Amicus Brief — Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.

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No. 79-1538

——

SUPREME COURT OF THE UMTED STATES

October Term, 1980

CECIL D. ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior, - Appellant

versus

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLA- |

MATION ASS®CIATION, INC., Et Al, - Appellees

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

APPELLEES’ POSITION BY PIKE

COUNTY, KENTUCKY

EUGENE F. MOONEY

Counsel of Record

University of Kentucky

College of Law

Lexington, Kentucky 40506

(606) 257-3780

GEORGE L. SEAY, JR.

JOHN ROBERT LEATHERS

ZALUSKI, SEAY and KIRKLAND

P. O. Box 495

Frankfort, Kentucky 40602

(502) 223-2104

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

WESTERFIELD-BONTE CO., 619 W. KENTUCKY-P.O. BOX 3251, LOU!SVILLE, KY.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the provisions of the Surface Mining Control

and Reclamation Act of 1977, Section 915(b) and (d),

30 U.S.C. §1265(b) and (d) (1979), requiring mined land

to be restored to its approximate original contour with all

highwalls eliminated is violative of the tenth amendment

to the United States Constitution.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

SONI DRONE os nooo sd Soe ees a neces i

I ERT Pie er ii

Seen OE GD (05 6 eee ili—vii

Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................ 1- 2

Duamary. cf ACW osc aA ee 3- 5

Argument—The Approximate Original Contour Re-

quirement of the Act Is Unconstitutional Under

the Usery Rule as Applied. .................06. 5-26

A. The Act Forces the State and County to Re-

verse Their Land Use Policies Because of the

Approximate Original Contour Requirement

or Have Their Policies Preempted. ........ 9-12

B. The Approximate Original Contour Require-

ment Directly Displaces State Land Use

COME. 5 dives ns cent ce keek Vena 12-20

C. The Approximate Original Contour Require-

ment Adversely Affects Pike County’s Inte-

gral Governmental Operations of Traditional

Government Functions. ...............000. 20-26

EE hy veer eRy oars peter Leow 27-29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

SEE

PAGE

Cases:

Agins v. Tiburon, ____ U.S. —_-, 100 8. Ct. 2138

ENE SREP ae eae ra eee aa 21

Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033 (6th

eae Pe ibs 0565s Ke5 oho. oo 0s os hose 7

Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 i) Sg eee 21

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 545 (No. 3230)

ES RD oc 3 27, 28

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).. 21

Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 See ye 27

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 a 7

Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 * gaara 5d, 20

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) .... 9

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.

ED oi EE Gian 9

Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. 8. 556 (2088) iiss 27

James Moore, IBSMA 79-10, 1 IBSMA 216, United

States Department of Interior, Office of Hear-

ings and Appeals (July 20, DE fa oss Heed ice 19, 23

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543

NCE EIS ESE AE eearae es m 27

Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869) 9

Marshal v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir.

EOS EOL ER eel pega en ae ae 11

Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (3988). .... 10

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

a6 a8 0g oo 'd's bao co ccdco ces, 9

Metcalf @ Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) ... 9

Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 ( RARE ee 28

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

SRST Eee Oe 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 20, 26, 27

New York v. United States, 326 U. 8. 572 (1946)... 7,9

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 DUNN ives sis tc 7

Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (197 Se 9

PAGE

Public Service Co. of North Carolina v. Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission, 587 F. 2d 716

SE EN MONEE kin a0 SC Ca AN ban asyd aaa een ck 7

Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36

LEE Sak AUCES «bone R bRkD 4 ak dik wrk Reicks 28

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) 10

Tollage Creek Elkhorn Mining Co., IBSMA 80-32,

2 IBSMA 341, United States Department of In-

terior, Office of Hearings and Appeals (Nov. 24,

recat PRE OT EPEC OT LG PORE te Oe 19, 20, 23

Umited States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1930) ........ 28

Umited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ...... 9

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ............. 21

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) .......... 9

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ........... 7

Statutes:

hs es SNR As Be Os hk OAK s cnc cdc cvuAG cau passim

Taxing and Spending Clause .................. 9,10

Necessary and Proper Clause ................. 7,8

Rarer be ee rer oa ae 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Ris ee SOs NG Eg SAUD SN ic a's o wate pole ae & eb we 7

U.S. Const., Art. VI (Supremacy Clause) ........ 8, 10

Rs ee UN, 5h bs ho ck 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11

Sie MAIO, RR ov ie ines Oh hn Cok eo 7

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857 et seg. ............ 13

Costal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1452

OF QU aids ie RRO ROSS Chad glow ds Wowk Ch: 13

Costal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1456(3) (a) 138

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

Ee Oe OO ii ik bua id oie ea sev beo ees 13

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C.

