Petition — Berk v. County of Los Angeles

Supreme Court brief1980

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Text

Bupreme Cou

FILED

JUN 11 1980

WICHAEL RODAK, JR., OLE

IN THE .

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1979

No. “WO PA 1 9 5 1)

SHIRLEY BERK, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate

of Oscar Berk,

Petitioner,

VAY

COUNTY OF Los ANGELES and City OF TORRANCE, -

Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of California.

JERROLD A. FADEM,

MICHAEL M. BERGER,

of FADEM, BERGER,

& NORTON,

A Professional Corporation,

501 Santa Monica Boulevard,

Suite 600,

P.O. Box 2148,

Santa Monica, Calif. 90406,

~ (213) 451-9951,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

ME oi 5 a's a aa as Sk SNES ee eo oe 2

eo loti ed a me en ss iat eet 2

I I ig cc a ees od 2

Constitutional Provisions ..................... ano

IE GE I 6 ais bis os kb vo vc eee ev tetsckues 4

ORR ee vere 4

The California Supreme Court Changes the Law... 6

The California Supreme Court’s New Rule Was a

PN INI 0's UY is ho Cowen dues Cape tena 8

The Federal Questions Are Significant and Were Appro-

PEMMRNTY TIDE TNT ow sk ioe ei bk eae eabs 11

Reasons for Granting the Writ.................... 13

1.

The Decision in This Case Is of Widespread Importance

to Property Owners and Government Agencies .... 13

2.

The California Supreme Court’s Decision Conflicts With

This Court’s Repeated Refusals to Sweep Aside

Vested Property Rights by Sudden Changes inthe Law 16

3.

The Decision of the California Supreme Court Interferes

With the Jurisdiction of Federal Bankruptcy Courts, by

Holding That Property in the Custody of a Federal

Bankruptcy Court—and Subject to a Federal Restrain-

ing Order Preventing Any Change in Ownership—

May Be ‘‘Impliedly Dedicated’’ by the Bankrupt to the

General Public, While in the Hands of a Federal Re-

IN a os 5 nooks bn cacecannenaeenseue ee 18

INDEX TO APPENDICES Page

APPENDIX A. The Opinion of the Supreme Court of

the State of California ................. App. p. 1

Dissenting Opinion by Clark, J. ................ 28

ee 38

APPENDIX C. Order March 13, 1980, Rehearing

Glas «ule esd nwssdccssvsecehs 39

APPENDIX D. Modification of Opinion.......... 40

APPENDIX E. The Opinion of the Court of Appeal of

eer ere 4]

ALARCON, J.—Concurring and Dissenting ...... 68

nn errr 72

eee “. Judgment..........:......4000 74

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Page

Agins v. City of Tiburon, No. 79-602 ............. 13

Board of Trade v. Johnson [1924] 264 U.S. 1....... 20

Briggs v. State of California, No. 79-1678 ......... 13

Cameron v. United States [1914] 231 U.S. 710...... 21

Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago [1897] 166 U.S.

OM AGE RAE ORG Rr ates We SRO 16

City of Long Beach v. Daugherty (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d

if MR Ba EI ar ee Pn Ip 16

City of San Diego v. Hall (1919) 180 Cal. 165...10, 11

Converse v. Highway Const. Co. (6th Cir. 1939) 107

Fhe MN AL edb s wRekale vende eh iia Maleate 20

County of Los Angeles v. Berk [consolidated with City of

Torrance v. Berk] (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 161

COLE. Fey Oe Od AE a nc iRe atc eb me's

Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244..... 17, 18

F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal.

ng PEE Ee EC ee oe er ee 10, 11

Gion v. City of Santa Cruz [consolidated with Dietz v.

Ps CES Fae BR Bh kv oS va eck seeks us

ide koe 6 nls cere oe ee 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18

Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses [1902] 186 U.S. 181.. 20

Hughes v. Washington [1967] 389 U.S. 290 ..16, 17, 18

Katz v. United States (1968) 389 U.S. 347 ......... 17

Lazarus, Michel, & Lazarus v. Prentice [ 1914} 234 U.S.

I PE OR ale piel ded Hid WR 40 ecards wc nab eb acs 21

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt [1934] 292 U.S. 234....... 20

Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou (1938) 10 Cal.2d

East nn e e ERs oe er ov 4ae owe beats 10, 11

May v. Henderson [1925] 268 U.S. 111 ........... 20

Meek v. Centre County Banking Co. [1925] 268 U.S.

WN ec 5 ch eee ee eae edhe tho re ea ck 20

Page

Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. [1905] 197 U.S.

EN peo Ain WS ed Cites be Bae ava ek we mG 16

Muller v. Nugent [1902] 184 U.S. 1 .............. 20

New Jersey v. Anderson [1906] 203 U.S. 483....... 20

Owen v. City of Independence [1980] ___ U.S. ___, 63

SRE UR ae aa es akties os Cake Ke wee 13

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, No. 79-289... 12

Robinson v. Ariyoshi (D. Haw. 1977) 441 F.Supp.

PA cope b Steg Sere PON ddan eh abhauses 17, 18

Rubin, In re (E.D. Pa. 1965) 242 F.Supp. 408 ...... 20

San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, No.

a Waa rh lei 's.« adine ai abs Kae Rees 13

Sotomura v. County of Hawaii (D. Haw. 1975) 402

F.Supp. 95 [ruling on motion to dismiss] (D. Haw.

EP ree PW .,. GEe ig vic votes vce ccees 14, 17, 18

Straton v. New [1931] 283 U.S. 318 .............. 20

Whiteman v. City of San Diego (1920) 184 Cal.

MAS alo eave Aas Paks Wo va oe kw Gaius 10, 11

Statutes

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1257(3) ......... 2

United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 4

EEE Lea a Pe we Gee eek bk (Ck bk Rs bs b's 4

United States Constitution, Art. 6, Cl. 2 ........... 4

United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment .... . ae

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amend-

RES GEN ce bar ye. Ne ae ee ne ee eae 3, 1l, 16

Textbooks Page

Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An

Alternative to Implied Dedication (1971) 18 U.C.L.A.

eee st eee

Gallagher, Jure and Agnew, Implied Dedication: the

Imaginary Waves of Gion-Dietz [1973] 5 Sw. U.L.

Se I SE PO sw ciws becuse e aan Unies cunwa ue.

Lascher, Tips For the Overburdened Reader (1971) 46

Le, Ui GL Oo chs wchankok sa eeeuwedus

Note, The Supreme Court of California 1969-1970

(1971), 59 Calif. L.Rev., pp. 30, 231-232........

Note, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied

Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches

(1971) 44 S.Cal. L. Rev., pp. 1092, 1093,

Ass 65 w5.0 Ge dens kwe sy au u 4k eee 9,

Shavelson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go

From Here? (1972) 47 Cal.St.B.J., p. 415........

9

11

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1979

Pe eGaxiwut

SHIRLEY BERK, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate

of Oscar Berk,

Petitioner,

vs.

COUNTY OF Los ANGELES and CiTy OF TORRANCE,

Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of California.

Petitioner Shirley Berk' respectfully prays that a Writ of

Certiorari issue to review a judgment and opinion of the

California Supreme Court.

The California Supreme Court’s opinion not only con-

fiscates Mrs. Berk’s property for public use without the

payment of any compensation, but it does so in a manner

which:

@ deprives Mrs. Berk of due process of law, by ret-

roactively changing a long-standing rule of property;

and

® conflicts with the jurisdiction of Federal Courts

proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, by holding that

'Mrs. Berk brings this action both individually and as Executrix of

the Estate of her husband, who died shortly after the trial court's con-

fiscation order.

a, oe

property which is in the custody of a Federal bank-

ruptcy court may be transferred from the bankrupt by

operation of State law — even though the Federal court

has enjoined any dilution of the bankrupt’s property

interests.

Opinion Below.

The opinion of the California Supreme Court (App. A)

is reported as County of Los Angeles v. Berk [consolidated

with City of Torrance v. Berk] (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 161

Cal.Rptr. 742, 605 P.2d 381.

Jurisdiction.

The judgment of the California Supreme Court (App. B)

was filed and entered January 24, 1980. A timely Petition

for Rehearing was denied March 13, 1980 (App. C). When

rehearing was denied, the opinion was modified (App. D).

A copy of the California Court of Appeal’s January 19,

1979 opinion is Appendix E. Copies of the judgments in

the County and Torrance cases are Appendices F and G

respectively.

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 USC

§1257(3).

Questions Presented.

1. When a U.S. District Court (applying Federal bank-

ruptcy law) takes the property of a bankrupt in custodia

legis, and issues an injunction barring anyone from altering

the status quo by diluting the bankrupt’s assets, does a State

court violate Federal law by holding that property subject

to such an injunction has been transferred from the bankrupt

by being ‘‘impliedly dedicated’’ by the bankrupt to the

general public during the Federal court’s custody, while the

Federal injunction was in effect?

ae

2. When a state Supreme Court reverses a long-standing

rule of property which sets up the requirements for estab-

lishing the prescriptive (or ‘‘implied’’) dedication of private

property to public use, and then the courts of that state

retroactively apply the new rule in such a manner that prop-

erty which was private under the old rule, ipso facto, eo

instanti, becomes public under the new rule — without the

payment of any compensation to the owner, and without

any opportunity for private property owners to adjust their

actions to fulfill the requirements of the new rule — has

the owner been deprived of property without due process

of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution?

3. Can a state, without violating the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, take

private property for public use without compensation, by

means of a sudden change in judicially declared property

law?

4. Isa litigant afforded due process of law when a state

court, without hearing evidence, indulges in presumptions

about the effect of human behavior — which have no basis

in fact — which are applied so conclusively that once the

presumption has been indulged, the adverse litigant can not

rebut the presumption?

Constitutional Provisions.

The following Constitutional provisions are involved:

U.S. Const., 5th Amendment:

‘*. . . nor shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation."’

U.S. Const., 14th Amendment:

‘*. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law

ar wae

U.S. Const., Art. 1, $8, cl. 4 and 18:

‘*Section 8. Powers Granted to Congress

* * *

‘“4. To establish . . . uniform laws on the subject

of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

* * *

‘‘18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and

proper for carrying into execution the foregoing pow-

ers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution

in the Government of the United States, or in any

department or officer thereof.’’

U.S. Const., Art. 6, cl. 2:

‘2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United

States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and

all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be

bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of

any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”’

Statement of the Case.

The Subject Property.

This case involves approximately 2 acres of property on

California’s southern and urban coast. The property is in

Los Angeles County, approximately half in the City of Re-

dondo Beach and half in the City of Torrance.” Most of the

property is on a bluff, overlooking the ocean. The remainder

of the property consists of a steep slope leading to the beach

below, and a small part of the beach.

"Two separate lawsuits were filed: County v. Berk (the Redondo

Beach property) (App. F) and Torrance v. Berk (the Torrance property)

(App. G). The cases were tried and appealed together, resulting in

consolidated opinions in the Court of Appeal (App. E) and the California

Supreme Court (App. A).

ee.

At the time of trial (1972), the property was worth more

than $600,000.00.

The Torrance property was developed in the 1920’s by

the developer of a neighboring residential tract, who built

a private club on the property for the residents of his nearby

development. The clubhouse occupied almost all the area

of the Torrance bluff. After a succession of owners, the

clubhouse burned down in 1958.

There was evidence that, during the five year period from

1958 to 1963, some use was made of the property by mem-

bers of the public for sightseeing and access (down the bluff)

to the beach.

In 1963, the Torrance property was acquired by a man

named Keillor. He (or a company controlled by him) owned

the property for six years, during which time he attempted

to develop it for a high-rise apartment. His development

efforts received widespread publicity in the area. They were

vigorously opposed (and eventually defeated) by neighber-

ing residents, because the neighbors did not want a high-

rise blocking their view. No one ever claimed that there

were public rights in the property or that it could not be put

to conventional, private uses. The widespread publicity sur-

rounding Mr. Keillor’s development efforts was sufficient

to apprise everyone that this was private property which

would eventually be developed.

Stymied in Torrance, Mr. Keillor arranged to trade the

beach part of the Torrance property to the County of Los

Angeles, in exchange for adjoining land in Redondo Beach.

This exchange received widespread publicity, culminating

in its approval by the County Board of Supervisors at a

public meeting in 1965.

During the delay attendant to trying to develop the Re-

dondo Beach property, Mr. Keillor defaulted on notes se-

eat ee

cured by deeds of trust, which were liens on the property.

To protect his only asset, Mr. Keillor filed a bankruptcy

petition in the U.S. District Court. The U.S. District Court

appointed a receiver to take possession of the property and

issued an injunction to preserve the status quo. It took Mr.

Keillor’s lender nearly all of 1969 to get the U.S. District

Court’s permission to foreclose.

The Berks became interested in the property in mid-1970.

Mr. Berk examined the County Tax Assessor’s records for

the property,’ as well as the planning and zoning files in

both Torrance and Redondo Beach. He discussed the prop-

erty with employees in those offices and learned that Mr.

Keillor had problems only because he wanted to erect a

high-rise building. Having no such grandiose designs, the

Berks were reassured that rational development was possible

and purchased the property.

The California Supreme Court Changes the Law.

Before 1970, the law of California was clear, from a

series of California Supreme Court decisions beginning in

1915, that an owner of undeveloped beach property who

failed to object to ‘‘public’’ use was presumed to have

granted a license for such use. This licensed use could not

result in the prescriptive loss, or ‘‘implied dedication’’, of

the property to the public.

Then in 1970, the California Supreme Court stunned the

legal community‘ with its decision in Gion v. City of Santa

Cruz [consolidated with Dietz v. King] (1970) 2 Cal.3d 29.

Gion-Dietz turned the law around. Under the new Gion-

"He learned that the property had always been taxed as valuable

private property, available for private development.

“Commentators referred to it as a ‘‘bombshell’’, and likened its im-

pact on real property law to both an ‘‘earthquake’’ and a ‘“‘hurricane.”’

(See text accompanying notes 10-15, infra.).

—, ae

Dietz rule, five years of ‘‘public’’ use no longer resulted

in a presumption of a license but, instead, of a presumption

of an intent to dedicate the land to the public.

If Gion-Dietz were applied prespectively only, property

owners would have the opportunity to adjust their actions

to the new rule.

But in the case at bench — the California Supreme Court’s

first substantive consideration of Gion-Dietz since it created

the rule — the California Supreme Court applied Gion-Dietz

retroactively. The Court held that innocent pre-1970 acts,

which were presumed to have been performed under a /i-

cense from the owner (and thus could not result in the

‘“public’s’’ acquisition of any rights), were now to be judged

by the post-1970 law, which presumes the owner is giving

his property away.

Thus, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial

court’s judgments,’ which found a ‘‘recreation easement’”®

in the property ‘‘impliedly dedicated’’ to the public. The

trial court found ‘ vo specific five year periods of use (Cal-

ifornia’s period for adverse possession): 1958-1963 for the

*The California Court of Appeal had partially reversed the judgments,

holding that the unreasonable conduct of Torrance and the County in

not asserting ownership of these easements before the Berks purchased

the property entitled the Berks to compensation for out-of-pocket loss.

(App. E). The Supreme Court’s grant of a hearing automatically vacated

the Court of Appeal’s opinion. Justice Clark dissented from the Supreme

Court’s opinion (App. A, p. 28).

*The scope of a recreation easement precludes any use of the rty

by its owner. *‘Recreation’’ includes virtually all human activity, and

the public’s easement has been declared dominant (App. F and G).

par ee

Torrance property,’ and 1965-1970 for the Redondo Beach

property.*

The holding with respect to the Redondo Beach property

required the inclusion (as one of the five years of ‘‘impliedly

dedicative’’ use), of the one year during which the property

was in the custody of the Federal bankruptcy court, which

had appointed a receiver and enjoined everyone from in-

terfering with the receiver’s possession of the property. The

California Supreme Court chose to ignore the conflict this

created with the Bankruptcy Act and the proper jurisdiction

of federal bankruptcy courts. (App. A, pp. 1-27.)

The California Supreme Court’s New Rule Was a Startling Change.

Statement of this Case cannot be complete without a brief

discussion of the change in California real property law

wrought by Gion-Dietz.

In the case at bench, the California Supreme Court says

Gion-Dietz decided nothing new. (App. A, pp. 1-27.)

Virtually no one agrees with the California Supreme

Court’s hindsight analysis. (Compare Justice Clark’s dissent

[App. A, p. 28].)

