Petitioners Brief — Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn.

Supreme Court brief1981

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Nos. 79-1711; 79-1754; 79-1760; 80-12 (Cons

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

$< -—-

CITY OF NEW YORK AND ABRAHAM BEAME,

Petitioners (79-1760,

—Y —

NATIONAL SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION

AND GOSTA LOVGREN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

RRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

CITY OF NEW YORK AND BEAME

ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ

Corporation Counsel

of the City of New York

Attorney for Petitioners

City of New York and Beame

100 Church Street

New York, New York 10007

(212) 566-2091

LEONARD KOERNER,

STEPHEN P. KRAMER,

of Counsel.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED*

1. Whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33

U.S.C. (& Supp. I) §§ 1251 et seq., and the Marine Protection,

Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 32 U.S.C. (& Supp. I)

§§ 1401 et seq., imply a private right of action independent of

the rights explicitly created by the citizen suit provisions of

those Acts, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365 and 1415(g).

2. Whether a private citizen has standing to maintain a

federal common law nuisance action for alleged damages re-

sulting from ocean pollution as a general federal question

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

3. Whether any federal common law nuisance action for

alleged damages resulting from ocean pollution, if available to

a private citizen, is not preempted by the present regulatory

scheme governing ocean pollution established by the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Re-

search and Sanctuaries Act.

° The other parties not appearing in the caption named as appellees in

the court below were the United States Environmental Protection

Agency; Russell E. Train, individually and as Administrator of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency; United States Army

Corps of Engineers; Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secretary

of the United States Department of the Army; Bergen County Sewer

Authority; The Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; Passaic

Valley Sewerage Commissioners; Middlesex County Sewerage Author-

ity; The Linden Roselle Sewerage Authority; Middletown Sewerage

Authority; the City of Glen Cove; and the City of Long Beach. Others

named as parties in the District Court were the New York Department

of Environmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, individually and as

Commissioner of the New York Department of Environmental Conser-

vation; New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; David J.

Bardin, individually and as Commissioner of New Jersey Department

of Environmental Protection; County of Westchester Department of

Environmental Facilities; and the West Long Beach Sewer District.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED: ois ccc cdcvebecddnclenun i

TABLE OF AUTHORITICS 0ocvicscckilslnn LS Vv

CAPE RAW a 6 coda ood ch akehacibee Lee |

PUP ne as RIES is kd bose doeahede ince 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......... 1, la-15a

SIATEMENT OF THE CAGE ooo cca ocicnkave cS ]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................... 2)

RPE ES icc nedvvaddsuwben cianeeeel eee

The Water Pollution Control Statutes Here In

Issue Contain Explicit Statutory Remedies Which

Define Citizen Rights. No Other Remedies Can Be

SN ov pks kd taccecudencdl eee 1]

POPREOS Wek vie sccinns 4h cuee cnackcne eee

Congress Has Determined That State Common

Law, Not Federal, Is To Provide The Rule Of

Decision For Torts Occurring In The Territorial

Waters Of The United States And That The

United States Would Not Assert General Jurisdic-

tion Over Ocean Waters Adjacent To Territorial

Waters. No Basis Exists For The Creation Of A

Federal Common Law Nuisance Claim For Ocean

Pollution Assertable By Private Parties ......... 15

ot |: eer per wom rE cern Fle See |

The Clean Water And The Marine Protection Acts

Present A Comprehensive Scheme For The

Achievement Of Levels Of Water Quality Which

Protect State Sovereign Interests And The Public

Health And Welfare. The Statutory Scheme

Leaves No Room For The Development Of Com-

- PREVIOUS PAGE WAS BLANK |

iv

PAGE

mon Law Standards Of Acceptable Levels Of

Pollution Or Water Quality.................... 30

ec te Pie 35

Appendix of Relevant Statutory Provisions

1) Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act,

ae U.0.C. (Supp. Il) 1401 ef g0g. . 0.0... oc ccc ccwccs la

2) The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

(Supp. II) sections 1332, 1333, and 1339............ 8a

3) The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

(1976) (superseded) sections 1332 and 1333.......... l4a

4) The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 33 U.S.C.

ESOi(e) and 1311(a) and (d) .......... ccc c cece cece 1Sa

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE

Aqua Slide ’N’ Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety

Comm’n, 569 F.2d 831 (Sth Cir. 1978).............. 33

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)............ 31

Askew v. American Waterways Operations, Inc., 411

She MY ag week wa Whee Soa Oil ad hae ke 22, 29

CETA Workers’ Organizing Committee v. City of New

Yore, G17 F.20 926 (2nd Cir. 1900)... ccc cc cccees 12

Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441

Re a 7, Sipe ener gai Gir ah treo an a> Pane sea neem 12

Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542

SR ee Bs CAP enn ee ai ay ar meen es ee 28

City of Evansville, Indiana v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling

Corp., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) ............... 12

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363

ARCS La Ad ewe BEER eee a CA au wands ies 8a 22

Committee for Jones Falls Falls Sewage System v. Train,

See dee ee ee is STON ios 6 a vs bce e ss ob ao) 34

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d

Rr I he as a ae 29

Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931)..... ae

Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co.,

Gat Wome ee GO Paik dice ib does deena. 18

Core VM, Se SI, Bate hiv tk kok Cah vec dowkanews 14

Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 48 U.S.L.W. 4243,

PO, FeSO ra Ste Tt, TW 6s wks sv oecserivvane. 5

Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) . 27

vi

PAGE

Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919).17, 20,

33

D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit & Insur-

oer Game. 515 U.S; OCF IGE)... oo. Sree bcc ck 22

Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel.

State Water Resources Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976)... 4

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)........ 18, 21

Ethyl Corp. v. E.PRA., 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),

CONT. a. SOD UB. BOE AIO ivk os ove kk eb da cae, 34

Forrester v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 559

Ree POOR ME ROPER erga ee i 33

Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) .19, 20

Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 713 (1865)... 17

Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F.Supp. 1140

re MN ave Ak ado vk bac deeb Sr 19

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) ...11, 19-21,

29-31

Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) ............. 21

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) .............. 20

Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930)............. 20

Miree v. DeKalb Co., 433 U.S. 25 (1977) ............. 18

Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) .............. 20

Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Comm’n, 557 F.2d

Pe A PPR es coe cle ki, ret ue 33

New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883)...... 20

New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953)......... 20

New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)... 29

New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) ......... 33

North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923)...... 21

Vii

PAGE

Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493

I hie ceca. Been wu blew ae hae Oe eee ae 22

Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976)....... 20

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) ............. 18

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. i151 (1978)..... 31

Red Star Towing & Transportation Co. v. Dept. of

Transportation of New Jersey, 423 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir.

RG. bis uke 046i haben de decduee dene 18

Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352

RRR Pes SR rari pre te Rogar trees ep he SH. 24

Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918) .......... 27

Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940) ....... 28

Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448

0 PO Perry ee grt rem Na? 14, 22

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) . 14

Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569

oe Fe ae pe ee eee 26

Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)... 20

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)........ 23

United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965)....... 27

United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 415 (1816) 17

United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 32 (1812). 17

United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) ........ 26, 27

United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical

Ce: EE Rc Gee Caran 6d vce bbaNicwnseceunesea 18

United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289 (Sth Cir.

SNK Gad vv ckvahke cabs lowen beienwbk skeen 27

Viii

PAGE

United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482

SN ds Fen! foo eon ya OCOD bok ke 18

United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332

en SUR ose di ben ok ove sabtuesudon. ik. 23

United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.

Wass ka ry ei ge ar ey te 5

Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63

SEY 650 NGS VAM Nae ake eo aks cake Eee a cd ia, 18

Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591; (1634) «... 6.5. 17, 18

Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 CU a bckien sued 23

Willamette Iron Bridge Co. vy. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1880) 16-19

Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) .... 20

Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389

WN edn Se er ee So 34

Statutes, Proclamations and International Conventions

Act of August 11, 1888, c. 860, § 9 (25 Stat. 424)...... 18

Clean Air Act, Section 304(e), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II)

PM Rit a Peti en did $ 00d vos sides oo, 12, 13

Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.

816, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.

Ree fae Se} Re nn cia passim

Pe Pie ges o a eo ee 14

Bae MAEMO 55 f0.d ae vids koe bach ceri onc, 3, 34

Me I hae oS ela ee oy 6

oi Lo: EO 34

i et ee 3, 4,3

ix

PAGE

De PEs RERUN 560-06 6.6.06 he vuchw baeinune wees 3

EEE e CLES sy Nn abd heehee ed cab kee cae 3

i a as Cie eke Lat ane pee ate ee Dua ees 3

i PEC b bce. ia kihee ahs s 4 Ke s.cma cama ws 4

MOMs Ask caboas hs ck soak eb ccene coeaes 4

Ss SED So isd anc pedinasbebasaeuna Wan’ 4

SE, SP as has bask A kw ea ee ayers so eke Ne 5, 14, 30,

31

EE er Terre for eee rere re 3

i cigs ees le tho ce ace aks 6 owen 4

i Ch Sok aus Cas Gos we CK Ok MK Me Oar weeek 6 4

Pr RE ik os 6 SF ihe Cada banecuedeanwe sens 5

Se srg Es Si ae 84 0 wa 'e-p re 4's 60 Se Ne 8A .

A ge ORE en Seen 5, 31

Be Biudytrs COMMUCAPHOMSD 65 bs oda buco obs wad dee weeie 5, 6, 31

ey ns SEED 66's hiens bd eckson es aap eens 6

ME Stas is Sie nah Rada dee oe bbe Rew 5

eh EI 6 oats borane wake ea kha Cheese aS 6, 30

eS aos 6 44g b 9594598 BAKE Ree e ene hs eRe 4, 6, 30

EE dis ehh ates ewae b bh Gea aK a Ao a owe 3

Pe eas RUGS vk wa ace v6 Pabewas peda ede ee ks 12

Pe as Sai aa pv dN Veoh ees RAK Le SOS Re Ka yee 4

Lag Dy. SIRRRERS TR Snare Mr oan Pr aor ee PIR CIR 3

Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29

Sins Se: MERE UE a coe s bw iva cbiea ees us 12

Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 2313,

NE aU ins 5. sob whee eo0-0u Cece Ca Meee es 26

PAGE

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by

Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 26 U.S.T. 2403,

Beh Aigis POG EN EROS «slick 0's 0b Se ov 6a eb ae 8

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous

Zone, 15 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639 (1964) 26

Exec. Proc. 2667 (Sept. 28, 1945), 59 Stat. 884........ 23

Sh UA... TR lee aa webcast 12

Interstate Sanitation Commission, 49 Stat. 932 ........ 5

Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of

1972, Pub. L. No. 95-532, 86 Stat. 1052, as amended

by Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50 and Pub. L. No.

