Respondents Brief — CBS v. Federal Communications Commission

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Text

Nos. 80-207, 80-213 and 80-214

Iu thy Sayre Cont of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

CBS INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL. ~

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION AND THE UNITED STATES

WADE H. McCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

LOUIS F.. CLAIBORNE

Deputy Solicitor General

STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO

Assistant to the Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20580

(202) 633-2217

ROBERT R. BRUCE

General Counsel

DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG

Associate General Counsel

C. GREY PASH, JR.

LISA B. MARGOLIS

Attorneys

Federal Communications Commission

Washington, D.C. 20554

:

F

ee ee

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-207

CBS INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

No. 80-213

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.,

PETITIONER

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

No. 80-214

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION AND THE UNITED STATES

(I)

|

II

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Federal Communications Commis-

sion correctly determined that Section 312(a) (7) of

the Communications Act provides an affirmative right

of reasonable access to broadcast stations for indi-

vidual candidates seeking federal elective office.

2. Whether the Commission correctly determined

that petitioners failed to provide reasonable access

as required by Section 312 (a) (7).

3. Whether Section 312(a) (7), as applied by the

Commission, is consistent with the First Amendment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SI EIEN, hai sisthin.saiSscipideinsinlenunpydbdchesisioydbdicligiiclaclccablelincdeionl

I ii das onic anatsepdtiionbmeriphbsbanaseiiakabiiecedeatdinnaiie

Statutory provisions involved -....................ccccceeseeseeeeeeees

Statement

The proceeding before the Commission ...................

The decision of the court of appeals ......................

Summary of argument .................cccccccsccccsseecceseesessceeesseeeees

Argument:

I.

II.

Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act

imposed on broadcasters a new obligation to

afford reasonable access to individual candidates

seeking federal elective office ...............cccccccccccccee

A. The language of Section 312(a) (7) is un-

EI REST IAG a POA ORO A a ed

B. The statutory scheme and legislative history

support a literal interpretation of Section

URINE LUD. ialaiichisncdesdcnecohaatnpetouinct eines sibanisdons

C. The Commission’s consistent administrative

construction, which has been brought to the

attention of Congress, confirms the appro-

priateness of a literal interpretation of Sec-

SIRENS CED cijasnpibiciSensebinthorpbatiiiliaesesiae either

D. This Court’s decision in CBS v. Democratic

National Committee does not call into ques-

tion the Commission’s interpretation of Sec-

POE MO LUD eictacocscee cell ccacedinestEle iibeecess

The Commission’s finding that the networks

failed to afford reasonable access is supported

by the record and is neither arbitrary nor ca-

SII esi dh ori mpnnse ecoenin hah dipedibaiee hie diy oueanceeas

10

18

19

19

23

82

37

41

7%

IV

Argument—Continued Page

III. Section 312(a) (7), as implemented by the Com-

mission, makes a significant contribution to

freedom of expression on issues of vital impor-

tance and does not impermissibly interfere with

broadcasters’ First Amendment rights .............. 55

A. The statute, as interpreted by the Commis-

sion, facilitates free expression by candi-

NN in es 57

B. The statute, as interpreted by the Commis-

sion, facilitates the right of voters to receive

information about political candidates .......... 60

C. The statute, as interpreted by the Commis-

sion, does not unduly restrict the discretion

OF DEORGORBUOES .nnccccccccccscccccncccesscssecccsecescersonsesees 62

COMMINUIID. sss cccdbsnuismainasaireabdndehibiduiebs tap iceesoe dlls tasdeussAeticil ci 71

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases:

Aaron Vv. SEC, No. 79-66 (June 2, 1980) 0000000000... 40

Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., No. 78-1815 (June 2,

TUITE. echaiianiah dicta beibadieandaticiccadidcselgliesinbe sale besa tk piliuidp en 87

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 oo...cccccccccceceee 17, 41, 58, 59, 61

CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412

TI ie a passim

CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, No. 79-521 (June 9,

PRES ARCEMIS, 25906775 RRP A BO IN Oe 20

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. BI dtiinsiseannie 23

Farmers Union v. WDAY, 860 U.S. 625 .....0.......... 24, 64

FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 ............ 65

FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broad-

casting, 486 U.S. 776 ..........cccccccsececceseeseeneesees 42, 58-59, 64

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 488 U.S. 726 .......... 21, 64, 69

PCC V. Wai COe Uk BOB o. occysscccccrevecvetsccccccssdsccccse: 21

FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 829 U.S, 228 oo... 42, 45

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 485 U.S

po ERBET ERE ARS FEET FT NETS OE RS Mere By SO 61

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555... 33

Vv

Cases—Continued Page

Garrison V. Louisiana, 879 U.S. 64 00... 61

Harrison v. PPG Industries, No. 78-1918 (May

nN aah 20

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,

LEER STRAT ise a 20

Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617... 89

Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC, No. 80-

1549 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1980) wooo. 53

NBC v. United States, 819 U.S. 190 ...0000000 42, 64

Office of Communication of the United Church of

Christ Vv. FCC, 859 F.2d 994 ooo... ccc cence. 55

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 87 .0.0000000000 ow. 20

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 895 U.S. 367....passim

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 880 ........00...... 40

Rubin v. United States, No. 79-1018 (Jan. 21,

eRe NR REP Re The AI 9 SS 20

United States v. Bergh, 352 U.S. 40 0.0000. 37

United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 258 ........... 19

United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 ............ 15, 33

Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474.... 45

Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer

Ns MII GIN. WII cnc eccadiccercsovesococteescewenateniitoce 69

Homes V. Musk, SB1 UB. 1 :......c..cccccecceccccecarccosececees 37

Administrative Decisions:

Ken Bauder, 62 F.C.C.2d 849 ooo. eceeecccccceseeeee 34

Lew Breyer, 81 F.C.C.2d 548 2000... ceccceeeceeteeeene 22

Frank Church, 87 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 2d 387 .......... 52

Enbane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2808...... 22

Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, reconsideration

denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, aff’d in relevant part,

National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting

v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, cert. denied, 436 U.S.

IRON EAC 1 SRST OC OR SD PE CERAM CNTR 21

Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 888 2.000000... 46

Robert H. Hauslein, 89 F.C.C.2d 1064 (Broadcast

RPT AIA EeE Fe EL Ne DO 34

Labor Party, 67 F.C.C.2d 589 0.000000 34

Licensee Responsibility under Amendments to the

Communications Act made by the Federal Elec-

tion Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 616...... 83, 60

VI

Administrative Decisions—Continued Page

Martin-Trigona, 66 F.C.C.2d 968 (Broadcast Bu- ~

reau), rev. denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 38, reconsid. de-

Sy ee SE 46

Memorandum Concerning Interpretation of Sec-

ond Sentence of Section 315(a), 40 F.C.C.2d

po _SHCTETIRTIRSS SEBO ACI ISN Ait a oR oC EN 22, 24

New Primer on Political Broadcasting and Cable-

casting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 .....00...0...-nn.e ccecccceeeeee passim

Report on Enforcing Section 312(a) (7), 68 F.C.C.

B.ED yrrlbes oR? 0 0 STs a ee NT passim

Donald W. Riegle, 59 F.C.C.2d 1814 ............ 46

Don C. Smith, 49 F.C.C.2d 678 ...........-cccccccccceeceeoeee 34, 45

Summa Corp., 48 F.C.C.2d 602 ...............-0000.-0-0:.---- 34

Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities By Can-

didates For Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510 ........ 22, 33,

34, 50, 54

WALB-TV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246 ......................... 46, 52

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

United States Constitution, First Amendment ..... passim

Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, Section 11, 66 Stat.

717 (amended by Federa! Election Campaign

Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, Section 108 (a)

oR Pa SCRE aS cn a 25

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.:

Section 3(h), 47 U.S.C. 158(h) _........... 26

Section 4(i), 47 U.S.C. 154 (i) 0000... 2, 21, 42

Section 4(j), 47 U.S.C. 154(j) 0.00... 21, 42

Section 303(r), 47 U.S.C. 308(r) ................. 2,21, 42

Section 312(a) (7), 47 U.S.C. 312(a) (7) ...... passim

Section 8316, 47 U.S.C. S16 ................................ passim

Section 315 (a), 47 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 315 (a)... 31

Section 315(a), 47 U.S.C. 315(a) _.............. passim

Section 315(b), 47 U.S.C. 315(b) _........... 40

Communications Act Amendments of 1952, ch.

-- 879, 66 Stat. 717, Section 11, 47U.S.C. 315 (b).... 40

VII

Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued Page

Communications Act Amendment of 1959, Pub. L.

No. 86-274, Section 2, 73 Stat. 557... 25

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.

en I a 29

Section 108(a), 86 Stat. 4 ........................... 25

Sections 103-106, 86 Stat. 4-8... 41

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of

1974, Pub. L. No. 93-448, Section 205 (b), 88

Ms MIU cabbies ee ue oa yt a 86

Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, Section 18, 44 Stat.

2 DROSS DS RES I RE aD SE RES el 24, 26

Sk, Ry SBIR STIRS Re NV fy a 21, 69

vo TB SORTED INAS a aR Span eae 21

Oe Soares FORD os 53, 66

ae Seen Oe ED ee a 48

eR SENT a 6, 53

ene, ED 48, 53, 66

Miscellaneous:

Campaign Broadcast Reform Act of 1969: Hear-

ings on S. 2876 and others Before the Communi-

cations Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Com-

merce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ............... 27-28

B. Cole, Television Today (1981) .......... 55

67 Cong. Rec. 12501-12505 (1926) ..... 25

116 Comg. Ree. 11598 (1970) .............. 28

117 Cong. Rec. 48150 (1971) ....0...... 58

117 Cong. Rec. 48168 (1971) ................... 58

318 Cong. Ree. 826 (1872)... 31

121 Cong. Rec. 6446 (1975) ........................... 36

121 Cong. Rec. 6454-6458 (1975) ...... 36

123 Cong. Rec. S186-S187 (daily ed. Jan. 10,

Lh SPER EATS Aa RE 37

124 Cong. Rec. S8879-S8881 (daily ed. June 8,

GEESE NS come ION A EI Eee ea 87

T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expres-

NE IPE taliiectibadvdctesnstiniiaisence cident 57-58, 59

VIII

Miscellaneous—Continued

Fairness Doctrine: Hearings on S. 2, S. 608, and

S. 1178 Before the Communications Subcomm.

of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,

Jot Beam, CROTB) cccccstecticcco

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: He earings

on S. 1, S. 882, and S. 956 Before the Senate

Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate

Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

CSTD: scrresnaiiecscchoehie meaisab betes atla tcuiboabied teinaameatiomeim

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hear-

ings on S. 372 Before the Subcomm. on Com-

munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,

OBd Cong, 1st Bemis CUGTBY ccsccceccsornccnscccscniitinucses

First Amendment Clarification Act of 1978: Hear-

ing on S. 22 Before the Subcomm. on Com-

munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d

Bane, CATED nicsinssccheisacetccceentiake eles eee

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1918, 78d Cong., 2d Sess.

CREO: iiss acencisiatiies Berea arei ee ana nl

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1971) a a ee

Oxford English Dictionary fh, BERRIES SEA

Political Broadcasting: Hearings on S. 1585,

S. 1604, S. 1858, and S. 1929 Before the Sub-

comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.

On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th

Conn, 200 Buais CI. cxcicinsosseovibidesccnbseemitioe ions

Political Broadcasting: Hearings on S. 204 and

Others Before the Communications Subcomm. of

the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong.,

26 Bene. CHE ethene ae

Political Broadcasting—1970: Hearings on H.R.

13721, S. 3637 and Others Before the Subcomm.

on Communications and Power of the House

Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ...............----ccccceeeeeeeee

Presidential Campaign Broadcasting Act: Hear-

ings on S. 3171 Before the Communications

Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1960)

Page

.. 86-37

34, 35

27

Ix

Miscellaneous—Continued Page

Projections—Predictions of Election Results and

Political Broadcasting (Sec. 315, Communica-

tions Act): Hearings on S. 1548 and Others Be-

fore the Subcomm. on Communications of the

Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st

CII Ces nee 27

Repeal of “Equal Time” Requirements: Hearings

on S. 6103 Before the Subcomm. on Commu-

nications of the House Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

EES RE HIRE Re RS ear cave ee 36

S. 3171, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) 27

_ §. 1548, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967 RNS ae 27

S. 2876, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. ( ___ __. SR Aaeenton 27

S. 3637, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) 28

S. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 I a 28, 29

S. 882, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) 28, 29

S. 956, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 302 ( oe 28, 29

S. 1178, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (1975) 36

S. 22, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §3 (1977) 37

S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1971) sabeeeicNiamansnanbentnceasoisnseerpeunsinsssiansngcurcipsoon 29, 31

S. Doc. No. 91-109, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) .... 28

S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ....passim

S. Rep. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ..... 29

S. Rep. No. 93-170, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) ..... 36

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1la-

68a) is reported at 629 F.2d 1. The decision of the

Federal Communications Commission (Pet. App. 69a-

109a) is reported at 74 F.C.C.2d 631. The Commis-

sion’s opinion and order denying reconsideration (Pet.

App. 110a-15la) ure reported at 74 F.C.C.2d 657.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on March 14, 1980. Petitions for rehearing filed by

petitioners in Nos. 80-213 and 80-214 were denied

on May 15, 1980. The petition for a writ of certiorari

in No. 80-207 was filed on August 11, 1980. The

petitions for a writ of certiorari in Nos. 80-213 and

80-214 were filed on August 18, 1980. The petitions

were granted on November 3, 1980. The jurisdiction

of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act,

47 U.S.C. 312(a) (7), provides:

The Commission may revoke any station license

or construction permit—

* * * for willful or repeated failure to allow

- reasonable access to or to permit purchase of

reasonable amounts of time for the use of a

broadcasting station by a legally qualified can-

didate for Federal elective office on behalf of his

candidacy.

2. Section 315(a) of the Communications Act,

47 U.S.C. 315(a), provides in pertinent part:

If any licensee shall permit any person who is

a legally qualified candidate for any public of-

fice to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford

(1)

2

equal opportunities to all other such candidates

for that office in the use of such broadcasting

station: Provided, that such licensee shall have

no power of censorship over the material broad-

cast under the provisions of this section. No

obligation is imposed under this subsection upon

any licensee to allow the use of its station by

any such candidate.

3. Section 4(i) of the Communications Act, 47

U.S.C. 154(i), provides in pertinent part:

The Commission may perform any and all acts,

make such rules and regulations, and issue such

orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may

be necessary in the execution of its functions.

4. Section 303(r) of the Communications Act, 47

U.S.C. 303(r), provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,

the Commission from time to time, as public con-

venience, interest, or necessity requires, shall—

* * * [mJake such rules and regulations and

prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not in-

consistent with law, as may be necessary to carry

out the provisions of this chapter * * *.

STATEMENT

The Proceeding Before the Commission

1. In early October 1979, the Carter-Mondale

Presidential Committee advised petitioners ABC,

CBS and NBC that it desired to purchase a thirty-

minute time period during “prime time” on one of

four alternative days—December 4, 5, 6, or 7, 1979.