First, as the trial judge acknowledged:

‘‘T am very concerned. I sympathize with the Perks

and with the lenders on the basis that this kind of a

'The five year period was held to begin on the very day the clubhouse

burned down.

*The Redondo Beach —— presents a special cause for concern,

if not outrage. This is the property which the County had exchanged

with Mr. Keillor in 1965. The County gave Mr. Keillor a quitclaim

deed in 1965. Then, when — in 1970 — the Berks attempted to use

the quitclaimed property, the same County filed suit to stop them, on

the incredible ground that the property which had been quitclaimed a

scant five years before still belonged to the County. The ‘‘implied

dedication’’ was alleged — and later held — to have begun on the very

day the quitclaim was signed. Even one of the County’s most ardent

supporters felt compelled to refer to this as an example of **. . . the

Indian-giving doctrine.’’ (RT 3322) How such action by the government

can comport with due process is a mystery.

ee AS

holding almost constitutes a legal confiscation. I’m

afraid that the lenders and the Berks are really victims

of an era where there are sudden changes in the law,

which doesn’t make it any more palatable, I can un-

derstand that.’’ (RT 4021; emphasis added. )°

The practicing bar agrees.

Assistant California Attorney General Jay Shavelson, one

of the successful counsel in Gion-Dietz, called Gion-Dietz

**. . . an earthquake of major proportions . . . in California

real property law.’’'®

Edward L. Lascher (a former member of the State Bar’s

Board of Governors, and a past President of the California

Academy of Appellate Lawyers) thought it akin to both a

‘“‘bombshell’’ and a ‘‘hurricane.’’"'

While student commentators were somewhat more re-

strained, they too, echoed this thought:

‘*. . . an important extension of the law of implied

dedication by adverse use... .’’”

** . . novel use of doctrine... .’’"

. . excessively expanded an already muddled var-

iation of the doctrine of implied dedication.’’'*

é

"Indeed, because the trial judge thought Gion-Dietz could not have

been anticipated, he refused to hold Torrance and the County guilty of

laches for failing to file suit earlier.

'Shavelson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go From

Here? (1972) 47 Cal.St.B.J. 415.

4, ygecher. Tips For the Overburdened Reader (1971) 46 Cal.St.B.J.

’

"Note, The Supreme Court of California 1969 - 1970 (1971) 59

Calif. L. Rev. 30, 231-232.

"Note, This Land is My Land: The Doctrine o Implied Dedication

and Its Application to California Beaches (1971) 44 S. Cal. L. Rev.

1092, 1093.

“Ibid.

—_" on

‘

‘. . . the legal foundation for this decision is equally

obscure.’’'*

All of these characterizations are true.

Before Gion-Dietz, the basic law with sespect to implied

dedication of coastal property was clearly stated in the Cal-

ifornia Supreme Court’s decision in F.A. Hihn Co. v. City

of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal. 436. In Hihn, the City

claimed that property (unused by the fee owner) adjoining

public beach property, had been dedicated for public rec-

reational purposes because the public had long used the land

as if it were public land, and the owners never objected

(170 Cal. at 447).'° The California Supreme Court curtly

rebuffed the notion:

‘“Where land is uninclosed and uncultivated, the fact

that the public has been in the habit of going upon the

land will ordinarily be attributable to a license on the

part of the owner, rather than to his intent to dedicate.

(13 Cyc. 484). This is more particularly true where the

user by the public is not over a definite and specified

line, but extends over the entire surface of the tract.

(13 Cyc. 484). It will not be presumed from mere

failure to object, that the owner of such land so used

intends to create in the public a right which would

practically destroy his own right to use any part of the

property.’’ (170 Cal. at 448) (Emphasis added.)

Hihn was adhered to by the California Supreme Court in

the later beach cases of City of San Diego v. Hall (1919)

180 Cal. 165, 168; Whiteman v. City of San Diego (1920)

184 Cal. 163, 173; and Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou

(1938) 10 Cal.2d 653, 668.

‘Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative

to Implied Dedication (1971) 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 795, 802.

'°The facts are remarkably similar to Gion and Dietz.

vn,

The rational of the Hihn line of cases was never judicially

questioned until Gion-Dietz (see Shepard’s California Ci-

tations).

Now the California Supreme Court says it is otherwise.

Its opinion cites earlier decisions which approve implied

dedication of property. (App. A, pp. 1-27) There are such.

But all of the earlier cases dealt either with roads (see Note,

This Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication

and Its Application to California Beaches [1971] 44

S. Cal. L. Rev. 1092, 1099), or well-defined areas, or with

express (not implied) intent to dedicate. Indeed, the Cali-

fornis Supreme Court had refused to extend its implied

dedication cases to open, undeveloped land (Hihn, Hall,

Whiteman and Cortelyou, all cited above).

Thus, one reading the body of law developed by the

California Supreme Court before Gion-Dietz would learn

that open land was not subject to implied dedication. Any

public use was presumed to be by license from the owner."’

The Federal Questions Are Significant and Were Appropriately

Raised Below.

The result of retroactive application of a radical change

in property law is that Mrs. Berk’s property has been taken

from her for public use, without any compensation, in vi-

olation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

Moreover, the result was achieved in such a fashion as

to conflict with Federal bankruptcy law, causing the like-

"Indeed, one group of commentators who were favorably inclined

toward the Gion-Dietz concept, concluded that the trial court’s appli-

cation of the doctrine in this case was wrong. (Gallagher, Jure and

Agnew, /mplied Dedication: the Imaginary Waves of Gion-Dietz [1973]

5 Sw. U.L. Rev. 48, 78.)

a

lihood of future litigation as others attempt to invoke this

decision to evade Federal bankruptcy court orders.

These issues were raised by Mrs. Berk at each level of

the California court system, beginning with her pleadings,

and maintained throughout.

The decision below seems utterly at odds with the phi-

losophy underlying this Court’s June 9, 1980 decision in

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, No. 79-289. In

Pruneyard, this Court found no unconstitutional taking be-

cause, “‘[t]here is nothing to suggest that preventing [the

owners] from prohibiting this sort of activity will unrea-

sonably impair the value or use of their property . . .’’ Here,

by contrast, the rights granted the ‘‘public’’ leave the owner

with nothing.

pi |, Pea

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

i.

The Decision in This Case Is of Widespread Importance

to Property Owners and Government Agencies.

This case represents a particularly cruel illustration of the

grief which can accompany the use of extreme ‘‘solutions’’

to problems perceived as ‘‘environmental’’ in nature.

One can endorse the general public goal of preservation

of coastal resources and provision of public access to the

shore. Such agreement, however, does not lead to approval

of the means chosen by the California Supreme Court to

accomplish it.

Confiscation of Mrs. Berk’s property, based on events

which occurred under [retroactively overruled] legal rules

which gave no warning of the confiscation which would

later occur, illustrates the California Supreme Court’s cur-

rent preference for the use of confiscation in the name of

‘‘environmental preservation’’.'*

The general solution devised by the California Supreme

Court in Gion-Dietz was a radical and unexpected expansion

of the doctrine of ‘‘implied dedication’’ based upon a series

'*Indeed, the California Supreme Court has recently issued a series

of decisions which show a complete disregard for the constitutionally-

based protection of private property rights. At least three are presently

before this Court as appeals: Agins v. City of Tiburon, No. 79-602; San

Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, No. 79-678; and Briggs

v. State of California, No. 79-1678.

Plainly said, the California Supreme Court has shown an ideological

antipathy to private property rights which strips property owners of the

protection intended by the U.S. Constitution. A California property

owner’s rights in the 1980’s are treated about as sympathetically as a

civil rights worker’s in Mississippi in the 1960’s. But regional ideology

cannot supplant the Constitution as the Supreme law of the land.

The time appears appropriate for a reminder by this Court to the

California Supreme Court that confiscation — no matter how well

intended — is not constitutionally permitted. (Compare Owen v. City

of Independence [1980] .... U.S. ...., 63 L.Ed 2d 673.)

a?

of fictional presumptions. The Court presumed that long use

of property by ‘‘the public’’ meant that the owner knew of

the use being made and acquiesced in it (2 Cal.3d at 38,

84 Cal.Rptr. at 167, 465 P.2d at 55). It further presumed

that ‘‘public use’’ for five years meant that the use was

adverse (2 Cal.3d at 39, 84 Cal.Rptr. at 168, 465 P.2d at

56).'” And it further presumed that this presumably adverse

use in which the owner presumably acquiesced meant that

the owner presumably intended to dedicate his property to

“the public’’ (2 Cal.3d at 38-39, 84 Cal.Rptr. at 167-168,

465 P.2d at 55-56).

The California Supreme Court impliedly presumed that

there are no ‘‘nice guys’’ who would allow members of

‘‘the public’’ to use their vacant property, and expressly

refused to recognize that a general license to ‘‘the public’’

would or could knowingly be granted (2 Cal.3d at 41, 84

Cal.Rptr. at 169, 465 P.2d at 57).”°

After five years of such use, the property is deemed

dedicated to ‘‘the public.”’

As if this rule were not sufficiently draconian, as for-

mulated in Gion-Dietz, the California Supreme Court put

the final nail in the coffin of private property rights in the

instant case. This case held the revolutionary Gion-Dietz

decision to have retroactive application.

To the ‘‘nice guys’’ in the world, confiscation is their

reward. The only California beach owners who escaped

Gion-Dietz/Berk are the misanthropes who fenced ‘‘the pub-

lic’’ out.

It is a bit troublesome to try to reconcile the conclusions that five

years of ‘‘use by the public’’ is presumptive proof of simultaneous

acquiescence and adversity.

The California Supreme Court reached these conclusions without

the benefit of any evidence thereon. (Compare Sotomura v. County of

Hawaii [D. Haw. 1978] 460 F.Supp. 473, 479-480.)

— |,

Emboldened by the California Supreme Court’s enthu-

siasm for ex post facto confiscation, government agencies

in California are seeking to apply the doctrine to its hilt.

For example, the following advertisement appeared in the

July 3, 1975, Los Angeles Times:

16 Port i—Thurs.. July 3, 1975 Los Angeles Tunes #

___ATTENTION:

Sata Monica Beach Users

The State of California is suing to confirm the pub-

lic’s rights to use Santa Monica State Beach north of the

Santa Monica Pier between California Avenue and Santa

Monica Canyon.

If you, your friends, relatives or ancestors have ever

used this beach for any recreational activities—espe-

cially that portion near the California Avenue

incline during the 1920‘s and 1930‘s—or if you

have any old photographs or written accounts of such

recreational use, please contact:

California Aftorney General's Office

3580 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90010

Attention: Peter H. F. Graber, Deputy Attorney General

YOUR HELP IS URGENTLY NEEDED

an!

Note the ad’s emphasis on attempting to presently con-

fiscate property based on actions which occurred fifty years

ago. Nor is this merely a hypothetical problem. In City of

Long Beach v. Daugherty (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 972, 142

Cal.Rptr. 593, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

imposition of an ‘‘implied dedication’’ recreation easement

based on activities from 1917 to 1922 (75 Cal.App.3d at

976).

Since then, the California Attorney General has prepared

a 112 page Implied Dedication And Prescriptive Rights

Manual, replete with form questionnaires and newspaper

ads (like the one reprinted above), giving government agen-

cies a blueprint for the retroactive invasion of the rights of

California property owners, based on turn-of-the-century

facts.

The problem is a significant one. It merits this Court’s

attention.

2.

The California Supreme Court’s Decision Conflicts With

This Court’s Repeated Refusals to Sweep Aside

Vested Property Rights by Sudden Changes in the

Law.

This Court has consistently held that the 14th Amendment

prohibits state courts from establishing or changing rules

of law relating to vested property rights in such a way that

the rights are taken for public use without just compensation.

(Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. {1905] 197 U.S.

544, 570-571; Hughes v. Washington | 1967] 389 U.S. 290,

296-299 |concurring opinion]; Chicago B.&Q. R. Co. v.

Chicago [1897] 166 U.S. 226, 241.)

In Hughes, for example, the Supreme Court of Wash-

ington was concerned with preserving its shoreline for public

use — like the California Supreme Court here. It did so by

—

a 1966 reinterpretation of its 1889 Constitution, in a manner

the Washington Supreme Court thought was ‘. . . not star-

tling. . .’? (389 U.S. at 297) — like the California Supreme

Court here. Mr. Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in

Hughes illuminates the issue at bench, noting that sudden

changes in State law by its Supreme Court cannot be used

to evade the Constitutional prohibition against taking private

property for public use without just compensation (389 U.S.

at 296-299).*' This is so even if the State Supreme Court

neither intends to ‘‘take’’ property, nor realizes that it has

radically changed the law.

This Court is no stranger to the question whether an

opinion marks a clear break with the past. For example, in

Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244, this Court had

to determine whether Katz v. United States (1968) 389 U.S.

547, was a sharp departure. Conceding (394 U.S. at 248)

that some earlier principles ‘‘... had been modified

. .’’, while others *‘ . . . had not survived. . .’’, and that

some pre-Kaiz decisions ‘‘. . . may have reflected growing

disstisfaction . . .*’, and even concluding that ‘*. . . our

holding in Katz may have been clearly foreshadowed

...', this Court nonetheless faced the fact that its earlier

cases had not been overruled, rendering Katz ‘*. . . a clear

break with the past... .”’

"And see Sotomura v. County of Hawaii (D. Haw. 1975) 402 F ‘Supp.

95 [ruling on motion to dismiss] and (D. Haw. 1978) 460 F.Supp. 473

{ruling on the merits]; Robinson v. Ariyoshi (D. Haw. 1977) 441

F.Supp. 559. Sotomura and Robinson involved attempts by the Hawaii

Supreme Court to redefine beach ownership rights and water ownership

rights. In each case, the Hawaii Supreme Court suddenly changed the

law, transforming private property into public property. In each case,

the U.S. District Court held this coula not be done without compen-

sation. (Sotomura, 402 F.Supp. at 101, 460 F.Supp. at 481; Robinson,

441 F.Supp. at 580, 584-585).

—

The same is true here. Just as in Desist, none of the earlier

California cases had been expressly overruled. Indeed, none

had even been expressly questioned.

How can it be said that no ‘*. . . clear break with the past

..’’ occurred?

What happened in Gion-Dietz — as in Hughes, Sotomura

and Robinson — was a drastic re-definition of property

rights. That which was private property was declared by the

California Supreme Court — under newly issued rules —

to have become public.

But those settled, pre-1970 rules formed the basis of

property law before 1970. Those who relied on what the

courts — including the California Supreme Court — had

said before 1970, should not be placed in the position of

having their property confiscated because they could not

predict what the California Supreme Court would do. To

do so is to deprive them of their property without any legal

process —much less due process of law.

3

The Decision of the California Supreme Court Interferes

With the Jurisdiction of Federal Bankruptcy Courts,

by Holding That Property in the Custody of a Fed-

eral Bankruptcy Court — and Subject to a Federal

Restraining Order Preventing Any Change in Own-

ership — May Be ‘‘Impliedly Dedicated’’ by the

Bankrupt to the General Public, While in the Hands

of a Federal Receiver.

Please recall that the trial court found the subject property

to be *‘impliedly dedicated’’ because of five very precisely

defined years of public use (App. A, p. 8, fn. 7).

This creates direct conflict with Federal bankruptcy law,

because during nearly one year of the ‘impliedly dedicated”’

) period, the property was in custodia legis. The property

=—_

owner had commenced bankruptcy proceedings in U.S.

District Court, a receiver had taken possession of the bank-

rupt’s assets and a restraining order had issued to protect

the estate by prohibiting anyone from giving or taking any

interest in the bankrupt’s estate.

Foreclosure had been imminent when the restraining order

was issued. It took the trust deed beneficiary (lender) nearly

a year to obtain the Federal court’s approval to foreclose.

Thus, for nearly one year out of the five years of ‘‘im-

pliedly dedicative’’ use:

@ the property owner was restrained from transferring

the property;

@ the trust deed beneficiary was restrained from fo-

reclosing; and

@ the ‘‘public’’ was restrained from acquiring the

property.

Mrs. Berk urged the California courts that one of two

results must follow as a consequence of the one year Federal

custodia legis:

@ the Federal court custody interrupted the five year

period, so that five years uf ‘impliedly dedicative’’

use had to begin anew when the Federal restraining

order was dissolved; or

@ the Federal court custody tolled the five year pe-

riod, so that the one year custodia legis could not

count as one of the years of ‘‘implied dedication’.