95-153, 91 Stat. 1255, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1401-

DOF cb cs NCb anes seve ts-0s0619 eee passim

SO OS... LAGI oso vn ius veeenc dean eae eee 7

Po Sirs PORE va uv iveg biweecekeeaeouelane eeu 7

Bo Gahan WOM s vo e's Sched) 4545 Ned ek ee 7

DF Cites SORE 0 ck kus bh as vy ean es ecu cen cae 7, 30, 31

39 OA. Ge PIRI svi ves chct eae tee 9

nA, ARB seek ccneasivedhbioieaeen ee 7

Pe Wins MERA nhs swsknke sy ¥ seen eaeeeeaens 12

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.

(1976 & Supp. II) 1331-1343, 67 Stat. 462-470..... 1, 24, 25

SS USC. GPE ERR 6 5 so ivckcs ducevaniekeens 24

43 UBC. GIOFED BRIO b's once Uiwsscdescawaesecanel 25

8S USL. CEPR FE vin kins scaxcacunnaadbecueeeun 24, 25

A3-U.5.C. Gam SE CORRES ov eck a cunanca beensanuen 25

43 U.S.C. Gong. EE) BIBI oy onisisinvc vineconvencebts 25

43 U.5.C, Comp. FE) ASR oon aca cediaceaee 25

xi

PAGE

Sn ME, BED ROWOERPLED ccc ccc ccececscccccens 25

a Mn, GED EPPLUME). co ccveccccccvscccceces 25

ee RE) | 25

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, 33

es as Cue e wate w 08 449 6009 0:00 0 6, 18

Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315....1, 15,

24

Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 209, 33

Ec iden cb abacecebichecceeevesas 6

ous Sa swt bua Wb cb incctddessavect 10, 19, 20,

22

Regulations

nL sO. kts Ve ea an wh ewes Us ewnadesece 3

Te ect W eed ek bends seees teehee’. 3

RE I ee eee ee eee 5

ee ee 8 | | oe

NE BET 6 ns 660s. cdccacistecvavececas 7, 8, 30

40 C.F.R. Part 227, Subpart (B), Subpart (C); 227.3,

ere i Cian ckG Cah vA dhe vase do scenes’ 8,9

I NE ob eds ccccccccccsdeccccscesuse 7,8

Cee GS. i Ne ages bance cds te.c 8

i ee ee seca ccsecesesccacseseseness 5

Ne ee bi tenn seeeenn es eeesbed nn’ 3

es hs eek basins Ons i 6b-oes esau 4

Miscellaneous:

Bator, Mishkin, Shapiro, Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler,

The Federal Courts and the Federal System, (2nd ed.

eee kk onde dveca es eencaadess 17, 28

xii

W. Bishop, /nternational Law (3rd ed. See Gao oe 21, 27

Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act:

Key to a New Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 2334 (1953) .. 25

Currie, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials (2nd ed.

POPE Se eh ve Wha hve caU hoc banal cease 21

Friendly, Jn Praise of Erie—and the New Federal Com-

mon Law, 39 New York Univ. L. Rev. 383 (1964). ... 22

Heinzen, The Three Mile Limit: Preserving The Freedom

of the Seas, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 597 (1959)............ 24

H.R. Rep. 92-361, 92 Cong., Ist Sess.........cccccc. 6

A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act

of 1972, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (Comm. Print. 1973). .12, 13

Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States

Supreme Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665 (1959) ........ 21

Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) ................. 33

Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L.

igh Beach io. ORE PO eer On eee 20, 32, 33

S. Rep. No. 411, 83rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1953) ......... 25

S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. ........... 13

S. Rep. No. 92-451, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess............. =e

S. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1971) 13

Schwartzenberger, The Dynamics of International Law

GOP ah koh db eal oubh cies iis kk ive cies ian 27

Von Moschzisker, R., Common Law and Our Federal

Jurisprudence, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109, 270, 367 (1925) 23

Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,

OF GOMRW. Ea, TRL OP CIUEIR s scead dns occ lkecn 17

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 616 F.2d

1222. The opinion and judgment of the court of appeals are

reproduced in the Middlesex Appendix at la and 37a. The

opinion of the district court is not officially reported and is

reproduced in the Middlesex Appendix at 40a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Middlesex Appendix

38a) was entered on February 5, 1980. A timely petition for

certiorari was filed by petitioners herein on May 5, 1980. An

order granting the petition for certiorari and consolidating it

with Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-12 was entered on October

20, 1980 (Joint Appendix 48a). The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. I) 1251 et seq. are reproduced

in the Middlesex Appendix at 72a ef seg. The pertinent provi-

sions of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act,

33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1401 ef seg., the Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1331 ef seg., and the

Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 33 U.S.C. 1301 ef seq. are

reproduced in an Appendix to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Pleadings and Proceedings Below

Respondent National Sea Clammers Association is an asso-

ciation whose members make their living harvesting fish and

shellfish from the water and ocean beds of the Atlantic Ocean

near New York and New Jersey. Respondent Lovgren is an

2

individual similarly employed. Petitioners City of New York

and Beame,' and the other parties in the District Court, are

various federal, state and local officials and governmental

departments that are charged with environmental! protection or

are responsible for sewage treatment and disposal.

Respondents allege that petitioners discharged or permitted

the discharge of certain nutrient-rich sewage and toxic wastes

into the Atlantic Ocean or its tributaries. Respondents com-

plained of discharges allegedly made both in compliance with

and in violation of federal regulatory statutes. They alleged

that in 1976 these discharges caused death and other adverse

effects on marine life, and, as a result, they sustained business

losses.

The local governments discharge treated and untreated sew-

age from pipes (“point sources”) into the territorial waters off

their respective states pursuant to federal permits. In addition,

sewage sludge, a by-product of modern sewage treatment, is

placed in vessels which transport the materials and discharge

them at various locations approximately 12 miles off the

United States coastline. This dumping is also done pursuant to

federal permits.

The complaint was dismissed by the district court on motions

for summary judgment, with prejudice, on all claims except for

two said to arise under state law which were dismissed without

prejudice. The court of appeals reversed the order of dismissal

of those claims based upon the Federal Water Pollution Con-

trol Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376, the Marine Protection, Re-

search and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. 1401-1444, the federal

common law of nuisance, and the maritime tort law.

l Edward I. Koch replaced Abraham Beame as Mayor of the City of

New York on January 1, 1978. Abraham Beame was sued individually

and in his official capacity as Mayor.

3

B. Regulatory Scheme of the Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act? provides for both federal and state

regulatory power over the discharge of pollutants into the

navigable waters, which are defined as “the waters of the

United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C.

1362(7). Federal technology-based effluent limitations for all

discrete point sources of pollution must be met by certain

specified dates. For publicly owned treatment works, with

which we are concerned here, the Act requires application of

“secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator” of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency (“the Ad-

ministrator”) no later than July 1, 1977 (33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)

(B), 1314(d)(1)), subject to extension to July 1, 1983 in speci-

fied instances. 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1311(i). The secondary

treatment requirement may be modified for publicly owned

plants that discharge into marine waters upon a showing that

state water quality standards will not be violated and that other

potential uses of the waters will be protected. 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

II) 1311(h). By July 1, 1983, all publicly owned plants must

employ the “best practicable waste treatment technology over

the life of the works,” 33 U.S.C. (and Supp. II) 1311(b)(2)(B);

1281(g)(2)(A).

Discharges of untreated sewage resulting from overflows of

combined storm and sanitary sewage systems are not consid-

ered publicly owned treatment works requiring the application

of secondary treatment technology. See 40 C.F.R. 122.3(bb), 45

Fed. Reg. 33423 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 122.3).

Hence they are regulated by conditions in discharge permits

under 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C) and 1342 (a)(2). Congress re-

cently required the Administrator to submii a report on the

problem of combined storm and sanitary sewer overflows, 33

2 The Clean Water Act refers to the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as

amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.

1566. See also Act of Dec. 28, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-207, 87 Stat. 906;

Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2467.

a

4

U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1375(c), but did not mandate that they be

eliminated.

In addition to his power to mandate the use of specific

technology and specific discharge limitations, the Administra-

tor also has authority to control water quality. Should a

particular discharge from a point source, or the collective

impact of a group of point sources, interfere with the attain-

ment of that level of water quality necessary to protect a broad

spectrum of potential uses, including protection of fish and

other wildlife, the Administrator may impose stricter standards

than those otherwise mandated. 33 U.S.C. 1312(a). However,

stricter standards may not be imposed under this authority if a

person affected by the proposed limitation demonstrates that

there is no “reasonable relationship between the economic and

social costs and the benefits to be achieved.” 33 U.S.C.

1312(b)(2).

The Administrator has been given powers supplementary to

those given in 33 U.S.C. 1312 over discharges into the oceans.

The Administrator is authorized to promulgate guidelines for

the degradation of the waters of the territorial seas, the

contiguous zone, and the oceans. 33 U.S.C. 1343. All dis-

charges must be made in compliance with the guidelines, which

take into account a broad array of environmental factors. See

45 Fed. Reg. 65942-54 (1980).

States are allowed to impose more stringent controls than

those imposed by federal authorities by either of two means.

First, States have blanket authority under federal law to impose

stricter effluent limitations on point sources within their juris-

diction than those imposed by the federal authorities.’ 33

U.S.C. 1370. See Environmental Protection Agency v. Califor-

nia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200,

218 (1976). Second, States may adopt overall water quality

3 One exception is that facilities built after 1972 in conformity with

applicable performance standards are given a grace period of up to ten

years. 33 U.S.C. 1316(d). See also 33 U.S.C. 1322(f) (marine sanitation

devices).

5

standards which may require a source to meet stricter effluent

limitations than federal technology-based limitations.‘ 33

U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C). No cost benefit analysis is required for a

State’s imposition of stricter effluent limitations.

tates are mandated to develop, subject to the

Administrator’s approval, water quality standards which cover

both intrastate and interstate waters. 33 U.S.C. 1313.° Since

these water quality standards must be reflected in any discharge

permit, 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C), including a permit for a point

source affecting the waters of a neighboring State, 33 U.S.C.

1341 (a)(2), the individual States are given a means of protect-

ing their waters from sources of out-of-state pollution. Out-of-

state discharges incompatible with another state’s water quality

standards must be controlled by the regulatory authority issu-

ing the permit to reflect the receiving state’s water quality

standards. Jd. The applicant for any discharge permit must

certify that the discharge will comply with applicable effluent

limitations and state water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. 1341

(a)(1).

All interested parties, including a State whose water quality

standards may be affected by a discharge, are entitled to notice

and an opportunity for a hearing regarding the issuance of a

permit. See Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 48 U.S.L.W.

4243, No. 78-1472 (March 17, 1980); 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1),

1342(a)(1), (b)(3)-(b)(5), (j); 40 C.F.R. Parts 124-125; 45 Fed.

Reg. 3384 ef seq. (1980). An affected State may submit written

recommendations to the Administratcr or, if a State is adminis-

tering the discharge permits, to the permitting State. If the

permitting State does not accept the recommendations, it must

4 See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d $22, 830 (7th Cir.

1977).

5 The Interstate Sanitation Commission, a tri-state agency created

pursuant to an agreement among New York, New Jersey and Connect-

icut to cope with pollution of New York Harbor and adjacent coastal

waters pursuant to an interstate compact, see 49 Stat. 932, has

esiablished water quality standards for coastal waters within its juris-

diction.

