Jurisdictional Statement — National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources

Supreme Court brief1980

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: Supreme ae U.S.

ED

JUL 23 1989

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

80-98

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Terra, 1980

CLIFFORD ROGERS AND VIRGINIA ROGERS,

Appellants,

v

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

NATIONAL WOOD PRESERVERS, INC.,

Appellees.

TOWNSHIP OF HAVERFORD, Intervenor.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

APPELLANTS’ JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.

James S. KILPATRICK, JR.,

15 Rittenhouse Place,

Ardmore, Pa. 19003

(215) 649-5200

Attorney for —

Cliffor ciiiee and

Virginia Rogers.

International Printing Co., 711 So. 50th St., Phila., Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-8711

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Opinions BELOW ........... Santee ha 6 es CURRIE CR EReIEN

III ii oink cs wip eee deus oo tks been ed heeeeeasaes

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .........esceecceeeeeees

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......eee0008 eves bbe sbebeneeate

The Adjudication of the Environmental Hearing Board

The Commonwealth Court Decision ..................

Removal Cost Information Submitted With Request for

Continuation of Supersedeas ...............0000-

Proceedings in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court .......

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Decision ..........

THE SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTIONS ........+0..eeeeeees

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Has Misconstrued Prior

Holdings of This and Other Courts in Dismissing

Appellant's Contention That the Statute Is Unduly

sb METRE OTT CTT ee ae

The Government Is Not Merely Regulating Past or

Present “Use” of the Property by the Party to Be

Charged With Liability, But Rather Is Taking Re-

sources From the Most Expedient Source at Hand

The Statute Imposes Strict Liability Upon a Land Owner

or Occupier for the Illegal Act of a Third Person

Without Any Requirements on the State to Proceed

Against the Third Person Who Created the Polluting

CIE ink ca cdines dcqnskenceeconeeeeee

The Strict Vicarious Liability Is Being Imposed Retro-

MEE 6 evi CHA ce eee eee

The Statute, as Applied, Has Harsh Consequences Which

Impair the Contractual Expectations of Occupiers of

Land Such as Short Term Tenants and Will Have

Serious Impact on the Expectations of Past Pur-

CRUNE OF WG PONE on 55k eckson caiieaueeks

18

20

22

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued).

Page

The Provision of the Statute Which Gives Unlimited Dis-

cretion to the Law Enforcement Agency With Re-

spect to What May Be Required by Way of Com-

pliance Is Subject to Abuse ............sesseseee 26

The Selective Enforcement Techniques Being Used in the

Enforcement of This Statute, as Illustrated in This

Case Are Onerous and Oppressive and May Well

Rise to a Level of Denial of Equal Protection Under

Peeve CE re iseperdhdddsa vir cicrn tie sees 27

Nee ee phew edoouedelceeaas ones 29

TABLE OF CITATIONS.

Cases: | , Page

Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 98 S. Ct.

eae. Oe tas te BR FE Ce 5 oie hs cn 62 ie tee 24

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Public Utilities Com-

mission, 346 U. S. 346, 74 S. Ct. 92, 98 L. Ed. 51 (1953) 17

Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A. 2d

Re Poe e ny Ur Perey Prey Peer 24

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 VU. S. 665,

40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974) ........0cceee. 18

Causby v. United States, 328 U. S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90

ae ED Sp veh ek con ewian ren esnaeienenteris 21

Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284, 91 S. Ct.

i |} ee Hig ahs Giese a eaadsaeass 4

Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78, 32 S. Ct. 31, 56 L. Ed. 102

Gt BR ra er me er ere ee ee rn a eee 26

F. H. A. v. The Darlington, 358 U. S. 84, 79 S. Ct. 141, 3

Ee 6 eR Ty red Pee eer ey reer F 25

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 8 L. Ed. 2d

OO ee ls ED 5 ec eV oR scab oud tyes cin ck 17, 22

Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States, 573 F. 2d 1303 (3rd Cir.,

DE Siss5 + Cav nav Chee bubba nae or ecind peeanee ee) 23

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 60 L. Ed, 348, 36 S. Ct.

SP RAE) + past ache sence waeee ths eae eer ee Lse eee 17, 20

Hancock Natioaal Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 S. Ct.

ek Oe Ee. Be Wee LEE ei habeas tiesdencecetiesrsi 4

Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, Ky., 173 U. S.

592, 19 S. Ct. 553, 43 L. Ed. 823 (1899) .............. 4

In Re National Wood Preservers, Inc., 64 D. & C. 2d 78

TN oti ea ec earn ae ee ee: 1,9

Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 1294, 92

his Fe REE? ab Lekenge ce keses aber ces 25

Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Redford, 295 U. S. 555,

55 S. Ct. 854, 79 L. Ed. 1503 (1935) ...........se000 25

Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 48 S. Ct. 246, 72 L. Ed. 568

CE o dek Veh akichna bo eed ed VLMa n ee nc core es 17, 21

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Cases (Continued): Page

National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania, Department of Resources, — Pa. —, 414 A. 2d

NE al es adn HS ea sp eletbid ens od bee Codadien 13

Penn Central Transpertation Co. v. New York, 438 U. S. 104,

98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978) .............. 21, 22

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S, 393, 43 S. Ct. 158,

Oe SED Cac yisce chee ve bles aeaksereeees 20

Portland Pipe Line v. Environmental Improvement Commis-

sion, 414 U. S. 1035, 94 S. Ct. 532, 38 L. Ed. 2d 326, dis-

missing appeal for want of a substantial federal question,

ee CE HO, 5 cb. ore FRET ACR bbs vas bsbues 22, 23

Queenside Hills Realty Co., Inc. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80, 90

i CRED fo cevedgehewnvesttcenbbaeddecdees 17, 22

Railroad Retirement Board vy. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U. S.

330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468 (1935) ............. 24

United States v. General Motors Corporation, 403 F. Supp.

Ce a, Se Co ce vis pasa ct needs coast sheveyi 17

United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F. 2d 1305 (7th

ES AT PEC DT y iter Teen ney ae 17

United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F, 2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978) 17

Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 49 L, Ed. 2d

ee LOPE ee 0d sdb Ki eanrekeeanb ccs 24

Statutes:

Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22, 1937, P. L.

EE 65s nS ede se cessereineenevive ssc 1 et seq.

