Opposition — Compania Maritime Navegacion Netumar, S. A. v. Irizarry

Supreme Court brief1981

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No. 80-94 AUG15 1980

[MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CU

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoner Term 1980

Companta Manttime Navecacion Netumanr, S.A.,

Petitioner,

—against—

Sam Irizarry,

Respondent.

— =

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Morris C:7WER

Counsel for Respondent

160 Broadway

New York, New York 10038

Questions Presented

Where the facts in evidence and as found by the jury,

namely: That Petitioner’s ship came into port covered

with snow and ice and containers in the hold blanketed

with ice; that the longshoremen were required to walk on

top of containers and unhook same when landed on the

stringpiece of the pier and so could not avoid the danger-

ous condition; that ice on top of the container was ex-

tremely hazardous; that by custom and practice shipowner

had the duty and the ship’s crew was required to clean

off the ice and to make the place of work reasonably safe;

that the longshoremen were never required to nor did

they clean off the ice; that when complaints were made to

the ship’s First Mate about the dangerous conditions he

shrugged, walked away, and the ice was never removed.

The questions presented are:

1. Should the verdict be disturbed on appeal where the

jury found shipowner failed to exercise reasonable care

under these circumstances and was negligent?

2. Where shipowner does not take exception to the jury

charge, should there be a reversal on appeal because of

possible theoretic differences between the Circuits as to

ship’s duty derived from standards of care, when:

(a) There is no conflict under the facts presented

and the ship’s duty was derived from custom and prac-

tice in the Port of New York and not from the “stan-

dard of care”, and

(b) On the facts in evidence as presented to the

jury there is no conflict between Circuits and plaintiff

would recover damages in any Circuit.

ii

3. Is shipowner relieved of liability for their negligence

when they turned over to longshoremen a hatch with cargo

of containers then in an icy, dangerous condition which

causes injury to a workman when shipowner could not rely

on stevedore correcting the condition since by practice and

custom ship’s crew had sole responsibility for removing

the ice?

4. Since the Federal Safety Regulations require that

slippery conditions be eliminated as they occur and the icy

condition on the container tops occurred prior to the long-

shoremen boarding the vessel, should the shipowner be

considered in violation of such regulation here?

5. Should this court disagree with and overrule the

Supreme Court holding in Edmonds yv, Compagnie Gen-

erale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979) so that any

negligence on the part of stevedore relieves shipowner of

their liability for their negligence?

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

CIID ROI ili caciabiploceidinteisstneeseonseceinutananccasonenan i

ee Be eS ai iiecnccniten sn cnececnesiniahind ptdthiereaascentiiin iv

Mr, MR I IO NN ia sca scctecnsartoncapeniliicerceogiede 1

RIE AN EA a a SE OO 1

DT eB CI I csc ecrencaccttenteens 6

3. The Opinion of the Cireuit Court ...00.0000...... 8

II. Reasons for Denying the Petition for a Writ of

IIE, “uct hicdacceladeetadeisaeeecilh dsktieallie che beigennsiiiencaiensibia 9

1. The Modern View of the Law as Applied in

I CII RIND aiicitcovsnchceecciseckveeacaiansetcnipcesins 9

2. The Non-Existent Conflict Between Circuits

Under the Facts Presented .0..................ccccceeee 16

I a adibtiesecemniomuits 24

Appenpix [—

Pertinent Portion of the Charge to Jury ............... la

TasBLe or AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Company, 585 F. 2d

Br Ge Ry CIEE. retichincnieaincssesscundishtesidbisintbaiabiniatinseainittaalaitn 17

Anuszewski v, Dynamic Mariners Corp, Panama, 391

F.Supp. 1143 (D.Md. 1975), aff'd 540 F.2d 757 (CA4

MII sinsssitonveibiseaselidiattsntniciintiidebeil asada echeelaeaitalas ideale 12

Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438

I TE a a 11

Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4 Cir. 1975) ........ 22

Darwin v. United States, 435 F.Supp. 501 (N.D.Cal.

a ae 12

Delos Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.,

fe fg 9. E. ) Ree 18, 19, 22, 23

Denny v. Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plov, 455 F.2d 1277

I a eee 12

Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443

Ff © 3 RRS ae ae iis 7, 13, 14, 19, 21

Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233

Re RN aS ae 22

Giglio v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.

ERS SCRA RA LOC Re ERE TONERS ESSE S ery 8, 9,12

Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d

RU I ea ed 20, 21, 22, 23

Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, 170

F.Supp. 601 aff'd 274 F.2d 875 (9 Cir.) cert. den.

363 U.S. 803 (1960) .. oo 20

Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co. " | 554 P2d 1287 rey r te.)

cont. dom. GB4 UF. GER (2GTT) mnceeccccceeeecreccerrcenecenc.

PAGE

Johnson v. A/S Iverans Rederi, 613 F. 2d 334 (1 Cir.

Ria iain lida sienlinlaiagla delaaticiembebnastslipinioeinnnesitobaconsis 12, 18, 19

Kermarec v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 358

ES UNCER SORE ERIE SOP RSE Dac pn 13, 14, 19

Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F. 2d 319 (2 Cir.

SI i dtiriaietillaaldeiehphdievnkintecnentihncsitadapntcnwbiotoesss.iblaieninapnpeetiinpinse 9

ER SE RLU Sa RRR rece Rs ee 8, 9, 15, 21

Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.