6

notify the affected State and the Administrator of its reasons.

33 U.S.C. 1342(b)(5). Thereafter the Administrator may refuse

to approve the permit, in which case the permit may not be

issued. 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1342(d)(2).

Compliance with a permit is deemed compliance with speci-

fied sections of the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1342(k). Most relevant here

is that the sections specified in section 1342(k) include 33

U.S.C. 1311 and 1343—the sections which require permits to

reflect effluent limitations necessary to protect state water

quality standards and the federal guidelines for the degradation

of the oceans. Hence compliance with a permit is deemed

compliance with both those specific statutory sections limiting

discharges of pollutants and with the water quality standards

imposed by either the discharger’s home State, any other State,

or the federal government.

C. Regulatory Scheme of the Marine Protection Act.

Prior to the enactment of the Marine Protection Act,* the

United States had no comprehensive law controlling the ocean

disposal of wastes.’ The Marine Protection Act, enacted in

response to increasing concerns regarding unregulated dump-

ing,* established a single, uniform regulatory scheme regarding

6 The Marine Protection Act refers to the Marine Protection, Research

and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 95-532, 86 Stat. 1052, as

amended by Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50 and Pub. L. No. 95-153,

91 Stat. 1255, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1401-1444.

7 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, 33 U.S.C. § 407,

and the Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 209, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 441-451(b), authorized the Corps of Engineers to regulate dumping

within the navigable waters of the United States and beyond the

territorial seas where barges transporting materials for dumping passed

through the ports of New York, Baltimore or Hampton Roads, Vir-

ginia. Other federal statutes regulating the intentional or accidental

discharge of certain materials in ocean waters were even more limited in

scope, and unlike the 1888 and 1899 Acts did not require permits for

ocean disposal.

8 See H.R. Rep. 92-361, 92d Cong. Ist Sess.; S. Rep. No. 92-451, 92d

Cong. Ist Sess.

7

the dumping of material into ocean waters from vessels travel-

ling from the United States, or by any United States vessel, or

by any person if the dumping occurs in the territorial waters of

the United States or the contiguous zone.

The Marine Protection Act regulates the dumping of all

types of materials “to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into

ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect

human health, welfare or amenities, or the marine environ-

ment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities.” 33

U.S.C. 1401(b). Unless authorized by permit “[n]o person shall

transport from the United States . . . any material for the

purposes of dumping it into the ocean.” 33 U.S.C. 1411.

Permits for ocean dumping of dredged material are issued by

the Secretary of the Army through the Corps of Engineers and

permits for dumping of nondredged material, including sewage

sludge, are issued by the Administrator. 33 U.S.C. 1412, 1413.

In no event may dumping permits be issued except where the

Administrator or the Secretary determines that the “dumping

will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,

welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological

systems or economic potentialities.” 33 U.S.C. 1412(a),

1413(a). Nor may a permit be issued which will violate applica-

ble water quality standards 33 U.S.C. 1412(a). The Administra-

tor is required to promulgate criteria for the evaluation of

permit applications for disposal of both dredged and non-

dredged material. 33 U.S.C. 1412(a), 1413(b).

Fed. Reg. 28610. The regulations emphasized the environmen-

tal acceptability of ocean disposal of the wastes in question,

focusing primarily on their physical and chemical characteris-

tics. See 40 C.F.R. Part 227, as published at 38 Fed. Reg.

28618.

The regulations established several categories of permits.

Material that complied with the Part 227 numerical criteria

could qualify for a “special” three-year dumping permit. 40

C.F.R. 220.3(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 28614. Where the material could

8

not satisfy Part 227 limitations, but the applicant could show a

need to dump and lack of alternatives which outweighed

temporary or permanent environmental impacts, the regula-

tions authorized the Administrator to issue an “interim” permit

for a term of not more than one year. 40 C.F.R. 220.3(d), 38

Fed. Reg. 28614. Sites for dumping were designated in the

individual permits. 40 C.F.R. 223.1(d); 38 Fed. Reg. 28616.

Wastes which could present a hazard to fishing were to be

disposed of at sites precluding such an interference. 40 C.ER.

227.32; 38 Fed. Reg. 28619.

In 1977 the Administrator promulgated revisions to the

regulations. 42 Fed. Reg. 2462 (1977). These revisions were

prompted in part by ratification of the International Conven-

tion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of

Wastes and Other Matter, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.°

The revised regulations refined the criteria for determining

environmental acceptability. Instead of relying chiefly on a

simple description of the constituents of the material, the

regulations require bioassay tests to determine the actual effects

of the material on exposed marine organisms. See 40 C.ER.

9 In the fall of 1972, an intergovernmental conference held in London

adopted the Convention. At that time the United States signed the

Convention; and on August 3, 1973, the Senate gave its advice and

consent. The Convention was drafted

to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of wastes and

other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to

harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to

interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

Convention, Article I.

The Convention prohibits ocean disposal of materials containing

certain enumerated substances except under specified conditions. Con-

vention, Annex I. The Convention also requires that special care be

taken in the ocean disposal of certain other specified chemicals and

materials which are likely to pose obstacles to navigation. Convention,

Annex II.

On March 2%, 1974, Congress amended the Act to incorporate into

domestic law those features of the Convention which were not then

included in the basic statute. Public Law 93-254. 88 Stat. 50. That

amendment became effective on August 30, 1975.

9

Part 227, Subpart B. In addition, the 1977 regulations added

more specific provisions for assessing the need for the dump-

ing, 40 C.F.R. Part 227, Subpart C, and provided new require-

ments regarding the significance of the need factor. Interim

permits are available for the dumping of materials which do

not comport with certain environmental impact criteria if

specified prohibited materials are present only as trace ele-

ments, and if the need for dumping outweighs its environmen-

tal impact on potential other uses of the ocean. 40 C.F.R.

227.3.

Specific sites for the dumping of material, based on histori-

cal locations, were designated. The dumping of municipal

sewage sludge was continued at a location approximately

twelve miles from the shore. See 40 C.F.R. 228.12.

The Act was amended in 1978 to mandate the cessation of

municipal sewage sludge dumping by the end of 1981. Sewage

sludge was defined as that sludge which unreasonably degrades

the environment. 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1412a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

(1)

The Clean Water and Marine Protection Acts each contain

an express provision authorizing any citizen or person to sue

“on his own behalf” to compel enforcement of the respective

statutes. The express remedies apply both to persons specially

injured and to those suing simply as private attorneys general;

the express remedies are the exclusive means to redress viola-

tions of the Acts.

The legislative history of the Clean Water Act, and the

legislative history of the Clean Air Act, on which the express

remedy was modeled, evidence a clear legislative intent to

preclude development of court-defined standards of reasonable

levels of water and air quality, or other court-developed reme-

dies beyond those explicitly authorized. Congress deliberately

10

chose not to create a damage remedy for violation of these

statutes. Damages, if available, may be sought only under State

law which is the traditional source of such a common law

entitlement. Creation of an implied right of action for damages

would be to create a remedy which Congress explicitly and

intentionally rejected.

(2)

There are explicit holdings by this Court that federal courts

have no jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims brought

by private parties regarding nuisances occurring in navigable

waters. While this Court has original jurisdiction under the

Constitution to adjudicate cases in which a State alleges that

the acts of another State, or acts of citizens in another State,

are interfering with its quasi-soverign interests, and the federal

district courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 to

adjudicate these cases, the federal common law applied in these

disputes may not be asserted by private parties. Neither the

Constitution nor any statute authorizes actions by private

parties to seek redress of int state pollution under a federal

common law.

Analysis of the statutes and treaties governing the jurisdic-

tion and powers of the United States in the oceans adjacent to

its territorial waters demonstrates that Congress has not as-

serted sovereignty over these waters. An assertion of sov-

ereignty is a prerequisite to the development of a common law

determining competing property rights. Congress has carefully

defined those public and private rights it wishes recognized in

the ocean waters. These rights do not include a common law

available to private parties. Congress has expressed its sov-

ereign interest in the oceans adjacent to the United States in the

muititude of statutes it has passed regulating conduct in the

area; the legislative and political judgment of Congress should

not be supplemented by a court-developed common law of

legal duties and liabilities.

11

(3)

Congress has authorized the United States Environmental

Protection Agency to promulgate minimum discharge limita-

tions and water quality standards for the territorial seas of the

United States and the adjacent oceans. Congress has further

mandated that States adopt their own water quality standards

which are included by reference into federal discharge and

dumping permits. These statutory provisions—and particularly

the federally enforceable state water quality standards—have

given States a means of protecting their waters from sources of

out-of-state pollution. The need for development of a federal

common law identified in J/linois v. City of Milwaukee, 304

U.S. 64 (1972), has been satisfied by a statutory mechanism.

Moreover, state and federal discharge limitations and water

quality standards have been promulgated which in and of

themselves preempt common law standards. Should these stan-

dards be violated and damages result, state common law

affords redress.

POINT I

THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL STATUTES HERE

IN ISSUE CONTAIN EXPLICIT STATUTORY REME-

DIES WHICH DEFINE CITIZEN RIGHTS. NO OTHER

REMEDIES CAN BE IMPLIED.

The City of New York generally concurs with the arguments

submitted by the Solicitor General of the United States in the

Environmental Protection Agency’s petition for certiorari re-

garding the question as to whether the statutes in issue can be

construed to contain implied rights of action. We rely on the

position set forth in that petition, and submit only the follow-

ing additional observations:

1. The Court of Appeals concluded that the citizen suit

provisions of the two statutes, and their concomitant prerequi-

sites to suit, applied only to those plaintiffs who have no

12

personal stake in the lawsuit under traditional standing doc-

trines and not to those who allege special injury. This conclu-

sion has no basis in the statutory language. The Clean Water

Act provision provides that, subject to the notice requirement,

“any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf.”

33 U.S.C. 1365(a). The Marine Protection Act is identical

except for the use of the word “person” in place of “citizen.”

33 U.S.C. 1415(g). A person suing “on his own behalf” surely

includes a person who has been specially injured.

2. A common sense reading of the savings clause does not

support the inference that Congress intended to “preserve” an

unexpressed remedy available to private parties alleging special

injury. The savings clause preserves concurrent remedies—it

neither grants rights or remedies, nor acknowledges their exist-

ence under federal law. Compare Chapman v. Houston

Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (42

U.S.C. 1983 is an authorizing statute); see City of Evansville,

Indiana v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Corp., 604 F.2d 1008,

1014 (7th Cir. 1979) (savings clause of Clean Water Act creates

no rights); see also CETA Workers’ Organizing Committee v.

City of New York, 617 F.2d 926 (2nd Cir. 1980) (savings clause

of Comprehensive Employment and Training Act lends no

support to inference of Congressional intent that implied right

of action existed concurrently with express right).

