Petition — Daniels v. Southern California Rapid Transit District
Supreme Court brief1980
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‘Gupreme Court, U,
* FILED’
i
ib = JUN 9 1980
(*,
IN THE MICHAEL RODAK, JR.,
SUPREME COURT
OF ‘THE UNITED STATES
ait sia i's 1 9 3 4
FLOYD H. DANIELS,
Appellant and Petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT
DISTRICT, a public corporation;
and JACK R, GILSTRAP, as General
Manager of the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT,
Appellees and Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FLOYD H. DANIELS
4650 Coliseum Street, Apt. #1
Los Angeles, California 90016
(213) 296-4588 - 788-9450, Ext. 40
In Propria Persona
IN ‘THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1979
No.
FLOYD H. DANIELS,
Appellant and Petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT
DISTRICT, a public corporation;
and JACK R, GILSTRAP, as General
Manager of the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT,
Appellees and Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FLOYD H. DANIELS
4650 Coliseum Street, Apt. #1
Los Angeles, California 90016
(213) 296-4588 - 788-9450, Ext. 40
In Propria Persona
TOPICAL INDEX
Table of Authorities
OPINIONS BELOW
JURISDICTION
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
STATUTES INVOLVED
CONCISE STATEMENT OF CASE
ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, FILED IN THE
DISTRICT COURT ON FEBRUARY 14,
1978, MERIT THE PROTECTION OF
RULE 59(e), FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Petitioner's Present Inde-
pendent New Cause of Action
With a Different Claim Is The
Result Of A Separate And
Distinct Act Of An Unlawful
Employment Practice Upon
Which Relief Can Be Granted
B. The Committed Separate And
Distinct Unlawful Act In
Employment Practice By
Respondents On August 16, 1977,
Violates Title 42, U.S.C.,
Sections 1981, And 1983
Page
iv
wr 6h UNC CN
10
10
11
13
Il.
1. Title 42, U.S.C.,
Section 1981 14
2. Title 42, U.S8.C.,
Section 1983 16
The Statute Of Limitations In
Petitioner's Present New
Cause of Action With A
Different Claim Merits The
Protection of "Jurinko vw.
Edwin L. Wiegand Co.$' Ruling 18
The Doctrine Of Res Judicata
Is An Inapplicable Law To Bar
Petitioner's Present New
Cause Of Action With A
Different Claim 21
WHY THIS UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT SHOULD REVIEW PETITIONER'S
PRESENT NEW CAUSE OF ACTION UPON
A DIFFERENT CLAIM; AND REVERSE
THE DECISIONS OF THE LOWER
COURTS 31
Article 3, Section 2, Clause l,
Of The United States
Constitution Provides This
Supreme With Judicial Power
And Authority To Review And
Issue Opinions In Causes Of
Actions Unlawfully Violating
Title 42, U.S.C., Sections
1981, And 1983; And The 14th
Amendment 31
ii.
Page
A. The District Court, And The
Court Of Appeals Have Denied
Petitioner The "Due Process Of
Law" And , Equal Protection Of
The Laws" 33
CONCLUSION 36
APPENDIX 38
Judgments And Final Orders 40-48
Exhibits 49-63
iii.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Donovan v. Reinbold
433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) 17
Forman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178. (1962). 11
Guarantee Acceptance Corp. v.
Fidelity Mortgage Investors
544 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1976). 29
I.N. McDonald and Raymond L,
Laird v. Santa Fe Trail Trans-
ortation Co., et al.
27 U.S. 273. (1976). 16
Iselin v. C.W. Hunter Co.
173 F.2d 388 (Sth Cir. 1949). 29
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency
421 U.S. 454. (1975). 33... 28
Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co.
477 F.2d. 1038 (3rd Cir. 1973).
414 U.S. 970. (Cert. Granted). 12, 19
Masco v. United Airlines
574 F.2d 1127 (3rd Cir. 1978). 18
Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Co.
320 U.S. 661. (1944). 31
Miller et al. v. Meinhar-
Commercial Corp.
462 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1972). 29
iv.
Smith v. Cremins
308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962). 20, 21
Smith v. Hampton Training
School for Nurses
300 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966) 17
Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp v.
Nowalk
420 F.2d 858 (3rd Cir. 1970) ll
United States v. International
Building Co.
345 U.S. 502. (1953). 30
Young v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Co,
438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1971). 20
Rules
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 38(b) 38
Rule 60(b), (2) 25
Rule 59(e) id, 13
Statutes
California Code of Civil
Procedure, Section 338(1) 19, 20
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1981 14
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983 16
Vv.
United States Constitution
Article 3, Section 2, Clause 1 33
14th Amendment 36
vi.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1979
No.
FLOYD H. DANIELS,
Appellant and Petitioner.
vs.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT
DISTRICT, a public coporation;
and JACK R, GILSTRAP, as General
Manager of the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT,
Appellees and Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, FLOYD HIRAM DANIELS,
petitions for Writ of Certiorari to
review the Final Order of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, entered on April 21, 1980, in
which Petitioner's Petition For Rehearing
filed March 25, 1980, was DENIED, and
thereby affirming the United States
District Court for the Central District
of California; wherin, Petitioner's
be
Motion For Reconsideration, and Demand
For Jury Trial was DENIED in a Final
Order entered on April 10, 1978,
Petitioner alleges:
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions delivered 4 the
Courts below are appended to this Petition
as follows:
1. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's Final
Order denying Petitioner's Petition For
a Rehearing, Page #40 ,
2. The Court of Appeals' Memorandum
affirming the District Court's Final
Order, Page # 41,
3. The District Court's Final Order
Seaping Petitioner's Motion For
Reconsideration, Page # 45,
4. The District Court's Judgment
Dismissing Petitioner's "Complaint For
Discriminatory Breach of Reinstatement
For Damages and Payment For Lost Time",
entered gnd filed on February 7, 1978,
Page # 4/7,
JURISDICTION
The ground on which the jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked is that the
Court of Appeals has decided two (2)
a
important questions of federal law which
should be settled by this Court.
1. The District Court's Final
Order entered on April 10, 1978; in which
Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration;
and Demand For Jury Trial, by barring
this present Civil Rights Cause of
Action by:
a. Statute of Limitations.
b. Doctrine of Rejudicata,
2. The Final Order of the Court of
Appeals that was filed on April 21, 1980;
in which, Petitioner's Petition For
Rehearing was denied, and thereby, uphold-
ing the Court of Appeals' Memorandum,
affirming the Final Order of the District
Court.
3. The Court of Appeals, and the
District Court have improperly denied
Petitioner, as a United States Citizen
the "Due Process of Law" and "Equal
Protection of the Laws", as prescribed
by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States of America, in this
present Cause of Action.
The statutory provisions believed
by Petitioner to confer on this Court's
jurisdiction to review the judgment in
rt paar ee by Writ of Certiorari are Title
2, U.S.C., Sections 1981, and 1983;
California Code of Civil Procedure,
Section 338(1); and the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States
of America.
3.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The questions presented for
review are as follows:
A. Whether the District Court
improperly denied Petitioner's Motion
For Reconsideration by barring this
present Cause of Action with the
Doctrine of Res Judicata; and the Statute
of Limitations.
B. Whether the Court of Appeals
can affirm the above states Action by
the District Court when the Court of
Appeals improperly denied Petitioner's
petition For Rehearing, by ignoring and
refusing to address Itself to the
Financial Transaction that happened on
June 22, 1577 between Petitioner and
Respondents ; in which, the Court of Appeals
has deprived Petitioner the "Due Process
of Law", and the "Equal Protection of the
Laws", as precribed by the 14th Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United
States of America.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Statutes involved in this Action
are Article #3, Section #2, Clause #1, of
the United States' Constitution; the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States; Title 42 U.S.C., Sections
1981. and 1983; 338(1), California Code
of Civil Procedure,
The above stated Statutes will be
4.
quoted later in this Petition when it is
appropriate to do so.
CONCISE STATEMENT OF CASE
The facts material to the consid-
eration of the questions presented are
as follows:
Petitioner's "Complaint For
Discriminatory Breach Of Reinstatement
For Damages and Payment For Lost Time",
filed in the District Court on November
2, 1977, is a New Cause of Action, with
different Claim or Issue, is based upon a
separate and distinct Act of unlawful
racial discrimination in employment
practice, committed by Respondents.
This Cause of Action commenced
and started on June 21, 1977, when
Petitioner visited Respondents' Head-
quarters at 425 South Main Street, Los
Angeles, California; and presented a
letter, dated January 28, 1971, from
Respondents to Petitioner providing for
the peynent of $1,098.24; and Respondents
and Petitioner's Union's Agreement for
the reinstatement of Petitioner, as a
bus operator. The above stated Letter
was filed with Petitioner's Complaint
on November 2, 1977, attached thereto
as Exhibit I-i, (CT’50-51; and is filed
in the Appendix as Exhibit "B", Page# 51.
As a result of Petitioner's visit
to Respondents' Headquarters on June 21,
1977, Respondents mailed Petitioner a
5.
check, dated June 22, 1977, in the amount
of $1,098.24; which Petitioner received
by U.S. Mail on June 24, 1977, The above
stated Financial Transaction, and in
accordance with Respondents' Letter of
agreement, dated January 28, 1971,
restored Petitioner's Reinstatement
Rights as a bus operator. A photostat
of the above said check was filed with
the Complaint on November 2, 1977,
attached thereto, as Exhibit "H-2",(CT 52);
and is filed in the Appendix, as Exhibit
"Cc", on Page # 52 ,
As a result of Petitioner receiving
the above stated check on June 24, 1977;
and also the fact that there were material
evidence of White Bus Operators Employees
(Caucasian) of Respondents who were
continuing to perform dual employment;
Petitioner wrote a letter, dated June 25,
1977, and informed Respondents that
Petitioner was available and ready for
reinstatement as a Bus Operator; and
requested Respondents to modify "agree-
ment #2'' of said letter from Respondents,
dated January 28, 1971, by striking from
"Agreement #2", as follows:
"and that you sever your employ-
ment by the Los Angeles City
School System."
