Jurisdictional Statement — National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
Supreme Court brief1980
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: Supreme ae U.S.
ED
JUL 23 1989
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
80-98
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Terra, 1980
CLIFFORD ROGERS AND VIRGINIA ROGERS,
Appellants,
v
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,
NATIONAL WOOD PRESERVERS, INC.,
Appellees.
TOWNSHIP OF HAVERFORD, Intervenor.
On Appeal From the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
APPELLANTS’ JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.
James S. KILPATRICK, JR.,
15 Rittenhouse Place,
Ardmore, Pa. 19003
(215) 649-5200
Attorney for —
Cliffor ciiiee and
Virginia Rogers.
International Printing Co., 711 So. 50th St., Phila., Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-8711
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Opinions BELOW ........... Santee ha 6 es CURRIE CR EReIEN
III ii oink cs wip eee deus oo tks been ed heeeeeasaes
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .........esceecceeeeeees
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......eee0008 eves bbe sbebeneeate
The Adjudication of the Environmental Hearing Board
The Commonwealth Court Decision ..................
Removal Cost Information Submitted With Request for
Continuation of Supersedeas ...............0000-
Proceedings in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court .......
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Decision ..........
THE SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTIONS ........+0..eeeeeees
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Has Misconstrued Prior
Holdings of This and Other Courts in Dismissing
Appellant's Contention That the Statute Is Unduly
sb METRE OTT CTT ee ae
The Government Is Not Merely Regulating Past or
Present “Use” of the Property by the Party to Be
Charged With Liability, But Rather Is Taking Re-
sources From the Most Expedient Source at Hand
The Statute Imposes Strict Liability Upon a Land Owner
or Occupier for the Illegal Act of a Third Person
Without Any Requirements on the State to Proceed
Against the Third Person Who Created the Polluting
CIE ink ca cdines dcqnskenceeconeeeeee
The Strict Vicarious Liability Is Being Imposed Retro-
MEE 6 evi CHA ce eee eee
The Statute, as Applied, Has Harsh Consequences Which
Impair the Contractual Expectations of Occupiers of
Land Such as Short Term Tenants and Will Have
Serious Impact on the Expectations of Past Pur-
CRUNE OF WG PONE on 55k eckson caiieaueeks
18
20
22
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued).
Page
The Provision of the Statute Which Gives Unlimited Dis-
cretion to the Law Enforcement Agency With Re-
spect to What May Be Required by Way of Com-
pliance Is Subject to Abuse ............sesseseee 26
The Selective Enforcement Techniques Being Used in the
Enforcement of This Statute, as Illustrated in This
Case Are Onerous and Oppressive and May Well
Rise to a Level of Denial of Equal Protection Under
Peeve CE re iseperdhdddsa vir cicrn tie sees 27
Nee ee phew edoouedelceeaas ones 29
TABLE OF CITATIONS.
Cases: | , Page
Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 98 S. Ct.
eae. Oe tas te BR FE Ce 5 oie hs cn 62 ie tee 24
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 346 U. S. 346, 74 S. Ct. 92, 98 L. Ed. 51 (1953) 17
Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A. 2d
Re Poe e ny Ur Perey Prey Peer 24
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 VU. S. 665,
40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974) ........0cceee. 18
Causby v. United States, 328 U. S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90
ae ED Sp veh ek con ewian ren esnaeienenteris 21
Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284, 91 S. Ct.
i |} ee Hig ahs Giese a eaadsaeass 4
Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78, 32 S. Ct. 31, 56 L. Ed. 102
Gt BR ra er me er ere ee ee rn a eee 26
F. H. A. v. The Darlington, 358 U. S. 84, 79 S. Ct. 141, 3
Ee 6 eR Ty red Pee eer ey reer F 25
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 8 L. Ed. 2d
OO ee ls ED 5 ec eV oR scab oud tyes cin ck 17, 22
Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States, 573 F. 2d 1303 (3rd Cir.,
DE Siss5 + Cav nav Chee bubba nae or ecind peeanee ee) 23
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 60 L. Ed, 348, 36 S. Ct.
SP RAE) + past ache sence waeee ths eae eer ee Lse eee 17, 20
Hancock Natioaal Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 S. Ct.
ek Oe Ee. Be Wee LEE ei habeas tiesdencecetiesrsi 4
Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, Ky., 173 U. S.
592, 19 S. Ct. 553, 43 L. Ed. 823 (1899) .............. 4
In Re National Wood Preservers, Inc., 64 D. & C. 2d 78
TN oti ea ec earn ae ee ee: 1,9
Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 1294, 92
his Fe REE? ab Lekenge ce keses aber ces 25
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Redford, 295 U. S. 555,
55 S. Ct. 854, 79 L. Ed. 1503 (1935) ...........se000 25
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 48 S. Ct. 246, 72 L. Ed. 568
CE o dek Veh akichna bo eed ed VLMa n ee nc core es 17, 21
TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).
Cases (Continued): Page
National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, Department of Resources, — Pa. —, 414 A. 2d
NE al es adn HS ea sp eletbid ens od bee Codadien 13
Penn Central Transpertation Co. v. New York, 438 U. S. 104,
98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978) .............. 21, 22
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S, 393, 43 S. Ct. 158,
Oe SED Cac yisce chee ve bles aeaksereeees 20
Portland Pipe Line v. Environmental Improvement Commis-
sion, 414 U. S. 1035, 94 S. Ct. 532, 38 L. Ed. 2d 326, dis-
missing appeal for want of a substantial federal question,
ee CE HO, 5 cb. ore FRET ACR bbs vas bsbues 22, 23
Queenside Hills Realty Co., Inc. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80, 90
i CRED fo cevedgehewnvesttcenbbaeddecdees 17, 22
Railroad Retirement Board vy. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U. S.
330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468 (1935) ............. 24
United States v. General Motors Corporation, 403 F. Supp.
Ce a, Se Co ce vis pasa ct needs coast sheveyi 17
United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F. 2d 1305 (7th
ES AT PEC DT y iter Teen ney ae 17
United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F, 2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978) 17
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 49 L, Ed. 2d
ee LOPE ee 0d sdb Ki eanrekeeanb ccs 24
Statutes:
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22, 1937, P. L.
EE 65s nS ede se cessereineenevive ssc 1 et seq.
