). There is no indication that either network
received even a single request for equal time, much less a
large number of such requests, following those broadcasts.
44 The Commission has recognized that undue program dis-
ruption would occur, for example, if multiple requests for
equal time in the closing days of a campaign resulted in po-
litical programming “to the exclusion of all or most other
types of programming.” Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Fa-
cilities by Candidates for Public Office, supra, 34 F.C.C. 2d
at 536. The Commission has thus acknowledged that Con-
gress did not intend “that all or most time be preempted for
political broadcasts.” Ibid.
45 Each network had 44 half hours of prime time program-
ming per week, for a three network monthly total of 528 half
hours. The Carter-Mondale Committee sought to purchase
55
And, as previously noted, the record in this case did
not support a claim that requests for equal time were
likely to be tendered in any significant number.
In short, the Commission was prepared in this case
to listen to any reasonable explanation offered by the
networks for their refusal to provide time. That
explanation was never forthcoming. In this context,
the networks should not be heard to complain that
their discretionary judgment was not heeded. At
bottom, the networks argue in this case that any
asserted justification for refusing time, clothed in the
rhetoric of “broadcaster discretion,” must be accepted
by the candidate and the Commission, regardless of
its factual basis. Such a view would nullify the rea-
sonable access obligation prescribed by Congress in
Section 312 (a) (7).*°
III. SECTION 312(a)(7), AS IMPLEMENTED BY THE
COMMISSION, MAKES A SIGNIFICANT CONTRI-
BUTION TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ON
ISSUES OF VITAL IMPORTANCE AND DOES NOT
IMPERMISSIBLY INTERFERE WITH BROAD-
CASTERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
All of the networks base their final challenge to
Section 312(a) (7), as interpreted by the Commission
only one of those half hours. Networks, of course, frequently
alter their scheduled programming to serve their own com-
mercial interests. See B. Cole, Television Today 6-7 (1981).
46 The networks’ exaggerated claims of “eviscerated” dis-
cretion are perhaps best answered by Office of Communica-
tion of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1008 (1966) (Burger, J.); “A broadcaster seeks and is
granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable
part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise
it is burdened with enforceable public obligations. * * * After
nearly five decades of operation the broadcast industry does
not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broadcast
license is a public trust * * *.”
%
56
and as applied in this case, on the First Amendment
(ABC Br. 43-49; CBS Br. 40-49; NBC Br. 25-33).
The familiar terms of the First Amendment provide
that “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging
the freedom of speech, or the press * * *.” Far from
“abridging” freedom of speech or the press, Section
312(a)(7) “makes a tremendous positive contribu-
tion to the cause of freedom of expression” (Pet. App.
65a; Tamm, J., concurring). Congress enacted this
provision to “give increased play to ideas touching
the very essence of our democracy”’—a “goal that
surely lies near the heart of the first amendment”
(id. at 67a).
Section 312(a)(7) facilitates freedom of expres-
sion by candidates and permits voters to hear infor-
mation of vital importance to them. Moreover, the
Commission has not ignored the legitimate interests
of broadcasters in effectuating these objectives. The
record in this case clearly shows that the Commis-
sion has bent every effort to accommodate all of the
First Amendment interests at stake. As the Commis-
sion explained (id. at 90a) :
[W]e recognize that our decision concerns First
Amendment interests—both those of the gener-
al public in full-ranging debate on electorate in-
forming issues and those of broadcasting jour-
nalists in preserving their editorial discretion.
While the constitutionality vel non of Section 312
(a) (7) is basically a matter for Congress and the
courts, we must interpret the statute, if possible,
to effectuate Congress’ intent while not unneces-
sarily impinging on the broadcasters’ journalistic
discretion.
The Commission added that it was fully aware that
Section 312(a)(7) “must be applied with First
Amendment interests in mind” (id. at 90a n. 18). As
we demonstrate below, the Commission has suc-
57
ceeded in the “delicate balancing of competing in-
terests” called for by the First Amendment. CBS
Inc. v. Democratic National Commitiee, supra, 412
U.S. at 117.