SO NOUN 6588's 5s DA eA Tien BENE ROA Soca passim

Section 503, 30 U.S.C. §1253 (1979) ...... 10, 11, 12

Section 504, 30 U.S.C. §1254 (1979) ......... 10, 12

Vv

PAGE

Section 505, 30 U.S.C. §1255 (1979) ......... 10

Section 515, 30 U.S.C. §1265 (1979) ......... 18

Section 515(b)(3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b) (3)

SE Sia opa a Nb on deter re 4, 10, 12, 19

Section 515(c), 30 U.S.C. §1265(c) (1979) 4, 10, 14, 17

Section 515(c)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(c)(2)

SEPT bbrad eroding teeta Case 15, 17

Section 515(c)(3)(B), 30 U.S.C. §1265(c¢) (3)

ey CEE vs nip pes: ise aks. 18

Section 515(d), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (1979)... 4, 10,

14, 15, 17, 18, 19

Section 515(d)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (2)

POR Sek sino ve ve DN vactteldadeaat oe 15, 17

Section 515(d)(4), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (4)

RAMEE os obs eh gud dd ti geo pecmine oe 14

Section 515(e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (1979) ... 4, 10,

14, 15, 17, 18, 19

Section 515(e)(1), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (1)

MRT Sab s sre Metin Kae ecuaces Cae cue 15, 17

Section 515(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (2)

SUPE. Sig ia tigrcekiin tbe ee. 15

Section 515(e)(3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (3)

Case, | Ae eT ETT Cotes Saat Rr Se 17

Section 515(e)(3)(C), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (3)

Ord SEMEN os vet OR a 8 17

Section 516, 30 U.S.C. $1266 ( Pc cen <. 18

Section 528(3), 30 U.S.C. §1278(3) (1979) ... 19

Section 701(2), 30 U.S.C. §1291(2) (1979) ... 13

Section 711, 30 U.S.C. §1301 co Poop 18, 19

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.201 <5 } BRR 21

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.113 bo Pe 21

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.133 fp) eR een 21

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.141 2) DA GneR 21

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.183-.191 ost Pa |

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.203 tos Bae 21

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.273-.283 2) eee |

vi

PAGE

Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.303 (1971) ........ 21

Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 350 (1977) ... 22

Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.060 (1977) ........ 1i

Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.050 (1977) ........ 11

Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.090 (1977) ........ 11

Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.095-.117 (1977) .... 11

Kentucky Acts 1980, ch. 62, preamble ............. 12

Federal Regulations:

SE OE EEO vp cinkbchnstananacaduscnan 13, 14

SD CP ee CODCOD ini e sicthnes Che ved seaasas 19

90 OP Bi BIO tee) GIBTB) . winn one dives tsvnsidnads 15

90 CIB: 67OG.14(6) (3) (IDTB) .. 5. anc ceedessccs 17

ar as Re AITO oc kn cs cnsn td cwdlbennwew ce 15

80 OF Be. STSRIG(e)(1) (IBTE) on. ek cee escees 17

30 C.F.RB. $785.16(c) (4) (1979) .......ceccccccces 17

RS Bk ge | rrr 16

30 C.F.R. §816.104(b)(2) (1979) .............048. 16

Be Gore Ee CRUDE 6 o's0 ds Sc eccersenccences 17

30 C.F.R. §817.102(a) (2) (1979) ....... ccc ceecnce 16

90: OF: SERRIAD) CIRO) o 5. vedicusicscncesn 16

Be Re a Sn COME, wine seesnducavdns dveee cae 15

SO O.F ER. $696. 16(a) (39TO) oon ccs cacececccecct 16

Miscellaneous:

eg ee | re eee ee me 14, 15

44 Wed. Reg. 15291 (1979) .........cccccccecesces 15

Annual Report 1978-1979, Kentucky Departmeut of

Maeva Cee. TF, TOTO) da vc hove vi eaescecdes 25

H.R. Rep. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 106

EUED..°5 ov Cha'gs cag sXe DRL WER Rb ORO RSNA ORES 13

Hunt, “Federal and State Control of Land: A Syn-

opsis,” in Property, Wealth, Land, (M. Mc-

Dougal and D. Haber, 1948) at 70-94 .......... 27

Vil

PAGE

Industrial Resources Pike County, Kentucky, Ken-

tucky Department of Commeree, ( i a ae 25

Kentucky Aviation System Plan, Landrum and

acjeasne poh EE Oe nC I aia ap 22

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

No. 79-1538

Cecm D. Anprus, Secretary of the Interior, - Appellant

Vv.