Petitioner's above said letter,
dated June 25, 1977, to Respondents was
filed with the Complaint on November 2,
1977, attached thereto, as Exhibit I,
(CT 48-49); and is filed in the Appendix,
as Exhibit "D", Page # 53,
6.
Petitioner's request in the above
stated said letter was denied in a letter
from Respondents to Petitioner, dated
July 12, 1977. This said letter was filed
with the Complaint on November 2, 1977
attached thereto, as Exhibit "J", (CT 53).
Again, as the result of the above
stated financial Transaction Fact, and
Material Evidence of White Bus Operator
Employees (Caucasian) of Respondent who
continues to perform dual employment;
Petitioner, on July 15, 1977, wrote a
letter to Respondents and requested
reinstatement as a bus operator, as
follows, in Pertinent Part:
"As you are aware, I, Floyd H.
Daniels, have never resigned
as a Bus Operator from the
Southern California Rapid
Transit District.
I am hereby advising the District
that I, Floyd H. Daniels, accept
the offer of reinstatement with
full seniority unimpaired from
the date of my hiring; and, I
be treated and extended the same
privileges as other employees of
the Southern California Rapid
Transit District.
I, Floyd H. Daniels, is hereby
advising the District to make
the offer of reinstatement
effective Sunday, August 14,
1977.
A copy of the above said and stated
/.
letter was filed with the Complaint on
November 2, 1977, attached thereto, as
Exhibit "K", (CT 55); and is filed in the
Appendix, as Exhibit "E", Page #55.
On August 16, 1977, Respondents, in
a letter to Petitioner, denied Petitioner's
request for reinstatement as a Bus
Operator, effective, Sunday, August 14,
1977; thereby, committing a separate and
distinct unlawful Act of racial discrimi-
nation in employment practice. A copy of
this stated letter was filed with the
Complaint on November 2, 1977, attached
thereto, as Exhibit 'M", (CT 63); and is
filed in the Appendix, as Exhibit "G",
Page # 63.
Therefore, as a result of the above
stated Separate and Distinct Unlawful Act
of Racial Discrimination in employment
Practice committed by Respondents on
August 16, 1977, when Respondents denied
Petitioner (Black) His request for rein-
statement as a Bus Operator Employee;
while White Bus Operator Employees
(caucasian) of Respondents continued to
Se dual employment; Petitioner timely
iled a Complaint For Discriminator
Breach Of Reinstatement For Damages And
Payment For Lost Time in the Central
District Federal Court on November 2, 1977,
pursuant to Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1981;
and Title 42, U.S.C, Section 1983. (CT 1).
The above stated Complaint was dis-
missed by a Judgment of the District
Court on the 7th my of February, 1978.
(CT 100), and is filed in the Appendix on
Page #47 .
8.
Within the ten (10) day requirement,
on February 14, 1978, Petitioner filed a
Motion For Reconsideration, pursuant to
Rule IO} Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; and Demand For Jury Trial, pur-
suant to Rule 38(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; and Rule 13, United
States District Court, Central District
of California. (CT 106) and (CT 156).
Petitioner's Motion For Reconsid-
eration was denied by a Final Order of
the District Court, filed on the 10th Day
of April, 1978. (CT 163), and filed in
the Appendix on Page #_ 45.
The United States Court of Appeals,
for the Ninth Circuit, in a Memorandum,
filed on March 12, 1980, affirmed the
Final Order of the District Court, filed
on April 10, 1978. This Court of Appeals’
Memorandum is filed in the Appendix on
Page # 41.
Petitioner, timely, filed a Petition
For Rehearing, dated March 21, 1980, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
In a Final Order 5! the Court of
Appeals, filed on April 21, 1980,
Petitioner's Petition For Rehearing was
denied. This Final Order by the Court of
Appeals is filed herein the Appendix on
Page #40 .
Whereas, Petitioner Petition For A
Writ Of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
for a Review; and an Opinion by this
9.
United States Supreme Court, reversing
the Final Orders of the lower Courts.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner presents the following
argument in his behalf:
I. PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, FILED IN THE
DISTRICT COURT ON FEBRUARY 14, 1978,
MERIT THE PROTECTION OF RULE 59(e),
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Petitioner's Complaint was dismissed
by a Judgment of the District Court on the
7th Day of February, 1978; and within the
ten (10) day requirement, Petitioner,
timely, filed his Motion For Reconsiderat-
ion in the District Court on the 14th Day
of February, 1978.
Rule 59(e), as follows:
"Rule 59(e), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Motion to
Alter Or Amend A Judgment. A
Motion to Alter Or Amend The
Judgment shall Be Served Not
Later Than 10 Days After The
Entry Of The Judgment."
The United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, in 1970, held:
"Motion requesting district
court to vacate its order of
10.
ruled:
summary judgment and enter an
order for rehearing and recon-
sideration constituted a motion
to alter or amend a —
under Rule Rule 59(e)."
Sonnenblick-Goldman Sate v. Nowalk,
This United States Supreme Court
"In absence of specific desig-
nation of provision of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure under
which Motion to Vacate Judgment
is filed, Motion may be treated
as filed pursuant to 59(e),
rather than pursuant to
Rule 60(b)."
Foman v. Davis,
oe s A262).
Petitioner's Present Independent
New Cause of Action With a
Different Claim Is The Result Of
A Separate And Distinct Act Of
An Unlawful Employment Practice
Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
As a result of Petitioner's visit
to Respondents’ Headquarters on June 21,
1977
at 425 South Main Street, Los
Angeles, California, and presenting a
letter from Respondents to Petitioner,
dated
January 2°, 1971; which was an
agreement providing for the payment of
ll.
$1,098.24; and Respondents' offer for the
reinstatement of Petitioner as a Bus
Operator, Respondents mailed Petitioner
a check, dated June 22, 1977, in the
amount of $1,098.24; which restored
Petitioner's reinstatement Rights, as a
Bus Operator.
As a result of Petitioner's rein-
statement Rights having been restored,
Petitioner, in a letter dated July 15,
1977, requested reinstatement as a Bus
Operator.
When Respondents denied Petitioner's
request for reinstatement in Respondents'
Letter, dated August 16, 1977, Respondents
committed a separate and distinct unlawful
Act of Racial Discrimination in employ-
ment practice; which brought about
a new Cause of Action with a different
Claim, the Discriminatory Breach of
Reinstatement Claim. a
This separate and distinct unlawful
Act of Racial Discrimination in Employ-
ment Practice on August 16, 1977, merit
the protection of the "Jurinko v. Weigand"
Ruling, which states, in pertinent part:
"Tt is clear, however, that the
plaintiffs' reapplication in
June of 1966 represents the
occurrence of an alleged unlaw-
full employment practice, and
consequently this Court is not
without Jurisdiction. See Cox
v. United States Gypsum Co.,
409 F.2d 289 (C.A. 7, 1969),
331 F. Supp. at 1186, n.3.
12.
We are in agreement with the
District court's conclusion,
for there were three separate
and distinct acts, the latter
of which occurred within the
90-day period. Therefore the
90-day statutory period com-
menced to run anew from the
last allegedly unlawful em-
ployment practice."
Jurinko v. Edwin L Wiegand Co.,
414 U.S. 970. (Cert. Granted).
Therefore, as a result of the above
stated committed separate and distinct
unlawful Act of Racial Discrimination in
employment practice on August 16, 1977,
by Respondents; Petitioner, timely, filed
a cheniaint For Discriminatory Breach Of
Reinstatement For Damages An ayment
For Lost Time in the Central District
Federal Court on November 2, 1977,
Pursuant to Title 42, U.S.C., Sections
1981, and 1983, (CT 1-80).
B. The Committed Separate And
Distinct Unlawful Act In
Employment Practice By
Respondents On August 16, 1977,
Violates Title 42, U.S.C.,
Sections 1981, And 1983
As there were White Bus Operator
Employees (Caucasian) of Respondents who
continued to perform dual employment,
while Petitioner (Black) was not permitt-
ed to perform dual employment when
13.
Respondents denied Petitioner's request
for reinstatement as a Bus Operator on
August 16, 1977; brought about and
created a separate and distinct unlawful
Act of Racial Discrimination in employ-
ment practice "y Respondents; which
violates Title 42, U.S.C., Sections 1981,
and 1983.
1. Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1981
"All persons within the Juris-
diction of the United States
shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal ene-
fit of all laws and proceedings
for the security persons and
property as enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pain,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to
nother, R.S. 1977."
This United States Supreme Court
ruled:
"B, Title 42, U.S.C., Section
1981, arigpe the present codi-
fication of one of the centry-
old Civil Rights Acts of 1866,
14 Stat. 27, on the other hand,
on its face relates primarily
to racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of con-
tracts. Although this court
has not specifically so held,
14.
it is well settled among the
federal courts of appeals --
and we now join them -- that
1981 affords a federal remedy
against discrimination in
private employment on the basis
of race. An individual who
establishes a cause of action
under 1981 is entitle to both
equitable and legal relief,
including compensatory and,
under certain circumstances,
punitive damages. See, e.g.
Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F,2d
799, (CA1), Cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968); Mansell v.
Sanders, 372 F.3d 573 (CA5 1967).
And a backpay award under 1981
is not restricted to the two
years specified for backpay
recover under Title VII."
Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Gol U.S. 23% C1073).
This United States Supreme Court,
again, ruled in 1976:
"Title 42, U.S.C., 1981 pro-
vides in pertinent part that
all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States
shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts ...
as is enjoyed by white citizens
.+.- We have previously held
where discrimination against
Negroes was in question, that
1981 afford a federal remedy
against discrimination in
15.
private employment on the
basis of race, and respondents
do contend otherwise,"
I McDonald and Raymond L
ra v anta fre Tr rans-
protatio Co et al 9 G27 U.S.
° CLOVE)
2. Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983
When Respondents denied Petitioner's
request for reinstatement as a Bus
Operator, in Respondents' Letter, dated
August 16, 1977; Respondents, as an
Employer, deprived Petitioner of rein-
Statement under color of State Law.
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983:
"Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custon, of usage,
of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the
United States or other persons
within the th ongghel gan thereof
to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured
bY the constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper
ae a roceeding for redress.
R. ” l 79,
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, held:
16,
"Position of defendants as
police officer did not render
them immune from liability
under Civil Rights Act against
charges that Plaintiff had
been refused reinstatement to
his employment as a city life-
ard in retaliation for his
aving exercised his First
Amendment rights by authoring
newspaper articles concerning
certain activities on city
beaches."' Donovan v, Reinbold,
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, also held:
"Compensatory damages awardable
in a Civil Rights Act case are
not limited to the out-of-pocket
pecuniary loss suffered by com-
plaint and may be awarded for
emotional and mental distress
caused by intentional tort."
Donovan 7 Reinbold, 433 F.2d
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, held:
"This section was designed to
provide comprehensive remedy
for deprivation of constitutional
rights." Smith v. Hampton
at a School for Nurses, 300
. b ] *
Based upon the above quoted Title
42, U.S.C., Section 1981, and Section
17.
1983; and based upon the above quoted
Rulings by the Courts on Section 1981,
and Section 1983; Petitioner is entitled
to have His Day in Court,
C. The Statute Of Limitations In
Petitioner's Present New Cause
Of Action With A Different Claim
Merits The Protection Of
"Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand
Co," Ruling
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, held:
"In Jurinko, this court was pre-
sented with a claim that an em-
ployed, on three separate occas~
ions, had refused to employ two
persons because they were married
women, The employer urged that
because the employment charge
against it was not filed within
the prescribed time after the
initial refusal, the district
court lacked jurisdiction over
the action. This court dis-
agreed, observing that "there
were three separate and distinct
acts, the latter of which
occurred with the (statutory)
period. Therefore (that)
period commenced to run anew
from the last allegedly un-
lawful employment Practice.
477 F.2d at 1042." Masco v.
United Airlines, 574 F.2d 1127,
18,
This United States Supreme Court,
the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, ruled:
"Where plaintiffs, two married
women, requested reinstatement
by employer in July , 1965 and
pele arin 7, 1965, one plaintiff
submitted written application
and second plaintiff submitted
similar request on January 10
1966 and in June 1966 plaintiffs
ones sought —e and
filed charges of discrimination
with Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission on July 29,
1966, there were three separate
and distinct acts of discrimi-
nation and 90-day statutory
— commenced to run anew
rom the last allegedly unlaw-
ful employment practice."
urinko v, Edwin L. Wiegand Co.,
. ; an ewe >
(1973). (Cert. Granted).
Therefore, when Respondents, as an
Employer, committed their separate and
distinct unlawful Act of Racial Discrimi-
nation in Employment Practice on August
16, 1977, when Respondents, in a letter,
denied Petitioner's request for rein-
statement; and Petitioner filed a
Complaint For Discriminatory Breach Of
€instatement For Damages An nt
For Lost Time in the Central Discrict
ederal Court on November 2, 1977;
well within the Three-Year Statute of
Limitations provided by the California
Code of Civil Procedure, Section 338(1),
19,
which
is as follows:
"Within three years:
(1) An action upon a
liability created by statute,
other than a penalty or
forfeiture,"
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, held:
"Since federal Civil Rights
Acts contain no provision
Limiting time within which
action thereunder may be
brought, applicable period
“ts limitation is that provided
y state," Smith v, Cremins,
308 F.2d 187, (1962).
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, held:
ruled:
"There is no federal statute
of limitations applicable to
1981, and the federal courts
would look to the most nearly
analogous state statute of
limitations." Young v. Inter~
rab On eT Telephone elegraph Co,,
7. y °
This United State Supreme Court
"A. Since there is no speci-
fically stated or otherwise
relevant federal statute of
limitations for a cause of
20,
action under 1981, the controll-
ing period would ordinarily be
the most appropriate one provided
by state law."’ Johnson v. Railwa
ie Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, held:
"California statute providing
that actions on Lliabilit
created by statute must be
mehr within three years was
applicable to action under
federal Civil Rights Act and
not one-year California
limitations statute." Smith v.
Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, (1962).
Therefore, Petitioner's Present
New Cause of Action, with a different
Claim is not barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
D. The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Is
An Inapplicable Law To Bar
Petitioner's Present New Cause
Of Action With A Different
Claim
When Petitioner, timely, filed his
"Complaint For Discriminatory Breach Of
Reinstatement For Damages And Payment
For Lost Time" in the District Court on
November 2, 1977; Petitioner filed a
Complaint based upon a separate and
distinct unlawful Act of Racial
21.
Discrimination in employment practice;
which brought about and created a
different Claim or Issue, "The Discrimi-
natory Breach of Reinstatement Claim, or
Issue''; which has never been litigated,
or adjudicated by the Courts in any of
Petitioner's prior cause of actions.
Petitioner's discharge was not
final and binding upon the parties be-
cause Respondent ignored Petitioner's
Union's written request for an Arbitration
Board Hearing in accordance with the then
Written Contract, which specified, in
pertinent part:
"and the majority decision of the
Board shall be final and binding."
Therefore, as a result of Petit-
ioner's Discharge not being final and
binding upon the parties; Petitioner filed
a Petition For Writ of Mandate in the
Los Angeles County Superior Court in
November, 1971. en Petitioner filed
his Petition For Writ of Mandate in the
Superior Court, Petitioner could not, and
did not alledge Racial Discrimination
ecause of Petitioner's Race; because
Petitioner could not, and did not produce
any evidence of any employees of Respond-
ents who were bus operators and perform-
ing dual employment; rg Petition-
er diligently searched for this dual em-
ployment evidence, As Petitioner was
demanding a Right to perform dual employ-
ment which was more then what other bus
operators were performing; Petitioner's,
because of his Race, could not, and did
not alledge Racial Discrimination, and
22.
ask the State Courts for more Rights then
that "as enjoyed by white citizens".
Therefore, when the State Courts
issued their Ruling of Summary Judgment,
the above State Court did not rule on
any unlawful Act of Racial Discrimination
in employment practice by Respondents.
The above stated State Court Ruling
Document is in the Clerk Transcript, as
Exhibit "A", "B", pages 126, and 128,
will also substantiate that the State
Courts did not rule on any unlawful Act
of Racial Discrimination in employment
practice by Respondents in issuing their
Rulings on Summary Judgment.
The Memorandum filed herein the
Appendix on page # 41, in which the
Court of Appeals filed on March 12, 1980;
page #2, starting at line #29, states:
"We have considered whether the
court properly dismissed the
action on the Transit District's
motion of summary judgment."
Exhibit "A'', of the Appendix, on
page #49, which is a Final Order of the
Federal District Court, filed June 12,
1975, in Petitioner's prior Cause of
Action will substantiate that Respondents
withdrew their Motion For Summary Judgment,
which states as follows, in partinent
part:
"and Defendants withdrawing
their Motion for Summary
Judgment."
rk
. The above quoted Exhibit "A", in
pertinent part, filed herein the Appendix
is, also, filed in the Clark's Transcript
. as Exhibit "F", page #141, sent to the
Court of Appeals, in Petitioner's Appeal
to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and his Attorney hoping,
and believing that materal evidence of
racial discrimination in dual employment
practice by Respondents could be found,
filed a "Compliant For Discriminator
Breach Of Contract For Damages" in the
Federal District Court on February 28,
1975, but Petitioner and his Attorney
could not find, or produce any evidence
of Racial Discrimination in dual employ-
ment practice by Respondents before the
Federal District Court entered the Final
Order on June 12, 1975. The prospect of
finding this Material Evidence was so
bleak, Petitioner's Attorney resigned
from the Case.
Petitioner's continued hard, sincere,
and diligent work finally paid off, when
Material Newly Discovered Evidence of
Racial Discrimination in dual employment
practice by Respondents when Petitioner
was discharged by Respondents; was dis-
covered on September 29, 1975, by a tele-
phone call from a Person, unknown until
this date.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate,
and an Amended Complaint in the Federal
District Court on December 15, 1975,
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), and Rule 15,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
: is within one (1) year of the above
24.
stated June 12, 1975, Final Order of the
District Court,
Rule 60(b)(2), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in pertinent part:
"The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3),
not more than one year after
the judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding was entered or taken,"
Petitioner's above stated prior
Cause of Action was time barred by the
California Statute of Limination, Code
338(1), in the District Court's Final
Order on January 14, 1976.
Therefore, based upon the above
stated Final Order; the District Court
ruled that Petitioner's prior Cause of
Action was not within the jurisdiction
of the Federal Court; and therefore, the
Federal District Court could not, and
did not adjudicate, or litigate a Claim
or a separate and distinct unlawful Act
of Racial Discrimination in emplcyment
practice when Respondents discharged
Petitioner, as a Bus Operator.