1964), cert. denied sub nom. Continental Gram Co.

v. City of Buffalo, 380 U.S. 944, 85 S.Ct. 1026, 13

ik ae labachiphehaesloossnaatcanssoene 24

Rich v. United States Lines, 596 F.2d 541 (3 Cir. 1979) 20

Other Authorities:

SE III... ssciiarcnsepsansennausiiasbepeiersncscnecnseotiiote) 8,13

ais senseuisncisaninddenaeclennbeneeseneosoreres 11

Joint Maritime Safety Code Part C, §1 -....0.00000..... 8,12

Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Edition Chap. 10, par. 61

pp. 394-396 ................. Wissen alalshitanteiaieWdtsAclapineniniicenisssnonkens 10

Restatement (Second) of Torts $3434 ............ 8, 9, 15, 16, 17,

18, 19, 22

Restatement of Torts, Second, Sees. 343-343A ...... 19, 21, 23

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Ruited States

OctoBerR Term 1980

No. 80-94

Compania Maritime Navecacion Netumak, §.A.,

Petitioner,

—against—

Sam Irizarry,

Respondent,

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I,

Statement of the Case

l. Facts

The Petition here should be denied since it is based upon

misstatements of fact and serious errors in law. Petitioner

tailors the facts to fit the law as they would like it to be

and then ask this Court to overrule the Supreme Court and

change the law to their liking.

The Petitioner’s “facts” are substantially different in

content and import from those facts ascertained from the

trial record by the Trial Court (see charge to the jury in

Appendix 1, Respondent’s Brief) as well as by the Circuit

Court as set forth in their opinion (Appendix B to the

Petition 4a-6a).

This case involves a working surface which was icy and

slippery and so supplied and provided by shipowner to

2

longshoremen who had to perform their work thereon. The

container tops were so slippery that at times the men

would have to crawl on their knees. The condition was

not created by the longshoremen but was in existence at

the time the longshoremen came on board to perform their

work of unloading the vessel.

The dangerous condition did not arise as a result of the

work of handling of cargo by the longshoremen. They were

on board to load and unload and not to do housekeeping

nor to correct the dangerous conditions on board defen-

dant’s vessel. The expertise of stevedores for which they

were hired did not play any part in the creation of the

hazard, The testimony shows that it was the ship’s crew

that was required to remove the ice on the containers and

not the duty of the longshoremen to do so.

The longshoremen did not undertake to correct the con-

dition but looked to the shipowner to do so. Complaints

were made to the First Mate about the slippery condition

but “He looked at me and he looked at the containers and

he shrugged his shoulders and he walked away.”

The jury found that shipowner did not act in a rea-

sonable manner under the circumstances and that it was

negligent. It also found that shipowuer had either actual

or constructive notice of the conditions complained of.

Despite the foregoing, shipowner asserts distortedly that

plaintiff should not succeed.

The testimony was simple. Plaintiff, a longshoreman,

was injured on February i, 1977 at about 7:45 P.M. while

on top of a container which was being discharged from

Hatch No. 1 of defendant’s vessel. The container top was

slippery with ice. He slipped and fell on the container

and then down to the stringpiece of the pier sustaining

injuries,

3

The container was a box, 20 feet by 8 feet by 8 feet. It

had eyes at each corner into which hooks would fit. To

discharge the container, four 20-foot wires with a hook at

the end of each was used. These hooks fit into the eyes of

the container and all four wires were connected to the

eargo hook. The container would be taken out of the hatch

and landed on the stringpiece of the pier. In order for it

to be hooked up for removal off the ship, the longshoremen

had to go on top of the containers, When landed on the

stringpiece, the longshoremen had to walk on top of the

containers to take off the hooks.

When the ship came into New York it was full of snow

and ice. The containers on the deck had snow thereon.

The containers below deck had ice and slush on them. After

removing the containers on deck, at about 5:00 P.M. the

hatch was opened, There was ice, broken ice and water on

top of these below deck containers.

When the hatch was opened, the First Mate was standing

on deck looking down onto the containers,

It was the ship’s duty to clean the ice and snow off the

containers. It was the longshoremen’s job to load and

unload the ship. They had nothing to do with the removal

of snow and ice on board. The longshoremen never re-

move snow or ice from the containers or anywhere else.

When the hatch was opened the conditions on the con-

tainers were very hazardous, icy and slippery. The con-

tainers had a blanket of ice.

When the containers below deck were seen, a witness

testified that he complained to the First Mate. He testified :

“Q. What was he doing. when you complained to

him?

A. He was standing and he was looking in the hatch.

Q. What did you say to him?

4

A. I said—I said, ‘What are we supposed to do,

work like this, with this snow and ice?’, and we have

to get on these containers which they’re sometimes

four high. It’s a 40-foot fall if you fall. It’s very

hazardous. I said, ‘How are we supposed to walk on

them?’

Q. What did he say, if anything?

A. He looked at me and looked at the containers

and he shrugged his shoulders and he walked away.

Q. Did you tell me approximately what time of the

day this was?

Q. Well, I could not be sure. It was towards the

evening or late afternoon.

Q. Did you do this on one occasion or on more than

one occasion?

A. Other than one occasion.” (Trial Transcript

54-55)

(It is this that the Petitioner, from the safety of his

office, characterizes as “a rhetorical expression of irrita-

tion” about seasonal weather effects, and erroneously

claims that the lower court held the shrug to be sufficient

“to shift the responsibility for the conduct of the discharge

operations”—p. 4 Petition. Such position is pure fantasy.)

The dangerous condition of the ice and snow on the

container tops was open and obvious. Complaints were

not made to the Hatch Boss because it was an obvious

condition and the latter saw it.

In removing the container from the ship, it was placed

on the stringpiece alongside the ship to be unhooked.

When plaintiff went onto the container for that purpose,

he took three steps, slipped and fell thereon and then fell

down onto the stringpiece.

5

Shipowner argues that they engage stevedores such as

plaintiff’s employer “to load and unload cargo” from their

vessel, Once more it becomes necessary to point out that

the use of the container top as a walking and working

surface is not loading and unloading cargo. It is not the

handling of cargo but the performance of housekeeping

chores that is involved.

Shipowner’s denial that they have any control where

longshoremen work is fallacious. They furnished an un-

safe place of work and by doing so they violated their

duty that they owed to plaintiff. For them now to claim

that they delegated their duty to stevedore is incredible.

If stated correctly, they claim the ship can delegate its

responsibility or liability for the consequences of its vio-

lation of its duty. When they speak of a non-delegable

duty equal to the warranty of seaworthiness they are

distorting the facts and law. They cannot tices their

liability for their own negligence.