Be ges EE ich accuiéaes <b 0be bad nes ecrsedes ce dte 4
16A C, J. S. Constitutional Law, Section 661 .............. 18
United States Constitution:
cca edcdbavds boas eetacsacaees 4,5,14
Authorities:
J. L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36
CREE, 04 pres 5:06.54 Sp VORITEESS A REVENUES ROSE EN On 0 20
OPINIONS BELOW.
The Opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
dated April 24, 1980, affirming the Orders of the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania, is reported at — Pa.
—, 414 A. 2d 37 (1980) and is found in the Appendix
at A-l. The Opinion of the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, dated May 24, 1978, affirming in part and
reversing in part the Adjudication and Order of the
Environmental Hearing Board, is reported at 35 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 443, 387 A. 2d 142 (1978) and is
found in the Appendix at A-25. The Adjudication and
Order of the Environmental Hearing Board, dated July
30, 1976, is unreported and is found in the Appendix at
A-48. A prehearing Opinion of the Environmental Hear-
ing Board denying a Petition to Join Samuel Jacoby as an
additional defendant is reported as of In Re National
Wood Preservers, Inc., 64 D. & C. 2d 78 (1974) and is
found in the Appendix at A-91.
JURISDICTION.
The Act of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987, known as the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, was enacted in 1937.
In 1965, that law was amended to include Section 316
which gave the State the power to order a landowner or
occupier to give access to the land so as to enable the
Commonwealth or its appropriate agency to enter upon
the land and eliminate a condition of pollution.
Section 316 itself was amended on July 31, 1970, so
as to further broaden and extend the powers of the Com-
monwealth to eliminate a condition of pollution by allow-
ing the Commonwealth to elect to place responsibility for
such elimination upon the landowners and occupiers with-
out consideration of fault and solely by virtue of their
status as landowners and occupiers. Section 316 now
provides in part as follows:
“691.316 Responsibility of Landowners and Land
Occupiers
Whenever the Sanitary Water Board finds that pollu-
2 Jurisdiction
tion or a danger of pollution is resulting from a con-
dition which exists on land in the Commonwealth,
the Board may order the landowner or occupier to
correct the condition in a manner satisfactory to the
Bourd or it may order such owner or occupier to allow
a mine operator or other person or agency of the
Commonwealth access to the land to take such action.
For the purpose of this se¢tion, “landowner” includes
any persons holding title to or having a proprietary
interest in either surface or subsurface rights.” [Act
of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987 Article III, Sec. 316 as
amended July 31, 1970, P. L. 653, 35 P. S. Sec.
691.316]
This Appeal has its origins in three identical Enforce-
ment Orders issued by the Appellee, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources
(hereinafter referred to as “DER”) to National Wood
Preservers, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Wood” ), Shell
Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as “Shell”) and
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation (hereinafter re-
ferred to as “Gum”). The Enforcement Orders directed
each of the above entities to take action to eliminate a
condition of pollution on the properties which they owned
or occupied. Gum was a property owner and Wood and
Shell were lessees of the Appellants, Clifford E. and
Virginia Rogers.
DER stated that the properties involved were subject
to a contaminant consisting of creosote containing penta-
chlorophenol and that it was entering into a stream known
as “Naylor’s Run”. Under those Orders, the original three
entities were directed to proceed to locate the area of the
pollutant, develop plans for removal, and then to remove
the contaminant from ground and surface waters so as to
restore the waters to their natural quality. (See Orders
of DER dated July 12, 1973, found in the Appendix at
A-116 & A-118.) Subsequently, on September 21, 1973, a
Jurisdiction 3
similar Order was issued to Appellants Clifford A. and
Virginia Rogers (hereinafter referred to as “Rogers” )
(R. 3la, 32a). All of the persons and entities, including
Appellants, filed timely appeals from the Orders with the
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (hereinafter
referred to as “Board”) and all such Appeals were con-
solidated for hearing.
After lengthy and protracted hearings, the Board, by
Adjudication and Order dated July 30, 1976, sustained
the Appeals in part and dismissed other parts thereof.
[See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing Board dated
July 30, 1976, Appendix at A-48].
Appellants Rogers and all other entities and persons
filed timely Appeals from the Adjudication and Order to
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. These various
Appeals were consolidated by the Court, and a Super-
sedeas was granted. After filing of briefs and oral argu-
ment, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued
an Opinion and Order sustaining in full the Appeals of
Gum and Shell and dismissing the Appeals as to Wood
and Rogers. [See Opinion and Order of the Common-
wealth Court, Appendix at A-25).
Appellants Rogers on June 23, 1978, filed a timely
Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania seeking a review of the Opinion and
Order of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Similar Petitions for Allowance of Appeal were filed by
Wood and DER. After consideration of the Petitions,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on February 16, 1979,
granted the Petitions for Allowance of Appeal and the
matters were consolidated for Argument on Appeal.
After the filing of briefs and oral Argument, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on April 24, 1980, issued
its Opinion and Final Judgment in this case dismissing the
Appeal of the DER as being not timely filed and sustain-
ing and affirming the Opinion and Orders of the Common-
4 Jurisdiction
wealth Court of Pennsylvania as to Appellants Rogers
and Wood.
The principal attack of Appellants Rogers at all stages
of these proceedings has been that Section 316 of the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act of July 31, 1970, P. L. No.
222, 35 Pa. Stat. Anno. $91.316 violated the due process
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in that it subjected them to an uncon-
stitutional burden without consideration of fault merely by
virtue of their status as landowners.
A timely notice of Appeal to this Court was filed with
the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
on July 10, 1980, and it is found in the Appendix at A-107.
Your Honorable Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 1257(2). This Appeal lies directly
with your Honorable Court since the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, the highest Court of that Commonwealth,
has upheld the provisions of Section 316 of the Pennsyl-
vania Clean Streams Law as against a challenge that it is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Appellants
Rogers. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 29 L. Ed. 2d
284, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971).
It is noted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
declined to rule on a specific challenge to the constitution-
ality of Section 316 on the basis of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and other state grounds.
That Court rather, elected to rule directly upon the chal-
lenge of Appellants Rogers to Section 316 pursuant to the
due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States of America. That Court has, thus, enter-
tained and ruled adversely to the Appellants Rogers that
Section 316 is constitutional. By virtue of that ruling,
your Honorable Court has jurisdiction to hear an Appeal
of this case. 28 U. S. C. 1257(2); Hancock National
Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 S. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed.