3. The legislative history of the citizen suit provision of the

Clean Water Act demonstrates that it was modeled on a parallel

provision in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. A

Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1972, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (Comm. Print 1973)

(hereafter “Leg. Hist.”) 1497. A review of the legislative

history of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act

demonstrates an unequivocal intent of Congress not to save

“implied remedies” under the Clean Air Act itself or to

authorize a damage remedy for statutory violations.

In the original Senate version of the Clean Air Act amend-

ments, from which the citizen suit provision was derived, the

13

savings clause itself referred to saving rights “under other law.”

S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. p. 123; see also p.

39. Although the word “other” was dropped in the House

Senate Conference, the conference report still described the

savings clause of the Clean Air Act as preserving “[o]ther rights

to seek enforcement of standards under other provision [sic] of

law.” Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 304

(1971). Hence there appears to be no significance to the

omission of the word “other” from the final bill.

The legislative history of the Clean Air Act also demon-

strates an explicit intent not to create a damage remedy which

the Court of Appeals has authorized in its decision below. The

Senate Report describes the citizen suit provision thus:

The section [304] does not, however, affect in any way

whatever remedies such citizens or class of citizens might

have under statutory or other law, nor does it provide for

damage or nuisance actions. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, supra

at 65.

This same point is reiterated in the Senate Report several times

(“Section 304 would not substitute a ‘common law’ or court

developed definition of air quality,” id. at 36; “[t]here would be

no jurisdictional amount required in section 304 nor is there

any provision for the recovery of property or personal dam-

ages,” id. at 38.

The only significant modification between the citizen provi-

sions of the Clean Water Act and those of the Clean Air Act is

that the Clean Water Act permits the courts to impose civil

penalties in citizen suits. In this regard the Senate Report on

the Clean Water Act emphasizes that the penalties are not

available as damages to the citizen plaintiff:

It should be noted that any penalties imposed would be

deposited as miscellaneous receipts and not be recovered

by the complainant. 2 Leg. Hist. 1497.

I+

Hence the argument that an implied common law or other right

of action for damages to fill in the “interstices” of this statute

does not comport with the legislative history. This interstice was

intentional.

4. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), this Court

identified four factors for ascertaining whether a private right

of action may be implied in a statute. The first three factors

provide a means for ascertaining legislative intent, which we

have discussed above. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

U.S. 560, 575-576 (1979). The fourth Cort factor is whether the

- matter is one that has traditionally been relegated to State law,

and whether a federal remedy is appropriate. As is set forth

more fully in Points II and III infra, common law rights in

navigable waters are matters traditionally relegated to State

law. The interstate and international character of the oceans do

not ipso facto call for the creation of a federal common law

remedy. The federal courts have no non-statutory authority to

enforce common law rights, even in “federal territories.” See

cases cited at p. 28 infra. Congress has expressed the national

concern with ocean pollution in a complex array of statutes,

none of which authorizes, explicitly or implicitly, development

of a federal common law.

In the nation’s territorial waters, Congress has evidenced no

intent to oust the States from their traditional role as being the

primary source of legal rights and duties. The Clean Water Act

supplies a federal remedy to what is essentially a State problem.

Under the Acct it is the States which establish the water quality

standards with which all discharges of pollution must comply.

33 U.S.C. 1313; 1311(b)(1)(C). The statute states that it “is the

policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the

primary responsibility and rights of States to prevent, reduce

and eliminate pollution. . . .” 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1251(b). It

cannot be argued that Congress has expressed a desire to oust

State law and apply uniform federal rights and duties. Com-

pare Textile Workers’ Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353

U.S. 448 (1957).

15

In the Marine Protection Act, Congress has either incorpo-

rated applicable State water quality standards by reference or

authorized federal officials to develop surrogate standards for

ocean waters outside the jurisdiction of the coastal States.

Implied property rights have no place in the scheme of the

statute or under the statutory and international law which

govern the high seas.

POINT II

CONGRESS HAS DETERMINED THAT STATE COM-

MON LAW, NOT FEDERAL, IS TO PROVIDE THE

RULE OF DECISION FOR TORTS OCCURRING IN

THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE UNITED

STATES AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD

NOT ASSERT GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER

OCEAN WATERS ADJACENT TO TERRITORIAL WA-

TERS. NO BASIS EXISTS FOR THE CREATION OF A

FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE CLAIM FOR

OCEAN POLLUTION ASSERTABLE BY PRIVATE

PARTIES.

Although pollution flows freely from international waters

into territorial waters and vice-versa, federal statutes and in-

ternational law treat differently those activities occurring

within the nation’s territorial waters and those occurring out-

side them. The legal analysis set forth below follows this

distinction and the two geographical areas are treated sepa-

rately.

A. Federal Common Law In State Territorial Waters

In the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315,

Congress provided that the individual States would exercise

jurisdiction over the lands and waters lying three miles seaward

of the coastline. 43 U.S.C. 1311. Hence whatever rule is

applicable to the nation’s internal waterways applies to ocean

pollution in the three mile ocean belt. We will show below that

16

it has long been established that no federal common law

nuisance action is maintainable by private parties for pollution

occurring in the nation’s internal waters.

In Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888),

this Court held that a private citizen could not challenge a

nuisance in a navigable waterway under the “federal common

law.” In Willamette a property owner sued to prevent the

construction of a bridge which would have impeded boat access

to his property which bordered a navigable waterway. This

Court dismissed the suit, stating:

The power of Congress to pass laws for the regulation of

the navigation of public rivers, and to prevent any and all

obstructions therein, is not questioned. But until it does

pass some such law, there is no common law of the United

States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navi-

gable rivers, unless it be the maritime law, administered by

the courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. No

precedent, however, exists for the enforcement of any

such law. . . . Such obstructions and nuisances are of-

fenses against the laws of the States within which the

navigable waters lie, and may be indicated or prohibited

as such; but they are not offenses against United States

laws which do not exist; and none such exist except what

are to be found on the statute book. 125 U.S. at 8.

While Willamette concerned an intrastate bridge, the Court

made it clear that it was the private character of the parties and

the non-sovereign interests they represented which precluded

relief under federal common law or maritime law. The Court

noted (at 125 U.S. 13-14) that if this nuisance interfered with

the operations of the federal government, it would indeed have

been actionable.

Willamette Iron Bridge was one of a long series of cases

denying private parties the right to challenge under federal

common law bridges or other obstructions of navigable water-

ways. See cases cited in Willamette at 125 U.S. 8-9; see also

17

Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540, 542-43 (1919)

(holder of land under state tidal waters had no federal claim

relating to damages sustained to fishing business by municipal

discharge of sewage into those waters). The decision reflected

the well-settled view that in the federai system the States were

the proper entities to define primary legal obligations among

private parties asserting conflicting rights. As stated in Gilman

v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 713, 729 (1865), cited in

Willamette Iron Bridge:

It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations

which belong to the subject [of determining whether

bridge traffic or river traffic shall have priority]. The

States have always exercised this power, and from the

nature and objects of the two systems of government they

must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in

all cases to the paramount authority of Congress [over

commerce].

Gilman and the other cases relied upon in Willamette are part

of a settled federal judicial tradition that, in the absence of

Congressional action, there is no federal common law to

protect the property rights of citizens either civilly (see

Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591, 658 (1834) (author

who had not complied with federal copyright statute had no

federal common law right protecting his works from reproduc-

tion)) or criminally (see United States v. Hudson, 7 Crarch (11

U.S.) 32 (1812); United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.)

415 (1816) (federal courts have no jurisdiction over common

law crimes)).'° These rights are defined and protected by State

law.

The principles applied in Wheaton v. Peters, supra, are

particularly appropriate to the present action. There the plain-

10 See generally Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of

1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 73 (1923); Bator, Mishkin, Shapiro,

Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal

System (2nd ed. 1973) 1262-65.

18

tiff sought the protection of federal common law to prevent

unfair competition from another publisher who was printing

copies of court decisions which the plaintiff had compiled. The

plaintiff in Wheaton v. Peters, like the plaintiffs in the case at

bar, had not complied with the statutory prerequisites to assert

a claim under the federal copyright statutes. Even though the

Constitution gave Congress the power to enact laws for the

protection of authors’ works, the Court refused to fashion a

federal common law remedy and instead looked to Pennsylva-

nia law to ascertain the plaintiff’s rights.

The perspective of Wheaton v. Peters and Willamette Iron

Bridge that state law is the basic source of property rights in the

federal system has not changed in spite of the increasingly

frequent use of Congressional power to determine the conduct

of persons whose activities affect commerce. Unless Congress

has otherwise acted, it is state common law, not federal, which

defines property rights and supplies the rules of conduct even

for parties engaged in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Miree v.

DeKaib County, 433 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1977); Wallis v. Pan

American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Erie Railroad

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); cf. Perry v. Sinderman,

408 U.S. 593, 604 (1972).

Congress’s response to the decision in Willamette Iron

Bridge was the enactment of the predecessor statute to section

10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 403.'' See

generally United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical

Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 663 (1973); United States v. Republic

Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 488 (1960). No private rights were

created. Both in the original enactment and in the later codifi-

cations enforcement is limited by its terms to actions brought

by the United States Attorneys. 25 Stat. 425; 23 U.S.C. 413.

See Red Star Towing & Transportation Co. .. Dept. of Trans-

portation, 423 F.2d 104, 105 (3rd Cir. 1970); Connecticut

1! The original enactment was Act cf August 11, 1888, c. 860, § 9, 25

Stat. 424, and provided for the removal of obstructions at the demand

of the Secretary of War.

19

Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 90 n.16

(2nd Cir. 1972); Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F.

Supp. 1140, 1147 (N.D. Ala. 1971).

Congress’s refusal to create private rights when it responded

to Willamette Iron Bridge should not be overruled by creation

of the very common law right rejected in Willamette. Certainly

such private federal rights cannot be based upon the decision in

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), relied upon

by the court of appeals in the instant case. Illinois v. Milwau-

kee held that “federal common law” would be applied to

determine the rights of a plaintiff State which claimed that

citizens of another State were unreasonably polluting interstate

waters. The Court reasoned that this common law was a “law”

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1331—hence the claim “arose

under” federal law and was cognizable in the District Courts.

All of the cases relied upon in J/linois v. Milwaukee support-

ing the proposition that the federal common law was a “law”

for adjudicating disputes under 28 U.S.C. 1331 involved claims

by a State that its sovereign interests were being infringed upon

by activities of persons in another State. In J/linois this Court

quoted extensively from Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206

U.S. 230, 237 (1907), where the necessity behind development

of a federal common law of nuisance was enunciated—that in

the absence of statutory rules, a forum given authority to

peacefuily adjudicate disputes between formerly sovereign

states must develop rules of decision to decide the competing

claims.

The power given to the district courts in J/linois v. Milwau-

kee to adjudicate controversies under the federal common law

is derivative from, and no greater than, the Supreme Court’s

power to adjudicate disputes in which a State is a party

plaintiff. That power does not extend to private parties unless

the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to adjudicate claims

in which a State is a party plaintiff extends to claims brought

by private parties asserting their sovereign’s claims. But clearly

it does not. This Court has refused to allow intervention by

“

20

parties raising claims under a theory that they had cognizable

interests their sovereigns did not represent. See, e.g., New

Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953); Kentucky v.

Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 171 (1930). Compare Darling v. City of

Newport News, supra, 249 U.S. 540 (1919) with Georgia v.

Tennessee Copper, supra, 206 U.S. 230 (1907). Similarly, this

Court has not permitted its original jurisdiction to be invoked

even by a State to assert or protect the individual rights of its

citizens. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660,

665 (1976); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).

The plaintiff must be a State and the dispute must involve an

allegation of infringement of the State’s sovereign interests in

order for Illinois v. Milwaukee to apply.'?

The common law applied in cases brought by a State under

28 U.S.C. 1331 reflects the entitlement the Constitution grants

States not to have their sovereignty unreasonably infringed. As

stated in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907), “through

these successive disputes and decisions the Court was practi-

cally building up what may not improperly be called interstate

common law.” This law has no counterpart in the common law

applied in the courts of the individual States to adjudicate

disputes among private parties. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.

496, 520 (1906). Hence the fact that some common law juris-

dictions grant a right of action to private parties (such as

fishermen) who allege “special injury” from torts categorized

as public nuisances'’ has no persuasive value here. The logic of

———e

12 Hence, the statement in footnote 6 in /ilinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S.

at 105, that “it is not only the character of the parties that requires us

to apply federal law,” did not mean that the problem of interstate

pollution atone would support federal question jurisdiction, but that

the presence of States as parties in conjunction with a claim of

interstate pollution would warrant such a suit. Footnote 6 cites, inter

alia, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1988)—a case

(and page) standing for the proposition that the Supreme Court’s

original jurisdiction does not extend to monetary claims brought by a

State against a citizen of another State.

13 See Prosser, Private Action For Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997,

1013-1014 (1966); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.

1974).

21

the rules of decision applied in suits between sovereign states

has a different basis from that applied in traditional common

law suits. As stated in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146

(1902):

Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a

domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and

international law as the exigencies of the case may de-

mand.

See also Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670

(1931); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923).

See generally, Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United

States Supreme Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 680-85 (1959).'*

And principles of international law do not permit individuals

the right to assert their sovereign’s rights in a nuisance action.

W. Bishop, Jnternational Law 463 (3d ed. 1971).

Nor does the interstate nature of pollution in the territorial

seas mandate the creation of a federal common law to deter-

mine the rights of competing users of these waters. All inter-

state commerce has interstate consequences. Yet Congress has

not deemed it necessary that torts occurring in the stream of

commerce—nor even those arising from the operation of inter-

state carriers—be governed by a uniform body of federal tort

law. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra.

A lawsuit brought under state law is an available remedy to

an individual unable to persuade his State that a suit under

federal common law is necessary to protect its sovereign in-

14 _—_ Indeed to rule that federal common law authorizes individuals to

bring federal common law nuisance actions on the basis of Jilinois v.

Milwaukee would be, as Professor Currie has noted, bootstrapping:

In one respect Milwaukee goes beyond even Swift v. Tyson, for in

Swift it was possible to argue that the powers to create federal law

was implicit in the grant of diversity jurisdiction, while in Milwau-

kee the District Courts’ jurisdiction existed only if there was federal

common law.

Currie, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials (2nd ed. 1974) 882.

22

terests in the territorial seas. State law is competent to cope

with water pollution (or indeed any other tort) originating in

another State or on the high seas affecting an individual’s

property. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,

411 U.S. 325 (1973) (upholding the validity of a Florida statute

imposing strict liability for damages resulting from an oil spill

by any ship destined for or leaving a Florida oil transfer

Station). Either federally mandated pollution limitations—

which incorporate state water quality standards (see Point III,

infra)—will govern the determination of what is reasonable

conduct, or conflicts principles will determine whether the law

of the State in which the injury occurs, or the law of the

jurisdiction in which the pollution Originates, governs the

action. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493,

498-99 n.3 (1971). And the commerce clause will prevent States

from imposing unreasonable water quality standards on their

neighbors.

While the federal courts have developed non-statutory rules

of decision in areas where adjudication of disputes in which the

sovereign interests of the States have not been implicated—-see

generally, Friendly, J., In Praise of Erie—and of the New

Federal Common Law, 39 New York Univ. L. Rev. 383

(1964)—these holdings will not support creation of a federal

common law nuisance action for ocean pollution brought by

private parties under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The courts have applied

federal common law rules of decision either by explicit direc-

tion from Congress (see, e.g., D’Oench Dukne & Co. v.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 467-75 (1942) (Jack-

son, J., concurring)), or because the federal courts had been

granted specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the particular dispute

and the subject matter was so suffused with federal policy that

only a uniform federal rule would effectuate national policy.

See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363

(1943); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S.

448 (1957). Federal jurisdiction did not exist in these cases

because federal common law supplied the rule of decision;

common law was applied because jurisdiction otherwise existed

23

and there was a necessity to fashion uniform federal rules to fill

in the interstices of a federal statutory program. One commen-

tator has stated the rule as follows:

Thus, we see that, even though there may be no common

law as a source of jurisdiction in the federal courts, there

can nevertheless exist, as a means of exercising jurisdic-

tion already conferred, a federal common law in the sense

of a body of non-statutory rules independently announced

and administered by those tribunals.

Von Moschzisker, R., Common Law and Our Federal Jurispru-

. dence, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 109, 270, 367 at 117 (1925).

Even when federal policies are paramount, if a federal

entitlement or liability cannot fairly be said to have been clearly

implied by Congress, this Court has denied the existence of a

federal remedy. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of

California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947); where the Court refused to

create a common law right in the United States for the medical

expenses it incurred in treating a soldier run over by a negli-

gently driven truck. See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 USS.

647 (1965). And, as we demonstrated in Point I, supra, Con-

gress evidenced no intent to create private federal entitlements

or liabilities in the field of water pollution.

B. Federal Common Law Outside the Territerial Waters of

the United States

The first general assertion of United States jurisdiction over

the geographical area beyond the three-mile limit was President

Truman’s proclamation of September 28, 1945 (Exec. Proc

2667, 59 Stat. 884). The proclamation cited general United

States dominion and power over the mineral resources of the

outer continental shelf, and also affirmed the waters above the

shelf as high seas. The extent of federal control in the three-

mile belt of the outer continental shelf adjacent to the coasts

was delineated in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19

(1947). This Court decreed that federal dominion included

oa

control over the lands and minerals underlying the ocean

waters. The Court outlined the history of federal legislative and

executive pronouncements in the area,'* 332 U.S. at 33-37, and

held that the assertion of national dominion by the executive

and legislative branches of government over any particular

territory was binding on United States courts.

In response to this decision and the need to demarcate

property rights in the outer continental shelf, Congress in 1953

passed two statutes which set forth the basic legal framework

for the governance of activities in this geographical area: The

Submerged Lands Act of 1953, supra, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315;

and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.

(1976) 1331-1343, 67 Stat. 462-470, as amended by Pub. L. 95-

372, Title II, 92 Stat. 632 (1978), 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1331-

1356. These two statutes may be described as “constitutional”

in that they (and applicable treaties) provide the basic legal

framework for the scope of American jurisdiction in the outer

continental shelf and the waters over the shelf.

As noted above, the Submerged Lands Act granted the

respective coastal states jurisdiction and management of the

lands and natural resources in the waters of the three-mile belt

adjacent to their shores. 43 U.S.C. 1311(a). State law was

provided as the applicable law of these areas. In the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act, however, Congress took a dif-

ferent approach, and carefully preserved the character of the

waters seaward of the States’ territorial waters as high seas.

Congress provided that the subsoil and seabed of the shelf were

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 43 U.S.C.

(1976) 1332(a), and that the civil and criminal laws of the

respective adjacent States—except as preempted by Congress—

would apply to the subsoil, seabed, and the artificia! islands

and structures built thereon. 43 U.S.C. (1976) 17} %«).'* But

15 See also Heinzen, The Three Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of

the Seas, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 597, 613-629, esp. at notes 112-114 (1959).

16 = The state law applied is a species of “federal common law.” See

Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 342 (1969).

25

Congress explicitly provided that the waters over the seabed

were outside the jurisdiction asserted. 43 U.S.C. (1976)

1332(b). This provision was included to make “abundantly

clear the unequivocal legislative intent” that the jurisdiction

asserted was “horizontal jurisdiction” and did not affect the

status of the superadjacent waters as international waters. Sen.

Rep. No. 411, 83rd Cong., Ist Sess., at 2 (1953).'’ Parallel

provisions were enacted in extensive 1978 amendments. See 43

U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1332 subd. (1) and (2); 1333(a).

The federal district courts were given jurisdiction over cases

and controversies arising from the development of natural

resources of the subsoil and seabeds. 43 U.S.C. (1976) 1333(b).

A similar provision was reenacted in the 1978 amendments to

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. ID)

1349(b)(1). In addition, the 1978 amendments contain a citizen

suit provision authorizing any person “having a valid legal

interest” to institute an action to compel compliance with the

Act. 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1349(a)(1). The amendments also

authorize “any resident of the United States who is injured in

any manner” through the failure of an offshore mineral opera-

tor to comply with any requirement of the subchapter to bring

a civil action for damages.'* 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1349(b)(2).

The 1978 amendments again reasserted the character of these

waters as high seas. 43 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 1332(2).

These statutory provisions clearly indicate that Congress has

not asserted general jurisdiction over conduct on the high seas

contiguous to United States territorial waters. The district

courts were not even given general jurisdiction over all cases

arising in the geographical area: specific types of cases were

enumerated. These statutes do not impliedly authorize creation

of a general common law applicable to the seas. See generally

17 See Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a

New Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 2334 (1953).

18 The legislative history of these amendments is set forth at 1978 U.S.

Code Cong. & Adm. News 1450; these specific provisions are detailed

at pp. 1566-1568, 1679-80; and 1710-13.

26

Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d

330 (Sth Cir. 1978) (holding that under the Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act the federal government has asserted general

jurisdiction over minerals, but not general sovereignty over the

area). Congress has carefully crafted the private rights it wishes

to create and protect in this area, and has stated explicitly the

legal interests it wishes to protect. A right of action has been

given for damages arising from mineral exploration activities in

violation of federal law; state law applies to determining other

rights flowing from mineral expioration; but no general right to

be free from ocean pollution has been authorized. Expressio

unius.

Any doubt as to the intent of Congress in not asserting

territorial powers over these areas is resolved by the provisions

of two treaties'® to which the United States is a signatory. The

first of the treaties to become effective was the Convention on

the High Seas (T.1.A.S. 5200, [1962] 13 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 2313),

which became effective on September 30, 1962. It provides

(Article 2) that no nation may assert sovereignty outside its

territorial waters except in limited instances not relevant here.”°

See generally United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 n.26

(1969).

The second convention to become effective was the Conven-

tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (T.1.A.S.

