Petition — Berk v. County of Los Angeles
Supreme Court brief1980
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Bupreme Cou
FILED
JUN 11 1980
WICHAEL RODAK, JR., OLE
IN THE .
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term 1979
No. “WO PA 1 9 5 1)
SHIRLEY BERK, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate
of Oscar Berk,
Petitioner,
VAY
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES and City OF TORRANCE, -
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of California.
JERROLD A. FADEM,
MICHAEL M. BERGER,
of FADEM, BERGER,
& NORTON,
A Professional Corporation,
501 Santa Monica Boulevard,
Suite 600,
P.O. Box 2148,
Santa Monica, Calif. 90406,
~ (213) 451-9951,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622
SUBJECT INDEX
Page
ME oi 5 a's a aa as Sk SNES ee eo oe 2
eo loti ed a me en ss iat eet 2
I I ig cc a ees od 2
Constitutional Provisions ..................... ano
IE GE I 6 ais bis os kb vo vc eee ev tetsckues 4
ORR ee vere 4
The California Supreme Court Changes the Law... 6
The California Supreme Court’s New Rule Was a
PN INI 0's UY is ho Cowen dues Cape tena 8
The Federal Questions Are Significant and Were Appro-
PEMMRNTY TIDE TNT ow sk ioe ei bk eae eabs 11
Reasons for Granting the Writ.................... 13
1.
The Decision in This Case Is of Widespread Importance
to Property Owners and Government Agencies .... 13
2.
The California Supreme Court’s Decision Conflicts With
This Court’s Repeated Refusals to Sweep Aside
Vested Property Rights by Sudden Changes inthe Law 16
3.
The Decision of the California Supreme Court Interferes
With the Jurisdiction of Federal Bankruptcy Courts, by
Holding That Property in the Custody of a Federal
Bankruptcy Court—and Subject to a Federal Restrain-
ing Order Preventing Any Change in Ownership—
May Be ‘‘Impliedly Dedicated’’ by the Bankrupt to the
General Public, While in the Hands of a Federal Re-
IN a os 5 nooks bn cacecannenaeenseue ee 18
INDEX TO APPENDICES Page
APPENDIX A. The Opinion of the Supreme Court of
the State of California ................. App. p. 1
Dissenting Opinion by Clark, J. ................ 28
ee 38
APPENDIX C. Order March 13, 1980, Rehearing
Glas «ule esd nwssdccssvsecehs 39
APPENDIX D. Modification of Opinion.......... 40
APPENDIX E. The Opinion of the Court of Appeal of
eer ere 4]
ALARCON, J.—Concurring and Dissenting ...... 68
nn errr 72
eee “. Judgment..........:......4000 74
iil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases Page
Agins v. City of Tiburon, No. 79-602 ............. 13
Board of Trade v. Johnson [1924] 264 U.S. 1....... 20
Briggs v. State of California, No. 79-1678 ......... 13
Cameron v. United States [1914] 231 U.S. 710...... 21
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago [1897] 166 U.S.
OM AGE RAE ORG Rr ates We SRO 16
City of Long Beach v. Daugherty (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d
if MR Ba EI ar ee Pn Ip 16
City of San Diego v. Hall (1919) 180 Cal. 165...10, 11
Converse v. Highway Const. Co. (6th Cir. 1939) 107
Fhe MN AL edb s wRekale vende eh iia Maleate 20
County of Los Angeles v. Berk [consolidated with City of
Torrance v. Berk] (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 161
COLE. Fey Oe Od AE a nc iRe atc eb me's
Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244..... 17, 18
F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal.
ng PEE Ee EC ee oe er ee 10, 11
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz [consolidated with Dietz v.
Ps CES Fae BR Bh kv oS va eck seeks us
ide koe 6 nls cere oe ee 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18
Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses [1902] 186 U.S. 181.. 20
Hughes v. Washington [1967] 389 U.S. 290 ..16, 17, 18
Katz v. United States (1968) 389 U.S. 347 ......... 17
Lazarus, Michel, & Lazarus v. Prentice [ 1914} 234 U.S.
I PE OR ale piel ded Hid WR 40 ecards wc nab eb acs 21
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt [1934] 292 U.S. 234....... 20
Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou (1938) 10 Cal.2d
East nn e e ERs oe er ov 4ae owe beats 10, 11
May v. Henderson [1925] 268 U.S. 111 ........... 20
Meek v. Centre County Banking Co. [1925] 268 U.S.
WN ec 5 ch eee ee eae edhe tho re ea ck 20
Page
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. [1905] 197 U.S.
EN peo Ain WS ed Cites be Bae ava ek we mG 16
Muller v. Nugent [1902] 184 U.S. 1 .............. 20
New Jersey v. Anderson [1906] 203 U.S. 483....... 20
Owen v. City of Independence [1980] ___ U.S. ___, 63
SRE UR ae aa es akties os Cake Ke wee 13
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, No. 79-289... 12
Robinson v. Ariyoshi (D. Haw. 1977) 441 F.Supp.
PA cope b Steg Sere PON ddan eh abhauses 17, 18
Rubin, In re (E.D. Pa. 1965) 242 F.Supp. 408 ...... 20
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, No.
a Waa rh lei 's.« adine ai abs Kae Rees 13
Sotomura v. County of Hawaii (D. Haw. 1975) 402
F.Supp. 95 [ruling on motion to dismiss] (D. Haw.
EP ree PW .,. GEe ig vic votes vce ccees 14, 17, 18
Straton v. New [1931] 283 U.S. 318 .............. 20
Whiteman v. City of San Diego (1920) 184 Cal.
MAS alo eave Aas Paks Wo va oe kw Gaius 10, 11
Statutes
United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1257(3) ......... 2
United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 4
EEE Lea a Pe we Gee eek bk (Ck bk Rs bs b's 4
United States Constitution, Art. 6, Cl. 2 ........... 4
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment .... . ae
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amend-
RES GEN ce bar ye. Ne ae ee ne ee eae 3, 1l, 16
Textbooks Page
Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An
Alternative to Implied Dedication (1971) 18 U.C.L.A.
eee st eee
Gallagher, Jure and Agnew, Implied Dedication: the
Imaginary Waves of Gion-Dietz [1973] 5 Sw. U.L.
Se I SE PO sw ciws becuse e aan Unies cunwa ue.
Lascher, Tips For the Overburdened Reader (1971) 46
Le, Ui GL Oo chs wchankok sa eeeuwedus
Note, The Supreme Court of California 1969-1970
(1971), 59 Calif. L.Rev., pp. 30, 231-232........
Note, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied
Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches
(1971) 44 S.Cal. L. Rev., pp. 1092, 1093,
Ass 65 w5.0 Ge dens kwe sy au u 4k eee 9,
Shavelson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go
From Here? (1972) 47 Cal.St.B.J., p. 415........
9
11
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term 1979
Pe eGaxiwut
SHIRLEY BERK, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate
of Oscar Berk,
Petitioner,
vs.
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES and CiTy OF TORRANCE,
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of California.
Petitioner Shirley Berk' respectfully prays that a Writ of
Certiorari issue to review a judgment and opinion of the
California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court’s opinion not only con-
fiscates Mrs. Berk’s property for public use without the
payment of any compensation, but it does so in a manner
which:
@ deprives Mrs. Berk of due process of law, by ret-
roactively changing a long-standing rule of property;
and
® conflicts with the jurisdiction of Federal Courts
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, by holding that
'Mrs. Berk brings this action both individually and as Executrix of
the Estate of her husband, who died shortly after the trial court's con-
fiscation order.
a, oe
property which is in the custody of a Federal bank-
ruptcy court may be transferred from the bankrupt by
operation of State law — even though the Federal court
has enjoined any dilution of the bankrupt’s property
interests.
Opinion Below.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court (App. A)
is reported as County of Los Angeles v. Berk [consolidated
with City of Torrance v. Berk] (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 161
Cal.Rptr. 742, 605 P.2d 381.
Jurisdiction.
The judgment of the California Supreme Court (App. B)
was filed and entered January 24, 1980. A timely Petition
for Rehearing was denied March 13, 1980 (App. C). When
rehearing was denied, the opinion was modified (App. D).
A copy of the California Court of Appeal’s January 19,
1979 opinion is Appendix E. Copies of the judgments in
the County and Torrance cases are Appendices F and G
respectively.
This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 USC
§1257(3).
Questions Presented.
1. When a U.S. District Court (applying Federal bank-
ruptcy law) takes the property of a bankrupt in custodia
legis, and issues an injunction barring anyone from altering
the status quo by diluting the bankrupt’s assets, does a State
court violate Federal law by holding that property subject
to such an injunction has been transferred from the bankrupt
by being ‘‘impliedly dedicated’’ by the bankrupt to the
general public during the Federal court’s custody, while the
Federal injunction was in effect?
ae
2. When a state Supreme Court reverses a long-standing
rule of property which sets up the requirements for estab-
lishing the prescriptive (or ‘‘implied’’) dedication of private
property to public use, and then the courts of that state
retroactively apply the new rule in such a manner that prop-
erty which was private under the old rule, ipso facto, eo
instanti, becomes public under the new rule — without the
payment of any compensation to the owner, and without
any opportunity for private property owners to adjust their
actions to fulfill the requirements of the new rule — has
the owner been deprived of property without due process
of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution?
3. Can a state, without violating the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, take
private property for public use without compensation, by
means of a sudden change in judicially declared property
law?
4. Isa litigant afforded due process of law when a state
court, without hearing evidence, indulges in presumptions
about the effect of human behavior — which have no basis
in fact — which are applied so conclusively that once the
presumption has been indulged, the adverse litigant can not
rebut the presumption?
Constitutional Provisions.
The following Constitutional provisions are involved:
U.S. Const., 5th Amendment:
‘*. . . nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."’
U.S. Const., 14th Amendment:
‘*. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law
ar wae
U.S. Const., Art. 1, $8, cl. 4 and 18:
‘*Section 8. Powers Granted to Congress
* * *
‘“4. To establish . . . uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies throughout the United States;
* * *
‘‘18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing pow-
ers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof.’’
U.S. Const., Art. 6, cl. 2:
‘2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and
all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”’
Statement of the Case.
The Subject Property.
This case involves approximately 2 acres of property on
California’s southern and urban coast. The property is in
Los Angeles County, approximately half in the City of Re-
dondo Beach and half in the City of Torrance.” Most of the
property is on a bluff, overlooking the ocean. The remainder
of the property consists of a steep slope leading to the beach
below, and a small part of the beach.
"Two separate lawsuits were filed: County v. Berk (the Redondo
Beach property) (App. F) and Torrance v. Berk (the Torrance property)
(App. G). The cases were tried and appealed together, resulting in
consolidated opinions in the Court of Appeal (App. E) and the California
Supreme Court (App. A).
ee.
At the time of trial (1972), the property was worth more
than $600,000.00.
The Torrance property was developed in the 1920’s by
the developer of a neighboring residential tract, who built
a private club on the property for the residents of his nearby
development. The clubhouse occupied almost all the area
of the Torrance bluff. After a succession of owners, the
clubhouse burned down in 1958.
There was evidence that, during the five year period from
1958 to 1963, some use was made of the property by mem-
bers of the public for sightseeing and access (down the bluff)
to the beach.
In 1963, the Torrance property was acquired by a man
named Keillor. He (or a company controlled by him) owned
the property for six years, during which time he attempted
to develop it for a high-rise apartment. His development
efforts received widespread publicity in the area. They were
vigorously opposed (and eventually defeated) by neighber-
ing residents, because the neighbors did not want a high-
rise blocking their view. No one ever claimed that there
were public rights in the property or that it could not be put
to conventional, private uses. The widespread publicity sur-
rounding Mr. Keillor’s development efforts was sufficient
to apprise everyone that this was private property which
would eventually be developed.
Stymied in Torrance, Mr. Keillor arranged to trade the
beach part of the Torrance property to the County of Los
Angeles, in exchange for adjoining land in Redondo Beach.
This exchange received widespread publicity, culminating
in its approval by the County Board of Supervisors at a
public meeting in 1965.
During the delay attendant to trying to develop the Re-
dondo Beach property, Mr. Keillor defaulted on notes se-
eat ee
cured by deeds of trust, which were liens on the property.
To protect his only asset, Mr. Keillor filed a bankruptcy
petition in the U.S. District Court. The U.S. District Court
appointed a receiver to take possession of the property and
issued an injunction to preserve the status quo. It took Mr.
Keillor’s lender nearly all of 1969 to get the U.S. District
Court’s permission to foreclose.
The Berks became interested in the property in mid-1970.
Mr. Berk examined the County Tax Assessor’s records for
the property,’ as well as the planning and zoning files in
both Torrance and Redondo Beach. He discussed the prop-
erty with employees in those offices and learned that Mr.
Keillor had problems only because he wanted to erect a
high-rise building. Having no such grandiose designs, the
Berks were reassured that rational development was possible
and purchased the property.
The California Supreme Court Changes the Law.
Before 1970, the law of California was clear, from a
series of California Supreme Court decisions beginning in
1915, that an owner of undeveloped beach property who
failed to object to ‘‘public’’ use was presumed to have
granted a license for such use. This licensed use could not
result in the prescriptive loss, or ‘‘implied dedication’’, of
the property to the public.
Then in 1970, the California Supreme Court stunned the
legal community‘ with its decision in Gion v. City of Santa
Cruz [consolidated with Dietz v. King] (1970) 2 Cal.3d 29.
Gion-Dietz turned the law around. Under the new Gion-
"He learned that the property had always been taxed as valuable
private property, available for private development.
“Commentators referred to it as a ‘‘bombshell’’, and likened its im-
pact on real property law to both an ‘‘earthquake’’ and a ‘“‘hurricane.”’
(See text accompanying notes 10-15, infra.).
—, ae
Dietz rule, five years of ‘‘public’’ use no longer resulted
in a presumption of a license but, instead, of a presumption
of an intent to dedicate the land to the public.
If Gion-Dietz were applied prespectively only, property
owners would have the opportunity to adjust their actions
to the new rule.
But in the case at bench — the California Supreme Court’s
first substantive consideration of Gion-Dietz since it created
the rule — the California Supreme Court applied Gion-Dietz
retroactively. The Court held that innocent pre-1970 acts,
which were presumed to have been performed under a /i-
cense from the owner (and thus could not result in the
‘“public’s’’ acquisition of any rights), were now to be judged
by the post-1970 law, which presumes the owner is giving
his property away.
Thus, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s judgments,’ which found a ‘‘recreation easement’”®
in the property ‘‘impliedly dedicated’’ to the public. The
trial court found ‘ vo specific five year periods of use (Cal-
ifornia’s period for adverse possession): 1958-1963 for the
*The California Court of Appeal had partially reversed the judgments,
holding that the unreasonable conduct of Torrance and the County in
not asserting ownership of these easements before the Berks purchased
the property entitled the Berks to compensation for out-of-pocket loss.
(App. E). The Supreme Court’s grant of a hearing automatically vacated
the Court of Appeal’s opinion. Justice Clark dissented from the Supreme
Court’s opinion (App. A, p. 28).
*The scope of a recreation easement precludes any use of the rty
by its owner. *‘Recreation’’ includes virtually all human activity, and
the public’s easement has been declared dominant (App. F and G).
par ee
Torrance property,’ and 1965-1970 for the Redondo Beach
property.*
The holding with respect to the Redondo Beach property
required the inclusion (as one of the five years of ‘‘impliedly
dedicative’’ use), of the one year during which the property
was in the custody of the Federal bankruptcy court, which
had appointed a receiver and enjoined everyone from in-
terfering with the receiver’s possession of the property. The
California Supreme Court chose to ignore the conflict this
created with the Bankruptcy Act and the proper jurisdiction
of federal bankruptcy courts. (App. A, pp. 1-27.)
The California Supreme Court’s New Rule Was a Startling Change.
Statement of this Case cannot be complete without a brief
discussion of the change in California real property law
wrought by Gion-Dietz.
In the case at bench, the California Supreme Court says
Gion-Dietz decided nothing new. (App. A, pp. 1-27.)
Virtually no one agrees with the California Supreme
Court’s hindsight analysis. (Compare Justice Clark’s dissent
[App. A, p. 28].)
