Petition — Glaser v. Salorio

60-123

In THE

Supreme Court of the United

OctoserR Term, 1980

SIDNEY GLASER, Director of the Division of Taxation,

Department of the Treasury of the State of New J ersey,

Cross Petitioner,

v.

JOHN SALORIO, ROBERT COE and

JOHN D. McGARR, JR.,

Cross Respondents.

On Cross Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of New Jersey

CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

Joon J. DeGcnan,

Attorney General of New Jersey,

Attorney for Cross Petitioner,

Sidney Glaser, Director of the

Division of Taxation, Department

of the Treasury of the State of

New Jersey,

State House Annex,

Trenton, New Jersey 08625.

STEPHEN SKILLMAN,

Assistant Attorney General,

Of Counsel and on the Petition,

State House Annex,

Trenton, New Jersey 08625.

. (609) 292-4965

Adams Press Corp., 5 Commerce Street, Newark, N. J. 07102—(201) 623-8611

Questions Presented

1. Is the New Jersey Emergency Transportation Tax

Act properly designed to impose a fair share of the costs

incurred by New Jersey in the operation of interstate

transportation facilities upon nonresidents who directly

benefit from those facilities and thus consistent with the

requirements of Article IV of the Privileges and Im-

munities Clause of the United States Constitution?

2. Can two stutes enter into an agreement to coordinate

their laws relating to the taxation of individuals who work

in one of the states and reside in the other without securing

congressional approvai pursuant to the Compact Clause

of the United States Constitution (Art. I, $10, el. 3)?

3. Is the objective of the Privileges and Immunities

Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution

of maintaining harmonious interstate relations satisfied by

the 1962 agreement between the States of New York and

New Jersey which establishes a system for the coordina-

tion of the tax laws of the two states by which tax reve-

nues from individuals who reside in one state and earn

their income in the other are equitably apportioned while

the imposition of double taxation is avoided?

li]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions PRESENTED

Oprnion BELow ...

JURISDICTION

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT:

Point I—If the Court notes probable jurisdic-

tion to consider the claim of the appellants-

cross respondents that the Emergency Trans-

portation Tax Act violates the Privileges and

Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United

States Constitution it should grant the cross

petition in order to be able to review the entire

case

Point II—The decision of the Supreme Court

of New Jersey, that the 1962 Agreement be-

tween New York and New Jersey is unen-

forceable against the cross respondents be-

cause it did not receive congressional approval

pursuant to Article I, §10, Cl. 3 of the United

States Constitution, is irreconcilable with

the Court’s decision in United States Steel

Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S.

452 (1978) ‘

PAGE

Lo) |

li TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Powt I1I—The Emergency Transportation Tax

is consistent with the principles of federalism

which the Privileges and Immunities Clause

of Article IV is designed to serve, because

it is imposed and collected pursuant to a 1962

Agreement between the states of New York

and New. Jersey which provides for the co-

ordination of the tax laws of the two states

by equitably apportioning tax revenues frum

individuals who reside in one state amd earn

their income in the other while avoiding the

imposition of double taxation ..... Hy)

CONCLUSION .. 15

Cases Cited

Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) ........ 10

Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953) 2... tt teeeeeeee 9

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) 10

Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276

(1932) 11

N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132

(1975) | 5

Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) ....10, 11

Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) 4

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) 14

United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Com-

mission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) .......... 7-9

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

PAGE

United States Constitution Cited

Pirtanne By Tometieh TE, Came Sansa cositcccincecsecteinens i, 3, 7

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 .................... 1, 3, 5, 9-11, 14

Statutes Cited

L. 1962, Ch. 2 12

Is. I sescasesceaiaiceicilainctbistaiveieadhnlaplahetaa basanites 12, 13

N.J.S.A. 54:8A-1 to 57 (New Jersey Emergency

UUIIOTIEION TIE BGO) meicceincnsnscctecntinscetetmsicpecies i, 3, 5, 12

28 U.S.C.:

Ua DUT. Gccinsecaeidhccciasheiiesehdectiiberdpetcheicasiaplninsscstbichseidecnseidb i 2,5

FEO, SIF GED casi ennpuinionhanitiasiahalenahidiapentiisimninedk 2

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1980

.