Be ges EE ich accuiéaes <b 0be bad nes ecrsedes ce dte 4

16A C, J. S. Constitutional Law, Section 661 .............. 18

United States Constitution:

cca edcdbavds boas eetacsacaees 4,5,14

Authorities:

J. L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36

CREE, 04 pres 5:06.54 Sp VORITEESS A REVENUES ROSE EN On 0 20

OPINIONS BELOW.

The Opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

dated April 24, 1980, affirming the Orders of the Com-

monwealth Court of Pennsylvania, is reported at — Pa.

—, 414 A. 2d 37 (1980) and is found in the Appendix

at A-l. The Opinion of the Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania, dated May 24, 1978, affirming in part and

reversing in part the Adjudication and Order of the

Environmental Hearing Board, is reported at 35 Pa.

Commonwealth Ct. 443, 387 A. 2d 142 (1978) and is

found in the Appendix at A-25. The Adjudication and

Order of the Environmental Hearing Board, dated July

30, 1976, is unreported and is found in the Appendix at

A-48. A prehearing Opinion of the Environmental Hear-

ing Board denying a Petition to Join Samuel Jacoby as an

additional defendant is reported as of In Re National

Wood Preservers, Inc., 64 D. & C. 2d 78 (1974) and is

found in the Appendix at A-91.

JURISDICTION.

The Act of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987, known as the

Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, was enacted in 1937.

In 1965, that law was amended to include Section 316

which gave the State the power to order a landowner or

occupier to give access to the land so as to enable the

Commonwealth or its appropriate agency to enter upon

the land and eliminate a condition of pollution.

Section 316 itself was amended on July 31, 1970, so

as to further broaden and extend the powers of the Com-

monwealth to eliminate a condition of pollution by allow-

ing the Commonwealth to elect to place responsibility for

such elimination upon the landowners and occupiers with-

out consideration of fault and solely by virtue of their

status as landowners and occupiers. Section 316 now

provides in part as follows:

“691.316 Responsibility of Landowners and Land

Occupiers

Whenever the Sanitary Water Board finds that pollu-

2 Jurisdiction

tion or a danger of pollution is resulting from a con-

dition which exists on land in the Commonwealth,

the Board may order the landowner or occupier to

correct the condition in a manner satisfactory to the

Bourd or it may order such owner or occupier to allow

a mine operator or other person or agency of the

Commonwealth access to the land to take such action.

For the purpose of this se¢tion, “landowner” includes

any persons holding title to or having a proprietary

interest in either surface or subsurface rights.” [Act

of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987 Article III, Sec. 316 as

amended July 31, 1970, P. L. 653, 35 P. S. Sec.

691.316]

This Appeal has its origins in three identical Enforce-

ment Orders issued by the Appellee, Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources

(hereinafter referred to as “DER”) to National Wood

Preservers, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Wood” ), Shell

Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as “Shell”) and

Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation (hereinafter re-

ferred to as “Gum”). The Enforcement Orders directed

each of the above entities to take action to eliminate a

condition of pollution on the properties which they owned

or occupied. Gum was a property owner and Wood and

Shell were lessees of the Appellants, Clifford E. and

Virginia Rogers.

DER stated that the properties involved were subject

to a contaminant consisting of creosote containing penta-

chlorophenol and that it was entering into a stream known

as “Naylor’s Run”. Under those Orders, the original three

entities were directed to proceed to locate the area of the

pollutant, develop plans for removal, and then to remove

the contaminant from ground and surface waters so as to

restore the waters to their natural quality. (See Orders

of DER dated July 12, 1973, found in the Appendix at

A-116 & A-118.) Subsequently, on September 21, 1973, a

Jurisdiction 3

similar Order was issued to Appellants Clifford A. and

Virginia Rogers (hereinafter referred to as “Rogers” )

(R. 3la, 32a). All of the persons and entities, including

Appellants, filed timely appeals from the Orders with the

Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (hereinafter

referred to as “Board”) and all such Appeals were con-

solidated for hearing.

After lengthy and protracted hearings, the Board, by

Adjudication and Order dated July 30, 1976, sustained

the Appeals in part and dismissed other parts thereof.

[See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing Board dated

July 30, 1976, Appendix at A-48].

Appellants Rogers and all other entities and persons

filed timely Appeals from the Adjudication and Order to

the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. These various

Appeals were consolidated by the Court, and a Super-

sedeas was granted. After filing of briefs and oral argu-

ment, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued

an Opinion and Order sustaining in full the Appeals of

Gum and Shell and dismissing the Appeals as to Wood

and Rogers. [See Opinion and Order of the Common-

wealth Court, Appendix at A-25).

Appellants Rogers on June 23, 1978, filed a timely

Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania seeking a review of the Opinion and

Order of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Similar Petitions for Allowance of Appeal were filed by

Wood and DER. After consideration of the Petitions,

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on February 16, 1979,

granted the Petitions for Allowance of Appeal and the

matters were consolidated for Argument on Appeal.

After the filing of briefs and oral Argument, the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on April 24, 1980, issued

its Opinion and Final Judgment in this case dismissing the

Appeal of the DER as being not timely filed and sustain-

ing and affirming the Opinion and Orders of the Common-

4 Jurisdiction

wealth Court of Pennsylvania as to Appellants Rogers

and Wood.

The principal attack of Appellants Rogers at all stages

of these proceedings has been that Section 316 of the

Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act of July 31, 1970, P. L. No.

222, 35 Pa. Stat. Anno. $91.316 violated the due process

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution in that it subjected them to an uncon-

stitutional burden without consideration of fault merely by

virtue of their status as landowners.

A timely notice of Appeal to this Court was filed with

the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

on July 10, 1980, and it is found in the Appendix at A-107.

Your Honorable Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal

pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 1257(2). This Appeal lies directly

with your Honorable Court since the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, the highest Court of that Commonwealth,

has upheld the provisions of Section 316 of the Pennsyl-

vania Clean Streams Law as against a challenge that it is

unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Appellants

Rogers. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 29 L. Ed. 2d

284, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971).

It is noted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

declined to rule on a specific challenge to the constitution-

ality of Section 316 on the basis of the Constitution of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and other state grounds.

That Court rather, elected to rule directly upon the chal-

lenge of Appellants Rogers to Section 316 pursuant to the

due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States of America. That Court has, thus, enter-

tained and ruled adversely to the Appellants Rogers that

Section 316 is constitutional. By virtue of that ruling,

your Honorable Court has jurisdiction to hear an Appeal

of this case. 28 U. S. C. 1257(2); Hancock National

Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 S. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed.