Vircin1A SurRFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

Association, Inc., Er At., - - - Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

APPELLEES’ POSITION BY PIKE

COUNTY, KENTUCKY

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Pike County is a political subdivision of the State of

Kentucky. The City of Pikeville is the county seat and

major urban center.

The County and the incorporated municipalities provide

their citizens roads, streets and bridges, public sewer

and water services through municipal agencies and public

water districts, refuse collection and disposal, police and

fire protection, parks and recreational facilities.

Planning and zoning authority for all areas of the

county is exercised by the Pikeville-Elkhorn City-Pike

2

County Planning Commission. Zoning is enforced in all

areas of the county. Subdivision regulations are enforced

inside the City of Pikeville and five miles beyond the city

limits. Municipal building and housing codes are enforced

in the incorporated areas of the county. Ninety-four units

of public housing are provided by Pikeville and the County.

The 1977-78 budget for Pike County was $1.2 million,

exclusive of federal revenue sharing funds, which came

from local property tax levies and turned back portions of

the State severance tax from coal mined in the county.

Pike County occupies the easternmost tip of the State

of Kentucky and lies wholly within the Appalachian coal

fields. Entirely mountainous in topography, over 75%

of the county’s surface is mountain slope and the remainder

lies in the floodplain areas of the Big Sandy River and its

tributaries. The County, in 1977-78, was Kentucky’s largest

coal producing county. The County produced nearly 20

million tons in 1978-79 worth more than $500 million on

which nearly $26 million in severance taxes were paid.

Pike County’s economy, employment base and tax reve-

nues are solely dependent upon coal mining. The type,

quality and level of public services are thus directly de-

pendent on coal mining. County land use policies tradi-

tionally reflect the needs of its coal economy and depend

upon the local coal industry for excavation, cut and fill,

stream chanelization and much rural road construction.

Being adversely impacted by the direct and indirect efforts

of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C. §$§1201

et seq. [hereinafter “the Act”], the County wishes its views

on the constitutionality of the Act under the tenth amend-

ment to be advanced in support of Appellees.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Approximate Original Contour Requirement of

the Act Is Unconstitutional Under the Usery

Rule as Applied

The tenth amendment establishes a constitutional im-

munity for the states against the federal government and

thus reflects the dual sovereignty structure of our Constitu-

tion. This immunity prevails over commerce clause legis-

lation to the extent the latter would invade a state’s free-

dom to structure integral operations regarding their tradi-

tional governmental functions. National League of Cities

v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). Thus Congress has no

power under the commerce clause to force, displace or

penalize states or their political subdivisions regarding

their important traditional affairs, whether or not the sub-

ject matter is in interstate commerce. This case presents

the question of whether the Act as applied in Appalachian

counties does have such a displacing effect.

A. The Act Forces the State and County to Reverse Their

Land Use Policies Because of the Approximate Orig-

inal Contour Requirement or Have Their Policies

Preempted

Federal categorical regulatory programs which are

backed up by the threat of federal preemption—unlike

categorical assistance programs—are inherently “coercive.”

The fact that the Act does not directly command state offi-

cials to do or not to do anything does not ameliorate its

inherent coercion where the threat is to preempt state con-

trol over its lands. Kentucky delegates to its counties con-

trol over land uses within their boundaries and would not

require, but for the Act, that mined land be restored to its

OT ee Re he ee

4

approximate original contour [hereinafter “AOC”] in de-

ference to the counties’ authority, needs and desires for

flat, developable land. The 1980 Kentucky General As-

sembly was coerced by the Act to adopt post-effective

statutes changing its land use policy.

B. The Approximate Original Contour Require-

ment Directly Displaces State Land Use Policy

There is a direct conflict between the state and federal

land use policies regarding AOC, a conflict which Congress

intended and wrote into the Act in the form of Sections

515(b) (3) and 515(¢), (d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b) (3),

(c), (d) and (e) (1979). These AOC provisions, with their

inflexible requirement that all highwalls be covered in all

postmining circumstances, as applied in Appalachia, permit

no meaningful variances from AOC even for valid alterna-

tive postmining land use purposes. Further, the Secretary

of the Interior [hereinafter “the Secretary”] has inter-

preted the Act and taken enforcement actions indicating

that meaningful variances will not be available under the

permanent program.