In our case it is the shipowner that was wa is in the

best position to prevent the dangerous conditions from

arising again and similar accidents from occurring. It is

they who were in control of the vessel and its cargo when

the condition was created. They knew that unless some

special precautions were taken that on a winter crossing

ice would form on the cargo and longshoremen would

have to walk thereon. Such knowledge should have brought

forth a more positive attempt by shipowner to “control

the conditions”, They could have insulated their holds to

a greater and better extent; could have covered the cargo

with canvas or tarpaulins; could have spread non-skid

material on each container before ice formed thereon;

eould have placed non-skid material on the cargo after

the ice formed; could have made inspections to ascertain

the condition, corrected same or at least warned the long-

~~

6

shoremen; and the like. Obviously shipowner was in the

best position to prevent the accident from occurring. They

did none of the foregoing.

2. The Charge to the Jury

The Court charged the jury* that plaintiff must prove

that the accident occurred in the manner claimed by him;

that the defendant was negligent and its negligence was

the proximate cause of the accident, Negligence was de-

fined as the doing of some act that a reasonably prudent

person would not do or the failure to do something that

a reasonably prudent person would do under the same

or similar circumstances. It is the failure to use ordinary

care under the circumstances.

The jury was charged that the plaintiff had to prove the

claimed manner of the happening of the accident which

was as follows:

Plaintiff was required to work on top of a container;

that he slipped and fell because of ice and melting slush

on the top of the container; that the ship’s crew had failed

to remove the ice and slush; that he was“injured because

the shipowner breached its duty to provide him with a

safe place to work. He claimed that the ship’s First Mate

knew that there was ice and slush on the tops of the con-

tainer which were being unloaded from the ship and ship-

owner should have removed same. Its failure to do so

was a violation of its duty to supply him with a reasonably

safe place to work.

The Court reiterated in its charge that shipowner would

be liable for unsafe working conditions of which it was or

should have been aware and for any negligence by the

* Pertinent portions of the charge to the jury are reproduced in

Appendix 1 annexed to this brief in opposition.

7

ship’s crew; that plaintiff must establish that the Mate

knew that the ice and slush was on the top of the con-

tainer and negligently failed to have it removed; that the

ice had been on the top of the container for such a period

of time that it should have been discovered and removed

by the ship’s crew in the exercise of reasonable care under

the circumstances; that plaintiff contends that prior to the

accident a witness advised the Mate of the presence of ice

on the containers and that the Mate shrugged and walked

away. If the jury believed the testimony of this witness,

they could find that shipowner knew that there was ice on

the container and its failure to remove same may be con-

sidered negligence for which shipowner would be liable.

The jury was charged that plaintiff did not assume the

risk of his employment if the injury resulted from the neg-

ligence of shipowner. Comparative negligence was charged.

Following the charge, shipowner’s counsel stated it had

“no exceptions” thereto.

Shipowner requested a further charge that by “. . . em-

ploying the stevedore to discharge the vessel that the steve-

dore has certain responsibilities under the law which ship-

owner has a right to assume that the stevedore will per-

form.” The Trial Court refused to so charge as Edmonds

v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra, holds that

the negligence of the shipowner stands on its own two

feet and that such a charge would not be correct as a

matter of law; and that it would confuse the jury.

The Court might have also added that the requested

charge in the language used was irrelevant to the issues;

that the negligence of the stevedore should not be imputed

to the plaintiff; and that since shipowner and stevedore are

concurrently negligent here, the only question is,—did ship-

owner exercise reasonable care under the circumstances?

8

3. The Opinion of the Circuit Court

The Circuit Court affirmed the court below stating that

there was evidence from which the jury could have con-

cluded that:

1. Plaintiff’s job required him to walk across the top

of the container; 2. He slipped due to ice and slush on

the top of the container that had accumulated before the

ship reached port; and 3. The vessel had actual notice of

this condition.

The Court then stated that a Shipowner is not liable

to a longshoreman

“for physical harm caused by any condition whose

danger is known or obvious to the longshoreman, un-

less the shipowner should anticipate the harm despite

such knowledge or obviousness. Restatement (Second)

of Torts §343A; Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536

F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976). Both notice to the shipowner

and the necessity for Irizarry to walk across the con-

tainer are established by the evidence.” (5a)

The Court pointed out that the dangerous condition in-

volved here was not caused by and under the control of

the stevedore and longshoremen. That

“Giglio v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.

1980) recognized, 29 C.F.R. 1918.91(c) (“Slippery

conditions shall be eliminated as they occur.) does

not relieve the vessel “from responsibilities or duties

now placed upon them by law, regulation or custom.”

29 C.F.R. §1918.2(b). Moreover, the Joint Maritime

Safety Code, Part C, §1 provides, “The owner, master

and officers of the vessel shall supply and maintain

in safe condition for use all ship’s gear, equipment,

9

tools and work spaces which are to be used in steve-

doring operations.” (6a)

Il.

Reasons for Denying the Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari.

1. The Modern View of the Law as Applied

in the Second Circuit

The decision of the circuit court in our case is based

upon Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F. 2d 505 (2 Cir.

1976); Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F. 2d 319 (2

Cir. 1978); and dissenting opinion of Judge Oakes in

Gigho v. Farrell Lines Incorporated, 613 F. 2d 429 at 436-

438 (2 Cir. 1980).

In Napoli, plywood on deck cargo had snow thereon and

hence, was slippery. Plaintiff had to stand and walk on

it in connection with the performance of his work as sig-

nalman. He slipped and fell. The Court stated:

“[8] As we proceed with our task of adopting

appropriate land-based principles of negligence for

application under the LAHWCA, we would be lack-

ing in wisdom if we turned our backs on the changes

which increased social awareness has brought about

in traditional concepts of liability. Accordingly, we

believe that where a shipowner has notice of an

obviously dangerous condition, his duty of care to

longshoremen exposed to such danger should be as

set forth in § 343A of the Restatement of Torts above

quoted.” (509)

The Court rejected the Traditional interpretation of See.