619 (1900); Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson,

Ky., 173 U. S. 592, 19 S. Ct. 553, 43 L. Ed. 823 (1899).

Question Presented 5

It is by virtue of that jurisdiction rather than certiorari

jurisdiction that this matter comes before your Honorable

Court as a matter of right.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

Has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania engaged in

an unduly oppressive exercise of its “police power” in

violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution, where the Penn-

sylvania Clean Streams Law was amended subsequent to

the acquisition of land by an owner so as to impose lia-

bility upon the owner solely by virtue of the status of

landowner to remove and eradicate, at an unlimited cost,

a condition of pollution not created by the landowner

which is partially under the property owned by the land-

owner and which was created by the unlawful acts of a

third party to which unlawful creation the landowner has

not contributed and which has no reasonable connection

with the landowner’s ownership of the property?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This Appeal arises out of the ownership by Appellants

Rogers of a certain portion of land on the north and south

sides of Eagle Road between its intersection with Lawrence

Road on the west and Hillcrest Road on the east in Haver-

ford Township, Delaware County, Pennsylvania. That

property has been owned by the Appellants since the

1940’s (R. 187a). The Appellants have not engaged in

any business activity on their property since the 1940’s.

Since that time, the Appellants’ property has continuously

been occupied by tenants operating their own businesses

(R. 188a, 198a ).

On January 10, 1947, Appellants leased their land to

Samuel T. Jacoby and C. David Jacobs who ultimately

assigned their rights under the lease to National Wood

Preservers, Inc., a corporation which was controlled by

Jacoby. National Wood Preservers, Inc., by Jacoby, con-

6 Statement of the Case

ducted a wood preservative business on this parcel of land

between March 28, 1947 and July 30, 1963. National

Wood Preservers, Inc., by Jacoby, utilized a substance

known as pentachlorophenol in this wood preservative

business and during the course of the operation of this

business under Jacoby’s ownership waste liquids were dis-

charged or permitted to be discharged from the surface of

the land upon which said business was conducted to the

ground water via a well on the premises.

On July 30, 1963, Jacoby sold his entire interest in the

corporation to the Goldstein family and that family has

operated the wood preservative business on all or a portion

of the Appellants’ land to the present date. The present

Appellee, National Wood Preservers, Inc., is the corpora-

tion as owned, controlled and operated by the Goldstein

family.

On February 10, 1967, Wood released a portion of

the premises owned by Appellants from its leasehold and

on that date Appellants leased that portion to Shell. Shell

has operated and .maintained a gasoline service station

on the parcel of land at all times from that date to the

present time.

Gum owns and occupies land south of Eagle Road

and contiguous thereto. Intervenor Township of Haver-

ford is the local municipal government body in which all

of the land is located.

On July 12, 1973, the Department of Environmental

Resources issued orders with respect to Wood, Gum and

Shell directing each as owners or occupiers of the property

to develop engineering plan designed to remove the con-

taminants, pentachlorophenol and oil, which have been

located under the lands of the Appellants and the said

Appellees (R. 27a, 28a). On September 21, 1973, DER

issued an order with respect to Appellants requiring them

to: (1) define the specific geographical area in which the

pollutant is found; (2) prepare a profile of the ground

water table in the area in which the pollutant is found;

Statement of the Case 7

and (3) formulate a proposal to remove the pollutant.

All Appellees and Appellants filed timely appeals to the

Environmental Hearing Board.

The evidence, submitted on behalf of Wood, demon-

strates that the accumulation of pentachlorophenol and

oil allegedly existing on the Appellants’ land was created

by Wood through the actions of its former president and

sole stockholders, Samuel T. Jacoby (R. 376a). A Petition,

filed by Shell, sought to join Jacoby as an additional de-

fendant (R. 179a). However, that Petition to join was

denied (R. 179a). Thirteen hearings were held before

Louis R. Salamon, Esquire, Hearing Examiner for the

Environmental Hearing Board. During these hearings it

was stipulated that the orders issued by DER were based

on Section 316 of the Clean Streams Act of July 22, 1937,

as amended (35 P. S. 691.316) (R. 187a). While the

specific area of contamination was never defined, it al-

legedly existed far beyond the properties owned by the

Appellants (R. 508a, 509a). During these hearings, no

evidence was produced by DER or any other Appellee as

to the Appellants Rogers having caused the pollution in

any way or ever having knowledge of the same.

At the conclusion of the hearings before the Examiner

and after deliberation, the Board entered an Adjudication

and Order in which it specifically found that Wood, under

Jacoby, had created the pollution condition; however, it

ordered the Appellants and the other Appellees to proceed

in accordance with its modification of DER’s Order.

The Adjudication of the Environmental Hearing Board.

The Board found that the pentachlorophenal in ques-

tion was under the surface of the property lease by Appel-

lants Rogers to Shell and Wood; that this pentachloro-

phenol flowed southwesterly under Eagle Road, a highway

owned and maintained by the Commonwealth of Penn-

sylvania, and that thereafter it infiltrated under the surface

of property owned by Gum into a storm sewer pipe on

8 Statement of the Case

the property of Cum, maintained by Intervenor, Township

of Haverford, and that the pentachlorophenol traveled

through the storm sewer pipe and was discharged at its

terminus into Naylor’s Run. [See Adjudication of Environ-

mental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976, Finding of

Fact 72, A-70].

The Board determined that the pentachlorophenal is

under the property owned and maintained by the Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania and the Township of Haver-

ford and by landowners or occupiers, the identity of whom

or which were not disclosed in the proceedings before it.

[See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing Board, dated

July 30, 1976, Finding of Fact 74(b), A-70—A-71]}.

It found also that in order to determine the volume of

pentachlorophenol under the surface of the property

owned or leased to Appellees, including Wood and how

widely the pentachlorophenol was disbursed thereunder,

many more wells would have to be drilled on the property

to the water table and additional samples from these wells

taken. [See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing

Board, dated July 30, 1976, Finding of Fact 76, A-71].

It found finally that it was impossible to assess the

cost uf the removal program until further drilling, testing

and sampling was completed; and, that the participation

of landowners and occupiers, in addition to the Appellants,

would be necessary in order to complete the drilling, test-

ing and removal program. [See Adjudication of Environ-

mental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976, Finding of

Fact 78 and 79, A-72].