_-

SIDNEY GLASER, Director of the Division of Taxation,

Department of the Treasury of the State of New Jersey,

Cross Petitioner,

v.

JOHN SALORIO, ROBERT COE and

JOHN D. McGARR, JR.,

Cross Respondents.

On Cross Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of New Jersey

die.

———

CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

The cross petitioner, Sidney Glaser, respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the opinion and

order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey entered on

March 26, 1980.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey has

been officially reported in 82 N.J. 482 and also is re-

produced in Appendix A to the appellants’ jurisdictional

statement on the appeal of this matter (Salorio v. Glaser,

United States Supreme Court Docket No. 79-2026). The

opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery

Division, which is not officially reported, has been re-

produced in Appendix B to the appellants’ jurisdictional

statement.

Jurisdiction

The opinion and order of the Supreme Court of New

Jersey which is the subject of this cross petition was

issued on March 26, 1980. On June 24, 1980, the cross

petitioner applied for an extension of time within which

to file this cross petition. This application was granted

on June 25, 1980 by order of Mr. Justice Brennan extend-

ing the time to file this cross petition until July 24, 1980.

Although the cross petition invokes the jurisdiction of

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(3), it is the posi-

tion of the cross petitioner, for the reasons set forth

in Point I of his motion to dismiss the appeal filed by

appellants-cross respondents, that the opinion and order

of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is not a final judg-

ment for the purposes of conferring jurisdiction upon

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $1257. However, if the

Court concludes that those parts of the case decided

hy the Supreme Court of New Jersey are sufficiently sepa-

rate and distinct from that part remanded so as to be

characterized as final, it is submitted that that conclusion

necessarily would extend to the questions which the cross

3

petitioner seeks to have reviewed. In fact, although the

Privileges and Immunities claim on which the appellants-

cross respondents seek to appeal is the same issue as is the

subject of the remand, the claims of the cross petitioner

that the 1962 agreement between New York and New Jer-

sey is enforceable against the appellants-cross respondents

even though it did not receive congressional approval and

that this agreement requires the Emergency Transporta-

tion Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the “ETT”’)

to be sustained are not involved in the remand. There-

fore, the arguments that the Supreme Court of New Jer-

sey’s rejection of these claims is a final judgment are,

if anything, stronger than the finality arguments pres-

ented by the appellants-cross respondents in their Juris-

dictional Statement.

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Involved

New Jersey Emergency Transportation Tax Act,

N.J.S.A. 54:8A-1 to 57.

Reported in Appendix C to Jurisdictional Statement.

United States Constitution, Art. IV, §2, el. 1.

“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all

Priviliges and Immunities of Citizens in the several

States.”

United States Constitution, Art. I, $10, el. 3.

“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,

... enter into any Agreement or Compact with an-

other State...”

4

Statement of the Case

The general procedural history of the case and the facts

material to the issues presented by this cross petition are

set forth in the Statement of the Case in the motion to

dismiss.

The claim that the ETT is properly designed to im-

pose upon nonresidents a fair share of the costs of in-

terstate transportation facilities was raised in paragraph

4 of cross petitioner’s answer and in his brief in opposition

to cross respondents’ summary judgment motion dated Oc-

tober 28, 1977 at page 21, et seq. The contention was

accepted by the trial court (see App. B at 51-55) but, as

more fully discussed in the motion to dismiss, the Su-

preme Court of New Jersey has concluded that a plenary

trial must be conducted to properly evaluate this claim

(App. A at 17-27).