The Committee explained that it needed the time to

present a documentary film setting forth the record of

President Carter and his administration during the

preceding three years. The requested time period co-

incided with President Carter’s scheduled announce-

3

ment of his candidacy for reelection. The request

also asserted that the 1980 campaign already had

commenced, as evidenced by forthcoming caucuses and

conventions and intensive media coverage (J.A. 35-

40). Petitioners ABC and NBC both refused to offer

any time in response to this request (J.A. 41-43).

Petitioner CBS offered to sell two five-minute pro-

gram segments, only one of which fell within “prime

time” (J.A. 44-45). The networks’ rejection of the

Committee’s request was based on their assertion that

it was too early in the presidential campaign to be-

gin selling time for political broadcasts, that any

sale would force them to sell time to a substantial

number of rival candidates, and that such sales would

result in disruption of their regularly scheduled pro-

gramming (J.A. 41-45, 52-93).

In view of the refusal of ABC and NBC to sell

the Committee any time, and the refusal of CBS to

sell time that responded to its request, the Committee

filed a complaint with the Federal Communications

Commission alleging that the networks had violated

the “reasonable access” requirement of Section 312

(a)(7) (J.A. 27). The Committee asserted, inter

alia, that (id. at 28-29) :

The prime time programming of all three net-

works is almost exclusively devoted to entertain-

ment programming for commercial purposes.

Each network on week nights (and Saturdays)

schedules six half-hour prime time periods and

eight on Sundays for a three network total of

132 per week or 528 per month.

* * * * *

* * * [T]he Committee is seeking to use the

[requested] half-hour program for an appear-

ance by the President shortly after he formally

declares his candidacy * * *. The proposed pro-

gram would stress the President’s record and

that of his administration. It is intended to set

4.

forth the basic case for renomination and thus

it was desirable to air the program shortly after

the announcement. It is planned to have the

television appearance coincide with more than

2,000 small-donor, grass roots fundraising gath-

erings in communities throughout the country.

* * *

The request of the Committee was made

nearly two months in advance of the air date in

order to ease the scheduling burden on the net-

works * * *, Also, the time requested was se-

lected so as not to interfere with the national

ratings sweep period which is so important to

network sales.

The Committee also asserted it had not made any

other requests for time, and, because of the expense

of such time, it would not likely make any such ad-

ditional requests in the near future (id. at 33). Fi-

nally, the Committee alleged that none of the reasons

advanced by the networks for their refusal to sell

the requested time was sufficient to justify their ac-

tions (id. at 29-32).

2. After considering the networks’ responses to

the Committee’s complaint (J.A. 52-93), the Com-

mission found that each network had acted unreason-

ably in responding to the request to purchase time

and that each therefore had failed to fulfill its obliga-

tions under Section 312(a)(7) of the Communica-

tions Act (Pet. App. 69a).

Initially, the Commission rejected the networks’

contention that it was “too early” in the presidential

campaign to begin selling time for political broad-

casts. The Commission identified numerous objective

facts that led to the conclusion that the presidential

campaign already was “in full swing” (Pet. App.

92a-94a).' The Commission therefore turned to a

1 The Commission relied on prior decisions establishing that

the point when a broadcaster must afford reasonable access

5

consideration of the reasonableness of the net-

works’ responses.

The Commission found that, in contravention of

its previously announced legal standards (see Report

on Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), 68 F.C.C.2d 1079,

1090 (1978)), the networks had applied “blanket”

policies in dealing with the request for time, rather

than-attempting in good faith to tailor their responses

to the particular request of the individual candidate

(Pet. App. 90a-101a). The Commission saw no evi-

dence that the networks, in their responses to the

Committee or in their pleadings, had given any con-

sideration at all to the candidate’s individual request.

By failing to offer any time that would coincide with

the President’s planned announcement of his candi-

dacy, NBC and ABC simply cut off the President’s in-

tended presentation to the public (ibid.). And by of-

fering only five minutes in prime time to allow tl

Committee to summarize the President’s record over

a three-year period, CBS ignored the Committee’s as-

sertion that this was “ ‘totally insufficient’ in amount

to present the ‘detailed and thoughtful’ picture of the

administration’s record envisioned by the Committee

** *” (id. at 100a).

In addition to finding that the networks failed to

make any reasonable attempt to tailor their responses

to the stated request of the candidate, the Commis-

sion also found that the networks’ reliance on counter-

vailing factors was lacking in support. While the

Commission acknowledged that broadcasters may

varies depending upon the nature of the particular campaign

(Pet. App. 88a-91a). The Commission previously had deter-

mined that “a presidential campaign may be in full swing

almost a year before an election.” Report on Enforcing Sec-

tion 312(a)(7), 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1091 (1978) (1978 Report

and Order).

6

take into account the likelihood of requests for reply

time from other candidates in determining whether

to grant access to a particular candidate, it found

that the danger of multiple requests in the present

case was remote. The Commission explained that,

in December 1979, it was unlikely that more than a

small percentage of candidates would soon become

“legally qualified” under the Commission’s rules, and

that, in any event, few candidates would “have the

financial resources necessary to purchase a half hour

of network prime time” (Pet. App. 96a).2 Accord-

ingly, the Commission concluded that the likelihood of

requests from multiple candidates did not justify the

networks’ denials (Pet. App. 95a-96a, 99a-101a).°

Finally, the Commission rejected the contention

that potential “programming disruption” justified the

denial of access in this case. While the Commission

acknowledged that disruption was a factor properly

to be considered (id. at 97a), it found the likelihood

of disruption to be minimal. The Commission ob-

served (id. at 98a): “the request for time was made

far in advance of the closing days of the campaign

and nearly two months prior to the broadcast date.

Furthermore, as the Committee has stated, ‘it gave

*A request for equal time under Section 815 of the Act

must be presented to the broadcaster within seven days by

a rival candidate who has qualified under the Commission’s

rules. 47 C.F.R. 78.1940(e). A half hour of prime time on

CBS costs between $172,000 and $186,000 (J.A. 171).

*In reference to CBS’s offer of 5 prime time minutes, the

Commission observed (id. at 100a-101a): “Even if all 18

major party candidates were entitled to equal treatment,

CBS’ policy would result in the mrp 65 prime time

minutes—a total of miniscule proportions when it is realized

that there are approximately 5400 minutes available in prime

time in a single month.”

7

the networks considerable leeway in providing avail-

abilities’ in that it listed four alternative dates for

the broadcast, and we recognize that the networks

in fact make frequent scheduling changes for their

own commercial purposes.”’

3. In a subsequent order denying reconsideration

of its original decision, the Commission rejected (Pet.

App. 118a-119a) the networks’ argument that Con-

gress intended Section 312(a)(7) merely to codify

prior Commission policy under the general “public

interest” standard.‘ The Commission pointed out that

it previously had considered and rejected that argu-

ment in its 1978 Report and Order.’ The Commission

also clarified the principles applicable in determining

when a campaign is underway and what amount of

* As discussed on pages 22-28, infra, the Commission’s “‘pub-

lic interest” policy, which applied to all political broadcasts

prior to the enactment of Section 812(a) (7), merely re-

quired broadcasters to make some time available for political

programming. No obligation rested on broadcasters to give

reasonable consideration to individual requests by candidates

for air time. This general duty to offer some political pro-

gramming applied without distinction to local, state and fed-

eral campaigns.

5 In the 1978 Report and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1088,

the Commission stated: ‘“‘We see no merit to the contention

that Section 312(a) (7) was meant merely as a codification of

the Commission’s already existing policy concerning political

broadcasts. There was no reason to commit that policy to

statute since it was already being enforced by the Commis-

sion. Moreover, Congress limited the applicability of the

‘reasonable access’ provision to candidates for Federal elective

office. The Commission’s [prior] policy made no specific dis-

tinction between those candidates and candidates for state

and local office. Therefore, it seems clear that Congress was

creating a different, additional obligation which was to apply

only to Federal candidates.”

8

consideration must be given by a broadcaster to a

candidate’s request for time.

The Commission explained that, in deciding when a

campaign has commenced—and therefore when it is

no longer reasonable for broadcasters to deny re-

quests for access on a blanket basis—the Commission

would consider all relevant evidence tendered by the

networks and the candidate. The Commission stated

that, since “[n]Jeither broadcasters nor candidates

bring a perspective of total objectivity * * * to ques-

tions of the initial applicability of Section 312(a)

(7),” determination of this threshold issue is an ap-

propriate subject for the Commission’s own “inde-

pendent evaluation * * * taking into account the po-

sition of the candidate and the networks as well as

other factors” (Pet. App. 124a).

In light of the networks’ apparent misunderstand-

ing of the original order’s discussion of candidate

needs, the Commission further explained the im-

portance of, and the limitations on, that consideration.

The Commission stated that the purpose for its focus

ov: the needs of individual candidates was to ensure

that broadcasters would give consideration to “each

request in its own specific context on a particularized

basis” (Pet. App. 126a).° The Commission empha-

sized that “the candidate’s particular request is by

no means conclusive of the question of how much time,

if any, is appropriate,” but rather is only one factor

to be considered in the weighing process (id. at 128a).

However, the Commission reiterated that a broadcaster

must attempt “to tailor his offer of air time to be as

* The Commission noted (id. at 185a) that “blanket deter-

minations,” of the kind found to exist here, “too easily allow

decisions based on [the] broadcaster’s own convenience or

economic interest * * *,”

9

reasonably responsive as possible (given countervail-

ing factors) to a particular candidate’s stated pur-

pose in seeking air time” (Pet. App. 128a). Thus,

while broadvasters are not expected to evaluate or

censor the subject matter of individual programs, to

“second guess’ the ‘policital’ wisdom * * * of longer

versus shorter formats,” or to assess the “candidate’s

subjective, personal, or immediate ‘political’ desires’’

(Pet. App. 127a), they should “consider the particu-

lar nature of the reyuest etrade so that ‘as much as

possible’ and ‘within reasonable limits’ airtime will be

responsive to the candidate’s needs” (Pet. App.

135a). In this case, the Commission explained, the

networks clearly had made no effort at all to be re-

sponsive to the candidate’s request (Pet. App. 137a-

139a).

Finally, the Commission stressed the importance of

a full explanation of the broadcaster’s reasons for

denying a candidate’s request. The requirement of a

full explanation is “essential to assuring that we do

give careful consideration, and appropriate deference,

to a broadcaster’s discretion [because] [w]e must

deal essentially with the broadcaster’s own reason-

ing” (Pet. App. 136a). In this case, it was not pos-

sible for the Commission to defer to the networks

because their explanation for their actions disclosed

that they failed to consider those factors that the

Commission previously had held must be considered

in evaluating candidate requests. See 1978 Report

and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C. 2d at 1090; Pet. App.

135a-139a particular, the networks’ refusals to

afford air time rested on the erroneous legal con-

clusion that Section 312(a)(7) imposed no obliga-

tion on them to consider and attempt to accommo-

date the particular request of the individual candi-

date.

10

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On petitions for review, the court of appeals unani-

mously affirmed the Commission’s ruling (Pet. App.

la-68a). With respect to the networks’ assertion

that Section 312(a)(7) merely “codified” the Com-

mission’s prior “public interest” policy, the court held

(Pet. App. 14a):

Our study of the plain language of Section 312

(a) (7) and our review of the legislative history

of the provision leads us to conclude that Sec-

tion 312(a) (7) did not merely codify prior FCC

policy and that it did create a new right of af-

firmative access for candidates to federal elec-

tive office.

The court explained (id. at 15a) that the literal text

of the statute “speaks in terms of individual candi-

dates—‘a legally qualified candidate’ seeking time to

advocate ‘his candidacy.’ By contrast, the Com-

mission’s policy before Section 312(a)(7) gave no

attention to individual candidates.” This change in

focus demonstrates that “Congress was doing some-

thing different in [Section 312(a)(7)] and supports

the view that the legislators were creating a new

right for individual candidates when they passed that

provision” (id. at 16a; footnote omitted).

The court of appeals also held that, in implement-

ing Section 312(a) (7), the Commission “articulated

reasonable standards designed to minimize govern-

mental intrusion into broadcasting and to maximize

respect for the editorial discretion of broadcasters,

while at the same time advancing the important stat-

utory purpose of candidate access” (Pet. App. 54a).

The court rejected the argument that determination

by the Commission of when statutory obligations

attach, 7.e., when broadcasters must begin affording

11

reasonable access, was improper (id. at 24a-29a). It

held that “determination of when statutory obliga-

tions attach is not an editorial decision * * * [but

rather] is purely a legal judgment * * * for which

the Commission is better suited than either broad-

casters or candidates” (id. at 28a-29a). Similarly, the

court found no basis for the contention that, in mak-

ing this decision, the Commission impermissibly in-

volved itself in the election process. It noted that

“[t]his would be true only if the Commission sought

to set a starting daie for the campaign, rather than

merely find that it ha[d] already begun” (id. at

27a). The court added that “[b]y confining the ap-

plicability of Section 312(a) (7) to a period when the

campaign is fully under way, the Commission has

limited the statute’s impact on broadcasters” (Pet.

App. 29a).

The court of appeals also reviewed the Commis-

sion’s requirement that broadcasters consider the in-

dividual requests of candidates, and concluded that

this requirement comported with the rule of reason

prescribed by Congress in Section 312(a)(7) (Pet.

App. 32a-41a). Applying this requirement, the court

agreed with the Commission that the networks had

failed to consider the particular request for air time

made by the Committee. The court held (id. at 39a-

40a) that all three networks had “displayed unrea-

sonable disregard for the relevant standards * * *

[in adopting] across-the-board policies [which] vio-

lated the longstanding mandate of the Commission

that, in addressing a request for access from a can-

didate for federal office, the broadcaster ha[s] to

tailor his response to the individual candidate.”

Finally, the court of appeals found no basis for

the contention that Section 312(a)(7), as imple-

mented by the Commission, unconstitutionally re-

12

stricts the editorial discretion of broadcasters (Pet.

App. 42a-47a). The court noted that Section 312

(a) (7) applies only to a narrow and clearly defined

class of beneficiaries—legally qualified candidates

for federal elective office. Moreover, the statute

grants access only for the prescribed purpose of ad-

vocating the candidate’s election to office, and statu-

tory obligations apply only during the political season

when the campaign is fully underway. The court also

noted that the Commission has articulated standards

to assist broadcasters in determining which requests

for access should be honored, and has limited its re-

view to a consideration of whether broadcasters

reasonably have applied those standards (id. at 46a).

In conclusion, the court of appeals emphasized (Pet.

App. 46a-47a; footnote omitted) :

The right of “use” granted to the candidate un-

der section 312(a)(7) does not confer on the

candidate any right to interfere with what the

broadcast journalist says or does on the air.

Similarly, the broadcast journalist may not de-

termine what the candidate says or does with the

limited amount of air time available to him.