619 (1900); Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson,
Ky., 173 U. S. 592, 19 S. Ct. 553, 43 L. Ed. 823 (1899).
Question Presented 5
It is by virtue of that jurisdiction rather than certiorari
jurisdiction that this matter comes before your Honorable
Court as a matter of right.
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
Has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania engaged in
an unduly oppressive exercise of its “police power” in
violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, where the Penn-
sylvania Clean Streams Law was amended subsequent to
the acquisition of land by an owner so as to impose lia-
bility upon the owner solely by virtue of the status of
landowner to remove and eradicate, at an unlimited cost,
a condition of pollution not created by the landowner
which is partially under the property owned by the land-
owner and which was created by the unlawful acts of a
third party to which unlawful creation the landowner has
not contributed and which has no reasonable connection
with the landowner’s ownership of the property?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This Appeal arises out of the ownership by Appellants
Rogers of a certain portion of land on the north and south
sides of Eagle Road between its intersection with Lawrence
Road on the west and Hillcrest Road on the east in Haver-
ford Township, Delaware County, Pennsylvania. That
property has been owned by the Appellants since the
1940’s (R. 187a). The Appellants have not engaged in
any business activity on their property since the 1940’s.
Since that time, the Appellants’ property has continuously
been occupied by tenants operating their own businesses
(R. 188a, 198a ).
On January 10, 1947, Appellants leased their land to
Samuel T. Jacoby and C. David Jacobs who ultimately
assigned their rights under the lease to National Wood
Preservers, Inc., a corporation which was controlled by
Jacoby. National Wood Preservers, Inc., by Jacoby, con-
6 Statement of the Case
ducted a wood preservative business on this parcel of land
between March 28, 1947 and July 30, 1963. National
Wood Preservers, Inc., by Jacoby, utilized a substance
known as pentachlorophenol in this wood preservative
business and during the course of the operation of this
business under Jacoby’s ownership waste liquids were dis-
charged or permitted to be discharged from the surface of
the land upon which said business was conducted to the
ground water via a well on the premises.
On July 30, 1963, Jacoby sold his entire interest in the
corporation to the Goldstein family and that family has
operated the wood preservative business on all or a portion
of the Appellants’ land to the present date. The present
Appellee, National Wood Preservers, Inc., is the corpora-
tion as owned, controlled and operated by the Goldstein
family.
On February 10, 1967, Wood released a portion of
the premises owned by Appellants from its leasehold and
on that date Appellants leased that portion to Shell. Shell
has operated and .maintained a gasoline service station
on the parcel of land at all times from that date to the
present time.
Gum owns and occupies land south of Eagle Road
and contiguous thereto. Intervenor Township of Haver-
ford is the local municipal government body in which all
of the land is located.
On July 12, 1973, the Department of Environmental
Resources issued orders with respect to Wood, Gum and
Shell directing each as owners or occupiers of the property
to develop engineering plan designed to remove the con-
taminants, pentachlorophenol and oil, which have been
located under the lands of the Appellants and the said
Appellees (R. 27a, 28a). On September 21, 1973, DER
issued an order with respect to Appellants requiring them
to: (1) define the specific geographical area in which the
pollutant is found; (2) prepare a profile of the ground
water table in the area in which the pollutant is found;
Statement of the Case 7
and (3) formulate a proposal to remove the pollutant.
All Appellees and Appellants filed timely appeals to the
Environmental Hearing Board.
The evidence, submitted on behalf of Wood, demon-
strates that the accumulation of pentachlorophenol and
oil allegedly existing on the Appellants’ land was created
by Wood through the actions of its former president and
sole stockholders, Samuel T. Jacoby (R. 376a). A Petition,
filed by Shell, sought to join Jacoby as an additional de-
fendant (R. 179a). However, that Petition to join was
denied (R. 179a). Thirteen hearings were held before
Louis R. Salamon, Esquire, Hearing Examiner for the
Environmental Hearing Board. During these hearings it
was stipulated that the orders issued by DER were based
on Section 316 of the Clean Streams Act of July 22, 1937,
as amended (35 P. S. 691.316) (R. 187a). While the
specific area of contamination was never defined, it al-
legedly existed far beyond the properties owned by the
Appellants (R. 508a, 509a). During these hearings, no
evidence was produced by DER or any other Appellee as
to the Appellants Rogers having caused the pollution in
any way or ever having knowledge of the same.
At the conclusion of the hearings before the Examiner
and after deliberation, the Board entered an Adjudication
and Order in which it specifically found that Wood, under
Jacoby, had created the pollution condition; however, it
ordered the Appellants and the other Appellees to proceed
in accordance with its modification of DER’s Order.
The Adjudication of the Environmental Hearing Board.
The Board found that the pentachlorophenal in ques-
tion was under the surface of the property lease by Appel-
lants Rogers to Shell and Wood; that this pentachloro-
phenol flowed southwesterly under Eagle Road, a highway
owned and maintained by the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, and that thereafter it infiltrated under the surface
of property owned by Gum into a storm sewer pipe on
8 Statement of the Case
the property of Cum, maintained by Intervenor, Township
of Haverford, and that the pentachlorophenol traveled
through the storm sewer pipe and was discharged at its
terminus into Naylor’s Run. [See Adjudication of Environ-
mental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976, Finding of
Fact 72, A-70].
The Board determined that the pentachlorophenal is
under the property owned and maintained by the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and the Township of Haver-
ford and by landowners or occupiers, the identity of whom
or which were not disclosed in the proceedings before it.
[See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing Board, dated
July 30, 1976, Finding of Fact 74(b), A-70—A-71]}.
It found also that in order to determine the volume of
pentachlorophenol under the surface of the property
owned or leased to Appellees, including Wood and how
widely the pentachlorophenol was disbursed thereunder,
many more wells would have to be drilled on the property
to the water table and additional samples from these wells
taken. [See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing
Board, dated July 30, 1976, Finding of Fact 76, A-71].
It found finally that it was impossible to assess the
cost uf the removal program until further drilling, testing
and sampling was completed; and, that the participation
of landowners and occupiers, in addition to the Appellants,
would be necessary in order to complete the drilling, test-
ing and removal program. [See Adjudication of Environ-
mental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976, Finding of
Fact 78 and 79, A-72].