A. The Statute, as Interpreted by the Commission,
Facilitates Free Expression by Candidates
The court of appeals correctly highlighted the im-
portance of the broadcast media in a democratic soci-
ety, and stressed the unique utility of such media in
communicating the views of candidates (Pet. App.
lla-12a). Access to program time on national tele-
vision networks permits candidates to present their
views on political issues in homes throughout the na-
tion; conversely, denial of access effectively ob-
structs such communication.” Congress enacted Sec-
tion 312(a) (7) precisely because candidate access to
the broadcast media had been denied unreasonably in
the past and a guarantee of “reasonable access” was
essential to facilitate the operation of the democratic
process (see pages 26-32, supra) .*®
47 The Carter-Mondale Committee stated in its affidavit filed
with the Commission (J.A. 209): “There are no feasible
alternatives to purchasing time for the half-hour program on
one of the three respondent networks on, or as close as possi-
ble to, the date of the President’s announcement as originally
requested. * * * Attempting at this point to purchase com-
parable time on the hundreds of individual stations required to
duplicate network coverage would be prohibitively expensive
and logistically impractical, if not completely impossible.”
48 As Professor Emerson has observed: “There are numer-
ous reasons for the failures now threatening the existence of
the system [of freedom of expression]. Probably the most
significant is the overpowering monopoly over the means of
communication acquired by the mass media. * * * Three gi-
gantic networks, ABC, CBS and NBC, determine most of what
is seen in American homes on television.” T. Emerson, The
58
Candidates, of course, have First Amendment
rights to present their views to potential voters. As
this Court observed in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424
U.S. at 52-53:
The candidate, no less than any other person, has
a First Amendment right to engage in the discus-
sion of public issues and vigorously and tire-
lessly to advocate his own election and the elec-
tion of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particu-
lar importance that candidates have the unfet-
tered opportunity to make their views known so
that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the
candidates’ personal qualities and their positions
on vital public issues before choosing among
them on election day.”
See also id. at 48. Accordingly, a statute aimed at
securing “reasonable access” to the airwaves for can-
didates is a “congressional effort, not to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather * * * to facili-
tate and enlarge public discussion and participation
in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing
people.” Id. at 92-98. See also Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 375, 394; FCC v.
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra,
System of Freedom of Expression 627-628 (1970). At the
same time that it enacted Section 312(a) (7), Congress re-
jected proposals that the equal opportunities provision con-
tained in Section 315 should be repealed. At that time, Con-
gress expressed deep concern that unfettered control of the
airwaves by broadcasters would stifle political communication.
See 117 Cong. Rec. 48150 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) ;
id. at 48168 (remarks of Rep. Harvey).
**The First Amendment right of candidates to advocate
their election does not, in itself, include the right to demand
access to television or radio. Congress enacted Section 312
(a) (7), vesting candidates with a statutory right of access,
to facilitate their First Amendment rights.
59
436 U.S. at 801-802; The System of Freedom of Ex-
pression, supra, at 629-630, 664-667.
The Commission’s interpretation of Section 312 (a)
(7), which requires consideration of the media plans
of the individual candidate, is entirely consistent with
this Court’s recognition that it is essential for each
candidate to “vigorously and tirelessly advocate his
own election.” If broadcasters could simply ignore
the stated requirements of a candidate, or decide uni-
laterally when air time should be made available for
sale, the candidate’s ability to communicate with the
public—in a manner that is most efficient and con-
ducive to the presentation of his own particular
message—would be seriously eroded.”
5 The purposes of the First Amendment are best served by
affording reasonable attention to the individual requests of
candidates. If broadcasters had unilateral power to dictate
formats, program lengths, and broadcast times, then broad-
casters, not candidates, would decide what could be said to
the public and when. This would constitute effective censor-
ship by broadcasters of the expression of candidates. In this
respect, the networks’ assertion that they offer adequate cov-
erage to candidates in newscasts is completely beside the point.