, C. The Approximate Original Contour Requirement Ad-

versely Affects Pike County’s Integral Operations Re-

garding Governmental Functions

The intended and applied effect of the AOC provisions

directly affects Pike County’s land use control authority

and indirectly affects its governmental structure and opera-

tions regarding public services and facilities, housing and

private commercial development, revenues, and its long-

range economic development plans and prospects. Pike

County's traditional reliance on private coal industry ex-

Hy)

cavation activities to create level, developable land for

itself and private surface owners has been and will con-

tinue to be defeated completely by the AOC requirement

of the Act as applied in Appalachia.

ARGUMENT

The Approximate Original Contour Requirement of

the Act Is Unconstitutional Under the Usery

Rule as Applied

“The Tenth Amendment expressly declares the consti-

tutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a

fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability

to function effectively in a federal system.” Fry v. United

States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). The tenth amend-

ment expresses the dual sovereignty structure of govern-

mental authority embodied in our Constitution and carves

out an area of state immunity from Article I exercises of

power by Congress:

We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes

of sovereignty attaching to every state government.

which may not be impaired by Congress, not because

Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative

authority to reach the matter, but because the Consti-

tution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that

matter. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S.

833, 845 (1976).

Modern constitutional doctrine marking the boundary be-

tween tenth amendment immunity and the commerce clause

was formulated by this Court in Usery. The Court stated,

“We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments oper-

ate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure

integral operations in areas of traditional governmental

6

functions, they are not within the authority granted Con-

gress by Art. I, §8, cl. 3.” Jd. at 852. Following Usery

it is clear that the central issue in cases presenting clashes

between state immunity under the tenth amendment and

Congress’ powers under the commerce clause is whether the

congressional legislation as applied displaces state “funce-

tions essential to separate and independent existence.”

Id. at 845.

The criteria employed in Usery to determine the con-

stitutional effect of challenged wage and hour provisions of

the Fair Labor Standards Act when applied to the states

and their political subdivisions were: 1) the increased

operating costs imposed on states, cities and counties lead-

ing to “forced relinquishment of important governmental

activties” Id. at 847, 2) displacement of state policies re-

garding integral governmental operations, relating to tradi-

tional local governmental functions such “as fire prevention,

police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and

recreation” Jd. at 851;' and 3) direct or indirect penaliza- -

tion of States for structuring the conduct of their tradi-

tional affairs in a manner at variance with Congress’

policy choices.

This tenth amendment immunity extends to the integral

governmental functions of the states’ political subdivisions,

placing them also “beyond the reach of congressional power

under the Commerce Clause” just as if these operations

were performed by the state itself. Jd. at 855 n. 50.

The Usery case stands on far broader constitutional

ground than the Secretary would allow. The Usery rule is

1This list of traditional governmental functions are examples

only and ‘‘not an exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and

(Footnote continued on next page)

-

—

7

that admittedly valid commerce clause legislation, even

when accompanied by formal necessary and proper clause

findings, cannot be applied to displace, directly or in-

directly, in any substantial matter the free exercise of state

powers relating to “functions essential to separate and in-

dependent existence.” Id. at 845. This aspect of inter-

governmental immunity complements the states’ absolute

immunity from suit prohibited by the eleventh amendment ;

their immunity from direct federal taxes, New York vy.

United States, 326 U. 8. 572 (1946) ; and the absolute rights

conferred by Article IV §3 of the United States Constitu-

tion. It reflects the federalism considerations underlying

their executive branch immunity from the Sherman Act

prohibitions under Parker vy. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) ;

the protection of their judical proceedings from undue in-

terference by the federal judiciary, Younger vy. Harris, 401

U. S. 37 (1971), and respect for the economic regulatory

legislative enactments. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. §. 726

(1963). When commerce clause legislation clashes with

tenth amendment immunities any substantial invasion by

Congress of states’ traditional governmental functions

raises a presumption of unconstitutionality which can be

overcome only by the highest national considerations.

The Secretary attempts to avoid the thrust of the tenth

amendment claim here by first asserting that the Act does

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

support activities . . . of state and local governments’’ which

may be similarly protected. Usery at 851n.16. The case-by-case

process of inclusion and exclusion has begun. Municipal operation

of an airport is protected, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598

F. 2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) ; operation of state oil and gas business

is not. Public Service Co. of North Carolina v. Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, 587 F. 2d 716 (5th Cir, 1979),

8

not “coerce” the states at all because its commands concern-

ing AOC are directed to private citizens and not state offi-

cials, and then by contending that the provisions of AOC

are not directed at the states’ land use powers and only

incidentally affect them. He rests his case primarily on

Congress’ power under the commerce clause. That reliance

is misplaced.?

