Opposition — Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers

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Supreme Court, U. §.

FILED

AUG2 0 19890

No. 80-33 MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

rr

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1980

Smitty Baker Coat Company INc.,

Petitioner,

V.

Unrrep Mine Workers or AMERICA,

Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

Harrison Comps

0) Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 638-0530

Stuart B. Campsetw, Jr.

Post Office Box 320

Wytheville, Virginia 24382

(703) 228-3183

EK. H. Rayson

United American Plaza

Suite 2521

Knoxville, Tennessee 37929

(615) 525-5134

Counsel of Record for Respondent

United Mine Workers of America

Press of Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc.. Washington, D. C.

i.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CouUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE .......... errr rye 1

Bee OE ee Ge sk a ko kn RR 1

Is Gees OD gs yank dhe a hues cveueebene 2

1. Petitioner’s Mining Operations and Labor

Be PU Oe Erte ey eae ne 2

2. The “Conspiracy” Evidence. ................ 7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........cccccccccccccccccccs 12

SI oo os 8 ds cet cewek nde wa ke eventos 14

A. The Court of Appeals Has Correctly Construed

Pennington and Related Decisions; and it Has

Correctly Applied Those Decisions to the Facts

OE Nb iGa 5 deh 6 ¥5chsds eevee 14

B. The Lower Courts Correctly Held That the Rec-

ord Contains No Evidence From Which the Jury

Could Have Concluded That Petitioner’s Claimed

Damage Was Proximately Caused by the Con-

MONE Fa con wc ivdses dn cee eel seaesae ane 18

C. Petitioner’s Contention That the Lower Courts

“Invaded” the Province of ¢he Jury in Violation

of the Seventh Amendment Fails to Raise a Con-

stitutional Question and is Plainly Without Merit 22

PPO e prairie heer rr nah 25

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CasEs: Page

Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251

‘).. | SPE re tT eT T vier Tete 23

Comfort Trane Air Conditioning v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d

1378, 1383 (Sth Cir. 1979) ....cccccccccccccccess 18

Connell Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters 421 U.S. 616

PII cccnbeetu saancctseusetecescaisiwosss a

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,

Se Cs GP GE kv vv ccescadedcecncdddinces 22, 23

Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437,

SEE LUT nin neki pneasentcsiaretvanevens 24

Manaia v. Potomac Electric Power, 268 F.2d 793, 799

(4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied ................ 22, 24

Meat Cutters Union v. Jewell Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676

SE weer snsedinacpnentasedevsecen banaeeeeus 3

NLRB vy. Trosch, 321 F.2d 692, (4th Cir. 1963), cert.

denied 375 U.S. 908 (1064)... ..cncccceccessess 19

NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local 449 [Buffalo Linen],

gop & ge -s Raerer ry Tere ETE Terre ree 16

NLRB vy. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956)....... 20

Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971) .... 8,10, 14, 16,17

Rogers v. Missowri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 537

Sf ee eeorerr perder crrrrry rrr hoe 21

Smith v. Reinauer Oil Transport, 256 F.2d 646, 649

Cie UE, TOG odes cc venccccisycessivenciteues 24

Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. UMW, 457 F.Supp. 1123

CU Ws SE bc occ enevedpaseess ciaeenis 2,18, 19

Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. UMW, 620 F.2d 416 (4th

Ge, MED 3s Sad ce ineecsAckepeesnsebarvena 2, 16, 17, 19

iii

Page

Solar Fuels Company v. UMW, 346 F.2d 789 at 794-5

(3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 909 (1974) .. 12

Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper

Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931) ......ccccccccccces 22

Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. UMW, 416 F.2d

CIE vn cingaebceescceqnaesutenncvstsateceseres 10

Terrell Machine Company v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088

(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 929.. . 19

UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) .......... 8,

9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20

U.S. v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925) ........... 21

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Haseltine Research, Inc., 395

U.S. 100, 114, m. 9 (19GB) .....ccccccccccccene —

U.S. ConstTITuTION AND STATUTES:

Oe CN, SI, WE och eccscccwcnccsecen 13, 22, 23, 24

Clayton Act, Section 4 ...........cecccccccccceeees 16

Labor-Management Relations Act, Sec. 301 [29 U.S.C.

Dic cage ies sotaneetesss (neko a Cra 1

Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959

hit 7? | eer rrererrrT re tree ee

Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Sections 1 and 2 [15 U.S.C.

PEE DE ing cGeesdea SOs Naeheteseeretes vances 1

MISCELLANEOUS :

5 A Moore’s Federal Practice, 50.07(2]............. 22

“The Great Employment Controversy”, Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science,

(March 1962), pp. 46, 49-50 ......... eee eee ee eee 9

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1980

No. 80-33

Smirry Baker Coat Company Inc.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

Unrrep Mine Workers or AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

Petitioner, Smitty Baker Coal Company, Inc., sued the

Respondent, United Mine Workers of America, for damages

under the Labor Management Relations Act, including

Section 301, 29 USC §185, and under Sections 1 and 2 of the

Sherman Act, 15 USC 8§1 and 2.

At trial Petitioner abandoned all actions other than

that under the Sherman Act (1131a).' A jury trial resulted

in a verdict against UMW for $1,250,000 (28a-30a).

* References with the suffix ‘‘a’’ are to the Joint Appendix in

the Court of Appeals; and with the suffix ‘‘App’’ are to the ap-

pendix to the Petition.

2

The District Court sustained UMW’s motion for judg-

ment NOV (53a) upon the ground that there “was no

evidence of record upon which the jury could have reason-

ably found that the damages sustained by the plaintiff

were in any way caused by the actions of the defendant

taken pursuant to an illegal conspiracy” (80a). Smitty

Baker Coal Co. v. UMW, 457 F.Supp. 1123, 1135 (W.D.