The California Supreme Court rejected these means of

harmonizing its ‘‘implied dedication’’ rule with paramount

Federal bankruptcy law. Instead, it disregarded the conflict

(see App. A, pp. 1-27). To have acknowledged the conflict

would not have made the property public.

=

Long-settled Federal law is to the contrary. It calls for

protecting the assets of bankrupt estates from any dilution

of the bankrupt’s interest.

First. The construction of Federal bankruptcy laws

clearly presents a federal question. (Board of Trade v. John

son [1924] 264 U.S. 1, 10; New Jersey v. Anderson [1906]

203 U.S. 483, 491.)

Second. Bankruptcy is essentially an in rem proceeding

(Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses |1902] 186 U.S. 181, 192;

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt [1934] 292 U.S. 234, 241), so that

the filing of the petition places the assets of the bankrupt

in custodia legis (Straton v. New [1931] 283 U.S. 318, 321;

Meek v. Centre County Banking Co. [1925] 268 U.S. 426,

429).

Third. The initial consequence of filing the petition is

to give ‘*. . . acaveatto all the world. . .”’ that the property

is in the hands of the Federal court. (Muller v. Nugent

[1902] 184 U.S. 1, 14; May v. Henderson [1925] 268 U.S.

111, 117.) When accompanied by a receiver and restraining

order (as in this case) the ‘*. . . caveat to all the world

..’’ 1s even broader:

‘“The order of injunction in question was not only

in personam but also operated in rem to prevent inter-

ference with or the invasion of the property rights of

the debtor. It was broad enough in its terms to enjoin

all persons from interfering with the property in cus-

todia legis and was sufficient as a public record to

impart constructive notice to all.’’”

Fourth. The consequence of providing ‘*. . . construc-

tive notice to all . . .”’ is that interests in the property may

“Converse v. Highway Const. Co. (6th Cir. 1939) 107 F.2d 127,

129-130. To the same effect is /n re Rubin (E.D. Pa. 1965) 242 F.Supp.

408, 411-412.

i=, an

neither be given by the property owner nor obtained by

others during the Federal court custody. (Lazarus, Michel,

& Lazarus v. Prentice [1914] 234 U.S. 263, 266; Cameron

v. United States [1914] 231 U.S. 710, 717.)

The impact of these rules in this case is clear. From the

time the bankruptcy petition was filed until the Federal court

authorized foreclosure, no dilution of the property owner's

interest could occur. The property owner could not give it

away (expressly or ‘‘impliedly’’), the trust deed beneficiary

could not foreclose, and no one else could seize it.

The California Supreme Court ignored this. It permitted

the property owner’s interest to be reduced during the cus-

todia legis by refusing to toll the five year period. If that

year is removed, five years of ‘‘impliedly dedicative’’ use

did not occur. The Berks began construction of new apart-

ments before the end of the tolled period.

Thus, settled Federal bankruptcy law calls for a holding

that no easement could be ‘‘impliedly dedicated’’ while the

Federal bankruptcy court had possession of the property.

The California Supreme Court's contrary holding inter-

feres with the jurisdiction of Federal bankruptcy courts. It

will also generate additional litigation, as creditors and third

parties seek to use the California Supreme Court’s new rule

to evade the impact of Federal bankruptcy restraining orders.

Conclusion.

By retroactively applying a drastic re-definition of prop-

erty rights, the California Supreme Court has placed nu-

merous property Owners in danger of having their property

confiscated. Under the California rules, property owners

can do little but stand by and watch.

By ignoring the effect of the custody of the U.S. District

Court and its bankruptcy receiver, the California Supreme

Court has jeopardized the jurisdiction of Federal bankruptcy

a, ; wa

courts, as others will seek to take advantage of the disregard

for Federal court orders shown by the California Supreme

Court.

Mrs. Berk prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue so these

significant issues may be addressed, and the Constitutional

protection against deprivation of property without due proc-

ess of law be reaffirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

JERROLD A. FADEM,

MICHAEL M. BERGER,

FADEM, BERGER & NORTON,

A Professional Corporation,

Attorneys for the Petitioner.

APPENDIX A.

The Opinion of the Supreme Court

of the State of California.

In the Supreme Court of the State of California.

County of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and

Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, Individually and as Executrix,

etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Appellant. City

of Torrance, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shirley Berk,

Individually and as Executrix, etc., Defendant and Appel-

lant. L.A. 31099, Super. Ct. Nos. 999043 and SWC 19574.

Filed: Jan. 24, 1980.

In March 1971, the City of Torrance and the County of

Los Angeles (County), acting for themselves and as trustees

for the public, brought separate actions to establish a ‘‘public

beach recreation easement’’ on certain property owned by

Oscar and Shirley Berk, naming as defendants in addition

to the Berks certain parties alleged to have security interests

in the property. Answers and cross-complaints were filed

by the Berks and other defendants. In their answers the

Berks asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including

estoppel and laches. Their cross-complaints, to the extent

that they were directed against plaintiffs,’ sought declaratory

relief negating the existence of the claimed easement and

also money damages on theories of slander of title, unjust

enrichment, and, with respect to County, inverse condem-

nation. The actions were consolidated for trial, and after a

trial by the court judgments were entered in favor of plain-

tiffs in all respects. All defendants including the Berks ap-

‘Affirmative relief was also sought against other parties on other

grounds. These claims were severed from the main action, to be tried

separately, and do not concern us here.

eae, UES

pealed,’ but all appeals other than that of the Berks were

dismissed by the Court of Appeal prior to our granting a

hearing. Thus, only the Berk appeal is presently before us.’

I.

The property here in dispute consists of slightly less than

two contiguous acres of vacant shoreline land straddling the

boundary line between the Cities of Torrance and Redondo

Beach. It includes sandy beach areas (none of which pres-

ently extend te the mean high tide line) together with steep

slopes and a considerable bluff area overlooking the ocean.*

Seaward from the property, and surrounding the sandy beach

portions thereof, is an expanse of what is now public beach.

There are no visible artificial boundaries between the subject

property and the public beach.

In the 1920’s this property, together with an additional

parcel lying seaward from the Torrance portion thereof, was

Oscar Berk died during the ndency of the appeal. The sole ap-

pellant remaining is Shirley Berk, both in her own behalf and as exe-

cutrix of the estate of her late husband. We hereafter refer to her as

‘-defendant.”’

*County has filed a motion to dismiss the Berk appeal as well, urging

present mootness. It is pointed out that after judgment was rendered

certain holders of security interests in the subject property, upon default

by the Berks, foreclosed those interests and acquired the Berks’ fee

interest, which has now been sold to County for an undisclosed amount.

Thus, it urged, appellant Berk lacks any present substantial interest to

be adjudicated. It is clear, however, that in spite of these events Berk

presently retains such an interest in obtaining monetary redress on

equitable grounds under the allegations of her cross-complaint. (See

and cf. Klopping v. City of Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 58.) Because

a determination of her right to such relief must necessarily involve an

examination of the judgments in their entirety, we decline to dismiss

her appeal. (Cf. American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle (1952) 39

Cal.2d 210, 217-218, and cases there cited.)

“Prior to the completion of a beach-widening project in 1967 and

1968 (see fn. 5, post) the seaward border of the property was apparently

the mean high tide line, and in winter the sea often reached the base

of the cliff or sloping area. Presently the seaward border of the property

is not touched by the sea.

— on

acquired by the developer of a neighboring residential area,

the Hollywood Riviera tract. In 1928, the developer con-

structed a large private beach club on the bluff portion of

the property for the use of owners of homes in the tract.

Following the depression shares in the property were dis-

tributed among the Hollywood Riviera homeowners, who

in 1947 sold a seaward portion of the property lying in

Redondo Beach to County. In 1958, however, the beach

club building burned to the ground, and the only evidence

of it presently remaining consists of steps leading from the

bluff to the beach below.

In 1963, the remaining property was sold to a real estate

developer named Keillor, who planned to construct a high-

rise condominium thereon. He placed a small real estate

office on a bluff portion of the property lying in Torrance

and commenced a public promotion program designed to

persuade local homeowners of the merits of his project. In

this, however, he was unsuccessful. Meeting with strong

and effective opposition from members of the Hollywood

Riviera Homeowners’ Association, who wished to maintain

the low-density character of the neighborhood, he aban-

doned the project in Torrance after being denied a variance

by the city council in 1964. Thereupon Keillor turned his

attention to the development of the bluff portions of the

property which lay in Redondo Beach. Pursuant to these

plans, in 1965 he negotiated an exchange of parcels with

the County, trading a seaward parcel lying in Torrance for

the seaward parcel in Redondo Beach which had previously

been sold to the County by the former owners of the prop-

erty.” Again, however, his plans miscarried when he failed

*Keillor subsequently granted the County a right of entry over the

parcel he obtained in this exchange in order to enable it to replenish

and maintain the surrounding public beaches. In 1967 and 1968, he

also permitted a private concern to store certain materials on the bluff

portion lying in Torrance while it performed a beach-widening project

pursuant to a contract between the County and the United States Army

Corps of Engineers.

ics

to obtain financing for the planned Redondo Beach devel-

opment, and following subsequent difficulties in meeting

his financial obligations under secured notes relating to the

property, he filed a petition for bankruptcy. In November

1969, after the property had been held in receivership for

approximately one year, foreclosure was effected by one

of the trust deed holders, Halperin, who then became the

owner.

In 1970, Halperin, seeking to dispose of the property,

opened an escrow on the remaining Torrance portion (i.e.,

the bluff area upon which the bulk of the private beach club

had stood) with a group of developers. After it appeared,

however, that the group’s plans, which contemplated the

erection of a high-rise building, would require a density

variance, local homeowners again mobilized their efforts,

and when in July 1970 the request for variance was denied

the escrow was terminated.

In the meantime, defendant Oscar Berk had become aware

of the availability of the Redondo Beach portions of the

property. After a personal inspection of the property he

proceeded to consult county tax records and familiarize him-

self with applicable zoning and building requirements. In

the course of these investigations he was advised of the

likelihood of local homeowner opposition to any planned

development but was given to understand that any such

opposition would probably not affect his plans with respect

to Redondo Beach. Upon learning of the termination of the

escrow on the Torrance portion of the property, however,

he expanded his investigations to include it as well. These

soon revealed that homeowner opposition in Torrance was

a more significant factor, the Hollywood Riviera Home-

owners’ Association being composed of Torrance residents.

In view of the experience of the previous group of pro-

spective developers he was advised that development would

eo ek

be possible in Torrance only if he could create a plan which

would require no variances. Concluding that this was pos-

sible, he proceeded to draw plans for a four-story apartment

complex utilizing the bluff parcels in both Redondo Beach

and Torrance. These plans were presented to officials in

both cities. Upon being advised by these officials that his

plan would require no variances from applicable zoning and

building codes, he submitted an offer on the whole of the

property and an escrow was opened.

During the pendency of the escrow Mr. Berk continued

his discussions with city officials in both Redondo Beach

and Torrance; these discussions were concerned with how,

rather than whether, the project should proceed. On Sep-

tember 28, 1970, the escrow closed, and shortly thereafter

Berk obtained a building permit from Redondo Beach. In

February 1971, construction commenced on the Redondo

Beach portion of the property and Berk applied for a building

permit in Torrance. At this point, however, members of the

local homeowners’ body—who the previous autumn had

become aware of the then-recent decision of this court in

Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (consolidated with Dietz v.

King) (1970) 2 Cal.3d 29° —appeared before the Torrance

City Council urging that an action be filed by the city to

quiet title to public recreational easements on the Torrance

portion of the property. On March 13, 1971, the Torrance

action was commenced and shortly thereafter the County,

after receiving a similar request, filed its own action with

respect to the Redondo Beach portion of the property. An

‘Hereafter, in referring to our decision in the consolidated cases of

Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v. King, we shall adopt the

hyphenated usage which has become customary among commentators,

bench, and bar: Gion-Dietz.

ide.

injunction was obtained preventing further construction dur-

ing the pendency of the litigation.

II.

Our decision in Gion-Dietz was filed on February 19,

1970, more than six months prior to the opening of the Berk

escrow. In that case this court, after examining a number

of well-established principles governing the implied com-

mon law dedication of public easements in private real prop-

erty, held that such principles were applicable in the case

of shoreline property and that, given certain conditions of

public user and owner inaction, a public easement for rec-

reational purposes could arise in such property. The decision

received substantial coverage and commentary in the public

media and was the subject of considerable attention in legal

publications.

The City Attorney of Torrance, although he became aware

of the Gion-Dietz decision soon after it appeared in

the advance sheets, was initially uncertain whether its ap-

plication was limited to sandy beach areas or extended as

well to slope and bluff areas of beach property. He did not

then communicate with the planning and building depart-

ments concerning the decision and its possible implications.

By the time that the Berk escrow closed (Sept. 1971), how-

ever, he had apparently resolved his uncertainties, for by

that time he had filed on behalf of the city several actions

seeking to establish public recreational easements in shore-

line property—including five such actions concerning bluff

property. He had not, however, undertaken such action con-

cerning the portion of the property here in question which

lay in Torrance, apparently because the deputy who prepared

the letter seeking authorization for suit was under the

impression that the parcel in question was county property.

anti

Mr. Berk did not learn of the Gion-Dietz decision until

late October or early November 1970, when he was in-

formed of it by his engineer. By this time, of course, the

escrow had closed. None of the officials in Redondo Beach

or Torrance with whom he had dealt prior to and during the

escrow had advised him of the decision or of the effect

which it might have on the subject property.

Il.

There was ample evidence presented at trial concerning

public recreational use of the property here in question. That

evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing

parties, established in general that the whole of the subject

property (excepting, for the 30-year period between 1928

and 1958, the site on which the beach club building stood)

has been subject to public recreational use of substantial

diversity and scope for several decades. The present sandy

beach portion of the property (contained within the parcel

which was in County ownership from 1947 to 1965) has

been used along with the adjoining beach area by thousands

of persons annually—persons engaged in all of the recre-

ational pursuits generally associated with the seashore. The

area sloping up toward the bluff—most notably that con-

taining the stairs from the old beach club—has been used

for access to the beach below. The bluff area, lying largely

in Torrance, has been used by the public for a great variety

of purposes, including enjoyment of the spectacular marine

view, photography, painting, dog-walking, picnicking, bi-

cycling, and the parking of vehicles. Occasional efforts on

the part of former owners, including the posting of signs

and the erection of chain barriers, has had little effect upon

what one witness referred to at trial as ‘‘the multitudes,”’

and after the 1958 clubhouse fire no fencing of any kind

was attempted.

a

There was also evidence that for 25 years preceding 1970,

the County maintained the property as if it were publicly

owned, cleaning it regularly of the debris generated by pub-

lic use and providing lifeguard services on the beach area.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence the trial court

concluded in substance that the whole of the property in

question was subject to an easement arising out of implied

dedication for public recreational purposes.’ It also con-

cluded that neither plaintiff was guilty of laches or should

be estopped from asserting the claim of public right. With

respect to defendants’ cross-complaints the court concluded

that no provision of the state or federal Constitutions had

been violated by plaintiffs, that no act amounting to slander

of title had occurred, and that inverse condemnation had not

resulted from plaintiffs’ actions. Judgments were entered

declaring the existence of the said public easement; quieting

title thereto in plaintiffs for themselves and as trustees for

the people; enjoining defendants from all construction or

other conduct which would interfere with or obstruct the

full use and enjoyment of the public easement; and ordering

that defendants take nothing by their cross-complaints.

The court in its findings undertook to assign various time periods

during which the easement had been perfected with respect to the several

constituent parcels. It was found and concluded that implied dedication

had occurred with respect to those portions of the property which had

been the site of the beach club house (i.e., the entire Torrance portion

and that part of the bluff area lying in Redondo Beach) ‘during the

period commencing on a date subsequent to September 25, 1958, [the

date of the club house fire], but prior to November 1, 1958, and ending

on or by November |, 1963.’’ The sandy beach and slope portion lying

in Redondo Beach, on the other hand, was found to have been dedicated

“during the period September 7, 1965 [the date it was received by

Keillor in exchange for the similar parcel to the south of it] to September

28, 1970 [the date of the closing of the Berk escrow].”’

—

IV.

Defendant Shirley Berk, the sole appellant herein (see fn.

