Petition — International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1402 v. Marshall

- Buprems Court, Uh

FILED

80-6 f “5

LMICHAEL RODAK, JR. CLERR

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION,

LOCAL 1402,

Petitioner,

V.

F. RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

FRANK E. HAMILTON, JR.

HAMILTON & DouG.as, P.A.

2620 West Kennedy Blvd.

Tampa, Florida 33609

813-879-9842

Attorneys for Petitioner

Local 1402

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

csr 60

agar

*

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether a non-onerous and reasonable rule, untainted

by any evidence of discrimination, unfairness, or abuse,

freely adopted (and revocable at any time) by the mem-

bership of a local union and requiring a candidate for

local union office to evidence only a minimal interest in,

and awareness of, union affairs as a demonstration of

qualification for the responsibility of local union office is

required to be invalidated by this Court’s decision in

Usery v. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. 305, as not being a “rea-

sonable qualification” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

Section 481(e), solely because only about seven percent

of the membership have bothered to meet the requirement.

PARTIES BELOW

The parties below are shown in the caption of this case,

the Secretary of Labor and Local 1402 of the Interna-

tional Longshoremen’s Association.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...................

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LSE EES

APPENDIX

Page

12

la

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron

Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers,

AFL-CIO v. George W. Hardeman, 401 US 233,

28 L.Ed.2d 10, 91 S.Ct. 609 reh. den. 402 US

967, 29 L.Ed.2d 182, 91 S.Ct. 1607 0.00000... 8

Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America, AF'L-

CIO, et al., v. W. J. Usery, Jr., Secretary of

Labor, 429 US 3805, 50 L.Ed.2d 502, 97 S.Ct.

5 ERR eco araear Oo ogee RD TAP A CER CRE ER i, 5, 6, 11

W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor v. Hotel,

Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391

US 492, 20 L.Ed.2d 768, 88 S.Ct. 1748 0000000000000... 6,9

W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor v. Local 158,

Glass Bottle Blowers Association, etc., 8389 US

463, 19 L.Ed.2d 705, 88 S.Ct. 648 000. 5

Statutes :

28 U.S.C.

IE PIII BI idiisic cio chccicisdeapicbesnbessecetictrededontolicte 2

29 U.S.C.

SRE SR. Sar anne in ea PO ER OREN 4,5,7

Ee Nae ees MET sidlidaksoccamocacuasenn 8

RE IES EER KIER ATE ROPE RO 2

I ie eal 2

4

Regulations:

29 C.F.R.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No.

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION,

LOCAL 1402,

Petitioner,

Vv.

F, RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPORTED DECISIONS

The decision of the District Court for the Middle Dis-

trict of Florida, Tampa Division, is not reported, and

the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is

reported at 617 F.2d 96. Copies of each opinion are

attached hereto in the Appendix.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on May 14,

1980, issued a decision reversing and remanding for

“further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” J udg-

ment was also entered on May 14, 1980.

2

Under the Rules of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

rehearings are substantially disfavored, and no applica-

tion for rehearing was sought. This Court has jurisdic-

tion to review the application for writ of certiorari pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

sy.

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

29 U.S.C. Section 481 provides, in pertinent part, that:

(e) In any election required by this section which

is to be held by secret ballot a reasonable opportu-

nity shall be given for the nomination of candidates

and every member in good standing shall be eligible

to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to Sec-

tion 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications

uniformly imposed) ...

29 U.S.C. Section 482 provides, in pertinent part, that:

(a) A member of a labor organization—

(1) who has exhausted the remedies available

under the constitution and bylaws of such organiza-

tion and of any parent body, or

(2) who has invoked such available remedies with-

out obtaining a final decision within three calendar

months after their invocation, may file a complaint

with the Secretary within one calendar month there-

after alleging the violation of any provision of sec-

tion 481 of this title. . .

(b) The Secretary shall investigate such complaint

and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a viola-

tion of this subchapter has occurred and has not

been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the

filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against

the labor organization as an entity in the district

court of the United States in which such labor

organization maintains its principal office . . .

The full text of the statutes is set forth in the Appendix.

3

The Secretary of Labor has promulgated regulations,

and the regulations, found at 29 CFR Section 452.36-38,

as they read at the time of the election and complaint,

are set out in the Appendix at pp. 17a-21a.

Pertinent provisions of the local union by-laws are also

set out in the Appendix at p. 22a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Since at least 1972, Local 1402 of the International

Longshoremen’s Association has had a by-law requirement

for nomination to office in the union, which required a

member to have attended or have been excused from

attending at least one of the regular meetings in each of

the twelve months prior to the nomination. By-Laws,

Article IX, par. 1(e). The requirement was freely

adopted by the membership, and could be changed by the

membership at any time. By-Laws, Article XX. Its re-

quirements were well known, and no suggestion has

been made that the purpose, application or enforcement

of the rule was unfair, or was applied in any manner to

infringe upon any rights of the membership. Under the

operation of the membership rule, a member could be

excused merely by prior notice to union officers that he

would not be in attendance at that meeting.

During the period prior to the December, 1975 elec-

tion, Local 1402 held two meetings each month except in

the months of November and December of 1974. Since

there was only one meeting in each of those months,

each member was automatically credited with attendance

for both months for purposes of the eligibility require-

ment.

In November, 1975, when nominations were held, only

6.3 percent of the members of the union had either at-

tended or been excused from sufficient meetings to be

eligible for nomination to office. After the election a

4

challenge was filed, and the Secretary of Labor investi-

gated to determine whether there had been a violation

of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,

and subsequently brought this action to set aside the

election, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 482 (b).

Suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Mid-

dle District of Florida, Tampa Division. Local 1402

raised a number of factual and legal challenges to the

application by the Secretary of Labor, including whether

the Complainant had exhausted internal union remedies,

had complied with the administrative prerequisites,

whether the application was timely, and similar issues.