The interest of a candidate in communicating his views is
poorly served, if at all, when reliance must be placed on
others to filter and edit the presentation. Candidates are en-
titled to have their views presented by “ ‘persons who actually
believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very
utmost for them.’”’ Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra,
895 U.S. at 392 n.18 (citation omitted).
51 The fact that candidates with substantial economic re-
sources may purchase more time than those who do not is not
an argument against affording individualized treatment. The
expenditure of funds to promote one’s candidacy is itself an
aspect of protected free speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra,
424 U.S. at 39, 54, 57. Moreover, flexibility in purchasing
time on broadcast stations may be essential to a candidate of
limited means who wishes to mount an early, effective media
60
B. The Statute, as Interpreted by the Commission,
Facilitates the Right of Voters to Receive Infor-
mation About Political Candidates
The right of the public to receive information about
political candidates is correlative to the right of can-
didates to advocate their views. In the hierarchy
of First Amendment rights, the right of the public
to receive this information—and to participate in the
process of self-government on an informed basis—is
supreme. Regardless of the party affiliation of a
particular candidate, the public requires information
about the candidate to cast the ballot in an intelli-
gent manner. That information is of utmost impor-
tance to the public because it is an essential ingre-
dient in the effective functioning of representative
government.
The Commission’s enforcement of the “reasonable
access” provision in cases such as this facilitates the
publie’s right to receive essential political informa-
tion.” As this Court has observed, “[i]t is the right
of the public to receive suitable access to * * * politi-
cal * * * ideas and experiences which is crucial here.”
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S.
at 390. Stated otherwise, “[i]t is the right of the
campaign in order to acquire additional financial support.
Flexible access to the media may be essential in establishing
name recognition for the newcomer, just as it is for an in-
cumbent wishing to pursue his own individual media strategy.
52 Contrary to the networks’ suggestion (CBS Br. 35,
45; NBC Br. 48-49), Section 312(a)(7) does not merely
facilitate the free speech of candidates. It also serves to
“more fully and completely inform the voters.” See S. Rep.
No. 92-96, supra at 20, 283. The Commission has consistently
construed the statute with that understanding. See 1978 Re-
port and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1087-1089; Licensee
Responsibility under Amendments to the Communications
Act made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
supra, 47 F.C.C.2d at 517; Pet. App. 90a, 128a, 184a.
61
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcast-
ers, which is paramount.” Ibid. See also CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S. at
122 (“it must constantly be kept in mind that the
interest of the public is our foremost concern”). See
also Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 14-15, em-
phasizing that the First Amendment has “ ‘its fullest
and most urgent application’ ” in protecting the pub-
lie’s right to information about political candidates,
since, “[i]n a republic where the people are sover-
eign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential, for
the identities of those who are elected will inevitably
shape the course that we follow as a nation.”
The statute, on its face, makes a significant con-
tribution to this objective. It assures that candidates
have reasonable access to the airwaves to reach the
electorate. And, as interpreted by the Commission,
it is effective in doing its job. The Commission has
interpreted it to apply precisely when the public
needs information most—when the campaign is fully
underway. Moreover, the Commission has interpreted
it to require attention to the media strategy of indi-
vidual candidates so that those candidates may, with
the help of their advisers, chart the course that is
best adapted to reaching the intended audience.
In short, if the Commission and the courts were to
accept the position of the networks here—two of
which denied the candidate any time and one of which
offered only five minutes to summarize a three year
term in office—that decision not only would fail to
give effect to the statute but also would disregard the
constitutional precept that “speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74-75 (1964); First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 485 U.S. 765, 776-777 (1978).
62
C. The Statute, as Interpreted by the Commission,
Does Not Unduly Restrict the Discretion of Broad-
casters
Despite its manifest contribution to the cause of
political free speech, the networks nonetheless contend
that Section 312(a) (7), as construed by the Commis-
sion, impairs their discretion to such a degree that it
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. In response
to that assertion, several preliminary observations are
in order. The statute does not preclude broadcasters
from presenting their views on any issue or from
carrying entertainment or public affairs program-
ming. It calls for no governmental surveillance of the
contents of their broadcasts, and has no impact on
their news and editorial presentations. Finally, it
does not require broadcasters to evaluate the con-
tents of political programming proposed by candi-
dates, and it does not require them to choose among
or discriminate against candidates. The statute sim-
ply requires broadcasters to afford candidates for
federal office reasonable access to the airwaves, and
to adhere to standards prescribed by the Commission
in considering individual requests. Thus, as in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at
396:
There is no question here of the Commission’s
refusal to permit the broadcaster to carry a
particular program or to publish his own views;
of a discriminatory refusal to require the licensee
to broadcast certain views which have been de-
nied access to the airwaves; of government cen-
sorship of a particular program contrary to [47
U.S.C.] § 326; or of the official government view
dominating public broadcasting.