Petitioner did not file his present
Complaint in the District Court on
November 2, 1977, in this present Cause
of Action based upon the above stated
separate and distinct unlawful Act of
Racial Discrimination in employment
practice when Respondents discharged
Petitioner as a Bus Operator.
25.
There is one (1) important pertin-
ent fact that happen in Petitioner's
present New Cause of Action, with a
ditferent Claim, or Issue, after Petit-
ioner's prior Cause of Action had termi-
nated in the Courts; that did not happen
in "Scoggin v. Schrunk, 552 F.2d (9th
cir. » cert denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976); United Airlines v. Evans, 431
U.S. 555 ; and, Masco v., United
574 F.2d 1127 (3rd Cir. 1978)"; in which
the Court of Appeals cited to bar this
present New Cause of Action.
However, these above stated cited
Cases do not bar this present New Cause
of Action at all, because of the one (1)
important pertinent fact, as follows:
1. The Independent Financial
Transaction in the form of a check dated
June 22, 1977, in the amount of $1,098.24;
which was paid to Petitioner by Respond-
ents, as part of an agreement for the
reinstatement of Petitioner, as a Bus
Operator; and, in accordance with this
Written Letter of Agreement, Exhibit "B"
herin the Appendix on page # 51 ; it
restored Petitioner's Reinstatement
Rights, while continued dual employment
was being performed by White Bus Operator
Employees (Caucasian) of Respondents,
while Petitioner (Black) was not permitt-
ed to perform dual employment by Respond-
ents.
The above stated Financial Trans-
action paid to Petitioner by Respondents
triggered the creation of a separate and
distinct unlawful Act of Rac’.al Discrimi-
26.
nation in employment practice by Respond-
ents; because as a result of this
Financial Transaction, Petitioner wrote
a letter, July 15, 1977, to Respondents,
and requested reinstatement as a Bus
Operator.
On August 16, 1977, Respondents
in a letter, dated August 16, 1977,
denied Petitioner (Black) his request
for reinstatement as a Bus Operator;
while White Bus Operator Employees
(Caucasian) of Respondents continued to
perform dual employment; which created
a separate and distinct unlawful Act of
Racial Discrimination in employment
practice by Respondents.
The two aforestated separate and
distinct unlawful Acts of Racial Discrim-
ination in employment by Respondents are
not one and the very same.
ype as aforequoted, this United
States Supreme Court, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, ruled:
"It is clear, however, that
the plaintiffs' reapplication
in June of 1966 represents the
occurrence of an allege unlaw-
ful employment practice, and
consequently this Court is not
without Jurisdiction. See Cox
v. United States Gypsum Co.,
331 F. Supp. at 1186, n.3.
We are in agreement with the
District Court's conclusion,
for there were three separate
av
and distinct acts, the latter
of which occured within the
90-day period. Therefore the
90-day statutory period com-
menced to run anew from the
last allegedly unlawful em-
ployment practice." Jurinko v.
Edwin L, Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d
1038 (1973); 414 U.S. 970.
Based upon the above quoted Ruling
by the Courts, when Respondents, in
their Letter, dated August 16, 1977,
denied Petitioner's request for rein-
Statement as a Bus Operator; Respondents
committed a separate and distinct unlaw-
ful Act of Racial Discrimination in em-
ployment practice on August 16, 1977; which
poe a about, and created a separate and
distinct Claim, or Issue, The Discrimi-
natory Breach of Reinstatement Claim, or
ssue,
Therefore, when Petitioner, timely,
filed his Complaint For Discriminator
Breach of Rienstatement For Damages And
Payment For Lost Time, in the Fotcral
District Court on Nevember ay anee, Of
a result of a separate and distinct un-
lawful Act of Racial Discrimination in
employment practice by Respondents on
August 16, 1977; which created and
ner fi about a New Cause of Action, with
a different Claim, or Issue that has
never been Adjudicated, or Litigated by
the Courts in Petitioner's prior Cause
of Action.
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, held;
28,
"Identity of parties, of
subject-matter, and issues,
are the essential elements
of Res Judicata, and the
absence of any one thereof
is fatal to a plea under
such Doctrine.'' Iselin v.
C,W, Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388
CS ee:
The United States Court of Appeals,
for the Tenth Circuit, held:
"Doctrine of res judicata
requires identity of issues
as between cases involved."
rantee Acceptance Cor Vv.
elit rt e Investors,
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, held:
"For res judicata to apply
there must be wg hy
both parties and issués.
Miller et al. v. Meinhard-
ommerc or
52).
The Court of Appeals states in its
Memorandum, filed March 12, 1980, on page
#3, paragraph #3, starting at line #9,
the followings:
"The state court judgment
based on the Transit District's
motion for summary judgment
and the prior federal district
court's judgment based on the
29.
Transit District's motion to
dismiss on the ground that
Daniels' claim was time barred
were both judgments ‘on the
merits,"
Very surely the above stated judg-~
ments were on the merits, but very surely
the above stated judgments did not
adjudicate, or patigate the Claim, or
ssue in Petitioner's present New Cause
of Action with a different Claim, or Issue,
The Discrimi ory Breach of Reinstate-
ment Claim Tssue Tr, upon a separate
and distinct unlawful Act of Racial Dis-
crimination in Employment Practice when
Respondents on August 16, 1977, denied
Petitioner's request for reinstatement
as a Bus Operator,
The above statement appear to be
very much supported by two (2) Rulings
by this United States Supreme Court, in
regard to a New Cause of Action, with a
different Claim,
This United States Supreme Court
Ruled:
"In a subsequent action between
the same parties on a different
claim, a judgment is conclusive
only as to the point or question
actually litigated and determined
in the original action, not as
to what might have been liti-
ated and determined." United
tates v. International Building
O.; “ o .
30,
Court
Again, this United States Surpreme
Ruled:
"Where the second cause of
action between the parties
is upon a different claim
the prior judgment is res
Jacke not as to the
ssues which might have
been tendered but only as
to those upon the determi-
nation of which the finding
or verdict was rendered,"
SRB Corps Ys Mid-Continent Co.,,
Therefore, the Doctrine of Res
Judicata is an inapplicable Law to bar
Petitioner's Present New Cause of Action
With a Different Claim; as the Doctrine
does not bar this present new Cause of
ction with a different Claim.
II,
WHY THIS UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT SHOULD REVIEW PETITIONER'S
PRESENT NEW CAUSE OF ACTION UPON
A DIFFERENT CLAIM; AND REVERSE THE
DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS
Article 3, Section 2, Clause 1,
Of The United States Constitution
Provides This Supreme Court With
Judicial Power And Authority To
Review And Issue Opinions In Causes
Of Actions Unlawfully sane taee
Title 42, U.S.C., Sections 1981 And
1983; And The 14th Amendment
31.
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1981
and 1983, aforequoted in this "Petition
For A Writ Of Certiorari", are two (2)
Federal Statutes that have been —
and adopted by the Congress of the
of America.
Article 3, Section 2, Clause 1, of
the United States Constitution provides
this United States Supreme Court with
ope ae power and authority to Review
auses of Actions, and Issue Opinions on
the unlawful violations of Title 42,
U.S.C., Sections 1981, and 1983 Statutes,
and the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution, by ensuring all
Citizens of the United States of America
the protection of their Endowed Equal
Knots. which also, includes Floyd H,
Daniels, A Natural Born United States
Citizen, and the Petitioner in this
present new Cause of Action upon a differ-
ent Claim, which is the result of an
independent Financial Transaction on
June 22, 1977, from Respondents to
Petitioner, that triggered the creation
of a separate and distinct unlawful Act
of Racial Discrimination in Employment
Practice committed by Respondents on
August 16, 1977, when Respondents denied
Petitioner's Written Request for rein-
Statement as a Bus Operator; which result-
ed into a Complaint that was timely filed
by Petitioner in the Federal District
Court on November 2, 1977; was timely
filed to the Court of Appeals; and now,
has timely been Petitioned to this United
States Supreme Court for a Review, and
An Opinion issued by this United States
Supreme Court,
32.
Article 3, Section 2, Clause 1, o°
the United States Constitution States,
as follows:
"The judicial power shall ex-
tend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this con-
stitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made
under their authority; to ali
cases affecting ambassadors,
other public minister and
consuls; to all cases of ad-
miralty and maritime juris-
diction; to controversies to
which the United States
shall be a party; to con-
troversies between two citi-
zens of different states;
between citizen of the same
State claiming Lands under
grants of different states,
and between a state, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign
States, citizens, or subjects."
B. The District Court, And The
Court Of Appeals Have Denied
Petitioner The "Due Process Of
Law" And "Equal Protection Of
The Laws"
The District Court improperly
denied Petitioner's 'Motion For Recon-
sideration" in a Final Order; and the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit have ignored and knowingly
33.
failed to address it itself to the
"Financial Transaction Fact", in the
form of a check in the amount of $1,098.24,
dated June 22, 1977, paid to Petitioner
by Respondents, as part of an agreement,
which restored Petitioner's Reinstatement
Rights as a Bus Operator; in the Court of
rage Memorandum, filed on March 12,
1980, Affirming the District Court's
Final Order.
The above stated "Financial Trans-
action Fact" is filed herein the Appendix,
Exhibit "C" on page #52 ,
Also, the above stated "Financial
Transaction Fact" was filed hereto, with
Petitioner's Complaint, and referred to
in Petitioner's Opening Brief, as "(CT 52)!'
Petitioner, also, filed the
"Financial Transaction Fact" attached
herewith, as an Exhibit "A", in Petition-
er's "Petition For Rehearing"; and stated
the followings, in pertinent part:
"This Financial Transaction
Fact has been over Looked by
this Court; and this Court has
failed to address itself to
this Financial Transaction Fact
in this Court's Memorandum,
filed on March 12, 1980; which
impose an injustice by this
Court, to Appellant, as a
Citizen of these United States
of America."