None of those issues was resolved since the matter was

determined by the District. Court on Local 1402’s Motion

for Summary Judgment. The Court, reviewing the re-

quirement, and the pertinent statutes and regulations

promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, determined that

the rule was reasonable, and dismissed the Complaint.

A copy of the Final Judgment is in the Appendix at 8a.

The Secretary appealed to the Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit, urging that the District Court had erred,

suggesting principally that the fact that 93 percent of the

membership was ineligible for nomination to office con-

clusively established that the rule was “unreasonable”

within the meaning of 401(e). The Fifth Circuit agreed

with that position, and entered Judgment on May 14 as

noted previously.

ARGUMENT

The position of the Secretary of Labor in this action,

and implicitly approved by the panel of the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals, was that a union eligibility require-

ment was per se unreasonable where the “effect” of it,

in any given election, was to result in the disqualifica-

tion of 93% of the union membership, without the neces-

5

sity of any inquiry as to the reason for the disqualifica-

tion, its relationship to the legitimate needs and in-

terests of the union or to the demands of union office,

comparison of the particular qualification with the re-

quirements generally prescribed by other labor organiza-

tions, or the degree of difficulty in meeting this qualifica-

tion by union members.

The petitioner, Local 1402, ILA, and the District Court

which initially dismissed this action, disagreed, finding

that a reasonable inquiry was necessary into those fac-

tors, and that on balance, the minimal burden imposed

upon members, their ability to qualify independently of

any action of the organization, and the need to be able to

determine the reasonableness of the rule in advance,

rather than at the time of qualification, made the rule

in question “reasonable” within the meaning of 410(e).

In this regard it should be noted that the Secretary’s

own regulations, 29 CFR Section 452.36, adopted pur-

suant to general authority under the Act, set out each of

these qualifications as factors to be considered. While it

is certainly tempting, as a matter of administrative

convenience for the Secretary to be able to turn to a per

se standard, and evaluate the facts as they appear at

the time of the investigation, rather than at the time

of adoption of the Rule, and without any evaluation as

to the purpose of the Rule, the delegation of authority by

the Congress was not so broad. As this Court noted in

Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 US

463, 470-71, Congress

- . weighed how best to legislate against revealed

abuses in union elections without departing need-

lessly from its long-standing policy against unneces-

sary governmental intrusion into internal union

affairs.

The Secretary urged below that the decision of this

Court in Steelworkers Local 3489 v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305

6

(1977) controlled, and mandated a per se application of

an “effects” test. The Secretary’s initial Brief to the

Fifth Circuit, at page 10, states:

The statement in Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, approved

in Steelworkers, that a rule that disqualified 93%

of the membership is hardly reasonable, should con-

trol without more.

The Secretary filed an amended brief inserting the

words “in the circumstances here” between “should”

and “control,” but failed to discuss what those circum-

stances were. Accordingly, a fair conclusion may be

drawn that the Secretary is urging, and the Fifth Cir-

cuit approved, a per se test which permits the Secretary

to merely demonstrate a numerical disqualification, re-

sulting in a conclusive presumption that the rule is un-

reasonable within the meaning of 401(e).

We respectfully disagree, and urge that this Court

reconsider the position taken by the majority in Steel-

workers, clarifying that decision to the extent that it

suggests a blind adherence to a mechanical application of

numbers, not predictable in advance, and which result

in the invalidation of a presumptively reasonable rule,

voluntarily adopted by the membership of the local

union’, where the member has it completely within his

control to qualify or disqualify for union office, depend-

ing upon his own demonstrated interest in the affairs of

the local union, and his attentiveness to reasonable time

periods and notice requirements.

Unlike the provisions struck down in Steelworkers,?

1 The rule could also be rescinded by the membership, re-

quiring only a majority of those in attendance at any given

meeting. Bylaws of Local 1402, ILA, Article XX.

2 The Steelworkers requirement comes from the Interna-

tional Union Constitution, rather than Local Union by-laws,

so the local union was powerless to change the rule.

7

the excuse provision for members who do not attend

union meetings is unlimited and consists of no more of a

burden than having the member notify the union office

prior to the meeting. There are no qualifications or con-

ditions on the reasonableness of the excuse, and no au-

thority in any officer or person to deny the member an

excused absence, for purposes of this rule.

Even the Secretary’s current regulations, 29 CFR Sec-

tion 452.36 (1979*), provide for a number of factors

to be considered in determining whether a “meeting at-

tendance” * rule is “reasonable” under Section 401(e) of

the Act. Those factors are:

(1) The relationship of the qualification to the legiti-

mate needs and interests of the union;

(2) The relationship of the qualification to the de-

mands of union office;

(3) The impact of the qualification, in the light of

the Congressional purpose of fostering the broadest

possible participation in union affairs;

(4) A comparison of the particular qualification

with the requirements for holding office generally

prescribed by other labor organizations; and

(5) The degree of difficulty in meeting a qualifica-

tion by union members.

We respectfully suggest that the intention of Congress,

that the Secretary inquire the reasonableness of the Rule

consistent with the concern to avoid interference with

the internal affairs of the union, suggests that the Secre-

tary, by regulation, has adopted a more prudent course

3’ They are identical to the 1976 Regulations, in the Ap-

pendix.

* Because of the excuse provisions, it is a misnomer to call

the rule in question a “meeting attendance” rule; rather, it is

more in the nature of a “meeting awareness” rule.

8

than that espoused in his argument to the Court of Ap-

peals. The net effect of the Secretary’s argument and

the Fifth Circuit’s holding is to place the burden on the

union to demonstrate the reasonableness of the Rule,

rather than to require the Secretary to demonstrate that

it is unreasonable. This intrusion does not sit well with

this Court’s prior admonitions to avoid substitution of

the Secretary or the Court’s judgment for that of the

union membership.