2, ante), raises several arguments challenging the trial

court’s application of Gion-Dietz to the instant case. It is’

urged in essence (1) that Gion-Dietz may not constitutionally

be applied to a case such as that at bench in which the facts

giving rise to the asserted public easement antedated the

Gion-Dietz decision; (2) that even if it can be so applied,

Gion-Dietz should not be read to permit the establishment

of a public easement on the basis of ‘‘mere public use’’ for

the requisite period but should instead be interpreted to

require a specific finding of adversity or claim of public

right; (3) that settled rules of property governing the ac-

quisition of prescriptive interests preclude the application

of Gion-Dietz in the instant circumstances; and (4) that

considerations of fundamental fairness, among them those

shaping the doctrines of laches and estoppel, will not allow

the result reached below. Sensible of the significance of

these contentions—and of the interest of the bench and bar

of this state in obtaining guidance relative to the matter of

the implied dedication of public recreational easements—

we take up each of them in order.

A. ‘‘Retroactive’’ Application.

Defendant Berk, characterizing the Gion-Dietz decision

as ‘‘revolutionary,’’ urges that to apply its precepts to a

case such as that at bench, wherein the events giving rise

to the alleged dedication occurred prior to our decision,

results in an unconstitutional taking of property. She rec-

ognizes, of course, that the Gion and Dietz cases themselves

were based on events similarly situated in time, but she

urges that the principle of Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S.

293, 301—pursuant to which a new rule of law, although

applied to the parties before the court in the case establishing

a Se

it, may be limited to otherwise prospective application—

should here have application to preclude an unconstitutional

result. In view of significant reliance by former owners of

the property here in question upon rules of public dedication

in existence prior to the Gion-Dietz decision, it is argued,

it is those rules, and not the precepts of Gion-Dietz, which

must here apply.

We think it clear that defendant may properly raise this

contention. Although the Gion-Dietz decision became final

. several months prior to the opening of the subject escrow,

this fact cannot preclude Mrs. Berk from challenging a

dedication to the public which occurred, if at all, at a time

substantially previous to that decision. Even if it must be

presumed—contrary to the record herein—that Mr. and

.Mrs. Berk acted with full knowledge of Gion-Dietz, and

even if it be granted that they were on notice of substantial

past and present use of the subject property by the public,

these factors are in no way inconsistent with defendant’s

present position. If the principle of Gion-Dietz may not be

constitutionally applied to allegedly dedicatory events and

circumstances occurring previous to our decision, defend-

ant’s knowledge—presumed or otherwise—becomes a mat-

ter of little consequence, for the property passed to her free

of any public easement.

Passing on to the merits of the contention, however, we

find ourselves unable to accept its major premise—i.e., that

the Gion-Dietz decision marked so ‘‘revolutionary’’ a

change in the law that to apply its precepts to past events

and actions, occurring in the context of prior law, is to

countenance an unconstitutional taking of property without

due process of law. We conclude on the contrary that Gion-

Dietz, far from signaling the momentous ‘‘redefinition of

property rights’? which defendant would depict,* simply

represents a restatement and clarification of well-established

former law and an application of that law, as so restated

and clarified, to a unique pattern of factual circumstances.

Such a decision, we think, cannot be deemed to so betray

the legitimate and reasonable reliance interests of property

owners that its application to them and their property

amounts to an unconstitutional taking of vested rights.

As early as 1854 this court, in addressing the matter of

common law dedication of property to the public, indicated

that such a dedication might occur not only be deed or other

action so manifesting dedicatory intention on the part of the

owner but by ‘“‘lapse of time.’’ (San Francisco v. Scott

(1854) 4 Cal. 114, 116.) In a series of subsequent cases it

was made clear that dedication arising out of ‘‘lapse of

time,’’ in the words of Scott, was to be distinguished from

dedication arising from dedicatory acts or conduct by the

owner in that it looked not to the intentions of the owner

but to the intent and activities of the public on the land in

question; here the inquiry became whether the public,

‘Defendant's characterization of the Gion-Dietz decision appears to

have been shared in substance by the authors of several of the comments

appearing in legal literature shortly after its rendition. (See, e.g., Note,

This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its

Application to California Beaches (1971) 44 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1092;

Note, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and its Effect

on the California Coastline Property Owner (1971) 4 Loyola L.A.L.

Rev. 438; Lascher, Highlighting the California Law Reviews (1971)

46 State Bar J. 13, 16-17; Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last—At Least

They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1971) 8

Cal. Western L.Rev. 75; Armstrong, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Now

You Own It—Now you Don't (1970) 45 L.A. Bar. Bull. 529; but see

Comment, Public Access to Beaches (1970) 22 Stan.L.Rev. 564.) More

recent commentary, however, has adopted a somewhat different view,

tending to view Gion-Dietz as a predictable development and elabo-

ration of established law. (See Briscoe & Stevens, Gion After Seven

Years: Revolution or Evolution? (1977) 53 L.A. Bar J. 207; Gallagher,

et al., /mplied Dedication: The Imaginary Waves of Gion-Dietz (1973)

5 Sw.U.L.Rev. 48.).

a

through long-continued ‘‘adverse’’ use of the property, had

so manifested its public aspect as to justify the implication

in law that a dedication had occurred. (See especially

Schwerdtle v. County of Placer (1895) 108 Cal. 589, 592-

596; see also Hartley v. Vermillion (1903) 141 Cal. 339,

348-349; People v. Myring (1909) 144 Cal. 351, 354; Hare

v. Craig (1929) 206 Cal. 753, 757; Diamond Match Co.

v. Savercool (1933) 218 Cal. 665, 669-670.) Our 1954

opinion in Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County (1954)

42 Cal.2d 235, which drew upon all of these as well as

other cases, identified this form of dedication as one implied

in law, as opposed to those forms resting upon the acts of

acquiescence of the owner, which it characterized as implied

in fact. (/d., at p. 241.)

Our Gion-Dietz case, adverting to this venerable line of

authority, went on to distinguish the character of ‘‘adver-

sity’’ necessary to implied in law dedication to the public

from that obtaining in the law of private prescriptive rights,

pointing out that what must be shown here is not a personal

claim of right but rather a use by members of the public

“believing the public had a right to such use.’’ (2 Cal.3d

29, 39.) Here again we did not purport to announce ‘‘new

law’’ but rather to consolidate and explain prior expressions

and holdings. Indeed, as long ago as 1908 it had been

explained that in such cases the public was not required #

‘‘to make proclamation that they are using [the subject prop

erty] under a claim of right where the right is asserted as

flowing from long usage with the knowledge and acquies-

cence” of the owner of the land; nor is it always necessary

"In the case of Hare v. Craig, supra, 206 Cal. 753, at page 755, we

had indicated that the owner's ‘‘knowledge and acquiescence”’ did not

imply permission or license in this context but rather suggested the

absence of any significant acts by the owner ‘‘which would interrupt

the continuity of the adverse use... .”’

a

to show some aggressively hostile act by the public that

such use was intended to be adverse to the owner. The claim

of right, the adverse character of the use and the knowledge

and acquiescence"® of the owner of the land may be pre-

sumed from the facts and circumstances attending the use."’

(Barnes v. Daveck (1908) 7 Cal.App. 487, 490-491; see

also Laguna Beach v. Consolidated Mtg. Co. (1945) 68

Cal.App.2d 38, 43-44.).

It is suggested, however, that the form of dedication to

the public here in question had, prior to Gion-Dietz, always

been limited in application to cases involving roadways,

and that the possible application of these principles to other

types of property could not reasonably have been antici-

pated. In responding to this argument, however, we need

look no further than the case of Morse v. Miller (1954) 128

Cal.App.2d 237, wherein the court, relying significantly

upon the very portion of the Union Transportation opinion

which we summarized in Gion-Dietz, concluded that the

trial court’s finding of public dedication of beach front and

athletic field property could be supported on the theory,

among others, of implied in law dedication arising from

long-continued adverse public use. The Morse decision,

cited in Gion-Dietz (2 Cal.3d at p. 43), antedated it by

almost 16 years.

Defendants make much of the case of F.A. Hihn Co. v.

City of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal. 436, urging in essence

that it and later cases following it had the effect of lulling

beachfront landowners into a false sense of security by as-

suring them that failure to object to public use of their lands

would not lead to a presumed intention on their part to create

public rights therein. As we pointed out in Gion-Dietz,

"See footnote 9, ante.

—; a

however, the case of O’Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d

145 made clear that future cases were to be decided not

from the standpoint of presumptions but from that of ‘‘the

sufficiency of the evidence in the light of all the circum-

stances disclosed.’’ (32 Cal.2d at p. 150.) More signifi-

cantly, perhaps, the landowner relying on Hihn and related

cases, whatever comfort he may have derived from them

with respect to implied in fact dedication arising from his

own act, could not reasonably have read them to suggest

that they precluded the emergence of public rights in his

property due to long-continued public use—i.e., through

a dedication implied in law. Not only was the subject lan-

guage clearly dictum in the Hihn case itself (see 170 Cal.

at p. 447), but the issue there addressed was that of dedi-

cation by the owner through acts manifesting a dedicative

intent—i.e., implied in fact dedication."'

We conclude on the basis of the foregoing that our Gion-

Dietz decision had none of the ‘‘revolutionary’’ aspects

which defendant would ascribe to it. Not only were the

principles upon which it relied firmly imbedded in prior

decisional law, but they had previously been applied on at

least one occasion to property of the general character here

involved. It thus cannot be maintained that the application

of these principles on the basis of facts taking place previous

to Gion-Dietz resulted in an unconstitutional taking of prop-

erty.

We reject for similar reasons defendant’s related conten-

tion that a ‘‘mutual mistake of law’’ vitiated any donative

"This was made quite clear in the subsequent case of Manhattan

Beach v. Cortelyou (1938) 10 Cal.2d 653, where we cited Hihn as a

clear illustration of the principle that ‘‘Acts of a landowner from which

the law implies a dedication of his property for public use as a street

do not always lead to the same result where land is used for other

purposes.’’ (/d., at p. 667.).

— | Soe

intent on the part of prior owners. As we have pointed out,

the principles of implied in law dedication to public use

look not to the intent of the owner but to the intent and

activities of the public.

B. Public Intent.

It is urged that the judgments cannot stand because they

are unsupported by a specific finding that the public’s use

of the subject property was accompanied by a belief on its

part that it had a right to such use. The trial court specifically

found, however, that the uses made of the subject property

by the public were made ‘‘as if said parcels were part of

a public recreational area.’’ This, under the specific terms

of our Gion-Dietz decision, was a sufficient finding of that

kind of ‘‘adversity’’ which is requisite to implied in law

dedication. (2 Cal.3d at p. 39.)

Defendant also argues that the evidence before the court

cannot be read to support such a finding of public interest.

Without detailing the evidence upon which she relies, we

can adequately characterize it as indicating that during the

periods of time in which public dedication was held to have

occurred no reasonable member of the public could have

concluded that the subject property was publicly owned.

Even if we ignore all contrary evidence, however — the

fact remains that knowledge of private ownership is not

inconsistent with a belief in a right to public use. No case

has ever suggested that the public, in order to bring about

the implication of public rights upon private land, must act

in the belief that the land is in public ownership. It is enough

that the public demonstrate through its actions that its mem-

bers believed that they had a right to use the property as

they did.

We do not here suggest — nor have we ever in the past

suggested — that the requisite belief on the part of the

we

public, as manifested by its actions with respect to the prop-

erty, is not subject to the requirement of reasonableness in

all of the circumstances. Thus if the owner can show that

his efforts to exclude the public or otherwise discourage

public use were such that the public was effectively put on

notice that its use of the property was not authorized, he

may thereby preclude the accrual of public rights. This

question, however, is ordinarily one of fact, to be deter-

mined in light of all of the circumstances. (See Gion-Dietz,

supra, at p. 41.) In the instant case the trial court found on

the basis of substantial evidence ‘‘that no effective effort

was made by any owner or anyone else to interfere with or

halt such use by said members of the general public at any

time.”’

C. Third Party Interests; the Effect of Receivership.

Defendant advances several technical arguments based

upon the presence of secured interests in the subject property

and the placing of a portion thereof in receivership. It is

urged (1) that no rights of a ‘‘prescriptive’’ character could

accrue to the public in the presence of deeds of trust affecting

the subject property; (2) that even if such rights could accrue

in these circumstances, they were here cut off prior to per-

fection by the occurrence of foreclosure sales; and (3) that

the placing of a portion of the subject property in receiv-

ership during the ‘‘prescriptive’’ period cut off all inchoate

public rights or at least had a fatal tolling effect with respect

to their perfection.

We think it important before addressing each of these

contentions separately to draw attention to a fundamental

misconception which runs through all of them. We deal here

not with a form of prescription or adverse possession but

with a unique form of dedication. Here the element of

‘“adversity’’ is looked to not as a factor necessary to the

—,

perfection of a superior property right in the possessor or

possessors as such (i.e., in themselves) but rather as an

ingredient in the evidentiary structure necessary to the im-

plication in law that a dedication to the public as a whole

_ has occurred. (See 3 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal.

Real Estate (rev. ed. 1977) § 20:13, p. 475.) When that

structure is made to appear the public is not deemed to have

wrested its right from the owner but rather is held in law

to have been granted it by him. Thus, the true questions

facing us are (1) whether such a dedication may be made

through legal implication in the face of deeds of trust af-

fecting the subject property; (2) whether foreclosure and

sale under such deeds of trust prior to the time when ded-

ication would otherwise be implied operates to prevent such

dedication on the part of the new record owner; and (3)

whether the placing of the property in receivership operates

to remove the period of such receivership from consideration

with respect to the implication of dedication on the part of

present or future record owners. 4

While we are aware of no case which discusses the effect

of the presence of deeds of trust affecting the subject prop-

erty on its implied in law dedication to public use, there are

two cases which bear indirectly on the problem. In People

v. Myring, supra, 144 Cal. 351, this court held that long-

continued public uses of a roadway and bridge situated on

land held by defendant pursuant to a federal patent had

resulted in their implied in law dedication to public use.

When it was objected that such a dedication could not be

so implied because the property was held under a declaration

of homestead giving rights therein to defendant’s wife, we

responded as follows: ‘‘If the prosecution had sought to

show a declaration by deed from him alone, this objection

might have been good .. ., but the dedication which is

presumed from the adverse user by the public operated as

a ae

an estoppel against the wife as well as the husband, and was

independent of any question of homestead.’’ (/d., at p. 355.)

A parallel result was reached in the case of Gray v. Magee

(1933) 133 Cal.App. 653. There a certain roadway long

dedicated to public use had been rerouted shortly before the

death of the owner of the property over which it is passed.

The question was whether the relocated portions of the road-

way were subject to implied in law dedication through con-

tinued public user of them during the pendency of the

owner's estate, it being urged in essence that the executors

of the estate had no power to make any kind of dedication

contrary to the interests of the beneficiaries. We disagreed

with this contention. “‘Without doubt,’’ the court said, ‘‘an

executor may not make an express dedication as to estate

lands, but an easement may arise as to estate lands through

implied dedication or prescription.’’ (/d., at p. 662.)

What these cases would seem to indicate is that a dedi-

cation implied in law as a result of adverse public user arises

‘‘independently’’ of third party interests in the property.

This is so, we believe, because of the character of the public

user which underlies any such dedication. Such user must

be substantial; it must be carried on by diverse members of

the public; and it must be ‘‘adverse’’ in the sense that we

have explained. Such user must be held to impart notice of

The court cited by way of analogy the early case of Patchett v.

Pacific Coast Ry. Co. (1893) 100 Cal. 505, a case involving an easement

by prescription over trust lands. There this court, addressing the effect

of the trustee’s failure to bring an action within the statutory period

upon infant beneficiaries, quoted with approval from earlier authority

as follows: ** ‘The rule that the statute of limitations does not bar a

trust estate holds only between cestui que trust and trustee, not as

between cestui que trust, and trustee on one side, and strangers on the

other; for that would make the statute of no force at all, because there

is hardly any estate of consequence without such trust, and so the act

would never take place. . . .’ ’’ (100 Cal. at p. 510; original italics.)

(See also Triplett v. Williams (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 135, 137-138;

Rest. 2d Trusts, § 327, p. 125.)

—_' =

its occurrence to the whole world, including the holders of

other interests in the property.