No. 5639, [1964] 15 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1607). This Convention

provides for national sovereignty over the “territorial seas”

(Article 1) (without defining territorial seas), and provides for a

“contiguous zone” of limited national sovereignty (Article 24),

The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from

the landward edge of the nation’s territorial waters. The coasta’

nation may exercise that control of activities in the contiguoux

19 A third treaty which regulates ocean dumping is described at p. 8,

supra.

20 Article 22 (piracy); Article 23 (hot pursuit of ships believed to have

violated laws in nation’s territorial waters).

27

zone necessary for preventing infringement of “customs, fiscal,

immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or

territorial sea.” Jd.

Although these conventions do not impair Congressional

authority to regulate pollution emanating from American

sources on the high seas, and although they do not impair

Congressional authority to regulate pollution-related activities

of foreign nationals in the contiguous zone which affect this

country’s interests, any general expression of national sov-

ereignty in the contiguous zone is inconsistent with them. An

assertion by the courts of one nation to regulate conduct in any

particular geographical area has traditionally been viewed as an

expression of sovereignty. Cf. United States v. Louisiana,

supra, 394 U.S. 25-27; United States vy. California, 381 U.S.

139, 174-175 (1965).

Moreover, the creation of a United States common law

would have consequences on international law itself, for in-

ternational law is a reflection of the generalized practices of

individual nations. Bishop, Jnternational Law, supra, 30-33;

Schwarzenberger, The Dynamics of International Law 6-7

(1976). Congress should make the ultimate decision as to how

to shape international law in this area.?'

Even apart from the statutes and conventions, we also note

that United States domestic law has traditionally not veen

applied to activities outside the three-mile limit. For example,

in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923),

this Court refused to extend the eighteenth amendment to

domestic merchant ships outside the territorial waters of the

United States. The scope of legislation is “presumptively terri-

torial,” Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918);

United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 (Sth Cir.

1980). So ought to be the federal common law. And even in

21 If federal common law rights assertable by private parties are

authorized, quaere whether Canadian interests could challenge activi-

ties allegedly creating “acid rain.”

28

federal territories a general federal common law has not been

applied. Private rights in areas over which the government has

acquired exclusive federal jurisdiction have been determined

under the principle that, upon cession of territory, the laws

existing at the time of cession remain in force until changed by

the new sovereign. See Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S.

94, 100 (1940); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S.

542, 547 (1885); Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and

the Federal System, supra, p. 17 n.10, at 1268.

Congress has expressed the limited extent of United States

sovereignty over the oceans seaward of the three mile limit in

the numerous regulatory statutes it has passed. These statutes

are listed in the margin.”? The complex interplay among these

22 _In addition to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which provides

for damages arising from oil spills arising from drilling, the Federal

Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. (1970) 1161

authorized the federal government to clean up oil spills from tankers

and imposed strict liability on dischargers within certain limits. These

limits were raised in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act. The

Port and Water Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. (1976) 1221-27, as

amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

II) 1221-27 regulates the navigational devices and rules of ships in and

adjacent to United States waters; the Intervention on the High Seas Act

of 1974, 33 U.S.C. (1976) 1471-87 authorizes federal intervention in

marine catastrophes on the high seas which threaten United States

coastlines or the natural resources of the seas. The Marine Protection

Act, directly involved in this lawsuit, governs the dumping of virtually

any pollutant by a United States vessel under a permit system carefully

weighing all environmental impacts; similariy the Clean Water Act

governs the discharge of all pollutants from all points sources into the

navigable waters. Federal jurisdiction over most living creatures exist-

ing in the fishery conservation zone (a 197 mile belt of water seaward

of the territorial sea) was established in 1976 by the Fishery Conserva-

tion and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. 1811-1813. Marine

mammals and endangered species within the fishery conservation zone

were subjected to federal jurisdiction by the Marine Mammal Protec-

tion Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1362(15), 1372(a), and the Endangered

Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1538(a). The Secretary of Commerce is

authorized by this Act to preempt regulation of fisheries within the

territorial seas, 16 U.S.C. 1856(6), and, to designate marine sanctuaries

for preserving or restoring ocean waters overlying the outer continental

shelf and the Great Lakes. 16 U.S.C. 1432(a). Such a designation

29

statutes is set forth in some detail in Commonwealth of

Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (Ist Cir. 1979). To

provide an overlay of federal common law in this heavily

regulated area would allow parties asserting particular interests

to bypass the political process and the regulatory mechanisms

Congress has set forth. Oil leasing, mineral exploration, dredg-

ing activities et al. could all be enjoined on the grounds that the

federal regulator provided insufficient protection to the

plaintiff’s interests. The City of New York’s sewerage activities

affecting the ocean are all regulated by federal law and re-

spondents may participate in the formulation of regulations

governing them. But Congress has not provided for common

law jurisprudence in this area.

We do not imply that pollution in the high seas affecting a

State’s sovereign interests is beyond the scope of a common law

nuisance action brought by a State, J/linois v. City of Milwau-

kee, supra (unless that common law has been preempted; see

Point III, infra). In addition, pollution reaching state territorial

waters may be subject to the inherent police power of the States

and to the water quality standards they promulgate under the

Clean Water Act. See Askew v. American Waterways Opera-

tors, supra, 411 U.S. 325. Similarly, ocean pollution affecting

the sovereign interests of the United States government may

perhaps be actionable by the government, either pursuant to its

inherent authority to regulate maritime affairs, and interstate

and foreign commerce (see generally New Jersey v. New York

City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)).But as we noted above, the existence

of this right of action in the sovereign does not imply that it is

maintainable by private parties.

severely limits the jurisdiction of either States or other federal agencies.

See generally Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d

872 (ist Cir. 1979). The Secretary has not exercised his authority in the

areas which are the subject of this lawsuit. In the Coastal Zone

Management Act, 16 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. II 1978) 1451-1464,

Congress required the Secretary of Commerce to approve state “coastal

zone management programs” that meet certain requirements. 16

U.S.C. (1976) 1454, 1455. Once a program has been approved, federal

agencies must determine that their activities affecting the state’s coastal

zone are consistent with the program. 16 U.S.C. 1456(1)(1)-(2).

30

POINT III

THE CLEAN WATER AND THE MARINE PROTEC-

TION ACTS PRESENT A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME

FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF LEVELS OF WATER

QUALITY WHICH PROTECT STATE SOVEREIGN IN-

TERESTS AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND

WELFARE. THE STATUTORY SCHEME LEAVES NO

ROOM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW

STANDARDS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF POLLU-

TION OR WATER QUALITY.

Under the Clean Water Act, discharges of pollution into

navigable waters are permitted if they comply with federal and

state effluent limitations and if they do not result in a violation

of either state or federal water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.

1311(b)(1)(C); 1342(k). States have broad discretion in estab-

lishing their water quality standards, and, hence, in determin-

ing what levels of effluent reduction, beyond minimum federal

technology-based limitations, must be employed. 33 U.S.C.

1313. The federal government also has powers over the quality

of marine waters. 33 U.S.C. 1343. See pp. 4-6, supra

The Marine Protection Act authorizes dumping from vessels

only if the Administrator determines that the resulting pollu-

tion will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,

welfare or the marine environment or violate applicable water

quality standards. 33 U.S.C. 1412(a). Under current regula-

tions EPA will not even issue a permit if the applicant fails to

show a need for the dumping and lack of alternative means of

disposal. 40 C.F.R. 227.2(a).

Under this regulatory scheme, there is no room for a federal

common law of nuisance. The gaps and inadequacies of inter-

state pollution law identified in J/linois v. City of Milwaukee,

supra, 406 U.S. 91, as requiring development of federal com-

mon law to adjudicate disputes impinging upon State sov-

ereignty have been dealt with by federal statutes and reguia-

tions. The traditional standards applied in common law public

31

nuisance actions have been transferred from the Courts to

federal and state officials for determination. In saving common

law remedies, Congress did not preclude federal judges from

deferring to agency expertise disputes concerning the proper

method of pollution and control and sewage technology, and

proper standards of water quality.

The Clean Water and Marine Protection Acts provide an

explicit remedy for States to protect themselves from extra-

territorial pollution. A State can determine for itself what level

of water quality it wishes maintained. The Clean Water Act

provides that water quality standards

be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance

the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter.

Such standards shall be established taking into considera-

tion their use and value for public water supplies, propa-

gation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and

agricultural, industrial and other purposes, and also tak-

ing into account their use and value for navigation. 33

U.S.C. 1313(c)(2).

By delegating this broad authority to the States; by mandating

that all discharges and dumping from vessels be such as to

comply with state and federal water quality standards, 33

U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(C) and 1412(a); by mandating that a permit-

tee certify compliance with State standards, 33 U.S.C.

1341(a)(2); and by authorizing State intervention into the

permit issuance process of another State when a receiving

State’s water quality standards may be affected, 32 U.S.C.

1342(b)(3) and (b)(5), Congress has provided a statutory mech-

anism to protect the unprotected sovereign interests identified

in Illinois v. Milwaukee.

The logic to be applied in determining statutory preemption

of federal common law does not differ substantially from the

logic of federal preemption of state police powers. Compare

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) with Ray v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164-165 (1978). The Congressional

32

mandate in both instances represents the supreme sovereign’s

determination of the manner in which members of the public

shall conduct their activities. The legislative standards of con-

duct and water quality incorporated into the federal permits

represent the sovereign police power which is the heart of

public nuisance law. See Prosser, supra, 52 Va. L. Rev. at 997.

The federal permitting procedures implement substantive fed-

eral and state rules developed to achieve the objects of the

federal common law of nuisance. Non-statutory standards are

superseded.

The district courts should not be available, at the behest of

private parties or State legal officers, to grant de novo review

of the judgment of federal and State officials as to the proper

levels of water quality and methods of control in federal

common law nuisance actions. Once federal and State officials

have determined acceptable levels of water quality, once federal

officials have determined that alternatives not be employed

after considering the broad array of Congressionally mandated

criteria, the legislative and political judgments of the responsi-

ble officials should be respected.

We are not arguing here that compliance with federal tech-

nology-based effluent limitations acts in itself as a shield from

damages that state common law imposes upon a polluter.

Rather, we are arguing that compliance with a permit under

these statutes precludes a finding by a federal court under

federal common law that a State’s sovereign interests are being

unreasonably infringed, or that the acts of pollution involved

unreasonably degrade water quality or unreasonably infringe

on public rights. In the Clean Water Act Congress has man-

dated that the States define what level of water quality protects

the public welfare; citizens of those States and citizens of other

States should be bound by the sovereign’s determination. If a

polluter’s actions impose costs on others, the injured party may

seek redress under state common law if it imposes such a

liability, or from his legislature to reduce the amount of

pollution that its officials have deemed acceptable. In the

Marine Protection Act, federal officials have been given

33

authority to define acceptable levels of water quality in the

oceans, and to weigh the need for the dumping in light of its

environmental impact and the availability of alternatives. Pre-

cluding private parties from challenging the official judgment

that, in light of these criteria, a given amount of pollution is

not unreasonable would do no harm to the statutory scheme.