This Court has previously suggested that review of the

internal workings of unions was not contemplated by the

Congress. As the Court noted in Boilermakers v. Harde-

man, 401 U.S. 233, 244 (1971), in a case where a mem-

ber brought an action against the union for damages

arising out of his expulsion.

We think that this is sufficient to indicate that Sec-

tion 101(a) (5) was not intended to authorize courts

to determine the scope of offenses for which a union

may discipline its members. And if a union may

discipline its members for offenses not prescribed by

written rules at all, it is surely a futile exercise for

a court to construe the written rules in order to

determine whether a particular conduct falls within

or without their scope. 401 U.S. 244-45.

While Boilermakers dealt with a different portion of

the statute, the interests involved are surely equal to

those raised herein. In Boilermakers, the member was

seeking to vindicate his rights under Section 101 (29

U.S.C. Section 411, commonly referred to as the “Bill of

Rights”), which we respectfully suggest is of at least

equal significance in the promotion of union democracy as

the right to nominate or be nominated for union office.

Similar deference herein would suggest that the Secre-

tary make more of a showing that the rule was unrea-

sonable than merely that a substantial number of mem-

bers failed to qualify, where such failures is a result of

9

things over which the member had complete control. This

is not a case where the member was excluded or declared

ineligible because he had not previously held office, Wirtz

Vv. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, 391 U.S. 492

(1968), or because of some other criterion whereby the

union leadership retained power to grant or deny access

to the nomination process. Here, in a very real sense,

it is not the incumbent officers but is the individual mem-

ber who has in his possession the “key to the court-

house.” In such a case, the cavalier assertion that the

large percentage of the membership which did not bother

to qualify demonstrates the unreasonableness of the rule

is insufficient.

The purpose of the rule is to encourage membership

participation and awareness of union activities generally,

instead of excluding such participation. The fact that

about 93% of the membership were indifferent to such

encourageinent does not make the rule itself an unreason-

able rule of exclusion. By looking through the wrong end

of the telescope, the Secretary determined that because

the rule demonstrates that only a limited number of

members demonstrated concern, responsibility, or par-

ticipation .n their union, the rule is unreasonable. We

are unable to see what is unreasonable about a rule

which requires a prospective officer at least at one of

the two monthly union meetings, either to attend or to

notify the union that he will not, and cannot appreciate

the sophistication of the Secretary’s argument that

since so many members were so indifferent to the meet-

ings at and through which their union acts, there must

have been something wrong with the rule.

The rule seeks to encourage broad participation by

the membership, at least to the extent of acknowledging

minimal awareness of the time of meetings, and as such,

the number or percentage of members who do not

“qualify” is more a measure of the lack of interest or

10

involvement, rather than any limitation imposed by the

incumbents. Invalidation of the rule would likely dis-

courage attendance and involvement to a greater, rather

than lesser extent.

The Secretary argued and the Fifth Circuit apparently

agreed that the high percentage of persons who did not

meet the requirement showed the rule had such an “ef-

fect”” as to make it an unreasonable requirement. It is

submitted that such is a post hoc or “after this-therefore

because of this” approach instead of an examination of

the rule itself.

If the Court accepts the proposition announced by the

Fifth Circuit, that this rule is unreasonable because its

“effects” (as just defined) are unreasonable, then any

union will be effectively discouraged from adopting any

sort of membership qualification, since the union will

have no way of knowing when or whether that rule will

be challenged, based on the “effect”? of that rule at any

given election. We suggested below, and repeat here, that

a rule might be found reasonable for six elections in a

row, where the percentage of eligibility was sufficiently

high to withstand scrutiny, but in the seventh election,

merely because of substantial drop in attendance or noti-

fication at even one meeting, the rule could be declared

unreasonable, and the election subject to being set aside

by the Secretary.

Where the validity of the rule turns not on its rea-

sonableness, but only on its “effect,” it can only encour-

age irresponsible actions of union officers, since it dis-

courages efforts to thoughtfully and responsibly adopt

rules which seem to accomplish legitimate union objec-

tives. Moreover, it deprives the membership of an assur-

ance that the prospective candidates to whom they are

asked to entrust the responsibility and property of their

union have demonstrated at least a minimal ability to

observe time and notice requirements. These are matters

11

which have tremendous impact and significance on the

governance of the union, enforcement of its contracts,

and compliance with local, state, and federal reporting

and record keeping requirements. Failure to comply

with these requirements can impose substantial harm or

liability both to the union and the officer, and it does not

seem unfair that a candidate be required to demonstrate

some ability to conform his conduct to such guidelines.

The Secretary’s action, and the decision of the Court of

Appeals has the direct result of prohibiting any such

requirement, for no other reason than the lack of interest

or awareness of an arbitrary proportion of the member-

ship.

Such a proposition is manifestly “unreasonable,” and

we respectfully request that this Court take the oppor-

tunity to disavow such principles, and to the extent that

a reading of Steelworkers suggested this Court’s con-

currence with them, clarify that decision to qualify the

substantial factual basis for the decision in Steelworkers,

including the substantially less liberal excuse require-

ments, the known probability that a percentage of mem-

bers would be working, or otherwise unavailable to at-

tend, and the other factual distinctions which permitted

a prediction that that rule would result in a substantial

disqualification.

12

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner Local 1402,

International Longshoremen’s Association, respectfully re-

quests that this Court grant the application for cer-

tiorari, and upon review of this cause reverse the de-

cision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, remanding

the case to it with instructions to reinstate the Final

Judgment of the District Court dismissing this cause.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK E. HAMILTON, JR.

HAMILTON & DOUGLAS, P.A.

2620 West Kennedy Blvd.

Tampa, Florida 33609

813-879-9842

Attorneys for Petitioner

Local 1402

™

=

—

APPENDIX

CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

Page

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS....._. la

FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT... 8a

FULL TEXT OF 29 U.S.C. Section 481-482... lla

29 CFR Section 452.36 and 452.38 as of July 1, 1976... 17a

29 CFR Section 452.38 as of J Ry eRe eae 20a

PORTIONS OF BY-LAWS OF LOCAL 1402, ILA, as

I 22a

la

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 78-2338

F. RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor,

United States Department of Labor,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOCAL 1402, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S

ASSOCIATION OF TAMPA, FLORIDA AND VICINITY AFL-CIO,

Defendant-A ppellee.