Therefore, Section 312(a) (7) represents only a

congressional reallocation of the “use” of por-

tions of the airwaves from the licensee to the

candidate. The broadcaster’s exercise of journal-

istic discretion—his right to speak and editorial-

ize—is unimpaired. |

In a concurring opinion, Judge Tamm warned

against applying the statute to “favor[] one speaker

or viewpoint over another’\(Pet. App. 67a). Having

pointed out the need to avoid that danger, Judge

Tamm agreed that the statute, as implemented by the

Commission, was fully consistent with constitutional

requirements. Judge Tamm reached that conclusion

13

because “section 312(a)(7) makes a tremendous

positive contribution to the cause of freedom of ex-

pression” (Pet. App. 65a), because “we dare not for-

get that there is also a potential for evil in leaving

the question of access in the hands of private broad-

casting interests” (id. at 65a-66a), and because “the

Commission’s standards for implementing section

312(a) (7), as long as they are carefully followed, are

sufficient to save the statute from constitutional in-

firmity” (7d. at 67a).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

IL

The affirmative access provision prescribed by Con-

gress in 1972, 47 U.S.C. 312(a)(7), imposes on

broadcasters a duty to afford “reasonable amounts

of time” to “a legally qualified candidate” for federal

elective office, who seeks “use of a broadcasting sta-

tion” to advocate “his candidacy.” Repeated failure

to afford reasonable access to such a candidate—or

even a single episode of willful withholding—subjects

the broadcaster to sanctions. The literal terms of the

statute leave no room to doubt that Congress in-

tended to protect individual candidates against un-

reasonable denials of air time. Congress’ focus on “a”

candidate, seeking the “use” of “a broadcasting sta-

tion” to advocate “his candidacy,” shows plainly that

individual candidates were intended to have legally

protected rights. This new statutory obligation dif-

fers markedly from the Commission’s prior “public

interest” policy, which merely required broadcasters

to make some time available for political program-

ming, and which offered no protection of any kind to

individual candidates.

Construing the statute literally to afford affirma-

tive rights to individual candidates involves no break

14

with historical tradition. Since the inception of radio

regulation in 1927, Congress has treated political

broadcasting on a special basis. Individual candidates

traditionally have enjoyed the right to “use” broad-

cast stations to reply to their rivals. Broadcasters

never have had editorial control over the format or

content of such political broadcasts. Furthermore,

the general “public interest” obligation always has

required broadcasters to offer some political pro-

gramming, notwithstanding their contrary wishes.

The obligation created by Section 312(a)(7) is a

natural outgrowth of that requirement.

Events preceding the enactment of Section 312

(a) (7) demonstrate clearly that Congress intended to

expand candidate access to the airwaves. Between

1960 and 1971, numerous bills were proposed in Con-

gress that sought to alter the status quo and give

candidates a greater opportunity to broadcast their

views. And when, in 1972, Congress enacted Section

312(a)(7), it unambiguously stated the objective:

to “give candidates for public office greater access

to the media so that they may better explain their

stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and com-

pletely inform the voters.” S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d

Cong., lst Sess. 20 (1971). Far from contradicting

the literal terms of the statute, the legislative history

shows that Congress intended to expand candidate ac-

cess to broadcast stations and that it understood

that it was vesting individual candidates with affirm-

ative access rights.

Following its enactment, the Commission consist-

ently has interpreted Section 312(a)(7) to superim-

pose upon the general “public interest” requirement a

new obligation, which vests rights in individual can-

didates. That consistent administrative interpretation

is entitled to substantial judicial deference under

15

familiar principles. Moreover, the Commission’s views

have been explained to Congress and approved by

the Senate Subcommittee responsible for communica-

tions. Congress has considered complaints from

broadcasters about the operation of Section 312(a)

(7), but has declined to amend the statute or to dis-

turb the administrative contruction. Accordingly, def-

erence to the agency’s view is “particularly appro-

priate” because the “agency’s interpretation involves

issues of considerable public controversy, and Con-

gress has not acted to correct any misperception of

its statutory objectives.” United States v. Ruther-

ford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).

Although the networks rely heavily on this Court’s

decision in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-

mittee, 412 U.S. 94, 118-114 n.12 (1978), that case

did not consider or decide the question presented in

this case. In the course of its opinion, the Court had

occasion to contrast the treatment afforded political

candidates and private citizens under the Communi-

cations Act. In pointing out the differences between

the access granted to candidates and private citizens,

it referred to Section 312(a) (7) and stated generally

that it “essentially” codified prior law. The Court

did not state or imply that the new statute was in all

respects coextensive with prior doctrine, or that it

imposed no new duties or obligations.

IL

The Commission correctly determined that the

networks denied reasonable access in this case. Con-

trary to legal requirements clearly set forth in the

Commission’s earlier rulings under Section 312(a)

(7), the networks simply applied blanket, precon-

ceived policies and dismissed out of hand the candi-

date’s request for one half-hour of time during De-

cember 1979. The networks afforded the request no

16

individualized attention, and made no attempt to ac-

commodate the stated requirements of the candidate.

Moreover, the business justifications offered by the

networks for their withholding lacked any factual

basis. As the Commission expressly found, there was

no realistic possibility of a large number of requests

for equal time if the candidate’s request was honored,

and no claim of program disruption could logically be

predicated upon a request for air time made two

months in advance, which specified four alternative

days.

The Commission has reasonably exercised its au-

thority to interpret the statute and prescribe condi-

tions for its application by determining that access

rights do not vest until the campaign is fully under-

way. That interpretation benefits broadcasters. In

the absence of such a limiting interpretation, the

statute would apply whenever a legally qualified can-

didate demanded reasonable access. In determining

when a campaign is fully underway, the Commission

renders a legal judgment based on objective facts. It

does not review the contents of any program or ex-

ercise an “editorial” function. Nor does it trigger the

onset of the campaign; to the contrary, the Com-

mission’s determination is triggered by the existence

of substantial campaign activities, as evidenced by

objective, extrinsic facts.

The Commission did not exceed its authority by

requiring broadcasters to consider the individual re-

quests of candidates. The Commission has not in-

sisted that broadcasters attempt to second-guess the

requests of candidates, or pass judgment on the wis-

dom of their media strategy. Rather, it has required

broadcasters to consider the stated requests of can-

didates and attempt, in good faith, to accommodate

those requests with their own business concerns. This

17

requirement is aimed essentially at the situation pre-

sented in this case—in which the broadcasters dis-

missed out of hand the candidate’s request based on

preconceived, blanket policies. Such an approach, if

condoned, would permit broadcasters to decide uni-

laterally what may be said by candidates and when,

without attention to the particular media strategy

candidates believe to be best adapted to reaching their

intended audience.

ITI.

As Judge Tamm observed (Pet. App. 65a), Section

312(a) (7), as interpreted by the Commission, “makes

a tremendous positive contribution to the cause of

freedom of expression.” It facilitates the First

Amendment right of each candidate “tirelessly to

advocate his own election.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1, 52 (1976). And it implements the First

Amendment right of voters in the viewing and listen-

ing audience to receive information necessary ‘to

make informed choices among candidates for office.”

Id. at 14-15. In the broadcast context, “[i]t is the

right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of

the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Red Lion

Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).

That principle has particularly great relevance in a

case such as this, which involves the right of viewers

and listeners to obtain information that is essential

to the proper functioning of representative govern-

ment.

In enacting Section 312(a) (7), Congress balanced

the First Amendment rights of candidates, voters, and

broadcasters. And it arrived at a fair accommodation

—it prescribed a right of “reasonable access.” The

enactment reflects the well-established legal principle

that broadcasters have no First Amendment right to —

“monopolize a radio frequency” to the exclusion of

18

political candidates (Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.

FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 389). Congress may require

a licensee to “share his frequency with others and to

conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obliga-

tions to present those views and voices which * * *

otherwise, by necessity, [would] be barred from the

airwaves” (ibid.). These principles strongly confirm

the constitutionality of Section 312(a)(7), as con-

strued by the Commission, which temporarily reallo-

cates the “‘use” of the frequency from the broadcaster

to the candidate,

The facts of this case show that the Commission

paid appropriate deference to the discretion of the

networks. It did not second-guess any attempt to

accommodate the needs of the candidate and it did

not reject any claim of business necessity resting on

a valid factual basis. It merely determined that the

conduct of the networks was unreasonable, since they

ignored the stated request of the candidate and of-

fered no tenable justification for their denial of ac-

cess. Despite this conduct, which contravened the

Commission’s long-standing interpretation of Section

312(a) (7), the Commission imposed no sanctions. It

merely directed the networks to state how they would

comply with the statute. The Commission has thus

applied the statute with sensitivity and restraint, and

there is no basis for speculating that it will do other-

wise in the future.

19

ARGUMENT

I, SECTION 312(a)(7) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS

ACT IMPOSED ON BROADCASTERS A NEW

OBLIGATION TO AFFORD REASONABLE ACCESS

TO INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES SEEKING FED-

ERAL ELECTIVE OFFICE

Petitioners CBS and NBC contend that Section 312

(a) (7) merely codified policies developed by the Com-

mission under the public interest standard of the

Communications Act prior to 1971, and that it did

not impose any additional obligations on broadcasters

(CBS Br. 14-34; NBC Br. 37-49).”7. The plain lan-

guage of the statute, however, clearly shows that

Congress fashioned a new right of access for in-

dividual candidates seeking reasonable amounts of

broadcast time. Although it is unnecessary to look

beyond the statutory text to affirm the Commission

and the court of appeals in this case, we also demon-

strate below that their interpretation is supported

by the structure of the statute and its legislative his-

tory, as well as the Federal Communications Com-

mission’s consistent administrative construction.

A. The Language of Section 312(a)(7) is Unambiguous

In response to the networks’ arguments about the

intended seope of Section 312(a) (7), we submit that

“this is a case in which the meaning of [the] statute

may be determined by the admittedly old-fashioned

but nonetheless still entirely appropriate ‘plain mean-

ing’ canon of statutory construction.” United States

v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 258, 254 (1980). Giving the

7 ABC appears to take a different view. See ABC Pet. 7:

“Section 312(a) (7) confers on federal candidates a certain

limited right to broadcast time that licensees are obligated

to honor. This petition does not challenge that obligation.”

See also Pet. App. 22a.

7%

7%

20

words used by Congress “their ordinary, contem-

porary, common meaning” (Perrin v. United States,

444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)), there can be no doubt that

Congress imposed on broadcasters an obligation to

grant individual candidates for federal office a right

of reasonable access."

Section 312(a)(7) authorizes the Commission to

impose the sanction cf license revocation based on a

broadeaster’s willful or repeated failure to allow

reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reason-

able amounts of time “for the use of a broadcasting

station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal

elective office on behalf of his candidacy” (emphasis

supplied). Congress did not prescribe a duty merely

to provide some measure of political programming in

general. Congress focused on the individual candi-

date: “a legally qualified candidate” is given a right,

enforceable by government sanction, to a _ specific

“use” of “a broadcasting station” to advocate “his

candidacy.” *

8 While the briefs of the networks dwell at great length on

legislative history, they fail to come to grips with the literal

language of the statute itself. That approach ignores this

Court’s repeated admonition that “‘[t]he starting point in

every case involving construction of a statute is the language

itself.’”’ International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,

439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) (citations omitted). “Absent a

clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that

language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” CPSC

v. GTE Sylvania, No. 79-521 (June 9, 1980), slip op. 5. See

also Harrison V. PPG Industries, No. 78-1918 (May 27, 1980)

slip op. 138; Rubin v. United States, No. 79-1013 (Jan. 21,

1981), slip op. 6.

®In the present case, the Commission ruled on the candi-

date’s complaint alleging a violation of Section 312(a) (7).

The Commission’s adjudication of individual complaints and

21

Applying these statutory terms literally, it follows

that the Commission may impose the sanction of revo-

cation based on a single episode of “willful” failure

to afford a reasonable amount of air time to a can-

didate. And, if an unreasonable denial of air time

is “repeated”—that is, it occurs more than once—

the sanction of revocation may be imposed even in

the absence of a showing of willfulness. In short,

the statute focuses not only on the individual can-

didate, but also authorizes the Commission to impose

sanctions even in the case of a single instance of will-

ful withholding.”

its issuance of orders is in aid of its u:timate authority to

impose sanctions under Section 312(a)(7)—if sanctions

should prove to be necessary—and is consistent with its ex-

press authority to issue orders and prescribe conditions rea-

sonably necessary to enforce the statute. See 47 U.S.C. 154(i),

(j), 303(r); 47 C.F.R. 1.2, 1.89. See also FCC v. WJR, 337

U.S. 265, 282 (1949); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,

395 U.S. 3867, 372 n3 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Foun-

dation, 488 U.S. 726, 730 (1978). Broadcasters have urged

the Commission to act upon individual complaints in this

manner rather than awaiting renewal or revocation hearings.

See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 18 (1974), reconsidera-

tion denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff’d in relevant part,

National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567

F.2d 1095, 1115-1116 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.

926 (1978).

10 We do not suggest that the Commission should exercise

its authority to impose sanctions based on relatively isolated

or good faith violations of the statute. Indeed, the Commis-

sion never has imposed sanctions on any broadcaster based

on a violation of Section 312(a) (7). As discussed on pages

66-69, infra, the Commission has taken effective steps to mini-

mize the need for sanctions in this area. In this case, for

example, the Commission encouraged the parties to negoti-

ate their differences after it reiterated the applicable legal

standards (Pet. App. 10la & n.34). Moreover, after finding a

violation, it merely directed the networks to advise it of what

steps they would take to assure compliance (id. at 142a).

|

22

This specific statutory duty stands in marked con-

trast to the broadcaster’s more limited duty under the

general “public interest” policy. Under that policy,

broadcasters wishing to assure renewal of their li-

censes were expected, among other things, to make

judgments about the importance of particular cam-

paigns, and, on that basis, to decide which campaigns

and which candidates should be given air time. The

requirement was that some time be given to political

broadcasting, but no individual candidate could claim

a personal right of access in the absence of a broad-

cast by his rival, and no distinction was drawn be-

tween local, state, and federal elections.“ In sum,

unlike the general public interest policy, the express

terms of Section 312(a) (7) prescribe special access

rights for individual candidates.”

11See Enbanc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303,

2314 (1960); Memorandum Concerning Interpretation of

Second Sentence of Section 315(a), 40 F.C.C. 1088, 1093-1095

(1968) ; Lew Breyer, 31 F.C.C.2d 548 (1968) ; Use of Broad-

cast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office,

34 F.C.C.2d 510, 535-5388 (1972); 1978 Report and Order,

supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1088. As summarized in the Commis-

sion’s New Primer on Political Broadcasting & Cablecasting,

69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2286 (1978), Section 312(a) (7) “does

require [broadcasters] to permit [reasonable] access to all

candidates for Federal office if the candidates request it.”

The public interest standard, in contrast, permits broadcast-

ers to “use [their] judgment as to which races are most sig-

nificant and of greatest interest to the public, and refuse to

sell or give time for ‘uses’ of the station by candidates for

other offices.” Jd. at 2290 (footnote omitted).

12 The candidate’s right to protection against unreasonable

denials of air time is the converse of the broadcaster’s duty,

upon pain of government sanction, to afford reasonable ac-

cess to individual candidates. The candidate enforces the

right through the ordinary process of filing a complaint with

23

The plain terms of the statute further demonstrate

that Congress was not simply codifying the prior

“public interest” standard because the statute applies

only to candidates seeking “Federal elective office.”