It is objected that the holder of a deed of trust on property

subject to public user of the nature here in question, even

if he is deemed to be on notice of it, is wholly without

power to discourage or prevent it. This, however, does not

appear to be so. Under the provisions of section 2929 of

the Civil Code, one whose interest in property is subject to

a deed of trust is precluded from doing any act which will

substantially impair the security of the beneficiary of the

deed of trust. (See Cornelison v. Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d

590, 599.) Such acts, we believe, must be held to include

that of permitting public user of the character here in ques-

tion, and we see no reason why such a beneficiary may not

maintain an action to prevent its continuance. (See Code

Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. 2; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co.

(1889) 80 Cal. 245; Perrine v. Marsden (1867) 34 Cal. 14;

Buckout v. Swift (1865) 27 Cal. 433; Robinson v. Russell

(1864) 24 Cal. 467.).

The case of Phillips v. Laguna Beach Co. (1922) 190

Cal. 180, upon which defendant strongly relies, is of little

assistance to her. There the owner of beachfront property

had, by resolution of its board of directors, offered to ded-

icate a portion of it along the shoreline to public use for

park purposes. Subsequent public use was apparently not

intense and occurred on a less than regular basis, but it was

held that such use was sufficient to constitute an acceptance

by the public of the offered dedication. We also held, how-

ever, that the judgment—which enjoined future sale or en-

cumbrance—could not be sustained as to the beneficiary of

a trust deed who had made a loan on the property some 10

years after the offer of dedication was made. Nothing of

record had alerted the beneficiary of the prior dedication

and, we noted, a view of the premises at the time of the

oe

loan had revealed no significant evidence of public use.

‘‘There is no evidence that the public were occupying the

public use at the time of the visit of the [beneficiary], nor

that it ever had occupied any part of the premises so as to

impart notice to the [beneficiary] . ...’’ (190 Cal. at

p. 185; italics added.) Thus it is clear that even had this

case involved implied in law dedication (which it did not,

being concerned with express dedication), and even if it had

addressed the question of the effectiveness of such dedi-

cation in the presence of existing deeds of trust (which it

did not, any dedication therein having occurred long prior

to the inception of the deed of trust), it suggests only that

sparse public user of the type therein involved was not such

as to impart notice of its occurrence. We deal here with an

entirely different situation, involving substantial, diverse,

and readily apparent public user over a considerable period

of time.

We conclude on the basis of the foregoing that public

user of the character involved in the instant case must be

held to impart knowledge of its occurrence to the world at

large, and that when it has continued for the requisite period

of time a dedication to the public will be implied in law

which binds not only record owners but all persons having

interests in the subject property—including the beneficiaries

of deeds of trust in existence during the said period.

We are further of the view that the occurrence of fore-

closure and sale during the course of the dedicatory period

should lead to no different result. Although the purchaser

at such a sale will normally receive title free and clear of

any unrecorded interests or liens (see 1 Miller & Starr,

Current Law of Cal. Real Estate (rev. ed. 1975) § 3:121,

p. 544), and although no rights of a prescriptive or adverse

nature can arise against him prior to sale and the expiration

of the period of redemption (see 3 Miller & Starr, Current

<a

Law of Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 19:25, pp. 431-432), we

believe that the unique form of notice imparted by public

user of the character here in question should operate to

burden the title received by the purchaser with all accu-

mulated public interests, even if they not be ripened into

an implied dedication at the time he receives title. Accord-

ingly, dedication may in some circumstances be implied in

law on the part of such a purchaser even when he has not

been record owner for the full length of the dedicatory

period.

The fact that the subject property was in federal receiv-

ership during a portion of the period of public user did not

in our view operate to cut off accumulated public interests

or remove the period of receivership from consideration for

purposes of implied dedication to public use. The order

appointing receiver, in enjoining all persons ‘‘from inter-

fering with the Receiver’s possession of the assets . . . and

from attempting in any manner to take possession’’ of said

assets without court order, was intended ‘‘to preserve the

estate or prevent loss thereto’’ (11 U.S.C.A. § 11(a)(3))

pending disposition pursuant to the chapter XI proceedings

which led to its issuance. (See generally, 2 Cowans, Bank-

ruptcy Law and Practice (2d ed. 1978) § 606, pp. 263-266;

1 Clark, The Law and Practice of Receivers (3d ed. 1959)

§ 74, pp. 100-101.) It did not purport to enjoin the public

from continuing its long-established uses of the property—

at least insofar as such uses did not result in ‘‘loss’’ to the

estate during the period of receivership. We therefore see

no reason why continued public user occurring during the

subject period should be disregarded or omitted from con-

sideration with respect to a dedication implied in law after

the termination of the receivership.

a. ;

D. Estoppel and Laches.

Defendant contends that plaintiffs should be estopped

from claiming the public recreational easement here found

to exist by the trial court. It is urged that the County, by

assessing and taxing the property as if it were private and

not subject to such an easement, and the officials of the

Cities of Redondo Beach and Torrance by applying their

zoning and building ordinances to the property on the same

assumption, thereby represented to defendant and her hus-

band that the said assumption was true. The Berks, it is

argued, relied on this representation to their detriment.

We see no merit in this argument. The trial court found,

on the basis of substantial evidence, that plaintiffs lacked

any actual knowledge that a public easement existed on the

subject property, that they at no time acted with an intent

to deceive the Berks or any of their predecessors in this

respect, and that they were guilty of no culpable negligence

in treating the property as they did. Moreover, any reliance

by the Berks on the actions of the governmental entities

here involved was clearly unreasonable. It simply cannot

be maintained that an existing or prospective property

owner, upon being advised by planning and building offi-

cials that a given project complies with applicable local

codes, thereby gains the right to proceed with that project

regardless of the rights of third parties or the public in the

prooperty on which it is proposed to be built. Finally, any

such reliance must also be deemed unreasonable in light of

the Berks’ knowledge of the long-continued public user of

the property—the Gion-Dietz decision having been rendered

by this court five months prior to the opening of escrow.

It is suggested that there is some inherent inconsistency

in a determination that whereas governmental officials were

not culpably negligent in treating the property as if it were

on

not burdened with a public easement, the Berks and others

in the chain of title acted other than reasonably in relying

on such treatment in their own assessment of the status of

the property. The short answer to this, of course, is that the

owner of property or one proposing to acquire it cannot

justify his ignorance of the true state of the facts and the

law affecting it by pointing to similar ignorance in govern-

ment bodies. Negligence which may be less than culpable

in a government body, charged with the administration and

regulation of vast amounts of land under diverse ownership,

cannot be so easily excused in one whose interest is focused

upon a particular piece of property.

Even if the elements of estoppel'’ here appeared—which

as we have indicated they do not—this is not a case in which

an estoppel could properly be raised against the government

and the people to defeat a claim of public recreational ease-

ment. It is well established that an estoppel will not be

raised against such parties when to do so would nullify

‘‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the

public, . . .’’; (County of San Diego v. Cal. Water etc. Co.

(1947) 30 Cal.2d 817, 829-830; cf. City of Long Beach v.

Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493-501.) As we pointed out

"As we pointed out in City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3

Cal.3d 462, 490, quoting from an early case: ‘* ‘[T]o the application

of this principle with respect to the title of property, it must appear,

first, that the party making the admission by his declarations or conduct,

was apprised of the true state of his own title; second, that he made

the admission with the express intention to deceive, or with such care-

less and culpable negligence as to amount to constructive fraud; third,

that the other party was not only destitute of all knowledge of the true

state of the title, but of the means of acquiring such knowledge, and

fourth, that he relied directly upon such admission, and will be injured

by allowing its truth to be disproved.’ ’’ (Original italics.) We went

on to point out in Mansell that the third of these requirements has been

interpreted to mean that a person seeking to raise an estoppel in this

context be destitute not ‘‘of all possible means of acquiring knowledge

of the true state of the title, but rather of all convenient or ready means

to that end.”’ (/d., at pp. 490-491.)

a." ae

in Gion-Dieiz, there is a clearly enunciated public policy

in this state in favor of allowing public access to shoreline

areas. (2 Cal.3d at pp. 42-43.) To allow the raising of an

estoppel to defeat the claim of public right here involved

would be manifestly contrary to this policy.

Considerations identical to the foregoing support the trial

court’s refusal to permit the assertion of the equitable de-

fense of laches. (See People v. Department of Housing &

Community Dev. (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 185, 196, and cases

there cited.)

V.

Defendant additionally asserts that the trial court erred

in denying recovery in damages under the cross-complaints

directed against the governmental plaintiffs. It is urged that

the failure of these entities to act more promptly in light of

Gion-Dietz with respect to the property here in question—

whether by advising interested parties of its possible status

under that decision or by expeditiously filing an action to

establish the public claim of easement—resulted in their

purchase of the property and subsequent losses. These

losses, she asserts, should be recoverable against the entities

who, by bringing these actions subsequent to the purchase,

brought them about.

The sole authority advanced in support of this novel prop-

osition—and that only by way of analogy—is the case of

Klopping v. City of Whittier, supra, 8 Cal.3d 39. We there

held that a property owner who can demonstrate that his

land has suffered a diminution in value ‘‘as a result of”’

unreasonable precondemnation actions on the part of a pub-

lic authority—such activities there alleged to involve un-

reasonable delay of an eminent domain action following the

prior announcement of intent to condemn—is entitled to

recover his consequent losses from the public authority.

—_

peel,

(See especially id., at pp. 51-52.) It is suggested that here,

by the same token, the governmental plaintiffs were guilty

of *“‘unreasonable conduct”’ in treating the subject property

without respect to any possible claim of public easement

and dealing with its prospective owners on the sole basis

of their right to develop it under applicable zoning and

building ordinances, only to reverse this position after the

purchase had occurred by maintaining the instant actions

to establish a public easement. This conduct, defendant

asserts, resulted in the losses suffered by them due to the

subsequent establishment of the easement.

The suggested analogy, we think, is manifestly over-

broad. Even if it be assumed for purposes of argument that

the actions of the governmental agencies here involved were

‘“unreasonable’’ in some sense—a fact which the instant

record can by no means be said to establish as a matter of

law (see part II, ante)—we cannot conclude that the losses

accruing to defendant from the purchase of the subject prop-

erty occurred ‘‘as a result of’’ such governmental actions

within the meaning of K/opping. In the latter case the prop-

erty owner, faced with the condemner’s intention to proceed

and its failure to institute proceedings, was wholly without

means for averting the diminution in value which ensued. '4

Here, on the other hand, the situation was quite different.

Defendant and her late husband, as prospective purchasers

of the subject property, had at their disposal ample means

of informing themselves of all of the considerations, legal

and otherwise, which might have had an effect on the wis-

dom of their decision. Rather than availing themselves of

the full range of these means, however, they apparently

‘*As we pointed out in the Klopping case, such a means was later

rovided by the 1971 addition of former section 1243.1 (now

245.260) to the Code of Civil Procedure.

ra,” EN

chose to limit their inquiry to those considerations relating

to the feasibility of proceeding with their plans in light of

applicable zoning and building codes. In so doing they

wholly neglected to inform themselves on the current state

of the common law and its possible effect on the property

they proposed to purchase. Had they done otherwise, of

course, they would quickly have been made aware of our

then recent Gion-Dietz decision and the principles on which

it was based.

Defendant would seem to suggest, however, that the gov-

ernmental plaintiffs herein were under an obligation to ad-

vise her and her husband in this matter, and that it is the

breach of this obligation which resulted in her losses. We

do not believe, however, that defendant may so easily divert

the responsibility for her own inattention. We are aware of

no authority which requires a government entity, on pain

of an award of damages against it, to furnish a legal opinion

concerning the possible effect of an appellate decision to

persons proposing to purchase property whose title may be

affected thereby.

VI.

We close with a formal matter. As has been indicated

above, the judgments herein quieted title in the subject pub-

lic easement in defendants both for themselves and as trust-

ees for the people. Although we have concluded that plain-

tiffs have standing to assert the public right as trustees for

the people, we see no basis in this record for determining

that they have any rights in the subject easement other than

those which they are adjudged to hold as public trustees. '*

We so interpret and construe the judgments.

'SCounty, of course, presently is the holder of fee title to the under-

lying real property. (See fn. 3, ante.).

_,

(See and cf. In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76,

87-89, 92.).

The motion of County to dismiss the appeal herein is

denied. The judgments, which we interpret and construe to

quiet title in the subject public easement in plaintiffs as

trustees for the people of the State of California, are and

each of them is affirmed.

MANUEL, J.

We Concur:

BIRD, C.J.

TOBRINER, J.

MOSK, J.

RICHARDSON, J,

NEWMAN, J.

ae. mn

Dissenting Opinion by Clark, J.

I dissent.

Gion-Dietz Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1970) 2 Cal.3d

29) declared substantial law without adequate discussion,

repudiated settled principles applicable to claims of dedi-

cation by adverse use, ignored constitutional guarantees of

property rights, established an inequitable doctrine punish-

ing the unselfish, and promulgated a rule counterproductive

to the policy sought to be served. The Legislature repudiated

Gion-Dietz in large part. We should acknowledge the court’s

mistake and overrule the case.

Prior to Gion-Dietz no case held dedication of an easement

occurred by adverse use for recreation, and substantial rea-

son existed to believe that use could ripen into fee title only

following compliance with statutory requirements for ad-

verse possession. All cases had rejected claims a right to

recreational use was acquired by prescription. Because the

undefined public easement for recreation would deprive an

owner of practically all use of his land, a dedication for

recreational use would be equivalent to transfer of the fee.

Civil Code section 802 enumerating servitudes which may

be granted upon land does not include a recreational ease-

ment. In cases involving implied and express dedication of

an interest in land for use as a park, courts had always held

the full fee interest was transferred, the owner losing all

right to possession. Finally, deeds purporting to create pub-

lic easements for park purposes were held to convey fee

interest so that grantors or their successors were precluded

from making any use of the property, even one consistent

with the purported easement, such as selling refreshments.

(E.g., Slavich v. Hamilton (1927) 201 Cal. 299, 305-306;

Archer v. Salinas City (1892) 93 Cal. 43, 51: Morse v.

E.A. Robey Co. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 464, 469-470.)

a,

The combination of statutory exclusion, park dedication

cases, and denial of owner use, told us that a general public

right to use private property for recreational purposes could

not be acquired by prescription but rather only by compli-

ance with requirements of adverse possession—substantial

enclosure, cultivation, or improvement of the property.

(Civ. Code, § 325.)

Prior to Gion-Dietz, public use of open and unenclosed

land was considered a license from the owner rather than

an intention to dedicate. The presumption of license applied

where the use by the public is not over a definite and spec-

ified line, but extends over the entire surface of the tract.

[Citation.] It will not be presumed, from mere failure to

object, that the owner of such land so used intends to create

in the public a right which would practically destroy his

own right to use any part of the property. [Citations.)’’

(F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz (1915) 170 Cal. 436,

448.) Like Gion-Dietz, Hihn involved public use of beach

property. But the court concluded that the public did not

obtain rights by adverse use or dedication. Hihn was fol-

lowed in Manhattan Beach v. Cortelyou (1938) 10 Cal.2d

653, 688; Whiteman v. City of San Diego (1920) 184 Cal.

163, 172; and City of San Diego v. Hall (1919) 180 Cal.

165, 167-168.

A different rule was applied to roads where public use

for more than the prescriptive period with knowledge of the

owner and without permission or objection established ded-

icatory intent by the owner. (Union Transp. Co. v. Sacra-

mento County (1954) 42 Cal.2d 235, 240-241 (citing nu-

merous Cases).) In road cases the public ordinarily is deemed

to make the same use as the owner, the road is sharply

defined and determination of a prescriptive right of way has

not been deemed to deprive the owner of all use of his

property. Additionally, roads are often expressly dedicated

a, es

to the public. (O’Flaherty, This Land is My Land: The

Doctrine of Implied Dedication to California Beaches

(1971) 44 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1072, 1101-1102.) Finally, road

use is often adverse to the owner either because the road

is built by others or because others’ use of an existing road

increases the owners’ burdens of repair and maintenance.

Hihn and similar cases placed the burden on those claim-

ing dedication by prescription to negate the presumed license

by showing circumstances in addition to mere public use.

To establish dedication by prescription prior to Gion-Dierz,

all cases required continuous use and many required the use

be adverse. (/d.)

In Gion-Dietz, this court announced a new doctrine of

public easement for recreational use acquired by prescrip-

tion. The court ignored the purported easement was equiv-

alent to transfer of fee and did not even discuss requisites

of obtaining title by adverse possession.' Absence of such

an easement from the enumeration of easements in section

802 and the park purpose cases were dismissed in a cryptic

footnote. (2 Cal.3d 29, 44-45, fn. 7.)