All Appellants challenged the constitutionality of
Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law on the basis that it
was unconstitutional since it punishes a “status” and re-
quired them to assume responsibility to correct a condition
which none of them caused, created or were at fault in
continuing (R. 192-197; 33-3F ). They also challenged the
constitutionality of Section 316 on the grounds that it was
invalid ex post facto legislation (R. 192-197; 33-35).
Statement of the Case 9
As to all such attacks on the constitutionality of
Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law, the Environmental
Hearing Board ruled that it did not have the authority to
pass upon the constitutionality of Section 316 of the Clean
Streams Law and that it would assume the constitutionality
thereof for the purposes of its Adjudication. [See Ad-
judication of Environmental Hearing Board, dated July
30, 1976, A-48].
Appellants also argued and contended that the DER
was applying Section 316 in an unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory fashion particularly because of its failure to
include in the proceedings, Jacoby as the party who had
created the polluting condition and other property owners,
including the Township of Haverford and the State De-
partment of Highways, under whose property the polluting
condition was also found to exist. Prior to the hearings
before the Environmental Hearing Board, Shell had peti-
tioned to join Jacoby as an additional defendant, pursuant
to the State Civil Procedural Rules, on the basis that he
was the party responsible for causing the condition. DER
opposed this joinder and the Board sustained that position,
denying the Petition on the grounds that only DER had
the authority to bring Jacoby upon the record. In re
National Wood Preservers, 64 D. & C. 2d 78 (1974), A-91.
DER at no time sought to join Jacoby in those proceedings.
In its Adjudication, the Board in dismissing the con-
tentions of discriminatory enforcement, alluded to the
fact that Section 316 of the Clean Streams |.aw permitted
DER to ignore the issue of fault in proceeding to recover
clean-up costs. It stated:
«
. . Section 316 clearly authorizes the Department
to ignore the issue of fault, as it is done here, and
proceed against whoever owns or occupies land so as
to remedy a pollution problem as quickly as possible.
We might prefer a more delicate balancing of respon-
sibility in the Department's actions, but we cannot
10 Statement of the Case
say that their approach is unauthorized.” [Adjudi-
cation of Environmental Hearing Board, July 30,
1976, Footnote i3, A-84},
The Board also ruled that it would cure any problem
with respect to the issue of discriminatory enforcement by
restricting any Order against the Appellants to that they
would be required to take corrective measures only upon
property owned or occupied by them and would not be
required to take corrective action outside of the geographi-
cal boundaries of the property which they owned or oc-
cupied. [See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing
Board, dated July 30, 1976, A-48].
After disposing of all of the arguments raised by the
various Appellants in the proceedings before it, the Board
issued its Adjudication.
The Commonwealth Court Decision.
On Appeal, the Commonwealth Court ruled that Sec-
tion 316 could not constitutionally be applied to any of
the parties before the Board based solely upon their owner-
ship or occupancy of land. It stated:
“Applying these legal principles to the facts of this
case, we believe that requiring these Appellants to
spend the financial sums necessary to abate this con-
dition, based solely upon their ownership or occupancy
of land, would be to employ means unduly oppressive
upon these individuals. We believe that such an
exercise of police power would transcend ‘the parame-
ters of reason’. We believe that EHB’s conclusion
that Section 316 is a declaration of the strict liability
of these Appellants to correct the condition is errone-
ous as a matter of law because such a construction of
Section 316 would permit the Commonwealth to en-
gage in regulation which constitutes the taking of
property without compensation, and hence, would be
an unconstitutional exercise of police power.” [See
Opinion of Commonwealth Court, A-38—A-39]
Statement of the Case 11
The Court went on, however, to point out that:
“Where a statute can be given two constructions, one
of which will render it constitutional and the other
unconstitutional, the former construction must be
invoked.” [See Opinion of Commonwealth Court,
A-39]
Relying on this principle, the Court held that there was a
construction of Section 316 which:
“both comports with the law of public nuisance and
renders that section constitutional as applied to the
factual situation present in this case.” [See Opinion
of Commonwealth Court, A-39]
As stated by the Court, where a polluting condition
has been created by the conduct of an individual other
than an owner or occupier of land, that owner or occupier
can be ordered to take corrective measures if he permitted
or authorized the creation of the condition on its land.
Such an owner or occupier can also be ordered to take
corrective measures if after knowing of the existence of
the condition on his land, he engages in some affirmative
conduct indicating his adoption of the condition. The
Court stated in its Opinion:
“The key to imposing liability under Section 316 upon
an owner or occupier for the correction of a condition
which he did not create is that such an owner or
occupier, after knowing of the condition, engages in
some affirmative conduct indicating his adoption of
the condition. Essentially, this theory of liability for
owners or occupiers who do not create the condition
is an application to Section 316 of the Common law
liability of owners or occupiers who ‘continue’ or
‘adopt’ a nuisance not created by them. See 66C. J. S.
Nuisances Sections 83-89 (1950); 58 Am. Jur. Nui-
sances Sections 48-56 (1971).” [See Opinion of
Commonwealth Court, A-40]
12 Statement of the Case
The Commonwealth Court, in its Opinion, applied the
Common Law Doctrine of Nuisance so as to preserve the
constitutionality of Section 316 and it specifically found
that Appellants Rogers, by receiving rental from Wood,
adopted and ratified the illegal conduct. That Court, in
its Opinion, specifically found that there was no evidence
of Appellants Rogers having knowledge of the illegal
activities of Wood through its representative, Mr. Jacoby.
Following the Opinion and Order of the Common-
wealth Court, Appellants Rogers filed a Petition for Al-
lowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which was granted as of No. 67 January Term, 1979, and
which was consolidated with Appeals filed by Wood and
DER. ~—
Removal Cost Information Submitted With Request for
Continuation of Supersedeas.
After the Commonwealth Court had issued its Opinion
and while Wood’s Petition for Review was pending in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Wood filed with the Com-
monwealth Court, a Petition for Continuation of Super-
sedeas previously entered.
Among other allegations which were made apart of
the record subsequent to hearings before the Environ-
mental Hearing Board, that Petition pointed out the
following:
On October 28, 1976, the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency advised Wood that it was going to
remove the polluting condition. At that time, it believed
that the total cost of removal would range between Fifty
Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars and Two Hundred Thou-
sand ($200,000.00) Dollars.