Va. 1978)

Petitioner appealed. UMW cross-appealed—asserting

error in the denial of judgment NOV on the conspiracy

issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the

action. It held that the evidence did not sustain the verdict

on the conspiracy issue and sustained the dismissal on the

proximate cause issue for “the reasons stated by the dis-

trict court in its detailed analysis of the evidence” (82

App.) Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. UMW, 620 F.2d 416, 438

(4th Cir., 1980)

B. Statement of Facts

1. Petitioner's Mining Operations and Labor Relations ”

Under the heading “Facts Not In Dispute”, Petitioner

discusses its mining operations and its relationship with

UMW but it has failed to state facts which are central to

the decisions below and has misstated others.

Petitioner started its mining operations in 1969 with a

capital of $100 on coal lands leased from Peabody Coal

Company.’ It became a party to the 1968 UMW Agreement

and operated profitably thereunder until the strike of Octo-

ber 1, 1971, which gave rise to this case.

2 The facts set forth herein are more fully stated in the opinion

of the Court of Appeals at pages 36-43 of the appendix to the

Petition.

® Petitioner had after-tax profits of $9,968.12 for the year end-

ing December 31, 1970, and after-tax profits of $36,104.38 for the

year ending December 31, 1971. See 620 F.2d at 419.

3

Petitioner’s general manager, Ralph Baker, testified

that Peabody, itself a coal operator and a signatory to

the 1968 Agreement, told him that he would have to sign a

UMW agreement. UMW Representative Clark said he

called upon Baker at the request of union miners and was

told by Baker that he intended to operate under the agree-

ment. Baker was then doing preliminary work. Later

Clark left a copy of the 1968 Agreement with Baker, which

Baker signed on October 13, 1969 (100a, 905-906a).

The 1968 Agreement was subject to termination as of

September 30, 1971. UMW gave notice of termination and

negotiations with the Bituminous Coal Operators Associa-

tion (“BCOA”) ensued.’ No agreement was reached and a

strike of employees of signatory operators, including

4*The property leased to Petitioner was property available to Pea-

body for mining through its own employees. As a signatory to the

1968 Agreement, Peabody was bound by the following provision:

‘“*As a part of the consideration of this agreement, the opera-

tors signatory hereto agree that this agreement covers the

operation of all of the coal lands, coal producing and coal

preparation facilities owned or held under lease by them, or

any of them, or by any subsidiary or affiliate at the date of

this agreement, or acquired during its term which may here-

after (during the term of this agreement) be put into produc-

tion or use. The operators agree that they will not lease,

license or contract out any coal lands, coal producing or coal

preparation facilities for the purpose of avoiding the applica-

tion of this agreement or any section, paragraph or clause

thereof’’ (1198a).

As the Court of Appeals noted (79 App), this provision in one

form or another has been incorporated in every UMW contract

when its inclusion was directed by the War Labor Board in 1943.

(1023a).

5Since at least 1922, UMW has negotiated first with a basic

group of operators, which has periodically changed in composition,

and used the agreement reached as the basis for its demands

upon others (1009a-1010a; 1082a-1084a). See Justice Goldberg’s

dissent in Meat Cutters Union v Jewell Tea Co. 381 US 676, 698

(1965).

4

Petitioner, commencea “n October 1. The strike lasted

until the 1971 Agreement was reached on November 13.

Baker testified he was not given a notice of termination

(192a) and this action originally included a claim for

breach of contract under 29 USC §185. As noted, however,

this claim was withdrawn at trial. In any event, Baker

knew the strike was coming. He asked Representative

Clark if he could sign a stipulation for a retroactive adop-

tion of any new agreement and work during the strike.*

Clark said he could do “dead work” but not “run coal”

(110a-llla; 194a). After the strike started, maintenance

was performed for about a week. Then a picket line was

established by the local union representing Petitioner’s

employees and those of other employees in the same hollow.

The men then ceased work. Baker complained to Clark

but Clark told him that he would not order anyone to cross

the picket line (111a-113a, 194a). Shortly thereafter Baker

wrote his 28 employees that they would be replaced if they

did not return to work by November 10, but none did so

(196a-197a).

On November 13 the 1971 Agreement was reached.

Clark had attended the negotiations in New York and

hurried back to Virginia because operators were calling

to see when they could resume work (911a).

Petitioner states (Pet. p. 5) that on November 16, Baker

refused to sign a stipulation presented by Clark that

would have bound Petitioner to the Agreement and which

would have ended the strike of his employees, because

“he (Baker) had just the day before hired several Southern

Labor Union employees... .” The Petitioner therein fails

to state a very material fact. In fact what the Petitioner

did on November 15 (Baker insisting he had not then heard

of the new agreement—137a-138a, 202a) was to sign a three-

* Apparently for this reason Petitioner insists it had no ‘‘labor

dispute’’ with UMW (Petition, p. 3).

4)

year contract with Southern Labor Union granting it ex-

elusive recognition as bargaining agent, a union shop, a

reduced welfare royalty and other provisions. He then

hired 10 employees, including 3 of his foremen, who im-

mediately began working and were producing coal on No-

vember 16 (118a, 123a, 913a). Baker met with Clark on

November 16 but refused to sign the tendered stipulation,

saying he “didn’t think he could sign two contracts” (203a,

912a). Clark told Baker that his execution of the SLU was

an unfair labor practice and UMW promptly filed such a

charge with the NLRB’ (942a).