Gion-Dietz utilized the rule theretofore applied to road

easement cases to establish dedication of open and unen-

closed property. The presumption that public use of such

property was derived by license from the owner was for the

first time rejected, and the burden was placed on the land-

owner to establish the license. Further, the court held the

fact use permission was given to some but not to all members

of the public was insufficient to establish the license. (2

Cal.3d at p. 44.)

The court proclaimed: ‘‘We will not presume that owners

of property today knowingly permit the general public to

'A private easement for recreational purposes obviously would not

have the effect of transferring fee.

=

use their lands and grant a license to the public to do so.”’

(2 Cal.3d at p. 41.) The court concluded that if ‘‘the owner

has not attempted to halt public use in any significant way

. it will be held as a matter of law that he intended to

dedicate the property or an easement therein to the public,

and evidence that the public used the property for the pre-

scriptive period is sufficient to establish dedication.’’ (/d.)

Gion-Dietz also repudiated the requirement of continuity

in favor of sporadic use. (2 Cal.3d at p. 40.) And the

traditional requirement of adversity was expressly elimi-

nated, mere public use now being sufficient. ‘‘What must

be shown is that persons used the property believing the

public had a right to such use. This public use may not be

‘adverse’ to the interests of the owner in the sense that the

word is used in adverse possession cases. If a trial court

finds that the public has used land without objection or

interference for more than five years, it need not make a

separate finding of ‘adversity’ to support a decision of im-

plied dedication.’’ (2 Cal.3d at p. 39.)

Repudiation of prior authority and change from a doctrine

based on adverse use to one of simple use was grounded

on the court’s announced preference for public recreation.

(2 Cal.3d at pp. 42-43.) The court ignored the prohibition

against taking property for public use without just compen-

sation reflected in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of

our state Constitution.

Commentators’ reaction to the per curiam opinion was

immediate and striking. Edward L. Lasher, writing in the

State Bar Journal called it a ‘‘bombshell.’’ (46 State Bar

J. 13, 16 (1971).) Assistant Attorney General Shavelson,

head of the land law section, termed it an ‘‘earthquake of

major proportions in California real property law.’’ (Shav-

elson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go From

a, ee

Here? (1972) 47 State Bar J. 415.) With characteristic pre-

cision and understatement, Bernard E. Witkin referred to

the decision as ‘‘innovative,’’ pointing to critical commen-

tary and immediate legislative repudiation. (3 Witkin, Sum-

mary of Cal. Law (1973) pp. 1834-1836.).

Commentators were severe in their criticism of Gion-

Dietz, noting not only departure from precedent,” the failure

to consider total loss to the owner, and the prohibition of

taking property without compensation, but also that the case

created an obvious inequity and would prove counterpro-

ductive to the public policy espoused. (Armstrong, Gion v.

City of Santa Cruz; Now You Own It—Now You Don’t; or

The Case of the Reluctant Philanthropist (1970) 45 L.A.

Bar Bull. 529; Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last—At Least

They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz (1971)

8 Cal. Western L.Rev. 75; Comment, This Land Is My Land:

The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to

California Beaches (1971) 44 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1092; Com-

’The majority’s attempted reliance in the instant case upon O’Banion

v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145 and Morse v. Miller (1954) 128

Cal. App.2d 237, to establish precedent for Gion-Dietz fails. O’Banion

neither mentions nor impliedly overrules Hihn. O’Banion was a pre-

scriptive easement case dealing with roads in which the court did away

with the presumption of adversity arising from open, continuous, no-

torious and peaceable use for the preseciptive period in favor of treating

the issue as ‘‘one of fact, giving consideration to all circumstances and

the inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’’ /d., at p. 149.) Hihn,,

which is not mentioned in O’Banion, involved a presumption of license

where public use is over open land, not a roadway. Moreover, O’ Banion

did not specifically address the issue of burden of proof of license, and

did not suggest that the landowner had the burden to prove license

rather than a burden to prove adversity upon those claiming public use.

Morse recognized a recreational beach easement but the easement

was implied in fact rather than prescriptive. In that case, a subdivider

selling lots represented that the beach and athletic field would be open

to use, and the court held that his statements constituted an implied

dedication. While the court earlier in its opinion spoke of prescriptive

dedication, this was by way of illustration, and furnishes no basis for

a conclusion that mere use is sufficient to obtain a prescriptive recre-

ational easement.

ment, A Threat to the Owners of California’s Shoreline

(1971) 11 Santa Clara Law. 327; Comment, Public or Pri-

vate Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative to Implied Ded-

ication (1971) 18 UCLA L.Rev. 795; Note, Californians

Need Beaches—Maybe Yours! (1970) 7 San Diego L.Rev.

605; Note, Implied Dedication in California: A Need for

Legislative Reform (1970) 7 Cal. Western L.Rev. 259, Note,

The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its

Effect on the California Coastline Property Owner (1971)

4 Loyola U.L.Rev. 438; Note, Public Access to Beaches

(1970) 22 Stan.L.Rev. 564; Note (1971) 59 Cal.L.Rev.

231.)

The inequity addressed by commentators appears when

weighing penalties against rewards to landowners having

no immediate use for their property so that permitting public

use poses no interference or impairment. Those landowners

who were neighborly and hospitable in permitting public

use were penalized by Gion-Dietz by loss of their land,

while those excluding the public by fencing or other means

were rewarded by retention of their exclusive use. While

virtue is usually its own reward, the law does not usually

penalize the virtuous.

The decision was asserted to be counterproductive be-

cause landowners to avoid prescriptive dedication would

now exclude the public from using open and unimproved

property for recreation purposes. Thus the very policy

sought to be furthered would be defeated. (County of Orange

v. Chandler-Sherman Corp. (1976) 54 Cal. App.3d 561, 564

points out that one of the reactions to Gion-Dietz was ‘‘soar-

ing sales of chain link fences.’’)

The Legislature quickly and decisively repudiated the

factual assumption of Gion-Dietz. (Stats. 1971, ch. 941,

1845.) Whereas in Gion-Dietz this court announced, ‘‘We

will not presume that owners of property today knowingly

a ae

permit the general public to use their lands and grant a

license to the public to do so’’ (2 Cal.3d at p. 41), the

Legislature concluded that California landowners are far

more charitable and neighborly. Following our 1970 opinion

in Gion-Dietz, the Legislature expressly stated in 1971 that:

‘*The Legislature finds that: (1) It is in the best interests of

the state to encourage owners of private real property to

continue to make their lands available for public recreational

use... .’” (Civ. Code, § 1009, subd. (a); italics added.)

Further findings by the Legislature make it abundantly clear

we should not require property owners, by rules creating

prescriptive dedication, to become less charitable and neigh-

borly.’

*Civil Code section 1009 provides: ‘‘(a) The Legislature finds that:

[%] (1) It is in the best interests of the state to encourage owners of

private real property to continue to make their lands available for public

recreational use to supplement opportunities available on tax-supported

publicly owned facilities. [{] (2) Owners of private real property are

confronted with the threat of loss of rights in their property if they

allow or continue to allow members of the public to use, enjoy or pass

over their property for recreational purposes. [4] (3) The stability and

marketability of record titles is clouded by such public use, thereby

compelling the owner to exclude the public from his property. [4] (b)

Regardless of whether or not a private owner of real property has

recorded a notice of consent to use of any particular property pursuant

to Section 813 of the Civil Code or has posted signs on such property

pursuant to Section 1008 of the Civil Code, except as otherwise provided

in subdivision (d), no use of such property by the public after the

effective date of this section shall ever ripen to confer upon the public

or any governmental body or unit a vested right to continue to make

such use permanently, in the absence of an express written irrevocable

offer of dedication of such property to such use, made by the owner

thereof in the manner prescribed in subdivision (c) of this section,

which has been accepted by the county, city, or other public body to

which the offer of dedication was made, in the manner set forth in

subdivision (c). [{] (c) In addition to any procedure authorized by law

and not prohibited by this section, an irrevocable offer of dedication

may be made in the manner prescribed in Section 7050 of the Govern-

ment Code to any county, city, or other public body, and may be

accepted or terminated, in the manner prescribed in that section, by the

county board of supervisors in the case of an offer of dedication to a

county, by the city council in the case of an offer of dedication to a

city, or by the governing board of any other public body in the case

of an offer of dedication to such body. [§] (d) Where a governmental

—_

Additional provisions of section 1009 and the 1971

amendment to Civil Code section 813 (Stats. 1971, ch. 941,

p. 1845, § 1) clearly reflect the legislative judgment that

the policy of public access to recreational areas is best served

by encouraging landowners to allow the public to use their

land. Section 1009, subdivision (b), provides: ‘*. . . except

as otherwise provided in subdivision (d), no use of such

property by the public after the effective date of this section

shall ever ripen to confer upon the public or any govern-

entity is using private lands by an expenditure of public funds on visible

improvements on or across such lands or on the cleaning or maintenance

related to the public use of such lands in such a manner so that the

owner knows or should know that the public is making such use of his

land, such use, including any public use reasonably related to the

purposes of such improvement, in the absence of either express per-

mission by the owner to continue such use or the taking by the owner

of reasonable steps to enjoin, remove or prohibit such use, shall after

five years ripen to confer upon the governmental entity a vested right

to continue such use. [{]] (e) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to any

coastal property which lies within 1,000 yard inland of the mean high

tide line of the Pacific Ocean, and harbors, estuaries, bays and inlets

thereof, but not including any property lying inland of the Carquinez

Straits bridge, or between the mean high tide line and the nearest public

road or highway, whichever distance is less. [4] (f) No use, subsequent

to the effective date of this section, by the public of property described

in subdivision (c) shall constitute evidence or be admissible as evidence

that the public or any governmental body or unit has any right in such

property by implied dedication if the owner does any of the following

actions: [{]] (1) Posts signs, as provided in Section 1008, and renews

the same, if they are removed, at least once a year, or publishes an-

nually, pursuant to Section 6066 of the Government Code, in a news-

paper of general circulation in the county or counties in which the land

is located, a statement describing the property and reading substantially

as follows: ‘Right to pass by permission and subject to control of owner:

Section 1008, Civil Code.’ [{] (2) Records a notice as provided in

Section 813. [{]] (3) Enters into a written agreement with any federal,

state, or local agency providing for the public use of such land. [4]

After taking any of the actions set forth in paragraph (1), (2), or (3),

and during the time such action is effective, the owner shall not prevent

any public use which is appropriate under the permission granted pur-

suant to such paragraphs by physical obstruction, notice, or otherwise.

[{] (g) The permission for public use of real property referred to in

subdivision (f) may be conditioned upon reasonable restrictions on the

time, place, and manner of such public use, and no use in violation of

such restrictions shall be considered public use for purposes of a finding

of implied dedication.”’

a

mental body or unit a vested right to continue to make such

use permanently, in the absence of an express irrevocable

offer of dedication of such property .. . .’’ Subdivision

(d) permits dedication by prescription where governmental

entities have improved, maintained or cleaned the land by

expenditure of public funds. Thus, the general rule in Cal-

ifornia is again that, absent public improvement or main-

tenance, the gracious landowner who permits the public to

use his property is in no worse position than he who excludes

the public.

While section 1009, subdivision (e), exempted from sub-

division (b)’s prohibition of prescriptive dedication certain

oceanside properties, subdivision (f) provides: ‘‘No use,

subsequent to the effective date of this section, by the public

of property described in subdivision (e) shall constitute evi-

dence or be admissible that the public or any governmental

body or unit has any right in such property by implied

dedication if the owner does any of the following actions.”’

Included in the actions an owner may take are posting signs

disclaiming dedication once a year of more, publish dis-

claimer notices annually, or record a disclaimer revocable

notice pursuant to Civil Code section 813. These provisions

make clear that contrary to Gion-Dietz, owner conduct is

not to be ignored in determining prescriptive dedication.

At the time Gion-Dietz was decided Civil Code section

813 provided the owner of property could protect his interest

by recording a notice providing that the right of the public

or any person to use the property was by permission. Re-

cordation of such notice constituted evidence of permissive

use. Gion-Dietz ignored this section. The 1971 amendment

made the recordation conclusive evidence of permission,

and further provided the permission ‘‘may be conditioned

a

upon reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner

of such public use, and no use in violation of such restric-

tions shall be considered public use for purposes of a finding

of implied dedication.’’

Not only has the Legislature rejected the Gion-Dietz as-

- sumptions but it has also rejected our proclamation that

public use alone without regard to landowner conduct is

sufficient to warrant a finding of prescriptive dedication.

As to the noncoastal properties, prescriptive dedication is

available only where governmental agencies have improved,

maintained or cleaned the land by expenditure of public

funds. As to the coastal properties, landowners may easily

avoid the effect of Gion-Dietz by recording notices, or an-

nually posting or publishing notices.

For the future all that remains of Gion-Dietz as to coastal

properties is a trap for the unwary landowner, the one un-

aware of his right to record, post or publish notice. We

should recognize this court’s mistake and eliminate the trap

by overruling Gion-Dietz.

CLARK, J.

an

APPENDIX B. Judgment.

Supreme Court of the State of California.

County of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and

Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, Individually and as Executrix,

etc., Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant. City of

Torrance, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, In-

dividually and as Executrix, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

L. A. No. 31099.

Appeal, County of Los Angeles, Superior Court No.

999043 & SWC 19574.

The above-entitled cause having been heretofore fully

argued, and submitted, It is Ordered, Adjudged, and De-

creed by the Court that the Motion of County to Dismiss

the Appeal Herein in the above-entitled cause, is hereby

Denied. The Judgments, Which We Interpret and Construe

to Quiet Title in the Subject Public Easement in Plaintiffs

as Trustees for the People of the State of California, are and

Each of Them is Affirmed. Respondents are to Recover

Their Costs on Appeal.

I, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of California,

do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of an

original judgment entered in the above-entitled cause on the

24th day of January, 1980.

Witness my hand and the seal of the Court, this 13th day

of March, 1980.

Deputy

G. E. Schneider

ee

APPENDIX C.

Clerk’s Office, Supreme Court

4250 State Building

San Francisco, California, 94102

Order March 13, 1980, Rehearing Denied.

In re: L.A. No. 31099, County of Los Angeles, et al.

vs. Berk, et al.

Respectfully,

G. E. Bishel,

Clerk

ea

APPENDIX D. Modification of Opinion.

In the Supreme Court of the State of California.

County of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and

Respondent, v. Shirley Berk, Individually and as Executrix,

etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Appellant. City

of Torrance, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shirley Berk,

Individually and as Executrix, etc., Defendant and Appel-

lant. L.A. 31099, Super.Ct. Nos. 999043 and SWC 19574.

Filed: Mar. 13, 1980.

BY THE COURT:

[t is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 24,

1980, and reported in the Official Reports (26 Cal.3d 201),

be modified in the following particulars: The second full

paragraph on page 209, extending through the first three

lines on page 210, is deleted, and the following paragraph

is inserted in its place:

The City Attorney of Torrance, although he became aware

of the Gion-Dietz decision soon after it appeared in the

advance sheets, was initially uncertain whether its appli-

cation in Torrance would be limited to sandy beach areas

or would extend as well to slope and bluff areas of beach

property. He did not then communicate with the planning

and building departments concerning the decision and its

possible implications. In June 1970 he assigned a deputy

to investigate the possibility of filing actions on beach prop-

erties in Torrance, and in September of the same year he

recommended to the city council that actions be commenced

on certain shoreline properties to establish public recrea-

tional easements therein. However, no action was recom-

mended concerning the Torrance portion of the property

here in question because the deputy who prepared the letter

seeking authorization for suit was under the impression that

the parcel in question was county property.

+a ae

APPENDIX E. The Opinion of the Court of Appeal

of the State of California.

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second

Appellate District, Division Four.

County of Los Angeles, etc., Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants

and Respondents, vs. Shirley Berk, individually and as

Executrix of the Estate of OSCAR BERK, et al., Defend-

ants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants. City of Torrance,

etc., Plaintiffs and Respondents, vs. Shirley Berk, individ-

ually and as Executrix of the Estate of OSCAR BERK, et

al., Defendants and Appellants. 2 Civ. Nos. 45732, 45573.

Super. Ct. Nos. 999 043 SW C 19574.