May 14, 1980

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida.

Before MORGAN, ANDERSON and RANDALL, Cir-

cuit Judges.

R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, Circuit Judge:

The Secretary of Labor brought this action under Title

IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 481, et seq., against the de-

fendant, Local 1402, International Longshoremen’s As-

sociation of Tampa, Florida and Vicinity, AFL-CIO

(Union), to set aside the Union’s December 9, 1975,

election of officers. The Union’s bylaw provides, as an

eligibility requirement for election of officers, that a mem-

ber must have attended, or been excused from, at least

one of the regular meetings in each of the twelve months

prior to nomination.’ Two such meetings were held each

1 All members were automatically credited with attendance

in the first two months of the twelve-month period relevant

2a

month. The excuse provisions were liberal, requiring no

reason for the absence; a member must simply notify

the Union office in advance of a scheduled meeting in

order to obtain an excused absence. Pursuant to this

eligibility provision, only 6.3% of the Union members

were eligible; 93.7% were not.

The district court granted the Union’s motion for

summary judgment, holding that the eligibility require-

ment was reasonable and thus permitted under § 401 (e)

of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481(e). The Secretary timely

filed his notice of appeal. We reverse.

The sole issue before us is whether the eligibility

requirement violates §401(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 481(e), which provides:

(e) In any election required by this section which

is to be held by secret ballot a reasonable oppor-

tunity shall be given for the nomination of candi-

dates and every member in good standing shall be

eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject

to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifi-

cations uniformly imposed) and shall have the right

to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or

candidates of his choice, without being subject to

penalty, discipline, or improper interference or re-

prisal of any kind by such organization or any

member thereof. Not less than fifteen days prior to

the election notice thereof shall be mailed to each

member at his last known home address. Each mem-

ber in good standing shall be entitled to one vote.

No member whose dues have been withheld by his

employer for payment to such organization pursuant

in this case. Therefore, the parties tried this case assuming

that the eligibility requirement was to attend at least one of

the regular meetings in each of the ten months prior to

nomination.

8a

to his voluntary authorization provided for in a col-

lective bargaining agreement shall be declared in-

eligible to vote or be a candidate for office in such

organization by reason of alleged delay or default

in the payment of dues. The votes cast by members

of each local labor organization shall be counted, and

the results published, separately. The election offi-

cials designated in the constitution and bylaws or

the secretary, if no other official is designated, shall

preserve for one year the ballots and all other

records pertaining to the election. The election shall

be conducted in accordance with the constitution and

bylaws of such organization insofar as they are not

inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter.

The Supreme Court has held that the statute was de-

signed to guarantee free and democratic union elections

similar to the model of our political elections, and that

the permitted “reasonable qualifications” on eligibility

to hold office were intended to have only a narrow reach.

Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 97 S.Ct. 611, 50

L.Ed.2d 502 (1977) ; Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Em-

ployees Union, Local 6, 891 U.S. 492, 88 S.Ct. 17438, 20

L.Ed.2d 763 (1968).

Steelworkers involved a challenge to a union bylaw

setting eligibility requirements for union office holders.

Members had to attend at least one-half of the union

meetings for three years prior to the election. Meetings

were held once a month. Thus, if a union member had

attended no meetings at all for the first eighteen months

of the relevant three-year period, he would have to attend

each meeting for the last eighteen months. Ninety-six

and one-half percent of the members failed to meet the

eligibility requirements. The Supreme Court held that

the antidemocratic effects of the eligibility requirement

outweighed the interests urged in its support, emphasiz-

ing that “an attendance requirement that results in the

4a

exciusion of 96.5% of the members from candidacy for

union office hardly seems to be a ‘reasonable qualifica-

tion’ consistent with the goal of free and democratic

elections. A requirement having that result obviously

severely restricts the free choice of the membership in

selecting its leaders.” Jd. 429 U.S. at 310, 97 S.Ct. at 615.

The Union attempts to escape the controlling effect of

the Steelworkers case by pointing to two distinctions:

first, that the Steelworkers rule provided for only very

limited excused absences, whereas the instant rule pro-

vides liberally for excused absences; and second, that the

Steelworkers rule required the formulation of an inten-

tion to run for office eighteen months prior to the elec-

tion, whereas the instant rule requires only ten months

advance intention.?

The Union argues that the instant rule places only a

minimal burden upon Union members, because of the

liberal excuse provisions. A member need only call the

Union office prior to a meeting. He need give no reason

for his inability to attend. We agree that the burden thus

imposed on Union members is slight indeed. However,

we note that the same argument was rejected in the

Steelworkers case. The Supreme Court stated: “[{T]his

argument misconceives the evil at which the statute aims.

We must judge the eligibility rule not by the burden it

imposes on the individual candidate, but by its effect on

free and democratic processes of union government.” 429

U.S. at 310-311, n.6, 97 S.Ct. at 615.

The Union argues that the liberal excuse provisions

here make it considerably easier in this case, as compared

to Steelworkers, to meet the eligibility requirements. This

we acknowledge. A member who merely calls in before

2 The district court concluded that these two factors ade-

quately distinguished Steelworkers from the case at hand. We

disagree.

5a

each meeting will meet the eligibility requirements with-

out ever having attended a single meeting. Rather than

adding strength to the Union’s case, however, this under-

mines the only legitimate purposes that have been as-

serted on behalf of the Union’s bylaw; i.e., that the rule

encourages attendance and insures nominees who will

have at least minimal awareness and interest in the

activities of the Union. The only purposes for the rule

having evaporated, we are left with a rule which serves

no demonstrable purpose, but which, on the other hand,

significantly limits eligible candidates and imposes a

substantial adverse effect on the democratic process.