The claim that the agreement between New York and

New Jersey is invalid because not entered into in con-

formity with the Compact Clause of the United States

Constitution (Art. I, $10, el. 3) was raised by cross

respondents by letter dated March 10, 1978 to the trial

court. This argument was explicitly rejected by the trial

court (App. B at 56). Although cross respondents seem-

ingly abandoned this claim in their appellate brief, the

Supreme Court of New Jersey nonetheless held that the

1962 agreement could not be relied upon in defending

the ETT because it was not entered into in conformity

with the Compact Clause (App. A at 27-31). The issue

was therefore expressly passed upon by the State’s high-

est court and may be reviewed by the Court. Raley v.

Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 486 (1959).

The claim that the 1962 agreement between the states

satisfies the obligations of the Privileges and Immunities

Clause was explicitly raised by the cross petitioner in its

5

reply memorandum to the trial court dated February 17,

1978 at page 22, et seq. This argument was accepted by the

trial court (App. B at 56-57). However, the Supreme

Court of New Jersey did not reach this issue because it

ruled, as noted in the preceding paragraph, that the

agreement was invalid because not entered into in con-

formity with the Compact Clause. Under these circum-

stances the Court normally will decline to consider an

issue as a matter of policy and instead remand the case

for initial consideration of the issue by the lower court,

but this restriction is not jurisdictional in nature and

thus the Court may reach the issue if it is deemed ap-

propriate. See N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.

132, 163-164 (1975).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

POINT I

If the Court notes probable jurisdiction to consider

the claim of the appellants-cross respondents that the

Emergency Transporation Tax Act violates the Privi-

leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United

States Constitution, it should grant the cross petition in

order to be able to review the entire case.

As indicated in the motion to dismiss, it is the posi-

tion of the cross petitioner that the remand order from

which the appeal and cross petition have been taken is

not a final judgment subject to appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1257. Furthermore, even if the remand order

could be characterized as final, the cross petitioner also

urges that the decision of the Supreme Court of New

Jersey, that the existing record is inadequate, does not

present a substantial constitutional question warranting

review by the Court. However, in the event the Court

finds the remand order to be a final judgment and con-

cludes that the case presents a substantial constitutional

question in its present procedural posture, it is impera-

tive that the Court consider the entire case rather than

solely the portion of the case which would be placed before

it by the appeal.

Since the Supreme Court of New Jersey remanded the

case for further proceedings, the sole effect of an affirm-

ance of the order sought to be appealed would be to per-

mit the proceedings on remand to go forward, For the

Court to review the trial court’s determination that the

constitutionality of the ETT can be upheld based upon

the existing record the Court also would have to grant

the cross petition.

It also should be noted that the record and ease auth-

ority upon which the cross petitioner would rely in urging

that the validity of the ETT can be upheld on the exist-

ing record is the same as that which will be relied upon

by the appellants-cross respondents. Therefore, it would

require no greater expenditure of resources of the Court

or the parties if the Court also grants the cross petition

in the event probable jurisdiction is noted.

Furthermore, the existing record provides a sufficient

foundation upon which the constitutionality of the ETT

can be sustained. The record developed before the trial

court contains competent proof that nonresidents receive

a direct benefit from the tax and that the tax burden upon

those nonresidents is not unreasonable. The record shows

that nonresidents who work in New Jersey impose a sub-

stantial burden on the State’s transportation system, that

New Jersey incurs substantial costs in the construction

and maintenance of that system and that without the ETT

nonresidents would not pay their fair share of those costs.

The record also shows that there is no inequity in the

taxes generally paid by nonresidents under the ETT com-

pared with the overall taxes paid by New Jersey resi-

dents. In short, it is the position of the State that there

is ample credible evidence in the record to support the

trial court’s conclusion that the taxes imposed upon non-

residents by the ETT are fairly related to the benefits

they derive from New Jersey. Consequently, if probable

jurisdiction is noted the Court should also have before it

the arguments which support the appellee’s-cross peti-

tioner’s position that the ET'T is consistent with the re-

quirements of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of

Article IV.