Filed: Jan. 19, 1979.

APPEALS from judgment of the Superior Court, Los

Angeles County. Richard S. Schauer, Judge. Affirmed in

part; reversed in part.

Fadem, Berger & Norton and Michael M. Berger for |

Cross-Defendant, Complainant and Appellant Shirley Berk.

John H. Larson, County Counsel and Charles Vinson

Tackett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff, Cross-

Defendant and Respondent County of Los Angeles.

Stanley E. Remelmeyer, City Attorney and A. D. ‘‘Jack’’

Allen, for Plaintiffs and Respondents City of Torrance.

Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, N. Gregory Taylor

and Robert H. Connett, Assistant Attorneys General, and

Katherine E. Stone, Deputy Attorney General, as amici

curiae on behalf of the State Lands Commission and Cali-

fornia Coastal Commission of the State of California.

In March 1971, the City of Torrance, a municipal cor-

poration, and the County of Los Angeles, as trustees for the

|

public, brought separate actions to establish public beach

recreation easements on certain beach property located in

Los Angeles County and owned by Oscar and Shirley Berk.

Named as defendants, in addition to the Berks, were persons

alleged to have security interests in the property. These

included United California Bank, Fidelity Federal Savings

and Loan Association, and J. Halperin & Co. of California,

Inc. and John Halperin.

The City of Torrance filed its action on March 12, 1971,

and the County of Los Angeles filed its action on March

23, 1971. The theory asserted in each complaint was that

the public, for a period of at least five years preceding the

action, had made uninterrputed and continuous use of the

property for recreational purposes, with full knowledge of

all successive owners of the property and without asking

or receiving permission to do so from the owners. The legal

theory of plaintiffs’ actions rested on the doctrine that there

had been an implied dedication of the parcels of property

for public recreational use.

The plaintiffs’ theory of the recreational easement in

beach or shoreline property by implied dedication was de-

rived from the companion cases of Gion v. City of Santa

Cruz and Dietz v. King (hereinafter Gion-Dietz,) decided

together in one opinion by the California Supreme Court

on February 19, 1970, and reported in 2 Cal.3d 29. In

essence Gion-Dietz held that a public recreational easement

in shoreline or beach property would be created under the

legal principle of an implied dedication of property upon

a showing of public use of the land for recreational purposes

‘* “for a period of more than five years with full knowledge

of the owner, without asking or receiving permission to do

so and without objection being made by anyone.’ ’’ (Gion-

Dietz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 43.).

aoe | wee

Answers and cross-complaints were filed by the Berks

and other defendants. In their amended answers, the Berks

asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including the

defenses of estoppel and laches. In their cross-complaints

against plaintiffs, the Berks sought declaratory relief that

no public easement existed and also sought money damages

on various theories, including slander of title, inverse con-

demnation and unjust enrichment.’

The actions were consolidated for trial. After trial by the

court, judgments were rendered in favor of the plaintiffs

against the defendants on the complaints and in favor of

plaintiffs as cross-defendants on the cross-complaints of the

Berks.

Appeals were taken by all defendants. The court has

dismissed the Halperin appeal because Halperin did not

pursue it. Except for the appeal of the Berks, the court has

also dismissed the appeals of the other defendants at the

latters’ request. Defendant Oscar Berk died while the ap-

peals have been pending, and defendant Shirley Berk is now

the appellant on her own behalf and as executrix of the

estate of her husband, Oscar Berk.

I.

ie Preliminary Issue of Whether the Berks’ Appeals

Should Be Dismissed as Moot.

A preliminary issue raisedby the County of Los Angeles

in its opening brief is whether or not the appeals of te Berks

should be dismissed as moot. The County has also filed a

formal motion to dismiss their appeals, accompanied by the

affidavit of a deputy county counsel. The County asserts

‘The Berks also sought relief against other cross-defendants not par-

ties in the actions brought by the City of Torrance and the County of

Los Angeles; these claims were severed from the main action to be

tried separately, and do not concern us here.

— * a

that, after the trial court’s judgment, the Berks defaulted

on their obligations with respect to the property in dispute,

and United California Bank and Fidelity Federal Savings

and Loan Association, holders of security interests in the

property, foreclosed and eliminated the fee interest of the

Berks. These parties then sold the fee interest in the property

to the County of Los Angeles. The amounts paid by the

County of Los Angeles to United California Bank and Fi-

delity Federal Savings were undisclosed. At oral argument

we were told that the secured parties received 50 percent

of the amounts owed on the property from the County of

Los Angeles, in return for conveyance of the fee.

The County advances the contention that, since Shirley

Berk no longer has any interest in the property, she had no

substantial interest to be adjudicated here. As a conse-

quence, the Berks’ appeals should be dismissed.

A review of the trial court’s judgments requires explo-

ration not only of the imposition of a public easement on

the subject property but of the denial of the defendant Berks’

claims for equitable relief set forth in their cross-complaints.

In Klopping v. City of Whittier(1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 58, the

court observed, with respect to a plaintiff therein whose

land had been taken by foreclosure after suit had been filed,

that ‘*[c]ertainly this fortuity [foreclosure] does not preclude

[plaintiff] from recovering from any damages caused by the

city... .’’ Similarly in the case before us, defendant Berk

is not precluded from seeking monetary redress for the loss

of the subject property. We therefore decline to dismiss her

appeals.

II.

The Procedural and Factual Background.

The property in dispute consists of slightly less than two

acres of vacant shoreline land situated in the cities of Re-

a

dondo Beach and Torrance. Parcels 1-B, 8 and 9 are in

Redondo while parcel T is in Torrance; all are contiguous

and there are no visible artificial boundaries between them.

Included are sandy beach areas, some steep slopes and con-

siderable acreage on a bluff overlooking the Pacific Ocean.

The beach portion does not extend to the mean high tide

line, but is surrounded by publicly owned beach, some of

which lies between the property in question and the ocean.

From the bluff the view both to the north and south is unique

— in the words of a witness, ‘‘breathtaking.’’ Suffice it to

say that, by 1970, the property was immensely valuable.

In the 1920’s, the property (including an additional par-

cel, S, located seaward of parcel T) was acquired by the

Huntington Redondo Company, the developer of a neigh-

boring residential area, the Hollywood Riviera tract. A pri-

vate beach club was constructed on parcels T, 8 and 9 in

1928, and was used by the owners of Hollywood Riviera

tract homes. After the depression years, a successor of Hun-

tington Redondo distributed shares of ownership to the prop-

erty among the home owners in the Hollywood Riviera tract.

In 1947, these owners sold parcel 1-B, located in Redondo

Beach, to the County of Los Angeles. In 1958, the club

house burned to the ground; the only evidence of the struc-

ture remaining consisted of steps from the bluff to the beach

below.

In 1963, parcels T, S, 8 and 9 were sold to a real estate

developer, Keillor. It was Keillor’s plan to construct a high-

rise condominium on the property. Pursuant to a business

license obtained from the City of Torrance, Keillor placed

a small real estate office on parcel T. The office was re-

moved to a nearby location in 1965. Keillor engaged in a

public promotional program to persuade local residents of

the merits of his highrise project. He encountered strong

— and effective — opposition from members of the Hol-

—

lywood Riviera Homeowners’ Association, a group of local

citizens interested in preserving their residential area for

low-density housing. Keillor sought a variance from the

City of Torrance to permit the construction of his highrise,

but, after a widely attended public meeting, the city council

of that city denied his request in 1964.

Stymied in Torrance, Keillor then concentrated on de-

velopment of parcels 8 and 9, located in Redondo. In 1965,

he also negotiated an exchange of parcels with the County

of Los Angeles, In return for parcel S, located in Torrance,

Keillor received parcel 1-B in Redondo. This exchange had

been approved by the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles

County after holding public hearings pursuant to Govern-

ment Code section 25365.

Subsequent to the exchange, the County obtained from

Keillor a right of entry over a portion of parcel 1-B so that

the County could more easily replenish and maintain the

surrounding beaches which it owned. During 1967 and

1968, Keillor permitted a private concern, Shellmaker’s

Inc., to store materials on parcel T in Torrance while per-

forming a beach widening project seaward of the property

pursuant to a contract with the County of Los Angeles and

the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

Keillor, unable to arrange adequate financing for his de-

velopment efforts, defaulted on a note payable to United

California Bank; payment was secured by a deed of trust

on the property. Keillor filed a bankruptcy petition in federal

district court. The property was in receivership for approx-

imately a year; then foreclosure was effected in November

1969, by another trust deed holder, Halperin.

Halperin, as the owner of the property, began negotiating

for the sale of parcel T in Torrance to a group of developers

(referred to herein as the Meister group). An escrow was

er al

opened and some preliminary planning and investigation

was undertaken by the Meister group. On behalf of the

Meister group, an architect, Cobb, engaged in discussions

with officials of the Planning and Building Department of

the City of Torrance. It became clear that there would be

strong local opposition to any building plan on the property

that would require a variance from the existing zoning and

building restrictions. The Torrance City Council turned

down the Meister group’s request for a density variance in

July 1970, and the escrow terminated.

In May or June 1970, defendant Oscar Berk, a busi-

nessman With many years of experience as a building con-

tractor, was approached by a real estate agent concerning

parcels 1-B, 8 and 9, located in Redondo Beach, and offered

for sale by Halperin. Berk viewed the parcels in June 1970.

He examined the County Tax Assessor’s records, and visited

the appropriate departments of the City of Redondo Beach

to acquaint himself with the zoning and building require-

ments which he would have to meet in order to build on the

Redondo property. Berk then became aware that the ad-

joining parcel, T, in Torrance, was also for sale; he knew

that that property had been in escrow and conducted an

investigation into the reasons the Meister group had been

unable to proceed with their plans for the property. Berk

learned of the strong influence exerted by the local home-

owners; he discussed development problems with various

planning and building officials of the City of Torrance. He

was advised that the property was zoned R-3, and that de-

velopment would only be possible if he could create a plan

which would not require any variances. Perusal of the min-

utes of Torrance City Council meetings bore out Berk’s

impression that the Meister group had failed to pursue their

project because of their need for an increased density var-

iance. Berk concluded that he could build within the frame-

— a

work of the existing requirements without the need for spe-

cial dispensation by the Torrance City Council. Berk then

drew plans for an apartment complex utilizing both the

Redondo and Torrance parcels.

Having assurance from the planning and building officials

of the cities of Torrance and Redondo Beach that his build-

ing project would not require variances from the applicable

zoning and building requirements, Berk offered to purchase

the property from Halperin for $600,000. Halperin accepted

this offer and a purchase and sale escrow was opened in

July 1970. As the escrow progressed, Berk continued his

discussions with city officials in both Redondo and Tor-

rance; the emphasis was not upon whether he could build

at all, but in what manner he would build. Sums were

expended for plans and fees paid to the cities involved.

The escrow closed on September 28, 1970. Berk — now

the owner of the property — continued to discuss his project

with city officials of Torrance and Redondo Beach through-

out the year 1970. By November 1970, Berk had obtained

a building permit from Redondo Beach. In February 1971,

construction began on the Kedondo property and Berk made

official application for a building permit from the City of

Torrance. The governmental response was immediate. Both

the City of Torrance and the County of Los Angeles filed

Suits to establish public easements on the property — the

City of Torrance with respect to parcel T and the County

of Los Angeles with respect to the remainder. An injunction

was obtained which prevented further construction of the

Berk project until the issues had been resolved by litigation.

III.

New Law Forged by the Gion-Dietz Decision.

On February 19, 1970, the California Supreme Court

rendered an important and far-reaching decision in the two

a ee

cases previously referred to herein as Gion-Dietz. This de-

cision encouraged the assertion of public recreational ease-

ments on shoreline property. The decision was the subject

of considerable publicity and considerable comment (much

of it adverse) in law journals. The Gion-Dietz decision be-

came known to Torrance City Attorney Stanley E. Remel-

meyer almost immediately after it appeared in the advance

sheets. The impact of Gion-Dietz upon shoreline property

in Torrance became the subject of discussion among mem-

bers of the City Attorney’s office. Remelmeyer testified at

the trial that he was initially uncertain whether public ease-

ments could successfully be asserted on sandy beach areas

only, or, could also be established with respect to the slopes

and bluffs of beach property. He did not officially com-

municate his interest in pursuing this matter to members of

the planning and building departments of the City of Torr-

ance while the Meister group attempted to secure official

approval of their development plans for parcel T.

Berk had not learned of Gion-Dietz nor its possible ap-

plication to the property here involved, nor did any of the

public officials of the cities of Torrance or Redondo with

whom he dealt prior to his purchase of the property advise

him of the decision or the rule of law announced therein or

of any possible effects on the validity of the fee title interest

in the property involved. Still, by the time of the close of

the Halperin-Berk escrow, the City of Torrance had filed

several Gion-Dietz-type actions against property on the

city’s shoreline, but did not take any action against the

property in question here.

ee

IV.

Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish a Public Rec-

reational Easement by Implied Dedication in the

Property in Question Within the Meaning of Gion-

Dietz.

A. In General.

At the trial herein, plaintiffs presented ample evidence

of public use of the property in dispute from early in the

century. Defendant Berk assails the quality of the evidence

presented below on this issue, noting that much of the tes-

timony emanated from members of the local homeowners’

association which had opposed development of the site for

many years. We note, however, the appropriate standard

of appellate review: ‘‘In resolving the issue of the suffi-

ciency of the evidence, we are bound by the established

rules of appellate review that all factual matters will be

viewed most favorably to the prevailing party [citations]

and in support of the judgment [citation]. All issues of

credibility are likewise within the province of the trier of

fact.’’ (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920,

925.) We also call attention to the fact that, while members

of the homeowners’ association testified concerning their

own use of the subject property on a daily basis, they also

testified to the continuous use of the property by members

of the general public.

We need only briefly summarize the evidence on this

point. That portion of the Berk property located on the sand

was used by thousands of persons annually — persons en-

gaged in all of the recreational pursuits generally associated

with the seashore. Access to the sand and surf was achieved

not only from the surrounding public beaches but via the

slope and the stairs which remained from the days of the

private beach club. On the bluff, persons viewed the sunset,

_—

walked their dogs, camped, painted and photographed the

view. The use was diverse; children played; teenagers re-

veled; older people tended to be spectators. Occasional in-

effective efforts to curtail these encroachments were made

by prior owners. Signs were torn down and chains were

removed; no fencing was attempted after the club house

fire. Keillor referred to the visitors in the sixties as the

‘“multitudes.’’ While various interested persons debated the

proper development of the property throughout the years,

the public proceeded to use the property for recreational

purposes. As a result, clearly defined paths were worn on

the bluff and slope.

There was evidence that, for 25 years before 1970, the

County of Los Angeles had been maintaining the sand, slope

and bluff area of the property as if it were publicly owned;

cleaning it regularly of the debris generated by the public

use. Berk visited the property a number of times in the

summer of 1970, and must have been cognizant of the public

present. But what was reasonably unknown to him was the

effect the public presence would have on his private property

interest.

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial

court specifically declared that public use by diverse num-

bers of the public had been established; as to the Torrance

property and parcels 8 and 9 in Redondo, the use had com-

menced in 1958, after the club house fire, and had continued

in uninterrupted fashion until 1963, when Keillor acquired

it. As to parcel 1-B, in Redondo, the public use had com-

menced in 1965, after the exchange with the County of Los

Angeles, and had ripened into a public easement in 1970,

shortly before the Halperin-Berk escrow had closed. The

court concluded that there was ‘‘an implied dedication of

property rights for beach and shoreline recreational uses’’

id

to the public, represented in the within actions by the gov-

ernmental plaintiffs.

In arriving at judgment, the trial court expressed some

dissatisfaction with the result it felt was compelled by the

evidence and the applicable law. The Berks, the court con-

cluded, had been caught by a change in the law which

resulted in their ownership of prime beach property subject

to a public easement destroying any possibility of private

development or use. By the judgments, entered on February

26, 1973, the Berks retained the fee — and the obligation

to pay taxes on the property, but little else.

B. Is the Rule of Law Announced in Gion-Dietz Limited to the

Factual Situations Presented There?

On this appeal, defendants argue that Gion-Dietz should

be narrowly construed, and limited to factual situations sim-

ilar to those involved in that decision.