On November 2, 1976, the EPA, using a private con-
tractor, commenced work on the site. Less than two (2)
months later, One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand
($118,000.00) Dollars of cost had been incurred. As of
June 2, 1977, the EPA had spent approximately One
Statement of the Case 13
Hundred and Eighty Thousand ($180,000.00) Dollars
and had discontinued major efforts to remove the jollutants
awaiting the outcome of these proceedings.
Wood, in this Petition, stated that it believed that
the One Hundred and Eighty Thousand ($180,000.00)
Dollars spent in the time that the EPA was on the site only
paid for the removal of a small amount of the pollutant
which Wood believes would be substantially in excess of
that sum.
On July 3, 1980, the Commonwealth Court ordered
that the Supersedeas should remain in effect “pending
disposition of the Appeal.”
Proceedings in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Appellants Rogers argued in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania that the Commonwealth Court had erred in
finding that they adopted the polluting condition by
affirmative conduct in receipt of rental payments submit-
ting that such conduct was so insubstantial and unrelated
to the illegal use of the property, that it did not constitute
in any way an adoption or ratification of the illegal con-
duct which in fact violated the lease with Wood signed
by Mr. Jacoby. It was further argued that Section 316
was unconstitutional as a violation of the due process pro-
vided under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its Opinion of
April 24, 1980, acknowledged that this was “a case of first
impression”, calling for the construction and a determina-
tion of the constitutionality of Section 316 of the Clean
Streams Law. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Resources, —
Pa, —, 414 A. 2d 37 (1980) [See Appendix at A-1].
“The principal questions presented by this appeal are
whether Section 316 authorizes the Department of
14 Statement of the Case
Environmental Resources to remedy water pollution
resulting from conditions other than mine drainage,
and whether Section 316 is a constitutional, exercise
of the Legislature’s police power.” [414 A. 2d at
page 39]
The Court first found that this section properly ap-
plied to pollution from conditions other than mine drain-
age. It then took up the question of the Statute’s con-
stitutionality, stating,
“Appellants’ second contention is that Section 316 of
The Clean Streams Law is an impermissible exercise
of the police power, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.” [414 A. 2d at page 42]
The Court then made clear that it would not decide
the case on State law concepts of “fault”, causation or the
theory of “adoption” articulated by the Commonwealth
Court, but rather would deal directly with the constitu-
tional question presented.
The Court stated that it disagreed with Appellant’s
argument, held Section 316 to be a constitutional exercise
of the State’s police power:
“We disagree. First it is absolutely clear that the
corrective orders here are based on much more than
mere ownership or occupancy. As discussed above,
they are based upon legislation designed to eliminate
all water pollution, and the Environmental Hearing
Board's findings that a substance, determined to be
pollution, redies under appellant’s land and can
feasibly be removed. There is thus a reasonable and
concrete basis for the corrective orders here.” [414
A. 2d at page 45]
Statement of the Case 15
The concurring opinion of Justice Flaherty stated that
the majority opinion was actually providing for an un-
constitutional imposition of liability, based solely on
ownership or occupancy of property. He, therefore, con-
curred only in the result since he accepted the theory of
“adoption” articulated by the Commonwealth Court. He
said:
“A reading of the majority opinion might lead to the
belief that we adopt the strict liability construction
of Section 316 which would compel the expenditure
of financial sums by an owner or occupancy (sic) of
land based on no other factor but the ownership or
occupancy of the land.” [414 A. 2d at page 47,
Concurring Opinion, A-21] (Emphasis added)
° o °
Justice Flaherty then stated his belief that an exercise
of the police power had to be associated with the use to
which one puts his property and not his mere ownership
or occupancy. He said:
“It has always been recognized that the ‘right’ of
property ownership carrier with it a concurrent ‘obli-
gation’ which is inherent in the basis relationship of
an ‘owner of property to society. These ‘obligations’,
however, have always related to the use one puts to
property, not mere ownership. To construe the sub-
ject Act as providing for strict liability, based on
nothing more than the ownership or occupation of
land, would be to impose on innocent individuals,
the burden which should be borne by society as a
whole, thus, an unconstitutional taking. I, thus, con-
cur only in the result.” [414 A. 2d at page 48; Con-
curring Opinion, emphasis added, A-23—A-24]
Notice of Appeal from the Court’s Judgment to the
Supreme Court of the United States was filed with the
Lower Court on July 10, 1980.
16 The Substantial Federal Questions
THE SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTIONS.
Appellants Rogers challenged the constitutionality of
Section 316 of The Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States asserting that it violates due process in that
it imposes unlimited liability upon them for the removal
of a pollution condition from their property which con-
dition they did not creat or adopt solely by virtue of their
status as landowners. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, in affirming the constitutionality of Section 316,
based upon mere status as an owner and the geographical
location of a polluting condition, has so drastically in-
fringed upon the personal and property rights of the
Appellants Rogers as to be oppressive.
If Section 316 based upon the decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania were to be applied in the event
there had been an escape of radioactive material from
“Three Mile Island” which contaminated the ground water
and stream on an owner's property, it would require the
owner, who was blameless, to expend an unlimited sum
of money to remove that radioactive pollution. To apply
such a statute in the State of New York would allow those
owners of property in the vicinity of “The Love Canal” to
be required to bear the unlimited cost of removing the
toxic pollutants which they did not even know existed let
alone were they responsible for their creation. The effect
of Section 316 is clearly to allow a state, in this instance
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to ignore fault in de-
termining responsibility for the clean-up of polluting con-
ditions. It allows a state to merely impose by order, the
responsibility solely by virtue of the status of landowner
or land occupier.
The “police power” of the state must be reasonably
and prudently applied. The exercise of the “police power”
in Section 316 creates, as set forth above, a situation which
has not yet been judicially reviewed by your Honorable
Court.
The Substantial Federal Questions 17
This is not a case in which the state has exercised its
“police power” to place a mere prohibition or restriction
upon a lawful use of property which reduces the economic
value of the property as in municipal zoning. [See
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 60 L. Ed. 348, 36
S. Ct. 143 (1915); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U. S. 590, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987 (1962) ].