First, as the trial judge acknowledged:
‘‘T am very concerned. I sympathize with the Perks
and with the lenders on the basis that this kind of a
'The five year period was held to begin on the very day the clubhouse
burned down.
*The Redondo Beach —— presents a special cause for concern,
if not outrage. This is the property which the County had exchanged
with Mr. Keillor in 1965. The County gave Mr. Keillor a quitclaim
deed in 1965. Then, when — in 1970 — the Berks attempted to use
the quitclaimed property, the same County filed suit to stop them, on
the incredible ground that the property which had been quitclaimed a
scant five years before still belonged to the County. The ‘‘implied
dedication’’ was alleged — and later held — to have begun on the very
day the quitclaim was signed. Even one of the County’s most ardent
supporters felt compelled to refer to this as an example of **. . . the
Indian-giving doctrine.’’ (RT 3322) How such action by the government
can comport with due process is a mystery.
ee AS
holding almost constitutes a legal confiscation. I’m
afraid that the lenders and the Berks are really victims
of an era where there are sudden changes in the law,
which doesn’t make it any more palatable, I can un-
derstand that.’’ (RT 4021; emphasis added. )°
The practicing bar agrees.
Assistant California Attorney General Jay Shavelson, one
of the successful counsel in Gion-Dietz, called Gion-Dietz
**. . . an earthquake of major proportions . . . in California
real property law.’’'®
Edward L. Lascher (a former member of the State Bar’s
Board of Governors, and a past President of the California
Academy of Appellate Lawyers) thought it akin to both a
‘“‘bombshell’’ and a ‘‘hurricane.’’"'
While student commentators were somewhat more re-
strained, they too, echoed this thought:
‘*. . . an important extension of the law of implied
dedication by adverse use... .’’”
** . . novel use of doctrine... .’’"
. . excessively expanded an already muddled var-
iation of the doctrine of implied dedication.’’'*
é
"Indeed, because the trial judge thought Gion-Dietz could not have
been anticipated, he refused to hold Torrance and the County guilty of
laches for failing to file suit earlier.
'Shavelson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go From
Here? (1972) 47 Cal.St.B.J. 415.
4, ygecher. Tips For the Overburdened Reader (1971) 46 Cal.St.B.J.
’
"Note, The Supreme Court of California 1969 - 1970 (1971) 59
Calif. L. Rev. 30, 231-232.
"Note, This Land is My Land: The Doctrine o Implied Dedication
and Its Application to California Beaches (1971) 44 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1092, 1093.
“Ibid.
—_" on
‘
‘. . . the legal foundation for this decision is equally
obscure.’’'*
All of these characterizations are true.
Before Gion-Dietz, the basic law with sespect to implied
dedication of coastal property was clearly stated in the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court’s decision in F.A. Hihn Co. v. City
of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal. 436. In Hihn, the City
claimed that property (unused by the fee owner) adjoining
public beach property, had been dedicated for public rec-
reational purposes because the public had long used the land
as if it were public land, and the owners never objected
(170 Cal. at 447).'° The California Supreme Court curtly
rebuffed the notion:
‘“Where land is uninclosed and uncultivated, the fact
that the public has been in the habit of going upon the
land will ordinarily be attributable to a license on the
part of the owner, rather than to his intent to dedicate.
(13 Cyc. 484). This is more particularly true where the
user by the public is not over a definite and specified
line, but extends over the entire surface of the tract.
(13 Cyc. 484). It will not be presumed from mere
failure to object, that the owner of such land so used
intends to create in the public a right which would
practically destroy his own right to use any part of the
property.’’ (170 Cal. at 448) (Emphasis added.)
Hihn was adhered to by the California Supreme Court in
the later beach cases of City of San Diego v. Hall (1919)
180 Cal. 165, 168; Whiteman v. City of San Diego (1920)
184 Cal. 163, 173; and Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou
(1938) 10 Cal.2d 653, 668.
‘Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative
to Implied Dedication (1971) 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 795, 802.
'°The facts are remarkably similar to Gion and Dietz.
vn,
The rational of the Hihn line of cases was never judicially
questioned until Gion-Dietz (see Shepard’s California Ci-
tations).
Now the California Supreme Court says it is otherwise.
Its opinion cites earlier decisions which approve implied
dedication of property. (App. A, pp. 1-27) There are such.
But all of the earlier cases dealt either with roads (see Note,
This Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication
and Its Application to California Beaches [1971] 44
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1092, 1099), or well-defined areas, or with
express (not implied) intent to dedicate. Indeed, the Cali-
fornis Supreme Court had refused to extend its implied
dedication cases to open, undeveloped land (Hihn, Hall,
Whiteman and Cortelyou, all cited above).
Thus, one reading the body of law developed by the
California Supreme Court before Gion-Dietz would learn
that open land was not subject to implied dedication. Any
public use was presumed to be by license from the owner."’
The Federal Questions Are Significant and Were Appropriately
Raised Below.
The result of retroactive application of a radical change
in property law is that Mrs. Berk’s property has been taken
from her for public use, without any compensation, in vi-
olation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
Moreover, the result was achieved in such a fashion as
to conflict with Federal bankruptcy law, causing the like-
"Indeed, one group of commentators who were favorably inclined
toward the Gion-Dietz concept, concluded that the trial court’s appli-
cation of the doctrine in this case was wrong. (Gallagher, Jure and
Agnew, /mplied Dedication: the Imaginary Waves of Gion-Dietz [1973]
5 Sw. U.L. Rev. 48, 78.)
a
lihood of future litigation as others attempt to invoke this
decision to evade Federal bankruptcy court orders.
These issues were raised by Mrs. Berk at each level of
the California court system, beginning with her pleadings,
and maintained throughout.
The decision below seems utterly at odds with the phi-
losophy underlying this Court’s June 9, 1980 decision in
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, No. 79-289. In
Pruneyard, this Court found no unconstitutional taking be-
cause, “‘[t]here is nothing to suggest that preventing [the
owners] from prohibiting this sort of activity will unrea-
sonably impair the value or use of their property . . .’’ Here,
by contrast, the rights granted the ‘‘public’’ leave the owner
with nothing.
pi |, Pea
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.
i.
The Decision in This Case Is of Widespread Importance
to Property Owners and Government Agencies.
This case represents a particularly cruel illustration of the
grief which can accompany the use of extreme ‘‘solutions’’
to problems perceived as ‘‘environmental’’ in nature.
One can endorse the general public goal of preservation
of coastal resources and provision of public access to the
shore. Such agreement, however, does not lead to approval
of the means chosen by the California Supreme Court to
accomplish it.
Confiscation of Mrs. Berk’s property, based on events
which occurred under [retroactively overruled] legal rules
which gave no warning of the confiscation which would
later occur, illustrates the California Supreme Court’s cur-
rent preference for the use of confiscation in the name of
‘‘environmental preservation’’.'*
The general solution devised by the California Supreme
Court in Gion-Dietz was a radical and unexpected expansion
of the doctrine of ‘‘implied dedication’’ based upon a series
'*Indeed, the California Supreme Court has recently issued a series
of decisions which show a complete disregard for the constitutionally-
based protection of private property rights. At least three are presently
before this Court as appeals: Agins v. City of Tiburon, No. 79-602; San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, No. 79-678; and Briggs
v. State of California, No. 79-1678.
Plainly said, the California Supreme Court has shown an ideological
antipathy to private property rights which strips property owners of the
protection intended by the U.S. Constitution. A California property
owner’s rights in the 1980’s are treated about as sympathetically as a
civil rights worker’s in Mississippi in the 1960’s. But regional ideology
cannot supplant the Constitution as the Supreme law of the land.
The time appears appropriate for a reminder by this Court to the
California Supreme Court that confiscation — no matter how well
intended — is not constitutionally permitted. (Compare Owen v. City
of Independence [1980] .... U.S. ...., 63 L.Ed 2d 673.)
a?
of fictional presumptions. The Court presumed that long use
of property by ‘‘the public’’ meant that the owner knew of
the use being made and acquiesced in it (2 Cal.3d at 38,
84 Cal.Rptr. at 167, 465 P.2d at 55). It further presumed
that ‘‘public use’’ for five years meant that the use was
adverse (2 Cal.3d at 39, 84 Cal.Rptr. at 168, 465 P.2d at
56).'” And it further presumed that this presumably adverse
use in which the owner presumably acquiesced meant that
the owner presumably intended to dedicate his property to
“the public’’ (2 Cal.3d at 38-39, 84 Cal.Rptr. at 167-168,
465 P.2d at 55-56).
The California Supreme Court impliedly presumed that
there are no ‘‘nice guys’’ who would allow members of
‘‘the public’’ to use their vacant property, and expressly
refused to recognize that a general license to ‘‘the public’’
would or could knowingly be granted (2 Cal.3d at 41, 84
Cal.Rptr. at 169, 465 P.2d at 57).”°
After five years of such use, the property is deemed
dedicated to ‘‘the public.”’
As if this rule were not sufficiently draconian, as for-
mulated in Gion-Dietz, the California Supreme Court put
the final nail in the coffin of private property rights in the
instant case. This case held the revolutionary Gion-Dietz
decision to have retroactive application.
To the ‘‘nice guys’’ in the world, confiscation is their
reward. The only California beach owners who escaped
Gion-Dietz/Berk are the misanthropes who fenced ‘‘the pub-
lic’’ out.
It is a bit troublesome to try to reconcile the conclusions that five
years of ‘‘use by the public’’ is presumptive proof of simultaneous
acquiescence and adversity.
The California Supreme Court reached these conclusions without
the benefit of any evidence thereon. (Compare Sotomura v. County of
Hawaii [D. Haw. 1978] 460 F.Supp. 473, 479-480.)
— |,
Emboldened by the California Supreme Court’s enthu-
siasm for ex post facto confiscation, government agencies
in California are seeking to apply the doctrine to its hilt.
For example, the following advertisement appeared in the
July 3, 1975, Los Angeles Times:
16 Port i—Thurs.. July 3, 1975 Los Angeles Tunes #
___ATTENTION:
Sata Monica Beach Users
The State of California is suing to confirm the pub-
lic’s rights to use Santa Monica State Beach north of the
Santa Monica Pier between California Avenue and Santa
Monica Canyon.
If you, your friends, relatives or ancestors have ever
used this beach for any recreational activities—espe-
cially that portion near the California Avenue
incline during the 1920‘s and 1930‘s—or if you
have any old photographs or written accounts of such
recreational use, please contact:
California Aftorney General's Office
3580 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90010
Attention: Peter H. F. Graber, Deputy Attorney General
YOUR HELP IS URGENTLY NEEDED
an!
Note the ad’s emphasis on attempting to presently con-
fiscate property based on actions which occurred fifty years
ago. Nor is this merely a hypothetical problem. In City of
Long Beach v. Daugherty (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 972, 142
Cal.Rptr. 593, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
imposition of an ‘‘implied dedication’’ recreation easement
based on activities from 1917 to 1922 (75 Cal.App.3d at
976).
Since then, the California Attorney General has prepared
a 112 page Implied Dedication And Prescriptive Rights
Manual, replete with form questionnaires and newspaper
ads (like the one reprinted above), giving government agen-
cies a blueprint for the retroactive invasion of the rights of
California property owners, based on turn-of-the-century
facts.
The problem is a significant one. It merits this Court’s
attention.
2.
The California Supreme Court’s Decision Conflicts With
This Court’s Repeated Refusals to Sweep Aside
Vested Property Rights by Sudden Changes in the
Law.
This Court has consistently held that the 14th Amendment
prohibits state courts from establishing or changing rules
of law relating to vested property rights in such a way that
the rights are taken for public use without just compensation.
(Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. {1905] 197 U.S.
544, 570-571; Hughes v. Washington | 1967] 389 U.S. 290,
296-299 |concurring opinion]; Chicago B.&Q. R. Co. v.
Chicago [1897] 166 U.S. 226, 241.)
In Hughes, for example, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington was concerned with preserving its shoreline for public
use — like the California Supreme Court here. It did so by
—
a 1966 reinterpretation of its 1889 Constitution, in a manner
the Washington Supreme Court thought was ‘. . . not star-
tling. . .’? (389 U.S. at 297) — like the California Supreme
Court here. Mr. Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in
Hughes illuminates the issue at bench, noting that sudden
changes in State law by its Supreme Court cannot be used
to evade the Constitutional prohibition against taking private
property for public use without just compensation (389 U.S.
at 296-299).*' This is so even if the State Supreme Court
neither intends to ‘‘take’’ property, nor realizes that it has
radically changed the law.
This Court is no stranger to the question whether an
opinion marks a clear break with the past. For example, in
Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244, this Court had
to determine whether Katz v. United States (1968) 389 U.S.
547, was a sharp departure. Conceding (394 U.S. at 248)
that some earlier principles ‘‘... had been modified
. .’’, while others *‘ . . . had not survived. . .’’, and that
some pre-Kaiz decisions ‘‘. . . may have reflected growing
disstisfaction . . .*’, and even concluding that ‘*. . . our
holding in Katz may have been clearly foreshadowed
...', this Court nonetheless faced the fact that its earlier
cases had not been overruled, rendering Katz ‘*. . . a clear
break with the past... .”’
"And see Sotomura v. County of Hawaii (D. Haw. 1975) 402 F ‘Supp.
95 [ruling on motion to dismiss] and (D. Haw. 1978) 460 F.Supp. 473
{ruling on the merits]; Robinson v. Ariyoshi (D. Haw. 1977) 441
F.Supp. 559. Sotomura and Robinson involved attempts by the Hawaii
Supreme Court to redefine beach ownership rights and water ownership
rights. In each case, the Hawaii Supreme Court suddenly changed the
law, transforming private property into public property. In each case,
the U.S. District Court held this coula not be done without compen-
sation. (Sotomura, 402 F.Supp. at 101, 460 F.Supp. at 481; Robinson,
441 F.Supp. at 580, 584-585).
—
The same is true here. Just as in Desist, none of the earlier
California cases had been expressly overruled. Indeed, none
had even been expressly questioned.
How can it be said that no ‘*. . . clear break with the past
..’’ occurred?
What happened in Gion-Dietz — as in Hughes, Sotomura
and Robinson — was a drastic re-definition of property
rights. That which was private property was declared by the
California Supreme Court — under newly issued rules —
to have become public.
But those settled, pre-1970 rules formed the basis of
property law before 1970. Those who relied on what the
courts — including the California Supreme Court — had
said before 1970, should not be placed in the position of
having their property confiscated because they could not
predict what the California Supreme Court would do. To
do so is to deprive them of their property without any legal
process —much less due process of law.
3
The Decision of the California Supreme Court Interferes
With the Jurisdiction of Federal Bankruptcy Courts,
by Holding That Property in the Custody of a Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Court — and Subject to a Federal
Restraining Order Preventing Any Change in Own-
ership — May Be ‘‘Impliedly Dedicated’’ by the
Bankrupt to the General Public, While in the Hands
of a Federal Receiver.
Please recall that the trial court found the subject property
to be *‘impliedly dedicated’’ because of five very precisely
defined years of public use (App. A, p. 8, fn. 7).
This creates direct conflict with Federal bankruptcy law,
because during nearly one year of the ‘impliedly dedicated”’
) period, the property was in custodia legis. The property
=—_
owner had commenced bankruptcy proceedings in U.S.
District Court, a receiver had taken possession of the bank-
rupt’s assets and a restraining order had issued to protect
the estate by prohibiting anyone from giving or taking any
interest in the bankrupt’s estate.
Foreclosure had been imminent when the restraining order
was issued. It took the trust deed beneficiary (lender) nearly
a year to obtain the Federal court’s approval to foreclose.
Thus, for nearly one year out of the five years of ‘‘im-
pliedly dedicative’’ use:
@ the property owner was restrained from transferring
the property;
@ the trust deed beneficiary was restrained from fo-
reclosing; and
@ the ‘‘public’’ was restrained from acquiring the
property.
Mrs. Berk urged the California courts that one of two
results must follow as a consequence of the one year Federal
custodia legis:
@ the Federal court custody interrupted the five year
period, so that five years uf ‘impliedly dedicative’’
use had to begin anew when the Federal restraining
order was dissolved; or
@ the Federal court custody tolled the five year pe-
riod, so that the one year custodia legis could not
count as one of the years of ‘‘implied dedication’.