In Gion, the property in dispute consisted of three parcels

of shoreline property, including bluff land with a sharp drop

to the sea. No permanent structures had ever been placed

on the land. It had been used by the public for recreational

purposes without any effective interference by its successive

owners since 1900. In addition, there was evidence that the

City of Santa Cruz had expended substantial sums for main-

tenance of the property for many years. Dietz involved a

beach and an access road, used by the public for 100 years.

In both cases, the California Supreme Court concluded that

there had been an implied dedication for public recreational

purposes. A fair reading of the decision, however, compels

the conclusion that the principles of law discussed in that

decision are of broad, rather than narrow, application.

The Gion-Dietz decision was based upon ‘‘the strong

policy expressed in the Constitution and statutes of this state

of encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas.”’

a

(Gion-Dietz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 42.) The crucial factual

determination to be made in such cases is ‘‘whether the

public had used the land ‘for a period of more than five

years with full knowledge of the owner, without asking or

receiving permission to do so and without objection being

made by anyone.’ ’’ (/d. at p. 38.) It is not necessary to

establish specific adverse intent to possess the land on the

part of the public, nor is a separate finding of ‘‘adversity’’

required, if use without objection or interference is estab-

lished. Evidence of .maintenance of the property by a gov-

ernmental entity is significant in showing public use; the

use must be for recreational purposes, and by diverse mem-

bers of the public.

To negate a finding of implied dedication by such use,

the owner must present affirmative evidence showing that

the use was pursuant to license, or that bona fide attempts

were made to prevent public incursion. The quality of such

attempts is a factual matter, but ‘‘[i] the owner has not

attempted to halt public use in any significant way . . . it

will be held as a matter of law that he intended to dedicate

the property or an easement therein to the public, and evi-

dence that the public used the property for the prescriptive

period is sufficient to establish dedication.’’ Gion-Dietz,

supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 41.)

As to the problems which might arise as the result of

changing ownership of the land in dispute, the court held

that ‘‘[nJothing can be done by the present owners to take

back that which was previously given away.’’ Gion-Dietz,

supra. 2 Cal.3d 29, 44.)

Defendant points out that factual distinctions from Gion-

Dietz may be found in the case at bench. Among them are

the topography of the land, the existence of a permanent

structure — the club house — for a long period of time,

as well as assertedly slight evidence of maintenance by

ui

public agencies. In addition, defendant points out that, in

Gion-Dietz, the owners had not only ignored their properties

for long periods of time but conceded at trial that the public

had made use of them; that such was not the case herein,

as there were sporadic attempts to curtail the public use,

and public controversy over the development of the property

had raged for years in the local community. Upon analysis,

however, these are distinctions without a difference. No

suggestion appears in Gion-Dietz that would limit that ruling

to property with similar topography or history to that in-

volved in the 1970 decision. As we have concluded, there

was substantial evidence of public use of all of the parcels

involved here.

In two subsequent cases involving the Gion-Dietz rule of

law, the Courts of Appeal did find relevant the factual

distinctions and rejected its application. In County of Orange

v. Sherman Corp. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 561, dedication

was sought concerning an isolated beach near Laguna; the

trial court’s finding that the evidence did not establish use

by sufficient members of the public was upheld on the

ground that the public use envisioned by Gion-Dietz must

be ‘‘substantial.’’ In Richmond Ramblers Motorcycle Club

v. Western Title Guaranty Co. (1975) 47 Cal.App. 3d 747,

the court declined to find public dedication of an area long

used by members of a motorcycle club, as well as their

families and friends, because their presence on the land was

the result of a license conferred by the owner.

However, in City of Long Beach v. Daugherty (1977) 75

Cal.App.3d 972, the plaintiff city successfully invoked

GionDietz to obtain public easements over beach-front prop-

erty located in the city and long maintained by the city and

subject to intense public use.

C. For Gion-Dietz to Apply, Must There Be Specific Proof That

the Public Who Used Beach Property Believed That the Public

Had a Right to Such Use?

Defendants argue that the evidence adduced below in the

case at bench was insufficient to show use by the public

‘*believing the public had a right to such use.”’ This lan-

guage was employed by the court in Gion-Dietz but was

followed by an explanation that the existence of such belief

is immaterial if the public use is established for the requisite

period of time. Daugherty, supra. 75 Cal. App.3d 972, 979.)

Accordingly, we reject this argument of defendant.

D. Other Contentions Raised by Defendant Regarding Insuffi-

ciency of the Evidence.

Defendant questions whether a public easement may be

established by use which involved the violation of various

ordinances and penal statutes. Acquisition of title by adverse

use, however, as it was recognized at common law, has

always involved the violation of some law protecting own-

ership — the prohibition against trespass, for example —

but that reality has not prevented an owner’s acquiescence

from creating title in another, whether he be a wrongdoer

or not.

Defendant also makes certain technical arguments based

upon traditional rules of real property, citing cases which

have held, in the past, that adverse possession can create

no prevailing rights against the holders of secured interests

in property or such entities as receivers in bankruptcy, hold-

ing in custodia legis. Defendant points out that during the

prescriptive periods identified by the trial judge in the case

at bench, there were foreclosures of the property as well as

a period when the property was subject to the jurisdiction

of the federal bankruptcy court. Gion-Dietz, of course, did

a

not discuss with any particularity the impact that breaks in

the chain of title of the owners might have, except to state

that, once the public easement had ripened, no subsequent

owner could prevent assertion by the appropriate authorities.

Resolution of this issue depends upon whether the correct

emphasis is upon the owner’s title or upon the conduct of

the encroaching public; we think that Gion-Dietz makes it

abundantly clear that public use may commence and run

against successive owners of property, and that it is im-

material how those owners acquired the property.

There are those who consider the Gion-Dietz rule of law

harsh and inequitable. But we cannot refuse to follow this

rule of law because of various personal opinions as to its

fairness or harshness in spite of official and nonofficial

reactions to Gion-Dietz. We recognize that it was cogently

stated in County of Orange v. Chandler-Sherman Corp.,

supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 561, 564: ‘‘Reaction to Gion-Dietz

was prompt. In addition to soaring sales of chain link fences,

as owners of shoreline property frantically attempted to bar

the public from the use of their property, the case generated

a spate of law review comment which was generally criti-

cal.’’ In addition, the California Legislature reacted promptly

by amending Civil Code sections 813’ and 1009 * to provide

the means by which private owners could protect their prop-

erty against implied dedication while allowing public use.

Such protection may now be obtained by: (1) sign posting

as provided in Civil Code section 1008; (2) public recor-

dation as provided in Civil Code section 813; and (3) a

written agreement with a public agency for the public use

of such land. Such agreement may impose ‘‘reasonable re-

strictions on the time, place, and manner of such public

“Amended by Stats. 1971, ch. 941, § 1, p. 1845.

*Added by Stats. 1971, ch. 941, § 2 p. 1846.

use, and no use in violation of such restrictions shall be

considered public use for purposes of a finding of implied

dedication.’’ (Civ. Code, § 1009, subd. (g).)

V.

Viability of the Defenses of Estoppel and Laches.

The Berks’ answer raised the equitable defenses of es-

toppel and laches.

California law has long recognized the viability of the

defense of equitable estoppel. Evidence Code section 623,

restating former Code of Civil Procedure section 1962, sub-

division 3, provides that ‘‘[w]Jhenever a party has, by his

own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led

another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon

such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such

statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.’’

‘*The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on con-

cepts of equity and fair dealing. It provides that a person

may not deny the existence of a state of facts if he inten-

tionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to

be true and to rely upon such belief to his detriment. The

elements of the doctrine are that (1) the party to be estopped

must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his

conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party

asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so in-

tended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state

of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.”’

(Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720,

725.)

“It is settled that ‘[t}he doctrine of equitable estoppel

may be applied against the government where justice and

right require it. [Citations.]’ Correlative to this general rule,

uliinss

however, is the well-established proposition that an estoppel

will not be applied against the government if to do so would

effectively nullify ‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the

benefit of the public, . . .” [Citation.] The tension between

these twin principles makes up the doctrinal context in which

concrete cases are decided.’’ (City of Long Beach v. Mansell

(1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 493.)

‘“The existence of an estoppel is generally a question of

fact for the trial court whose determination is conclusive on

appeal unless the opposite conclusion is the only one that

can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. [Citation.]

When the evidence is not in conflict and is susceptible of

only one reasonable inference, the existence of an estoppel

is a question of law.’’ (Driscoll v. County of Los Angeles

(1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305.)

The Berk defendants assert that the plaintiffs should be

estopped from claiming the public recreational easement

because the County assessed and taxed the property as if

it were private and not subject to a public easement and the

Officials of the cities of Torrance and Redondo Beach ap-

plied their zoning and building ordinances to the property

on the assumption that the property was private and not

encumbered with any public easement. There appears to be

no dispute that such taxation and application of ordinances

did occur, and that the governmental activity in this context

did influence Oscar Berk’s belief that the property was pri-

vate property free of any claim that would encumber the fee

interest.

The trial court rejected the defenses of estoppel and

laches, making a specific finding that none of the govern-

mental officials who dealt with the property had knowledge

concerning its status. The evidence supports this finding.

In the case at bench, there was no evidence that either

County, or Torrance or Redondo Beach officials intention-

=

ally misled Oscar Berk concerning the status of the property,

but misrepresentation of known facts need not be the product

of fraudulent conduct in order to invoke estoppel. (Mansell,

supra.) All of the officials did act upon the assumption that

the property was free of public claim. There is no doubt if

any of them had informed Berk of the possible consequences

of Gion-Dietz, he would not have purchased the property

from Halperin.

The evidence also supports the trial court’s finding against

the defense of laches. Laches refers to prejudicial delay,

and must be considered in the context of reasonableness.

The County and the City of Torrance acted to assert their

claims to a public easement some 13 months after Gion-

Dietz had been decided. We cannot conclude that, as a

matter of law, this lapse of time constitutes laches.

VI.

Miscellaneous Contentions of the Berk Defendants.

A. The Retroactive Application of Gion-Dietz.

The Gion-Dietz court established a principle creating pub-

lic recreational easements in shoreline property and applied

it retroactively in the two cases it considered. Defendant

argues that such application is lacking in fundamental fair-

ness. As an intermediate appellate court, it is not within our

jurisdiction to overrule a decision of the state’s highest court.

(See Daugherty, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 972, 980, rejecting

a similar argument.)

B. Does the Gion-Dietz Rule of Law Constitute a Taking of Private

Property Without Compensation in Violation of Constitutional

Principles?

The Berk defendants attack the Gion-Dietz rule of law

on the ground that it permits the taking of private property

in violation of constitutional guarantees. The argument must

oe ae

be rejected for the same reason that we reject the argument

as to the fairness of retroactive application of Gion-Dietz.

We should not be required to continue stating the well-

settled and well-known principle that the decisions of the

California Supreme Court are binding on ail other California

courts. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)

57 Cal.2d 450.)

VII.

The Berks’ Cross-Complaint for Damages Against Plain-

tiff Governmental Agencies.

By cross-complaints the Berk defendants sought, as one

item of relief, damages in the event that the court upheld

the plaintiffs’ claims for public recreational easements. The

claim for damages was posited on legal theories of unjust

enrichment and inverse condemnation. We hold that the

trial court erred in giving judgments against the Berks on

their cross-complaints.

Although the evidence in the cases at bench was sufficient

to establish public recreational easements pursuant to the

rule of law set forth in Gion-Dietz, this rule of law is not

to be interpreted to preclude liability of the plaintiffs — the

governmental agencies — for loss caused to the defendants

— the Berks, under the circumstances presented in the cases

at bench. The findings by the trial court that the doctrines

of estoppel and laches were not present to prevent the es-

tablishment of public easements by implied dedication do

not preclude the right of the Berks to establish a cause of

action for damages for losses occurring as the result of

actions by the governmental agency plaintiffs.

We start with the principle that Gion-Dietz recognized

a strong public policy favoring public use and public own-

ership of California’s shoreline beach areas. ‘‘Even if we

were reluctant to apply the rules of common law dedication

a

to open recreational areas, we must observe the strong policy

expressed in the Constitution and statutes of this state of

encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas.”’

(Gion-Dietz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29, 42.) Although ‘*[t]his

court has in the past been less receptive to arguments of

implied dedication when open beach lands were involved

than it has when well-defined roadways are at issue,’’ (/d.

at p. 43), nevertheless, ‘‘[w]ith the increased urbanization

of this state, however, beach areas are now as well-defined

as roadways. This intensification of land use combined with

the clear public policy in favor of encouraging and ex-

panding public access to and use of shoreline areas leads

us to the conclusion that the courts of this state must be as

receptive to a finding of implied dedication of shoreline

areas as they are to a finding of implied dedication of road-

ways.”’ (Id. at p. 43.)

It was only two years after Gion-Dietz that the California

Supreme Court in Klopping v. City of Whittier (1972) 8

Cal.3d 39, expressed an equally strong recognition of the

court’s ‘‘constitutional concern over property rights requires

that the owner be compensated’’ Klopping, supra, 8 Cal.3d

39, 52) for damages caused by ‘‘unreasonable conduct’’ on

the part of governmental agencies in the eminent domain

arena. ‘‘{[W]hen the condemner acts unreasonably in issuing

precondemnation statements, either by excessively delaying

eminent domain action or by other oppressive conduct, our

constitutional concern over property rights requires that the

owner be compensated’’ Klopping, supra, 8 Cal.3d 39, 51-

52; emphasis added) when ‘‘as a result of such action the

property in question suffered a diminution in market value.”’

Id. at p. 52; fn. omitted.)

This same constitutional concern over property rights”’

that necessitated ‘‘that the owner be compensated’’ in K/op-

ping requires that the Berks, the owners before us, be com-

a

pensated for the losses suffered by them as a result of un-

reasonable conduct prior to’’ Klopping, supra, 8 Cal.3d 39,

52) filing their actions against the property owners — the

Berks — to assert public recreational easements against the

Berks’ property. For all intents and purposes, the recog-

nition of a public easement against the Berks’ beach property

leaves the underlying fee interest valueless. There is no

ability of the fee owner to make any economically valuable

use of the property.

Although the Berks as fee owners are not entitled to

compensation for the loss of a less-then-a-fee interest in

their beach property because of the doctrine of an implied

dedication of their property to the public for recreational

use, they are not foreclosed from obtaining damages for

losses substained as a result of ‘‘unreasonable conduct’’ by

the governmental agencies prior to the institution of their

actions to assert public-use easements.

The law cannot be sterile in the face of injustice. For the

13-month period from the date of Gion-Dietz to the filing

of the instant actions, the officials of the cities of Torrance

and Redondo Beach treated the property involved as the

private property of the owners and dealt with the owners

on a basis of the owner’s right to develop the property within

the framework of the applicable zoning and building ordi-

nances of the respective cities. Had any of the city officials

notified defendant Oscar Berk of the possibility that the

Gion-Dietz rule of law might lead to the assertion of a public

easement for recreational purposes, he would not have pur-

chased the property from Halperin and sustained losses such

as the down payment on the property, the expenses of es-

crow, the payment to the County of Los Angeles of taxes

on the property and the expense of preliminary development

of the project after obtaining a building permit.

oy ae

The loss suffered by the Berks in the purchase of the

property could have been averted also by prompt action after

February 1970 — the date of the Gion-Dietz decision — on

the part of the City of Torrance, the City of Redondo Beach

or the County of Los Angeles, in filing actions against the

then owners to establish the public recreational easements

prior to the Berks’ purchase in July 1970.

Under the circumstances presented here, the failure of

the governmental agencies to act promptly after the Gion-

Dietz decision constitutes ‘‘unreasonable conduct’’ suffi-

cient to trigger a Klopping-type cause of action in the Berks

to recover against plaintiffs City of Torrance and the County

of Los Angeles damages for the losses sustained as a result

of such ‘unreasonable conduct’’ by plaintiffs. The County

of Los Angeles can claim no immunity on the theory that

it was not dealing with the property owners after the Gion-

Dietz decision. The County assessed and collected taxes

from the owners on the basis that the owners had an unen-

cumbered fee title to the property. In addition, the cities of

Torrance and Redondo Beach must be considered as sub-

trustees of the County of Los Angeles in terms of repre-

senting the public’s interest in the property in question. (See

City of Long Beach v. Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493.)

It bears repeating that the City of Torrance filed its action

against the Berks on March 12, 1971, and that the County

of Los Angeles followed with its action on March 23, 1971.

The County’s lawsuit which related to the portion of the

property situated in the City of Redondo Beach came after

the City of Redondo B

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