As the second factor distinguishing the instant case

from Steelworkers, the Union points to the fact that a

potential candidate in Steelworkers had to formulate his

intention to seek election eighteen months in advance,

whereas only a ten-month advance intention is necessary

in the instant case. We acknowledge that ten months is

substantially less than eighteen months.t The Supreme

3 The First Circuit rejected a similar argument with respect

to a more liberal “excuse” provision, permitting a member to

mail a post card within a week after a meeting to obtain at-

tendance credit. Usery v. Local Division 1205, Amalgamated

Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1800 (1st Cir. 1976). The First

Circuit noted that such bylaw served little purpose other than

to screen out those who had not decided to run for office soon

enough to meet the attendance requirement. Jd. at 1304, n.3.

* Reflection suggests that the difference between the ten-

month requirement in the instant case and the eighteen-

month rquirement in Steelworkers is not as substantial as

would appear at first glance. Unlike the rule in this case, the

Steelworkers rule would permit any meetings attended by a

union member during the first eighteen months of the relevant

three-year period to be credited against the number of meet-

ings which must be attended during the last eighteen months.

For example, if a member had attended five meetings during

the first eighteen months of the relevant three-year period, he

6a

Court in Steelworkers was concerned about the eighteen-

month requirement because election issues and member-

ship interest in changing union leadership would likely

emerge only shortly before elections. The Supreme Court

reasoned that the advance-intention requirement would

eliminate potential candidates whose interest in running

was aroused too late to comply with the qualifying pro-

cedures. The same concern is operative in this case; elec-

tion issues and membership interest in ousting Union

leadership might well be aroused after the ten-month

deadline.°

We conclude that the rationale of the Steelworkers

ease controls the decision in this case. On the particular

facts of this case, where the legitimate purposes served

by the rule are weak at best, where a potential candidate

would need to attend only thirteen meetings in the last eight-

een months. On the other hand, a member in the instant case

must attend at least one of the two meetings in each of the

ten months preceding the election. Good attendance prior to

the relevant ten-month period would be of no benefit. More-

over, in the instant case, a union member who missed, and

was not excused from, both meetings in any single month

during the relevant ten-month period would be disqualified.

5 The Union also argues that the emphasis placed upon the

actual antidemocratic impact of the rule places the Union in

the unfortunate position of not being able to predict, with any

degree of certainty, whether or not a particular requirement

will be valid under the statute. The short answer to this con-

tention is that the same argument was made and rejected in

Steelworkers, supra, 429 U.S. at 314, n.9, 97 S.Ct. at 617.

The Supreme Court suggested that it should have been obvi-

ous to the Steelworkers union that the rule would have a sig-

nificant antidemocratic impact. Similarly, in this case, it

should have been obvious to the Union that its rule was hav-

ing a substantial antidemocratic effect.. Moreover, the weak-

ness of the asserted legitimate purposes for this rule should

have forewarned the Union.

7a

must formulate his intention to run ten months in ad-

vance of the election, and where the impact of the rule

is to render ineligible 93.7% of the union membership,

we hold that the “antidemocratic effects of the meeting-

attendance rule outweigh the interests urged in its sup-

port.” 429 U.S. at 310, 97 S.Ct. at 615.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings con-

sistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

8a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

Case No. 76-413 Civ-T-H

[Filed Tampa, Fla., Apr. 19, 1978—

Wesley R. Thies, Clerk]

RAY MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor,

United States Department of Labor,

Plaintiff,

— Ys —

LOCAL 1402, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S

ASSOCIATION OF TAMPA, FLORIDA AND VICINITY, AFL-CIO,

Defendant.

FINAL JUDGMENT

This cause came on for consideration upon Defendant’s

oral motion for summary judgment made at the pre-trial

conference on March 29, 1978, and predicated upon the

stipulated facts recited in the Pre-Trial Stipulation of the

parties. At that time the Court reversed ruling on the

motion pending submission of memoranda by counsel.

This action was instituted by the Secretary of the

United States Department of Labor pursuant to Title IV

of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seg., and alleges that Defend-

ant violated section 401(e) of that Act. (29 USC § 481

(e)). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant denied

its members in good standing the right to be candidates °

for union office by imposing, with respect to the election

held December 9, 1975, an unreasonable candidate quali-

fication requirement. The rule in question required at-

tendance at one of two regular meetings per month for

9a

twelve consecutive months prior to the officer numination

meeting. The parties agree that this qualification ren-

dered 93% of Defendant’s members ineligible for can-

didacy at the December, 1975 election, but there is no

dispute that a member would be excused from attendance

by merely informing the union president, office clerk, or

financial secretary that he wished to be excused. The

member need not have stated a reason for such excuse,

and an excused absence was counted as attendance for

purposes of candidate eligibility.

In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant con-

tends that the qualification is reasonable as a matter of

law. Plaintiff, on the other hand, relying upon Local

3489, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v.

Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 97 S.Ct. 611 (1977), claims that

candidacy qualification requirements such as Defendant’s,

which render 93% of a union’s membership ineligible to

hold office, are unreasonable.

Upon consideration of the memoranda and authorities

cited by counsel, the Court is of the opinion that Defend-

ant’s candidacy requirements are not unreasonable as a

matter of law. The rule serves the legitimate purposes

of encouraging attendance at meetings and, more im-

portantly, of insuring that nominees will be those who

have demonstrated at least a minimal awareness of and

interest in the activities of the organization. This case

is distinguishable from Steelworkers, Local 3489, supra,

in that: (1) The Steelworkers’ rule made no apparent

provision for excused absence with the exception of

work schedule conflicts, whereas Defendant’s rule allows

excused absences upon the mere giving of notice to desig-

nated officers;* (2) The Steelworkers’ rule effectively re-

quired an opposition candidate to formulate an intention

to run for office (and meet the requirements for eligibil-

* See 29 C.F.R. 452.38.