At bottom, then, the networks’ First Amendment
arguments in this case resolve into the assertion that
63
affording reasonable access is an improper impair-
ment of their discretion to broadcast what they please,
and that the Commission’s standards cannot be en-
forced without undue intrusion into their affairs.
1. The argument that broadcasters have a First
Amendment right to resist Congress’ allocation of
air time for political “uses” is completely without
merit. As this Court held in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 389:
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee
has no constitutional right to be the one who
holds the license or to monopolize a radio fre-
quency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.
There is nothing in the First Amendment which
prevents the Government from requiring a li-
eensee to share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and voices
which * * * otherwise, by necessity, [would] be
barred from the airwaves.
The Court added that “the Government is permitted
to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose
views should be expressed on this unique medium.”
Id. at 390.% Thus, due to the overriding public in-
terest in the use of limited broadcast frequencies, this
Court’s decisions consistently have recognized that “of
53In upholding the Commission’s “fairness doctrine” in
Red Lion, the Court observed that “[r]ather than confer fre-
quency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees
* * * the Government could surely have decreed that each fre-
quency should be shared among all or some of those who wish
to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day
or the broadcast week. The ruling and regulations at issue
here do not go quite so far. They assert that under specified
circumstances, a licensee must offer to make available a rea-
sonable amount of broadcast time [to persons seeking to offer
a rebuttal].” 395 U.S. at 390-391.
64
all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that
has received the most limited First Amendment pro-
tection.”” FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 488 U.S. 726,
748 (1978); See also FCC v. National Citizens Com-
mittee for Broadcasting, 486 U.S. 775, 798-802
(1978) (“efforts to ‘enhanc[e] the volume and qual-
ity of coverage’ of public issues through regulation of
broadcasting may be permissible where similar efforts
to regulate the print media would not be’’) ; CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S.
at 94, 101-108; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
226-227 (1943). These precedents clearly confirm
Congress’ authority to “re-allocatfe] the ‘use’ of por-
tions of the airwaves from the licensee to the candi-
date” (Pet. App. 47a)—as it has done under Section
312(a) (7).™
This Court’s decision in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, supra, confirms the correctness
of the decision of the court of appeals in this case. In
% CBS argues (Br. 48) that once Congress vests broad-
casters with discretion in conducting their affairs, it may not
thereafter interfere with the freedom that it has conferred.
However, following the enactment of Section 312(a) (7) in
1972, no broadcaster could have expected to exercise “editorial
discretion” to deny a federal candidate’s request for reason-
able access. As this Court recognized in Red Lion, moreover,
it is proper for Congress to reallocate “use” of the broadcast
spectrum to accommodate the needs of political candidates.
Congress has long regulated the limited broadcast spectrum
by dividing its use between private broadcasters and political
candidates, and has divested broadcasters of “editorial discre-
tion” over the presentations of political candidates. See Farm-
ers Union V. WDAY, supra, 860 U.S. at 529. In short, with re-
spect to airtime that Congress has reallocated for political use,
broadcasters possess no editorial discretion.