All Appellants challenged the constitutionality of

Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law on the basis that it

was unconstitutional since it punishes a “status” and re-

quired them to assume responsibility to correct a condition

which none of them caused, created or were at fault in

continuing (R. 192-197; 33-3F ). They also challenged the

constitutionality of Section 316 on the grounds that it was

invalid ex post facto legislation (R. 192-197; 33-35).

Statement of the Case 9

As to all such attacks on the constitutionality of

Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law, the Environmental

Hearing Board ruled that it did not have the authority to

pass upon the constitutionality of Section 316 of the Clean

Streams Law and that it would assume the constitutionality

thereof for the purposes of its Adjudication. [See Ad-

judication of Environmental Hearing Board, dated July

30, 1976, A-48].

Appellants also argued and contended that the DER

was applying Section 316 in an unconstitutionally dis-

criminatory fashion particularly because of its failure to

include in the proceedings, Jacoby as the party who had

created the polluting condition and other property owners,

including the Township of Haverford and the State De-

partment of Highways, under whose property the polluting

condition was also found to exist. Prior to the hearings

before the Environmental Hearing Board, Shell had peti-

tioned to join Jacoby as an additional defendant, pursuant

to the State Civil Procedural Rules, on the basis that he

was the party responsible for causing the condition. DER

opposed this joinder and the Board sustained that position,

denying the Petition on the grounds that only DER had

the authority to bring Jacoby upon the record. In re

National Wood Preservers, 64 D. & C. 2d 78 (1974), A-91.

DER at no time sought to join Jacoby in those proceedings.

In its Adjudication, the Board in dismissing the con-

tentions of discriminatory enforcement, alluded to the

fact that Section 316 of the Clean Streams |.aw permitted

DER to ignore the issue of fault in proceeding to recover

clean-up costs. It stated:

«

. . Section 316 clearly authorizes the Department

to ignore the issue of fault, as it is done here, and

proceed against whoever owns or occupies land so as

to remedy a pollution problem as quickly as possible.

We might prefer a more delicate balancing of respon-

sibility in the Department's actions, but we cannot

10 Statement of the Case

say that their approach is unauthorized.” [Adjudi-

cation of Environmental Hearing Board, July 30,

1976, Footnote i3, A-84},

The Board also ruled that it would cure any problem

with respect to the issue of discriminatory enforcement by

restricting any Order against the Appellants to that they

would be required to take corrective measures only upon

property owned or occupied by them and would not be

required to take corrective action outside of the geographi-

cal boundaries of the property which they owned or oc-

cupied. [See Adjudication of Environmental Hearing

Board, dated July 30, 1976, A-48].

After disposing of all of the arguments raised by the

various Appellants in the proceedings before it, the Board

issued its Adjudication.

The Commonwealth Court Decision.

On Appeal, the Commonwealth Court ruled that Sec-

tion 316 could not constitutionally be applied to any of

the parties before the Board based solely upon their owner-

ship or occupancy of land. It stated:

“Applying these legal principles to the facts of this

case, we believe that requiring these Appellants to

spend the financial sums necessary to abate this con-

dition, based solely upon their ownership or occupancy

of land, would be to employ means unduly oppressive

upon these individuals. We believe that such an

exercise of police power would transcend ‘the parame-

ters of reason’. We believe that EHB’s conclusion

that Section 316 is a declaration of the strict liability

of these Appellants to correct the condition is errone-

ous as a matter of law because such a construction of

Section 316 would permit the Commonwealth to en-

gage in regulation which constitutes the taking of

property without compensation, and hence, would be

an unconstitutional exercise of police power.” [See

Opinion of Commonwealth Court, A-38—A-39]

Statement of the Case 11

The Court went on, however, to point out that:

“Where a statute can be given two constructions, one

of which will render it constitutional and the other

unconstitutional, the former construction must be

invoked.” [See Opinion of Commonwealth Court,

A-39]

Relying on this principle, the Court held that there was a

construction of Section 316 which:

“both comports with the law of public nuisance and

renders that section constitutional as applied to the

factual situation present in this case.” [See Opinion

of Commonwealth Court, A-39]

As stated by the Court, where a polluting condition

has been created by the conduct of an individual other

than an owner or occupier of land, that owner or occupier

can be ordered to take corrective measures if he permitted

or authorized the creation of the condition on its land.

Such an owner or occupier can also be ordered to take

corrective measures if after knowing of the existence of

the condition on his land, he engages in some affirmative

conduct indicating his adoption of the condition. The

Court stated in its Opinion:

“The key to imposing liability under Section 316 upon

an owner or occupier for the correction of a condition

which he did not create is that such an owner or

occupier, after knowing of the condition, engages in

some affirmative conduct indicating his adoption of

the condition. Essentially, this theory of liability for

owners or occupiers who do not create the condition

is an application to Section 316 of the Common law

liability of owners or occupiers who ‘continue’ or

‘adopt’ a nuisance not created by them. See 66C. J. S.

Nuisances Sections 83-89 (1950); 58 Am. Jur. Nui-

sances Sections 48-56 (1971).” [See Opinion of

Commonwealth Court, A-40]

12 Statement of the Case

The Commonwealth Court, in its Opinion, applied the

Common Law Doctrine of Nuisance so as to preserve the

constitutionality of Section 316 and it specifically found

that Appellants Rogers, by receiving rental from Wood,

adopted and ratified the illegal conduct. That Court, in

its Opinion, specifically found that there was no evidence

of Appellants Rogers having knowledge of the illegal

activities of Wood through its representative, Mr. Jacoby.

Following the Opinion and Order of the Common-

wealth Court, Appellants Rogers filed a Petition for Al-

lowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

which was granted as of No. 67 January Term, 1979, and

which was consolidated with Appeals filed by Wood and

DER. ~—

Removal Cost Information Submitted With Request for

Continuation of Supersedeas.

After the Commonwealth Court had issued its Opinion

and while Wood’s Petition for Review was pending in the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Wood filed with the Com-

monwealth Court, a Petition for Continuation of Super-

sedeas previously entered.

Among other allegations which were made apart of

the record subsequent to hearings before the Environ-

mental Hearing Board, that Petition pointed out the

following:

On October 28, 1976, the Federal Environmental

Protection Agency advised Wood that it was going to

remove the polluting condition. At that time, it believed

that the total cost of removal would range between Fifty

Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars and Two Hundred Thou-

sand ($200,000.00) Dollars.