In the course of the NLRB investigation SLU with-

drew as bargaining agent for Petitioner’s employees and

UMW then withdrew its charge (133a-135a; 208a). Baker

learned of this by a call (taken by Baker’s wife) from the

NLRB on December 13, and notified Peabody (140a). Pea-

body’s Charles Selvey said he would meet with Baker and

ask Clark to come. There had been no communication be-

tween Clark and Baker since Baker’s refusal to sign the

stipulation on November 16. (914a). Baker and Clark

(with Selvey) then met on December 15. Clark offered

Baker the 1971 Agreement but Baker said he was reluctant

to sign without verification from the NLRB that the charge

had been withdrawn. Clark called the NLRB by telephone

and asked NLRB representative to talk with Baker. He

did so and assured Baker that the charge had been with-

drawn. Baker, however, continued his refusal to sign with-

out formal notification, and the meeting ended (135a; 141a-

142a; 208a-210a; 914a-916a).

On December 17, Baker met with his employees and told

them that he had to return to work immediately or go

"In the meantime local union pickets asked the new hires not

to take their work. A fight started between a picket and a fore-

man but was broken up by other pickets. No other incidents oc-

eurred. The SLU employees never returned (125a-129a; 913a-

914a; 960a-961a; 982a).

6

broke. Baker told them—no UMW representative was

present—he would sign a stipulation to pay the union scale

and benefits and then sign the agreement itself upon

receipt of NLRB confirmation the charge had been with-

drawn (135a; 209a-213a). UMW did not refuse to agree

upon the stipulation as the Petitioner states (Pet. p. 5).

Clark, however, learned of the meeting and called Baker to

ask “just what he wanted.” Clark went on to tell Baker

that a stipulation would have to be cleared with UMW’s

area attorney. Clark arranged a meeting with Baker and

the attorney on December 23, at which discussion centered

on reopening the mines. In the meantime Baker told his

employees that he was turning the matter over to attorneys

(146a; 216a-217a; 918a).

After the December 23 meeting the parties’ attorneys

exchanged proposals by letters and in meetings. The Peti-

tioner’s attorney stated the Company could not afford to

operate under the 1971 Agreement.® UMW’s attorney asked

to see Petitioner’s books, which the Company refused to do,

and went on to demand that UMW pay the Petitioner

$75,000, which UMW refused to do (230a; 919a-920a;

944a-945a). UMW proposed resumption of work under the

1971 Agreement with a rider providing for renegotiation

if the operation proved to be financially unfeasible for the

Petitioner. Petitioner refused and countered with a pro-

posal that the parties agree on the basis of the 1968 scale.

* On cross-examination it was pointed out to Baker that as late

as December 17, he had wanted a stipulation calling for the 1971

scale. Baker was asked why he, through his attorneys, was now

proposing agreement on the basis of a materially lower wage. Baker

said it was because UMW had not given him a stipulation by

December 19, and that by the end of December ‘‘the attorneys had

gotten into it, and they knew the Company was broke then’’

(212a). Asked if he was still trying to negotiate, Baker said,

“‘No, I wasn’t. My attorneys might have been.’’

7

The meeting thus ended. Three days later UMW wrote

asking for another meeting but the Company did not reply,

and no further negotiations took place (945a-946a; 949a

et seq.).

On January 29, Baker’s employees submitted an agree-

ment for maintenance work. This agreement, which con-

templated further negotiations, was signed by the local

committee, the Petitioner and UMW (150a). Petitioner

started work under this agreement. A rock fall was found

and Baker told the employees that he was quitting (15la-

152a). Baker testified it would have taken $50,000 to

$75,000 to open the mines. He made no effort to borrow the

money (222a-223a; 944a). He sold the equipment, netting

$42,000, and opened a mine on another tract, signing a

labor agreement with Southern Labor Union before he had

any employees (219a; 427a).

2. The “Conspiracy” Evidence

In this aspect of the case Petitioner relies not on events

that occurred in 1971 concurrent with the strike at Peti-

tioner’s mine, but principally on events and negotiations

of the 1950’s and early 1960’s, and on statements that were

made during that era and even before, by such legendary

figures in the industry as John L. Lewis of the United

Mine Workers, and operator representatives George Love

and Joseph Moody. From this evidence Petitioner insists

that there was a tacit agreement in 1971 between UMW and

major operators—even, presumably, during UMW’s six-

week strike against those operators—whereby UMW would

“impose” the agreement to be negotiated with BCOA

operators on all other operators; and Petitioner contends,

notwithstanding the events and negotiations at Petitioner’s

mine as related in Section 1 above, that UMW’s insistence

on that agreement resulted in its demise.

The evidence discloses no basis for the inference of such

a tacit agreement. What UMW did, then uniquely mindful

8

by reason of this Court’s Pennington and Ramsey® de-

cisions of what a union could and could not do, was to insist

of all operators (to the extent it insisted) upon a uniform

wage, not as a matter of agreement with other operators,

but as a matter of its internal policies.

UMW’s policy calling for a uniform wage appears in evi-

dence of adoption of numerous resolutions at conventions

since before 1900 unto the present time (1058a-1061a).

Undisputed evidence shows UMW’s pursuit of a uniform

wage in negotiations long pre-dated 1950, when Petitioner

says the alleged conspiracy started, and its virtual ac-

complishment of the policy by the 1941 Agreement when the

National Defense Mediation Board approved UMW’s de-

mand for the elimination of a then existing 40-cent North-

South differential (442a-459a). It shows that historically

UMW had first negotiated with a basic group of operators

—generally those of a northern or central group such as

BCOA but not always of the same composition—and that

UMW had then utilized the agreement reached as the basis

for its negotations with other groups (491a-493a; 1009a-

1010a; 1027a-1028a; 1082a-1084a). The wages negotiated

over the years have been consistent with the rates nego-

tiated in the historically comparable automobile and steel

industries (Def. Ex. 6, 1002a-1003a). The total increases

negotiated at arms length from 1950 through the 1968

Agreements averaged slightly over 10 cents per hour per

year for the 21-year period (1021a). The 1950’s saw mech-

anization, but mechanization did not begin with that period

and had never been opposed by UMW.