2Well-settled precedent and conventional analysis establishing

the reach of Congress’ powers under the commerce clause over

private commercial conduct do not control this case. The issue

here is not whether in exercise of its commerce clause powers

Congress can impose such reclamation requirements on privately

conducted surface coal mining operations as it deems ‘‘necessary

and proper’’ to regulate interstate commerce or protect the en-

vironment, and thus castle this judgment behind the supremacy

clause, but whether in so doing it directly or indirectly displaces

state policy choices in the constitutionally protected areas dr the

state’s traditional governmental functions, viz, local control over

long-term land uses. Consequently, formal necessary and proper

clause ‘‘findings’’ by Congress that the AOC requirement ‘‘affects

commerce’’ or is in a ‘‘class of activities’ affecting commerce, or a

stated congressional ‘‘purpose’’ to ‘‘direct’’ surface coal mining

operations into areas where ‘‘reclamation is feasible’’ and away

from areas where it is not, and the fact—if it be one—that the

AOC requirement is thus the ‘‘heart of the Act’’, are neither con-

trolling nor even particularly relevant. To the contrary, the tenth

amendment immunity issue must be first resolved before the con-

ventional commerce clause-supremacy clause issues can arise at all.

Constitutional principles applicable to the seope of Congress’ power

to regulate commerce do not decide and bear only peripherally on

the scope of the tenth amendment immunity. Congress could not

bind this court directly by ‘‘finding’’ or ‘‘declaring’’ that AOC or

its inflexible ‘‘highwall’’ requirements do not infringe on tenth

amendment reserved powers, nor can it do so indirectly by ‘‘find-

ing’’ that uncovered highwalls ‘‘affect commerce’’ and thus (im-

pliedly) do not infringe upon the tenth amendment powers. The

constitutional test of the validity of the impact of Congressional

commerce clause legislation which impacts the tenth amendment

(Footnote continued on next page)

9

A. The Act Forces the State and County to Reverse Their

Land Use Policies Because of the Approximate Orig-

inal Contour Requirement or Have Their Policies

Preempted

Appellants seek to distinguish this case from the Usery

rule by asserting that the Act does not coerce the states

because its provisions are directed not to “States qua

States,” but only to the actions of private citizens. That

cosmetic feature of the Act does not take the Act out from

under the Usery rule nor the broader constitutional prin-

cipes on which Usery rests. Commerce clause regulatory

legislation backed by the threat of federal preemption of

traditional areas of state control—the categorical regula-

tory program—stands on altogether different constitutional

footings than the taxing and spending clause categorical

assistance programs.

If “coercion” is required in these “categorical regula-

tory” programs at all, the Act is clearly coercive. More

accurately, all federal categorical regulatory programs are

inherently coercive because they rest on the threat of fed-

eral preemption.®

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

immunities is not only that the legislation must have a ‘‘rational

basis’’ under the necessary and proper clause but the legislation

must also survive the more stringent arbitrariness principle of the

fifth amendment. Usery at 841. Resolution of the tenth amend-

ment issue in this case is controlled by the constitutional principles,

criteria and reasoning of McCulloch v. Maryiand, i7 U. 8S. (4

Wheat.) 316 (1819); National Association of Cities v. Usery, 426

U. 8. 833 (1976) ; New York v. United States, 326 U. 8. 572 (1946) ;

Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); and Lane

County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869) ; and not by those

of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. 8. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) ; United States

v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) ; Wickard v. Fiburn, 317 U. 8. 111

(1942) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241

(1964) ; and Perez v. United States, 402 U. 8. 146 (1971).

10

The applicable principles here do not rest on the mere

fortuity that in Usery the challenged FLSA amendments

were coercive because expressly directed at state and local

governmental officials as employers implementing state

policy choices regarding public employees’ wage levels and

hours of work. This Court made clear that the constitu-

tional vice in Usery was not the direct federal commands

to state officials, and not merely the monetary costs imposed

on the states directly by those commands, but was instead

the consequent “forced relinquishment” of state preroga-

tives. If the form of the invasion is determinative, Con-

gress can easily and deftly avoid all tenth amendment limi-

tations by the simple expedient of refraining from ordering

8Congress may confer on federal citizens whatever monetary

benefits it chooses pursuant to its Article I §8 clause I power to

tax and spend for the ‘‘general welfare’’ and may enlist the states

without coercion to act as its agent in distributing the federal

largesse through voluntarily enacted state categorical assistance

programs without preempting or invading the tenth amendment

powers of the state. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548

(1937) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. 8. 447 (1923). Categorical

regulatory programs, on the other hand, rest on Congress’ power to

regulate the conduct of federal citizens directly through exercise

of some affirmative grant in the constitution, coupled with the

preemptive effect given its legislation by the supremacy clause.