POINT II

The decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey,

that the 1962 Agreement between New York and New

Jersey is unenforceable against the cross respondents

because it did not receive congressional approval pur-

suant to Article I, §10, Cl. 3 of the United States Con-

stitution, is irreconcilable with the Court’s decision in

United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission,

434 U.S. 452 (1978).

In United States Steel Corp. vy. Multistate Tax Com-

mission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), the Court squarely held that

reciprocal legislation between two or more states provid-

ing for the apportionment or allocation of taxes payable

by taxpayers with multi-state contacts may be validly en-

acted without the consent of Congress pursuant to the

Compact Clause of the United States Constitution (Art.

I, $10, el. 3). The compact which was upheld was re-

markably similar in subject matter and purposes to the

8

accord at issue here. Both agreements seek interstate

coordination of tax policy toward taxpayers with ties to

more than one state, in the interests of equity and con-

venience. Specifically, the four stated purposes of the

Multistate Tax Compact are equally applicable to the

1962 Accord: equitable apportionment uniformity, con-

venience, and the avoiding of duplicative tax liability.

Id. at 456.

The Court in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate

Tax Commission reiterated the established doctrine that

the strictures of the Compact Clause apply only to those

interstate agreements that transfer state sovereignty “in

a way that encroaches wpon the supremacy of the United

States.” Id. at 472 (emphasis added). The Court found

that an agreement by which the states seek to coordinate

the operation of their tax laws with respect to taxpayers

with multistate contacts does not in any way encroach

upon the sovereignty of the United States and therefore

does not require congressional approval. In light of the

close similarities in purpose and effect between the Com-

pact upheld in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate

Tax Commission, supra, and the 1962 Accord between

New York and New Jersey, the Supreme Court of New

Jersey should have recognized that the 1962 Accord could

be fully effective without congressional approval.

However, in holding that because “. . . no [congressional]

approval was given, the Accord cannot be relied on by

the State here as an enforceable agreement”, the court

confused the question whether New York is free to with-

draw from the 1962 agreement (which it has never done)

with the question whether the agreement is binding upon

taxpayers such as the cross respondents so long as it

remains in effect. The power of New York to withdraw

from the 1962 Accord is not in issue in this case.

Rather, the question is whether the agreement is bind-

9

ing upon taxpayers so long as it remains in effect. And

on this latter question, the Court in United States Steel

Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission squarely held that

two or more states may enter into an agreement relat-

ing to the apportionment of tax revenues which would

be binding upon taxpayers without securing congressional

approval. See also, Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 586

(1953) (Illinois highway use tax exemption for nonresi-

dents does not require congressional approval where the

states of the nonresidents reciprocally grant similar tax

exemptions to citizens of Illinois). Therefore, the Su-

preme Court of New Jersey was simply wrong in con-

cluding that the 1962 Accord is unenforceable against

the cross respondents because not enacted in conformity

with the Compact Clause.

POINT III

The Emergency Transportation Tax is consistent with

the principles of federalism which the Privileges and

Immunities Clause of Article IV is designed to serve,

because it is imposed and collected pursuant to a 1962

Agreement between the states of New York and New

Jersey which provides for the coordination of the tax

laws of the two states by equitably apportioning tax

revenues from individuals who reside in one state and

earn their income in the other while avoiding the im-

position of double taxation.

A reciprocal arrangement between two states to fairly

allocate the financial burdens of government between citi-

zens who reside in one state and work in the other, with-

out imposing any additional overall tax burden on an in-

dividual simply because he chooses to work outside the

10

state where he resides, is fully consistent with the ob-

jectives sought to be achieved by the Privileges and Im-

munities Clause of Article IV. This provision, “. . .

which ‘appears in the so-called States’ Relations Article,

the same Article that embraces the Full Faith and Credit

Clause, the Extradition Clause ... the provisions for the

admission of new States, the Territory and Property

Clause, and the Guarantee Clause,’ Baldwin v. Montana

I’ish and Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978), ‘estab-

lishes a norm of comity.’ Austin v. New Hampshire, 420

U.S. 656, 660 (1975), that is to prevail among the States

with respect to their treatment of each other’s residents.”