The California Supreme Court rejected these means of
harmonizing its ‘‘implied dedication’’ rule with paramount
Federal bankruptcy law. Instead, it disregarded the conflict
(see App. A, pp. 1-27). To have acknowledged the conflict
would not have made the property public.
=
Long-settled Federal law is to the contrary. It calls for
protecting the assets of bankrupt estates from any dilution
of the bankrupt’s interest.
First. The construction of Federal bankruptcy laws
clearly presents a federal question. (Board of Trade v. John
son [1924] 264 U.S. 1, 10; New Jersey v. Anderson [1906]
203 U.S. 483, 491.)
Second. Bankruptcy is essentially an in rem proceeding
(Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses |1902] 186 U.S. 181, 192;
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt [1934] 292 U.S. 234, 241), so that
the filing of the petition places the assets of the bankrupt
in custodia legis (Straton v. New [1931] 283 U.S. 318, 321;
Meek v. Centre County Banking Co. [1925] 268 U.S. 426,
429).
Third. The initial consequence of filing the petition is
to give ‘*. . . acaveatto all the world. . .”’ that the property
is in the hands of the Federal court. (Muller v. Nugent
[1902] 184 U.S. 1, 14; May v. Henderson [1925] 268 U.S.
111, 117.) When accompanied by a receiver and restraining
order (as in this case) the ‘*. . . caveat to all the world
..’’ 1s even broader:
‘“The order of injunction in question was not only
in personam but also operated in rem to prevent inter-
ference with or the invasion of the property rights of
the debtor. It was broad enough in its terms to enjoin
all persons from interfering with the property in cus-
todia legis and was sufficient as a public record to
impart constructive notice to all.’’”
Fourth. The consequence of providing ‘*. . . construc-
tive notice to all . . .”’ is that interests in the property may
“Converse v. Highway Const. Co. (6th Cir. 1939) 107 F.2d 127,
129-130. To the same effect is /n re Rubin (E.D. Pa. 1965) 242 F.Supp.
408, 411-412.
i=, an
neither be given by the property owner nor obtained by
others during the Federal court custody. (Lazarus, Michel,
& Lazarus v. Prentice [1914] 234 U.S. 263, 266; Cameron
v. United States [1914] 231 U.S. 710, 717.)
The impact of these rules in this case is clear. From the
time the bankruptcy petition was filed until the Federal court
authorized foreclosure, no dilution of the property owner's
interest could occur. The property owner could not give it
away (expressly or ‘‘impliedly’’), the trust deed beneficiary
could not foreclose, and no one else could seize it.
The California Supreme Court ignored this. It permitted
the property owner’s interest to be reduced during the cus-
todia legis by refusing to toll the five year period. If that
year is removed, five years of ‘‘impliedly dedicative’’ use
did not occur. The Berks began construction of new apart-
ments before the end of the tolled period.
Thus, settled Federal bankruptcy law calls for a holding
that no easement could be ‘‘impliedly dedicated’’ while the
Federal bankruptcy court had possession of the property.
The California Supreme Court's contrary holding inter-
feres with the jurisdiction of Federal bankruptcy courts. It
will also generate additional litigation, as creditors and third
parties seek to use the California Supreme Court’s new rule
to evade the impact of Federal bankruptcy restraining orders.
Conclusion.
By retroactively applying a drastic re-definition of prop-
erty rights, the California Supreme Court has placed nu-
merous property Owners in danger of having their property
confiscated. Under the California rules, property owners
can do little but stand by and watch.
By ignoring the effect of the custody of the U.S. District
Court and its bankruptcy receiver, the California Supreme
Court has jeopardized the jurisdiction of Federal bankruptcy
a, ; wa
courts, as others will seek to take advantage of the disregard
for Federal court orders shown by the California Supreme
Court.
Mrs. Berk prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue so these
significant issues may be addressed, and the Constitutional
protection against deprivation of property without due proc-
ess of law be reaffirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JERROLD A. FADEM,
MICHAEL M. BERGER,
FADEM, BERGER & NORTON,
A Professional Corporation,
Attorneys for the Petitioner.
APPENDIX A.
The Opinion of the Supreme Court
of the State of California.
In the Supreme Court of the State of California.
County of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, Individually and as Executrix,
etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Appellant. City
of Torrance, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shirley Berk,
Individually and as Executrix, etc., Defendant and Appel-
lant. L.A. 31099, Super. Ct. Nos. 999043 and SWC 19574.
Filed: Jan. 24, 1980.
In March 1971, the City of Torrance and the County of
Los Angeles (County), acting for themselves and as trustees
for the public, brought separate actions to establish a ‘‘public
beach recreation easement’’ on certain property owned by
Oscar and Shirley Berk, naming as defendants in addition
to the Berks certain parties alleged to have security interests
in the property. Answers and cross-complaints were filed
by the Berks and other defendants. In their answers the
Berks asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including
estoppel and laches. Their cross-complaints, to the extent
that they were directed against plaintiffs,’ sought declaratory
relief negating the existence of the claimed easement and
also money damages on theories of slander of title, unjust
enrichment, and, with respect to County, inverse condem-
nation. The actions were consolidated for trial, and after a
trial by the court judgments were entered in favor of plain-
tiffs in all respects. All defendants including the Berks ap-
‘Affirmative relief was also sought against other parties on other
grounds. These claims were severed from the main action, to be tried
separately, and do not concern us here.
eae, UES
pealed,’ but all appeals other than that of the Berks were
dismissed by the Court of Appeal prior to our granting a
hearing. Thus, only the Berk appeal is presently before us.’
I.
The property here in dispute consists of slightly less than
two contiguous acres of vacant shoreline land straddling the
boundary line between the Cities of Torrance and Redondo
Beach. It includes sandy beach areas (none of which pres-
ently extend te the mean high tide line) together with steep
slopes and a considerable bluff area overlooking the ocean.*
Seaward from the property, and surrounding the sandy beach
portions thereof, is an expanse of what is now public beach.
There are no visible artificial boundaries between the subject
property and the public beach.
In the 1920’s this property, together with an additional
parcel lying seaward from the Torrance portion thereof, was
Oscar Berk died during the ndency of the appeal. The sole ap-
pellant remaining is Shirley Berk, both in her own behalf and as exe-
cutrix of the estate of her late husband. We hereafter refer to her as
‘-defendant.”’
*County has filed a motion to dismiss the Berk appeal as well, urging
present mootness. It is pointed out that after judgment was rendered
certain holders of security interests in the subject property, upon default
by the Berks, foreclosed those interests and acquired the Berks’ fee
interest, which has now been sold to County for an undisclosed amount.
Thus, it urged, appellant Berk lacks any present substantial interest to
be adjudicated. It is clear, however, that in spite of these events Berk
presently retains such an interest in obtaining monetary redress on
equitable grounds under the allegations of her cross-complaint. (See
and cf. Klopping v. City of Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 58.) Because
a determination of her right to such relief must necessarily involve an
examination of the judgments in their entirety, we decline to dismiss
her appeal. (Cf. American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle (1952) 39
Cal.2d 210, 217-218, and cases there cited.)
“Prior to the completion of a beach-widening project in 1967 and
1968 (see fn. 5, post) the seaward border of the property was apparently
the mean high tide line, and in winter the sea often reached the base
of the cliff or sloping area. Presently the seaward border of the property
is not touched by the sea.
— on
acquired by the developer of a neighboring residential area,
the Hollywood Riviera tract. In 1928, the developer con-
structed a large private beach club on the bluff portion of
the property for the use of owners of homes in the tract.
Following the depression shares in the property were dis-
tributed among the Hollywood Riviera homeowners, who
in 1947 sold a seaward portion of the property lying in
Redondo Beach to County. In 1958, however, the beach
club building burned to the ground, and the only evidence
of it presently remaining consists of steps leading from the
bluff to the beach below.
In 1963, the remaining property was sold to a real estate
developer named Keillor, who planned to construct a high-
rise condominium thereon. He placed a small real estate
office on a bluff portion of the property lying in Torrance
and commenced a public promotion program designed to
persuade local homeowners of the merits of his project. In
this, however, he was unsuccessful. Meeting with strong
and effective opposition from members of the Hollywood
Riviera Homeowners’ Association, who wished to maintain
the low-density character of the neighborhood, he aban-
doned the project in Torrance after being denied a variance
by the city council in 1964. Thereupon Keillor turned his
attention to the development of the bluff portions of the
property which lay in Redondo Beach. Pursuant to these
plans, in 1965 he negotiated an exchange of parcels with
the County, trading a seaward parcel lying in Torrance for
the seaward parcel in Redondo Beach which had previously
been sold to the County by the former owners of the prop-
erty.” Again, however, his plans miscarried when he failed
*Keillor subsequently granted the County a right of entry over the
parcel he obtained in this exchange in order to enable it to replenish
and maintain the surrounding public beaches. In 1967 and 1968, he
also permitted a private concern to store certain materials on the bluff
portion lying in Torrance while it performed a beach-widening project
pursuant to a contract between the County and the United States Army
Corps of Engineers.
ics
to obtain financing for the planned Redondo Beach devel-
opment, and following subsequent difficulties in meeting
his financial obligations under secured notes relating to the
property, he filed a petition for bankruptcy. In November
1969, after the property had been held in receivership for
approximately one year, foreclosure was effected by one
of the trust deed holders, Halperin, who then became the
owner.
In 1970, Halperin, seeking to dispose of the property,
opened an escrow on the remaining Torrance portion (i.e.,
the bluff area upon which the bulk of the private beach club
had stood) with a group of developers. After it appeared,
however, that the group’s plans, which contemplated the
erection of a high-rise building, would require a density
variance, local homeowners again mobilized their efforts,
and when in July 1970 the request for variance was denied
the escrow was terminated.
In the meantime, defendant Oscar Berk had become aware
of the availability of the Redondo Beach portions of the
property. After a personal inspection of the property he
proceeded to consult county tax records and familiarize him-
self with applicable zoning and building requirements. In
the course of these investigations he was advised of the
likelihood of local homeowner opposition to any planned
development but was given to understand that any such
opposition would probably not affect his plans with respect
to Redondo Beach. Upon learning of the termination of the
escrow on the Torrance portion of the property, however,
he expanded his investigations to include it as well. These
soon revealed that homeowner opposition in Torrance was
a more significant factor, the Hollywood Riviera Home-
owners’ Association being composed of Torrance residents.
In view of the experience of the previous group of pro-
spective developers he was advised that development would
eo ek
be possible in Torrance only if he could create a plan which
would require no variances. Concluding that this was pos-
sible, he proceeded to draw plans for a four-story apartment
complex utilizing the bluff parcels in both Redondo Beach
and Torrance. These plans were presented to officials in
both cities. Upon being advised by these officials that his
plan would require no variances from applicable zoning and
building codes, he submitted an offer on the whole of the
property and an escrow was opened.
During the pendency of the escrow Mr. Berk continued
his discussions with city officials in both Redondo Beach
and Torrance; these discussions were concerned with how,
rather than whether, the project should proceed. On Sep-
tember 28, 1970, the escrow closed, and shortly thereafter
Berk obtained a building permit from Redondo Beach. In
February 1971, construction commenced on the Redondo
Beach portion of the property and Berk applied for a building
permit in Torrance. At this point, however, members of the
local homeowners’ body—who the previous autumn had
become aware of the then-recent decision of this court in
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (consolidated with Dietz v.
King) (1970) 2 Cal.3d 29° —appeared before the Torrance
City Council urging that an action be filed by the city to
quiet title to public recreational easements on the Torrance
portion of the property. On March 13, 1971, the Torrance
action was commenced and shortly thereafter the County,
after receiving a similar request, filed its own action with
respect to the Redondo Beach portion of the property. An
‘Hereafter, in referring to our decision in the consolidated cases of
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v. King, we shall adopt the
hyphenated usage which has become customary among commentators,
bench, and bar: Gion-Dietz.
ide.
injunction was obtained preventing further construction dur-
ing the pendency of the litigation.
II.
Our decision in Gion-Dietz was filed on February 19,
1970, more than six months prior to the opening of the Berk
escrow. In that case this court, after examining a number
of well-established principles governing the implied com-
mon law dedication of public easements in private real prop-
erty, held that such principles were applicable in the case
of shoreline property and that, given certain conditions of
public user and owner inaction, a public easement for rec-
reational purposes could arise in such property. The decision
received substantial coverage and commentary in the public
media and was the subject of considerable attention in legal
publications.
The City Attorney of Torrance, although he became aware
of the Gion-Dietz decision soon after it appeared in
the advance sheets, was initially uncertain whether its ap-
plication was limited to sandy beach areas or extended as
well to slope and bluff areas of beach property. He did not
then communicate with the planning and building depart-
ments concerning the decision and its possible implications.
By the time that the Berk escrow closed (Sept. 1971), how-
ever, he had apparently resolved his uncertainties, for by
that time he had filed on behalf of the city several actions
seeking to establish public recreational easements in shore-
line property—including five such actions concerning bluff
property. He had not, however, undertaken such action con-
cerning the portion of the property here in question which
lay in Torrance, apparently because the deputy who prepared
the letter seeking authorization for suit was under the
impression that the parcel in question was county property.
anti
Mr. Berk did not learn of the Gion-Dietz decision until
late October or early November 1970, when he was in-
formed of it by his engineer. By this time, of course, the
escrow had closed. None of the officials in Redondo Beach
or Torrance with whom he had dealt prior to and during the
escrow had advised him of the decision or of the effect
which it might have on the subject property.
Il.
There was ample evidence presented at trial concerning
public recreational use of the property here in question. That
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing
parties, established in general that the whole of the subject
property (excepting, for the 30-year period between 1928
and 1958, the site on which the beach club building stood)
has been subject to public recreational use of substantial
diversity and scope for several decades. The present sandy
beach portion of the property (contained within the parcel
which was in County ownership from 1947 to 1965) has
been used along with the adjoining beach area by thousands
of persons annually—persons engaged in all of the recre-
ational pursuits generally associated with the seashore. The
area sloping up toward the bluff—most notably that con-
taining the stairs from the old beach club—has been used
for access to the beach below. The bluff area, lying largely
in Torrance, has been used by the public for a great variety
of purposes, including enjoyment of the spectacular marine
view, photography, painting, dog-walking, picnicking, bi-
cycling, and the parking of vehicles. Occasional efforts on
the part of former owners, including the posting of signs
and the erection of chain barriers, has had little effect upon
what one witness referred to at trial as ‘‘the multitudes,”’
and after the 1958 clubhouse fire no fencing of any kind
was attempted.
a
There was also evidence that for 25 years preceding 1970,
the County maintained the property as if it were publicly
owned, cleaning it regularly of the debris generated by pub-
lic use and providing lifeguard services on the beach area.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence the trial court
concluded in substance that the whole of the property in
question was subject to an easement arising out of implied
dedication for public recreational purposes.’ It also con-
cluded that neither plaintiff was guilty of laches or should
be estopped from asserting the claim of public right. With
respect to defendants’ cross-complaints the court concluded
that no provision of the state or federal Constitutions had
been violated by plaintiffs, that no act amounting to slander
of title had occurred, and that inverse condemnation had not
resulted from plaintiffs’ actions. Judgments were entered
declaring the existence of the said public easement; quieting
title thereto in plaintiffs for themselves and as trustees for
the people; enjoining defendants from all construction or
other conduct which would interfere with or obstruct the
full use and enjoyment of the public easement; and ordering
that defendants take nothing by their cross-complaints.
The court in its findings undertook to assign various time periods
during which the easement had been perfected with respect to the several
constituent parcels. It was found and concluded that implied dedication
had occurred with respect to those portions of the property which had
been the site of the beach club house (i.e., the entire Torrance portion
and that part of the bluff area lying in Redondo Beach) ‘during the
period commencing on a date subsequent to September 25, 1958, [the
date of the club house fire], but prior to November 1, 1958, and ending
on or by November |, 1963.’’ The sandy beach and slope portion lying
in Redondo Beach, on the other hand, was found to have been dedicated
“during the period September 7, 1965 [the date it was received by
Keillor in exchange for the similar parcel to the south of it] to September
28, 1970 [the date of the closing of the Berk escrow].”’
—
IV.
Defendant Shirley Berk, the sole appellant herein (see fn.