Therefore, the Court of Appeals
have ignored, and have knowingly failed
34,
to address itself to this ''Financial
Transaction Fact" by filing a Final Order
on April 21, 1980, “The petition for
rehearing is denied"; which has imposed
ar rp pada by the Court of Appeals in
Petitioner's Present New Cause of Action
upon a different Claim; and, Petitioner,
as a Natural Born Citizen of these
United States of America,
As a result of the above stated
injustice that was imposed by the Court
of Appeals to Petitioner's Present New
Cause of Action upon a different Claim;
and Petitioner, as a Natural Born Citi-
zen of these United States of America;
the Court of Appeals unjustly ruled the
the followings:
1. There was no separate and
distinct unlawful Act of Racial Discrimi-
nation in employment practice committed
by Respondents on August 16, 1977.
2. Petitioner's Present New Cause
of Action upon a different Claim is
barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
3. Petitioner's Present New Cause
of Action upon a different Claim is
barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Therefore, based upon the above
stated unjust ruling by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the Court of Appeals has denied
Petitioner, A Natural Born Citizen of the
United States of America, the "Due Process
of Law"; and "Equal Protection of the
Laws", as precribed by the 14th Amendment
i)
of the United States Constitution, which
states as follows:
"All persons born or natura-
lized in the United States,
subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state
wherein they reside."
"No state shall make or en-
force any Law which shall
abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of
the United States, nor shall
any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law,
nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
CONCLUSION
Petitioner has stated a Claim upon
which Relief can be granted in this
present new Cause of Action upon a differ-
ent Claim,
The above statement is supported
by three (3) important pertinent facts,
as follows:
1, There was a separate and distinct
unlawful Act of Racial Discrimination in
Employment Practice committed by Respond-
ents on August 16, 1977.
36.
2. Petitioner's Present New Cause
of Action upon a different Claim, is not
barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
3. Petitioner's Present New Cause
of Action upon a different Claim, is not
barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Therefore, there has been a
"Manifest Abuse of Discretion", committed
by the Lower Courts; and, Petitioner's
Motion For Reconsideration, pursuant to
59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
and, Petitioner' s Demand For Jury Trial,
pursuant to Rule 38(b), Federal kules of
Civil Procedure; both filed in the
Federal District Court on February 14,
1978, should be granted by this United
States Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully
petition the United States Supreme Court
to Review Petitioner's Present New Cause
of Action Upon A Different Claim; and
Reverse the Final Orders of the lower
Courts, by issuing an Opinion that
Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration;
and Demand For A Jury Trial, be so
granted; and Remand this present new
Cause of Action upon a different Claim,
to the District Court for futher pro-
ceedinge consistent with this United
States Supreme Court's Opinion.
DATED: June 6, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
FLOYD H, DANIELS
In Propria Persona
37.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1979
No.
FLOYD H, DANIELS,
Appellant and Petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT
DISTRICT, a public coporation;
and JACK R, GILSTRAP, as General
Manager of the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT,
Appellees and Respondents.
APPENDIX
A. JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
1. Court of Appeals' Final Order, filed,
April 21, 1980, page #40 .
2. Court of Appeals’ Memorandum, filed,
March 12, 1980, page #41.
3. Federal District Court's Final Order,
38.
ll.
filed April 10, 1978, page #45.
Federal District Court's Judgment,
entered February 7, 1978, page #47.
B, EXHIBITS
Exhibit "A", Federal District Court's
Amended Judgment (Final Order), filed
June 12, 1975, page #49.
Exhibit "B", A Letter of an agreement
for Reinstatement, Page #51,
Exhibit "C'', A Photostat Copy of a
Check, dated June 22, 1977, from
Respondents to Petitioner. Page #52.
Exhibit "D", A Letter, June 25, 1977,
from Petitioner to Respondents.
Page #53.
Exhibit "E", A Letter, dated July 15,
1977, from Petitioner to Respondents,
Requesting Reinstatement. Page#55.,
Exhibit "F", A Letter, dated August
15, 1977, from Petitioner to Respond-
ents. Page #61.
Exhibit "G", A Letter, dated August
16, 1977, from Respondents to
Petitioner, in which Respondents
denied Petitioner's Request for
Reinstatement. Page #63.
39.
so oeo7.06UcnrtmUCH
32
ott SSP beere
Mbt
| FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS appa 4 iggy
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD H. DEANE
CLERK, US. COURT OF APPEALS
FLOYD H. DANIELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs. No. 78-2007
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID
TRANSIT DISTRICT, a public
corporation; and JACK R.
GILSTRAP, as General Manager
of the Southern California
Rapid Transit District,
—_— =. SP ‘ee ce sr ee ee
°o
=
0
™
=
Defendants-Appellees,
Before: TRASK and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and
SOLOMON,* District Judge
The panel as constitutes in the above case has
voted to deny the petition for rehearing.
Theypetition for rehearing is denied.
40.
*Honorable Gus J. Solomon, Senlor United States District
Judge for the District of Oreyon, sitting by designation.
rr er ee ed
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ‘AR 4 2 1980
CLERK, US COURT UF APPEALS
FLOYD H, DANIELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No, 78-2007
vs.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID
TRANSIT DISTRICT, a public
corporation; and JACK R,
GILSTRAP, as General Manager
of the Southern California
Rapid Transit District,
MEMORANDUM
Defendants-Appellees.
a a ee ee ee ee te
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
.
Before: TRASK and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and
SOLOMON,* District Judge
4
Floyd H. Daniels, a black man, was a bus driver for the
Southern California Rapid Transit District (Transit District).
In April 1970, he was discharged after a hearing for violating
company rules on unauthorized dual employment and for falsify-
ing sick reports, These matters came to light as a result of
an investigation by the Transit District when he was arrested
for the attempted rape of a passenger on his bus, a charge on
which he was acquitted.
In November 1977, Daniels filed the pro se action against
the Transit District and its general manager (appellees) which
is now before the court. In it he contends, as he had in two
prior actions, that because of his race he was terminated, He
again sought reinstatement and damages for having been
* Honorable Gus J. Solomon, Senior United States District
Judge for the District .of Oregon, sitting by designation,
4X.
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wrongfully discharged in 1970,
The appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that under the doctrine of res judicata the adverse judg-
ments in the two prior actions barred Daniels from maintain-
ing this action and on the further ground that this action
was barred by the statute of limitations.
The district court granted the motion and ordered
the complaint dismissed on the ground that the judgment
against Daniels in the prior district court action barred
the present action on the doctrine of res judicata. Shortly
thereafter, Daniels filed a motion to reconsider [Civ. R.
59(e)] the ruling and judgment. On April 10, 1978, the
district court denied the motion for reconsideration and
again "ordered, adjudged and decreed that plaintiff take
nothing by his complaint."
Daniels appealed from that order.
The standard of review on a Rule 59(e) motion is
whether there was a manifest abuse of discretion. Walker
v. Bank vf America, 268 F.2d 16, 25 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 903 (1959).
Pleadings in civil rights actions must be libera ly
construed, Thomas v. Younglove, 545 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir.
1976), particularly when brought pro sec. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.8. $19 (1972).
Even with this standard, our review of the record
shows no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion
Moreover,
to reconsider. /we reject appellees' contention that we are
limited to that issue. We have considered whether the
court properly dismissed the action on the Transit District's
motion for summary judgment.
2.
42.
1 Daniels contends that the present action encompasses |
2 matters outside the scope of the prior state and federal |
3 actions and that his claim is therefore not identical with
4 that set forth in the prior actions.
5 Daniels sought the same kind of relief in each
6 action he filed. All of them arose out of the same set
7 of facts culminating in the termination of his employment
6 by the Transit District in 1970.
° The state court judgment based on the Transit District's,
" motion for summary judgment and the prior federal district
court's judgment based on the Transit District's motion to |
” dismiss on the ground that Daniels' claim was time barred
- were both judgments on the merits. |
- Where a claim is based on the same asserted wrong
16 that was the subject of a prior action, and where the
7 parties are the same, res judicata will har the subsequent |
18 action because a prior judgment on the merits will not only
19 bar evcry claim that was raised in the prior action but
20 will also preclude every other legal theory or ground for
21 recovery that might have been asserted. See Scoggin v. |
22 Schrunk, 552 F.24 436 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. |
93 1066 (1976).
24 There is no merit in Daniels’ attempt to overcome the
25 running of the statute of limitations by asserting that the
26 Transit District's refusal to meet his 1977 demand for ;
a7 unconditional reinstatement constitutes grounds for a new
2 claim. A request for reinstatement does not revive an
29 earlier claim based on a discriminatory termination, |
Sy particularly when the earlier termination was held to be
$1 lawful. United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 555 (1977);
32
e512. 100n-o001 43
Masco v. United Airlines, 574 F.2d 1127 (3rd Cir. 1978).
AFFIRMED.
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Lee ANarcae. CALIPONNIA 90Ot? oe
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Teuerwone (213) 620-3928 oO E | S E D
STEVEN D. WEINSTEIN a tenner»
Attorneys for Defendants - ee oe AFR 40 1973
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID P seats
TRANSIT DISTRICT and JACK R. | ats BR SS
GILSTRAP br) ‘1 . vy Bedtets “sat
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FLOYD H. DANIELS
Plaintiff Civil No. 77 4103-AAH
vs. 4 ORDER
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID
TRANSIT DISTRICT, a public
corporation; and JACK R,
GILSTRAP, as General Manager
of the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSI' DISTICT,
Defendants.