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523-524 (1978). The opin.

ion of the Court in Austin v. New Hampshire, supra, re-

affirmed the view that the primary purpose of this Clause

was the maintenance of proper relations between sovereign

states in a federal union:

“The Privileges and Immunities Clause, by making

noncitizenship or nonresidence an improper basis

for locating a special burden, implicates not only

the individual’s right to nondiscriminatory treat-

ment but also, perhaps more so, the structural

balance essential to the concept of federalism.” 420

U.S. at 662.

Therefore, while invalidating New Hampshire’s unilteral

action in imposing a tax on Maine residents—described

in Pennsylvama v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 662 (1976),

as a “beggar-thy-neighbor tax”—the Court was careful to

point out that the Privileges and Immunities Clause would

not require the invalidation of tax on nonresidents which

was part of a reciprocal arrangement between the state

of domicile and the state of employment:

“Neither Travis nor the present case should be

taken in. any way to denigrate the value of re-

11

ciprocity in such matters. The evil at which they

are aimed is the unilateral imposition of a dis-

advantage upon nonresidents, not reciprocally favor-

able treatment of nonresidents by States that co-

ordinate their tax laws.” 420 U.S. at 667, n. 12.*

Therefore, it is clear that the Privileges and Immunities

Clause of Article IV does not preclude sovereign states

in the federal system, each acting in the interests of its

own citizens, from entering into agreements which estab-

lish a fair system for the imposition of taxes upon citi-

zens with multi-state contacts.

* The cross respondents have argued previously that this quo-

tation does not support the valicity of the ETT because the ETT

does not accord them “favorable treatment”. This argument is falla-

cious for several reasons. First, it is strongly arguable that the

agreement does assure individuals in cross respondents’ situation

more favorable tax treatment than they otherwise might receive.

Since the State of New York may constitutionally suject cross

respondents to tax on the full amount of their income wherever

earned (Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 280-281

(1932) and it is not disputed that cross respondents may be taxed

pursuant to the New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act to the full ex-

tent of their New Jersey income, cross respondents have an ex-

posure to double taxation on their New Jersey income which the

agreement between the states serves to avoid. Furthermore, if the

avoidance of possible double taxation is not recognized as “favor-

able treatment”, it is still clear that the ETT does not impose any

disadvantage upon cross respondents but rather, at worst, simply

has a neutral effect upon them, since the amount of taxes which

they pay to New Jersey under the ETT is identical to what they

otherwise would be required to pay New York. A reciprocal ar-

rangement which has a neutral effect on the overall tax obligations

of a nonresident who works in another state is fully consistent with

the principles of federalism which the Privileges and Immunities

Clause of Article IV was designed to serve.

12

The trial court found as a fact that the States of New

York and New Jersey had entered into a reciprocal ar-

rangement in 1962 regarding the taxation of individuals

who reside in one of the states and work in the other.

It found that “[t]here was in 1962 and there continued

thereafter an arrangement between the States of New

York and New Jersey, their governors and their legis-

lators which accepted as valid the tax situation now

being challenged” (App. B at 51); “. .. that the 1962

Accord between the two states and the actions and in-

actions of the parties thereafter through 1975 represented

a reciprocal understanding, compact or the like between

the legislative and executive branches of these two states”

(App. B at 56); and that “[nJeither governor has taken

formal action to rescind the limited part of the accord

not dependent on legislative action, nor have they even

made a statement which would challenge the validity of

the arrangement” (App. B at 57).