10a

ity by regularly attending meetings) at least eighteen

months in advance of the election whereas, in this in-

stance, that decision could have been made as late as ten

months preceding the election. (Attendance for Novem-

ber and December 1974 was credited to all members).

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judg-

ment is GRANTED, and the Clerk is directed to enter

judgment for the Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE and ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 19th

day of April, 1978.

/s/ [Illegible]

United States District Judge

lla

FULL TEXT OF 29 U.S.C. $§ 481 and 482

$481 Terms of office and election procedures

Officers of national or international labor organizations;

manner of election

(a) Every national or international labor organization,

except a federation of national or international labor

organizations, shall elect its officers not less often than

once every five years either by secret ballot among the

members in good standing or at a convention of delegates

chosen by secret ballot.

Officers of local labor organizations; manner of election

(b) Every local labor organization shall elect its offi-

cers not less often than once every three years by secret

ballot among the members in good standing.

Requests for distribution of campaign literature; civil

action for enforcement; jurisdiction; inspection of

membership lists; adequate safeguards to

insure fair election

(c) Every national or international labor organiza-

tion, except a federation of national or international labor

organizations, and every local labor organization, and its

officers, shall be under a duty, enforceable at the suit

of any bona fide candidate for office in such labor or-

ganization in the district court of the United States in

which such labor organization maintains its principal

office, to comply with all reasonable requests of any can-

didate to distribute by mail or otherwise at the candi-

date’s expense campaign literature in aid of such person’s

candidacy to all members in good standing of such labor

organization and to refrain from discrimination in favor

of or against any candidate with respect to the use of

lists of members, and whenever such labor organizations

or its officers authorize the distribution by mail or other-

12a

wise to members of campaign literature on behalf of any

candidate or of the labor organization itself with refer-

ence to such election, similar distribution at the request

of any other bona fide candidate shall be made by such

labor organization and its officers, with equal treatment

as to the expense of such distribution. Every bona fide

candidate shall have the right, once within 30 days prior

to an election of a labor organization in which he is a

candidate, to inspect a list containing the names and last

known addresses of all members of the labor organization

who are subject to a collective bargaining agreement re-

quiring membership therein as a condition of employment,

which list shall be maintained and kept at the principal

office of such labor organization by a designated official

thereof. Adequate safeguards to insure a fair election

shall be provided, including the right of any candidate

to have an observer at the polls and at the counting of

the ballots.

Officers of intermediate bodies; manner of election

(d) Officers of intermediate bodies, such as general

committees, system boards, joint boards, or joint councils,

shall be elected not less often than once every four years

by secret ballot among the members in good standing or

by labor organization officers representative of such mem-

bers who have been elected by secret ballot.

Nomination of candidates; eligibility; notice of election;

voting rights; counting and publication of results;

preservation of ballots and records

(e) In any election required by this section which is

to be held by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall

be given for the nomination of candidates and every

member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candi-

date and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title

and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and

loa

shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the

candidate or candidates of his choice, without being sub-

ject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference or

reprisal of any kind Ly such organization or any mem-

ber thereof. Not less than fifteen days prior to the elec-

tion notice thereof shall be mailed to each member at his

last known home address. Each member in good standing

shall be entitled to one vote. No member whose dues have

been withheld by his employer for payment to such or-

ganization pursuant to his voluntary authorization pro-

vided for in a collective bargaining agreement shall be

declared ineligible to vote or be a candidate for office

in such organization by reason of alleged delay or default

in the payment of dues. The votes cast by members of

each local labor organization shall be counted, and the

results published, separately. The election officials desig-

nated in the constitution and bylaws or the secretary, if

no other official is designated, shall preserve for one year

the ballots and all other records pertaining to the election.

The election shall be conducted in accordance with the

constitution and bylaws of such organization insofar as

they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this

subchapter.

Election of officers by convention of delegates; manner

of conducting convention; preservation of records

(f) When officers are chosen by a convention of dele-

gates elected by secret ballot, the convention shall be con-

ducted in accordance with the constitution and bylaws

of the laber organization insofar as they are not incon-

sistent with the provisions of this subchapter. The offi-

cials designated in the constitution and bylaws or the

secretary, if no other is designated, shall preserve for one

year the credentials of the delegates and all minutes and

other records of the convention pertaining to the election

of officers.

l4a

Use of dues, assessments or similar levies, and funds

of employer for promotion of candidacy of person

(g) No moneys received by any labor organization by

ways of dues, assessment, or similar levy, and no moneys

of an employer shall be contributed or applied to pro-

mote the candidacy of any person in an election subject

to the provisions of this subchapter. Such moneys of a

labor organization may be utilized for notices, factual

statements of issues not involving candidates, and other

expenses necessary for the holding of an election.

Removal of officers guilty of serious misconduct

(h) If the Secretary, upon application of any member

of a local labor organization, finds after hearing in ac-

cordance with the Administrative Procedure Act ' that the

constitution and bylaws of such labor organization do not

provide an adequate procedure of the removal of an

elected officer guilty of serious misconduct, such officer

may be removed, for cause shown and after notice and

hearing, by the members in good standing voting in a

secret ballot conducted by the officers of such labor or-

ganization in accordance with its constitution and bylaws

insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions

of this subchapter.

Rules and regulations for determining adequacy

of removal procedures

(i) The Secretary shall promulgate rules and regula-

tions prescribing minimum standards and procedures for

determining the adequacy of the removal procedures to

which reference is made in subsection (h) of this section.