The realities of the period, moreover, must be seen in

light of fundamental economic events of that time, to-wit,

the elimination of traditional coal markets and the vast

increase in the use of oil and gas as the primary sources of

energy in the United States (1799a-1800a). Coal not only

*These references are to UMW v. Pennington, 381 US 657

(1965) and Ramsey v. UMW, 401 US 302 (1971), respectively.

9

lost that position, its production declined from 630 million

tons in 1947 to less than 400 million tons in the 1950's

(1802a). Loss of markets and mechanization both con-

tributed to the loss of employment in the industry.’° UMW’s

alternatives were to accept a low wage and fight mecha-

nization, or to accept mechanization and seek wages com-

parable with those in related industries. UMW pursued

the latter course consistent with its longstanding policy.”

This evidence also emphasizes vital distinctions in this

case and the Pennington type cases. Notably the latter

arose at a time when the industry was in a depression,

whereas by the early 1970’s coal production, after more

than 20 years curtailment, approached the levels of the

post World War II period. And in contrast to the Penning-

ton contention of inability to pay, here the Petitioner pro-

jected that it would have made millions had it operated

under the UMW agreement (72-73 App).

The factual contrast of the instant case and Pennington

1°Tn an article, ‘‘The Great Employment Controversy,’’ appear-

ing in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and

Social Seience, March, 1962, pp. 46, 49-50, there appear the follow-

ing employment trends: employment of production workers in

the electrical industry declined from 925,000 in 1953 to 836,000

in February, 1961; in steel, although steel production and ship-

ments in 1960 were identical with 1950, yet in 1960 production-

worker employment averages 461,800, as compared with 540,000

in 1950; in automation and shift from airplanes to missiles 200,000

production jobs have been eliminated in the past few years, even

though the industry’s dollar volume has continued to rise; during

the postwar period, railroad productivity rose by 65 percent while

employment fell by 540,000.

™ Petitioner offered evidence that during the 1950’s UMW made

substantial investments and loans with respect to West Kentucky

Coal Company, which for years before had been operating its

mines on a non-union basis, but no evidence that UMW suggested

policies for its management. Moreover, the evidence shows UMW

divested itself of its entire interest therein in 1963—eight years

before the events in question ( 836a-842a).

10

type cases, however, is not limited to the profitability of

mining operations under the UMW scale. Those cases

stressed the existence of the Protective Wage Clause of

the 1958 Agreement (PWC), which had been termed the

“crux” of the conspiracy and which the Petitioner here

characterizes (Pet. p. 14) as an explicit expression of a

conspiratorial arrangement “previously evidenced only by

their conduct.” In fact the PWC had been proposed in 1958

by the UMW as a means of protecting its members from

the consequences of subcontracting. Thus its Paragraph B

requires that coal mined, produced, prepared, procured or

acquired by signatory operators shall be mined under labor

standards as favorable to employees as those in UMW’s

contract (628a-629a). In negotiating this agreement, oper-

ators sought, and UMW agreed to, a reciprocal commitment

that UMW would enforce the Agreement to all signatories

thereto equally. This resulted in PWC’s Paragraph A.”

There is evidence that the provision had no relationship

to non-signatories or to any agreement on UMW’s part that

it impose any kind of contract on other operators, and

that it was applicable only to signatories (1026a).!* In any

event, the Joint Industry Contract Committee (JICC),

which had been established by PWC and which had sub-

mitted forms to signatory operators by which they were to

* Paragraph A is set forth in the opinion of the Court of Ap-

peals at 53 App.

** The Courts in the non-jury cases (Ramsey and Pennington)

have agreed with UMW’s interpretation of PWC. In the jury

cases, including the instant case, the issue of whether PWC bound

UMW to seek its standard agreement was submitted to the jury

on the theory PWC was ambiguous. See Tennessee Consolidated

Coal Company v. UMW, 416 F.2d (1969). The issue has not been

considered by the Supreme Court. In the dissenting opinion in

Ramsey, 401 U.S. 302, at 316, Justice Douglas remarked, with

Justices Black, Harlan and Marshall concurring, ‘‘. . . there is not

a word in the agreement, as I read it, that covers non-signatory

operators.’’

11

certify their compliance with the agreement and had dealt

with signatories who had failed to comply, suspended fur-

ther enforcement of PWC by November, 1959, because of

uncertainties resulting from the then recent enactment of

the Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959,

29 USC § 401. And, at its March 31, 1964, meeting, it ap-

pearing PWC had been deleted from the newly negotiated

1964 Agreement, the commttee proceeded to dissolve itself

(Pet. Ex. 51, 1548a et seq.).

The elimination of PWC from the agreement was accom-

plished by the 1964 Agreement which did not carry forward

the provision. It therefore ceased to exist. In the Court of

Appeals, however, Petitioner urged that UMW and the

operators had “used” language “to make it possible for

them to claim later, if they should get in trouble, that they

had taken PWC out of the Contract... .” (Pet.’s Brief in

the Court of Appeals, p. 33). While Petitioner no longer

appears to advance that contention, it contends the “80-

Cent Clause” ™* and the “Application of Contract to Coal

“The 80-Cent Clause first appeared in the 1964 Agreement and

reads as follows (722a) :

‘During the life of this agreement there shall be paid into

such Fund by each Operator signatory hereto the sum of

forty cents ($0.40) per ton of two thousand (2,000) pounds

on each ton of bituminous coal produced by such Operator

for use or for sale. On all bituminous coal produced or

acquired by any signatory Operator for use or for sale, (i.e.,

all bituminous coal other than that produced by such signatory

operator) there shall, during the life of this Agreement, be

paid into such Fund by each Operator signatory hereto or by

any subsidiary or affiliate of such Operator signatory hereto

the sum of eighty cents ($0.80) per ton of two thousand

(2,000) pounds on each ton of such bituminous coal so pro-

duced or acquired on which the aforesaid sum of forty cents

($0.40) per ton had not been paid into said Fund prior to

such procurement or acquisition.’’