The public interest standard, in contrast, applied to

candidates for all offices, and continues to govern

broadcaster obligations with respect to state and local

candidates. See New Primer on Political Broadcast-

ing and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2290. If

Congress had intended merely to codify the preexist-

ing public interest obligation, there would have been

no need to limit the statute to federal candidates; in-

deed, such a limitation would be inexplicable. Thus,

as the court of appeals pointed out (Pet. App. 16a),

the plain terms of the statute show that “candidates

in federal elections were being singled out for some-

thing beyond the amorphous right of access created

by the public interest doctrine.”

B. The Statutory Scheme and Legislative History Sup-

port a Literal Interpretation of Section 312(a)(7)

While the literal terms of Section 312(a)(7) are

so unambiguous as to suggest that “further inquiry

may be unnecessary” (Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,

425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)), an examination of the

statutory scheme and the legislative history strongly

the Commission. See New Primer on Political Broadcasting

and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2212-2215.

18 Congress did not extend the new obligation prescribed

under Section 312(a)(7) to state and local candidates be-

cause an individual right of access vested in those candidates,

as well as federal candidates, would have placed impractical

burdens on broadcasters. See Political Broadcasting—1970:

Hearings on H.R. 18721, S. 36387 and Others Before the Sub-

comm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm.

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23

(7970).

24

reinforces the literal interpretation adopted by the

Commission and the court of appeals in this case.

1. In enacting Section 312(a)(7) in 1972 to pre-

scribe a right of access for individual federal can-

didates, Congress did not write on a clean slate. From

the very beginning of the regulation of radio and

television, Congress has regulated “uses” of the air-

waves by political candidates under a regime that dif-

fers from that applicable to broadcaster presentations

of public issues. As discussed on pages 22-23, supra,

the “public interest” standard has long imposed on

broadcasters a duty to provide access to some candi-

dates for political uses. And, since the enactment of

Section 18 of the Radio Act in 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat.

1170, Congress has required broadcasters to provide

an equal opportunity of reply to candidates after

their rivals make public appearances over the air-

waves. The equal opportunity doctrine, which today

is codified in 47 U.S.C. 315(a), has always imposed

on broadcasters a special duty to carry political pro-

gramming regardless of their editorial views and

with no censorship of the contents of the program-

ming allocated to political candidates. Thus, Congress

has prescribed that, in the field of political program-

ming, the candidate—and not the broadcaster—

would be the ultimate judge of program content.”

14 See Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 527-531

(1959). The right of candidates to be the ultimate judge

of what is presented was intended to be a safeguard against

abuses of editorial control by broadcasters. See id. at 529-

530. In thus divesting broadcasters of their usual editorial

control in the context of political broadcasting, Congress fully

recognized that it was imposing special obligations on them.

See Memorandum Concerning Interpretation of Second Sen-

tence of Section 315(a), supra, 40 F.C.C. at 1090 (discussing

the legislative history).

25

The distinct treatment afforded to political broad-

casting is highlighted by the fact that, both in 1927

and 1934, Congress specifically considered but firmly

rejected suggestions that the equal opportunity re-

quirement be extended to cover general public issue

programming as well as political broadcasts by can-

didates. See 67 Cong. Rec. 12501-12505 (1926) ; H.R.

Conf. Rep. No. 1918, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 49 (1934) ;

see also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,

412 U.S. 94, 104-108 (1972).*

Thus, the pertinent feature of the historical back-

ground, against which Section 312(a)(7) was en-

acted, is Congress’ different treatment of general

broadcasting and political broadcasting. In contrast

to general programming, political programming al-

15 Events following the adoption of the 1934 Act also illus-

trate the distinctive treatment afforded to political broad-

casting. In 1952, Congress adopted a provision restricting the

rates that broadcasters could charge political candidates. Act

of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, Section 11, 66 Stat. 717 (amended

by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-

225, Section 103 (a) (1), 86 Stat. 4). In 1959, it acted promptly

to correct what it viewed as a misinterpretation of the equal

opportunities provision. See Political Broadcasting: Hearings

on S. 1585, S. 1604, S. 1858 and S. 1929 Before the Subcomm.

on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1-2 (1959). On

that occasion, when it adopted four exemptions to Section 315

for news-type programs (see 47 U.S.C. 315 (a) ), Congress de-

clared its intent to review regularly the operation of Section

315 and reqrired annual Commission reports on the applica-

tion of the statute as amended. Communications Act Amend-

ment of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, Section 2, 73 Stat. 557.

There is no other area of broadcast programming over which

Congress has exercised such thorough oversight and has so

pervasively regulated broadcaster discretion.

26

ways has been surrounded with special statutory ob-

ligutions. Under Section 315 and its predecessor,

broadcasters have been required, upon request, to

provide rival candidates with specific amounts of

time with no control over program content or for-

mat. Congress, therefore, rather than the licensee,

has allocated a substantial portion of the broadcast

frequency for political “uses.” In this context, the

prescription of a duty to afford “reasonable access”

to individual federal candidates was not a dramatic

change in statutory policy. Section 312(a)(7) rep-

resented only a limited extension of the contingent

right of access that Congress traditionally provided

for individual political candidates. It also represented

a natural evolution of the previously recognized ‘“‘pub-

lic interest”? requirement, which compelled broad-

casters to make some program time available in the

first instance for political candidates.”

2. The Commission’s literal interpretation of Sec-

tion 312(a)(7) is confirmed not only by the historic

approach of Congress to political programming, as

discussed above, but also by the events that preceded

enactment of Section 312(a) (7). Section 312(a) (7)

16—n reliance on 47 U.S.C. 153(h), petitioners argue that

they should not be deemed to be “common carriers.” See ABC

Br. 31 n.89; CBS Br. 17-19; NBC Br. 31. We agree that they

are not common carriers for the general public. They are, how-

ever, “special carriers” for political programming under pre-

scribed circumstances, and have been so ever since 1927. Un-

der Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1170,

and Section 315 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 315,

Congress has required broadcasters to relinquish “uses” of

their stations for political replies, has deprived broadcasters

of editorial control over those broadcasts, and has regulated

the rates they may charge.

27

represented the culmination of a legislative process

covering more than a decade. Following the 1959

amendments to Section 315 of the Act (see note 15,

supra), demands mounted in Congress for increased

media access for political candidates. In 1960, a bill

was introduced in the Senate that would have re-

quired television stations to make specific amounts of

free time available to presidential candidates. S.

3171, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). During hearings

on that bill, Senator Pastore expressed disapproval of

the policies of some stations that had refused re-

quests for political time. Presidential Campaign

Broadcasting Act: Hearings on S. 3171 Before the

Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d

Sess. 59-60 (1960). Subsequent hearings also fo-

cused on the Commission’s inability to protect indi-

vidual candidates seeking access. See Political Broad-

casting: Hearings on S. 204 and others Before the

Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on

Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-146 (1962) (re-

marks of Chairman Minow) (‘we do not presently

have authority to say to a station ‘you must put on

candidate X’”). Once again, in 1967, a bill that

would have required free access time for state and

local, as well as federal candidates, was proposed. S.

1548, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967). See Projections—

Predictions of Election Results and Political Broad-

casting (Sec. 315, Communications Act): Hearings

on S. 1548 and others Before the Subcomm. on Com-

munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th

Cong., lst Sess. 174-175 (1967). When that attempt

to fashion increased access rights failed, thirty-eight

Senators co-sponsored another bill (S. 2876, 91st

Cong., lst Sess. (1969) ), which would have required

that specific amounts of television time be sold to

Congressional candidates at discount rates. See Cam-

28

paign Broadcast Reform Act of 1969: Hearings on S.

2876 and Others Before the Communications Sub-

comm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong.,

lst Sess. 4-9 (1969) ; see also id. at 47-50 (remarks

of Chairman Hyde). In 1970, both houses of Con-

gress passed S. 3637, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), a

bill which, inter alia, would have regulated expendi-

tures for political broadcasts. As amended on the

floor of the Senate (116 Cong. Rec. 11593 (1970) ),

S. 3637 would have declared that “consistent with the

other needs of the community broadcast licensees

shall make a reasonable amount of time available for

legally qualified candidates for federal elective office

between the hours of 7:30 and 10:30 [P.M.].”

This bill was subsequently vetoed by the President

(S. Doe. No. 91-109, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ).

The subject of campaign reform was again taken up,

however, in 1971. Three bills were introduced in the

Senate—S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956—measures, which,

in different ways, were “intended to increase a can-

didate’s accessibility to the media * * *.” Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1,

S. 382, and S. 956 Before the Senate Subcomm. on

Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,

92d Cong., lst Sess. 2 (1971) (remarks of Senator

Pastore). S. 1 would have required each broadcaster

to “make available without charge the use of its facil-

ities * * * to candidates in a presidential election for

the offices of President and Vice President * * *” S. 1,

92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 202 (1971). Certain candi-

dates would have received free of charge “eight one-

half hour periods of prime time from each such sta-

tion and network * * *.” Ibid. S. 956, by contrast,

would have granted the Commission a broad power to

issue rules “to insure that all licensees make avail-

able to legally qualified candidates for public office

reasonable amounts of time for use of broadcasting

29

stations * * *.” S. 956, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 302

(1971).

Rather than adopting either S. 956 or S. 1, how-

ever, the Senate Commerce Committee and Rules and

Administration Committee approved S. 382, but in-

serted within it the language appearing today in Sec-

tion 312(a) (7).’’ As discussed on pages 19-23, supra,

the language deliberately chosen by Congress pre-

scribed a new obligation requiring broadcasters to

provide federal candidates with reasonable access to

the airwaves. In contrast to some of the bills pre-

viously considered by Congress (see pages 27-28,

supra), the language ultimately selected left no

doubt concerning the legislative intent to protect in-

dividual candidates.”

3. Although the contemporaneous commentary on

Section 312(a) (7) in the legislative history is limited,

that commentary also supports the view that Con-

gress sought to prescribe a new affirmative right

of access for candidates seeking federal elective office.

In summarizing one of the leading purposes of Title

I of the new statute—the title which contained Sec-

tion 312(a) (7)—Congress stated that it (emphasis

supplied) :

17 As reported in the Senate, the text of the new access pro-

vision was sweeping. It applied to “any legally qualified can-

didate on behalf of his candidacy.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580,

92d Cong., lst Sess. 22 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-96, 92d Cong.,

Ist Sess. 3 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

5 (1971). The Conference Committee limited the provi-

sion only in one respect—by confining it to candidates seek-

ing federal elective office. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, supra, at

22.

18 Section 312(a) (7) was enacted as part of Title I of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,

86 Stat. 3.

80

attempts to give candidates for public office

greater access to the media so that they may

better explain their stand on the issues, and

thereby more fully and completely inform

the voters.

S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 20. The Committee

plainly was referring to Section 312(a) (7) when it

recited the statutory purpose of affording “greater

access to the media” for political candidates. The

correlation between that purpose and the plain text

of Section 312(a)(7) is, we submit, obvious and

compelling.”

Subsequent portions of S. Rep. No. 92-96 further

establish that Congress understood that it was super-

imposing a new obligation on the prior “public in-

terest”? requirement. The Senate Report separately

describes the newly prescribed obligation,” and dis-

19 Petitioners assert that, because Section 312(a) (7) was

not specifically mentioned in conjunction with this statement

of purpose, and other portions of the statute were discussed by

the Committee shortly thereafter, it necessarily follows that

the statement of purpose has no relationship to Section 312

(a) (7). However, the short summary of statutory provisions

appearing on page 21 of the Senate Report obviously is not ex-

haustive. The Report’s subsequent, more detailed summary of

the provisions in Title I includes repeated references to Sec-

tion 312(a) (7). See S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 34, 38.

20 The Report states (id. at 34) :

[The new Section 312(a) (7)] provide[s] that willful or

repeated failure by a broadcast licensee to allow reason-

able access to or to permit purchase of reasonable

amounts of time for the use of his station’s facilities by a

legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on

behalf of his candidacy shall be grounds for adverse ac-

tion by the FCC.

Section 312(a)(7) sought to “emphasize” (id. at 28) the

duty to afford access to federal candidates by focusing on them

individually, rather than generally. Vesting candidates with

31

tinguishes it from the “general” public interest re-

quirement." Moreover, during floor debates on the

Conference Report that was submitted to the House,

it also was recognized that the new Section 312(a)

(7) imposed significant new obligations on broad-

casters and afforded rights to individual candidates.

See 118 Cong. Rec. 326 (1972) (remarks of Rep.

Keith).

The final, and in our view conclusive, piece of evi-

dence of legislative intent appears in Congress’ con-

temporaneous amendment of Section 315(a) of the

Act, 47 U.S.C. 315(a). That amendment was de-

scribed by the Senate Conference Committee as “a

conforming amendment” required by the enactment

of the new Section 312(a) (7). See S. Conf. Rep. No.

92-580, supra, at 22; accord, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-

752, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971). The text of Sec-

tion 315(a), prior to the “conforming amendment,”

was as follows (47 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 315(a)):

No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to

allow the use of its station by any such candidate.

individual rights directly served the statutory purpose to

“enable all who seek such office to have a better opportunity

to do so” (id. at 26; emphasis added).

*1 The Report gives separate treatment to the general pub-

lic interest obligation previously recognized by the Commis-

sion (S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 34) :

The duty of broadcast licensees generally to permit the

use of their facilities by legally qualified candidates for

these public offices is inherent in the requirement that

licensees serve the needs and interests of the [commu-

nity] of license. The Federal Communications Commis-

sion has recognized this obligation * * *.

Congress intended that this “general” public interest require-

ment would “continue” to be enforced at three year intervals

in the license “renewal” context, not in license revocation

proceedings (id. at 28).

32

As a result of the conforming amendment, however,

Section 315(a) now contains an important qualifica-

tion (47 U.S.C. 315(a) (emphasis supplied) ) :

No obligation is imposed under this subsection

upon any licensee to allow the use of its station

by any such candidate.

It was necessary for Congress to qualify its state-

ment that there was “no obligation” to afford in-

dividual access—and to make it clear that that state-

ment applied only under Section 315(a)—precisely

because the newly enacted Section 312(a)(7) does

require broadcasters to afford individual access. In

short, as the court of appeals explained (Pet. App.

18a), “[i]f Section 312(a) (7) was merely intended

to codify pre-existing obligations and add the sanction

of revocation, no ‘conforming amendment’ to Section

315 would have been required.” ”

Thus, far from contradicting the literal terms of

Section 312(a)(7), the legislative history provides

additional support for the literal interpretation

adopted by the Commission and the court of appeals.

C. The Commission’s Consistent Administrative Con-

struction, Which Has Been Brought to the Atten-

tion of Congress, Confirms the Appropriateness of a

Literal Interpretation of Section 312(a)(7)

As this Court frequently has held, the construction

of a statute by those charged with its administration

“should be followed unless there are compelling indi-

22'The networks suggest (CBS Br. 30 n.70; NBC Br. 45

n.*) that Congress merely intended its amendment of Sec-

tion 315(a) to testore certain language appearing in the Stat-

utes at Large, but omitted from the United States Code. That

theory, however, has virtually no support in the legislative

history, and is contradicted by Congress’ explicit statement

that the amendment was a “conforming” amendment needed

to bring Section 315(a) into harmony with the newly enacted

Section 312(a) (7).