On November 2, 1976, the EPA, using a private con-

tractor, commenced work on the site. Less than two (2)

months later, One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand

($118,000.00) Dollars of cost had been incurred. As of

June 2, 1977, the EPA had spent approximately One

Statement of the Case 13

Hundred and Eighty Thousand ($180,000.00) Dollars

and had discontinued major efforts to remove the jollutants

awaiting the outcome of these proceedings.

Wood, in this Petition, stated that it believed that

the One Hundred and Eighty Thousand ($180,000.00)

Dollars spent in the time that the EPA was on the site only

paid for the removal of a small amount of the pollutant

which Wood believes would be substantially in excess of

that sum.

On July 3, 1980, the Commonwealth Court ordered

that the Supersedeas should remain in effect “pending

disposition of the Appeal.”

Proceedings in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Appellants Rogers argued in the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania that the Commonwealth Court had erred in

finding that they adopted the polluting condition by

affirmative conduct in receipt of rental payments submit-

ting that such conduct was so insubstantial and unrelated

to the illegal use of the property, that it did not constitute

in any way an adoption or ratification of the illegal con-

duct which in fact violated the lease with Wood signed

by Mr. Jacoby. It was further argued that Section 316

was unconstitutional as a violation of the due process pro-

vided under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its Opinion of

April 24, 1980, acknowledged that this was “a case of first

impression”, calling for the construction and a determina-

tion of the constitutionality of Section 316 of the Clean

Streams Law. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Resources, —

Pa, —, 414 A. 2d 37 (1980) [See Appendix at A-1].

“The principal questions presented by this appeal are

whether Section 316 authorizes the Department of

14 Statement of the Case

Environmental Resources to remedy water pollution

resulting from conditions other than mine drainage,

and whether Section 316 is a constitutional, exercise

of the Legislature’s police power.” [414 A. 2d at

page 39]

The Court first found that this section properly ap-

plied to pollution from conditions other than mine drain-

age. It then took up the question of the Statute’s con-

stitutionality, stating,

“Appellants’ second contention is that Section 316 of

The Clean Streams Law is an impermissible exercise

of the police power, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-

tion.” [414 A. 2d at page 42]

The Court then made clear that it would not decide

the case on State law concepts of “fault”, causation or the

theory of “adoption” articulated by the Commonwealth

Court, but rather would deal directly with the constitu-

tional question presented.

The Court stated that it disagreed with Appellant’s

argument, held Section 316 to be a constitutional exercise

of the State’s police power:

“We disagree. First it is absolutely clear that the

corrective orders here are based on much more than

mere ownership or occupancy. As discussed above,

they are based upon legislation designed to eliminate

all water pollution, and the Environmental Hearing

Board's findings that a substance, determined to be

pollution, redies under appellant’s land and can

feasibly be removed. There is thus a reasonable and

concrete basis for the corrective orders here.” [414

A. 2d at page 45]

Statement of the Case 15

The concurring opinion of Justice Flaherty stated that

the majority opinion was actually providing for an un-

constitutional imposition of liability, based solely on

ownership or occupancy of property. He, therefore, con-

curred only in the result since he accepted the theory of

“adoption” articulated by the Commonwealth Court. He

said:

“A reading of the majority opinion might lead to the

belief that we adopt the strict liability construction

of Section 316 which would compel the expenditure

of financial sums by an owner or occupancy (sic) of

land based on no other factor but the ownership or

occupancy of the land.” [414 A. 2d at page 47,

Concurring Opinion, A-21] (Emphasis added)

° o °

Justice Flaherty then stated his belief that an exercise

of the police power had to be associated with the use to

which one puts his property and not his mere ownership

or occupancy. He said:

“It has always been recognized that the ‘right’ of

property ownership carrier with it a concurrent ‘obli-

gation’ which is inherent in the basis relationship of

an ‘owner of property to society. These ‘obligations’,

however, have always related to the use one puts to

property, not mere ownership. To construe the sub-

ject Act as providing for strict liability, based on

nothing more than the ownership or occupation of

land, would be to impose on innocent individuals,

the burden which should be borne by society as a

whole, thus, an unconstitutional taking. I, thus, con-

cur only in the result.” [414 A. 2d at page 48; Con-

curring Opinion, emphasis added, A-23—A-24]

Notice of Appeal from the Court’s Judgment to the

Supreme Court of the United States was filed with the

Lower Court on July 10, 1980.

16 The Substantial Federal Questions

THE SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTIONS.

Appellants Rogers challenged the constitutionality of

Section 316 of The Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act under

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States asserting that it violates due process in that

it imposes unlimited liability upon them for the removal

of a pollution condition from their property which con-

dition they did not creat or adopt solely by virtue of their

status as landowners. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

vania, in affirming the constitutionality of Section 316,

based upon mere status as an owner and the geographical

location of a polluting condition, has so drastically in-

fringed upon the personal and property rights of the

Appellants Rogers as to be oppressive.

If Section 316 based upon the decision of the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania were to be applied in the event

there had been an escape of radioactive material from

“Three Mile Island” which contaminated the ground water

and stream on an owner's property, it would require the

owner, who was blameless, to expend an unlimited sum

of money to remove that radioactive pollution. To apply

such a statute in the State of New York would allow those

owners of property in the vicinity of “The Love Canal” to

be required to bear the unlimited cost of removing the

toxic pollutants which they did not even know existed let

alone were they responsible for their creation. The effect

of Section 316 is clearly to allow a state, in this instance

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to ignore fault in de-

termining responsibility for the clean-up of polluting con-

ditions. It allows a state to merely impose by order, the

responsibility solely by virtue of the status of landowner

or land occupier.

The “police power” of the state must be reasonably

and prudently applied. The exercise of the “police power”

in Section 316 creates, as set forth above, a situation which

has not yet been judicially reviewed by your Honorable

Court.