As previously noted, the Coal Lands clause, in one form or another,

had been in the Agreement since the War Labor Board decision in

1943.

12

Lands” (see p. 3, fn. 4) reflect a tacit agreement between

UMW and major operators that UMW had agreed to “im-

pose” the agreement on all other operators. Neither pro-

vision, however, contains language that can be construed

as creating such an obligation or from which such an in-

ference may be drawn and, indeed, both relate to obliga-

tions of signatory operators not to subvert the agreement,

and not to obligations of UMW.

The Court of Appeals noted that the case of Solar Fuels

Company v. UMW, 346 F.2d 789 at 794-5 (3rd Cir., 1973),

cert, denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974), held that since PWC was

not expressly repudiated in the 1964 Agreement, it re-

mained in effect (73 App). The Court of Appeals correctly

went on to note that in the 1968 Agreement (and in the 1971

Agreement) there was an express recision of any prior

protective wage clause or any related obligation.” The

Petitioner claims nevertheless, there was no express re-

cision of PWC and that the language of the 1968 Agree-

ment somehow related only to pre-1950 contract provisions.

The language itself, as well as the history of problems

attending PWC during the 1950’s and earlier 1960’s, pre-

cludes such an interpretation or any inference of the tacit

agreement asserted by the Petitioner.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner presents essentially three questions: (1)

whether, as the Court of Appeals held, the Petitioner failed

to adduce sufficient proof of an antitrust violation to per-

18 The provision is found under the heading of ‘‘Miscellaneous’’

in the 1968 Agreement, and is as follows:

‘Any and all provisions of any contracts or agreements be-

tween the parties hereto or some of them whether national,

district, local or otherwise providing for a protective wage

clause and a modification of this agreement or said agree-

ments if a more favorable wage agreement is entered into by

the United Mine Workers of America, are hereby rescinded,

cancelled, abrogated and made null and void.’’

13

mit the submission of such issue to the jury; (2) whether

both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, upon a

review of the facts peculiar to this case, correctly con-

cluded the damages claimed by Petitioner were not the

proximate result of the claimed conspiracy; and (3)

whether the courts invaded the province of the jury in

violation of the Seveath Amendment.

Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals correctly

granted judgment NOV on the antitrust issue for a number

of reasons. It correctly held that an anti-competitive pur-

pose was an essential element of a Pennington type action

and that there was no evidence of such a purpose in this

record. It also correctly held that as of the time of the

1968 and 1971 UMW Agreements, there was no evidence

by which an express or tacit agreement could be found

that UMW had agreed with one group of operators that it

would impose a uniform agreement upon all other

operators.

Both lower courts properly held that there was no evi-

dence from which it could be found that the damages

claimed by the Petitioner were the proximate result of the

alleged conspiracy. The Petitioner had operated profitably

under the UMW agreement and projected enormous future

earnings under the terms of the agreement. The damages

Petitioner projected resulted from its refusal to bargain

with UMW because of its patently illegal execution of a

collective bargaining agreement with a rival union. Two

courts have reviewed the record and both have found that

there was no evidence establishing that Petitioner’s claimed

damages were proximately caused by UMW.

The lower courts did not invade the province of the

jury in violation of the Seventh Amendment, The standards

employed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals

in considering UMW’s motion for judgment NOV were

the correct standards for evaluating such a motion.

14

ARGUMENT

A. The Court of Appeals Has Correctly Construed Pennington and

Related Decisions; and it Has Correctly Applied Those

Decisions to the Facts of This Case.

The Court of Appeals concluded that ‘this case is simply

not a Pennington type case at all. It satisfies none of the

criteria for such a case.’’ (73 App).

The Court of Appeals found no evidence from which an

anti-competitive purpose or agreement could be attributed

to UMW;; and it found no evidence of a UMW-operator

agreement by which UMW agreed that it would insist upon

a particular agreement in its negotiations with other

operators.

Evidence of such an agreement is, of course, essential to

a Pennington type action. That a union seeks a uniform

agreement with all employers, including those not repre-

sented in the initial negotiations, is not evidence of a con-

spiracy, for as this Court made clear in Pennington and

reaffirmed in Ramsey, a union has the right to do so as a

matter of its own policy. It forfeits its antitrust exemption

only when it agrees with one employer group that it will

insist upon the agreement reached in negotiations with

other operators.

The finding that no such agreement existed was based

upon a consideration of the whole of the evidence. This

included the elimination of the PWC in 1964 and the ex-

press recision of PWC and even “favored nation” con-

cepts in 1968, In short, and without repeating the so-called

consipracy evidence summarized above, the Court found

that by 1971 there was nothing from which a ‘‘strait-

jacket’’ agreement may be inferred."*

*° In this regard the Court of Appeals aptly noted that UMW,

in its negotiations with Petitioner, offered a rider by which, if

Petitioner was unable to operate under the 1971 Agreement, it

would have agreed to enter into further wage negotiations (75

App).

15

Petitioner seeks to avoid this by the contention it

abandoned at trial relating to the alleged failure by UMW

to give notice of termination of the 1968 Agreement. The

argument is without merit. The point is irrelevant to the

antitrust issue. UMW had the contractual right to termi-

nate the agreement. Its alleged failure to do so, coupled

with a strike on a ‘‘no contract no work’’ basis, while

affording a possible ground for a breach of contract action,

can hardly be elevated into an antitrust violation.