2, ante), raises several arguments challenging the trial
court’s application of Gion-Dietz to the instant case. It is’
urged in essence (1) that Gion-Dietz may not constitutionally
be applied to a case such as that at bench in which the facts
giving rise to the asserted public easement antedated the
Gion-Dietz decision; (2) that even if it can be so applied,
Gion-Dietz should not be read to permit the establishment
of a public easement on the basis of ‘‘mere public use’’ for
the requisite period but should instead be interpreted to
require a specific finding of adversity or claim of public
right; (3) that settled rules of property governing the ac-
quisition of prescriptive interests preclude the application
of Gion-Dietz in the instant circumstances; and (4) that
considerations of fundamental fairness, among them those
shaping the doctrines of laches and estoppel, will not allow
the result reached below. Sensible of the significance of
these contentions—and of the interest of the bench and bar
of this state in obtaining guidance relative to the matter of
the implied dedication of public recreational easements—
we take up each of them in order.
A. ‘‘Retroactive’’ Application.
Defendant Berk, characterizing the Gion-Dietz decision
as ‘‘revolutionary,’’ urges that to apply its precepts to a
case such as that at bench, wherein the events giving rise
to the alleged dedication occurred prior to our decision,
results in an unconstitutional taking of property. She rec-
ognizes, of course, that the Gion and Dietz cases themselves
were based on events similarly situated in time, but she
urges that the principle of Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S.
293, 301—pursuant to which a new rule of law, although
applied to the parties before the court in the case establishing
a Se
it, may be limited to otherwise prospective application—
should here have application to preclude an unconstitutional
result. In view of significant reliance by former owners of
the property here in question upon rules of public dedication
in existence prior to the Gion-Dietz decision, it is argued,
it is those rules, and not the precepts of Gion-Dietz, which
must here apply.
We think it clear that defendant may properly raise this
contention. Although the Gion-Dietz decision became final
. several months prior to the opening of the subject escrow,
this fact cannot preclude Mrs. Berk from challenging a
dedication to the public which occurred, if at all, at a time
substantially previous to that decision. Even if it must be
presumed—contrary to the record herein—that Mr. and
.Mrs. Berk acted with full knowledge of Gion-Dietz, and
even if it be granted that they were on notice of substantial
past and present use of the subject property by the public,
these factors are in no way inconsistent with defendant’s
present position. If the principle of Gion-Dietz may not be
constitutionally applied to allegedly dedicatory events and
circumstances occurring previous to our decision, defend-
ant’s knowledge—presumed or otherwise—becomes a mat-
ter of little consequence, for the property passed to her free
of any public easement.
Passing on to the merits of the contention, however, we
find ourselves unable to accept its major premise—i.e., that
the Gion-Dietz decision marked so ‘‘revolutionary’’ a
change in the law that to apply its precepts to past events
and actions, occurring in the context of prior law, is to
countenance an unconstitutional taking of property without
due process of law. We conclude on the contrary that Gion-
Dietz, far from signaling the momentous ‘‘redefinition of
property rights’? which defendant would depict,* simply
represents a restatement and clarification of well-established
former law and an application of that law, as so restated
and clarified, to a unique pattern of factual circumstances.
Such a decision, we think, cannot be deemed to so betray
the legitimate and reasonable reliance interests of property
owners that its application to them and their property
amounts to an unconstitutional taking of vested rights.
As early as 1854 this court, in addressing the matter of
common law dedication of property to the public, indicated
that such a dedication might occur not only be deed or other
action so manifesting dedicatory intention on the part of the
owner but by ‘“‘lapse of time.’’ (San Francisco v. Scott
(1854) 4 Cal. 114, 116.) In a series of subsequent cases it
was made clear that dedication arising out of ‘‘lapse of
time,’’ in the words of Scott, was to be distinguished from
dedication arising from dedicatory acts or conduct by the
owner in that it looked not to the intentions of the owner
but to the intent and activities of the public on the land in
question; here the inquiry became whether the public,
‘Defendant's characterization of the Gion-Dietz decision appears to
have been shared in substance by the authors of several of the comments
appearing in legal literature shortly after its rendition. (See, e.g., Note,
This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its
Application to California Beaches (1971) 44 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1092;
Note, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and its Effect
on the California Coastline Property Owner (1971) 4 Loyola L.A.L.
Rev. 438; Lascher, Highlighting the California Law Reviews (1971)
46 State Bar J. 13, 16-17; Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last—At Least
They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1971) 8
Cal. Western L.Rev. 75; Armstrong, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Now
You Own It—Now you Don't (1970) 45 L.A. Bar. Bull. 529; but see
Comment, Public Access to Beaches (1970) 22 Stan.L.Rev. 564.) More
recent commentary, however, has adopted a somewhat different view,
tending to view Gion-Dietz as a predictable development and elabo-
ration of established law. (See Briscoe & Stevens, Gion After Seven
Years: Revolution or Evolution? (1977) 53 L.A. Bar J. 207; Gallagher,
et al., /mplied Dedication: The Imaginary Waves of Gion-Dietz (1973)
5 Sw.U.L.Rev. 48.).
a
through long-continued ‘‘adverse’’ use of the property, had
so manifested its public aspect as to justify the implication
in law that a dedication had occurred. (See especially
Schwerdtle v. County of Placer (1895) 108 Cal. 589, 592-
596; see also Hartley v. Vermillion (1903) 141 Cal. 339,
348-349; People v. Myring (1909) 144 Cal. 351, 354; Hare
v. Craig (1929) 206 Cal. 753, 757; Diamond Match Co.
v. Savercool (1933) 218 Cal. 665, 669-670.) Our 1954
opinion in Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County (1954)
42 Cal.2d 235, which drew upon all of these as well as
other cases, identified this form of dedication as one implied
in law, as opposed to those forms resting upon the acts of
acquiescence of the owner, which it characterized as implied
in fact. (/d., at p. 241.)
Our Gion-Dietz case, adverting to this venerable line of
authority, went on to distinguish the character of ‘‘adver-
sity’’ necessary to implied in law dedication to the public
from that obtaining in the law of private prescriptive rights,
pointing out that what must be shown here is not a personal
claim of right but rather a use by members of the public
“believing the public had a right to such use.’’ (2 Cal.3d
29, 39.) Here again we did not purport to announce ‘‘new
law’’ but rather to consolidate and explain prior expressions
and holdings. Indeed, as long ago as 1908 it had been
explained that in such cases the public was not required #
‘‘to make proclamation that they are using [the subject prop
erty] under a claim of right where the right is asserted as
flowing from long usage with the knowledge and acquies-
cence” of the owner of the land; nor is it always necessary
"In the case of Hare v. Craig, supra, 206 Cal. 753, at page 755, we
had indicated that the owner's ‘‘knowledge and acquiescence”’ did not
imply permission or license in this context but rather suggested the
absence of any significant acts by the owner ‘‘which would interrupt
the continuity of the adverse use... .”’
a
to show some aggressively hostile act by the public that
such use was intended to be adverse to the owner. The claim
of right, the adverse character of the use and the knowledge
and acquiescence"® of the owner of the land may be pre-
sumed from the facts and circumstances attending the use."’
(Barnes v. Daveck (1908) 7 Cal.App. 487, 490-491; see
also Laguna Beach v. Consolidated Mtg. Co. (1945) 68
Cal.App.2d 38, 43-44.).
It is suggested, however, that the form of dedication to
the public here in question had, prior to Gion-Dietz, always
been limited in application to cases involving roadways,
and that the possible application of these principles to other
types of property could not reasonably have been antici-
pated. In responding to this argument, however, we need
look no further than the case of Morse v. Miller (1954) 128
Cal.App.2d 237, wherein the court, relying significantly
upon the very portion of the Union Transportation opinion
which we summarized in Gion-Dietz, concluded that the
trial court’s finding of public dedication of beach front and
athletic field property could be supported on the theory,
among others, of implied in law dedication arising from
long-continued adverse public use. The Morse decision,
cited in Gion-Dietz (2 Cal.3d at p. 43), antedated it by
almost 16 years.
Defendants make much of the case of F.A. Hihn Co. v.
City of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal. 436, urging in essence
that it and later cases following it had the effect of lulling
beachfront landowners into a false sense of security by as-
suring them that failure to object to public use of their lands
would not lead to a presumed intention on their part to create
public rights therein. As we pointed out in Gion-Dietz,
"See footnote 9, ante.
—; a
however, the case of O’Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d
145 made clear that future cases were to be decided not
from the standpoint of presumptions but from that of ‘‘the
sufficiency of the evidence in the light of all the circum-
stances disclosed.’’ (32 Cal.2d at p. 150.) More signifi-
cantly, perhaps, the landowner relying on Hihn and related
cases, whatever comfort he may have derived from them
with respect to implied in fact dedication arising from his
own act, could not reasonably have read them to suggest
that they precluded the emergence of public rights in his
property due to long-continued public use—i.e., through
a dedication implied in law. Not only was the subject lan-
guage clearly dictum in the Hihn case itself (see 170 Cal.
at p. 447), but the issue there addressed was that of dedi-
cation by the owner through acts manifesting a dedicative
intent—i.e., implied in fact dedication."'
We conclude on the basis of the foregoing that our Gion-
Dietz decision had none of the ‘‘revolutionary’’ aspects
which defendant would ascribe to it. Not only were the
principles upon which it relied firmly imbedded in prior
decisional law, but they had previously been applied on at
least one occasion to property of the general character here
involved. It thus cannot be maintained that the application
of these principles on the basis of facts taking place previous
to Gion-Dietz resulted in an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty.
We reject for similar reasons defendant’s related conten-
tion that a ‘‘mutual mistake of law’’ vitiated any donative
"This was made quite clear in the subsequent case of Manhattan
Beach v. Cortelyou (1938) 10 Cal.2d 653, where we cited Hihn as a
clear illustration of the principle that ‘‘Acts of a landowner from which
the law implies a dedication of his property for public use as a street
do not always lead to the same result where land is used for other
purposes.’’ (/d., at p. 667.).
— | Soe
intent on the part of prior owners. As we have pointed out,
the principles of implied in law dedication to public use
look not to the intent of the owner but to the intent and
activities of the public.
B. Public Intent.
It is urged that the judgments cannot stand because they
are unsupported by a specific finding that the public’s use
of the subject property was accompanied by a belief on its
part that it had a right to such use. The trial court specifically
found, however, that the uses made of the subject property
by the public were made ‘‘as if said parcels were part of
a public recreational area.’’ This, under the specific terms
of our Gion-Dietz decision, was a sufficient finding of that
kind of ‘‘adversity’’ which is requisite to implied in law
dedication. (2 Cal.3d at p. 39.)
Defendant also argues that the evidence before the court
cannot be read to support such a finding of public interest.
Without detailing the evidence upon which she relies, we
can adequately characterize it as indicating that during the
periods of time in which public dedication was held to have
occurred no reasonable member of the public could have
concluded that the subject property was publicly owned.
Even if we ignore all contrary evidence, however — the
fact remains that knowledge of private ownership is not
inconsistent with a belief in a right to public use. No case
has ever suggested that the public, in order to bring about
the implication of public rights upon private land, must act
in the belief that the land is in public ownership. It is enough
that the public demonstrate through its actions that its mem-
bers believed that they had a right to use the property as
they did.
We do not here suggest — nor have we ever in the past
suggested — that the requisite belief on the part of the
we
public, as manifested by its actions with respect to the prop-
erty, is not subject to the requirement of reasonableness in
all of the circumstances. Thus if the owner can show that
his efforts to exclude the public or otherwise discourage
public use were such that the public was effectively put on
notice that its use of the property was not authorized, he
may thereby preclude the accrual of public rights. This
question, however, is ordinarily one of fact, to be deter-
mined in light of all of the circumstances. (See Gion-Dietz,
supra, at p. 41.) In the instant case the trial court found on
the basis of substantial evidence ‘‘that no effective effort
was made by any owner or anyone else to interfere with or
halt such use by said members of the general public at any
time.”’
C. Third Party Interests; the Effect of Receivership.
Defendant advances several technical arguments based
upon the presence of secured interests in the subject property
and the placing of a portion thereof in receivership. It is
urged (1) that no rights of a ‘‘prescriptive’’ character could
accrue to the public in the presence of deeds of trust affecting
the subject property; (2) that even if such rights could accrue
in these circumstances, they were here cut off prior to per-
fection by the occurrence of foreclosure sales; and (3) that
the placing of a portion of the subject property in receiv-
ership during the ‘‘prescriptive’’ period cut off all inchoate
public rights or at least had a fatal tolling effect with respect
to their perfection.
We think it important before addressing each of these
contentions separately to draw attention to a fundamental
misconception which runs through all of them. We deal here
not with a form of prescription or adverse possession but
with a unique form of dedication. Here the element of
‘“adversity’’ is looked to not as a factor necessary to the
—,
perfection of a superior property right in the possessor or
possessors as such (i.e., in themselves) but rather as an
ingredient in the evidentiary structure necessary to the im-
plication in law that a dedication to the public as a whole
_ has occurred. (See 3 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal.
Real Estate (rev. ed. 1977) § 20:13, p. 475.) When that
structure is made to appear the public is not deemed to have
wrested its right from the owner but rather is held in law
to have been granted it by him. Thus, the true questions
facing us are (1) whether such a dedication may be made
through legal implication in the face of deeds of trust af-
fecting the subject property; (2) whether foreclosure and
sale under such deeds of trust prior to the time when ded-
ication would otherwise be implied operates to prevent such
dedication on the part of the new record owner; and (3)
whether the placing of the property in receivership operates
to remove the period of such receivership from consideration
with respect to the implication of dedication on the part of
present or future record owners. 4
While we are aware of no case which discusses the effect
of the presence of deeds of trust affecting the subject prop-
erty on its implied in law dedication to public use, there are
two cases which bear indirectly on the problem. In People
v. Myring, supra, 144 Cal. 351, this court held that long-
continued public uses of a roadway and bridge situated on
land held by defendant pursuant to a federal patent had
resulted in their implied in law dedication to public use.
When it was objected that such a dedication could not be
so implied because the property was held under a declaration
of homestead giving rights therein to defendant’s wife, we
responded as follows: ‘‘If the prosecution had sought to
show a declaration by deed from him alone, this objection
might have been good .. ., but the dedication which is
presumed from the adverse user by the public operated as
a ae
an estoppel against the wife as well as the husband, and was
independent of any question of homestead.’’ (/d., at p. 355.)
A parallel result was reached in the case of Gray v. Magee
(1933) 133 Cal.App. 653. There a certain roadway long
dedicated to public use had been rerouted shortly before the
death of the owner of the property over which it is passed.
The question was whether the relocated portions of the road-
way were subject to implied in law dedication through con-
tinued public user of them during the pendency of the
owner's estate, it being urged in essence that the executors
of the estate had no power to make any kind of dedication
contrary to the interests of the beneficiaries. We disagreed
with this contention. “‘Without doubt,’’ the court said, ‘‘an
executor may not make an express dedication as to estate
lands, but an easement may arise as to estate lands through
implied dedication or prescription.’’ (/d., at p. 662.)
What these cases would seem to indicate is that a dedi-
cation implied in law as a result of adverse public user arises
‘‘independently’’ of third party interests in the property.
This is so, we believe, because of the character of the public
user which underlies any such dedication. Such user must
be substantial; it must be carried on by diverse members of
the public; and it must be ‘‘adverse’’ in the sense that we
have explained. Such user must be held to impart notice of
The court cited by way of analogy the early case of Patchett v.
Pacific Coast Ry. Co. (1893) 100 Cal. 505, a case involving an easement
by prescription over trust lands. There this court, addressing the effect
of the trustee’s failure to bring an action within the statutory period
upon infant beneficiaries, quoted with approval from earlier authority
as follows: ** ‘The rule that the statute of limitations does not bar a
trust estate holds only between cestui que trust and trustee, not as
between cestui que trust, and trustee on one side, and strangers on the
other; for that would make the statute of no force at all, because there
is hardly any estate of consequence without such trust, and so the act
would never take place. . . .’ ’’ (100 Cal. at p. 510; original italics.)
(See also Triplett v. Williams (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 135, 137-138;
Rest. 2d Trusts, § 327, p. 125.)
—_' =
its occurrence to the whole world, including the holders of
other interests in the property.