33

cations that it is wrong, especially when Congress has

refused to alter the administrative construction.”

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381

(1969); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-

tee, 412 U.S. 94, 121-123, 125, (1973); Ford Motor

Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-566, 568

(1980). Deference to the agency’s interpretation ‘“‘is

particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s

interpretation involves issues of considerable public

controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any

misperception of its statutory objectives.” United

States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).

These settled principles of statutory construction rein-

force the view that Section 312(a) (7) created a new

right of individual access for federal candidates.

Immediately following the enactment of Section

312(a) (7), and up until the present time, the Com-

mission consistently has construed the statute to im-

pose a new obligation on broadcasters to afford ac-

cess to individual federal candidates. The Commis-

sion repeatedly has determined that this obligation

extends beyond the prior public interest policy. See

Use of Broadcast & Cablecast Facilities by Candi-

dates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 535-538

(1972) (“1972 Policy Statement’) ; Licensee Respon-

sibility Under Amendments to the Communications

Act Made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516-517 (1974) (“1974 Public

Notice’) ; 1978 Report and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.

2d at 1088; New Primer on Political Broadcasting

and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2286, 2290.8

28 It is difficult to understand the basis for the networks’

attempt to fault the Commission (ABC Br. 33-37; CBS Br.

32-34) for inconsistency in construing the statute. In its first

published statement about the statute, the Commission made it

clear that Section 312(a)(7) imposes a new “specific re-

34

The Commission’s interpretation has been brought

to the attention of Congress and has been discussed

with approval by Senator Pastore, the Chairman of

the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Com-

merce Committee. In 1973, the Senate Subcommit-

tee on Communications held hearings to review the

operation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973:

Hearings on S. 372 Before the Subcomm. on Commu-

nications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d

Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (“Hearings on S. 372”). As

the court of appeals pointed out (Pet. App. 19a),

Commission Chairman Dean Burch testified concern-

ing the Commission’s experience with Section 312(a)

(7) and supplied the Committee with its 1972 Policy

Statement, which had construed the statute “to im-

pose[] on the overall obligation to operate in the

public interest the additional specific requirement

that reasonable access and purchase of reasonable

amounts of time be afforded candidates for Federal

office.” See 34 F.C.C.2d at 538; Hearings on S. 372,

quirement” on broadcasters in addition to the general “public

interest” obligation and that blanket refusals to sell time to

candidates could not be countenanced. 1972 Policy Statement,

supra, 84 F.C.C.2d at 538. The Commission reiterated this

position in the 1974 Public Notice, supra, 47 F.C.C. 2d at 516-

517, and in the 1978 Report and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at

1088. The Commission’s rulings on individual complaints have

adhered to the same view of the statute from the beginning.

See, e.g., Robert H. Hauslein, 39 F.C.C.2d 1064, 1065 (Broad-

cast Bureau 1973) ; Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602, 603-605

(1973) ; Don C. Smith, 49 F.C.C.2d 678, 679-680 (Broadcast

Bureau 1974) ; Ken Bauder, 62 F.C.C.2d 849 (Broadcast Bu-

reau 1976) ; Labor Party, 67 F.C.C.2d 589 (1978).

24 Senator Pastore presided since 1959 over all of the Com-

munications Subcommittee Hearings dealing with candidate

access bills and was floor manager of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (see pages 27-28, supra).

35

supra, at 137. Chairman Burch also discussed in de-

tail the practical problems implicit in attempting to

decide whether, in a particular case, an individual

station has afforded reasonable access to a particular

candidate. Hearings on S. 372, supra, at 137. After

advising the Subcommittee of the Commission’s inter-

pretation of the statute and its experience in apply-

ing it, Chairman Burch stated: “We have brought

our approach to these problems in the form of the

1972 Public Notice to the attention of Congress. If

we have erred in some important construction, we

would, of course, welcome congressional guidance.”

Ibid. Senator Pastore replied (ibid.) :

Let me say this. We didn’t draw the provision

any differently than we did because when you be-

gin to legislate on guidelines, and on standards,

and on criteria, you know what you run up

against. I think what we did was reasonable

enough, and I think what you did was reasonable

enough as well.

I know it is a difficult problem to say what is

reasonable. You have to take everything into

consideration. You couldn’t cancel all other pro-

grams that the public might be interested in, just

to accommodate all the candidates.

Yet, on the other hand, there is the question

of giving sufficient time. In some instances, es-

pecially since there is a lowest unit rate, some

licensees have been rather reluctant to give ade-

quate time.

I would suppose that in cases of that kind, you

would get some compiaints.'”!

25 While the Commission and Senator Pastore expressed

their satisfaction with the operation of the new access provi-

sion, network officials complained about its intrusive effect.

CBS Vice Chairman Frank Stanton objected to the fact that

“section 312 grants rights to all legally qualified candidates

for Federal office * * *.”’ Id. at 190. Despite the complaints

86

Congress revisited the subject of federal election

campaign reform in 1974. The Federal Election Cam-

paign Act Amendments of 1974, among other things,

repealed the expenditure limitations prescribed in

Title I of the 1971 legislation. See Pub. L. No. 93-

443, Section 205(b), 88 Stat. 1278. Although Section

312(a)(7) also had been enacted as part of Title I,

it was not altered by Congress and the administrative

construction of the statute was left undisturbed.”

of broadcasters, the Senate Commerce Committee approved

the Commission’s administration of Section 312 (a) (7). Chair-

man Burch assured the Committee that the Commission would

continue to consider “complaints on an ad hoc basis as actual

cases arise.” The Committee stated: “Your Committee be-

lieves that testimony submitted for the record by the Chair-

man of the FCC should allay any fears that the provisions of

section 312(a) (7) might work a hardship on a good faith

licensee or otherwise adversely surprise him.” S. Rep. No. 93-

170, 98d Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1973). See also id. at 7-8. Net-

work officials continued in subsequent years to object in Con-

gress that Section 312(a)(7) “unduly intrudes” upon edi-

torial discretion. First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977:

Hearings on S. 22 before the Subcomm. on Communications

of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transporta-

tion, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978). Still later, the House

Communications Subcommittee was advised of the manner in

which the Commission had interpreted Section 312(a) (7) in

the instant case and expressed no disapproval. See Repeal of

“Equal Time” Requirements: Hearings on H.R. 6103 Before

the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42

(1980). Counsel for the subcommittee agreed with the view

that Section 312(a) (7) creates a right of access for individ-

ual federal candidates. Jd. at 43.

26 Since 1974, Congress has considered proposals to re-

peal Section 312(a)(7), but has declined to change the

statute or the administrative interpretation. See S. 1178, 94th

Cong., Ist Sess. §2 (1975), introduced at 121 Cong. Rec.

6446, 6454-6458 (1975), hearings held, Fairness Doctrine:

Hearings on S. 2, S. 608, and S. 1178 Before the Communica-

37

In light of the consistent interpretation rendered

by the Commission and Congress’ continuing over-

sight of this widely discussed provision, ‘Congress’

failure to repeal or revise” Section 312(a)(7) “in the

face of such administrative interpretation [provides]

persuasive evidence that that intepretation is the one

intended by Congress.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11

(1965); accord, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,

supra, 395 U.S. at 381; United States v. Bergh, 352

U.S. 40, 46-47 (1956); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., No.

78-1815 (June 2, 1980), slip op. 8-13.

D. This Court’s Decision in CBS v. Democratic Na-

tional Committee Does Not Call Into Question the

Commission’s Interpretation of Section 312(a) (7)

In support of their view that Section 312(a) (7)

did nothing more than merely restate the “public

interest” requirement imposed on broadcasters prior

to its enactment (see page 22, supra), the net-

works cite (ABC Br. 21-22; CBS Br. 14-15; NBC

Br. 37-40) this Court’s decision in CBS, Inc. v. Dem-

ocratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S. at 113-

114 n.12. In that case, the Court observed in a foot-

note discussion that Section 312(a)(7) had “essen-

tially codified” prior Commission policy. Once again,

however, the networks misapprehend the meaning of

the language in question. The Court in Democratic

National Committee did not say that Section 312 (a)

(7) imposed no new duties, and it did not imply that

tions Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); S. 22, 95th Cong, Ist Sess. §3

(1977), introduced at 123 Cong. Rec. S186-S187 (daily ed.

Jan. 10, 1977), 124 Cong. Rec. S8879-S8881 (daily ed. June 8,

1978), hearing held, First Amendment Clarification Act of

1977: Hearing on S. 22 Before the Subcomm. on Communi-

cations of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

38

Section 312(a)(7) was in all respects coextensive

with prior doctrine. The Court said that the statute

“essentially” codified prior doctrine,” which is cor-

rect in the sense that Section 312(a)(7) directly

evolved from, was consistent with, and was superim-

posed upon the predecessor public interest doctrine.

In addition to the fact that this Court qualified its

footnote observation as it did, the fact of overriding

importance is that the Court was not called upon, and

did not purport, to rule on the precise contours of the

obligation imposed by Section 312(a)(7). The is-

sue before the Court in Democratic National Commit-

tee was whether the Communications Act or the First

Amendment requires the Commission to force broad-

casters to accept paid editorial announcements from

the general public. 412 U.S. at 97. The Court held

that the Commission need not prescribe such a gen-

eral access obligation. Jd. at 121-132. The Court ob-

served “that no private individual or group” has a

right to command the use of the airwaves (id. at

113), and contrasted that situation with the right of

“political candidates” to receive air time (id. at 113-

114 n.12):

Very recently, Congress amended § 312(a) of

the 1984 Act to authorize the Commission to

revoke a station license for “willfull or repeated

failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit

purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the

use of a broadcasting station by a legally quali-

fied candidate for Federal elective office on be-

half of his candidacy.” * * * This amendment

essentially codified the Commission’s prior in-

terpretation of §315(a) as requiring broad-

casters to make time available to political candi-

dates.

27 The word “essentially” denotes some correspondence, not

an identical relationship. Its synonym is “substantially.” See

Oxford English Dictionary 296 (1933).

39

Thus, read in context, it is clear that the Court in-

tended merely to contrast the special treatment af-

forded “political candidates” under the Communica-

tions Act with the treatment afforded any “private

individual or group.” * The Court did not attempt to

decide the question presented in this case—whether

Section 312(a)(7) vests individual candidates with

an affirmative right of access.”

Finally, even if there were some discrepancy be-

tween the Court’s discussion of Section 312(a) (7) in

Democratic National Committee and the literal terms

28 As the court of appeals explained, the point of this Court’s

discussion in Democratic National Committee was that “one

limited class of speakers, political candidates, has a stronger

claim to the airwaves than do citizens at large” (Pet. App.

21a).

29 In its brief before this Court in Democratic National Com-

mittee (Br. 42-48 n.87), the Commission also referred to

Section 312(a)(7) as a form of codification of the prior

public interest standard. However, the point of the Commis-

sion’s discussion was simply that, with the exception of politi-

cal programming, Congress has not required broadcasters to

serve as common carriers. The Commission’s brief did not

purport to render an interpretation on the issue now before

the Court. Moreover, the relevant statement of administra-

tive views appears in the Commission’s formal interpreta-

tions, not in appellate briefs dealing with other issues. See

Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627-628

(1971). As previously noted, the Commission’s consistent

interpretation of the statute—an interpretation beginning in

1972 and continuing to the present day—is that Section 312

(a) (7) imposed a new obligation on broadcasters to afford

individual access for federal candidates. As CBS recognized

in its brief filed in this Court in Democratic National Com-

mittee (Br. 30-31 n.72)}, Section 312(a) (7) “represents the

first time that Congress has created a specific individual right

to purchase broadcast time that does not depend upon a

previous use by opposing candidates.”

40

of the provision (as discussed on pages 19-23, supra)

it is obvious that the plain meaning of the statute

would be controlling. As the Chief Justice, writing

for the Court in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.

330, 341 (1979), recently observed, “the language

of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though

we were dealing with the language of a statute.”

Accordingly, while a paraphrase of the statute was

useful for purposes of the Court’s discussion in

Democratic National Committee, there is no substi-

tute for a literal application of the language of

Section 312(a) (7) in resolving the question of statu-

tory interpretation presented in this case.*

8° The networks also argue that, because the Federal Elec-

tion Campaign Act’s general goals included shortening cam-

paigns and reducing their costs, the statute should not be con-

strued literally to vest candidates with individual access

rights, particularly in the early phase of a campaign (ABC

Br. 23-24; CBS Br. 31; NBC Br. 46-47). However, “if the

language of a provision * * * is sufficiently clear in its context

and not at odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary

to examine the additional considerations of ‘policy’... that

may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of

the statute.” Aaron v. SEC, No. 79-66 (June 2, 1980), slip op.

14-15. Thus, “generalized references” to the “purposes” of

the Act do not warrant a departure from its literal text. In

any event, the Commission’s interpretation does not conflict

with those general purposes. The statute achieves the goal

of encouraging shorter campaigns by limiting application of

the economically beneficial “lowest unit charge” provision to

a relatively short time period. See 66 Stat. 717, as amended,

47 U.S.C. 315(b) ; S. Rep. No. 92-96, supra, at 28. That same

provision lowers campaign costs by reducing charges for air-

time (to a greater degree than prior law) during the period

when most political broadcasts occur. Total campaign expen-

ditures were also controlled by the statute, as originally en-

41

II. THE COMMISSION’S FINDING THAT THE NET-

WORKS FAILED TO AFFORD REASONABLE AC-

CESS IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND IS

NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS

As we have explained above, Section 312(a) (7)

prescribed a new obligation, requiring broadcasters

“to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase

of reasonable amounts of time” by individual can-

didates seeking to advocate their candidacies for fed-

eral office. Thus, Congress has prescribed a rule of

reason and it has charged the Commission with re-

sponsibility for enforcing it. Neither candidates

seeking time, nor broadcasters opposing their re-

quests, possess final authority in cases of disagree-

ment to declare what is “reasonable.” ™

Like the ‘public interest” standard enforced by

the Commission, the rule of reason prescribed in Sec-

tion 312(a)(7) imposes on the Commission a duty

of interpretation. And Congress has vested the Com-

mission with ample power to render interpretations,

acted, through expenditure limitations. See Pub. L. No. 92-

225, Sections 103-106, 86 Stat. 4-8. See also page 36, supra.

In sum, there is no support whatsoever for the proposition

that Congress intended a cramped construction of Section 312

(a) (7) to curtail the length of campaigns or their costs. And

there certainly is no indication that Congress meant to vest

in the networks unilateral power to truncate federal political

campaigns for the ostensible purpose of promoting campaign

brevity and economy. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57

(1976), noting that “the people—individually as citizens and

candidates * * * must retain control over the quantity and

range of debate * * * in a political campaign.”

31 As previously noted, the Commission expects that, in the

great majority of cases, broadcasters and political candidates,

applying the Commission’s standards in good faith, will nego-

tiate disagreements about access without Commission inter-

vention.