Petitioner also urges that the existence in the agreement

of the 80-Cent Clause and the Coal Lands clause provides

a basis for a jury inference of an illegal tacit agreement

to impose the same agreement on all employers. This

argument is likewise without merit. Both provisions singu-

larly require obligations of the operators by which they

are not to avoid their responsibilities to their employees.

Both provisions are designed to preserve the work oppor-

tunities of UMW members by restricting the ability of a

signatory operator to side step his obligations by the

utilization of low wage operators of whatever disguise.

This was Peabody’s obligation under the then long standing

Coal Lands clause.

There was no ‘‘top down’’ bargaining. Connell Co. v.

Plumbers and Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), which

involved a restraint outside the context of a collective

bargaining relationship, has no application in this case.

As the Court of Appeals said of the Coal Lands Clause,

it was intended to do nothing other than ‘‘protect the

legitimate interests of the Union.” (80 app.) Neither the

80 cent clause nor the Coal Lands clause restricts UMW in

its relationship with other operators. Neither clause is

‘‘tainted by any requirement which would limit the rights

of the Union in its bargaining with other parties.’’ (80

app.)

Considered alone, or in context with the whole of the

16

evidence, including the recision of the provisions which

Penmngton type plaintiffs once contended was such an

agreement, it is clear that the 1968 and 1971 Agreements

afford no basis for the inference of an illegal tacit agree-

ment, as the Court of Appeals held.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals misconstrued

UMW vy. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) and Ramsey v.

UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971) with regard to the factor of

predatory intent. Specifically, it is Petitioner’s contention

that the lower court “. . . established a standard of preda-

tory intent to accomplish absolute ruin as a prerequisite to

union liability under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.” (Peti-

tioner’s brief, p. 27.) This contention is incorrect.

The Court of Appeals held that “. .. it is not enough

that the Union may have entered into a contract with a

multi-employer unit in a national industry to establish an

antitrust violation by the Union or, for that matter, the

employer-group”, 620 F. 2d at 431. Such a conclusion is

obviously accurate, Bargaining on a multi-employer basis

is lawful. NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local 449 (Buffalo

Linen], 353 U.S. 87 (1957). “To amount to an antitrust

violation”, the Fourth Circuit said, “the agreement must

be rooted in an anti-competitive purpose, and must effect

an anti-competitive result, as evidenced by action ‘ruining’

a competitor’s business or driving him ‘out: of business’.

Unless there is such an agreement between the labor orga-

nization and the non-labor group and such an anti-

competitive result, there is no conspiracy actionable under

the antitrust laws.” 620 F. 2d 431-32.

This analysis is correct. As the Court of Appeals said,

Pennington and Ramsey stand for the propositicn that

“. .. for an agreement between the Union and the multi-

employer group to constitute an antitrust violation it must

arise out of a predatory intent, however it is described,

whether, as Mr. Justice Douglas said, ‘to do in one or more

competitors,’ or as Mr. Justice White said ‘with the purpose

17

and effect of driving the small marginal operators out of

business’ or, as the plaintiff itself has expressed it, ‘with

the purpose to eliminate competitors,’ or, again as Mr.

Justice White has said, where the wage scales demanded

are ‘ruinous to the business of the other employers.’” It

is thus clear that the Fourth Circuit was using the term

predatory intent as shorthand for anti-competitive purpose.

The analysis of the Fourth Circuit on this issue is also

in accord with the decisions of lower courts and with the

views expressed by commentators on the Pennington and

Ramsey cases. See, e.g., the cases and other authorities

listed in footnote 46 of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, 620

F. 2d at 433, n. 46.

Furthermore, to repeat what the Court of Appeals said,

this is not a Pennington-type case at all. In those cases the

plaintiffs’ claims were based on the premise that they were

unable to meet the terms of the UMW contract that was

allegedly imposed upon them. Here, in contrast, “[t]he

record ...is completely devoid of any evidence to support

any such premise in this case. In fact, the evidence con-

clusively demonstrates the contrary”. 620 F. 2d at 433.

Thus, as the Court of Appeals points out, the Petitioner

operated at a profit under the 1968 Agreement; used the

1968 and 1971 Agreements as the basis for projecting that

it would have made substantial if not exorbitant profits in

the future ; and offered to become bound by the 1971 Agree-

ment even before it knew what the terms of that agreement

would be.

It is true, as the lower court said, that late in the nego-

tiations Petitioner contended for the first time that it was

unable to meet the 1971 Agreement. But Petitioner offered

no evidence in support of this belated contention and in

fact refused UMW’s legitimate request to examine its

records in order to evaluate the claim of financial inability.

The Court of Appeals, properly granted judgment NOV

on the antitrust issue.

18

B. The Lower Courts Correctly Held that the Record Contains No

Evidence from Which the Jury Could Have Concluded that

Petitioner's Claimed Damage was Proximately Caused by

the Conspiracy

To recover damages in an antitrust action a plaintiff

must show not only a violation of the antitrust laws but

also that the violation of those laws was a material cause

of the claimed injury—i.e., that the injury was “by reason

of” the violation. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Haseltine Research,

Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 N. 9 (1969); Comfort Trane Air

Conditioning v. Trame Co., 592 F. 2d 1373, 1383 (5th Cir.

1979). It is not necessary, as the District Court said, for

petitioner to “. . . have established that the illegal actions

of defendant were the only cause, or even the most sub-

stantial cause of its injuries. Yet, [Petitioner] must offer

sufficient proof that defendant’s illegal conduct materially

contributed to the injury”, 457 F. Supp. at 1131. Applying

these standards, the lower courts correctly concluded that

there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Peti-

tioner’s damages were proximately caused by an antitrust

violation.