There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to

support the trial court’s findings. When New Jersey first

enacted the Emergency Transportation Tax Act in 1961,

the incidents of the tax fell exclusively upon New Jersey

residents. However, New York was‘apparently dissatis-

fied with the fiscal consequences of the reciprocal credit-

ing provisions of the ETT and the New York Personal

Income Tax, so appropriate steps were initiated to re-

verse the incidence of the taxes of the respective states.

The New York Legislature enacted chapter 2 of the Laws

of 1962 by which it repealed the tax credit previously

afforded nonresidents for taxes paid to their state of

residence and at the same time extended a credit to its

own residents for taxes paid to the state in which they

work. By chapter 70 of the Laws of 1962, the New Jer-

sey Legislature enacted similar complementary amend-

13

merts to the ETT. The practical effect of these legis-

lative enactments by the two states was to change the

interstate taxing system of New York and New Jersey

from one in which each state imposed a tax on its own

residents to one in which each state imposed a tax on the

residents of the other state who commuted to work in the

taxing state.

This reciprocal legislative action by the legislatures of

the two states set the essential framework for the May

6, 1962 agreement between Governors Rockefeller and

Hughes. Indeed, paragraph 2 of the agreement is simply

an announcement by Governor Rockefeller “, . . that New

York, wnder legislation enacted at the 1962 legislative

session, will allow its residents a credit against their

New York State personal income taxes for income taxes

paid to New Jersey under the New Jersey Emergency

Transportation Tax Act enacted in 1961, as amended”

(App. B at 44) (emphasis added). Similarly, paragraph

3 of the agreement announced the intent of Governor

Hughes to submit to the New Jersey Legislature the bill

which was enacted less than a month later as chapter 70.

Complementary to those basic legislative provisions, the

remaining paragraphs of the agreement set forth mutual

agreements by the states not to participate in contesting

the taxes imposed by the two laws and to assist and co-

operate in the administration and enforcement of the two

laws. Therefore, the 1962 Accord represented a solemn

reciprocal undertaking between the legislative and execu-

tive branches of the respective states.

Furthermore, this agreement remains intact today. The

New York Legislature has not sought to repeal the tax

credit extended to its residents for taxes paid to New

Jersey. And the New Jersey Legislature has adhered to

New Jersey’s essential obligation under the 1962 Accord

14

by continuing in effect the credit afforded its residents

for taxes paid to New York. Similarly, neither governor

has taken formal action to rescind the limited part of the

accord not dependent on legislative action. Therefore,

assuming arguendo that either state could unilaterally

withdraw from the 1962 Aceord, the plain fact is that

neither state has attempted to do so.

The cross respondents seek to cireumvent the provisions

of the 1962 Accord by arguing that this case involves

individual rights which are beyond the power of the states

to address by reciprocal executive and legislative action.

However, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is found

in Article 1V of the Constitution dealing with the rela-

tions among states. Therefore, “[t]he primary purpose

of this clause, like the clauses between which it is located—-

those relating to full faith and eredit and to interstate

extradition of fugitives from justice—was to help fuse

into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign

States.” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).

The legal import of the 1962 Accord is not that a state

‘in concert with another state may limit the constitutional

rights of an individual. Rather, the Accord represents a

practical resolution by the legislatures and executives of

New York and New Jersey of the problems of taxation

of individuals who work in one of the states and reside

in the other, without increasing the total tax burden of

the cross respondents or any of the other commuters

similarly situated. Therefore, if the Court notes prob-

able jurisdiction it also should grant the cross petition

in order to consider the effect of the 1962 Accord upon

the E'TT’s conformity with the principles of federal-

ism which the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article

IV was designed to serve.

15

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that for the foregoing

reasons the cross petition for writ of certiorari should

be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Joun J. Deanan,

Attorney General of New Jersey,

Attorney for Cross Petitioner,

Sidney Glaser, Director of the

Division of Taxation, Department

of the Treasury of the State of

New Jersey,

State House Annex,

Trenton, New Jersey 08625.

STEPHEN SKILLMAN,

Assistant Attorney General,

Of Counsel and on the Petition.