42

to prescribe conditions, and to issue orders necessary

to enforce the statute. See 47 U.S.C. 154(i), (j),

303(r). The Commission’s interpretations under

Section 312(a)(7) are entitled to substantial judicial

deference unless arbitrary or capricious. FCC v.

National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436

U.S. 775, 793-797, 810-811, 814 (1978); Red Lion

Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 380-

381; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-219,

224-225 (1943); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223,

229 (1946).

The networks do not dispute the Commission’s au-

thority to interpret Section 312(a)(7) or to issue

orders thereunder (Pet. App. 28a). They do, how-

ever, assert that certain of the standards prescribed

by the Commission fail to implement statutory objec-

tives and intrude unduly on their discretion (ABC

Br. 25-37; CBS Br. 34-40; NBC Br. 17-84). In

making these contentions, they must sustain a

weighty burden. For, as this Court repeatedly has

recognized, the Commission is the expert agency in

the field of broadcast regulation, and its views are

entitled to great respect by the judiciary. CBS, Inc.

v. Democratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S.

at 102-103, 122-123, 131-132. Broad discretion in pre-

scribing such standards is essential if the Commis-

sion is to “remain in a posture of flexibility to chart

a workable ‘middle course’ in its quest to preserve a

balance between the essential public accountability

and the desired private control of the media.” Jd. at

120. The networks’ burden in challenging the Com-

mission’s standards is particularly weighty since

those standards have been reviewed and approved by

a unanimous court of appeals, which found not only

that they were not “arbitrary or capricious,” but also

that “the standards employed in the orders under

43

review here represent a very reasonable effort at im-

plementing Section 312(a) (7)” (Pet. App. 42a).

1. The Commission’s standards establish the ground

rules for evaluating requests for access under Section

312(a)(7). In a nutshell, the standards are as fol-

lows. Broadcasters enjoy complete discretion to with-

hold air time prior to the commencement of a cam-

paign. However, once a campaign has commenced,

as evidenced by objective factors, broadcasters must

give reasonable and good faith attention to requests

for air time from candidates for federal elective of-

fice. This requires that they consider each request

on an individualized basis. Thus, if a candidate

wishes to concentrate limited resources for a single

half-hour presentation, rather than several five min-

ute presentations, the broadcaster must consider the

stated request and attempt to tailor its response as

much as possible to accommodate the request. Broad-

casters need not, however, ignore their own legitimate

concerns. In making their response, they may con-

sider the likelihood of requests for time from rival

candidates under Section 315 of the Act and the

magnitude of foreseeable program disruption. Broad-

casters may not, however, invoke these considera-

tions as pretexts for denying time and serving their

own convenience. They must cite a realistic danger

of substantial program disruption or of an unduly

large number of requests for equal time. Moreover,

broadcasters must explain their reasons for denying

time or presenting a limited counter-offer, so that

the Commission may determine whether they have

considered the relevant factors. If, in fact, broad-

casters have considered the relevant factors, and

have acted reasonably and in good faith, their de-

cision will be approved even if the Commission itself

would have analyzed the question differently in the

44

first instance. But if they simply have adopted

“across the board policies,” and have not even at-

tempted to respond to the particular request of the

candidate, their denial will not be approved. These,

in substance, are the relevant guidelines established

by the Commission under Section 312(a)(7). See

Pet. App. 86a-10la; 123a-139a; 1978 Report and

Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1089-1091, 1094. Far

from being patently irrational, it is difficult to per-

ceive how a rule of reason analysis in this area

could operate without such principles, or their near

equivalents.

Applying these principles to the facts of this par-

ticular case, the Commission found that the presi-

dential campaign was fully underway in December

1979 (Pet. App. 88a-94a). It further found that

NBC and ABC, by dismissing out of hand the Presi-

dent’s request and refusing to offer any time, had

applied “blanket,” preconceived policies and had not

made a good faith attempt to tailor their response

to the candidate’s stated request (id. at 9la, 99a,

125a, 128a-129a, 131la-188a, 137a-188a). Likewise,

CBS completely ignored the candidate’s particular re-

quest when it offered only five minutes to carry a

previously prepared one-half hour documentary film,

intended to comprehensively summarize the Presi-

dent’s record over three years (id. at 99a-101a, 129a-

131a). Thus, the networks’ denial of the request for

air time rested on a mistaken interpretation of Sec-

tion 812(a)(7). By enforcing blanket policies, and

by refusing to consider the candidate’s request on an

individual basis, the networks disregarded the stat-

ute’s requirements as clearly set forth in the Com-

mission’s 1978 Report and Order, supra.

The candidate’s request for air time, moreover, en-

tailed no realistic danger of program disruption. The

45

request was made more than two months before the

intended date of broadcast; the requested half hour

could be placed in any time slot in prime time over a

four day period; the four day period was selected to

avoid affecting network ratings; the candidate of-

fered to pay the normal commercial rate; and the

candidate had not previously requested.time and an-

ticipated no further requests in the foreseeable fu-

ture (Pet. App. 97a-98a; J.A. 29-33, 204-205). Fur-

thermore, the networks had no reasonable basis for

fearing a significant number of requests for equal

time from rival candidates as the Commission ex-

pressly found (Pet. App. 95a-96a; J.A. 209-210, 97-

98). Finally, although some of the networks sought

to justify their actions after the fact by reference

to the desires of the candidate, they failed to explain

how they had taken the particular request into ac-

count and how they had attempted to accommodate it

(Pet. App. 129a-133a, 187a).* Under these circum-

stances, the Commission had no alternative but to

find that reasonable access had been denied.”

82 The foregoing is only a brief summary of the elements

of the Commission’s “reasonable access” analysis. As noted

in FCC v. WOKO, Inc., supra, 329 U.S. at 229, “the fact that

we might not have made the same determination on the same

facts does not warrant a substitution of judicial for adminis-

trative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to

the latter.” See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340

U.S. 474, 491 (1951). A more extensive discussion of the

Commission’s application of its standards to the facts of this

particular case appears in the Commission’s brief in the court

of appeals at 50-91.

838 The facts of this case differ substantially from those in

the earlier cases on which the networks rely. In Don C. Smith,

49 F.C.C.2d 678 (Broadcast Bureau 1974), the Broadcast Bu-

reau determined that a counter-offer of a half-hour in prime

46

2. The networks nonetheless protest (ABC Br. 24,

37-39; NBC Br. 17-21; CBS Br. 36-39) that the Com-

mission should not have any role to play in determin-

ing when the campaign commences.” The networks

time was reasonable, even though the time slot differed from

that requested by the candidate. Contrary to CBS’ assertion

(Br. 39), the Broadcast Bureau did not “sustain[]” a counter-

offer of “five-minute program periods in response to a re-

quest for a half hour.” Similarly, in Donald W. Riegle,

59 F.C.C.2d 13814 (1976), the broadcaster made a responsive

counter-offer, extending five minute segments outside of prime

time as well as thirty-minute segments and spots within prime

time. Likewise, in Hon. Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838

(1974), and WALB-TYV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246 (1976), all of

the licensees agreed to sell substantial amounts of time during

the “prime time” period.

34 In its 1978 Report and Order, the Commission established

that “a licensee’s obligation to afford reasonable access” does

not attach until the campaign is in “full swing.” See 68

F.C.C.2d at 1091. The Commission left no room to doubt that

it would make determinations of this kind. Jd. at 1091-1092,

1094. The Commission’s willingness to determine when the

campaign commences in cases of disagreement is not incon-

sistent with the Martin-Trigona rulings upon which all peti-

tioners rely. See 66 F.C.C.2d 968 (Broadcast Bureau), review

denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 33 (1977), reconsideration denied, 67

F.C.C.2d 748 (1978). That case emphasized that “‘the licensee,

and ultimately the Commission, must look to the circum-

stances of each particular case to determine when it is rea-

sonable for a candidate’s access to begin as well as the amount

and types of access which are reasonable” (id. at 746 n.4; em-

phasis added). See also New Primer on Political Broadcast-

ing and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2288 (“The ques-

tion of * * * when access should apply * * * will be determined

by the Commission on a case by case basis.”’).

NBC suggests (Br. 19-20) that it is somehow more appro-

priate for the regulated parties—private broadcasters—to

determine for themselves when their own access obligations

attach than it is for a government body to make such a de-

termination. That view can hardly be squared with Congress’

47

fail to recognize that the Commission’s determination

serves to narrow the statute’s coverage. The statute,

on its face, potentially extends access rights to every

“legally qualified candidate for Federal elective of-

fice.” The Commission has done nothing more than

establish a limiting condition—intended to give sub-

stance to the concept of “reasonable access”—by hold-

ing that access rights do not vest until the campaign

is fully underway. The statute could, of course, have

been construed to vest rights in any federal candi-

date as soon as he becomes “legally qualified’? under

the Commission’s rules, without regard to the stage

of the campaign.” By prescribing a condition limit-

ing Section 312(a)(7) to the campaign period, the

Commission has confined its impact on broadcasters

and has established a reasonable guidepost to govern

negotiations between candidates and broadcasters,

thereby minimizing the necessity for governmental

intervention.”

prescription that unreasonable denials of air time, as adjudi-

cated by the Commission, subject broadcasters to sanctions.

Congress not only placed the question of reasonable access

in the hands of the Commission, but gave it explicit enforce-

ment powers to assure that broadcasters would comply with

their responsibilities.

85 As NBC points out (Br. 23), several candidates in the

1980 presidential race announced their candidacies very early.

The Commission’s interpretation reduces the problems caused

by such early announcements since, under the Commission’s

interpretation, a candidate cannot invoke access rights merely

by announcing his candidacy and becoming legally qualified.

If they desire, broadcasters may refuse to sell time to candi-

dates before the campaign is in full swing.

86 ABC misses the point in suggesting that the Commission

will be required to issue “declarations” as to when a campaign

has begun “in literally hundreds of federal congressional or

48

In the present case, the Commission made an inde-

pendent evaluation of the status of the presidential

campaign based on facts proffered by both the candi-

date and the networks (Pet. App. 91la-94a).* The

Commission then rendered ‘a legal judgment” resting

on that objective evidence (Pet. App. 28a). The Com-

mission did not make an “editorial’”’ decision, or other-

wise evaluate program content or choice of material.*

Instead, the Commission determined, based on ample

extrinsic evidence, that the campaign was fully under-

way and therefore that it no longer was reasonable

senatorial elections * * *.” ABC Br. 37 n.49. By establishing

standards to govern negotiations between candidates and

broadcasters, the Commission has reduced the likelihood that

it will be involved in case-by-case adjudication of complaints.

37 The networks repeatedly characterize the Commission’s

decision as somehow triggering the campaign (NBC Br. 19;

CBS Br. 36-37; ABC Br. 14, 17, 37-39, 48). As the court

below pointed out, however, the Commission did not set a

starting date for the campaign; it found from an abundance

of objective evidence that it was already in full swing: “the

Commission’s determination of when the statutory obligations

attach does not control the electoral process. To the contrary,

the determination is controlled by the process” (Pet. App.

27a).

88 The Commission is experienced in assessing the level of

campaign activity, since that is essential in applying some of

its own longstanding rules. See 47 C.F.R. 73.1940 (a) (5), (f).

CBS compares (Br. 35 n.83) this determination to determi-

nations involved in applying the “fairness doctrine.” How-

ever, application of the “fairness doctrine” requires review of

program materials to ascertain if controversial issues have

been presented and if opposing viewpoints have been ex-

pressed. In contrast, determining the commencement of a

campaign requires only a consideration of extrinsic evidence

relating to the existence of campaign activities in the relevant

geographical area.

49

to completely foreclose candidates from access to the

airwaves.”

3. The networks also contend that the Commission

has acted arbitrarily by requiring them to consider

candidate requests on an individual basis once the

campaign commences (NBC Br. 21-27; CBS Br. 37-

40; ABC Br. 39-41). However, there is nothing irra-

tional about construing a statute which focuses on

specific candidate requests for “use” of broadcast

facilities as requiring individualized treatment. This

does not compel the broadcaster to render a value

judgment about the particular request, to second-

guess the candidate or his media strategy, or to specu-

late about the ultimate utility of the requested time

to the campaign. The Commission requires a good

faith consideration of the individual request sclely to

assure that the broadcaster actually takes into ac-

count the stated requirements of the candidate and at-

tempts to accommodate the request to the extent fea-

sible. “[C]onsideration of the candidate’s needs

should manifest itself in a ‘specific—rather than

blanket—response to the individual request [which

affords] greater assurance * * * that the candidate’s

interests cannot be ignored in the balancing process’ ”

89 the Commission recognized in its 1978 Report and

Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1091, “each campaign is unique

with respect to the controversiality and importance of the

issues involved, the public interest in the race, and the amount

of campaigning done by the candidates.” Thus, while some

campaigns “may be limited to a short concentrated period,”

a “presidential campaign may be in full swing almost a year

before an election.” The Carter-Mondale Committee requested

broadcast time approximately eleven months before the gen-

eral election and eight months before the Democratic conven-

tion.

50

(Pet. App. 36a). After all, candidates are the im-

mediate beneficiaries of the statute, and they are

granted reasonable “use” of broadcast facilities to

advocate their own “candidacy.” The Commission

did not abuse its authority by determining that spe-

cific requests from candidates should be accommo-

dated to the extent practicable, since any other ap-

proach would permit their individual campaign strate-

gies simply to be “ignored.”

The networks also argue (ABC Br. 15, 37, 39;

CBS Br. 5, 6-7, 12, 21, 40; NBC Br. 238-25) that

attention to individual needs prevents them from

adopting an “evenhanded” or “uniform” policy in

dealing with candidate requests. The networks are

correct in asserting that they may not adopt a blanket

policy of this kind.** It is not the purpose of Section

#0 NBC argues (Br. 22-23) that consideration of candidate

requests on an individual basis is “meaningless” unless the

broadcaster is allowed to itself “assess or weigh each candi-

date’s needs.” There is no merit to this assertion. Under the

Commission’s analysis, the candidate’s stated needs are not

to be second-guessed, but rather are to be taken account of

along with the broadcaster’s own valid concerns—multiplicity

of requests and program disruption. The Commission’s ap-

proach thus precludes the adoption of blanket policies that

permit a broadcaster to overlook the particular request made

by the candidate.

*1 Broadcasters may, however, attempt to arrive at an over-

all policy in this area through agreement with candidates.

The Commission repeatedly has urged broadcasters to contact

candidates and attempt to arrive at such an accommodation.

See Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities By Candidates

for Public Office, supra, 34 F.C.C.2d at 586: “One conceivable

method of trying to act reasonably and in good faith might

be for licensees, prior to an election campaign for Federal

offices, to meet with candidates in an effort to work out the

problem of reasonable access for them on their stations.” In

this case, the Commission stated: ‘we believe that good faith

51

312(a)(7) to limit candidates to uniform time ra-

tions dispensed mechanically by broadcasters. Indeed,

since candidates often have differing needs and strate-

gies for reaching the public and articulating their

views, a blanket policy may intentionally or uninten-

tionally favor one candidate versus another. The risk

of such favoritism is reduced by the guarantee of

reasonable access’ to the individual candidate. Other

statutory provisions are aimed at equality of a care-

fully prescribed kind. Congress enacted Section 315

of the Act to permit an opposing candidate to re-

spond to any initial political use of the airwaves,

if a request for equal time is promptly made. The

contingent equal opportunities requirement thus has

a complementary role to play, but it does not super-

sede the affirmative “reasonable access” requirement

of Section 312(a)(7) (Pet. App. 68a n.22).