Petitioner cannot claim that UMW’s 1968 Agreement was

so burdensome as to damage or ruin its business for, as the

Court found, the record shows without dispute that Peti-

tioner earned a profit during the two year period that it

operated under that contract. The same is true of the 1971

Agreement. Even before the 1971 Agreement had been

negotiated, Petitioner offered to be bound by its terms if

UMW would agree in return to allow its mine to operate

during the national strike.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s

7 UMW declined this offer, because of its policy of ‘‘no contract,

no work’’ and as the District Court found, ‘‘!t]he strike was

uniformly enforced as to all employment units organized by the

UMW, large and small alike’’. Thus, as the Court went on to

say, Petitioner ‘‘. . . can scarcely be heard to argue that the UMW’s

refusal to allow [Petitioner] to continue to operate, under a mere

19

damage claim was itself based on the premise that Peti-

tioner could have made even greater profits than before

had it been allowed to operate during the national strike,

and thereafter, under either the 1968 or the 1971 Agree-

ments. These undisputed facts establish beyond doubt that

UMW’s national contracts were not harmful, let alone

ruinous, to Petitioner’s business.

Clearly, as the District Court held, “. . . the only con-

clusion that reasonable men could have reached was that

[Petitioner’s] damages and financial failure were caused

by the chain of events initiated by [Petitioner’s] general

manager’s adoption of the Southern Labor Union con-

tract”, 457 F. Supp. at 1134. This chain of events began on

November 15, 1971, when, under highly irregular cireum-

stances, discussed supra, pp. 5-7, Petitioner signed a col-

lective bargaining agreement with the Southern Labor

Union (SLU) and with ten replacements began to mine

coal.’® This occurred just two days after UMW and BCOA

had negotiated the 1971 Agreements.

That the lower courts were correct in holding that the

execution of the SLU contract caused Petitioner’s damages

is borne out by the undisputed proof relating to what

occurred on and after November 15, 1971.

stipulation to be bound retroactively to the new agreement, was

a manifestation of a conspiracy to drive small operators out of

business, The integrity of a nationwide industrial strike could

not be maintained if such variations were allowed to prevail’’.

457 F. Supp. 1133.

** As noted by the Court of Appeals (40 App., ftnt. 6), the

signing of the SLU contract was irregular for at least two reasons.

First, Petitioner’s striking employees were represented by UMW.

And, second, Petitioner recognized SLU as the representative of its

employees, and signed the SLU contract, solely on the basis of 10

authorization cards—3 of which had been signed by supervisors. See

Terrell Machine Company v. NLRB (4th Cir. 1970) 427 F. 2d

1088, cert. den. 298 U.S. 929; NZRB v. Trosch (4th Cir. 1963)

321 F. 2d 692, 695, cert. den. 375 U.S. 993 (1964).

20

On November 16, 1971, Petitioner refused UMW’s re-

quest to sign the new agreement. Petitioner did not refuse

because the terms of the 1971 Agreement were ruinous or

burdensome. On the contrary, Petitioner’s refusal was

based solely on its position that the SLU contract precluded

it from dealing further with UMW. (We note again that

Petitioner does not so much as mention the SLU contract

or its refusal to bargain by reason thereof.) As a result,

the strike continued and UMW filed a charge with the

NLRB alleging that Petitioner had committed an unfair

labor practice by executing the SLU contract. No further

negotiations occurred while these charges were pending.

On December 13, 1971, the NLRB informed Petitioner

that SLU had abandoned its claim as bargaining agent

for its employees and that UMWA had withdrawn its

unfair labor practice charges. But Petitioner still refused

to sign the UMW contract. As before, Petitioner took no

exception to the contract itself. At this point, Petitioner

merely said it was unwilling to sign the UMW agreement

until it had received official notice from the NLRB that

the charges had been withdrawn. Petitioner did say, how-

ever, that it was willing to sign a stipulation under which

it would agree to pay the wage scale in the 1971 Agreement

pending receipt of official confirmation from the NLRB.

The parties met again in January, 1972. Having recently

hired the attorneys who handled Pennington and other anti-

trust cases against UMW, Petitioner then claimed for the

first time that it could not pay the wage scale or the benefit

package in the new UMW agreement. UMW asked to see

Petitioner’s books in order to assess this new position,

but Petitioner refused this request.” UMW in turn pro-

posed that Petitioner resume operations under the 1971

*® As the Court of Appeals noted, Petitioner had an obligation

under these circumstances to honor UMW’s request to produce its

records. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956)

21

Agreement, but with the understanding that the Agreement

would be renegotiated if it developed that Petitioner could

not afford to operate under its terms. Petitioner rejected

this proposal as well and in response offered as a counter-

proposal the terms of the then expired 1968 Agreement

under which its employees had worked prior to the strike.

Although it found this counterproposal unacceptable, UMW

nevertheless requested that the parties have another

meeting. UMW’s request for further negotiations was never

answered.

Shortly thereafter it was discovered that Petitioner’s

mines would require substantial repairs in order to put

them im working condition and at this point Petitioner

chose to abandon the operation and liquidate its assets.

The dispositive issue of causation turns on facts which

are peculiar to this case. Two courts have already reviewed

those facts and both have concluded that the record con-

tains no evidence from which the jury could have concluded

that Petitioner’s damages were proximately caused by a

violation of the antitrust law.

Since the evidence relating to causation has already been

reviewed twice, and since it is not the practice of this Court

to grant certiorari in order to ‘‘. . . review evidence and

discuss specific facts,” U.S. v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227

(1925); Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500,

537 (1957) (dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter),

UMW believes the petition should be denied for this reason

atone.