It is also not a case in which a state orders a property
owner to destroy a portion of his property in order to pre-
serve other property. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272,
48 S. Ct. 246, 72 L. Ed. 568 (1928).
Further, it is not a case in which a state, by virtue of
the use of a property owner of the property, imposing
affirmative cost obligations such as requiring noise, water
and air pollution controls at a manufacturing or chemical
facility. See, Queenside Hills Realty Co., Inc. v. Saxl, 328
U. S. 80; 90 L. Ed. 1096 (1946); Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 346 U. S. 346,
74 S. Ct. 92, 98 L. Ed. 51 (1953); or in which a limited
fine, as distinguished from unlimited clean-up costs, is
imposed upon a property owner for the negligent or crimi-
nal act of a third person, but which could only have
occurred because of the property owner's use of its property
or operation of its business. United States v. General
Motors Corporation, 403 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975);
United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F. 2d 1305
(7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F. 2d
1310 (7th Cir. 1978).
As has been previously noted, the Environmental
Hearing Board specifically found that the polluting con-
dition was created by the activities of Mr. Jacoby, an
executive officer of Wood. There is no evidence in the
Record as specifically found by the Commonwealth Court
on its review that the Appellants Rogers had any knowl-
edge of its existence.
This is not even a case involving an innocent owner’s
forfeiture of property because of the criminal acts of his
18 The Substantial Federal Questions
Lessee. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U. S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974).
Finally, this is not a case in which a landowner or
occupier is assessed for improvements made in front of
the property occupied by him. Such assessments are uni-
formly upheld only to the extent that special benefits
accrue to the property assessed. See 16A C., J. S. Consti-
tutional Law, Section 661, pgs. 1035-1042 and particularly,
at pages 1037, 1038 and cases therein cited. In the
present case, no claim is made that removal of the pollutant
will benefit the Appellants who are the owners of the land.
Rather, what is at stake in the present case is the
propriety of a State’s raw, naked right through the use
of its “police power” to impose on a landowner or occupier,
the affirmative obligation to eradicate, at unlimited costs,
a polluting condition, based on nothing more than that
land owner’s status and geographical proximity to the
condition in question.
If the validity of this Statute is affirmed without fur-
ther consideration by this Court, it may signal legislatures
in other states desirous of attacking pollution problems,
that they may now abandon previous statutory enactments
designed to strike an acceptable balance between accom-
plishing desirable environmental goals and protecting the
rights of private individuals, in favor of expedient, but
oppressive laws which eliminate any consideration of such
rights.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has Misconstrued Prior
Holdings of This and Other Courts in Dismissing Ap-
pellant’s Contention That the Statute Is Unduly
Oppressive.
The analysis of the constitutionality of Section 316 as
applied by Pennsylvania’s highest court in this case is
wanting in several respects. First, its analysis partly rest
upon a consideration of economic impact of state law
found in cases dealing with regulation of uses of property
The Substantial Federal Questions 19
which, as well be explained below, have little bearing on
this case. Secondly, it deals with Appellant’s objection
that the Statute is unduly oppressive without considering
the elements of retroactivity, the fact that the Statute per-
mits and authorizes abdication by State officials of their
responsibilities to pursue the individual who actually
caused the polluting condition, and without considering
the serious potential for abuse in enforcing this law where,
as here, a polluting condition affects the property of sev-
eral innocent owners or occupiers of contiguous properties.
Finally, the Court ignored the oppressive manner of en-
forcement contained in the record of these proceedings
and contributed to that result by affirming a series of
conflicting orders which are thereby made internally incon-
sistent and incapable of fair applications.
The decision in this case by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court does not blend neatly with any of the past holdings
of this Court. Appellants’ belief that the Statute is “unduly
oppressive”, is founded upon a multi-faceted combination
of factors not present in the cases cited by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as precedents:
(1) The government is not merely regulating
past “use” of the property by the party to be charged
with liability, but rather is taking resources from the
most expedient source at hand.
(2) The Statute imposes strict liability upon a
land owner or occupier for the illegal act of a third
person without any requirements on the State to
proceed against the third person who created the
polluting condition.
(3) The strict vicarious liability is being im-
posed retroactively.
(4) The statute as applied has harsh conse-
quences which impair the contractual expectations of
occupiers of land such as short term tenants and will
20 The Substantial Federal Questions
have serious impact on the expectations of past pur-
chasers of the property.
(5) The provision of the Statute which gives un-
limited discretion to the law enforcement agency with
respect to what may be required by way of com-
pliance is subject to abuse.
(6) The selective enforcement techniques being
used in the enforcement of this Statute, as illustrated
in this case are onerous and oppressive and may well
rise to a level of denial of equal protection under the
law.
It is submitted that the collection of features as
found in Section 316 and as interpreted by Pennsylvania's
highest court are sufficient to overcome any presumption
concerning the constitutional validity of mislegislative
enactment.
The Government Is Not Merely Regulating Past or Present
“Use” of the Property by the Party to Be Charged
With Liability, But Rather Is Taking Resources From
the Most Expedient Source at Hand.
It is erroneous to pass on the validity of this Statute
based solely upon cases which deal with the tension be-
tween limitations or regulations concerning the use of
property and the fifth amendment proscription against
government taking of private property for public purposes
without compensation. See generally J. L. Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 (1964). The ques-
tion in such cases is whether regulation or prohibition of
uses of property is so onerous as to constitute a “taking”.
And, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has pointed
out, reduction of property value due to regulation as to
use has to be complete before there is a “taking”. Hada-
check v. Sebastian, supra; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922),
Further, it has been held that where complete destruction
The Substantial Federal Questions 21
of private property used in an individual's business enter-
prise—although otherwise legal—is reasonbly necessary
to protect the rest of the community, the destruction of
that property does not constitute a compensable taking.
Miller v. Schoene, supra.
If a complete loss of property can be justified for the
purpose of ensuring the safety for the rest of the com-
munity, does this mean that there is no limit on the police
power? Even in Miller v. Schoene, supra, the owner of
the offending trees which were destroyed for the public
good was not required to pay for the cost of destroying
or removing them.
Appellant believes that the reduction-in-value anal-
ysis, cited by the Pennsylvania Court in its Opinion, is not
relevant here because the Statute under present con-
sideration does not seek to regulate any particular use of
property. Appellants are not asked to change the use of
their property. Appellants are not prohibited from put-
ting their property to a proposed more profitable use be-
cause of zoning, or regulation such as was encountered in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U. S.