The critical question to be employed in a common law public

nuisance action is determining what conduct constitutes an

“unreasonable” interference with the public’s rights.?? The

discharges involved in the case at hand cannot be deemed

unreasonable either in and of themselves or in light of their

impact. Under the common law no one user of the public’s

rights has priority over others. Pollution from municipal sew-

age treatment operations is not in and of itself unreasonable

because it interferes with fishing. Sewage must be disposed of

in some manner, and if the only known way is to use the

oceans, there is no prima facie tort. See Darling v. City of

Newport News, supra, 249 U.S. 540 (1919); New York v. New

Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); and see cases collected in Moore v.

Hampton Roads Sanitation Commission, 557 F.2d 1030, 1033

(4th Cir. 1977). The question is whether the means chosen are

unreasonable or have an unreasonable impact. But in granting

the city a permit to engage in the challenged conduct, federal

and state officials have determined that the pollution in issue

here is not unreasonable. Their balancing of competing needs

and their judgment as to what are acceptable levels of water

quality are virtually identical to that which would be employed

in the common law tort action. Cf. Forrester v. Consumer

Product Safety Comm’n, 559 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1977);

Aqua Slide ’N’ Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety

Comm’n, 569 F.2d 831, 839 (Sth Cir. 1978).

We do not question the power of Congress to create a

regulatory scheme which delegates to state and federal officials

the authority to determine what levels of water quality would

23 See Prosser, supra p. 20, n.13, 52 Va. L. Rev. at 1003; see also W.

Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), 576-577. .

34

be deemed reasonable and allow, at the same time, for parties

to attempt to persuade federal judges in common law actions

that the officially sanctioned levels of pollution were unreason-

able. But such an approach would be wasteful, duplicative, and

in conflict with traditional notions of deference to the officials

upon whom Congress has placed the responsibility of carrying

oui its will. The regulations which govern ocean pollution

implement a highly complex and technical statute. Every dis-

charge from every point source must have a permit reflecting

applicable regulations. The Administrator is given discretion to

make legislative, policy-type judgments. See Ethyl Corp. v.

E.PA., 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. den. 426 U.S.

941 (1976). If the Administrator determines that elimination of

a given pollutant is not necessary to meet water quality stan-

dards applicable under 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1), or that elimina-

tion of a pollutant is not practicable under 33 U.S.C.

1281(g)(2)(a), his determination reflects the legislative judg-

ment. The absence of a particular control methodology does

not mean an absence of Congressional policy. Traditional

standards of review should not be circumvented by common

law actions that amount to collateral attacks on discretionary

agency decisions.

When Congress protected common law remedies by enacting

a savings clause in the citizen suit provisions of these statutes, it

did not have before it a developed body of federal common law

governing pollution of interstate waters. See Wyandotte Trans-

_ portation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 196, n.5 (1967).

It is not unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to

Save state common law remedies, and not an inchoate body of

federal common law. See Committee for Jones Falls Sewage

System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 n.9 (4th Cir. 1976). See

also pp. 12-13, supra.

35

CONCLUSION

Petitioners City of New York and Beame respectfully request

that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be reversed and that

the case be remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint

herein.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN G. SCHWARTZ

Corporation Counsel

of the City of New York

Attorney for Petitioners

City of New York and Beame

December 4, 1980

LEONARD KOERNER,

STEPHEN P. KRAMER,

of Counsel.

APPENDIX

la

Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,

33 U.S.C. 1401-1412a:

§ 1401. Congressional finding, policy, and declaration of pur-

pose

(a) Unregulated dumping of material into ocean waters en-

dangers human health, welfare, and amenities, and the marine

environment, ecological systems, and economic potentialities.

(b) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United

States to regulate the dumping of all types of materials into

ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into

ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect

human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environ-

ment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities.

(c) It is the purpose of this chapter to regulate (1) the

transportation by any person of material from the United

States and, in the case of United States vessels, aircraft, or

agencies, the transportation of material from a location outside

the United States, when in either case the transportation is for

the purpose of dumping the material into ocean waters, and (2)

the dumping of material transported by any person from a

location outside the United States, if the dumping occurs in the

territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the United States.

§ 1402. Definitions

For the purposes of this chapter the term—

(a) “Administrator” means the Administrator of the En-

vironmental Protection Agency.

(b) “Ocean waters” means those waters of the open seas

lying seaward of the base line from which the territorial sea is

measured, as provided for in the Convention on the Territorial

Sea and the Contiguous Zone (15 UST 1606; TIAS 5639).

2a

(c) “Material” means matter of any kind or description,

including, but not limited to, dredged material, solid waste,

incinerator residue, garbage, sewage, sewage sludge, muni-

tions, radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents,

radioactive materials, chemicals, biological and laboratory

waste, wreck or discarded equipment, rock, sand, excavation

debris, and industrial, municipal, agricultural, and other waste;

but such term does not mean sewage from vessels within the

meaning of section 1322 of this title. Oil within the meaning of

section 1321 of this title shall be included only to the extent

that such oil is taken on board a vessel or aircraft for the

purpose of dumping.

(d) “United States” includes the several States, the District

of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Canal

Zone, the territories and possessions of the United States, and

the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

(e) “Person” means any private person or entity, or any

officer, employee, agent, department, agency, or instrumental-

ity of the Federal Government, of any State or local unit of

government, or of any foreign government.

(f) “Dumping” means a disposition of material: Provided,

That it does not mean a disposition of any effluent from any

outfall structure to the extent that such disposition is regulated

under the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act, as amended under the provisions of section 407 of this

title, or under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, nor does it mean a routine discharge of

effluent incidental to the propulsion of, or operation of motor-

driven equipment on, vessels: Provided further, That it does

not mean the construction of any fixed structure or artificial

island nor the intentional placement of any device in ocean

waters or on or in the submerged land beneath such waters, for

a purpose other than disposal, when such construction or such

placement is otherwise regulated by Federal or State law or

occurs pursuant to an authorized Federal or State program:

And provided further, That it does not include the deposit of

3a

oyster shells, or other materials when such deposit is made for

the purpose of developing, maintaining, or harvesting fisheries

resources and is otherwise regulated by Federal or State law or

occurs pursuant to an authorized Federal or State program.

(g) “District court of the United States” includes the District

Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the

District Court of Puerto Rico, the District Court of the Canal

Zone, and in the case of American Samoa and the Trust

Territory of the Pacific Islands, the District Court of the

United States for the District of Hawaii, which court shall have

jurisdiction over actions arising therein.

(h) “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Army.

(i) “Dredged material” means any material excavated or

dredged from the navigable waters of the United States.

(j) “High-level radioactive waste” means the aqueous waste

resulting from the operation of the first cycle solvent extraction

system, or equivalent, and the concentrated waste from subse-

quent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reproc-

essing irradiated reactor fuels, or irradiated fuel from nuclear

power reactors.

(k) “Transport” or “transportation” refers to the carriage

and related handling of any material by a vessel, or by any

other vehicle, including aircraft.

(1) “Convention” means the Convention on the Prevention

of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.

SUBCHAPTER I—REGULATION

§ 1411. Prohibited acts

(a) Except as may be authorized by a permit issued pursuant

to section 1412 or section 1413 of this title, and subject to

regulations issued pursuant to section 1418 of this title,

4a

(1) no person shall transport from the United States,

and

(2) in the case of a vessel or aircraft registered in the

United States or flying the United States flag or in the case

of a United States department, agency, or instrumentality,

no person shall transport from any location

any material for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters.

(b) Except as may be authorized by a permit issued pursuant

to section 1412 of this title, and subject to regulations issued

pursuant to section 1418 of this title, no person shall dump any

material transported from a location outside the United States

(1) into the territorial sea of the United States, or (2) into a

zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States,

extending to a line twelve nautical miles seaward from the base

line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,

to the extent that it may affect the territorial sea or the territory

of the United States.

§ 1412. Dumping permit program

Environmental Protection Agency permits

(a) Except in relation to dredged material, as provided for in

section 1413 of this title, and in relation to radiological,

chemical, and biological warfare agents and high-level radioac-

tive waste, for which no permit may be issued, the Administra-

tor may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public

hearings, for the transportation from the United States or, in

the case of an agency or instrumentality of the United States,

Or in the case of a vessel or aircraft registered in the United

States or flying the United States flag, for the transportation

from a location outside the United States, of material for the

purpose of dumping it into ocean waters, or for the dumping

of material into the waters described in section 141 1(b) of this

title, where the Administrator determines that such dumping

will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,

Sa

welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological

systems, Or economic potentialities. The Administrator shall

establish and apply criteria for reviewing and evaluating such

permit applications, and, in establishing or revising such crite-

ria, shall consider, but not be limited in his consideration to,

the following:

(A) The need for the proposed dumping.

(B) The effect of such dumping on human health and

welfare, including economic, esthetic, and recreational

values.

(C) The effect of such dumping on fis*eries resources,

plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shore lines and beaches.

(D) The effect of such dumping on marine ecosystems,

particularly with respect to—

(i) the transfer, concentration, and dispersion of

such material and its byproducts through biological,

physical, and chemical processes,

(ii) potential changes in marine ecosystem diver-

sity, productivity, and stability, and

(ili) species and community population dynamics.

(E) The persistence and permanence of the effects of

the dumping.

(F) The effect of dumping particular volumes and con-

centrations of such materials.

(G) Appropriate locations and methods of disposal or

recycling, including land-based alternatives and the proba-

ble impact of requiring use of such alternate locations or

methods upon considerations affecting the public interest.

(H) The effect on alternate uses of oceans, such as

scientific study, fishing, and other living resource exploita-

tion, and nonliving resource exploitation.

6a

(I) In designating recommended sites, the Administra-

tor shall utilize wherever feasible locations beyond the

edge of the Continental Shelf.

In establishing or revising such criteria, the Administrator shall

consult with Federal, State, and local officials, and interested

members of the general public, as may appear appropriate to

the Administrator. With respect to such criteria as may affect

the civil works program of the Department of the Army, the

Administrator shall also consult with the Secretary. In re-

viewing applications for permits, the Administrator shall make

such provision for consultation with interested Federal and

State agencies as he deems useful or necessary. No permit shall

be issued for a dumping of material which will violate applica-

ble water quality standards. To the extent that he may do so

without relaxing the requirements of this subchapter, the Ad-

ministrator, in establishing or revising such criteria, shall apply

the standards and criteria binding upon the United States under

the Convention, including its Annexes.

Permit categories

(b) The Administrator may establish and issue various cate-

gories of permits, including the general permits described in

section 1414(c) of this title.

Sites and times for dumping

(c) The Administrator may, considering the criteria es-

tablished pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, designate

recommended sites or times for dumping and, when he finds it

necessary to protect critical areas, shall, after consultation with

the Secretary, also designate sites or times within which certain

materials may not be dumped.