The Motion of the Pluintiff, FLOYD Il. DANIELS, to Alter
or Amend Judgment, designated by the Plaintiff as a Motion for
Reconsideration, duly and regularly came on for hearing before
the HONORABLE A. ANDREW HAUK, District Judge, on the 27th day
of March, 1978, the Plaintiff appearing in propria persona, and
the Defendants appearing by their counsel, MUSICK, PURLER & GARRETT
by STEVEN Db. WEINSTEIN, and the Court having considered tho
Plaintiff's ‘iotion for Reconsideration of tha Judqment enteret? on
Vebruary 7, 1973, and the caso having been fully argued, and
ge
3 S47
; 45. Page #1 A,
nd YP HY YP HY ee ~~ ~
ee
MUGICK, PFELER
@ GARACTT
eo ert owe wd
a having been submitted, and the Court heaving found that
the Motion for Reconsideration raises no new matters and is
without merit, and the Court having found that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure io State a Claim Upon Which
‘Relief Can Be Granted was properly granted, and the Court having
advised and cautioned the Plaintiff regarding provisions
imposing sanctions for vexatious litigation, including Local
Rule 3(i) of the United States District Court of the Central
District of California:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DFCFERD, that Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration be denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint on file her ye
DATED: Los Angeles, California, this fom. day of
Mpid in
| 46. 164
co onv aaek}a«aewe ew .
~ ww ve» YY
SE&Seteee €
18 |
MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Los pa ap eg ry a ‘ “4 FE I L E D
TeLernone (213) 629-9328 NN , A
STEVEN D. WEINSTEIN Ory 274 FER G Wis
Attorneys tor Defendants . ;
. SOUTHERN CALIFOKUIA RAPID CLERK, US G.sia oT COURT
TRANSIT DISTRICT and JACK R.
GI\USTRAP Q
yay
* UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FEB 7 1978
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA YG ray U.S. flSIebce COURI
ENTRAL = CAL ORR
Civil No. 77 4103-A\n
FLOYD H. DANIELS
Plaintiff
vs. JUDGMENT
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPLD
TRANSIT DISTRICT, a public
corporation; and JACK R,.
GILSTRAP, as General Manager
of tne SOUTIIERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT,
Defendants.
The Motion of the Defendants, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT and JACK &. GILSTPAP, duly and regularly
came on for hearing before the IIONORABLE A. ANDREW HAUK, District
Judge, on tiie 23rd day of January, 1973, the Plaintiff appearing
in propria persona, and the Defendants apecaring by their counsel,
MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT by SYTRVEN D. WEINSTEIN, and the Court
having considered the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
for Failure to State a Claim Upon Waica volic! Can 3e Granted
and oticr matters submitted to the Court in connection with said
a Cochatee oys “A
eS rates PS 47. Page #1 109
“12. 156
eqPtnline DiSiRick CF CALeCo A
bepuly
SS ee
oo N*M foo f&® &@ tS KY
~
- Oo
12
MUCICK, PLELER
@ GARNLTT
Motion, and the case having bren fully argued, and the matter
having been submitted, and tne Court having found that the
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted in that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata by the prior court action of Floyd H. Danieis
v. Southern California Rapid Transit District, et al., No. CV
75 290 EAC, and the Court having found it unnecessary to maxe
a determination based on the other grounds presented by the
Defendants’ Motion:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRIED, that Defendants’
Motion be granted;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that
Plaintiff take ngthing by his Complaint on file herein.
DATED: Los Angeles, California, this 4 day cf
rng
Pata: 1978.
Sf! 62 tht
JUDGE,” UNITCD STATES DISTRICT COURT
-2-
48.
--
Py
Necketes =f
ee:3 aoe uw ft Oe
10
20
em 314 expr Py3
Zi
ip antese $008 49, Exhibit _"
\ 57-2 7. a < :
MUSICK, PCFLER & GARRETT
PP eso NEvS aTiaw oy.
* wievere ot
toe anc’. how. GAunc nas ‘ soot? nN INTN
Teservont (209) 629.3922 By ot ae
MICBAEL W. CONLON :
Attorneys for Defendants JUN 1085
FILED
gun 12 1975
-
OO, US Crier coir
Png os este st eaer . CANTAAL Gistaitn C+ Ca Ota
, a
‘ a O say | fh Neon
. . °
r oa EN T ft
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ercr
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNI-, ayy yr
vee 12975
.
FLOYD H. DANIELS,
, Plaintiff,
vs. NS. CV 75 290 EAC
SOUTHERM CALIFORNIA RAPID
TRANSIT DISTRICT, @ puvlic
Corporation, ct al.,
” AMENDED JUDCHINT
Defendants.
The Motion of the Plasntiff£, FLOYD H, DINIELS, to vacate
Judgment and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants
SOUTHER CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT and JACK R. GCILSTRAP,
@uly and regularly came on for hearing before the Honorable E.
Avery Crary, District Judge, on the 9th day of Junc, 1975, the
Plaintif€£ appearing by his counsel, McSherry ar.d Dickey, and the
Defendants appearing by their counsel, Musick, Pecler anu Garrett,
and the Court having considered the Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate
Judgment, and the case having been fully argued, and the matte:
having been sutmitted, and Ocfendants withdrawing their Motion for
Summary Judgrent and the Court having fcund that that portion of
Plaintif££'s Co: plaint brought pursuant to 42 U.5.C. Section 1933
is an action brought under Statute which Section recuires an
] action brought purcuant therety to alicce a racial discrininaticr.
and that Plaintiff dees not allese racial ciserims ration, anc the
P wT
ee ee ee
oowzteeesweun
Court having found that the Plaintiff's acticns brought pursuant
te 42. U.S.C. Section 1931 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 failed to
state a claim upon which relieZ can be granted in that Plaintiff's
claims arc barred by C.C.P. 339(1):
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND D=CREZD, that Plaintiff's Motion
to Vacate Judgment be denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Plaintiff
take nothing by his Complaint on file herein.
DATED: Los Angeles, California, this (tye day of June,
1975.
. , £4... Beas ay ow
jee, Taye * fi PIs. 11CT COURT
; /
Part of
50. Exhibit, "A"
¢%
ESD LD SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
1060 SOUTH BROADWAY + LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90015 + TELEPHONE (213) 749 6977
JACK R. GILSTRAP
eemanaL wanneee
January 28, 1971
REGISTERED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Mr. Floyd H. Daniels
4650 Coliseum Street - Apt. #1
Los Angeles, California 90016
Dear Mr. Daniels:
This letter will inform you that agreement has now been reached
between Southern California Rapid Transit District and United Transportation
Union, pursuant to the terms of which the District is to (1) compensate you
for the period June 20 through July 18, 1970, plus accrued vacation time,
and (2) offer to you reinstatement upon the conditions that such offer be
accepted within five days after receipt of this letter and that you sever your
employment by the Los Angeles City School System,
We accordingly enclose a check payable to your order in the amount
of $1,098.24, representing the above mentioned compensation after appro-
priate deductions, In addition, we hereby offer you reinstatement upon the
conditions above specified, which are that you accept the offer and scver
your School System employment within the permitted five-day period. Your
failure to comply with these conditions during such five-day period will,
of course, automatically result in the permanent loss of any reinstatement
rights on your part.
Very truly yours,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
e//2 4G
ons
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Earl R. Clark
General Chairman
United Transportation Union
51. Exhibit "B"
SERVING 2.260 SQUARE MILES OF SOUTHE, CALIFORNIA
en ie. ' Souther Califarata : a
215228 . RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT 0 ow -
4 ; r x : ' "= * LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA i ; 16-104
sete elas og ty" SPURATION FUND ae sf
") qmpeeeie @epenee B's Se Ne tag
F.H. DANIELS | 965228 jodz2p7 | |S *«1098, 24| ©
‘ 4650 COLISEUM ST., APT, 1 . ;
LOS ANGELES, CA, $0016) 2 ee |
et? pees Aa te . : ASSISTANT TREASURER
Miwh pf Amecten Eeicuseataas io" OF De C7 >
gas Ree ie i ed dete on acter ©
¥ e2ys226r. Sha romaine {00049 4"a0 Ske TEE Bt Nig STEPS
— Te
.
romans GOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
475 SOUTH MAIN, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90013
REMITTANCE ADVICE
acai wo. 83877
FM. DAUIELS 065228 062277 #1098, 24
4659 COLESCUN ST., APT. 9 $
LOS AUGELES, CA. $0016
" ;
INVOICE O'IsTRIBUTION
oarrT oare vOuR HO avount acill Kalb Hoel UNIT pac cOunet AMOUNT cn
TO REPLACE ACCOUNT ;
STALE DATE, PAYROLL
ACCOUNT SPECIAL
CHICK NO,| 0309681
ISSUED PAYABLE TO
YOU'R| ORDER ON 1-28-1971
1098 24 1990 | 10939 24
52. Exhibit ''c"
Floyd H. Daniels
4650 Coliseum Street, #1
Los Angeles, California 90016
June 25, 1977
Telephone (213) 296-4588
Mr. John S, Wilkens, Manager of Exployee Relations
Southern California Rapid Transit District
425 South Mein
Los Angeles, California 90013
Deer Sir:
As « result of my visit to the Southern California Rapid Transit District
Headquarters at 425 South Main on June 21, 1977; I, Floyd H, Daniels, received
on June 24, 1977, a eheck from the District in the amount of $1,098.24, as
part of an agreement between the Southern California Rapid Transit District
and United Transportation Union in a letter to me on January 28, 1971, The
letter is inclosed, '
ter
I want to thank you for the kind and friendly service I recieved on my visit
to the District Headquarters, It was great’,
4
As you know, another check for the same anount above vas sent to me vith the
Anclosed letter on January 28, 1971; and, on tho advice of my Attorney, this
check vas roturned to your Headquarters in a letter by my Attorney at the time
on february 27, 1971.