104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978), relied on so
heavily by the Pennsylvania Court. What remains is that
Appellants are being asked to eradicate pollution which is
present under the surface of property which they lease to
Wood. The “taking” does not need to be found through a
complex analysis of whether or not the government is
prohibiting some valuable use of property, or is physically
occupying it such as was found in Causby v. United
States, 328 U. S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206
(1946). The government is simply forcing the Appellant
to take affirmative action at enormous expense without
regard to the use of their property.
All of the cases cited by the Pennsylvania Court re-
quiring the positive expenditure of funds seem to involve
more than mere ownership or occupancy of property, i.e.
22 The Substantial Federal Questions
they involve regulating or prohibiting activity on the
property related to the use of that property. Thus, in
Queenside Hills Realty, Co., Inc. v. Saxl, supra, the re-
quired expenditures were for fire safety equipment related
to the safe operation of a rooming house. In Goldblatt v.
Town of Heampstead, supra, the Statute required the
operator of a quarry to fill existing holes as a condition to
the continued operation of its business. In Penn Central,
supra, the statute prohibited certain new construction and
required a railroad to maintain its terminal which was
designated as a historic landmark. Preservation of the
property had the dual benefit of meeting the objectives of
New York’s landmark regulation, and of maintaining
property used in the railroad’s business.
In Queenside, the property owner had the choice of
submitting to the regulation or ceasing his business opera-
tion. In Goldblatt, supra, the regulation in question im-
posed affirmative duties, under penalties of fine and
imprisonment, of refilling the existing excavation and con-
structing a new fence. However, it is important to note
that the Court in Goldblatt never ruled on the validity of
those affirmative duties, since enforcement of the affirma-
tive duties was not sought in the litigation before the
Court. )
The Statute Imposes Strict Liability Upon a Land Owner
or Occupier for the Illegal Act of a Third Person
Without Any Requirements on the State to Proceed
Against the Third Person Who Created the Polluting
Condition.
The pollution in question was caused by the illegal,
criminal acts of a third person, Jacoby.
The state court has cited modern cases imposing
vicarious liability on landowners for the negligent acts of
third persons. See, i.e., Portland Pipe Line v. Environ-
mental Improvement Commission, 414 U. S. 1035, 94 S. Ct.
The Substantial Federal Questions 23
532, 38 L. Ed. 2d 326, dismissing appeal for want of a
substantial federal question, 307 A. 2d 1 (Me. 1973); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. United States, 573 F. 2d 1303 (3rd Cir., 1978).
The distinguishing characteristic of those cases is that the
activity of the third party polluter was required to be
connected in some reasonable fashion to the furtherance
of the business activity of the party held responsible.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indi-
cated that neither it nor the Environmental Hearing Board
has had the issue of ultimate allocation of liability before
it, the result is that Rogers will be under compulsion to
expend funds to correct what is more properly Jacoby’s
responsibility, and will be left to their own devices to
recover from Jacoby. The Statute makes no provision for
singling out or proceeding against the actual polluter be-
fore seeking compliance from innocent landowners or oc-
cupiers who in some cases may in themselves be victims
of the polluting activity. If fines and jail terms are to be
the catalysts for positive action by innocent parties, it
seems anomalous that such compulsion is not provided
for use against the guilty party.
There is no factual finding or judicial holding in this
case that Appellants Rogers should stand in Jacoby’s shoes
as an actual wrongdoer or polluter. Section 316 of the
Clean Streams Law, at issue here, pursuant to which DER
issued the Orders, punishes the status of landowner or
occupier. That section of the law did not come into exist-
ence until 1970 long after Jacoby had created the polluting
condition in question. Section 316, is, at the very least,
quasi-criminal in nature and possibly truly criminal in
nature in light of the harsh penalties provided for under
Section 602 of the act for failure to comply with an Order
issued under Section 316. [Clean Streams Law, Act of
June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987 Article III, as amended July 31,
1970, P. L. 653, 35 P. S. Section 691.316, Section 602, 35
P. S. Section 691.602].
24 The Substantial Federal Questions
The Strict Vicarious Liability Is Being Imposed Retro-
actively.
It is not unreasonable to impose vicarious liability
upon a party for acts of persons under the dominion and
control of the party held responsible. It also may not be
reasonable to impose liability retroactively for prior acts
of the very party held liable, or persons svbject to their
control. Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania, 472 Pa.
115, 371 A. 2d 461 (1977).
However, it is beyond the pale of reason to impose
vicarious liability for the acts of third persons nor had
knowledge of the true nature of their acts, based upon
a Statute passed by a legislature fourteen (14) years after
the occurrence of such acts. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 49.L. Ed. 2d 752, 96 S. Ct. 2882
(1976).
While the Court has generally held that retroactivity
is a feature to be avoided except in certain appropriate
circumstances, Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rail-
road Co., 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468
(1935), modern law has allowed considerable latitude in
permitting retroactive application of regulation legislation,
where the cost of the remedy for a problem is allocated to
the person charged with the liability under the Statute as
an “actual, measurable cost of his business”. Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 2882, 49
L. Ed. 2d 752 (1976). However, a more recent decision
of the Court would indicate that retroactivity of legislation
is not a factor which can be simply ignored. Allied Struc-
tural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 57
L. Ed. 2d 727 (1978).
Retroactive liability for the acts of third persons under
Section 316 does not require that the polluting condition
arise in the course of the landowner or occupier’s business
and in this respect, does not come under the holding of
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., supra.
The Substantial Federal Questions 25
Similarly, this case is not one in which retroactive
legislation should be justified based upon an “emergency”.
Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 1294, 92
L. Ed. 1694 (1948) [but compare Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Redford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854, 79
L. Ed. 1593 (1935)]. Nor is this statute justified as one
which permits retroactivity because the statute is merely
curative of technical ambiguities in prior legislation.
F. H. A. v. The Darlington, 358 U. S. 84, 79 S. Ct. 141,
3 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1958).
The Statute, as Applied, Has Harsh Consequences Which
Impair the Contractual Expectations of Occupiers of
Land Such as Short Term Tenants and Will Have
Serious Impact on the Expectations of Past Purchasers
of the Property.
One of the serious oppressive features of Section 316
is that it tends to introduce new dangers and pitfalls into
common transactions such as buying or leasing property.