It is objected that the holder of a deed of trust on property
subject to public user of the nature here in question, even
if he is deemed to be on notice of it, is wholly without
power to discourage or prevent it. This, however, does not
appear to be so. Under the provisions of section 2929 of
the Civil Code, one whose interest in property is subject to
a deed of trust is precluded from doing any act which will
substantially impair the security of the beneficiary of the
deed of trust. (See Cornelison v. Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d
590, 599.) Such acts, we believe, must be held to include
that of permitting public user of the character here in ques-
tion, and we see no reason why such a beneficiary may not
maintain an action to prevent its continuance. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. 2; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co.
(1889) 80 Cal. 245; Perrine v. Marsden (1867) 34 Cal. 14;
Buckout v. Swift (1865) 27 Cal. 433; Robinson v. Russell
(1864) 24 Cal. 467.).
The case of Phillips v. Laguna Beach Co. (1922) 190
Cal. 180, upon which defendant strongly relies, is of little
assistance to her. There the owner of beachfront property
had, by resolution of its board of directors, offered to ded-
icate a portion of it along the shoreline to public use for
park purposes. Subsequent public use was apparently not
intense and occurred on a less than regular basis, but it was
held that such use was sufficient to constitute an acceptance
by the public of the offered dedication. We also held, how-
ever, that the judgment—which enjoined future sale or en-
cumbrance—could not be sustained as to the beneficiary of
a trust deed who had made a loan on the property some 10
years after the offer of dedication was made. Nothing of
record had alerted the beneficiary of the prior dedication
and, we noted, a view of the premises at the time of the
oe
loan had revealed no significant evidence of public use.
‘‘There is no evidence that the public were occupying the
public use at the time of the visit of the [beneficiary], nor
that it ever had occupied any part of the premises so as to
impart notice to the [beneficiary] . ...’’ (190 Cal. at
p. 185; italics added.) Thus it is clear that even had this
case involved implied in law dedication (which it did not,
being concerned with express dedication), and even if it had
addressed the question of the effectiveness of such dedi-
cation in the presence of existing deeds of trust (which it
did not, any dedication therein having occurred long prior
to the inception of the deed of trust), it suggests only that
sparse public user of the type therein involved was not such
as to impart notice of its occurrence. We deal here with an
entirely different situation, involving substantial, diverse,
and readily apparent public user over a considerable period
of time.
We conclude on the basis of the foregoing that public
user of the character involved in the instant case must be
held to impart knowledge of its occurrence to the world at
large, and that when it has continued for the requisite period
of time a dedication to the public will be implied in law
which binds not only record owners but all persons having
interests in the subject property—including the beneficiaries
of deeds of trust in existence during the said period.
We are further of the view that the occurrence of fore-
closure and sale during the course of the dedicatory period
should lead to no different result. Although the purchaser
at such a sale will normally receive title free and clear of
any unrecorded interests or liens (see 1 Miller & Starr,
Current Law of Cal. Real Estate (rev. ed. 1975) § 3:121,
p. 544), and although no rights of a prescriptive or adverse
nature can arise against him prior to sale and the expiration
of the period of redemption (see 3 Miller & Starr, Current
<a
Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 19:25, pp. 431-432), we
believe that the unique form of notice imparted by public
user of the character here in question should operate to
burden the title received by the purchaser with all accu-
mulated public interests, even if they not be ripened into
an implied dedication at the time he receives title. Accord-
ingly, dedication may in some circumstances be implied in
law on the part of such a purchaser even when he has not
been record owner for the full length of the dedicatory
period.
The fact that the subject property was in federal receiv-
ership during a portion of the period of public user did not
in our view operate to cut off accumulated public interests
or remove the period of receivership from consideration for
purposes of implied dedication to public use. The order
appointing receiver, in enjoining all persons ‘‘from inter-
fering with the Receiver’s possession of the assets . . . and
from attempting in any manner to take possession’’ of said
assets without court order, was intended ‘‘to preserve the
estate or prevent loss thereto’’ (11 U.S.C.A. § 11(a)(3))
pending disposition pursuant to the chapter XI proceedings
which led to its issuance. (See generally, 2 Cowans, Bank-
ruptcy Law and Practice (2d ed. 1978) § 606, pp. 263-266;
1 Clark, The Law and Practice of Receivers (3d ed. 1959)
§ 74, pp. 100-101.) It did not purport to enjoin the public
from continuing its long-established uses of the property—
at least insofar as such uses did not result in ‘‘loss’’ to the
estate during the period of receivership. We therefore see
no reason why continued public user occurring during the
subject period should be disregarded or omitted from con-
sideration with respect to a dedication implied in law after
the termination of the receivership.
a. ;
D. Estoppel and Laches.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs should be estopped
from claiming the public recreational easement here found
to exist by the trial court. It is urged that the County, by
assessing and taxing the property as if it were private and
not subject to such an easement, and the officials of the
Cities of Redondo Beach and Torrance by applying their
zoning and building ordinances to the property on the same
assumption, thereby represented to defendant and her hus-
band that the said assumption was true. The Berks, it is
argued, relied on this representation to their detriment.
We see no merit in this argument. The trial court found,
on the basis of substantial evidence, that plaintiffs lacked
any actual knowledge that a public easement existed on the
subject property, that they at no time acted with an intent
to deceive the Berks or any of their predecessors in this
respect, and that they were guilty of no culpable negligence
in treating the property as they did. Moreover, any reliance
by the Berks on the actions of the governmental entities
here involved was clearly unreasonable. It simply cannot
be maintained that an existing or prospective property
owner, upon being advised by planning and building offi-
cials that a given project complies with applicable local
codes, thereby gains the right to proceed with that project
regardless of the rights of third parties or the public in the
prooperty on which it is proposed to be built. Finally, any
such reliance must also be deemed unreasonable in light of
the Berks’ knowledge of the long-continued public user of
the property—the Gion-Dietz decision having been rendered
by this court five months prior to the opening of escrow.
It is suggested that there is some inherent inconsistency
in a determination that whereas governmental officials were
not culpably negligent in treating the property as if it were
on
not burdened with a public easement, the Berks and others
in the chain of title acted other than reasonably in relying
on such treatment in their own assessment of the status of
the property. The short answer to this, of course, is that the
owner of property or one proposing to acquire it cannot
justify his ignorance of the true state of the facts and the
law affecting it by pointing to similar ignorance in govern-
ment bodies. Negligence which may be less than culpable
in a government body, charged with the administration and
regulation of vast amounts of land under diverse ownership,
cannot be so easily excused in one whose interest is focused
upon a particular piece of property.
Even if the elements of estoppel'’ here appeared—which
as we have indicated they do not—this is not a case in which
an estoppel could properly be raised against the government
and the people to defeat a claim of public recreational ease-
ment. It is well established that an estoppel will not be
raised against such parties when to do so would nullify
‘‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the
public, . . .’’; (County of San Diego v. Cal. Water etc. Co.
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 817, 829-830; cf. City of Long Beach v.
Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493-501.) As we pointed out
"As we pointed out in City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3
Cal.3d 462, 490, quoting from an early case: ‘* ‘[T]o the application
of this principle with respect to the title of property, it must appear,
first, that the party making the admission by his declarations or conduct,
was apprised of the true state of his own title; second, that he made
the admission with the express intention to deceive, or with such care-
less and culpable negligence as to amount to constructive fraud; third,
that the other party was not only destitute of all knowledge of the true
state of the title, but of the means of acquiring such knowledge, and
fourth, that he relied directly upon such admission, and will be injured
by allowing its truth to be disproved.’ ’’ (Original italics.) We went
on to point out in Mansell that the third of these requirements has been
interpreted to mean that a person seeking to raise an estoppel in this
context be destitute not ‘‘of all possible means of acquiring knowledge
of the true state of the title, but rather of all convenient or ready means
to that end.”’ (/d., at pp. 490-491.)
a." ae
in Gion-Dieiz, there is a clearly enunciated public policy
in this state in favor of allowing public access to shoreline
areas. (2 Cal.3d at pp. 42-43.) To allow the raising of an
estoppel to defeat the claim of public right here involved
would be manifestly contrary to this policy.
Considerations identical to the foregoing support the trial
court’s refusal to permit the assertion of the equitable de-
fense of laches. (See People v. Department of Housing &
Community Dev. (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 185, 196, and cases
there cited.)
V.
Defendant additionally asserts that the trial court erred
in denying recovery in damages under the cross-complaints
directed against the governmental plaintiffs. It is urged that
the failure of these entities to act more promptly in light of
Gion-Dietz with respect to the property here in question—
whether by advising interested parties of its possible status
under that decision or by expeditiously filing an action to
establish the public claim of easement—resulted in their
purchase of the property and subsequent losses. These
losses, she asserts, should be recoverable against the entities
who, by bringing these actions subsequent to the purchase,
brought them about.
The sole authority advanced in support of this novel prop-
osition—and that only by way of analogy—is the case of
Klopping v. City of Whittier, supra, 8 Cal.3d 39. We there
held that a property owner who can demonstrate that his
land has suffered a diminution in value ‘‘as a result of”’
unreasonable precondemnation actions on the part of a pub-
lic authority—such activities there alleged to involve un-
reasonable delay of an eminent domain action following the
prior announcement of intent to condemn—is entitled to
recover his consequent losses from the public authority.
—_
peel,
(See especially id., at pp. 51-52.) It is suggested that here,
by the same token, the governmental plaintiffs were guilty
of *“‘unreasonable conduct”’ in treating the subject property
without respect to any possible claim of public easement
and dealing with its prospective owners on the sole basis
of their right to develop it under applicable zoning and
building ordinances, only to reverse this position after the
purchase had occurred by maintaining the instant actions
to establish a public easement. This conduct, defendant
asserts, resulted in the losses suffered by them due to the
subsequent establishment of the easement.
The suggested analogy, we think, is manifestly over-
broad. Even if it be assumed for purposes of argument that
the actions of the governmental agencies here involved were
‘“unreasonable’’ in some sense—a fact which the instant
record can by no means be said to establish as a matter of
law (see part II, ante)—we cannot conclude that the losses
accruing to defendant from the purchase of the subject prop-
erty occurred ‘‘as a result of’’ such governmental actions
within the meaning of K/opping. In the latter case the prop-
erty owner, faced with the condemner’s intention to proceed
and its failure to institute proceedings, was wholly without
means for averting the diminution in value which ensued. '4
Here, on the other hand, the situation was quite different.
Defendant and her late husband, as prospective purchasers
of the subject property, had at their disposal ample means
of informing themselves of all of the considerations, legal
and otherwise, which might have had an effect on the wis-
dom of their decision. Rather than availing themselves of
the full range of these means, however, they apparently
‘*As we pointed out in the Klopping case, such a means was later
rovided by the 1971 addition of former section 1243.1 (now
245.260) to the Code of Civil Procedure.
ra,” EN
chose to limit their inquiry to those considerations relating
to the feasibility of proceeding with their plans in light of
applicable zoning and building codes. In so doing they
wholly neglected to inform themselves on the current state
of the common law and its possible effect on the property
they proposed to purchase. Had they done otherwise, of
course, they would quickly have been made aware of our
then recent Gion-Dietz decision and the principles on which
it was based.
Defendant would seem to suggest, however, that the gov-
ernmental plaintiffs herein were under an obligation to ad-
vise her and her husband in this matter, and that it is the
breach of this obligation which resulted in her losses. We
do not believe, however, that defendant may so easily divert
the responsibility for her own inattention. We are aware of
no authority which requires a government entity, on pain
of an award of damages against it, to furnish a legal opinion
concerning the possible effect of an appellate decision to
persons proposing to purchase property whose title may be
affected thereby.
VI.
We close with a formal matter. As has been indicated
above, the judgments herein quieted title in the subject pub-
lic easement in defendants both for themselves and as trust-
ees for the people. Although we have concluded that plain-
tiffs have standing to assert the public right as trustees for
the people, we see no basis in this record for determining
that they have any rights in the subject easement other than
those which they are adjudged to hold as public trustees. '*
We so interpret and construe the judgments.
'SCounty, of course, presently is the holder of fee title to the under-
lying real property. (See fn. 3, ante.).
_,
(See and cf. In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76,
87-89, 92.).
The motion of County to dismiss the appeal herein is
denied. The judgments, which we interpret and construe to
quiet title in the subject public easement in plaintiffs as
trustees for the people of the State of California, are and
each of them is affirmed.
MANUEL, J.
We Concur:
BIRD, C.J.
TOBRINER, J.
MOSK, J.
RICHARDSON, J,
NEWMAN, J.
ae. mn
Dissenting Opinion by Clark, J.
I dissent.
Gion-Dietz Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1970) 2 Cal.3d
29) declared substantial law without adequate discussion,
repudiated settled principles applicable to claims of dedi-
cation by adverse use, ignored constitutional guarantees of
property rights, established an inequitable doctrine punish-
ing the unselfish, and promulgated a rule counterproductive
to the policy sought to be served. The Legislature repudiated
Gion-Dietz in large part. We should acknowledge the court’s
mistake and overrule the case.
Prior to Gion-Dietz no case held dedication of an easement
occurred by adverse use for recreation, and substantial rea-
son existed to believe that use could ripen into fee title only
following compliance with statutory requirements for ad-
verse possession. All cases had rejected claims a right to
recreational use was acquired by prescription. Because the
undefined public easement for recreation would deprive an
owner of practically all use of his land, a dedication for
recreational use would be equivalent to transfer of the fee.
Civil Code section 802 enumerating servitudes which may
be granted upon land does not include a recreational ease-
ment. In cases involving implied and express dedication of
an interest in land for use as a park, courts had always held
the full fee interest was transferred, the owner losing all
right to possession. Finally, deeds purporting to create pub-
lic easements for park purposes were held to convey fee
interest so that grantors or their successors were precluded
from making any use of the property, even one consistent
with the purported easement, such as selling refreshments.
(E.g., Slavich v. Hamilton (1927) 201 Cal. 299, 305-306;
Archer v. Salinas City (1892) 93 Cal. 43, 51: Morse v.
E.A. Robey Co. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 464, 469-470.)
a,
The combination of statutory exclusion, park dedication
cases, and denial of owner use, told us that a general public
right to use private property for recreational purposes could
not be acquired by prescription but rather only by compli-
ance with requirements of adverse possession—substantial
enclosure, cultivation, or improvement of the property.
(Civ. Code, § 325.)
Prior to Gion-Dietz, public use of open and unenclosed
land was considered a license from the owner rather than
an intention to dedicate. The presumption of license applied
where the use by the public is not over a definite and spec-
ified line, but extends over the entire surface of the tract.
[Citation.] It will not be presumed, from mere failure to
object, that the owner of such land so used intends to create
in the public a right which would practically destroy his
own right to use any part of the property. [Citations.)’’
(F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal. 436,
448.) Like Gion-Dietz, Hihn involved public use of beach
property. But the court concluded that the public did not
obtain rights by adverse use or dedication. Hihn was fol-
lowed in Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou (1938) 10 Cal.2d
653, 688; Whiteman v. City of San Diego (1920) 184 Cal.
163, 172; and City of San Diego v. Hall (1919) 180 Cal.
165, 167-168.
A different rule was applied to roads where public use
for more than the prescriptive period with knowledge of the
owner and without permission or objection established ded-
icatory intent by the owner. (Union Transp. Co. v. Sacra-
mento County (1954) 42 Cal.2d 235, 240-241 (citing nu-
merous Cases).) In road cases the public ordinarily is deemed
to make the same use as the owner, the road is sharply
defined and determination of a prescriptive right of way has
not been deemed to deprive the owner of all use of his
property. Additionally, roads are often expressly dedicated
a, es
to the public. (O’Flaherty, This Land is My Land: The
Doctrine of Implied Dedication to California Beaches
(1971) 44 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1072, 1101-1102.) Finally, road
use is often adverse to the owner either because the road
is built by others or because others’ use of an existing road
increases the owners’ burdens of repair and maintenance.
Hihn and similar cases placed the burden on those claim-
ing dedication by prescription to negate the presumed license
by showing circumstances in addition to mere public use.
To establish dedication by prescription prior to Gion-Dierz,
all cases required continuous use and many required the use
be adverse. (/d.)
In Gion-Dietz, this court announced a new doctrine of
public easement for recreational use acquired by prescrip-
tion. The court ignored the purported easement was equiv-
alent to transfer of fee and did not even discuss requisites
of obtaining title by adverse possession.' Absence of such
an easement from the enumeration of easements in section
802 and the park purpose cases were dismissed in a cryptic
footnote. (2 Cal.3d 29, 44-45, fn. 7.)