In paragraph number one of the inclosed letter from the District dated January
28, 1971, there vere two (2) ayreements; and the District only complied with the
number (1) agreement vhen the District sent mo the check dated Jue 22, 1977.
The two (2) agreomente are:
"(1) Compensate you for tho period June 20 through July 18, 1970,
plus accrued vacation tine."
For the above, this is the check in the amount of $1,098.24, tho District sent
to me dated June 22, 1977.
*(2) Offer to you roinstatenent upon the conditions that such
offer be accepted within five days after receipt of this letter
and that you sever your employuent by the Loe Anyeles City School
Systen." °
Since the District bas complied with agreement mmber (1), I am now asking the
District to kindly consider the number (2) part of the agreenent with modifications,
The modifications are that the District consider striking the follovings from
23. Exhibit “—”
-l-
agreement (2), which is, "and that oynent by the Los
jngeles City School Systexi,® a 7
I am kindly asking the District to modify agreement (2), because You, Mr.
Wilkens, and I, Floyd H. Daniels, both know thrt it has substantiated that
there vere Bus Operators (Caucasian), omployed by the Southern California
Rapid Transit District who were performing dual employment long before I,
Floyd EH, Daniels, started performing dual erployment. Those Bus Operators
Employees (Caucasian), vere performing dual exployment at the tine the
inclosed letter vas written; and, those Pus Oporator Employees (Caucasian)
have continued to perform dual exploywent until the present tire’,
So to require Me, Floyd H, Daniels, at this time to sever my exployment with
the Los Angeles City School System vould be Racial Diccrizinaticns
I went into one of the District's Division Headquarters, and a sign road
"EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IS THE LAW," “DISCRIMINATION IS PRONIBITE.
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and by Executive Order Kumber 11246,"
As I entered your very fine personnel Office on Jime 21, 1977, I locked to
Rk on the vall, and thare was sign which read, "AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
As I left one of the personne) offices, I, again, read the sign and I asked
myself, "if the District really intended for this to apply for all Citizens,
including Me, Floyd H, Daniels?"
Therefore, I am vriting this letter to inform the Mstrict that I have
received the chock in the amount of $1,095.24; and, I have accepted the
eheck, Also, I am available and ready for reinstatemmnt as a Bus Operator
with all rights, privileges, and seniority, It is my desire not to be just
a Bus Operator, but one of the top Bus Operators ef tho Southern California
Rapid Tranait District’.
I told Me. Showers in Personnel that you were a fine gentleman, and that I
highly respected you for your integrity end honor, inis is why I addressed
this letter to you. If you are not tho appropriate Officer to consider this
matter, kindly refer this letter to the appropriate Officer, or Officers for
considoration,
It is requested that the above matter be considered with the bost of integrity
and dignity’,
May God bless you and all of your fellow officers of the Southern California
Rapid Transit District’,
Very truly yours,
Floyd H, Daniels
Self:
ect File
Inclosures:
1, Letter to Floyd H, Daniels, dated January 28, 1971.
2. Exployee's Earning Statement — Special, dated January 28, 1971
3. Copy of check dated Juno 22, 1577 for the amount of $1,092.24,
and Remittance Advice, dated June 22, 1977,
54. Page #2 of
Exhibit "D"
Floyd H, Daniels
4650 Coliseum Street, #1
los Angeles, California 90016
July 15, 1977
Telephone (213) 296-4588
Mr. John 9, Wilkens, Manacer of Employee Relations
Southern California Rapid Transit District
425 South Main Street
Los Angeles, California 90013
Dear Mr, Wilkens:
In roceipt of your letter dated July 12, 1977 regarding my offer to accept
reinstatement as « bus operator for the Southern California Rapid Transit
District, I hereby give my reply.
First of all, the letter dated January 28, 1971, signed by George F,
Goehlor, the Manager of Operations at that time, was an agreement between
the Southern California Kapid Transit District and the United Transportation
Union, I have attached horeto, two letters, one (1) from the District, and
one (1) from the Union that led up to this agreement betwoen the Union and
the District in the letter to me, — Jamury 28, 1971.
Tho tvo (2) agreements in the letter dated January 28, 1971 were all in one
(1) sentence, as follows:
4This letter will inform you that arresmant has now been
reached between Southern California Rapid Transit District
and United Transportation Union, pursuant to the terms of
which the District is to (1) componzsate you for the period
June 20 through July 18, 1970, plus accured vacation tim,
and (2) offer to you reinstatement upon the conditions that
such offer be accepted within five days after receipt of
this letter and that you sever your employment by the los
Angeles City School System."
I did not accept tho chock for $1,098.24, I sent it back to the District,
and at the sane tino, 1 did not accept reinstatemont., Instead, my Attorney
at that time, end I vent to Court.
When I came into your personnel office on Jims 21, 1977, the accured vacation
tire in tho anount of $590.63 was due m, This is substantiated by the
"Tender of Wages Due", attached hereto, However, the District elocted to pay
me elso, for the period Juno 20 through July 18, 1970, which was the ezreement
between the Union emi District, which amounted to $650.79. 4520.79 + 590.63 =
$1,471.42, After $373.18 in deductions, the net amount was $1,098.24,
Tho above is the emount of the check that I did not accept, and instead,
returned it back to the District in a letter dated February 27, 1971.
Page #1 of
om Exhibit "E"
who was in a meeting and get his approvsl to replace this check with another
check, and we will get it out tomorrov," The check was made up and updated
1
1977, I made an offer to accopt reinstatement as a bus operator in a letter
to you. You, Mr, Wilkens, considered it fair and in order to adjust the
date of the check that I did not accept ani returned to the District on
February 27, 1971. You ordered prepare! and issued to mo another check
dated June 22, 1977.
If the District reconsidered and re-adjusted the date of the check that I
did not accept, but returned it to the District, which was agreenent (1)
between the Union and District in the letter dated Jamary 28, 197]; it is
only fair and just that the District consider it is fair and in order to
reconsider and adjust agreement (2) between the District and Union in the
same letter, same paragraph, and same sentence,
I stated to you in my letter dated June 25, 1977, that it had been sub~
stantiated that there vere Bus Operators (Caucasian) employed by the
Southern California Rapid Transit District who wore performing dual em
ployment long before 1, Floyd H, Daniels, started performing dual em-
ploymont. These Bus Operators Employees (Caucisian) were performing dual
exployment at the time the letter dated January 28, 1971 was written, It
was demanded that I, Floyd H, Daniels, sever my outside employment, while
the Bus Operators Employees (Caucasian) who were performing outside employ-
ment were not demanded that they sever their outside employment, This is
Raciel Discrimination, These Bud Operatory Employees (Cancasian) have con-
tinued to perform dual employment up until the present tine, If I, Floyd
FR, Daniels, is not reinstated as a bus operator, this is also, Racial
Discrimination,
In my letter dated Jume 25, 1977, I stated that the U.S. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, not the California Laws, being violated by the District. This is
U.S. Title WII, I now call your attention to Title 42, Section 1981 of the
United States Code boing violated by the District’,
You mentioned the Courts in your letter, dated July 12, 1977, This is an
independent style of action. This action sturted when the District prepared
and sent me the the check in the amount of $1,098.24, Therefore, the Courts
have not decided on this action,
As you are avare, I, Floyd H, Daniels, have never resignod as a Bus Operator
from the Southern California Rapid Transit District’,
I am hereby advising the District that I, Floyd H, Daniels, eccept the offer
of reinstatement with full seniority unirpaired from the date of xy hireing;
and, I be treated and extended the sane privileges as other employees of the
Southern California Rapid Transit District.
I, Floyd H, Daniels, ie hereby advising tho District to make the offer of
reinstatement effective Sunday, August 14, 1977.
I, Floyd H. Daniels, will come to work on time and perform my duties as a
56. Page #2 of
Exhibit "E"
bus operator just as other employees are required,
I vill come to vork every day J am suppose to come to vork,
This outeide employment will not affect my ormanoe as a bus operator,
This is reflected by my previously dual employment. I had 65 demerits vhen
I started performing dual exployment; and, I had reduced the demerits down
to 15 demerits before I was taken out of service, Also, I had no char le
accidents; and, only one miss-out, which was due to to a misunderstanding of
the schedule for Veterans Day,
Mr, Wilkens, since the above two (2) agreements were between the District and
Union, I am sending Mr’, Earl RK, Clark, General Chairman, United Transportation
Union, a copy of this letter, a copy of my letter to you dated June 25, 1977,
and a copy of your letter to me, dated July 12, 1977.
I am hereby, kindly requesting Mr. Earl R, Clark, General Chairman, United
Transportation Union, to execute in the writing of a letter to you stating
the United Transportation Union's position regarding my offer to accept
reinstatement effective Sumiay, August 14, 1977; and, a copy ef that letter
be sent to me for ny recor.
Mr, Wilkens, I am hereby, kindly requesting a written ansver ‘rom you of the
Southern California Rapid Transit District's position regariing ry offer to
accept reinstatement as a bus operator effective Sunday, August 14, 1977.
Yours very truly,
Floyd ‘I, Daniols
Self:
cc: Mr, Earl R, Clark, Genoral Chairman, United Transportation Union.
My‘, Jack R, Gilstrup, Goneral Manager, Southern vulifornia Rapid
Transit District.
Mr, Willaim C, Haag, Local Chairman 1565, United Transpartation Union,
Inclosures:
1. A copy of the letter from Mr, Clark to tho District, dated january 4,
1971.