§ 482. Enforcement

Filing of complaint; presumption of validity

of challenged election

(a) A member of a labor organization—

15a

(1) who has exhausted the remedies available un-

der the constitution and bylaws of such organization

and of any parent body, or

(2) who has invoked such available remedies with-

out obtaining a final decision within three calendar

months after their invocation,

may file a complaint with the Secretary within one cal-

endar month thereafter alleging the violation of any

provision of section 481 of this title (including violation

of the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization

pertaining to the election and removal of officers). The

challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a

final decision thereon (as hereinafter provided) and in

the interim the affairs of the organization shall be con-

ducted by the officers elected or in such other manner

as its constitution and bylaws may provide.

Investigation of complaint ; commencement of civil

action by Secretary ; jurisdiction; preservation

of assets

(b) The Secretary shall investigate such complaint

and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation

of this subchapter has occurred and has not been rem-

edied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such

complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organi-

zation as an entity in the district court of the United

States in which such labor organization maintains its

principal office to set aside the invalid election, if any,

and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and

vote upon the removal of officers under the supervision

of the Secretary and in accordance with the provisions

of this subchapter and such rules and regulations as the

Secretary may prescribe. The court shall have power to

take such action as it deems proper to preserve the assets

of the labor organization.

16a

Declaration of void election; order for new election;

certification of election to court; decree; certification

of result of vote for removal of officers

(c) If, upon a preponderance of the evidence after a

trial upon the merits, the court finds—

(1) that an election has not been held within the

time prescribed by section 481 of this title, or

(2) that the violation of section 481 of this title

may have affected the outcome of an election,

the court shall declare the election, if any, to be void and

direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of

the Secretary and, so far as lawful and practicable, in

conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the labor

organization. The Secretary shall promptly certify to the

court the names of the persons elected, and the court shall

thereupon enter a decree declaring such persons to be the

officers of the labor organization. If the proceeding is for

the removal of officers pursuant to subsection (h) of

section 481 of this title, the Secretary shall certify the

results of the vote and the court shall enter a decree

declaring whether such persons have been removed as

officers of the labor organization.

Review of orders; stay of order directing election

(d) An order directing an election, dismissing a com-

plaint, or designating elected officers of a labor organiza-

tion shall be appealable in the same manner as the final

judgment in a civil action, but an order directing an

election shall not be stayed pending appeal.

17a

PROVISIONS OF 29 CFR AS OF JULY 1, 1976

§ 452.36 Reasonableness of qualifications.

(a) The question of whether a qualification is reason-

able is a matter which is not susceptible of precise defini-

tion, and will ordinarily turn on the facts in each case.

However, court decisions in deciding particular cases have

furnished some general guidelines. The Supreme Court

in Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union,

Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 at 499 (1968) held that

Congress plainly did not intend that the authoriza-

tion in section 401(e) of ‘reasonable qualifications

uniformly imposed’ should be given a broad reach.

The contrary is implicit in the legislative history of

the section and in its wording that ‘every member in

good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and

to hold office * * *.’ This conclusion is buttressed by

other provisions of the Act which stress freedom of

members to nominate candidates for office. Unduly

restrictive candidacy qualifications can result in the

abuses of entrenched leadership that the LMRDA

was expressly enacted to curb. The check of demo-

cratic elections as a preventive measure is seriously

impaired by candidacy qualifications which substan-

tially deplete the ranks of those who might run in

opposition to incumbents.

Union qualifications for office should not be based on

assumptions that certain experience or qualifications are

necessary. Rather it must be assumed that the labor or-

ganization members will exercise common sense and judg-

ment in casting their ballots. “Congress’ model of demo-

cratic elections was political elections in this country”

(Wirtz v. Local 6, 391 U.S. at 502) and a qualification

may not be required without a showing that citizens as-

sumed to make discriminating judgments in public elec-

tions cannot be relied on to make such judgments when

voting as union members.

18a

(b) Some factors to be considered, therefore, in assess-

ing the reasonableness of a qualification for union office

are:

(1) The relationship of the qualification to the legiti-

mate needs and interests of the union;

(2) The relationship of the qualification to the de

mands of union office;

(3) The impact of the qualification, in the light of the

Congressional purpose of fostering the broadest possible

participation in union affairs;

(4) A comparison of the particular qualification with

the requirements for holding office generally prescribed by

other labor organizations; and

(5) The degree of difficulty in meeting a qualification

by union members.

452.38 Meeting attendance requirements.

(a) It may be reasonable for a labor organization to

establish a requirement of attendance at a specified num-

ber of its regular meetings during the period immediately

preceding an election, in order to insure that candidates

have a demonstrated interest in and familiarity with

the affairs of the organization. In the past, it was ordi-

narily considered reasonable to require attendance at no

more than 50 percent of the meetings over a period not

exceeding two years. Experience has demonstrated that

it is not feasible to establish arbitrary guidelines for

judging the reasonableness of such a qualification. Its

reasonableness must be gauged in the light of all the

circumstances of the particular case, including not only

the frequency of meetings, the number of meetings which

must be attended and the period of time over which the

requirement extends, but also such factors as the nature,

availability and extent of excuse provisions, whether all

or most members have the opportunity to attend meetings,

19a

and the impact of the rule, i.e., the number or percentage

of members who would be rendered ineligible by its

application.**

(b) Some guidance is furnished by court decisions

which have held particular meeting attendance require-

ments to be unreasonable under the following circum-

stances: one meeting during each quarter for the three

years preceding nomination, where the effect was to dis-

qualify 99 percent of the membership (Wirtz v. Independ-

ent Workers Union of Florida, 65 LRRM 2104, 55 L.C.

11,857 (M.D. Fla. 1967) ); 75 percent of the meetings

held over a two-year period, with absence excused only

for work or illness, where over 97 percent of the mem-

bers were ineligible (Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle

Blowers Ass’n., 244 F.Supp. 745 (W.D. Pa. 1965), order

vacating decision as moot, 372 F.2d 86 (C.A. 3 1966),

reversed 389 U.S. 463; decision on remand, 405 F.2d 176

(C.A. 3 1968) ) ; Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass Bottle Blowers

Ass’n., 290 F.Supp. 965 (N.D. Calif., 1968) ; attendance

at each of eight meetings in the two months between

nomination and election, where the meetings were held at

widely scattered locations within the state (Hodgson v.