343A since that incorporated contributory negligence as a

10

bar to the action and charged the injured with assumptions

of risk.

Eliminating these restrictions, the Court applied the

Modern view as set forth in Comment—subpar. (f) under

sec. 343A. See also Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Edition

Chap. 10, par. 61 pp. 394-395. The court stated:

“'5| Where dangers are unreasonable, their obvi-

ousness, standing alone, should not necessarily relieve

a defendant of all responsibility for their presence.

Although the invitee (or in this case the employee)

may be under a duty to avoid harm likely to result

to him from open and obvious dangers, he may not

be in a position fully to appreciate the risk or to avoid

the danger even though aware of it. For instance, his

attention may be distracted or his duties as an em-

ployee may require his unavoidable exposure to it.”

(508)

The Circuit Court held that the rule pertaining to ship-

owners generally, where a condition is obvious, the ques-

tion is whether (1) a longshoreman fully appreciated the

condition at the time of the occurrence, for example, his

attention was distracted, or (2) he could not have avoided

it since his job required him to work there. In this con-

nection the Circuit Court said that a man need not leave

his job or face trouble for delaying the work if he sees

a dangerous condition.

The Court stated:

“The thrust of Napoli’s testimony was that he had to

stand on the plywood in order to carry out his duties

of giving signals to the winchmen. Thus, it might be

argued that ‘f this was the only place for Napoli to

work and carry out his job, the vessel might reason-

11

ably anticipate that he would use it despite its obvi-

ous danger, since the only altrenatives would be to

leave his job or face trouble for delaying the work.”

(p. 509) (Emphasis edded)

The Circuit Court further stated that since shipowner

is best able to anticipute and prevent harm from obvious

dangers on a ship, he should be under a duty to take

corrective action.

Here Irrizarry could not avoid exposure to the danger-

ously slippery condition of the top of the container where

he had to walk to perform his work. The Shipowner knew

of the condition and the jury so found. Under such cir-

cumstances, the Shipowner had a duty to take corrective

action to make the place of work safe. To hold otherwise

would be contrary to the House and Senate Committee Re-

ports pertaining to the 1972 Amendments of the Act where-

in they expressed their intent to hold Shipowner liable

where, for example, there’s a slippery condition on the deck,

The dangerous condition was not created by plaintiff or

stevedore.

Furthermore, as the Circuit Court stated, there was testi-

mony that it was the Shipowner’s duty to clean off the ice.

The longshoremen did not do that work and they have a

right to rely on the ship’s crew performing their work in

a non-negligent manner,—not the reverse as Shipowner

erroneously claims.

The Circuit Court held shipowner not to be insulated

from the application of OSHA Regulations. See also

Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F. 2d 438

(9th Cir. 1979), wherein the Court stated at 446:

“Tn general, the regulations, which were promulgated

under 33 U.S.C. § 941, were intended to eliminate the

°%

12

risk of injury to all longshoremen and not just to

- those who exercise prudence. Denny v. Jugoslavenska

Oceanska Plov, 455 F.2d 1277, 1278 (CA5 1972). The

regulations might prove helpful in suggesting types

of measures deemed necessary for maintenance of a

safe ship. Darwin v. United States, 435 F.Supp. 501,

507 (N.D.Cal.1977), and are binding on the shipowner

where he knew or should have known of a violation

of the safety regulations. Anuszewski v. Dynamic

Mariners Corp. Panama, 391 F.Supp. 1143, 1145 (D.

Md. 1975), aff’d 540 F.2d 757 (CA4 1976)”.

See also, Johnson v. A/S Iverans Rederi, 613 F. 2d 334,

340 (1 Cir. 1980) wherein the Court stated that OSHA

Regulations would continue to apply to all parties and

may, in certain circumstances, define the appropriate stan-

dard of care.

As for reliance by Shipowner that stevedore would act

to correct the condition, Judge Oakes in Giglio, 613 F.2d

at 437, stated:

An important factor in assessing the likelihood that

the stevedore will act is the customary division of re-

sponsibilities with respect to a given risk.

Speaking of the ship’s duty to correct the dangerous con-

dition and make safe the area where the longshoremen had

to work, the opinion states at 438:

“That it is the ship’s duty is substantiated by Part C

§§ 1, 37 and 38 of the Joint Maritime Safety Code pre-

pared by the New York Shipping Association, Inc., the

International Longshoremen’s Association, and Port

of New York Joint Safety Committee, which surely

qualify under the Safety and Health Regulations as

a ‘regulation or custom’ and which read as follows:

13

1. The owner, master and officers of the vessel

shall supply and maintain in safe condition for use

all ship’s gear equipment, tools and work spaces

which are to be used in stevedoring operations.”

It should also be noted that Petitioner’s attempted appli-

cation of Sec. 1918.91(c) of the Safety Regulations is error.

That Section states that “slippery conditions shall be elimi-

nated as they occur.” The regulation is directed to the

time when it occurs. Slippery conditions on board ship

prior to turning same over to stevedores impose a duty

on shipowner to correct the condition for it is their duty

to furnish a reasonably safe place to work.

Thus, having a duty to alleviate the dangerous condition,

they acted in a negligent manner breaching their duty and

causing plaintiff to be injured. To have them escape liabil-

ity for their breach of duty would be unconscionable under

the facts in our case. Were this Court to agree with Pe-

titioner’s view, no cases could ever be brought against ship-

owner for their negligence, contrary to Congressional in-

tent. It would likewise reverse this Court’s opinions and

in particular, Kermarec v. Compagnie General Trans-

atlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) and Edmonds v. Campagnie

Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).