Fish wastes

(d) No permit is required under this subchapter for the

transportation for dumping or the dumping of fish wastes,

except when deposited in harbors or other protected or en-

7a

closed coastal waters, or where the Administrator finds that

such deposits could endanger health, the environment, or

ecological systems in a specific location. Where the Administra-

tor makes such a finding, such material may be deposited only

as authorized by a permit issued by the Administrator under

this section.

Foreign State permits; acceptance

(e) In the case of transportation of material, by a vessel or

aircraft registered in the United States or flying the United

States flag, from a location in a foreign State Party to the

Convention, a permit issued pursuant to the authority of that

foreign State Party, in accordance with Convention require-

ments, and which otherwise could have been issued pursuant to

subsection (a) of this section, shall be accepted, for the pur-

poses of this subchapter, as if it were issued by the Administra-

tor under the authority of this section.

§ 1412a. Cessation of sewage sludge ocean dumping; “sewage

sludge” defined

(a) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency (hereinafter referred to in this section as the “Adminis-

trator”) shall end the dumping of sewage sludge into ocean

waters, or into waters described in section 1411(b) of this title,

as soon as possible after November 4, 1977, but in no case may

the Administrator issue any permit, or any renewal thereof

(under Title I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanc-

tuaries Act of 1972) which authorizes any such dumping after

December 31, 1981.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term “sewage sludge”

means any solid, semisolid, or liquid waste generated by a

municipal waste-water treatment plant the ocean dumping of

which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human health,

welfare, amenities, or the marine environment, ecological sys-

tems, 9r economic potentialities.

8a

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (Supp.

II) 1332, 1333, and 1349:

§ 1332. Congressional declaration of policy

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that—

(1) the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental

Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its

jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided

in this subchapter;

(2) this subchapter shall be construed in such a manner

that the character of the waters above the outer Continen-

tal Shelf as high seas and the right to navigation and

fishing therein shall not be affected;

(3) the outer Continental Shelf is a vital national re-

source reserve held by the Federal Government for the

public, which should be made available for expeditious

and orderly development, subject to environmental safe-

guards, in a manner which is consistent with the main-

tenance of competition and other national needs;

(4) since exploration, development, and production of

the minerals of the outer Continental Shelf will have

significant impacts on coastal and non-coastal areas of the

coastal States, and on other affected States, and, in

recognition of the national interest in the effective

management of the marine, coastal, and human environ-

ments—

(A) such States and their affected local govern-

ments may require assistance in protecting their

coastal zones and other affected areas from any

temporary or permanent adverse effects of such

impacts; and

(B) such States, and through such States, affected

local governments, are entitled to an opportunity to

participate, to the extent consistent with the national

9a

interest, in the policy and planning decisions made

by the Federal Government relating to exploration

for, and development and production of, minerals of

the outer Continental Shelf;

(5) the rights and responsibilities of all States and,

where appropriate, local governments, to preserve and

protect their marine, human, and coastal environments

through such means as regulation of land, air, and water

uses, of safety, and of related development and activity

should be considered and recognized; and

(6) operations in the outer Continental Shelf should be

conducted in a safe manner by well-trained personnel

using technology, precautions, and techniques sufficient

to prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of

well control, fires, spillages, physical obstruction to other

users of the water or subsoil and seabed, or other occur-

rences which may cause damage to the environment or to

property, or endanger life or health.

§ 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands—Constitution

and United States laws; laws of adjacent States; publication of

projected State lines; international boundary disputes; restric-

tion on State taxation and jurisdiction

(a)(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political

jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and

seabed of the outer Continental Shelf ane to all artificial

islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or

temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected

thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or pro-

ducing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other

device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of trans-

porting such resources, to the same extent as if the outer

Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction

located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases

on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued

only under the provisions of this subchapter.

10a

(2)(A) To the extent that they are applicable and not incon-

sistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and

regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted,

the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State, now in effect

or hereafter adopted, amended, or repealed are declared to be

the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and

seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and

fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the

area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the

outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President

shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such pro-

jected lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All

of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by

the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State

taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.

(B) Within one year after September 18, 1978, the President

shall establish procedures for settling any outstanding interna-

tional boundary dispute respecting the outer Continental Shelf.

(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law

as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a

basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of

any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the

outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources

thereof or the revenues therefrom.

§ 1349. Citizens suits, jurisdiction and judicial review—Persons

who may bring action; persons against whom action may be

brought; time of action; intervention by Attorney General;

costs and fees; security

(a)(1) Except as provided in this section, any person having a

valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected may

commence a civil action on his own behalf to compel com-

pliance with this subchapter against any person, including the

United States, and any other government instrumentality or

agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to

lla

the Constitution) for any alleged violation of any provision of

this subchapter or any regulation promulgated under this

subchapter, or of the terms of any permit or lease issued by the

Secretary under this subchapter.

(2) Except as provided in par*graph (3) of this subsection,

no action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1) of this

section—

(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given

notice of the alleged violation, in writing under oath, to

the Secretary and any other appropriate Federal official,

to the State in which the violation allegedly occurred or is

occurring, and to any alleged violator; or

(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is

diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the

United States or a State with respect to such matter, but in

any such action in a court of the United States any person

having a legal interest which is or may be adversely

affected may intervene as a matter of right.

(3) An action may be brought under this subsection immedi-

ately after notification of the alleged violation in any case in

which the alleged violation constitutes an imminent threat to

the public health or safety or would immediately affect a legal

interest of the plaintiff.

(4) In any action commenced pursuant to this section, the

Attorney General, upon the request of the Secretary or any

other appropriate Federal official, may intervene as a matter of

right.

(5) A court, in issuing any final order in any action brought

pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or subsection (c) of this section,

may award costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney

and expert witness fees, to any party, whenever such court

determines such award is appropriate. The court may, if a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is

sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in a

12a

sufficient amount to compensate for any loss or damage

suffered, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure.

(6) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, all

suits challenging actions or decisions allegedly in violation of,

or seeking enforcement of, the provisions of this subchapter, or

any regulation promulgated under this subchapter, or the terms

of any permit or lease issued by the Secretary under this

subchapter, shall be undertaken in accordance with the proce-

dures described in this subsection. Nothing in this section shall

restrict any right which any person or class of persons may

have under any other Act or common law to seek appropriate

relief.

Jurisdiction and venue of actions

(b)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,

the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of

cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with

(A) any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf

which involves exploration, development, or production of the

minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental

Shelf, or which involves rights to such minerals, or (B) the

cancellation, suspension, or termination of a lease or permit

under this subchapter. Proceedings with respect to any such

case or controversy may be instituted in the judicial district in

which any defendant resides or may be found, or in the judicial

district of the State nearest the place the cause of action arose.

(2) Any resident of the United States who is injured in any

manner through the failure of any operator to comply with any

rule, regulation, order, or permit issued pursuant to this sub-

chapter may bring an action for damages (including reasonable

attorney and expert witness fees) only in the judicial district

having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

l3a

Review of Secretary’s approval of leasing program; review of

approval, modification or disapproval of exploration or

production plan; persons who may seek review; scope of

review; certiorari to Supreme Court

(c)(1) Any action of the Secretary to approve a leasing

program pursuant to section 1344 of this title shall be subject

to judicial review only in the United States Court of Appeal for

the District of Columbia.

(2) Any action of the Secretary to approve, require

modification of, or disapprove any exploration plan or any

development and production plan under this subchapter shall

be subject to judicial review only in a United States court of

appeals for a circuit in which an affected State is located.

(3) The judicial review specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of

this subsection shall be available only to a person who (A)

participated in the administrative proceedings related to the

actions specified in such paragraphs, (B) is adversely affected

or aggrieved by such action, (C) files a petition for review of

the Secretary’s action within sixty days after the date of such

action, and (D) promptly transmits copies of the petition to the

Secretary and to the Attorney General.

(4) Any action of the Secretary specified in paragraph (1) or

(2) shall only be subject to review pursuant to the provisions of

this subsection, and shall be specifically excluded from citizen

suits which are permitted pursuant to subsection (a) of this

section.

(5) The Secretary shall file in the appropriate court the

record of any public hearings required by this subchapter and

any additional information upon which the Secretary based his

decision, as required by section 2112 of Title 28. Specific

objections to the action of the Secretary shall be considered by

the court only if the issues upon which such objections are

based have been submitted to the Secretary during the

adrninistrative proceedings related to the actions involved.

l4a

(6) The court of appeals conducting a proceeding pursuant

to this subsection shall consider the matter under review solely

on the record made before the Secretary. The findings of the

Secretary, if supported by substantial evidence on the record

considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. The court may

affirm, vacate, or modify any order or decision or may demand

the proceedings to the Secretary for such further action as it

may direct.

(7) Upon the filing of the record with the court, pursuant to

paragraph (5), the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive

and its judgment shall be final, except that such judgment shall

be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States

upon writ of certiorari.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. (1976)

(superceded) 1332 and 1333:

§ 1332. Congressional declaration of policy; jurisdiction;

construction

(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that

the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain

to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control,

and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter.

(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that

the character as high seas of the waters above the outer

Continental ‘Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing

therein shall not be affected.

‘

§ 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands—Constitution

and United States laws; laws of adjacent States; publication of

projected State lines; restriction on State taxation and jurisdic-

tion

(a)(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political

jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and

15a

seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial

islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for

the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and trans-

porting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer

Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction

located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases

on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued

only under the provisions of this subchapter.

(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsis-

tent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and

regulations of the Secretary now in effect or thereafter

adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State as

of August 7, 1953, are declared to be the law of the United

States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer

Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures

erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if

its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of

the outer Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine

and publish in the Federal Register such projected lines extend-

ing seaward and defining each such area. All of such applicable

laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate

officers and courts of the United States. State taxation laws

shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.

(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law

as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a

basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of

any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the

outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources

thereof or the revenues therefrom.

The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. Sections

1301(e), 1311(a), 1311(d).

43 U.S.C. 1301(e) (Definitions):

(e) The term “natural resources” includes, without limiting

the generality thereof, oil, gas, and all other minerals, and fish,

l6a

shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and

other marine animal and plant life but does not include water

power, or the use of water for the production of power;

§ 1311. Rights of the States—Confirmation and establishment

of title and ownership of !ands and resources; management,

administration, leasing, development, and use

(a) It is determined and declared to be in the public interest

that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable

waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the

natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the

right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use

the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with

applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the provisions

hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and

assigned to the respective States or the persons who were on

June 5, 1950, entitled thereto under the law of the respective

States in which the land is located, and the respective grantees,

lessees, or successors in interest thereof;

* * * * *

(d) Nothing in this chapter shall affect the use, development,

improvement, or control by or under the constitutional author-

ity of the United States of said lands and waters for the

purposes of navigation or flood control or the production of

power, or be construed as the release or relinquishment of any

rights of the United States arising under the constitutional

authority of Congress to regulate or improve navigation, or to

provide for flood control, or the production of power;

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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