U.S. Const. art. VI. If voluntary participation by the states is

a constitutional factor at all in categorical regulatory schemes,

then the integral threat of federal preemption which must underlie

these programs provides the necessary ‘‘coercion’’. It is clear that

both a state regulatory program under Section 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253

(1979) of the Act or a federal program under Section 504, 30

U.S.C. §1254 (1979), must enforce Section 515(b) (3) and Sections

515(¢c), (d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b)(3), (ce), (d) and (e)

(1979), exactly as written, and unless the state program does so

the subject will be preempted. §505, 30 U.S.C. 1255 (1979). This

presents no ‘‘choice’’ at all. It is clear the State of Kentucky felt

it was ‘‘eoerced’’ by the Act. See p. 12, infra.

11

state and local officials directly to do or not to do some-

thing. This contention—the heart of the Secretary’s posi-

tion on this issue—was obviously rejected by this Court in

Usery. Mr. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Usery recites many

existing examples of when federal law directly prohibits

state and local officials from taking particular actions with-

out transgressing the tenth amendment issues. Usery at

880. These instances of direct federal commands to state

officials qua state officials are not automatically invalidated

by the Usery rule, but the reason is not because they are not

coercive but instead because they may or may not adversely

affect integral governmental operations in performance of

traditional state functions. Marshal v. City of Sheboygan,

077 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978).

Kentucky’s strip mining law prior to the Act contained

most of the elements reflected in the federal law, and, allow-

ing for relative differences in stringency, regulated strip

mining operations by substantially the same requirements

as appear in Title V of the Act. Thus Kentucky regulated

the method of mining operations: drainage control and the

disposal of spoil, KRS 350.090 (1977) ; required backfilling,

regrading, and revegetation, KRS 350.095-.117 (1977) ; and

employed a permit application process, KRS 350.060 (1977) ;

required reclamation bond, KRS 350.060 (1977); and pro-

vided administrative inspection and citation procedures to

enforce these requirements, KRS 350.050 (1977).

State policy regarding the AOC requirement of the Act,

however, is exactly contrary to federal policy. The Ken-

tucky General Assembly in 1978 and 1980 amended the Ken-

tucky statute to make it sufficiently consistent with the Act

to meet the requirements of Section 503, 30 U.S.C. §1253

(1979), in order to seek “primacy” under the Act. In so

12

legislating, however, the 1980 Kentucky General Assembly

knew it was being coerced:

The Commonwealth of Kentucky objects particularly

to the mandatory and inflexible requirement that all

surface mined land must be returned to its approximate

original contour with all highwalls completely covered

in all circumstances . . . and if not coerced by the

threatened denial of primacy by the federal office of

surface mining, the State would choose to address these

matters by measures of its own devising. Kentucky

Acts 1980, ch. 62, preamble.

and expressly reserved the option to challenge the require-

ment in court.

B. The Approximate Original Contour Require-

ment Directly Displaces State Land Use Policy

There is a direct and necessary conflict between the ex-

press land use provisions of the Act and the land use

policies of Kentucky regarding the environmental protec-

tion performance standards of both the interim [Section

503, 30 U.S.C. §1253 (1979)] and permanent [Section 504,

30 U.S.C. §1254 (1979) ] programs that all highwalls created

on surface mined lands be covered and the land returned to

AOC. No exceptions to AOC are permitted by the Act.‘

Section 515(b)(3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b)}{3) (1979), re-

quires all surface coal mining operations “as a minimum to

compact . . . and grade in order to restore the approxi-

‘This aspect of explicit and direct land use control in the Act

distinguishes it from other federal environmental protection cate-

gorical regulatory schemes. Clearly, the obvious interstate impact

dimensions to air and water pollution provide an adequate basis

for comprehesive commerce clause legislation. In contrast with

(Footnote continued on next page)

13

mate original contour of the land with all highwalls, . . ,

eliminated”. (Emphasis added. )5

This AOC concept of the Act embodies two distinct and

separate requirements:

1) the “configuration” requirement that the mined area

must be backfilled and graded so that it “closely

resembles” the pre-mining configuration of the land;

2) the “highwall” requirement that “all highwalls [must

be] eliminated.’¢

Congress deliberately chose this direct displacement, there

was nothing “incidental” about it. H.R. Rep. No. 95-493,

95th Cong., Ist Sess. 106 (1977).