The normal expectation of a purchaser or lessee of surface
rights to property is that he will get good title or the
right to use property for legal purposes.
What can be expected from this statute are variations
of what happened to Rogers in this case. The State,
wishing to have instant gratification, will attack the easiest
party to find, be it record owner or the person who is
present on the land, and use quasi-criminal sanctions to
compel a recovery for the purpose of abating polluting
conditions. The purchaser or tenant is then free to attempt
to pass the liability on to the “proper” party—a task which
is difficult at best and likely to be impossible in many
cases.
Instead uf proper and cooperative efforts with gov-
ernmental agencies to find and correct polluting condi-
tions, owners or occupiers who discover such conditions,
not created by themselves, will be encouraged to conceal
the conditions and pass them off to unsuspecting buyers.
26 The Substantial Federal Questions
The Provision of the Statute Which Gives Unlimited Dis-
cretion to the Law Enforcement Agency With Re-
spect to What May Be Required by Way of
Compliance Is Subject to Abuse.
The Statute gives unlimited discretion to law enforce-
ment officials to determine what may be required by way
of compliance with its own orders. The orders in this
case are themselves open ended in that compliance is con-
ditioned upon DER’s “acceptance” of plans and specifica-
tions of work to be done by Appellant, without any indi-
cation as to what standard, if any, will govern the
acceptance. Order of Environmental Hearing Board,
July 30, 1976. [A-48].
In Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78, 32 S. Ct. 31, 56
L. Ed. 102 (1911), the Court reversed an Order by a rep-
resentative of the Secretary of the Interior that a certain
private property owner within the confines of Yosemite
National Park mark and define his lands “by an agreed
understanding” with the Secretary’s representative. There,
the Court observed:
“A law requiring an owner in Appellant's situation to
fence his land might be within such power, though
of that we are not required to express an opinion.
A law making the trespass of his cattle on other lands
a criminal offense might be within such power.”
o oO a
“We have assured so far that Benson, the secretary’s
representative, has exercised a power in accordance
with the rules prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior. This, however, may be questioned. The
orders of Benson are not the Curtin mark and define
his lands, but that he do so ‘by an agreed understand-
ing’ with him (Benson), so that there could be no
subsequent controversy about their boundaries. But
this gives to Benson, power to force a concession to
The Substantial Federal Questions 27
his ‘understanding’ and to require Curtin to submit
to a limitation to the area of his land or a limitation
of its uses. It is no answer to say that the power
would not be arbitrarily or unreasonably exercised.
It must be judged by what can be done under it, not
what may be done under it.” (Emphasis added )
Orders in the form upheld by the Court, place Ap-
pellants at the mercy of DER and in a position of corpo-
rate involuntary servitude. At this wiiting, almost seven
(7) years, to the day, after the issuance of the original
DER Orders, and after an expenditure of approximately
One Hundred and Eighty Thousand ($180,000.00) Dol-
lars on the pollution problem by the Federal government,
there exists no concrete answer as to how much expense
and effort by Appellants will be required in complying
with the DER orders as modified by the Environmental
Hearing Board. It would appear that the DER is free to
determine whatever it wishes with regard to the level of
compliance expected, without limit.
In addition, DER is in a position to force Appellants
to experiment on methods to solve the problem. The
experiment activity, if determined by the Board first to be
“feasible’, will mean that Rogers will be expending funds
to devise new methods of dealing with the problem which
more properly should be borne by the government.
The Selective Enforcement Techniques Being Used in the
Enforcement of This Statute, as Illustrated in This
Case Are Onerous and Oppressive and May Well Rise
to a Level of Denial of Equal Protection Under the
Law.
In its Adjudication, the Board found that the pollut-
ing condition not only exists under the property owned or
occupied by other parties to the litigation, Gum and Shell,
but that it also existed under the property owned and
occupied by several other parties, the identification of
whom were not disclosed in that proceeding. [Adjudica-
28 The Substantial Federal Questions
tion of Environmental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976,
Finding of Fact No. 74, A-70—A-71]. The Board also
found that the participation of such landowners or oc-
cupiers was necessary to complete the removal program.
[Adjudication of Environmental Hearing Board, dated
July 30, 1976, Finding of Fact No. 79, A-72]. Finally, the
Board held that as applied to Appellant and other parties
then before it, Section 316 could require them to correct a
polluting condition “only on the land, which is owned or
occupied by such person or entity and that it would be
‘unconstitutional’ to require the Appellant to take action
outside his or its land.” [See Adjudication of Environ-
mental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976, at pages 34
and 35, A-83].
The Commonwealth Court in its Opinion, has by
silence, affirmed these findings. It has also removed Shell
and Gum from these proceedings. In essence, Rogers,
together with Wood, will be required to attempt to re-
move a polluting condition under their property, which
cannot be removed without the cooperation of other land-
owners or occupiers, who by the lower Court’s decision,
cannot be proceeded against to give such cooperation.
Under these circumstances, requiring it to expend the
funds necessary to attempt to remove the pollutant, would
be a vain and wasteful act.
Moreover, this situation is not an unusual one. It is
probable that in the future, when a polluting condition of
a widespread nature is found to exist, it may well be under
lands owned or occupied by several different persons or
entities, some of whom mav be liable to correct the con-
dition and others of whom may not. To the extent that it
can be required to exhaust its entire resources in eradicat-
ing a condition that cannot be so eradicated without the
cooperation of others, then it is believed that said Order
is unconstitutional as applied to Appellants.
Therefore, it is submitted to your Honorable Court
that Section 316 as applied to the Appellants Rogers is un-
Conclusion 29
constitutional. The Federal questions raised under the
due process amendment to the United States Constitution
are substantial and gravely affect the property rights of the
Appellants Rogers. It is for these reasons that the ques-
tions presented are so substantial as to require plenary
consideration with Briefs on the Merits and oral argument
before your Honorable Court for their resolution.
CONCLUSION.
It is submitted that in light of all of the foregoing
reasons, that your Honorable Court should note juris-
diction in this matter and reverse the Order of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMEs S. KILPATRICK, JR.,
15 Rittenhouse Place,
Ardmore, Pennsylvania. 19003
(215) 649-5200
Attorney for Appellants,
Clifford A. Rogers and
Virginia Rogers.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.