In the latter case this Court held that the Amendment to

the Statute did not override or modify the rule that the

longshoreman may recover the total amount of his damages

from the vessel if the latter’s negligence is even a minor

contributing cause of his injury, and if the stevedore is

partly to blame. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court

stated that Congress did not intend to modify the pre-

existing rule that a longshoreman who is injured by the

concurrent negligence of the stevedore and the ship may

recover for the entire amount of his injuries from the

14

ship. It points out that the Congressional Committee Re-

ports repeatedly refer to the refusal to limit the ship-

owner’s liability for negligence, which they felt left the

vessel in the same position as a land-based third party

whose negligence injures an employee. Because an em-

ployee generally may recover in full from a third party

concurrent tort feasor, these statements are hardly indica-

tive of an intent to modify the law then in existence.

Although there may be inequities that may arise there

should not be any shifting of the burdens onto the long-

shoremen. The Court makes clear that such burden of

inequity should not be placed on the longshoreman because

the Act seeks to protect him.

The Supreme Court further stated that the employer’s

fault is not imputed to the employee and there may be no

diminution of recovery due to the employer’s fault but

only due to his own fault.

Since the Supreme Court felt that whatever rights the

parties had at the time just prior to the 1972 Amendment

still appertain, it should be noted that the Supreme Court,

in Kermarec v. Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 1959,

358 U.S. 625, set forth its own negligence standard as “the

owner of a ship—owes to all who are on board for pur-

poses not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of

exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each

case”, (632)

Petitioner confuses the issues in a vain attempt to change

the law. In line with that approach they completely ignore

Edmonds. Many of the cases cited by Petitioner are based

on reasoning rejected in Edmonds and their conclusions

are in conflict with this opinion. It would have been im-

portant material and of benefit to this Court had Petitioner

distinguished that opinion.

15

The duty of shipowner to correct the dangerous condi-

tion under the facts in our case arises from a number of

sources including:

1. Napoli and Sec, 343A of the Restatement of Torts,

Second. (Modern rule)

2. The practice in the Port of New York where only the

ship’s crew does the cleaning and removal of the ice. The

longshoremen do not do that work.

3. Custom in the Port of New York for shipowners to

remove slippery conditions and ice.

4, OSHA Regulations.

It is presumed that “the standard of care” applied to

shipowner would also determine its duty. Under the facts

in our case, regardless of definition of ‘standard of care,’

shipowner breached its duty at least arising out of the

custom and practice in New York. Under the circumstances

shipowner is liable for injuries and damages that result

from their failure to exercise reasonable care.

To all intents and purposes, shipowner has an indepen-

dent obligation to furnish longshoremen with a reason-

ably safe place to work and to see that a longshoreman is

not exposed to harm.

Furthermore, the Congressional Committees’ Reports

and thus the intent of Congress was not to lessen ship-

owner’s duties owed to longshoremen and Congress felt it

would increase the safety on board vessels by holding ship-

owner liable for its negligence.

“Permitting actions against the vessel based on neg-

ligence will meet the objective of encouraging safety

because the vessel will still be required to exercise the

16

same care as a land-based person in providing a safe

place to work. Thus, nothing in this bill is intended to

derogate from the vessel’s responsibility to take ap-

propriate corrective action which it knows or should

have known about a dangerous condition.” (Sen, Re-

port, p. 10)

And the care required is reasonable care commensurate

with the dangers to be encountered. It should be noted that

the Committee stated that “longshoring remains one of

_ the most hazardous types of occupations” so that the stan-

dard of care is necessarily a high degree of care.

Under the facts in our case, in view of the custom and

practice in the Port of New York, the primary or perhaps

the sole obligation to remove the ice and make the place

of work safe was on the shipowner.

To hold that plaintiff could not recover against ship-

owner on these facts in any Circuit under any standard of

care that is applied, would make a mockery of Congres-

sional intent and in particular the example set forth in

the Congressional Committee reports.

2. The Non-Existent Conflict Between Circuits

Under the Facts Presented

Petitioner sets up a false issue of standard of care. They

failed to relate the various case holdings to the facts in

our case. By misstating facts and misinterpreting the law,

they confuse the real issue here.

Basically, they seek to show a conflict between the va-

rious Circuits alleging that Sec. 343A of the Restatement

was applied by the Second Circuit in our case whereas

others have rejected the application of said section or “re-

fined the application of the Restatement to longshoremen

suits and developed the present conflict” (p. 14, Petition)

with the Second Circuit.

17

Typical of Petitioner’s erroneous reasoning is found at

the very beginning of Point I. In discussing the First Cir-

cuit (p. 6, 7 Petition) Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Com-

pany, 585 F’. 2d 1142 (1 Cir 1978), is cited for the proposi-

tion that Sec, 343A is inapplicable to a case where injury

does not occur on the vessel, They urge a fictitious rule

of law based on “situs.”

Anderson is not analogous to our case and the above

proposition is not applicable. That case involves a dan-

gerous condition created by longshoremen on a pier upon

moving cartons of frozen fish by hilo on the pier after they

had been discharged from the vessel. The cartons had been

placed on pallets on the ship by longshoremen and were

so discharged onto the pier. Thereafter, forklifts carried

the pallets with the cartons to Anderson’s desk for check-

ing. While being so moved by the forklift, some cartons

fell to the pier floor. Wheels of the tractor rode over the

cartons resulting in fish juices and slime being spread on

the pier making it slippery under foot. The condition

existed on the pier for two days. Anderson slipped and

twisted his back.

The testimony showed that the longshoremen stacked

the cartons on the pallet; it was they who had the duty and

were required to place open and torn cartons into larger

or master cartons for unloading but failed to do so. If

the cartons were wet and soft, it was their duty to place

same into drums for discharging. Furthermore, it was they

who had the duty to maintain the pier; and it was their

forklift and operator who spread the slime on the pier.

The shipowner had no duties with respect to maintenance

on the pier. oe

Thus, a slippery condition was created on the pier. There

was no unsafe condition aboard ship as a result of slime

and no difficulty in discharging the pallets onto the pier.

18

The ship’s officers and crew did not know of the condition

created on the pier.