Local Union No. 624 A-B, International Union of Operat-

ing Engineers, 80 LRRM 3049, 68 L.C. $12,816 (S.D.

Miss. Feb. 19, 1972) ).

*8 Cf. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union,

Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, at 502; “Plainly, given the objective of

Title IV, a candidacy limitation which renders 93% of union

members ineligible for office can hardly claim to be a ‘reason-

able qualification.’ ”

20a

PROVISION OF 29 CFR § 452.38 AS OF JULY 1, 1979

§ 452.38 Meeting attendance requirements.

(a) It may be reasonable for a labor organization to

establish a requirement of attendance at a specified num-

ber of its regular meetings during the period immediately

preceding an election, in order to insure that candidates

have a demonstrated interest in and familiarity with the

affairs of the organization. In the past, it was ordinarily

considered reasonable to require attendance at no more

than 50 percent of the meetings over a period not ex-

ceeding two years. Experience has demonstrated that it is

not feasible to establish arbitrary guidelines for judging

the reasonableness of such a qualiiication. Its reason-

ableness must be gauged in the light of all the circum-

stances of the particular case, including not only the

frequency of meetings, the number of meetings which

must be attended and the period of time cover which the

requirement extends, but also such factors as the nature,

availability and extent of excuse provisions, whether all

or most members have the opportunity to attend meetings,

and the impact of the rule, i.e., the number of percent-

age of members who would be rendered ineligible by its

application.”

(a-1) In Steelworkers, Local 3489 v. Usery, 429 US.

305, 94 LRRM 2203, 79 L.C. $11,806 (1977), the Su-

preme Court found that this standard for determining

validity of meeting attendance qualifications was the type

of flexible result that Congress contemplated when it used

the word “reasonable.” The Court concluded that Con-

gress, in guaranteeing every union member the oppor-

tunity to hold office, subject only to “reasonable qualifica-

25 Cf. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union,

Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, at 502: “Plainly, given the objective of

Title IV, a candidacy limitation which renders 93% of union

members ineligible for office can hardly claim to be a ‘reason-

able qualification.’ ”

2la

tions,” disabled unions from establishing eligibility quali-

fications as sharply restrictive of the openness of the

union political process as the Steelworkers’ attendance

rule. The rule required attendance at fifty percent of the

meetings for three years preceding the election unless

prevented by union activities or working hours, with the

result that 96.5 percent of the members were ineligible.

(b) Other guidance is furnished by lower court deci-

sions which have held particular meeting attendance re-

quirements to be unreasonable under the following cir-

cumstances: One meeting during each quarter for the

three years preceding nomination, where the effect was to

disqualify 99 percent of the membership (Wirtz v. Inde-

pendent Workers Union of Florida, 65 LRRM 2104, 55

L.C. par. 11,857 (M.D. Fla., 1967)); 75 percent of the

meetings held over a two-year period, with absence ex-

cused only for work or illness, where over 97 percent

of the members were ineligible (Wirtz v. Local 1 53, Glass

Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 244 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Pa., 1965),

order vacating decision as moot, 372 F. 2d 86 (C.A. 3

1966), reversed 389 U.S. 463; decision on remand, 405

F.2d 176 (C.A. 3 1968) ) ; Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass Bot-

tle Blowers Ass’n., 290 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal., 1968) ) ;

attendance at each of eight meetings in the two months

between nomination and election, where the meetings

were held at widely scattered locations within the state

(Hodgson v. Local Union No. 624 A-B, International

Union of Operating Engineers, 80 LRRM 3049, 68 L.C.

par. 12,816 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 1972)); attendance at

not less than six regular meetings each year during the

twenty-four months prior to an election which has the

effect of requiring attendance for a period that must

begin no later than eighteen months before a biennial

election (Usery v. Local Division 1205, Amalgamated

Transit Union, 545 F. 2d 1800 (C.A. 1, 1976) ).

22a

PORTIONS OF THE BY-LAWS OF LOCAL 1402, I.L.A.

As Amended May 9, 1972

ARTICLE IX

Eligibility For Office

1. To be eligible for nomination or election to any

office in this organization a member must meet the fol-

lowing requirements:

(a) He must be a citizen of the United States.

(b)

(c)

(d)

He must have been a member in continuous good

standing for a period of one year prior to his

nomination.

He must have had a total of one year’s experi-

ence aboard and alongside ship.

He must not have been convicted of or served

any part term resulting from his conviction of

robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand

larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics

laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill,

assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury or a

violation of Title II or III of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of

1959, or conspiracy to commit any of such

crimes, for five years prior to the date of his

nomination, unless

(1) his citizenship rights, having been revoked

as a result of such conviction, have been

fully restored, or

(2) the Board of Parole of the United States

Department of Justice determines that such

person’s service as an officer would not be

contrary to the purposes of the Labor-

23a

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959.

(e) He must have been in attendance or excused at

at least one of the regular meeting in each of

the twelve months prior to his nomination.

(f) He must demonstrate a facility to read, speak

and understand the English language, equivalent

to that normally associated with a High School

education.

2. No member whose dues have been withheld by his

employer for payment to the Local pursuant to the mem-

ber’s voluntary authorization provided for in a collective

bargaining agreement shall be declared ineligible to be a

candidate in the Local by reason of alleged delay or de

fault in the payment of dues.

ARTICLE XX

By-Laws

1. These By-Laws may be revised at any regular meet-

ing or special meeting called for that purpose.

2. The proposed amendment or amendments shall be

in writing and shall be read at two meetings before a

vote is taken. The two meetings may include the meeting

at which the vote is taken. A majority vote shall be

sufficient to amend these By-Laws.

3. All such votes shall be by secret ballot.