65
that case, this Court reversed a decision of the court
of appeals which had compelled the Commission to
adopt regulations requiring broadcasters to make time
available to the general public. The Court found no
statutory authority, or authority in Commission
precedent, for such a requirement. Here, by contrast,
Congress has prescribed the right of access for fed-
eral candidates and the Commission has implemented
it. In these circumstances, the teaching of Demo-
cratic National Committee is plain: “[I]n evaluating
the First Amendment claims of [the litigants], we
must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress
and the experience of the Commission. * * * The judg-
ment of the Legislative Branch cannot be ignored or
undervalued simply because one segment of the broad-
cast constituency casts its claims under the umbrella
of the First Amendment.” 412 U.S. at 102-103. More
specifically, as the Court recognized in Democratic
National Committee, it is permissible for Congress to
devise a “limited right of access that is both prac-
ticable and desirable” (id. at 181).%
2. Broadcasters do, of course, receive certain pro-
tections from the First Amendment. The broadcast-
ing industry is entitled to exercise ‘the widest jour-
nalistic freedom consistent with its public obliga-
tions.” CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
supra, 412 U.S. at 110 (emphasis supplied). In this
55 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979),
has no bearing on the question presented here. The Court
held in that case that “authority to compel cable operators
to provide common carriage of public originated transmis-
sions must come specifically from Congress.” The Court ex-
pressed no views on the First Amendment in that case. Jd.
at 709 n.19. Here, by contrast, Congress has granted a specific
right of reasonable access to political candidates and has
given the Commission power to effectuate that right.
66
é¢ase, the statute, as implemented by the Commission,
affords broadcasters the widest measure of discretion
that is consistent with the essential First Amendment
interests of political candidates and the voting public.
Section 312(a)(7) imposes obligations only with re-
spect to a narrow and precisely defined group—
legally qualified candidates for federal office.” More-
over, the access right is limited to a specific “use,”
that is, advocacy of candidacy for office. Thus, com-
plexities of the kind associated with the general pub-
lie access scheme considered in CBS, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee are largely avoided. Con-
gress has specified who is entitled to invoke the stat-
ute (candidates for federal elective office) and for
what purpose (to advocate their candidacies). And
it also has identified, under Section 315(a) of the
Act, those who are entitled to “equal opportunities”
for reply.” Under this statutory scheme, moreover,
broadcasters need not (indeed, may not) evaluate or
edit the programming that candidates seek to present
to the public. In short, the statute imposes narrowly
drawn obligations on broadcasters and is largely self-
executing, particularly as construed by the Com-
mission:
The Commission’s interpretation of Section 312
(a) (7) provides guidance for broadcasters seeking to
% The Commission has adopted specific standards for de-
fining who is a “legally qualified candidate” entitled to invoke
Sections 312(a) (7) and 315 of the Act. See 47 C.F.R. 73.1940
(a), (f).
5? Equal opportunities under Section 315 of the Act are
available according to straightforward legal standards. If a
broadcaster grants access under Section 312(a) (7), equal
opportunities must be afforded to rivals who so request within
seven days. See New Primer on Political Broadcasting and
Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2215-2224,
67
negotiate with candidates without Commission inter-
vention and minimizes the burdens imposed by the
statute. Under the Commission’s interpretation, the
statute does not apply until the campaign is fully
underway, as established by objective evidence de-
scribed in the Commission’s opinion (Pet. App. 92a-
94a). Furthermore, the Commission has guided
broadcasters on how they should treat individual
requests once the campaign commences. They must
attempt to accommodate the particular request of the
candidate to the extent practicable, weighing in the
balance the countervailing factors of program disrup-
tion and multiple requests for equal opportunities.
If they do this reasonably and in good faith, the
Commission will not reverse their determination (Pet.
App. 86a-87a & n.16).°° Thus, by fashioning stand-
ards under the congressionally prescribed rule of
reason, and applying those standards with deference
to the broadcaster’s discretion, the Commission has
successfully walked the “tightrope” and balanced the
competing First Amendment interests of candidates,
voters, and broadcasters. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, supra, 412 U.S. at 117."
58 As the court of appeals pointed out (Pet. App. 46a), the
Commission’s review function is limited to two essential in-
quiries: 1) did the broadcaster consider the relevant factors?
and 2) did the broadcaster reasonably explain the basis for
its decision in terms of those factors?
5° The Commission’s standards, of course, cannot be applied
with the simplicity of a mathematical formula. The “rule of
reason” prescribed by Congress reqfitrea. attention to the facts
of each particular case. This, however, does not invalidate
the Commission’s approach. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 395: “The litigants embellish their
First Amendment arguments with the contention that the
regulations are so vague that their duties are impossible to
68
8. Nothing on the record in this case suggests that
the reasonable discretion of broadcasters has been
ignored. The Commission has not second-guessed any
good faith effort on the part of the networks to ac-
commodate the needs of an individual candidate, and
the Commission has not rejected any factually-
supported claim of business necessity. Nor has it
imposed any obligation that wculd disrupt entertain-
ment programming. Indeed, the Commission has not
imposed sanctions of any kind on any broadcaster.