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

the Act, however, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857 et 8€q., ex-

haustively regulating emissions of air contaminants, contains no

direct federal land use requirements or prohibitions; and the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq., con-

tains no direct federal land use provisions. Even the federal

Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1452 et seq., provides

that federally permitted activities effecting land use in the coastal

zone must comply with the State approved plan 16 U.S.C. §1456

(3) (a).

°The definition of ‘‘approximate original contour’’ (AOC) in

Section 701 (2), 30 U.S.C. §1291(2) (1979), is: ‘that surface

configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined

area so that the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access

roads, closely resembles the general surface configuration of the

land prior to mining and blends into and complements the drain-

age pattern of the surrounding terrain, with all highwalls and spoil

piles eliminated. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

°The term ‘‘highwalls’’ is not defined in the Act. The Secre-

tary’s regulations define the word as “‘the face of exposed over-

burden and coal in an open cut of a surface coal mining activity or

for entry to underground mining activities.’’ 30 CFR §701.5

(1979). 4

14

The Secretary asserts by way of justification for AOC

that because there are such statutory variances available

the Act provides “flexibility” and thereby avoids unfairness

or arbitrariness. These general assertions are misleading

because they are essentially inaccurate. Upon examina-

tion in light of the facts and the Secretary’s regulations,

statutory variances dwindle to nonexistence in the moun-

tainous counties of Appalachia.

A variance from the “configuration” requirement is

provided by Section 515(c), 30 U.S.C. §1265(¢) (1979), for

mountaintop removal mining operations, and by Sections

515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e) (1979), for

contour mining operations on “steep slopes”.? These

variances theoretically permit the mined land to be left

flat or gently rolling for approved postmining land uses.

7Steep slopes are defined by the Act as those ‘‘above twenty

degrees or such lesser slope as may be defined by the regulatory

authority after consideration of soil, climate or other characteris-

ties of a region or state’. §515/ )(4), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (4)

(1979).

This distinction between steep and non-steep slopes for pur-

poses of authorizing a variance from the configuration aspect of

the AOC requirement is irrational if the requirement is intended

as an environmental protection measure. There would seem to be

more need and less danger to public health, safety and the environ-

ment from landslides, sedimentation and erosion—and thus ample

justification—for a variance from AOC for non-steep slopes where

such occurrences would be rare, and just the contrary for steep

slopes. As if acknowledging this anomally the Secretary’s regula-

tions define ‘‘steep slopes’’ in the statutory language, 30 CFR

§701.5 (1979), (or such lesser slope . . . region or state) and

his official comments coyly intimate that the qualifying phrase

permits the regulatory authority to classify slopes Jess than twenty

degrees as ‘‘steep’’ for purposes of broadening the Section 515(d)

and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e) (1979), variance. 44 Fed.

Reg. 15084 (1979).

15

In reality, however, there is no meaningful variance from

the “configuration” requirement for contour mining on the

steep slopes in Pike County despite theoretical availability

in the Act because of the absolute “highwall elimination”

requirement.

There are no statutory variances from the “highwall”

requirement. No highwalls remain in mountaintop removal

operations, Section 515(c)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(¢) (2)

(1979), 30 CFR §785.14(b) (1979) ; but highwalls must be

eliminated in all contour mining operations on steep slopes,

Section 515 (d)(2) and (e)(1), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d)(2) and

(e)(1) (1979); 30 CFR 6785.16 (1979). The Secretary

takes the position that:

The intention of the Act was not to provide loopholes

by which operations might be conducted without

eliminating the highwall. The variance provision per-

mits the operator to regrade the (sic) effected area to

a steeper angle than the original topography; how-

ever, the stability of the backfilled materia] must be

assured and the highwall must be eliminated by back-

filling or reduction. OSM believes that the drafters of

Section 515(e)(2) meant what they wrote, when they

provided that the variance would be from “approxi-

mate original contour,” and not from the highwall

covering requirement, which is a separate requirement

of Section 515(d)(2) of the Act. 44 Fed. Reg. 15084

(1979).

See also 30 CFR §826.15 (1979) and the Secretary’s official

comment thereto at 44 Fed. Reg. 15291 (1979).

The “highwall” requirement of AOC effectively fore-

closes in Pike County, Kentucky, all possible application of

the Section 515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e)

(1979), variances for alternative postmining land uses.