The First Circuit held that in view of the absence of

notice to shipowner and because the dangerous condition on

the pier was created by the longshoremen after the cargo

had been discharged from the vessel and after it was moved

by the forklift, shipowner had no duty or liability for the

breach of a duty to anyone injured on the pier. The Court

therefore held that Sec, 343A was not applicable. The

Court however said that when a dangerous condition is

created off the shipowner’s premises which is not “inte-

grally related with conduct” on board the ship, supervisory

control by shipowner is lacking.

It is this type of oceurrenec vreated on a pier unbeknownst

to shipowner that gave rise to the First Circuit’s stating

that a shipowner could not be held liable under 343A for

injuries on the pier.

It should be noted that our case does not involve a

condition on the pier. It does involve a condition of cargo

at a time integrally connected with the conditions on board

ship; and a condition known to shipowner, It should also

be noted that in Delos Santos vy. Scindia Steam Navigation

Co., Ltd., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir.), the rule stated therein

sets forth the standard of care as follows: “A vessel is

subject to liability for injuries to a longshoreman work-

ing on or near the vessel caused by conditions on the

vessel .. .” (485).

Thus, the accident need not occur on the vessel to find

liability on the part of the shipowner.

Despite the foregoing, Petitioner proceeds to cite John-

son Vv. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F, 2d 334 (1 Cir. 1980)

claiming that that case enunciates the law to be applied

in cases where the injury has occurred on the vessel. They

19

ignore the fact that Johnson follows Santos, They also

fail to inform the Court that in Johnson, the First Circuit

rejected the application of Sec. 343A (the Traditional

view) because it was intermixed with assumption of risk

and contributory negligence as a bar to the action. Since

this contravened the intent of Congress, the Circuit Court

felt that the Kermarec standard of care, namely, “reason-

able care under the circumstances” should apply. The

Court noted that congress intended that the standard of

care must be designed to have the maximum, positive im-

pact on safety and it must reflect the fact that the LHWCA

is a remedial statute enacted to protect the longshoremen

and not the vessel. They cite Edmonds v. Compagnie

Generale Transatlantique, supra in support of their posi-

tion. It is because of such important considerations the

First Circuit adopted the standard of care owed long-

shoremen by the vessel which called for “reasonable care

under the circumstances” which permits a finding of neg-

ligence upon showing: 1. That the vessel knew or should

have known of the condition aboard ship which led to the

injury; 2. That such condition would pose an unreason-

able risk of harm to longshoremen; 3. That the vessel

failed to exercise reasonable care “to protect the long-

shoremen against that danger.”

The foregoing is consistent with the charge to the jury

in our case.

It is of interest to note that the Court viewed Sees, 343

and 343A of the Restatement to be more favorable to the

vessel than the standard of care that they favored. Since

the charge to the jury there was based on Sec, 343A and

the jury verdict was nevertheless in plaintiff's favor, the

Court felt that it would also have found the vessel solely

negligent under the standard of care adopted by the First

Cireuit and hence, the verdict should not be disturbed.

20

Obviously, Petitioner has missed the point and were

plaintiff's case tried in the First Circuit, under the stan-

dard set forth in Johnson, plaintiff would have recovered

in any event. Hence, there is no conflict of interest be-

tween the First and Second Circuits as it pertains to the

facts in our case and in the result that would follow.

Petitioner is clearly in error as to the meaning and im-

port of the cases in the Third Circuit. They have over-

looked Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. 610 F.2d

116 (3 Cir. 1979). There the Court analyzed the “pattern

of our earlier decisions” (124) which included Rich v.

United States Lines, 596 F.2d 541 (3 Cir. 1979) and Hurst

v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3 Cir.) cert. den. 434

U.S. 861 (1977). The Court commented that these decisions

“do not, however, speak directly to the scope of the ves-

sel’s independent duty under §905(b) to ‘exercise the same

care as a land based person in providing a safe place to

work.’” (124) Griffith adopted the standard of care which

imposes on the shipowner the duty to exercise reasonable

care under all the circumstances in the case.

The defendant barge owner argued in Griffith against

this standard of care, claiming that:

“« . , a vessel should not be held liable in negligence

under §905(b) if it has delivered the ship ‘in such

condition that an expert and experienced stevedoring

contractor, mindful of the dangers he should reason-

ably expect to encounter’ will be able to load or unload

the vessel safely by excercising ‘ordinary care under

the circumstances,’” (124)

This is the same approach that Petitioner takes by urging

the application of Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet In-

ternational, 170 F.Supp. 601 aff'd 274 F.2d 875, (9 Cir.)

cert. den, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).

21

The Third Circuit rejected this approach contrary to

Petitioner’s view, stating:

“Under :American’s first proposed standard of care

the vessel would be relieved of liability to a longshore-

man for unreasonably dangerous conditions on board

ship whenever the stevedoring contractor failed to per-

form his tasks in an “expert and experienced” fashion.

This would occur whether or not the individual long-

shoreman was personally at fault. The proposed rule

thus imputes to the non-negligent longshoreman the

negligence of his stevedore employer, and establishes

that negligence as a complete bar to recovery against

the vessel. This result is at variance with the Supreme

Court’s interpretation of the 1972 Amendments in

Edmonds v. Campagnie Generale Tramsatlantique,

supra. It is inconceivable to us that the Court, which

disapproved a rule that imputes the negligence of the

stevedore to the longshoreman to reduce his recovery

against a negligent shipowner, would approve a rule

barring all recovery against a negligent shipowner

on the basis of imputed employer negligence.” (124)

Barge owner, in Griffith, alternatively urged that the

Court adopt the standard of care established in the Restate-

ment of Torts, Second, Secs. 343-343A. The obvious intent

there was to have the Third Circuit adopt the Traditional

point of view of the Sections rather than the Modern view

as set forth in Napoli, supra. The Court understood it to

be so and referred to Comment (e), §343A (but see Com-

ment (f)) and rejected the application of said Section be-

cause that would mean that a negligent invitee assumes the

risk of injury. This would be contrary to the stated in-

tention of Congress to abolish the doctrine of assumption

of risk in these cases and have comparative negligence

apply.