Furthermore, given these facts, all of which are un-

disputed, there can be no doubt that the lower courts were

correct in holding that such damages as Petitioner sus-

tained were caused solely by its adoption of the SLU

contract and, conversely, that there is no evidence from

which it can be found that the damages were caused by an

22.

antitrust violation.” Indeed, as the District Court found,

there was no evidence of record ‘“‘. . . from which the jury

could have possibly found that the illegal conspiracy was

even a partial cause of [Petitioner’s] losses’’, 457 F. Supp.

at 1134. Hence, Petitioner failed to meet the requirement

of Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co.,

282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931), that damages must be the “certain

result of the wrong’’.

C. Petitioner's Contenion That the Lower Courts “Invaded” the

Province of the Jury in Violation of the Seventh Amendment

Fails to Raise a Constitutional Question and is Plainly With-

out Merit

Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals

‘‘invaded’’ the province of the jury in passing upon

UMW’s motion for judgment NOV. The standards em-

ployed by the District Court, 457 F.Supp. at 1130-31, and

adopted by the Court of Appeals, 620 F.2d at 438, are

the correct standards for evaluating a motion for judgment

NOV. See 5A Moore’s Federal Practice, 7 50.07[2]. Both

courts were “. . . conscious of the limitations on [their]

power, and conscientious and objective in its exercise.”

Manaia v. Potomac Electric Power, 268 F.2d 793, 799 (4th

Cir, 1959) Cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959),

Citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon

Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), Petitioner contends that the

lower courts compartmentalized the various components

of the proof and wiped the slate clean after scrutiny of

20The lower courts were also correct, as a matter of law, in

rejecting Petitioner’s theory that but for its having been required

to sign the 1968 Agreement, it would never have become involved

in the strike that occurred in 1971. Such a theory is ‘‘utterly

fantastic’’, as the District Court said, 457 F. Supp. at 1134, for

if such a theory were to prevail, UMW ‘‘would become the insurer

of the financial success of every small operator who performs

under the national contract.’’ Id.

23

each. The decisions themselves show that this contention is

manifestly incorrect. For example, in the analysis of the

causation issue, which the Court of Appeals adopted, the

District Court discussed and correctly applied the relevant

authorities, including Continental Ore and Bigelow v. RKO

Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), and after doing

so gave Petitioner the full benefit of its proof. Indeed, as

the decisions show, the lower courts reached the conclusion

that there was no evidence upon which the jury could have

found that Petitioner’s damages were caused by UMW

only after “{cJonsidering all the evidence in its totality,”

457 F.Supp. at 1134. The same is true of the Fourth Cir-

cuit’s analysis of the conspiracy issue. Both courts con-

sidered the evidence in its totality. It would be difficult to

find decisions that more carefully observe the principles

set forth in Continental Ore.

It is true, of course, that in reviewing the record in

order to pass upon UMW’s motion, the lower courts made

a point-by-point analysis of Petitioner’s theories and the

evidence introduced in support of them. But such an analy-

sis is neither inappropriate nor in conflict with Continental

Ore. The process used by a court in passing upon a motion

for judgment NOV is analytical, not intuitive, and it is

hard to imagine how the explication of such an analysis

can be accomplished other than by a point-by-point dis-

cussion. The evidence either contains evidence from which

a conspiracy can be found or it does not. The same is true

with regard to the causation. The only rational way of re-

solving such issues is by means of an analysis like that

used by the lower courts in this case.

Just as the courts below did not “invade” the province

of the jury in granting UMW’s motion for judgment NOV,

so too is it clear that their action did not viplate Peti-

tioner’s rights under the Seventh Amendment, Petitioner’s

reliance upon the Seventh Amendment “. . . merely seeks

an obscuring injection of the linguistics of constitutional

24

principle into the familiar process of appraisal of evidence

and its associated inferences.” Manaia v. Potomac Electric

Company, supra, at 799. “The attempt, therefore, to

glamorize the problem by an invocation of the Seventh

Amendment is, at best, an irrelevance contributing nothing

to the objective disposition of such questions as this.”

Id. at 799.

As Justice Frankfurter said, in his dissenting opinion

in Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437, 455-

06, (1959), “Fabulous invention cannot turn these con-

ventional motions [i.e., motions for directed and for judg-

ment NOV] turning on the appreciation of evidence into

constitutional issues ... This verbal smoke screen cannot

obscure the truth that all that is involved is an appraisal

of the fair inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” See

also Smith v. Reinauer Oil Transport, 256 F.2d 646, 649

(1st Cir, 1958).

After carefully reviewing the entire record in this case,

two courts have concluded that the record contained no

evidence to support the contention that Petitioner was

damaged by an antitrust violation. This review led the

Court of Appeals to reach the same conclusion with regard

to the conspiracy issue as well. UMW contends that in

passing on its motion for judgment NOV the courts below

did not invade the province of the jury in violation of the

Seventh Amendment and that the conclusions reached by

the Court of Appeals were in all respects correct.

*' Justice Frankfurter did not make the statement attributed

to him on page 31 of Petitioner’s brief, either in Dick v. New

York Life Insurance Co., supra, or in any other case. Indeed,

Justice Frankfurter was of the view that motions for judgment

NOV do not raise constitutional issues. The quotation on page 31

of Petitioner’s brief actually comes from Manaia v. Potomac

Electric Power Co., supra, at 799. It is, moreover, taken out of

context since Manaia stands for a proposition diametrically op-

posed to the one for which it is cited.

25

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the peti-

tion for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Harrison Comss

900 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 638-0530

Stuart B. CAMPBELL, JR.

Post Office Box 320

Wytheville, Virginia 24382

(703) 228-3183

EK. H. Rayson

United American Plaza

Suite 2521

Knoxville, Tennessee 37929

(615) 525-5134

Counsel of Record for Respondent

United Mme Workers of America

August 19, 1980

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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