The Substantial Federal Questions 17

This is not a case in which the state has exercised its

“police power” to place a mere prohibition or restriction

upon a lawful use of property which reduces the economic

value of the property as in municipal zoning. [See

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 60 L. Ed. 348, 36

S. Ct. 143 (1915); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369

U. S. 590, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987 (1962) ].

It is also not a case in which a state orders a property

owner to destroy a portion of his property in order to pre-

serve other property. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272,

48 S. Ct. 246, 72 L. Ed. 568 (1928).

Further, it is not a case in which a state, by virtue of

the use of a property owner of the property, imposing

affirmative cost obligations such as requiring noise, water

and air pollution controls at a manufacturing or chemical

facility. See, Queenside Hills Realty Co., Inc. v. Saxl, 328

U. S. 80; 90 L. Ed. 1096 (1946); Atchison, Topeka & Santa

Fe R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 346 U. S. 346,

74 S. Ct. 92, 98 L. Ed. 51 (1953); or in which a limited

fine, as distinguished from unlimited clean-up costs, is

imposed upon a property owner for the negligent or crimi-

nal act of a third person, but which could only have

occurred because of the property owner's use of its property

or operation of its business. United States v. General

Motors Corporation, 403 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975);

United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F. 2d 1305

(7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F. 2d

1310 (7th Cir. 1978).

As has been previously noted, the Environmental

Hearing Board specifically found that the polluting con-

dition was created by the activities of Mr. Jacoby, an

executive officer of Wood. There is no evidence in the

Record as specifically found by the Commonwealth Court

on its review that the Appellants Rogers had any knowl-

edge of its existence.

This is not even a case involving an innocent owner’s

forfeiture of property because of the criminal acts of his

18 The Substantial Federal Questions

Lessee. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,

416 U. S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974).

Finally, this is not a case in which a landowner or

occupier is assessed for improvements made in front of

the property occupied by him. Such assessments are uni-

formly upheld only to the extent that special benefits

accrue to the property assessed. See 16A C., J. S. Consti-

tutional Law, Section 661, pgs. 1035-1042 and particularly,

at pages 1037, 1038 and cases therein cited. In the

present case, no claim is made that removal of the pollutant

will benefit the Appellants who are the owners of the land.

Rather, what is at stake in the present case is the

propriety of a State’s raw, naked right through the use

of its “police power” to impose on a landowner or occupier,

the affirmative obligation to eradicate, at unlimited costs,

a polluting condition, based on nothing more than that

land owner’s status and geographical proximity to the

condition in question.

If the validity of this Statute is affirmed without fur-

ther consideration by this Court, it may signal legislatures

in other states desirous of attacking pollution problems,

that they may now abandon previous statutory enactments

designed to strike an acceptable balance between accom-

plishing desirable environmental goals and protecting the

rights of private individuals, in favor of expedient, but

oppressive laws which eliminate any consideration of such

rights.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has Misconstrued Prior

Holdings of This and Other Courts in Dismissing Ap-

pellant’s Contention That the Statute Is Unduly

Oppressive.

The analysis of the constitutionality of Section 316 as

applied by Pennsylvania’s highest court in this case is

wanting in several respects. First, its analysis partly rest

upon a consideration of economic impact of state law

found in cases dealing with regulation of uses of property

The Substantial Federal Questions 19

which, as well be explained below, have little bearing on

this case. Secondly, it deals with Appellant’s objection

that the Statute is unduly oppressive without considering

the elements of retroactivity, the fact that the Statute per-

mits and authorizes abdication by State officials of their

responsibilities to pursue the individual who actually

caused the polluting condition, and without considering

the serious potential for abuse in enforcing this law where,

as here, a polluting condition affects the property of sev-

eral innocent owners or occupiers of contiguous properties.

Finally, the Court ignored the oppressive manner of en-

forcement contained in the record of these proceedings

and contributed to that result by affirming a series of

conflicting orders which are thereby made internally incon-

sistent and incapable of fair applications.

The decision in this case by the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court does not blend neatly with any of the past holdings

of this Court. Appellants’ belief that the Statute is “unduly

oppressive”, is founded upon a multi-faceted combination

of factors not present in the cases cited by the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court as precedents:

(1) The government is not merely regulating

past “use” of the property by the party to be charged

with liability, but rather is taking resources from the

most expedient source at hand.

(2) The Statute imposes strict liability upon a

land owner or occupier for the illegal act of a third

person without any requirements on the State to

proceed against the third person who created the

polluting condition.

(3) The strict vicarious liability is being im-

posed retroactively.

(4) The statute as applied has harsh conse-

quences which impair the contractual expectations of

occupiers of land such as short term tenants and will

20 The Substantial Federal Questions

have serious impact on the expectations of past pur-

chasers of the property.

(5) The provision of the Statute which gives un-

limited discretion to the law enforcement agency with

respect to what may be required by way of com-

pliance is subject to abuse.

(6) The selective enforcement techniques being

used in the enforcement of this Statute, as illustrated

in this case are onerous and oppressive and may well

rise to a level of denial of equal protection under the

law.

It is submitted that the collection of features as

found in Section 316 and as interpreted by Pennsylvania's

highest court are sufficient to overcome any presumption

concerning the constitutional validity of mislegislative

enactment.

The Government Is Not Merely Regulating Past or Present

“Use” of the Property by the Party to Be Charged

With Liability, But Rather Is Taking Resources From

the Most Expedient Source at Hand.

It is erroneous to pass on the validity of this Statute

based solely upon cases which deal with the tension be-

tween limitations or regulations concerning the use of

property and the fifth amendment proscription against

government taking of private property for public purposes

without compensation. See generally J. L. Sax, Takings

and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 (1964). The ques-

tion in such cases is whether regulation or prohibition of

uses of property is so onerous as to constitute a “taking”.

And, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has pointed

out, reduction of property value due to regulation as to

use has to be complete before there is a “taking”. Hada-

check v. Sebastian, supra; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922),

Further, it has been held that where complete destruction

The Substantial Federal Questions 21

of private property used in an individual's business enter-

prise—although otherwise legal—is reasonbly necessary

to protect the rest of the community, the destruction of

that property does not constitute a compensable taking.

Miller v. Schoene, supra.

If a complete loss of property can be justified for the

purpose of ensuring the safety for the rest of the com-

munity, does this mean that there is no limit on the police

power? Even in Miller v. Schoene, supra, the owner of

the offending trees which were destroyed for the public

good was not required to pay for the cost of destroying

or removing them.

Appellant believes that the reduction-in-value anal-

ysis, cited by the Pennsylvania Court in its Opinion, is not

relevant here because the Statute under present con-

sideration does not seek to regulate any particular use of

property. Appellants are not asked to change the use of

their property. Appellants are not prohibited from put-

ting their property to a proposed more profitable use be-

cause of zoning, or regulation such as was encountered in

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U. S.