22

Perhaps more important as it affects the Petition here,

the Circuit Court noted that:

“ , . the same result would be reached whether one

applied the Restatement $343 formulation or the more

universal duty to exercise reasonable care under all

the circumstances.” (123)

This, of course, would be so if the Modern view as ex-

pressed in Napoli and Comment (f) of §343A were applied.

The Fourth Circuit has applied at times the Traditional

concept of negligence which imputes stevedore’s negligence

to the longshoremen; charges plaintiff with assumption of

risk and charges the stevedore with primary obligation to

correct the dangerous condition relieving shipowner of its

liability. This, however, is contrary to Congressional in-

tent and contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Edmonds. Perhaps more to the point is Bess v. Agromar

Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4 Cir. 1975). There plaintiff claimed

that shipowner breached its duty to provide suitable dun-

nage to be used in covering bales of cargo. The Circuit

Court in effect held that if shipowner had the duty to fur-

nish dunnage or to have someone there to make it avail-

able or there was the practice or custom in the trade for

shipowner to provide the dunnage, the shipowner is li-

able for the results of failing to so provide same.

Even petitioner recognizes that if there is a duty to

correct open and obvious conditions, there is liability for

failure to correct same. (P. 12 of Petition.) In our case

as hereinbefore set forth, shipowner did have a duty to

correct the dangerous condition and failed to do so.

The Fifth Circuit still considers Gay v. Ocean Transport |

& Trading Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5 Cir. 1977) as the law to

be followed. In that case the Court adopted the Modern

rule as set forth in Napoli, It noted that the Traditional

23

rule is premised on the concepts of contributory negligence

and assumption of risk which are inappropriate in 905(b)

cases.

The Petition here finds the ‘standard of reasonable care

under the circumstances’ as set forth in Santos v. Scindia

Steam Navigation Co., supra, is not supported by legisla-

tive history or the various courts’ opinions. Presumably

the same objection would apply to the Johnson Opinion of

the First Circuit and the Griffith Opinion of the Third Cir-

cuit. It is submitted that the three foregoing opinions make

considerably more sense in the light of Congressional in-

tent and in keeping with social progress. The archaic views

expressed by all too many courts with involved explana-

tions attempting to rationalize decisions that do not avoid

harsh results should not be encouraged. Petitioner would

have the clock turned back to the previous century.

Sufficient unto itself is the observation of the Court in

Santos, 598 F.2d at 491, fn. 8, that the “standard of rea-

sonable care under the circumstances is very similar to

the standard set forth in the Restatement of Torts, Sec.

343 and 343A minus the limitations placed on recovery by

Sec. 343(b) and 343A(1).” Had the District Court there

not relied on the limiting provisions of said sections, the

Circuit Court would have treated the law applied as harm-

less error.

The standard of care applied in our case is, therefore,

not in conflict in result obtained if it were tried in the

First, Third and Ninth Cirenits. Nor would the facts in

our case have resulted in a different verdict if tried in

the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. The duty of shipowner to

take corrective measures here not only arises from the

standard of care applicable, but such duty stems from cus-

tom and practice in the Port of New York. There is testi-

mony in our case showing such practice. Not only does

v4

shipowner have such duties from the OSHA Regulations,

but from the Safety Code promulgated by the shipping in-

dustry referred to in the Opinion of the Circuit Court in

our case. What better way of establishing custom and

usage in a trade than such industry-wide code.

Having violated its duty, shipowner could not shift its

responsibility for the injuries that resulted by claiming

the employer should have taken care of it. The Court in

Lopez stated that there was no reason, as a matter of

fundamental tort law, why it should not be held liable

in damages for its own negligence.

“Tt is well established tort law that “an actor whose

negligence has set a dangerous force in motion is not

saved from liability for harm it has caused to inno-

cent persons solely because another has negligently

failed to take action that would have avoided this.”

Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719

(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. Continental Grain

Co. v. City of Buffalo, 380 U.S. 944, 85 S.Ct. 1026, 13

L.Ed.2d 963 (1965).” (581 F.2d at 324)

Il.

CONCLUSION

The issues raised by Petitioner claiming conflicting stan-

dards of care as a basis for the relief requested herein is

a fictitious one. It has no bearing on the determination

of our case on the facts in our case. The last sentence of

the Petition (p. 23) reveals shipowner’s purpose herein—

namely, consolidation with other cases in which petitions

have been granted, where the same “standard of care issue”

is raised.

25

To support its position, shipowner changes the facts in

our case and distorts the law. We are unaware that such

approach has ever justified the granting of a Writ of

Certiorari.

Petitioner’s obvious desire to participate in a matter in

which an appeal is pending could be achieved in some

other way and should not involve our case in the manner

pursued.

Every court, no matter what its view of the standard

of care, would, on the facts here in evidence, sustain the

verdict of the lower court. The decision of the Circuit

Court, sought to be reversed, should be affirmed. Denial

of the shipowner’s Petition would effectively do just that.

It is, therefore, submitted that the Petition should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Morris CizNER

Counsel for Respondent

160 Broadway

New York, New York 10038

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1

_ Pertinent Portion of the Charge to Jury

[197] * * *

Turning to the facts of this case, on February 1, 1977,

the plaintiff, Sam Irizarry, was a dock man, employed by

Sealand Terminals, Inc., a stevedoring company. As such,

he was a harbor worker. I shall sometimes refer to him

as a longshoreman.

In this suit he asserts a claim for damages which he

alleges were caused by the negligence of the defendant

Companhia Maritima Navegacion Netumar, S.A. The de-

fendant which I will sometimes call the shipowner, denies

that it was negligent or that it violated any duty it owed

to plaintiff.

In addition, it claims that plaintiff caused or contributed

to his own injury. Let us consider the plaintiff's claim.

In order to recover, the plaintiff must prove by a pre-

ponderance of the credible evidence that the accident oe-

curred in the manner claimed by him, that the defendant

was negligent and that its negligence was a proximate

cause of plaintiff’s accident. What is the negligence?

[198] Negligence is the doing of some act that a rea-

sonably prudent person would not do or the failure to do

something that a reasonably prudent person would do

under the same or similar circumstances.