In this connection, it is important to distinguish

the operation of the equal opportunities provision,

as enacted by Congress, and the uniform treatment

concept proposed by the networks. Section 315 of the

Act does not apply to any initial grant of access. It

merely provides that, if access is granted, rival can-

didates may, if they choose, purchase an equivalent

amount of time. This benefits the rival candidate

without curtailing the right of the original candidate

to present his views. The networks in this case, by

contrast, propose a different scheme. They claim the

right to determine in advance and on a unilateral

basis how much time to afford all candidates for

federal office and when to offer such time. They assert

the right to adopt a blanket policy limiting, for ex-

negotiations are to be preferred and urge that course” (Pet.

App. 10la n.84)—a course that the networks refused to

follow.

:

52

ample, all candidates to five minutes of air time at a

particular stage of the campaign, even though one

candidate may desire a half hour segment and his

rival may desire several five minute segments. Thus,

they would arrogate to themselves authority to deter-

mine how much broadcast exposure each candidate

may have, regardless of his or her particular media

strategy. It was not irrational for the Commission to

reject that view of Section 312(a) (7).

The networks also misleadingly suggest that the

only dispute in this case concerns whether the individ-

ual candidate should have the right to insist on a half-

hour in December rather than January—and express

bewilderment that they could be found to have be-

haved unreasonably by merely offering an alterna-

tive time slot (ABC Br. 6 n.11, 21 n.23, 41; NBC Br.

29 n. *; CBS Br. 4 n.9). These arguments are con-

spicuously devoid of any reference to the record. In

fact, ABC stated before the Commission only that it

would begin to sell some time (although it did not

say in what amount or in what part of the day) on

some undisclosed date in January (J.A. 41, 58). NBC

merely represented that it would begin selling time at

some unspecified date in the future (J.A. 42, 60 n. *).

As previously noted, the preconceived policy of CBS

allowed only one five minute time segment in prime

time. Thus, the Commission was not faced with a rec-

ord in which the networks had made specific, respon-

sive counter-offers.** If such counter-offers had been

#2 Compare WALB, TV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1246, 1248

(1976) (broadcaster’s refusal to grant request for five-hour

block of time to presidential candidate was not unreasonable

when counter offer of one-half hour was made); Frank

Church, 37 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 337 (1976) (broadcaster re-

fusal to grant request for one-half hour of time to presiden-

tial candidate was unreasonable when counter-offer of only

53

made, the Commission’s decision may well have been

different. Indeed, the complaint may never have been

filed.

4. The Commission emphasized in its orders in

this case that the factors to be considered in evaluat-

ing Section 312(a)(7) requests—e.g., likely multi-

plicity of claims for reply time and significant pro-

gram disruption—are factors bearing on the broad-

caster’s needs and interests. The only countervailing

factor that the Commission required broadcasters to

consider in the balance was the candidate’s stated

requirements. The networks nonetheless contend in

this Court that the Commission has “eviscerated’’

broadcaster discretion and precluded a fair evalua-

tion of their legitimate needs (ABC Br. 14; NBC Br.

29-30 n.*; CBS Br. 38). In making this assertion,

the networks simply ignore the fact that they never

have offered any good reason for rejecting the request

of the Committee.

The networks wholly failed to demonstrate any rea-

sonable prospect of a large number of requests for

equal time if they honored the request made by the

Committee.** On the record in this case, the Commis-

five minutes was made). No request for time need be honored

under Section 312(a) (7), of course, unless the candidate is

willing to pay for that time. See Kennedy for President

Committee v. FCC, No. 80-1549 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1980),

slip op. 36.

48 There were approximately a dozen major candidates at

the relevant time who might have made requests for equal

time (Pet. App. 92a). However, only candidates for the

Democratic nomination, who were legally qualified under the

Commission’s rules, and who requested time within seven

days, would be entitled to “equal opportunities” under Section

815(a). See 47 C.F.R. 73.1940(a), (e), (f); New Primer on

Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d

54

sion reasonably concluded that the networks’ claims

of multiple requests for equal time were “specula-

tive and unsubstantiated at best” (Pet. App. 138a).

Likewise, no issue of “program disruption” ever

arose on this record.“ No colorable claim of disrup-

tion could be predicated on the sale of a single half-

hour to a political candidate, requested two months in

advance. This is particularly true where, as here,

the candidate specified no particular slot within the

prime time range and selected four alternative days.”

at 2218. Moreover, economic realities also stood in the way

of any significant number of such requests in December 1979,

either tinder Section 315(a) or 312(a)(7). The cost of a

half hour of prime time was then as much as $186,000, and

President Carter alone had qualified for federal matching

funds (J.A. 171, 209 n.*). Further, the networks never

claimed to have contacted any rival candidates to determine

their likely responses (Pet. App. 126a, 188a). Finally, subse-

quent events confirmed the reasonableness of the Commis-

sion’s finding that there was no realistic danger of an out-

pouring of such requests. President Carter ultimately suc-

ceeded in purchasing five minutes of time from CBS in De-

cember and thirty minutes of time from ABC in January

(Pet. App. lla). There is no indication that either network

received even a single request for equal time, much less a

large number of such requests, following those broadcasts.

44 The Commission has recognized that undue program dis-

ruption would occur, for example, if multiple requests for

equal time in the closing days of a campaign resulted in po-

litical programming “to the exclusion of all or most other

types of programming.” Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Fa-

cilities by Candidates for Public Office, supra, 34 F.C.C. 2d

at 536. The Commission has thus acknowledged that Con-

gress did not intend “that all or most time be preempted for

political broadcasts.” Ibid.

45 Each network had 44 half hours of prime time program-

ming per week, for a three network monthly total of 528 half

hours. The Carter-Mondale Committee sought to purchase

55

And, as previously noted, the record in this case did

not support a claim that requests for equal time were

likely to be tendered in any significant number.

In short, the Commission was prepared in this case

to listen to any reasonable explanation offered by the

networks for their refusal to provide time. That

explanation was never forthcoming. In this context,

the networks should not be heard to complain that

their discretionary judgment was not heeded. At

bottom, the networks argue in this case that any

asserted justification for refusing time, clothed in the

rhetoric of “broadcaster discretion,” must be accepted

by the candidate and the Commission, regardless of

its factual basis. Such a view would nullify the rea-

sonable access obligation prescribed by Congress in

Section 312 (a) (7).*°

III. SECTION 312(a)(7), AS IMPLEMENTED BY THE

COMMISSION, MAKES A SIGNIFICANT CONTRI-

BUTION TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ON

ISSUES OF VITAL IMPORTANCE AND DOES NOT

IMPERMISSIBLY INTERFERE WITH BROAD-

CASTERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

All of the networks base their final challenge to

Section 312(a) (7), as interpreted by the Commission

only one of those half hours. Networks, of course, frequently

alter their scheduled programming to serve their own com-

mercial interests. See B. Cole, Television Today 6-7 (1981).

46 The networks’ exaggerated claims of “eviscerated” dis-

cretion are perhaps best answered by Office of Communica-

tion of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,

1008 (1966) (Burger, J.); “A broadcaster seeks and is

granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable

part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise

it is burdened with enforceable public obligations. * * * After

nearly five decades of operation the broadcast industry does

not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broadcast

license is a public trust * * *.”

%

56

and as applied in this case, on the First Amendment

(ABC Br. 43-49; CBS Br. 40-49; NBC Br. 25-33).

The familiar terms of the First Amendment provide

that “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging

the freedom of speech, or the press * * *.” Far from

“abridging” freedom of speech or the press, Section

312(a)(7) “makes a tremendous positive contribu-

tion to the cause of freedom of expression” (Pet. App.

65a; Tamm, J., concurring). Congress enacted this

provision to “give increased play to ideas touching

the very essence of our democracy”’—a “goal that

surely lies near the heart of the first amendment”

(id. at 67a).

Section 312(a)(7) facilitates freedom of expres-

sion by candidates and permits voters to hear infor-

mation of vital importance to them. Moreover, the

Commission has not ignored the legitimate interests

of broadcasters in effectuating these objectives. The

record in this case clearly shows that the Commis-

sion has bent every effort to accommodate all of the

First Amendment interests at stake. As the Commis-

sion explained (id. at 90a) :

[W]e recognize that our decision concerns First

Amendment interests—both those of the gener-

al public in full-ranging debate on electorate in-

forming issues and those of broadcasting jour-

nalists in preserving their editorial discretion.

While the constitutionality vel non of Section 312

(a) (7) is basically a matter for Congress and the

courts, we must interpret the statute, if possible,

to effectuate Congress’ intent while not unneces-

sarily impinging on the broadcasters’ journalistic

discretion.

The Commission added that it was fully aware that

Section 312(a)(7) “must be applied with First

Amendment interests in mind” (id. at 90a n. 18). As

we demonstrate below, the Commission has suc-

57

ceeded in the “delicate balancing of competing in-

terests” called for by the First Amendment. CBS

Inc. v. Democratic National Commitiee, supra, 412

U.S. at 117.

A. The Statute, as Interpreted by the Commission,

Facilitates Free Expression by Candidates

The court of appeals correctly highlighted the im-

portance of the broadcast media in a democratic soci-

ety, and stressed the unique utility of such media in

communicating the views of candidates (Pet. App.

lla-12a). Access to program time on national tele-

vision networks permits candidates to present their

views on political issues in homes throughout the na-

tion; conversely, denial of access effectively ob-

structs such communication.” Congress enacted Sec-

tion 312(a) (7) precisely because candidate access to

the broadcast media had been denied unreasonably in

the past and a guarantee of “reasonable access” was

essential to facilitate the operation of the democratic

process (see pages 26-32, supra) .*®

47 The Carter-Mondale Committee stated in its affidavit filed

with the Commission (J.A. 209): “There are no feasible

alternatives to purchasing time for the half-hour program on

one of the three respondent networks on, or as close as possi-

ble to, the date of the President’s announcement as originally

requested. * * * Attempting at this point to purchase com-

parable time on the hundreds of individual stations required to

duplicate network coverage would be prohibitively expensive

and logistically impractical, if not completely impossible.”

48 As Professor Emerson has observed: “There are numer-

ous reasons for the failures now threatening the existence of

the system [of freedom of expression]. Probably the most

significant is the overpowering monopoly over the means of

communication acquired by the mass media. * * * Three gi-

gantic networks, ABC, CBS and NBC, determine most of what

is seen in American homes on television.” T. Emerson, The

58

Candidates, of course, have First Amendment

rights to present their views to potential voters. As

this Court observed in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424

U.S. at 52-53:

The candidate, no less than any other person, has

a First Amendment right to engage in the discus-

sion of public issues and vigorously and tire-

lessly to advocate his own election and the elec-

tion of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particu-

lar importance that candidates have the unfet-

tered opportunity to make their views known so

that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the

candidates’ personal qualities and their positions

on vital public issues before choosing among

them on election day.”

See also id. at 48. Accordingly, a statute aimed at

securing “reasonable access” to the airwaves for can-

didates is a “congressional effort, not to abridge,

restrict, or censor speech, but rather * * * to facili-

tate and enlarge public discussion and participation

in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing

people.” Id. at 92-98. See also Red Lion Broadcasting

Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 375, 394; FCC v.

National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, supra,

System of Freedom of Expression 627-628 (1970). At the

same time that it enacted Section 312(a) (7), Congress re-

jected proposals that the equal opportunities provision con-

tained in Section 315 should be repealed. At that time, Con-

gress expressed deep concern that unfettered control of the

airwaves by broadcasters would stifle political communication.

See 117 Cong. Rec. 48150 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) ;

id. at 48168 (remarks of Rep. Harvey).

**The First Amendment right of candidates to advocate

their election does not, in itself, include the right to demand

access to television or radio. Congress enacted Section 312

(a) (7), vesting candidates with a statutory right of access,

to facilitate their First Amendment rights.

59

436 U.S. at 801-802; The System of Freedom of Ex-

pression, supra, at 629-630, 664-667.

The Commission’s interpretation of Section 312 (a)

(7), which requires consideration of the media plans

of the individual candidate, is entirely consistent with

this Court’s recognition that it is essential for each

candidate to “vigorously and tirelessly advocate his

own election.” If broadcasters could simply ignore

the stated requirements of a candidate, or decide uni-

laterally when air time should be made available for

sale, the candidate’s ability to communicate with the

public—in a manner that is most efficient and con-

ducive to the presentation of his own particular

message—would be seriously eroded.”

5 The purposes of the First Amendment are best served by

affording reasonable attention to the individual requests of

candidates. If broadcasters had unilateral power to dictate

formats, program lengths, and broadcast times, then broad-

casters, not candidates, would decide what could be said to

the public and when. This would constitute effective censor-

ship by broadcasters of the expression of candidates. In this

respect, the networks’ assertion that they offer adequate cov-

erage to candidates in newscasts is completely beside the point.

The interest of a candidate in communicating his views is

poorly served, if at all, when reliance must be placed on

others to filter and edit the presentation. Candidates are en-

titled to have their views presented by “ ‘persons who actually

believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very

utmost for them.’”’ Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra,

895 U.S. at 392 n.18 (citation omitted).

51 The fact that candidates with substantial economic re-

sources may purchase more time than those who do not is not

an argument against affording individualized treatment. The

expenditure of funds to promote one’s candidacy is itself an

aspect of protected free speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra,

424 U.S. at 39, 54, 57. Moreover, flexibility in purchasing

time on broadcast stations may be essential to a candidate of

limited means who wishes to mount an early, effective media

60

B. The Statute, as Interpreted by the Commission,

Facilitates the Right of Voters to Receive Infor-

mation About Political Candidates

The right of the public to receive information about

political candidates is correlative to the right of can-

didates to advocate their views. In the hierarchy

of First Amendment rights, the right of the public

to receive this information—and to participate in the

process of self-government on an informed basis—is

supreme. Regardless of the party affiliation of a

particular candidate, the public requires information

about the candidate to cast the ballot in an intelli-

gent manner. That information is of utmost impor-

tance to the public because it is an essential ingre-

dient in the effective functioning of representative

government.

The Commission’s enforcement of the “reasonable

access” provision in cases such as this facilitates the

publie’s right to receive essential political informa-

tion.” As this Court has observed, “[i]t is the right

of the public to receive suitable access to * * * politi-

cal * * * ideas and experiences which is crucial here.”

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S.

at 390. Stated otherwise, “[i]t is the right of the

campaign in order to acquire additional financial support.

Flexible access to the media may be essential in establishing

name recognition for the newcomer, just as it is for an in-

cumbent wishing to pursue his own individual media strategy.