104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978), relied on so

heavily by the Pennsylvania Court. What remains is that

Appellants are being asked to eradicate pollution which is

present under the surface of property which they lease to

Wood. The “taking” does not need to be found through a

complex analysis of whether or not the government is

prohibiting some valuable use of property, or is physically

occupying it such as was found in Causby v. United

States, 328 U. S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206

(1946). The government is simply forcing the Appellant

to take affirmative action at enormous expense without

regard to the use of their property.

All of the cases cited by the Pennsylvania Court re-

quiring the positive expenditure of funds seem to involve

more than mere ownership or occupancy of property, i.e.

22 The Substantial Federal Questions

they involve regulating or prohibiting activity on the

property related to the use of that property. Thus, in

Queenside Hills Realty, Co., Inc. v. Saxl, supra, the re-

quired expenditures were for fire safety equipment related

to the safe operation of a rooming house. In Goldblatt v.

Town of Heampstead, supra, the Statute required the

operator of a quarry to fill existing holes as a condition to

the continued operation of its business. In Penn Central,

supra, the statute prohibited certain new construction and

required a railroad to maintain its terminal which was

designated as a historic landmark. Preservation of the

property had the dual benefit of meeting the objectives of

New York’s landmark regulation, and of maintaining

property used in the railroad’s business.

In Queenside, the property owner had the choice of

submitting to the regulation or ceasing his business opera-

tion. In Goldblatt, supra, the regulation in question im-

posed affirmative duties, under penalties of fine and

imprisonment, of refilling the existing excavation and con-

structing a new fence. However, it is important to note

that the Court in Goldblatt never ruled on the validity of

those affirmative duties, since enforcement of the affirma-

tive duties was not sought in the litigation before the

Court. )

The Statute Imposes Strict Liability Upon a Land Owner

or Occupier for the Illegal Act of a Third Person

Without Any Requirements on the State to Proceed

Against the Third Person Who Created the Polluting

Condition.

The pollution in question was caused by the illegal,

criminal acts of a third person, Jacoby.

The state court has cited modern cases imposing

vicarious liability on landowners for the negligent acts of

third persons. See, i.e., Portland Pipe Line v. Environ-

mental Improvement Commission, 414 U. S. 1035, 94 S. Ct.

The Substantial Federal Questions 23

532, 38 L. Ed. 2d 326, dismissing appeal for want of a

substantial federal question, 307 A. 2d 1 (Me. 1973); Gulf

Oil Corp. v. United States, 573 F. 2d 1303 (3rd Cir., 1978).

The distinguishing characteristic of those cases is that the

activity of the third party polluter was required to be

connected in some reasonable fashion to the furtherance

of the business activity of the party held responsible.

Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indi-

cated that neither it nor the Environmental Hearing Board

has had the issue of ultimate allocation of liability before

it, the result is that Rogers will be under compulsion to

expend funds to correct what is more properly Jacoby’s

responsibility, and will be left to their own devices to

recover from Jacoby. The Statute makes no provision for

singling out or proceeding against the actual polluter be-

fore seeking compliance from innocent landowners or oc-

cupiers who in some cases may in themselves be victims

of the polluting activity. If fines and jail terms are to be

the catalysts for positive action by innocent parties, it

seems anomalous that such compulsion is not provided

for use against the guilty party.

There is no factual finding or judicial holding in this

case that Appellants Rogers should stand in Jacoby’s shoes

as an actual wrongdoer or polluter. Section 316 of the

Clean Streams Law, at issue here, pursuant to which DER

issued the Orders, punishes the status of landowner or

occupier. That section of the law did not come into exist-

ence until 1970 long after Jacoby had created the polluting

condition in question. Section 316, is, at the very least,

quasi-criminal in nature and possibly truly criminal in

nature in light of the harsh penalties provided for under

Section 602 of the act for failure to comply with an Order

issued under Section 316. [Clean Streams Law, Act of

June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987 Article III, as amended July 31,

1970, P. L. 653, 35 P. S. Section 691.316, Section 602, 35

P. S. Section 691.602].

24 The Substantial Federal Questions

The Strict Vicarious Liability Is Being Imposed Retro-

actively.

It is not unreasonable to impose vicarious liability

upon a party for acts of persons under the dominion and

control of the party held responsible. It also may not be

reasonable to impose liability retroactively for prior acts

of the very party held liable, or persons svbject to their

control. Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania, 472 Pa.

115, 371 A. 2d 461 (1977).

However, it is beyond the pale of reason to impose

vicarious liability for the acts of third persons nor had

knowledge of the true nature of their acts, based upon

a Statute passed by a legislature fourteen (14) years after

the occurrence of such acts. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn

Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 49.L. Ed. 2d 752, 96 S. Ct. 2882

(1976).

While the Court has generally held that retroactivity

is a feature to be avoided except in certain appropriate

circumstances, Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rail-

road Co., 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468

(1935), modern law has allowed considerable latitude in

permitting retroactive application of regulation legislation,

where the cost of the remedy for a problem is allocated to

the person charged with the liability under the Statute as

an “actual, measurable cost of his business”. Usery v.

Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 2882, 49

L. Ed. 2d 752 (1976). However, a more recent decision

of the Court would indicate that retroactivity of legislation

is not a factor which can be simply ignored. Allied Struc-

tural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 57

L. Ed. 2d 727 (1978).

Retroactive liability for the acts of third persons under

Section 316 does not require that the polluting condition

arise in the course of the landowner or occupier’s business

and in this respect, does not come under the holding of

Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., supra.

The Substantial Federal Questions 25

Similarly, this case is not one in which retroactive

legislation should be justified based upon an “emergency”.

Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 1294, 92

L. Ed. 1694 (1948) [but compare Louisville Joint Stock

Land Bank v. Redford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854, 79

L. Ed. 1593 (1935)]. Nor is this statute justified as one

which permits retroactivity because the statute is merely

curative of technical ambiguities in prior legislation.

F. H. A. v. The Darlington, 358 U. S. 84, 79 S. Ct. 141,

3 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1958).

The Statute, as Applied, Has Harsh Consequences Which

Impair the Contractual Expectations of Occupiers of

Land Such as Short Term Tenants and Will Have

Serious Impact on the Expectations of Past Purchasers

of the Property.

One of the serious oppressive features of Section 316

is that it tends to introduce new dangers and pitfalls into

common transactions such as buying or leasing property.