In other words, it is the failure to use ordinary care

under the circumstances.

The prior fact that an accident happened to the plain-

tiff does not by itself make the shipowner liable to him.

The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the ecred-

ible evidence that an accident happened to him that was

caused by the shipowner’s negligence,

la

2a

Appendix 1

The plaintiff claims that he was injured because the ship-

owner negligently failed to provide him with a safe place

to work.

To sustain his claim he urges that the failure by the

ship’s crew to remove ice and melting slush from the top

of a container on which the plaintiff was required to work

caused him to slip and fall, thereby sustaining injuries.

He claims that the shipowner had a duty to provide him

with a safe place to work, that the shipowner breached its

duty and that as a result he was injured.

He claims that the ship’s first mate knew that there was

ice and melting slush on the tops of containers which

were being unloaded from the ship, and that [199] the

shipowner should have had the ice and melting slush re-

moved and that its failure to do so was negligence. In

this case a violation of the shipowner’s duty to supply Mr.

Irizarry with a reasonably safe place in which to work.

The shipowner would be liable for unsafe working con-

ditions of which it was or should have been aware and for

any negligence by the ship’s crew. To recover, the plain-

tiff must establish that the mate knew that ice and melting

slush was on the top of the container on which the plain-

tiff alleges that he slipped and fell; and that the defendant

negligently failed to have it removed, that the ice or melt-

ing slush had been on the top of the container for such a

period of time that it should have been discovered and re-

moved by the ship’s crew in the exercise of reasonable

care by the shipowner under the circumstances.

Plaintiff contends that prior to the accident, Mr. Espo-

sito, a member of plaintiff’s gang, advised the mate of the

presence of ice on the containers, and that the mate

shrugged and walked away.

3a

Appendix 1

If you believe the testimony of Mr. Esposito in this re-

gard, you may find that the shipowner knew that there

was ice on the containers and its failure to remove the

ice may be considered negligence for which the shipowner

would be liable.

[200] You have heard me use the words “proximate

cause.” In order to show proximate cause, it is necessary

for the plantiff to demonstrate that a chain of events

flowed from defendant’s claim of negligence and led to the

damages which plaintiff seeks to recover, a chain of events

unbroken by any other event for which the defendant is not

liable.

If you find the shipowner negligent and that the ship-

owner’s negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's

accident, the shipowner would be liable whether or not you

find that the plaintiff is also negligent. It is not a valid

defense to a suit like this one to contend that the injured

longshoreman assumed the risk of his employment if the

injury resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of

the shipowner.

Although a longshoreman never assumes the risk of

injury from the negligence of another, it is a fact of com-

mon knowledge that in almost every occupation aboard

ship there is some inherent and unavoidable risk which

does not arise out of negligence.

A longshoreman when he enters upon his calling must

assume all inherent and unavoidable risks of his occupa-

tion as all persons must and no person may recover for

injuries resulting solely from such inherent and [201] un-

avoidable risks. Also, the shipowner is not liable merely

because there has been an accident and a longshoreman has

been injured, The shipowner is liable only if it has been

negligent. If a longshoreman is injured as a result of the

4a

Appendix 1

normal hazards or risks of the business in which he is en-

gaged without participation on the part of anyone else, he

is not entitled to recover damages from the shipowner,

You heard counsel for the defendant contend that the

plaintiff was himself negligent, and that the plaintiff’s

negligence caused his injury. This is a defense, and the

burden of proving the plaintiff was himself negligent or

as it is sometimes said, contributorily negligent is on the

defendant. But the fact that the plaintiff’s acts may have

contributed to causing his accident in an injury, does not

by itself prevent his recovery of damages. In suits like

this one, you are required to find whether the plaintiff was

guilty of what we call contributory negligence, and if so,

what percentage’ his contributory negligence contributed

to the accident, but this does not prevent his recovery. It

only reduces the amount.

[208] Mr. Lassoff: But they won’t know necessarily

it’s a stipulated fact.

Mr. Delaney: He said it was stipulated.

The Court: I think I just said that the parties stipulated

as to medical expenses. I don’t believe I did give the

amount. I will do that, because you did so stipulate.

Are there any requests for supplementary instructions,

Mr. Lassoff ?

Mr. Lassoff: No, sir.

The Court: Very well.» Mr. Delaney, are there any

questions? ”

Mr. Delaney: The defendant has no exceptions, your

Honor. The only further request to charge is that with

regard to the shipowner’s duty to provide plaintiff with a

safe place to work that this—the shipowner does not owe

da

Appendix 1

the plaintiff an absolute duty to provide a safe place to

work and that consequently by employing the stevedore to

discharge the vessel that the stevedore has certain re-

sponsibilities under the law which the shipowner has a

right to assume that the stevedore will perform.

Mr. Lassoff: Your Honor, the plaintiff is not the steve-

dore. Whatever rights the ship has had against the

stevedore, Congress has stated in the Edmonds v. Com-

pagnie case it’s too bad if the ship has to bear that [209]

burden but it says the system devised by Congress did not

intend to pass the economic loss of the stevedores negli-

gence onto the longshoremen and that is what Mr. De-

laney is trying to do.

The Court: I have had the opportunity to review the

syllabus in Edmonds v. Compagnie General Transatlantic,

decided by the Supreme Court on June 27, 1979.

As I read the Edmonds case, the liability and the ques-

tion of the negligence of the shipowner stands on its own

two feet. I think if I were to supplement my charge to

the extent requested, it would not be correct as a matter of

law and would be confusing upon the jury. I think I have

set forth the law as it presently exists, and therefore I

decline to supplement my charge.

Is there anything further?

Mr. Delaney: Nothing further. Just I would like to note

my exception,

The Court: You have your exception.

The one thing I will do is to indicate to the jury that the

parties have stipulated that the medical expenses were

$1,545.

Is there anything further?

Mr. Delaney: No, your Honor.

Mr. Lassoff: No your Honor.

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