It simply ordered the networks to state how they
would comply with the statute. See Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 396 (the
Commission “will not impose sanctions in such cases
without warning”). Finally, there is no evidence
on this record of a continuing, day to day surveillance
of networks in their dealing with candidates. To
the contrary, the Commission has announced stand-
ards with the expectation that those standards will
be largely self-executing, through the good faith ef-
forts of broadcasters and candidates alike, and that
questions of reasonable access ordinarily will be re-
solved through negotiation.”
discern. Of this point it is enough to say that, judging the
validity of the regulations on their face as they are presented
here, we cannot conclude that the FCC has been left a free
hand to vindicate its own idiosyncratic conception of the
public interest or of the requirements of free speech. Past
adjudications by the FCC give added precision to the regu-
lations; there was nothing vague about the FCC’s specific
ruling in Red Lion that Fred Cook should be provided an
opportunity to reply.”
*° In cases of stalemate, the candidate may complain to the
Commission or the network may seek a declaratory ruling.
69
In this context, it is unnecessary to speculate about
abuses of the statute that might occur if it were ad-
ministered in bad faith or with disregard for the
interests of all concerned. It is enough here to note
that the Commission has made a painstaking effort
to balance the rights of broadcasters, candidates, and
the voting public, and that there is no reason to pre-
sume that it will follow any different course in the
future. As the Court observed in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, supra, 438 U.S. at 748: “[i]nvalidating
any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to
situations not before the court is ‘strong medicine’ to
be applied ‘sparingly and only as a last resort.’ ” For
this reason, the constitutionality of Section 312(a)
(7), as interpreted by the Commission, should not be
tested “by envisioning the most extreme applications
conceivable.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
supra, 395 U.S. at 396. If abuses should occur in the
future, reviewing courts may “deal with those prob-
See 47 C.F.R. 1.2. The possibility of Commission intervention,
however, should have no relevant “chilling effect.” The po-
tential intervention of the agency may cause broadcasters to
listen with greater seriousness to individual requests from
candidates, but that is precisely the effect that Congress
sought to achieve. And, in those circumstances, the potential
involvement of the agency would enlarge, not contract, free-
dom of speech. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that
this kind of oversight will have a “chilling effect’? on com-
merical programming. This Court has observed, with respect
to profiteble commercial speech in general, that “there is little
likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and fore-
gone entirely.” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). See also Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 392-393;
FCC Vv. Pacifica Foundation, supra, 438 U.S. at 742-748.
o
70
lems, if and when they arise.” Ibid; see also Pet.
App. 47a n.117, 62a-68a.™
In sum, Section 312(a) (7), as construed by the
Commission, guarantees to candidates and voters the
opportunity to exchange information essential to the
exercise of the fundamental right to vote. The legiti-
mate interests of candidates and voters must be
weighed in the balance along with the commercial con-
cerns of broadcasters. The Commission’s interpreta-
tion assures that intrusion on the discretion of broad-
casters is reduced to the minimum level that is con-
sistent’with the public necessity. Under these circum-
stances, it is appropriate to afford “weight to the
decisions of Congress and the experience of the Com-
mission” (CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-
tee, supra, 412 U.S. at 102), and to reject the consti-
tutional arguments advanced by the networks.
*1 It is noteworthy that, in the present case, the networks
obtained a stay from the court of appeals which relieved them
of any duty to comply with the Commission’s order while they
litigated the propriety of that order (without success) in the
court of appeals.
71
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
?
WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
Louis F.. CLAIBORNE
Deputy Solicitor General
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO
Assistant to the Solicitor General
ROBERT R. BRUCE
General Counsel
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG
Associate General Counsel
C. GREY PASH, JR.
LISA B. MARGOLIS
Attorneys
Federa! Communications Commission
JANUARY 1981
% ov. 8. covernment painting orrica; 1981 335676 240
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.