2. A copy of the letter from Mr, Goohler to the Union, dated Janumry 22,
1971.
3. "Tender of Wages Due", dated July 1, 1970.
Page #3 of
1S Exhibit "E"
JAN 5 1971
J,S. W.
aletittelal transportation ONIOn "Gow sno
Earl R. Clark
Sas GENERAL COMMITTEE OF ADJUSTMENT Vice Crawmen
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT OISTRICT William ©. Haag
Suite 497 + 1725 West Sixth Street + Les Angeles, California $0017 + StazqagG 484-8191 Secretary
te
January 4, 1971
Mr. George S. Goehler
Manager of Operations
So. Calif. Rapid Transic District
1060 South Broadway
_Los Angeles, California 90015
Dear Mr. Gochler:
Re: Operator Floyd H. Daniels, Badce #2921
Thank you for your letter of Docember 18, 1970, in which you offored to
compensate Operator Daniels for the period June 20 to July 18, 1970. The
Genera! Committee of Adjustment 4onsidered your proposal and has accupted
it subject to the following proviso; That Operator Danicls be offerad
reinstatoment to his forner position with tho District, and be given five
deys in which to accept sald offer of reinstatement.
It is understood, of course, that this offer of reinstatement would be
based upon the conditions sec forth in your letter of June 11, 1970, which
was accepted by Mr. K. R. Moore's letter of June 15, 1970, where it says
in part:
"In the event Operator Daniels is exonerated of the
pending charge of attempted rape, he must then make
an election as to whether he desires to work for the
District as a bus driver or for the Los Angeles
School District as a teacher. It is agreed that he
cannot do both." °
Would you kindly advise us at your earliest convenience whether this
condition to the proposed settlement is satisfactory. af
Yours very truly,
ate @ Chak
arl R. Clack
General Chairman
cc: Mr. W. C. Maag, Local Chairman
Te: Page #4 of
Gh 78. Exhibi¢ "E"
ees. F
Perey ZD
60 GOUTH BAOADOWAY ¢ LOB ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90016 + TELEPHONE (213) 7409 6077
JACK A, GILSTRAP
Garena, manaaen
January 22, 1971
Mr. Earl. R. Clark, General Chairman
United Transportaticn Union
1725 Weat Sixth Stroot - Suite 407
Los Angeles, California 90017
Doar Mr, Clark:
Thank you for your letter of January 4, 1971, in
response to our letter of December 18, 1970, with respect
to the Floyd H, Danicls case,,
This will confirm that we are now in agreemiont that
Operator Daniels will be (1) co:npunsated for she period June 20
through July 18, 1970, and (2) offered reinstatement by the
District upon the condi.ions that he accept such offer within
five days after its receipt and sever any employment by the
Los Angeles City School System,
We will accordingly proceed promptly with such pay-
ment and re-employment offer, furnishing you of course, with
appropriate copies including a copy of any response from
Operator Daniels.
Very truly yours,
Gop IGrte
George F. Gochler
; Manager of Operations
DPE/MLRieb ae
ect M. L, Rise : Page #5 ‘of:
" : “I. S. Wilkens
‘J. T. Johnston 59, Exhibit Oh
BERVING 2.260 SQUARE MILES OF GOUTHEAN CALIFORNIA
wrk ager LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY
TENDER OF WAGES DUE
Date. _ July 1, 19 TO.
DEPARTMENT. LOCATION.
—-_Tranaportation 3207
To Employee __7ioya BM. Duniels Index No. 2942
$590.63 [F088 in cash is hereby tendered to you in full payment of balance
of wages due upon your discharge this instant, Vacation Tine.of 68-69 -- be,
157 irs. 50 Min, - $590.63, Gross Gross. re “
, Le Le ¢ Li
" Superintendent
T sanante the above payment.
refuse to receive how te
Signature of Enployes
In our presenco, tho above tender was made to, and refused by, said employee
at the timo and place of his/her discharge.
| eile Witness
Witnens
Page #6 of '
Exhibit "E"
60.
Floyd H, Daniels
4650 Colisoum Street, #1
Los Angeles, California 90016
August 15, 1977
Telephone: (213) 296-4588
Mr, John S, Wilkens, Manager of Employee Relations
Southern California Rapid Transit District
425 South Main Street
Los Angeles, California 90013
Dear Mr, Wilkens:
Qu July 15, 1977, I wrote you a letter advising the Southern California
t District that I, Floyd H, Daniels, accepts the offer of
reinstatement vith seniority unimpaired from the date of my hireing; and,
that I be treated and od the same privileges as other employees of
the Southorn California Rapid Transit District; cnd, this offer for rein-
statement be made effective Sunday, August 14, 1977.
The reinstatement date effective Sunday, August 14, 1977 has now expired;
and, I have not received any notification from You and the Southern Califor
nia Rapid Tranist District, I have reasonable concluded that the thirty (30)
days was ample time for You and the Southern California Rapid Transit District
to notify Mo, Floyd 8, Daniels, of my offer for reinstatement as a Bus Operator,
I am pow advising You and the Southern California Rapid Transit District to
reinstate ct - i, mae in accordance vith the terms of the letter,
,
dated July 1 within thirty (30) days from tho above date of this
letter, August 15 hor? to yous which will be September 14, 1977, with the
exception of the following quoted paragraph of the letter:
"I am hereby requesting Mr. Earl R, Clark, General Chairman, United
Transportation Union, to execute in the writing of a letter to you
stating the Union's = regarding my offer to accept rein-
statement effective ev. Magust 1A, 19775 and, a copy of that
letter be sent to mo for ay record,"
I hereby withdraw the above quoted paragraph because J have talked with both
Mr, Earl R, Clark, General Chairman, and Mr, William C, Haag, Loca) Chairman,
#1565; and, both men have notified ne that J, Floyd MH, Daniels, should be
reinstated in accordance with the terms of my letter to you, dated July 15,
1977, Both Mr. Clark and Mr, Haag have also offored their services to serve
as vitnessea in my behalf in Court, if necessary, Thorefore, it is only fair
that I withdraw the above quoted paragraph because if you had talked to me
end likewise notified me of my reinstatement; I, Floyi H, Daniels, would have
beon reinstated and vorking effective Sumday, August 14, 1977.
I have had the opportumity to visit some of the District's employees vho are
. _ performing outeide employment, an! they have showed me their outelide employ-
Went with pride and dignity, This I could not, and can not do, because of
' Page #1 of
61. Exhibit "F"
You, and the Southern California Rapid Transit District,
I, Floyd H, Daniels, is a natural born “itisen af these United States of
Americal, I had the opportunity of being drafted into the U.S. Navy during
World War IIg and, I served in those dangerous waters of the great Pacific
Ocean helping to preserve and protect this grvat Country's Independence,
end the very precious Liberties and Civil Riglits it stand for. I ana
Teacher for the Los Angeles School System, As a teacher, I am charged to
teach your children, my children, and other children of parents vho are
living in the Los Angeles Mhified School District, the truths about develop-
ing their minds and bodies in order to be good United States Citizens in
order to enjoy and protect their Civil Rights, 1, Floyd H, Daniels, can
not effectively teach these truths, if I am not afforded my own Civil Rights;
and, do not protect and pursue my Civil Rights,
When You and the Southern California Rapid Transit District failed to rein-
atate Me, Floyd H, Daniels, to the service of the District as a Bus Operutor
wffeative Sunday, August 14, 1977, you have in fact indicated that I, Floyd He
Daniels, is an inferior United States Citizen; and aloo, an inferior Teacher
for the Los Angeles Unified School System, This is iunorally wronc,
and ynlavful on the of You as Manager of Employee Kelationa, and the
Southern Californis Transit District to impose thi» type of
on Me, H, Daniels, because of my Race, .
Therefore, if I, Floyd #, [aniels, is not reinstated by You and the Southern
California Ra Tranist District to the service of Pus Operator as effective
of Sunday, August 14, 1977; and, within thirty (30) days from the date of this
letter to You, the termination date being Wednesday, September 14, 1977; I,
_ Floyd 8, Daniels, have no choico but to secure the services of an Attorney,
and file a Complaint in the Federal District Court for reinstatemont as a Bus
Operator, and for punitive and exemplary damages in the amount of One Million
Dollars {$1, 000,000.00) tax-froo, plus attorney feos, eourt cost, and for such
other and further yolief as the Court may deam just,
Yours very truly,
Floyd H, Daniels
Selt/
cor Mr, Jack R, Qiletrap, General Manager, Southern California Rapid
Transit District’,
Mr, Ear! R, Clark, General Chairman, United Transportation Union’,
Mr, William O, Haag, Local Chaizman, #1565, United Transportation Union.
File
Page #2 of
62, Exhibit "F"
FRI)
Southem California Rapid Transit District
425 South Main St. Los Angeles, Calitorma 90013
Telephone. (213) 972-6000
JACK Fi GILSTRAP
General Manager August 16, 1977
Mr. Floyd H, Daniels
4650 Coliseum Street, #1
Los Angeles, California 4 90016
Dear Mr, Daniels:
This will acknowledge receipt of your letters dated July 15, 1977 and
August 15, 1977. Please be advised that there has been no change in
the District's position as ect forth in my letter to you dated July 12,
1977,
As you did not meet the conditions established by the District and the
United Transportation Union for your reinstatement in 1971, you were
terminated as an employee of the District at that time,
Your termination in 1971 was final for all purposes at that time and is
not subject to-reconsideration,
Sincerely,
~~
SAAB =
hn S, Wilkens
Ma bf Employee Relations
JISW/ju
ec: Mr, Earl R, Clark
Mr. William C, Haag
63. Exhibit "'g"
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