The normal expectation of a purchaser or lessee of surface

rights to property is that he will get good title or the

right to use property for legal purposes.

What can be expected from this statute are variations

of what happened to Rogers in this case. The State,

wishing to have instant gratification, will attack the easiest

party to find, be it record owner or the person who is

present on the land, and use quasi-criminal sanctions to

compel a recovery for the purpose of abating polluting

conditions. The purchaser or tenant is then free to attempt

to pass the liability on to the “proper” party—a task which

is difficult at best and likely to be impossible in many

cases.

Instead uf proper and cooperative efforts with gov-

ernmental agencies to find and correct polluting condi-

tions, owners or occupiers who discover such conditions,

not created by themselves, will be encouraged to conceal

the conditions and pass them off to unsuspecting buyers.

26 The Substantial Federal Questions

The Provision of the Statute Which Gives Unlimited Dis-

cretion to the Law Enforcement Agency With Re-

spect to What May Be Required by Way of

Compliance Is Subject to Abuse.

The Statute gives unlimited discretion to law enforce-

ment officials to determine what may be required by way

of compliance with its own orders. The orders in this

case are themselves open ended in that compliance is con-

ditioned upon DER’s “acceptance” of plans and specifica-

tions of work to be done by Appellant, without any indi-

cation as to what standard, if any, will govern the

acceptance. Order of Environmental Hearing Board,

July 30, 1976. [A-48].

In Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78, 32 S. Ct. 31, 56

L. Ed. 102 (1911), the Court reversed an Order by a rep-

resentative of the Secretary of the Interior that a certain

private property owner within the confines of Yosemite

National Park mark and define his lands “by an agreed

understanding” with the Secretary’s representative. There,

the Court observed:

“A law requiring an owner in Appellant's situation to

fence his land might be within such power, though

of that we are not required to express an opinion.

A law making the trespass of his cattle on other lands

a criminal offense might be within such power.”

o oO a

“We have assured so far that Benson, the secretary’s

representative, has exercised a power in accordance

with the rules prescribed by the Secretary of the

Interior. This, however, may be questioned. The

orders of Benson are not the Curtin mark and define

his lands, but that he do so ‘by an agreed understand-

ing’ with him (Benson), so that there could be no

subsequent controversy about their boundaries. But

this gives to Benson, power to force a concession to

The Substantial Federal Questions 27

his ‘understanding’ and to require Curtin to submit

to a limitation to the area of his land or a limitation

of its uses. It is no answer to say that the power

would not be arbitrarily or unreasonably exercised.

It must be judged by what can be done under it, not

what may be done under it.” (Emphasis added )

Orders in the form upheld by the Court, place Ap-

pellants at the mercy of DER and in a position of corpo-

rate involuntary servitude. At this wiiting, almost seven

(7) years, to the day, after the issuance of the original

DER Orders, and after an expenditure of approximately

One Hundred and Eighty Thousand ($180,000.00) Dol-

lars on the pollution problem by the Federal government,

there exists no concrete answer as to how much expense

and effort by Appellants will be required in complying

with the DER orders as modified by the Environmental

Hearing Board. It would appear that the DER is free to

determine whatever it wishes with regard to the level of

compliance expected, without limit.

In addition, DER is in a position to force Appellants

to experiment on methods to solve the problem. The

experiment activity, if determined by the Board first to be

“feasible’, will mean that Rogers will be expending funds

to devise new methods of dealing with the problem which

more properly should be borne by the government.

The Selective Enforcement Techniques Being Used in the

Enforcement of This Statute, as Illustrated in This

Case Are Onerous and Oppressive and May Well Rise

to a Level of Denial of Equal Protection Under the

Law.

In its Adjudication, the Board found that the pollut-

ing condition not only exists under the property owned or

occupied by other parties to the litigation, Gum and Shell,

but that it also existed under the property owned and

occupied by several other parties, the identification of

whom were not disclosed in that proceeding. [Adjudica-

28 The Substantial Federal Questions

tion of Environmental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976,

Finding of Fact No. 74, A-70—A-71]. The Board also

found that the participation of such landowners or oc-

cupiers was necessary to complete the removal program.

[Adjudication of Environmental Hearing Board, dated

July 30, 1976, Finding of Fact No. 79, A-72]. Finally, the

Board held that as applied to Appellant and other parties

then before it, Section 316 could require them to correct a

polluting condition “only on the land, which is owned or

occupied by such person or entity and that it would be

‘unconstitutional’ to require the Appellant to take action

outside his or its land.” [See Adjudication of Environ-

mental Hearing Board, dated July 30, 1976, at pages 34

and 35, A-83].

The Commonwealth Court in its Opinion, has by

silence, affirmed these findings. It has also removed Shell

and Gum from these proceedings. In essence, Rogers,

together with Wood, will be required to attempt to re-

move a polluting condition under their property, which

cannot be removed without the cooperation of other land-

owners or occupiers, who by the lower Court’s decision,

cannot be proceeded against to give such cooperation.

Under these circumstances, requiring it to expend the

funds necessary to attempt to remove the pollutant, would

be a vain and wasteful act.

Moreover, this situation is not an unusual one. It is

probable that in the future, when a polluting condition of

a widespread nature is found to exist, it may well be under

lands owned or occupied by several different persons or

entities, some of whom mav be liable to correct the con-

dition and others of whom may not. To the extent that it

can be required to exhaust its entire resources in eradicat-

ing a condition that cannot be so eradicated without the

cooperation of others, then it is believed that said Order

is unconstitutional as applied to Appellants.

Therefore, it is submitted to your Honorable Court

that Section 316 as applied to the Appellants Rogers is un-

Conclusion 29

constitutional. The Federal questions raised under the

due process amendment to the United States Constitution

are substantial and gravely affect the property rights of the

Appellants Rogers. It is for these reasons that the ques-

tions presented are so substantial as to require plenary

consideration with Briefs on the Merits and oral argument

before your Honorable Court for their resolution.

CONCLUSION.

It is submitted that in light of all of the foregoing

reasons, that your Honorable Court should note juris-

diction in this matter and reverse the Order of the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMEs S. KILPATRICK, JR.,

15 Rittenhouse Place,

Ardmore, Pennsylvania. 19003

(215) 649-5200

Attorney for Appellants,

Clifford A. Rogers and

Virginia Rogers.

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