52 Contrary to the networks’ suggestion (CBS Br. 35,

45; NBC Br. 48-49), Section 312(a)(7) does not merely

facilitate the free speech of candidates. It also serves to

“more fully and completely inform the voters.” See S. Rep.

No. 92-96, supra at 20, 283. The Commission has consistently

construed the statute with that understanding. See 1978 Re-

port and Order, supra, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1087-1089; Licensee

Responsibility under Amendments to the Communications

Act made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,

supra, 47 F.C.C.2d at 517; Pet. App. 90a, 128a, 184a.

61

viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcast-

ers, which is paramount.” Ibid. See also CBS, Inc. v.

Democratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S. at

122 (“it must constantly be kept in mind that the

interest of the public is our foremost concern”). See

also Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 14-15, em-

phasizing that the First Amendment has “ ‘its fullest

and most urgent application’ ” in protecting the pub-

lie’s right to information about political candidates,

since, “[i]n a republic where the people are sover-

eign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed

choices among candidates for office is essential, for

the identities of those who are elected will inevitably

shape the course that we follow as a nation.”

The statute, on its face, makes a significant con-

tribution to this objective. It assures that candidates

have reasonable access to the airwaves to reach the

electorate. And, as interpreted by the Commission,

it is effective in doing its job. The Commission has

interpreted it to apply precisely when the public

needs information most—when the campaign is fully

underway. Moreover, the Commission has interpreted

it to require attention to the media strategy of indi-

vidual candidates so that those candidates may, with

the help of their advisers, chart the course that is

best adapted to reaching the intended audience.

In short, if the Commission and the courts were to

accept the position of the networks here—two of

which denied the candidate any time and one of which

offered only five minutes to summarize a three year

term in office—that decision not only would fail to

give effect to the statute but also would disregard the

constitutional precept that “speech concerning public

affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence

of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.

64, 74-75 (1964); First National Bank of Boston

v. Bellotti, 485 U.S. 765, 776-777 (1978).

62

C. The Statute, as Interpreted by the Commission,

Does Not Unduly Restrict the Discretion of Broad-

casters

Despite its manifest contribution to the cause of

political free speech, the networks nonetheless contend

that Section 312(a) (7), as construed by the Commis-

sion, impairs their discretion to such a degree that it

cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. In response

to that assertion, several preliminary observations are

in order. The statute does not preclude broadcasters

from presenting their views on any issue or from

carrying entertainment or public affairs program-

ming. It calls for no governmental surveillance of the

contents of their broadcasts, and has no impact on

their news and editorial presentations. Finally, it

does not require broadcasters to evaluate the con-

tents of political programming proposed by candi-

dates, and it does not require them to choose among

or discriminate against candidates. The statute sim-

ply requires broadcasters to afford candidates for

federal office reasonable access to the airwaves, and

to adhere to standards prescribed by the Commission

in considering individual requests. Thus, as in Red

Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at

396:

There is no question here of the Commission’s

refusal to permit the broadcaster to carry a

particular program or to publish his own views;

of a discriminatory refusal to require the licensee

to broadcast certain views which have been de-

nied access to the airwaves; of government cen-

sorship of a particular program contrary to [47

U.S.C.] § 326; or of the official government view

dominating public broadcasting.

At bottom, then, the networks’ First Amendment

arguments in this case resolve into the assertion that

63

affording reasonable access is an improper impair-

ment of their discretion to broadcast what they please,

and that the Commission’s standards cannot be en-

forced without undue intrusion into their affairs.

1. The argument that broadcasters have a First

Amendment right to resist Congress’ allocation of

air time for political “uses” is completely without

merit. As this Court held in Red Lion Broadcasting

Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 389:

A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee

has no constitutional right to be the one who

holds the license or to monopolize a radio fre-

quency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.

There is nothing in the First Amendment which

prevents the Government from requiring a li-

eensee to share his frequency with others and to

conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with

obligations to present those views and voices

which * * * otherwise, by necessity, [would] be

barred from the airwaves.

The Court added that “the Government is permitted

to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose

views should be expressed on this unique medium.”

Id. at 390.% Thus, due to the overriding public in-

terest in the use of limited broadcast frequencies, this

Court’s decisions consistently have recognized that “of

53In upholding the Commission’s “fairness doctrine” in

Red Lion, the Court observed that “[r]ather than confer fre-

quency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees

* * * the Government could surely have decreed that each fre-

quency should be shared among all or some of those who wish

to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day

or the broadcast week. The ruling and regulations at issue

here do not go quite so far. They assert that under specified

circumstances, a licensee must offer to make available a rea-

sonable amount of broadcast time [to persons seeking to offer

a rebuttal].” 395 U.S. at 390-391.

64

all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that

has received the most limited First Amendment pro-

tection.”” FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 488 U.S. 726,

748 (1978); See also FCC v. National Citizens Com-

mittee for Broadcasting, 486 U.S. 775, 798-802

(1978) (“efforts to ‘enhanc[e] the volume and qual-

ity of coverage’ of public issues through regulation of

broadcasting may be permissible where similar efforts

to regulate the print media would not be’’) ; CBS, Inc.

v. Democratic National Committee, supra, 412 U.S.

at 94, 101-108; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,

226-227 (1943). These precedents clearly confirm

Congress’ authority to “re-allocatfe] the ‘use’ of por-

tions of the airwaves from the licensee to the candi-

date” (Pet. App. 47a)—as it has done under Section

312(a) (7).™

This Court’s decision in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic

National Committee, supra, confirms the correctness

of the decision of the court of appeals in this case. In

% CBS argues (Br. 48) that once Congress vests broad-

casters with discretion in conducting their affairs, it may not

thereafter interfere with the freedom that it has conferred.

However, following the enactment of Section 312(a) (7) in

1972, no broadcaster could have expected to exercise “editorial

discretion” to deny a federal candidate’s request for reason-

able access. As this Court recognized in Red Lion, moreover,

it is proper for Congress to reallocate “use” of the broadcast

spectrum to accommodate the needs of political candidates.

Congress has long regulated the limited broadcast spectrum

by dividing its use between private broadcasters and political

candidates, and has divested broadcasters of “editorial discre-

tion” over the presentations of political candidates. See Farm-

ers Union V. WDAY, supra, 860 U.S. at 529. In short, with re-

spect to airtime that Congress has reallocated for political use,

broadcasters possess no editorial discretion.

65

that case, this Court reversed a decision of the court

of appeals which had compelled the Commission to

adopt regulations requiring broadcasters to make time

available to the general public. The Court found no

statutory authority, or authority in Commission

precedent, for such a requirement. Here, by contrast,

Congress has prescribed the right of access for fed-

eral candidates and the Commission has implemented

it. In these circumstances, the teaching of Demo-

cratic National Committee is plain: “[I]n evaluating

the First Amendment claims of [the litigants], we

must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress

and the experience of the Commission. * * * The judg-

ment of the Legislative Branch cannot be ignored or

undervalued simply because one segment of the broad-

cast constituency casts its claims under the umbrella

of the First Amendment.” 412 U.S. at 102-103. More

specifically, as the Court recognized in Democratic

National Committee, it is permissible for Congress to

devise a “limited right of access that is both prac-

ticable and desirable” (id. at 181).%

2. Broadcasters do, of course, receive certain pro-

tections from the First Amendment. The broadcast-

ing industry is entitled to exercise ‘the widest jour-

nalistic freedom consistent with its public obliga-

tions.” CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,

supra, 412 U.S. at 110 (emphasis supplied). In this

55 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979),

has no bearing on the question presented here. The Court

held in that case that “authority to compel cable operators

to provide common carriage of public originated transmis-

sions must come specifically from Congress.” The Court ex-

pressed no views on the First Amendment in that case. Jd.

at 709 n.19. Here, by contrast, Congress has granted a specific

right of reasonable access to political candidates and has

given the Commission power to effectuate that right.

66

é¢ase, the statute, as implemented by the Commission,

affords broadcasters the widest measure of discretion

that is consistent with the essential First Amendment

interests of political candidates and the voting public.

Section 312(a)(7) imposes obligations only with re-

spect to a narrow and precisely defined group—

legally qualified candidates for federal office.” More-

over, the access right is limited to a specific “use,”

that is, advocacy of candidacy for office. Thus, com-

plexities of the kind associated with the general pub-

lie access scheme considered in CBS, Inc. v. Demo-

cratic National Committee are largely avoided. Con-

gress has specified who is entitled to invoke the stat-

ute (candidates for federal elective office) and for

what purpose (to advocate their candidacies). And

it also has identified, under Section 315(a) of the

Act, those who are entitled to “equal opportunities”

for reply.” Under this statutory scheme, moreover,

broadcasters need not (indeed, may not) evaluate or

edit the programming that candidates seek to present

to the public. In short, the statute imposes narrowly

drawn obligations on broadcasters and is largely self-

executing, particularly as construed by the Com-

mission:

The Commission’s interpretation of Section 312

(a) (7) provides guidance for broadcasters seeking to

% The Commission has adopted specific standards for de-

fining who is a “legally qualified candidate” entitled to invoke

Sections 312(a) (7) and 315 of the Act. See 47 C.F.R. 73.1940

(a), (f).

5? Equal opportunities under Section 315 of the Act are

available according to straightforward legal standards. If a

broadcaster grants access under Section 312(a) (7), equal

opportunities must be afforded to rivals who so request within

seven days. See New Primer on Political Broadcasting and

Cablecasting, supra, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2215-2224,

67

negotiate with candidates without Commission inter-

vention and minimizes the burdens imposed by the

statute. Under the Commission’s interpretation, the

statute does not apply until the campaign is fully

underway, as established by objective evidence de-

scribed in the Commission’s opinion (Pet. App. 92a-

94a). Furthermore, the Commission has guided

broadcasters on how they should treat individual

requests once the campaign commences. They must

attempt to accommodate the particular request of the

candidate to the extent practicable, weighing in the

balance the countervailing factors of program disrup-

tion and multiple requests for equal opportunities.

If they do this reasonably and in good faith, the

Commission will not reverse their determination (Pet.

App. 86a-87a & n.16).°° Thus, by fashioning stand-

ards under the congressionally prescribed rule of

reason, and applying those standards with deference

to the broadcaster’s discretion, the Commission has

successfully walked the “tightrope” and balanced the

competing First Amendment interests of candidates,

voters, and broadcasters. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic

National Committee, supra, 412 U.S. at 117."

58 As the court of appeals pointed out (Pet. App. 46a), the

Commission’s review function is limited to two essential in-

quiries: 1) did the broadcaster consider the relevant factors?

and 2) did the broadcaster reasonably explain the basis for

its decision in terms of those factors?

5° The Commission’s standards, of course, cannot be applied

with the simplicity of a mathematical formula. The “rule of

reason” prescribed by Congress reqfitrea. attention to the facts

of each particular case. This, however, does not invalidate

the Commission’s approach. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co.

v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 395: “The litigants embellish their

First Amendment arguments with the contention that the

regulations are so vague that their duties are impossible to

68

8. Nothing on the record in this case suggests that

the reasonable discretion of broadcasters has been

ignored. The Commission has not second-guessed any

good faith effort on the part of the networks to ac-

commodate the needs of an individual candidate, and

the Commission has not rejected any factually-

supported claim of business necessity. Nor has it

imposed any obligation that wculd disrupt entertain-

ment programming. Indeed, the Commission has not

imposed sanctions of any kind on any broadcaster.

It simply ordered the networks to state how they

would comply with the statute. See Red Lion Broad-

casting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 396 (the

Commission “will not impose sanctions in such cases

without warning”). Finally, there is no evidence

on this record of a continuing, day to day surveillance

of networks in their dealing with candidates. To

the contrary, the Commission has announced stand-

ards with the expectation that those standards will

be largely self-executing, through the good faith ef-

forts of broadcasters and candidates alike, and that

questions of reasonable access ordinarily will be re-

solved through negotiation.”

discern. Of this point it is enough to say that, judging the

validity of the regulations on their face as they are presented

here, we cannot conclude that the FCC has been left a free

hand to vindicate its own idiosyncratic conception of the

public interest or of the requirements of free speech. Past

adjudications by the FCC give added precision to the regu-

lations; there was nothing vague about the FCC’s specific

ruling in Red Lion that Fred Cook should be provided an

opportunity to reply.”

*° In cases of stalemate, the candidate may complain to the

Commission or the network may seek a declaratory ruling.

69

In this context, it is unnecessary to speculate about

abuses of the statute that might occur if it were ad-

ministered in bad faith or with disregard for the

interests of all concerned. It is enough here to note

that the Commission has made a painstaking effort

to balance the rights of broadcasters, candidates, and

the voting public, and that there is no reason to pre-

sume that it will follow any different course in the

future. As the Court observed in FCC v. Pacifica

Foundation, supra, 438 U.S. at 748: “[i]nvalidating

any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to

situations not before the court is ‘strong medicine’ to

be applied ‘sparingly and only as a last resort.’ ” For

this reason, the constitutionality of Section 312(a)

(7), as interpreted by the Commission, should not be

tested “by envisioning the most extreme applications

conceivable.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,

supra, 395 U.S. at 396. If abuses should occur in the

future, reviewing courts may “deal with those prob-

See 47 C.F.R. 1.2. The possibility of Commission intervention,

however, should have no relevant “chilling effect.” The po-

tential intervention of the agency may cause broadcasters to

listen with greater seriousness to individual requests from

candidates, but that is precisely the effect that Congress

sought to achieve. And, in those circumstances, the potential

involvement of the agency would enlarge, not contract, free-

dom of speech. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that

this kind of oversight will have a “chilling effect’? on com-

merical programming. This Court has observed, with respect

to profiteble commercial speech in general, that “there is little

likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and fore-

gone entirely.” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Con-

sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). See also Red

Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S. at 392-393;

FCC Vv. Pacifica Foundation, supra, 438 U.S. at 742-748.

o

70

lems, if and when they arise.” Ibid; see also Pet.

App. 47a n.117, 62a-68a.™

In sum, Section 312(a) (7), as construed by the

Commission, guarantees to candidates and voters the

opportunity to exchange information essential to the

exercise of the fundamental right to vote. The legiti-

mate interests of candidates and voters must be

weighed in the balance along with the commercial con-

cerns of broadcasters. The Commission’s interpreta-

tion assures that intrusion on the discretion of broad-

casters is reduced to the minimum level that is con-

sistent’with the public necessity. Under these circum-

stances, it is appropriate to afford “weight to the

decisions of Congress and the experience of the Com-

mission” (CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Commit-

tee, supra, 412 U.S. at 102), and to reject the consti-

tutional arguments advanced by the networks.

*1 It is noteworthy that, in the present case, the networks

obtained a stay from the court of appeals which relieved them

of any duty to comply with the Commission’s order while they

litigated the propriety of that order (without success) in the

court of appeals.

71

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

?

WADE H. McCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

Louis F.. CLAIBORNE

Deputy Solicitor General

STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO

Assistant to the Solicitor General

ROBERT R. BRUCE

General Counsel

DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG

Associate General Counsel

C. GREY PASH, JR.

LISA B. MARGOLIS

Attorneys

Federa! Communications Commission

JANUARY 1981

% ov. 8. covernment painting orrica; 1981 335676 240

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