Gion-Dietz utilized the rule theretofore applied to road
easement cases to establish dedication of open and unen-
closed property. The presumption that public use of such
property was derived by license from the owner was for the
first time rejected, and the burden was placed on the land-
owner to establish the license. Further, the court held the
fact use permission was given to some but not to all members
of the public was insufficient to establish the license. (2
Cal.3d at p. 44.)
The court proclaimed: ‘‘We will not presume that owners
of property today knowingly permit the general public to
'A private easement for recreational purposes obviously would not
have the effect of transferring fee.
=
use their lands and grant a license to the public to do so.”’
(2 Cal.3d at p. 41.) The court concluded that if ‘‘the owner
has not attempted to halt public use in any significant way
. it will be held as a matter of law that he intended to
dedicate the property or an easement therein to the public,
and evidence that the public used the property for the pre-
scriptive period is sufficient to establish dedication.’’ (/d.)
Gion-Dietz also repudiated the requirement of continuity
in favor of sporadic use. (2 Cal.3d at p. 40.) And the
traditional requirement of adversity was expressly elimi-
nated, mere public use now being sufficient. ‘‘What must
be shown is that persons used the property believing the
public had a right to such use. This public use may not be
‘adverse’ to the interests of the owner in the sense that the
word is used in adverse possession cases. If a trial court
finds that the public has used land without objection or
interference for more than five years, it need not make a
separate finding of ‘adversity’ to support a decision of im-
plied dedication.’’ (2 Cal.3d at p. 39.)
Repudiation of prior authority and change from a doctrine
based on adverse use to one of simple use was grounded
on the court’s announced preference for public recreation.
(2 Cal.3d at pp. 42-43.) The court ignored the prohibition
against taking property for public use without just compen-
sation reflected in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of
our state Constitution.
Commentators’ reaction to the per curiam opinion was
immediate and striking. Edward L. Lasher, writing in the
State Bar Journal called it a ‘‘bombshell.’’ (46 State Bar
J. 13, 16 (1971).) Assistant Attorney General Shavelson,
head of the land law section, termed it an ‘‘earthquake of
major proportions in California real property law.’’ (Shav-
elson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go From
a, ee
Here? (1972) 47 State Bar J. 415.) With characteristic pre-
cision and understatement, Bernard E. Witkin referred to
the decision as ‘‘innovative,’’ pointing to critical commen-
tary and immediate legislative repudiation. (3 Witkin, Sum-
mary of Cal. Law (1973) pp. 1834-1836.).
Commentators were severe in their criticism of Gion-
Dietz, noting not only departure from precedent,” the failure
to consider total loss to the owner, and the prohibition of
taking property without compensation, but also that the case
created an obvious inequity and would prove counterpro-
ductive to the public policy espoused. (Armstrong, Gion v.
City of Santa Cruz; Now You Own It—Now You Don’t; or
The Case of the Reluctant Philanthropist (1970) 45 L.A.
Bar Bull. 529; Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last—At Least
They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1971)
8 Cal. Western L.Rev. 75; Comment, This Land Is My Land:
The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to
California Beaches (1971) 44 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1092; Com-
’The majority’s attempted reliance in the instant case upon O’Banion
v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145 and Morse v. Miller (1954) 128
Cal. App.2d 237, to establish precedent for Gion-Dietz fails. O’Banion
neither mentions nor impliedly overrules Hihn. O’Banion was a pre-
scriptive easement case dealing with roads in which the court did away
with the presumption of adversity arising from open, continuous, no-
torious and peaceable use for the preseciptive period in favor of treating
the issue as ‘‘one of fact, giving consideration to all circumstances and
the inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’’ /d., at p. 149.) Hihn,,
which is not mentioned in O’Banion, involved a presumption of license
where public use is over open land, not a roadway. Moreover, O’ Banion
did not specifically address the issue of burden of proof of license, and
did not suggest that the landowner had the burden to prove license
rather than a burden to prove adversity upon those claiming public use.
Morse recognized a recreational beach easement but the easement
was implied in fact rather than prescriptive. In that case, a subdivider
selling lots represented that the beach and athletic field would be open
to use, and the court held that his statements constituted an implied
dedication. While the court earlier in its opinion spoke of prescriptive
dedication, this was by way of illustration, and furnishes no basis for
a conclusion that mere use is sufficient to obtain a prescriptive recre-
ational easement.
ment, A Threat to the Owners of California’s Shoreline
(1971) 11 Santa Clara Law. 327; Comment, Public or Pri-
vate Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative to Implied Ded-
ication (1971) 18 UCLA L.Rev. 795; Note, Californians
Need Beaches—Maybe Yours! (1970) 7 San Diego L.Rev.
605; Note, Implied Dedication in California: A Need for
Legislative Reform (1970) 7 Cal. Western L.Rev. 259, Note,
The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its
Effect on the California Coastline Property Owner (1971)
4 Loyola U.L.Rev. 438; Note, Public Access to Beaches
(1970) 22 Stan.L.Rev. 564; Note (1971) 59 Cal.L.Rev.
231.)
The inequity addressed by commentators appears when
weighing penalties against rewards to landowners having
no immediate use for their property so that permitting public
use poses no interference or impairment. Those landowners
who were neighborly and hospitable in permitting public
use were penalized by Gion-Dietz by loss of their land,
while those excluding the public by fencing or other means
were rewarded by retention of their exclusive use. While
virtue is usually its own reward, the law does not usually
penalize the virtuous.
The decision was asserted to be counterproductive be-
cause landowners to avoid prescriptive dedication would
now exclude the public from using open and unimproved
property for recreation purposes. Thus the very policy
sought to be furthered would be defeated. (County of Orange
v. Chandler-Sherman Corp. (1976) 54 Cal. App.3d 561, 564
points out that one of the reactions to Gion-Dietz was ‘‘soar-
ing sales of chain link fences.’’)
The Legislature quickly and decisively repudiated the
factual assumption of Gion-Dietz. (Stats. 1971, ch. 941,
1845.) Whereas in Gion-Dietz this court announced, ‘‘We
will not presume that owners of property today knowingly
a ae
permit the general public to use their lands and grant a
license to the public to do so’’ (2 Cal.3d at p. 41), the
Legislature concluded that California landowners are far
more charitable and neighborly. Following our 1970 opinion
in Gion-Dietz, the Legislature expressly stated in 1971 that:
‘*The Legislature finds that: (1) It is in the best interests of
the state to encourage owners of private real property to
continue to make their lands available for public recreational
use... .’” (Civ. Code, § 1009, subd. (a); italics added.)
Further findings by the Legislature make it abundantly clear
we should not require property owners, by rules creating
prescriptive dedication, to become less charitable and neigh-
borly.’
*Civil Code section 1009 provides: ‘‘(a) The Legislature finds that:
[%] (1) It is in the best interests of the state to encourage owners of
private real property to continue to make their lands available for public
recreational use to supplement opportunities available on tax-supported
publicly owned facilities. [{] (2) Owners of private real property are
confronted with the threat of loss of rights in their property if they
allow or continue to allow members of the public to use, enjoy or pass
over their property for recreational purposes. [4] (3) The stability and
marketability of record titles is clouded by such public use, thereby
compelling the owner to exclude the public from his property. [4] (b)
Regardless of whether or not a private owner of real property has
recorded a notice of consent to use of any particular property pursuant
to Section 813 of the Civil Code or has posted signs on such property
pursuant to Section 1008 of the Civil Code, except as otherwise provided
in subdivision (d), no use of such property by the public after the
effective date of this section shall ever ripen to confer upon the public
or any governmental body or unit a vested right to continue to make
such use permanently, in the absence of an express written irrevocable
offer of dedication of such property to such use, made by the owner
thereof in the manner prescribed in subdivision (c) of this section,
which has been accepted by the county, city, or other public body to
which the offer of dedication was made, in the manner set forth in
subdivision (c). [{] (c) In addition to any procedure authorized by law
and not prohibited by this section, an irrevocable offer of dedication
may be made in the manner prescribed in Section 7050 of the Govern-
ment Code to any county, city, or other public body, and may be
accepted or terminated, in the manner prescribed in that section, by the
county board of supervisors in the case of an offer of dedication to a
county, by the city council in the case of an offer of dedication to a
city, or by the governing board of any other public body in the case
of an offer of dedication to such body. [§] (d) Where a governmental
—_
Additional provisions of section 1009 and the 1971
amendment to Civil Code section 813 (Stats. 1971, ch. 941,
p. 1845, § 1) clearly reflect the legislative judgment that
the policy of public access to recreational areas is best served
by encouraging landowners to allow the public to use their
land. Section 1009, subdivision (b), provides: ‘*. . . except
as otherwise provided in subdivision (d), no use of such
property by the public after the effective date of this section
shall ever ripen to confer upon the public or any govern-
entity is using private lands by an expenditure of public funds on visible
improvements on or across such lands or on the cleaning or maintenance
related to the public use of such lands in such a manner so that the
owner knows or should know that the public is making such use of his
land, such use, including any public use reasonably related to the
purposes of such improvement, in the absence of either express per-
mission by the owner to continue such use or the taking by the owner
of reasonable steps to enjoin, remove or prohibit such use, shall after
five years ripen to confer upon the governmental entity a vested right
to continue such use. [{]] (e) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to any
coastal property which lies within 1,000 yard inland of the mean high
tide line of the Pacific Ocean, and harbors, estuaries, bays and inlets
thereof, but not including any property lying inland of the Carquinez
Straits bridge, or between the mean high tide line and the nearest public
road or highway, whichever distance is less. [4] (f) No use, subsequent
to the effective date of this section, by the public of property described
in subdivision (c) shall constitute evidence or be admissible as evidence
that the public or any governmental body or unit has any right in such
property by implied dedication if the owner does any of the following
actions: [{]] (1) Posts signs, as provided in Section 1008, and renews
the same, if they are removed, at least once a year, or publishes an-
nually, pursuant to Section 6066 of the Government Code, in a news-
paper of general circulation in the county or counties in which the land
is located, a statement describing the property and reading substantially
as follows: ‘Right to pass by permission and subject to control of owner:
Section 1008, Civil Code.’ [{] (2) Records a notice as provided in
Section 813. [{]] (3) Enters into a written agreement with any federal,
state, or local agency providing for the public use of such land. [4]
After taking any of the actions set forth in paragraph (1), (2), or (3),
and during the time such action is effective, the owner shall not prevent
any public use which is appropriate under the permission granted pur-
suant to such paragraphs by physical obstruction, notice, or otherwise.
[{] (g) The permission for public use of real property referred to in
subdivision (f) may be conditioned upon reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of such public use, and no use in violation of
such restrictions shall be considered public use for purposes of a finding
of implied dedication.”’
a
mental body or unit a vested right to continue to make such
use permanently, in the absence of an express irrevocable
offer of dedication of such property .. . .’’ Subdivision
(d) permits dedication by prescription where governmental
entities have improved, maintained or cleaned the land by
expenditure of public funds. Thus, the general rule in Cal-
ifornia is again that, absent public improvement or main-
tenance, the gracious landowner who permits the public to
use his property is in no worse position than he who excludes
the public.
While section 1009, subdivision (e), exempted from sub-
division (b)’s prohibition of prescriptive dedication certain
oceanside properties, subdivision (f) provides: ‘‘No use,
subsequent to the effective date of this section, by the public
of property described in subdivision (e) shall constitute evi-
dence or be admissible that the public or any governmental
body or unit has any right in such property by implied
dedication if the owner does any of the following actions.”’
Included in the actions an owner may take are posting signs
disclaiming dedication once a year of more, publish dis-
claimer notices annually, or record a disclaimer revocable
notice pursuant to Civil Code section 813. These provisions
make clear that contrary to Gion-Dietz, owner conduct is
not to be ignored in determining prescriptive dedication.
At the time Gion-Dietz was decided Civil Code section
813 provided the owner of property could protect his interest
by recording a notice providing that the right of the public
or any person to use the property was by permission. Re-
cordation of such notice constituted evidence of permissive
use. Gion-Dietz ignored this section. The 1971 amendment
made the recordation conclusive evidence of permission,
and further provided the permission ‘‘may be conditioned
a
upon reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner
of such public use, and no use in violation of such restric-
tions shall be considered public use for purposes of a finding
of implied dedication.’’
Not only has the Legislature rejected the Gion-Dietz as-
- sumptions but it has also rejected our proclamation that
public use alone without regard to landowner conduct is
sufficient to warrant a finding of prescriptive dedication.
As to the noncoastal properties, prescriptive dedication is
available only where governmental agencies have improved,
maintained or cleaned the land by expenditure of public
funds. As to the coastal properties, landowners may easily
avoid the effect of Gion-Dietz by recording notices, or an-
nually posting or publishing notices.
For the future all that remains of Gion-Dietz as to coastal
properties is a trap for the unwary landowner, the one un-
aware of his right to record, post or publish notice. We
should recognize this court’s mistake and eliminate the trap
by overruling Gion-Dietz.
CLARK, J.
an
APPENDIX B. Judgment.
Supreme Court of the State of California.
County of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and
Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, Individually and as Executrix,
etc., Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant. City of
Torrance, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, In-
dividually and as Executrix, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
L. A. No. 31099.
Appeal, County of Los Angeles, Superior Court No.
999043 & SWC 19574.
The above-entitled cause having been heretofore fully
argued, and submitted, It is Ordered, Adjudged, and De-
creed by the Court that the Motion of County to Dismiss
the Appeal Herein in the above-entitled cause, is hereby
Denied. The Judgments, Which We Interpret and Construe
to Quiet Title in the Subject Public Easement in Plaintiffs
as Trustees for the People of the State of California, are and
Each of Them is Affirmed. Respondents are to Recover
Their Costs on Appeal.
I, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of California,
do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of an
original judgment entered in the above-entitled cause on the
24th day of January, 1980.
Witness my hand and the seal of the Court, this 13th day
of March, 1980.
Deputy
G. E. Schneider
ee
APPENDIX C.
Clerk’s Office, Supreme Court
4250 State Building
San Francisco, California, 94102
Order March 13, 1980, Rehearing Denied.
In re: L.A. No. 31099, County of Los Angeles, et al.
vs. Berk, et al.
Respectfully,
G. E. Bishel,
Clerk
ea
APPENDIX D. Modification of Opinion.
In the Supreme Court of the State of California.
County of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, Individually and as Executrix,
etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Appellant. City
of Torrance, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shirley Berk,
Individually and as Executrix, etc., Defendant and Appel-
lant. L.A. 31099, Super.Ct. Nos. 999043 and SWC 19574.
Filed: Mar. 13, 1980.
BY THE COURT:
[t is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 24,
1980, and reported in the Official Reports (26 Cal.3d 201),
be modified in the following particulars: The second full
paragraph on page 209, extending through the first three
lines on page 210, is deleted, and the following paragraph
is inserted in its place:
The City Attorney of Torrance, although he became aware
of the Gion-Dietz decision soon after it appeared in the
advance sheets, was initially uncertain whether its appli-
cation in Torrance would be limited to sandy beach areas
or would extend as well to slope and bluff areas of beach
property. He did not then communicate with the planning
and building departments concerning the decision and its
possible implications. In June 1970 he assigned a deputy
to investigate the possibility of filing actions on beach prop-
erties in Torrance, and in September of the same year he
recommended to the city council that actions be commenced
on certain shoreline properties to establish public recrea-
tional easements therein. However, no action was recom-
mended concerning the Torrance portion of the property
here in question because the deputy who prepared the letter
seeking authorization for suit was under the impression that
the parcel in question was county property.
+a ae
APPENDIX E. The Opinion of the Court of Appeal
of the State of California.
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second
Appellate District, Division Four.
County of Los Angeles, etc., Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants
and Respondents, vs. Shirley Berk, individually and as
Executrix of the Estate of OSCAR BERK, et al., Defend-
ants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants. City of Torrance,
etc., Plaintiffs and Respondents, vs. Shirley Berk, individ-
ually and as Executrix of the Estate of OSCAR BERK, et
al., Defendants and Appellants. 2 Civ. Nos. 45732, 45573.
Super. Ct. Nos. 999 043 SW C 19574.
Filed: Jan. 19, 1979.
APPEALS from judgment of the Superior Court, Los
Angeles County. Richard S. Schauer, Judge. Affirmed in
part; reversed in part.
Fadem, Berger & Norton and Michael M. Berger for |
Cross-Defendant, Complainant and Appellant Shirley Berk.
John H. Larson, County Counsel and Charles Vinson
Tackett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff, Cross-
Defendant and Respondent County of Los Angeles.
Stanley E. Remelmeyer, City Attorney and A. D. ‘‘Jack’’
Allen, for Plaintiffs and Respondents City of Torrance.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, N. Gregory Taylor
and Robert H. Connett, Assistant Attorneys General, and
Katherine E. Stone, Deputy Attorney General, as amici
curiae on behalf of the State Lands Commission and Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission of the State of California.
In March 1971, the City of Torrance, a municipal cor-
poration, and the County of Los Angeles, as trustees for the
|
public, brought separate actions to establish public beach
recreation easements on certain beach property located in
Los Angeles County and owned by Oscar and Shirley Berk.
Named as defendants, in addition to the Berks, were persons
alleged to have security interests in the property. These
included United California Bank, Fidelity Federal Savings
and Loan Association, and J. Halperin & Co. of California,
Inc. and John Halperin.
The City of Torrance filed its action on March 12, 1971,
and the County of Los Angeles filed its action on March
23, 1971. The theory asserted in each complaint was that
the public, for a period of at least five years preceding the
action, had made uninterrputed and continuous use of the
property for recreational purposes, with full knowledge of
all successive owners of the property and without asking
or receiving permission to do so from the owners. The legal
theory of plaintiffs’ actions rested on the doctrine that there
had been an implied dedication of the parcels of property
for public recreational use.
The plaintiffs’ theory of the recreational easement in
beach or shoreline property by implied dedication was de-
rived from the companion cases of Gion v. City of Santa
Cruz and Dietz v. King (hereinafter Gion-Dietz,) decided
together in one opinion by the California Supreme Court
on February 19, 1970, and reported in 2 Cal.3d 29. In
essence Gion-Dietz held that a public recreational easement
in shoreline or beach property would be created under the
legal principle of an implied dedication of property upon
a showing of public use of the land for recreational purposes
‘* “for a period of more than five years with full knowledge
of the owner, without asking or receiving permission to do
so and without objection being made by anyone.’ ’’ (Gion-
Dietz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 43.).
aoe | wee
Answers and cross-complaints were filed by the Berks
and other defendants. In their amended answers, the Berks
asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including the
defenses of estoppel and laches. In their cross-complaints
against plaintiffs, the Berks sought declaratory relief that
no public easement existed and also sought money damages
on various theories, including slander of title, inverse con-
demnation and unjust enrichment.’
The actions were consolidated for trial. After trial by the
court, judgments were rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
against the defendants on the complaints and in favor of
plaintiffs as cross-defendants on the cross-complaints of the
Berks.
Appeals were taken by all defendants. The court has
dismissed the Halperin appeal because Halperin did not
pursue it. Except for the appeal of the Berks, the court has
also dismissed the appeals of the other defendants at the
latters’ request. Defendant Oscar Berk died while the ap-
peals have been pending, and defendant Shirley Berk is now
the appellant on her own behalf and as executrix of the
estate of her husband, Oscar Berk.
I.
ie Preliminary Issue of Whether the Berks’ Appeals
Should Be Dismissed as Moot.
A preliminary issue raisedby the County of Los Angeles
in its opening brief is whether or not the appeals of te Berks
should be dismissed as moot. The County has also filed a
formal motion to dismiss their appeals, accompanied by the
affidavit of a deputy county counsel. The County asserts
‘The Berks also sought relief against other cross-defendants not par-
ties in the actions brought by the City of Torrance and the County of
Los Angeles; these claims were severed from the main action to be
tried separately, and do not concern us here.
— * a
that, after the trial court’s judgment, the Berks defaulted
on their obligations with respect to the property in dispute,
and United California Bank and Fidelity Federal Savings
and Loan Association, holders of security interests in the
property, foreclosed and eliminated the fee interest of the
Berks. These parties then sold the fee interest in the property
to the County of Los Angeles. The amounts paid by the
County of Los Angeles to United California Bank and Fi-
delity Federal Savings were undisclosed. At oral argument
we were told that the secured parties received 50 percent
of the amounts owed on the property from the County of
Los Angeles, in return for conveyance of the fee.
The County advances the contention that, since Shirley
Berk no longer has any interest in the property, she had no
substantial interest to be adjudicated here. As a conse-
quence, the Berks’ appeals should be dismissed.
A review of the trial court’s judgments requires explo-
ration not only of the imposition of a public easement on
the subject property but of the denial of the defendant Berks’
claims for equitable relief set forth in their cross-complaints.
In Klopping v. City of Whittier(1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 58, the
court observed, with respect to a plaintiff therein whose
land had been taken by foreclosure after suit had been filed,
that ‘*[c]ertainly this fortuity [foreclosure] does not preclude
[plaintiff] from recovering from any damages caused by the
city... .’’ Similarly in the case before us, defendant Berk
is not precluded from seeking monetary redress for the loss
of the subject property. We therefore decline to dismiss her
appeals.
II.
The Procedural and Factual Background.
The property in dispute consists of slightly less than two
acres of vacant shoreline land situated in the cities of Re-
a
dondo Beach and Torrance. Parcels 1-B, 8 and 9 are in
Redondo while parcel T is in Torrance; all are contiguous
and there are no visible artificial boundaries between them.
Included are sandy beach areas, some steep slopes and con-
siderable acreage on a bluff overlooking the Pacific Ocean.
The beach portion does not extend to the mean high tide
line, but is surrounded by publicly owned beach, some of
which lies between the property in question and the ocean.
From the bluff the view both to the north and south is unique
— in the words of a witness, ‘‘breathtaking.’’ Suffice it to
say that, by 1970, the property was immensely valuable.
In the 1920’s, the property (including an additional par-
cel, S, located seaward of parcel T) was acquired by the
Huntington Redondo Company, the developer of a neigh-
boring residential area, the Hollywood Riviera tract. A pri-
vate beach club was constructed on parcels T, 8 and 9 in
1928, and was used by the owners of Hollywood Riviera
tract homes. After the depression years, a successor of Hun-
tington Redondo distributed shares of ownership to the prop-
erty among the home owners in the Hollywood Riviera tract.
In 1947, these owners sold parcel 1-B, located in Redondo
Beach, to the County of Los Angeles. In 1958, the club
house burned to the ground; the only evidence of the struc-
ture remaining consisted of steps from the bluff to the beach
below.
In 1963, parcels T, S, 8 and 9 were sold to a real estate
developer, Keillor. It was Keillor’s plan to construct a high-
rise condominium on the property. Pursuant to a business
license obtained from the City of Torrance, Keillor placed
a small real estate office on parcel T. The office was re-
moved to a nearby location in 1965. Keillor engaged in a
public promotional program to persuade local residents of
the merits of his highrise project. He encountered strong
— and effective — opposition from members of the Hol-
—
lywood Riviera Homeowners’ Association, a group of local
citizens interested in preserving their residential area for
low-density housing. Keillor sought a variance from the
City of Torrance to permit the construction of his highrise,
but, after a widely attended public meeting, the city council
of that city denied his request in 1964.
Stymied in Torrance, Keillor then concentrated on de-
velopment of parcels 8 and 9, located in Redondo. In 1965,
he also negotiated an exchange of parcels with the County
of Los Angeles, In return for parcel S, located in Torrance,
Keillor received parcel 1-B in Redondo. This exchange had
been approved by the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles
County after holding public hearings pursuant to Govern-
ment Code section 25365.
Subsequent to the exchange, the County obtained from
Keillor a right of entry over a portion of parcel 1-B so that
the County could more easily replenish and maintain the
surrounding beaches which it owned. During 1967 and
1968, Keillor permitted a private concern, Shellmaker’s
Inc., to store materials on parcel T in Torrance while per-
forming a beach widening project seaward of the property
pursuant to a contract with the County of Los Angeles and
the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
Keillor, unable to arrange adequate financing for his de-
velopment efforts, defaulted on a note payable to United
California Bank; payment was secured by a deed of trust
on the property. Keillor filed a bankruptcy petition in federal
district court. The property was in receivership for approx-
imately a year; then foreclosure was effected in November
1969, by another trust deed holder, Halperin.
Halperin, as the owner of the property, began negotiating
for the sale of parcel T in Torrance to a group of developers
(referred to herein as the Meister group). An escrow was
er al
opened and some preliminary planning and investigation
was undertaken by the Meister group. On behalf of the
Meister group, an architect, Cobb, engaged in discussions
with officials of the Planning and Building Department of
the City of Torrance. It became clear that there would be
strong local opposition to any building plan on the property
that would require a variance from the existing zoning and
building restrictions. The Torrance City Council turned
down the Meister group’s request for a density variance in
July 1970, and the escrow terminated.
In May or June 1970, defendant Oscar Berk, a busi-
nessman With many years of experience as a building con-
tractor, was approached by a real estate agent concerning
parcels 1-B, 8 and 9, located in Redondo Beach, and offered
for sale by Halperin. Berk viewed the parcels in June 1970.
He examined the County Tax Assessor’s records, and visited
the appropriate departments of the City of Redondo Beach
to acquaint himself with the zoning and building require-
ments which he would have to meet in order to build on the
Redondo property. Berk then became aware that the ad-
joining parcel, T, in Torrance, was also for sale; he knew
that that property had been in escrow and conducted an
investigation into the reasons the Meister group had been
unable to proceed with their plans for the property. Berk
learned of the strong influence exerted by the local home-
owners; he discussed development problems with various
planning and building officials of the City of Torrance. He
was advised that the property was zoned R-3, and that de-
velopment would only be possible if he could create a plan
which would not require any variances. Perusal of the min-
utes of Torrance City Council meetings bore out Berk’s
impression that the Meister group had failed to pursue their
project because of their need for an increased density var-
iance. Berk concluded that he could build within the frame-
— a
work of the existing requirements without the need for spe-
cial dispensation by the Torrance City Council. Berk then
drew plans for an apartment complex utilizing both the
Redondo and Torrance parcels.
Having assurance from the planning and building officials
of the cities of Torrance and Redondo Beach that his build-
ing project would not require variances from the applicable
zoning and building requirements, Berk offered to purchase
the property from Halperin for $600,000. Halperin accepted
this offer and a purchase and sale escrow was opened in
July 1970. As the escrow progressed, Berk continued his
discussions with city officials in both Redondo and Tor-
rance; the emphasis was not upon whether he could build
at all, but in what manner he would build. Sums were
expended for plans and fees paid to the cities involved.
The escrow closed on September 28, 1970. Berk — now
the owner of the property — continued to discuss his project
with city officials of Torrance and Redondo Beach through-
out the year 1970. By November 1970, Berk had obtained
a building permit from Redondo Beach. In February 1971,
construction began on the Kedondo property and Berk made
official application for a building permit from the City of
Torrance. The governmental response was immediate. Both
the City of Torrance and the County of Los Angeles filed
Suits to establish public easements on the property — the
City of Torrance with respect to parcel T and the County
of Los Angeles with respect to the remainder. An injunction
was obtained which prevented further construction of the
Berk project until the issues had been resolved by litigation.
III.
New Law Forged by the Gion-Dietz Decision.
On February 19, 1970, the California Supreme Court
rendered an important and far-reaching decision in the two
a ee
cases previously referred to herein as Gion-Dietz. This de-
cision encouraged the assertion of public recreational ease-
ments on shoreline property. The decision was the subject
of considerable publicity and considerable comment (much
of it adverse) in law journals. The Gion-Dietz decision be-
came known to Torrance City Attorney Stanley E. Remel-
meyer almost immediately after it appeared in the advance
sheets. The impact of Gion-Dietz upon shoreline property
in Torrance became the subject of discussion among mem-
bers of the City Attorney’s office. Remelmeyer testified at
the trial that he was initially uncertain whether public ease-
ments could successfully be asserted on sandy beach areas
only, or, could also be established with respect to the slopes
and bluffs of beach property. He did not officially com-
municate his interest in pursuing this matter to members of
the planning and building departments of the City of Torr-
ance while the Meister group attempted to secure official
approval of their development plans for parcel T.
Berk had not learned of Gion-Dietz nor its possible ap-
plication to the property here involved, nor did any of the
public officials of the cities of Torrance or Redondo with
whom he dealt prior to his purchase of the property advise
him of the decision or the rule of law announced therein or
of any possible effects on the validity of the fee title interest
in the property involved. Still, by the time of the close of
the Halperin-Berk escrow, the City of Torrance had filed
several Gion-Dietz-type actions against property on the
city’s shoreline, but did not take any action against the
property in question here.
ee
IV.
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish a Public Rec-
reational Easement by Implied Dedication in the
Property in Question Within the Meaning of Gion-
Dietz.
A. In General.
At the trial herein, plaintiffs presented ample evidence
of public use of the property in dispute from early in the
century. Defendant Berk assails the quality of the evidence
presented below on this issue, noting that much of the tes-
timony emanated from members of the local homeowners’
association which had opposed development of the site for
many years. We note, however, the appropriate standard
of appellate review: ‘‘In resolving the issue of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, we are bound by the established
rules of appellate review that all factual matters will be
viewed most favorably to the prevailing party [citations]
and in support of the judgment [citation]. All issues of
credibility are likewise within the province of the trier of
fact.’’ (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920,
925.) We also call attention to the fact that, while members
of the homeowners’ association testified concerning their
own use of the subject property on a daily basis, they also
testified to the continuous use of the property by members
of the general public.
We need only briefly summarize the evidence on this
point. That portion of the Berk property located on the sand
was used by thousands of persons annually — persons en-
gaged in all of the recreational pursuits generally associated
with the seashore. Access to the sand and surf was achieved
not only from the surrounding public beaches but via the
slope and the stairs which remained from the days of the
private beach club. On the bluff, persons viewed the sunset,
_—
walked their dogs, camped, painted and photographed the
view. The use was diverse; children played; teenagers re-
veled; older people tended to be spectators. Occasional in-
effective efforts to curtail these encroachments were made
by prior owners. Signs were torn down and chains were
removed; no fencing was attempted after the club house
fire. Keillor referred to the visitors in the sixties as the
‘“multitudes.’’ While various interested persons debated the
proper development of the property throughout the years,
the public proceeded to use the property for recreational
purposes. As a result, clearly defined paths were worn on
the bluff and slope.
There was evidence that, for 25 years before 1970, the
County of Los Angeles had been maintaining the sand, slope
and bluff area of the property as if it were publicly owned;
cleaning it regularly of the debris generated by the public
use. Berk visited the property a number of times in the
summer of 1970, and must have been cognizant of the public
present. But what was reasonably unknown to him was the
effect the public presence would have on his private property
interest.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court specifically declared that public use by diverse num-
bers of the public had been established; as to the Torrance
property and parcels 8 and 9 in Redondo, the use had com-
menced in 1958, after the club house fire, and had continued
in uninterrupted fashion until 1963, when Keillor acquired
it. As to parcel 1-B, in Redondo, the public use had com-
menced in 1965, after the exchange with the County of Los
Angeles, and had ripened into a public easement in 1970,
shortly before the Halperin-Berk escrow had closed. The
court concluded that there was ‘‘an implied dedication of
property rights for beach and shoreline recreational uses’’
id
to the public, represented in the within actions by the gov-
ernmental plaintiffs.
In arriving at judgment, the trial court expressed some
dissatisfaction with the result it felt was compelled by the
evidence and the applicable law. The Berks, the court con-
cluded, had been caught by a change in the law which
resulted in their ownership of prime beach property subject
to a public easement destroying any possibility of private
development or use. By the judgments, entered on February
26, 1973, the Berks retained the fee — and the obligation
to pay taxes on the property, but little else.
B. Is the Rule of Law Announced in Gion-Dietz Limited to the
Factual Situations Presented There?
On this appeal, defendants argue that Gion-Dietz should
be narrowly construed, and limited to factual situations sim-
ilar to those involved in that decision.
In Gion, the property in dispute consisted of three parcels
of shoreline property, including bluff land with a sharp drop
to the sea. No permanent structures had ever been placed
on the land. It had been used by the public for recreational
purposes without any effective interference by its successive
owners since 1900. In addition, there was evidence that the
City of Santa Cruz had expended substantial sums for main-
tenance of the property for many years. Dietz involved a
beach and an access road, used by the public for 100 years.
In both cases, the California Supreme Court concluded that
there had been an implied dedication for public recreational
purposes. A fair reading of the decision, however, compels
the conclusion that the principles of law discussed in that
decision are of broad, rather than narrow, application.
The Gion-Dietz decision was based upon ‘‘the strong
policy expressed in the Constitution and statutes of this state
of encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas.”’
a
(Gion-Dietz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 42.) The crucial factual
determination to be made in such cases is ‘‘whether the
public had used the land ‘for a period of more than five
years with full knowledge of the owner, without asking or
receiving permission to do so and without objection being
made by anyone.’ ’’ (/d. at p. 38.) It is not necessary to
establish specific adverse intent to possess the land on the
part of the public, nor is a separate finding of ‘‘adversity’’
required, if use without objection or interference is estab-
lished. Evidence of .maintenance of the property by a gov-
ernmental entity is significant in showing public use; the
use must be for recreational purposes, and by diverse mem-
bers of the public.
To negate a finding of implied dedication by such use,
the owner must present affirmative evidence showing that
the use was pursuant to license, or that bona fide attempts
were made to prevent public incursion. The quality of such
attempts is a factual matter, but ‘‘[i] the owner has not
attempted to halt public use in any significant way . . . it
will be held as a matter of law that he intended to dedicate
the property or an easement therein to the public, and evi-
dence that the public used the property for the prescriptive
period is sufficient to establish dedication.’’ Gion-Dietz,
supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 41.)
As to the problems which might arise as the result of
changing ownership of the land in dispute, the court held
that ‘‘[nJothing can be done by the present owners to take
back that which was previously given away.’’ Gion-Dietz,
supra. 2 Cal.3d 29, 44.)
Defendant points out that factual distinctions from Gion-
Dietz may be found in the case at bench. Among them are
the topography of the land, the existence of a permanent
structure — the club house — for a long period of time,
as well as assertedly slight evidence of maintenance by
ui
public agencies. In addition, defendant points out that, in
Gion-Dietz, the owners had not only ignored their properties
for long periods of time but conceded at trial that the public
had made use of them; that such was not the case herein,
as there were sporadic attempts to curtail the public use,
and public controversy over the development of the property
had raged for years in the local community. Upon analysis,
however, these are distinctions without a difference. No
suggestion appears in Gion-Dietz that would limit that ruling
to property with similar topography or history to that in-
volved in the 1970 decision. As we have concluded, there
was substantial evidence of public use of all of the parcels
involved here.
In two subsequent cases involving the Gion-Dietz rule of
law, the Courts of Appeal did find relevant the factual
distinctions and rejected its application. In County of Orange
v. Sherman Corp. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 561, dedication
was sought concerning an isolated beach near Laguna; the
trial court’s finding that the evidence did not establish use
by sufficient members of the public was upheld on the
ground that the public use envisioned by Gion-Dietz must
be ‘‘substantial.’’ In Richmond Ramblers Motorcycle Club
v. Western Title Guaranty Co. (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 747,
the court declined to find public dedication of an area long
used by members of a motorcycle club, as well as their
families and friends, because their presence on the land was
the result of a license conferred by the owner.
However, in City of Long Beach v. Daugherty (1977) 75
Cal.App.3d 972, the plaintiff city successfully invoked
GionDietz to obtain public easements over beach-front prop-
erty located in the city and long maintained by the city and
subject to intense public use.
C. For Gion-Dietz to Apply, Must There Be Specific Proof That
the Public Who Used Beach Property Believed That the Public
Had a Right to Such Use?
Defendants argue that the evidence adduced below in the
case at bench was insufficient to show use by the public
‘*believing the public had a right to such use.”’ This lan-
guage was employed by the court in Gion-Dietz but was
followed by an explanation that the existence of such belief
is immaterial if the public use is established for the requisite
period of time. Daugherty, supra. 75 Cal. App.3d 972, 979.)
Accordingly, we reject this argument of defendant.
D. Other Contentions Raised by Defendant Regarding Insuffi-
ciency of the Evidence.
Defendant questions whether a public easement may be
established by use which involved the violation of various
ordinances and penal statutes. Acquisition of title by adverse
use, however, as it was recognized at common law, has
always involved the violation of some law protecting own-
ership — the prohibition against trespass, for example —
but that reality has not prevented an owner’s acquiescence
from creating title in another, whether he be a wrongdoer
or not.
Defendant also makes certain technical arguments based
upon traditional rules of real property, citing cases which
have held, in the past, that adverse possession can create
no prevailing rights against the holders of secured interests
in property or such entities as receivers in bankruptcy, hold-
ing in custodia legis. Defendant points out that during the
prescriptive periods identified by the trial judge in the case
at bench, there were foreclosures of the property as well as
a period when the property was subject to the jurisdiction
of the federal bankruptcy court. Gion-Dietz, of course, did
a
not discuss with any particularity the impact that breaks in
the chain of title of the owners might have, except to state
that, once the public easement had ripened, no subsequent
owner could prevent assertion by the appropriate authorities.
Resolution of this issue depends upon whether the correct
emphasis is upon the owner’s title or upon the conduct of
the encroaching public; we think that Gion-Dietz makes it
abundantly clear that public use may commence and run
against successive owners of property, and that it is im-
material how those owners acquired the property.
There are those who consider the Gion-Dietz rule of law
harsh and inequitable. But we cannot refuse to follow this
rule of law because of various personal opinions as to its
fairness or harshness in spite of official and nonofficial
reactions to Gion-Dietz. We recognize that it was cogently
stated in County of Orange v. Chandler-Sherman Corp.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 561, 564: ‘‘Reaction to Gion-Dietz
was prompt. In addition to soaring sales of chain link fences,
as owners of shoreline property frantically attempted to bar
the public from the use of their property, the case generated
a spate of law review comment which was generally criti-
cal.’’ In addition, the California Legislature reacted promptly
by amending Civil Code sections 813’ and 1009 * to provide
the means by which private owners could protect their prop-
erty against implied dedication while allowing public use.
Such protection may now be obtained by: (1) sign posting
as provided in Civil Code section 1008; (2) public recor-
dation as provided in Civil Code section 813; and (3) a
written agreement with a public agency for the public use
of such land. Such agreement may impose ‘‘reasonable re-
strictions on the time, place, and manner of such public
“Amended by Stats. 1971, ch. 941, § 1, p. 1845.
*Added by Stats. 1971, ch. 941, § 2 p. 1846.
use, and no use in violation of such restrictions shall be
considered public use for purposes of a finding of implied
dedication.’’ (Civ. Code, § 1009, subd. (g).)
V.
Viability of the Defenses of Estoppel and Laches.
The Berks’ answer raised the equitable defenses of es-
toppel and laches.
California law has long recognized the viability of the
defense of equitable estoppel. Evidence Code section 623,
restating former Code of Civil Procedure section 1962, sub-
division 3, provides that ‘‘[w]Jhenever a party has, by his
own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon
such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such
statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.’’
‘*The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on con-
cepts of equity and fair dealing. It provides that a person
may not deny the existence of a state of facts if he inten-
tionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to
be true and to rely upon such belief to his detriment. The
elements of the doctrine are that (1) the party to be estopped
must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his
conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party
asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so in-
tended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state
of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.”’
(Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720,
725.)
“It is settled that ‘[t}he doctrine of equitable estoppel
may be applied against the government where justice and
right require it. [Citations.]’ Correlative to this general rule,
uliinss
however, is the well-established proposition that an estoppel
will not be applied against the government if to do so would
effectively nullify ‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the
benefit of the public, . . .” [Citation.] The tension between
these twin principles makes up the doctrinal context in which
concrete cases are decided.’’ (City of Long Beach v. Mansell
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 493.)
‘“The existence of an estoppel is generally a question of
fact for the trial court whose determination is conclusive on
appeal unless the opposite conclusion is the only one that
can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. [Citation.]
When the evidence is not in conflict and is susceptible of
only one reasonable inference, the existence of an estoppel
is a question of law.’’ (Driscoll v. County of Los Angeles
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305.)
The Berk defendants assert that the plaintiffs should be
estopped from claiming the public recreational easement
because the County assessed and taxed the property as if
it were private and not subject to a public easement and the
Officials of the cities of Torrance and Redondo Beach ap-
plied their zoning and building ordinances to the property
on the assumption that the property was private and not
encumbered with any public easement. There appears to be
no dispute that such taxation and application of ordinances
did occur, and that the governmental activity in this context
did influence Oscar Berk’s belief that the property was pri-
vate property free of any claim that would encumber the fee
interest.
The trial court rejected the defenses of estoppel and
laches, making a specific finding that none of the govern-
mental officials who dealt with the property had knowledge
concerning its status. The evidence supports this finding.
In the case at bench, there was no evidence that either
County, or Torrance or Redondo Beach officials intention-
=
ally misled Oscar Berk concerning the status of the property,
but misrepresentation of known facts need not be the product
of fraudulent conduct in order to invoke estoppel. (Mansell,
supra.) All of the officials did act upon the assumption that
the property was free of public claim. There is no doubt if
any of them had informed Berk of the possible consequences
of Gion-Dietz, he would not have purchased the property
from Halperin.
The evidence also supports the trial court’s finding against
the defense of laches. Laches refers to prejudicial delay,
and must be considered in the context of reasonableness.
The County and the City of Torrance acted to assert their
claims to a public easement some 13 months after Gion-
Dietz had been decided. We cannot conclude that, as a
matter of law, this lapse of time constitutes laches.
VI.
Miscellaneous Contentions of the Berk Defendants.
A. The Retroactive Application of Gion-Dietz.
The Gion-Dietz court established a principle creating pub-
lic recreational easements in shoreline property and applied
it retroactively in the two cases it considered. Defendant
argues that such application is lacking in fundamental fair-
ness. As an intermediate appellate court, it is not within our
jurisdiction to overrule a decision of the state’s highest court.
(See Daugherty, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 972, 980, rejecting
a similar argument.)
B. Does the Gion-Dietz Rule of Law Constitute a Taking of Private
Property Without Compensation in Violation of Constitutional
Principles?
The Berk defendants attack the Gion-Dietz rule of law
on the ground that it permits the taking of private property
in violation of constitutional guarantees. The argument must
oe ae
be rejected for the same reason that we reject the argument
as to the fairness of retroactive application of Gion-Dietz.
We should not be required to continue stating the well-
settled and well-known principle that the decisions of the
California Supreme Court are binding on ail other California
courts. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450.)
VII.
The Berks’ Cross-Complaint for Damages Against Plain-
tiff Governmental Agencies.
By cross-complaints the Berk defendants sought, as one
item of relief, damages in the event that the court upheld
the plaintiffs’ claims for public recreational easements. The
claim for damages was posited on legal theories of unjust
enrichment and inverse condemnation. We hold that the
trial court erred in giving judgments against the Berks on
their cross-complaints.
Although the evidence in the cases at bench was sufficient
to establish public recreational easements pursuant to the
rule of law set forth in Gion-Dietz, this rule of law is not
to be interpreted to preclude liability of the plaintiffs — the
governmental agencies — for loss caused to the defendants
— the Berks, under the circumstances presented in the cases
at bench. The findings by the trial court that the doctrines
of estoppel and laches were not present to prevent the es-
tablishment of public easements by implied dedication do
not preclude the right of the Berks to establish a cause of
action for damages for losses occurring as the result of
actions by the governmental agency plaintiffs.
We start with the principle that Gion-Dietz recognized
a strong public policy favoring public use and public own-
ership of California’s shoreline beach areas. ‘‘Even if we
were reluctant to apply the rules of common law dedication
a
to open recreational areas, we must observe the strong policy
expressed in the Constitution and statutes of this state of
encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas.”’
(Gion-Dietz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 42.) Although ‘*[t]his
court has in the past been less receptive to arguments of
implied dedication when open beach lands were involved
than it has when well-defined roadways are at issue,’’ (/d.
at p. 43), nevertheless, ‘‘[w]ith the increased urbanization
of this state, however, beach areas are now as well-defined
as roadways. This intensification of land use combined with
the clear public policy in favor of encouraging and ex-
panding public access to and use of shoreline areas leads
us to the conclusion that the courts of this state must be as
receptive to a finding of implied dedication of shoreline
areas as they are to a finding of implied dedication of road-
ways.”’ (Id. at p. 43.)
It was only two years after Gion-Dietz that the California
Supreme Court in Klopping v. City of Whittier (1972) 8
Cal.3d 39, expressed an equally strong recognition of the
court’s ‘‘constitutional concern over property rights requires
that the owner be compensated’’ Klopping, supra, 8 Cal.3d
39, 52) for damages caused by ‘‘unreasonable conduct’’ on
the part of governmental agencies in the eminent domain
arena. ‘‘{[W]hen the condemner acts unreasonably in issuing
precondemnation statements, either by excessively delaying
eminent domain action or by other oppressive conduct, our
constitutional concern over property rights requires that the
owner be compensated’’ Klopping, supra, 8 Cal.3d 39, 51-
52; emphasis added) when ‘‘as a result of such action the
property in question suffered a diminution in market value.”’
Id. at p. 52; fn. omitted.)
This same constitutional concern over property rights”’
that necessitated ‘‘that the owner be compensated’’ in K/op-
ping requires that the Berks, the owners before us, be com-
a
pensated for the losses suffered by them as a result of un-
reasonable conduct prior to’’ Klopping, supra, 8 Cal.3d 39,
52) filing their actions against the property owners — the
Berks — to assert public recreational easements against the
Berks’ property. For all intents and purposes, the recog-
nition of a public easement against the Berks’ beach property
leaves the underlying fee interest valueless. There is no
ability of the fee owner to make any economically valuable
use of the property.
Although the Berks as fee owners are not entitled to
compensation for the loss of a less-then-a-fee interest in
their beach property because of the doctrine of an implied
dedication of their property to the public for recreational
use, they are not foreclosed from obtaining damages for
losses substained as a result of ‘‘unreasonable conduct’’ by
the governmental agencies prior to the institution of their
actions to assert public-use easements.
The law cannot be sterile in the face of injustice. For the
13-month period from the date of Gion-Dietz to the filing
of the instant actions, the officials of the cities of Torrance
and Redondo Beach treated the property involved as the
private property of the owners and dealt with the owners
on a basis of the owner’s right to develop the property within
the framework of the applicable zoning and building ordi-
nances of the respective cities. Had any of the city officials
notified defendant Oscar Berk of the possibility that the
Gion-Dietz rule of law might lead to the assertion of a public
easement for recreational purposes, he would not have pur-
chased the property from Halperin and sustained losses such
as the down payment on the property, the expenses of es-
crow, the payment to the County of Los Angeles of taxes
on the property and the expense of preliminary development
of the project after obtaining a building permit.
oy ae
The loss suffered by the Berks in the purchase of the
property could have been averted also by prompt action after
February 1970 — the date of the Gion-Dietz decision — on
the part of the City of Torrance, the City of Redondo Beach
or the County of Los Angeles, in filing actions against the
then owners to establish the public recreational easements
prior to the Berks’ purchase in July 1970.
Under the circumstances presented here, the failure of
the governmental agencies to act promptly after the Gion-
Dietz decision constitutes ‘‘unreasonable conduct’’ suffi-
cient to trigger a Klopping-type cause of action in the Berks
to recover against plaintiffs City of Torrance and the County
of Los Angeles damages for the losses sustained as a result
of such ‘unreasonable conduct’’ by plaintiffs. The County
of Los Angeles can claim no immunity on the theory that
it was not dealing with the property owners after the Gion-
Dietz decision. The County assessed and collected taxes
from the owners on the basis that the owners had an unen-
cumbered fee title to the property. In addition, the cities of
Torrance and Redondo Beach must be considered as sub-
trustees of the County of Los Angeles in terms of repre-
senting the public’s interest in the property in question. (See
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493.)
It bears repeating that the City of Torrance filed its action
against the Berks on March 12, 1971, and that the County
of Los Angeles followed with its action on March 23, 1971.
The County’s lawsuit which related to the portion of the
property situated in the City of Redondo Beach came after
the City of Redondo B
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