The geophysical facts foreclose configuration variances if

16

highwalls must be covered in all instances. The angle of

repose for spoil material in Pike County (which are pre-

dominantly sandstone and shale composition) even when

mechanically compacted, is both physically and legally a

fifty-percent slope [lv:2h (50 percent) plus a minimum

static safety factor of not more than 1.3]. 30 CFR §816.102

(b) (1979) and 30 CFR $816.104(b)(2) (1979) (thin over-

burden); 30 CFR §826.12(b) (1979) (performance stand-

ards for steep slopes) ; 30 CFR §826.15(a) (1979) (limited

variances for contour mining of steep slopes); and 30

CFR §817.102(a)(2) (1979) (underground mining). <A

normal height highwall in Pike County (40 to 90 feet)

covered by a fifty-percent slope backfill will effectively

cover 50 to 80 percent of the surface of a normal width

contour mining bench in Pike County (60 to 120 feet wide)

thereby reducing the potential flat land remaining for post-

mining land use purposes to a narrow (15 to 30 feet wide)

curving, strip extending around a mountain contour for

1500 to 5000 linear feet. A theoretical statutory variance

from the “configuration” aspect of AOC is, practically

speaking, unavailable in Pike County, Kentucky, in light

of the de facto “configuration” effect of the “highwall

elimination” requirement, from which there is no variance

possible.

All surface coal mining in Pike County is done on

steep, rough, undeveloped mountain land, some previously

mined, not suitable in its original configuration for any

public or economic use other than mining, or perhaps,

forestry. Left flat after mining it is suitable for agri-

cultural uses in remote areas, and for public or economic

uses when located near urbanized areas.®

8The only authorized postmining land uses for which ‘‘con-

figuration’’ variances may be granted are ‘‘industrial, commercial,

(Footnote continued on next page)

17

Variances from the configuration requirement of AOC

in contour mining operations on steep slopes cannot be

granted unless “the watershed control of the area is im-

proved” Section 515(e)(1) and (e)(3)(C), 30 U.S.C.

§1265(e)(1) and (e)(3)(C) (1979). The administrative

interpretation of this requirement is that the postmining

land use must affirmatively reduce total suspended solids

and reduce flood hazards within the watershed by reducing

total flow as compared to the pre-mining hydrologic situa-

tion. 30 CFR §785.16(c)(4) (1979).

Variances in mountaintop removal operations must be

predicated upon authorized postmining land use plans and

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

agricultural, residential or public facility ( including recreational

facilities)’’ for mountaintop removal operations, Section 515(c)

(2), 80 U.S.C. §1265(¢)(2) (1979); and for **industrial, com-

mercial, residential or public facilities ( including recreational

facilities)’’ for contour mining operations on steep slopes under

Section 515(d) (2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (2) (1979). There is no

explanation or justification given in the Act or its legislative

history for expressly authorizing a variance for an agricultural

postmining land use in mountaintop removal mining operations but

not in contour mining operations on steep slopes. The postmining

land use potential is the same in both mining circumstances, and

the language, structure and requirements of Sections 515(¢), (d)

and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(¢), (d) and (e) (1979), are so similar as

to suggest that the omission of ‘‘agricultural’’ from the list of

authorized land uses of Section 515(e) (3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (3)

(1979), is either the result of a typographical error or Congres-

sional inadvertence. Whether deliberate or otherwise, the dis-

tinction is irrational. In Pike County the omission is crucial be-

cause contour mining on steep slopes is virtually the only feasible

method available, and agriculture is the most feasible alternative

post-mining land use. The Secretary has nevertheless rigorously

sutured the distinction into his regulations. Compare 30 CFR

§785.14(¢)(1) (1979) (mountaintop removal), with 30 CFR

§785.16(¢)(1) (1979) (contour mining on steep slopes), and 30

CFR §816.133 (1979) (postmining land uses).

18

“appropriate assurances” regarding, inter alia, “compati-

bility with adjacent land uses”, “expected need and mar-

ket”, “investment in necessary public facilities”, private

financial capability for completion and supporting com-

mitments from public agencies. Section 515(c)(3)(B),

380 U.S.C. §1265(c)(3)(B) (1979). No such statutory re-

quirements (regarding “appropriate assurances” for com-

patibility, economic feasibility, financial commitments, etc.)

are expressed in the Act for variances to support postmin-

ing land uses in contour mining operations.

The relatively small size of normal contour mining;

permit areas in Pike County, together with the fact that

outcrop coal deposits suitable for extraction by “steep

slope” mining methods are situated throughout the county

miles from any source of water, sewer or other “public

facilities”, dictates that Section 515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C.

§1265(d) and (e) (1979), variances for “industrial, com-

mercial, residential or public use (including recreational

facilities)” postmining land uses are not available in Pike

County. The Secretary’s savage restriction by adminis-

trative interpretation of already narrow statutory vari-

ances belies his assertions here that variances soften the

impact of the AOC requirement.®

Section 711, 30 U.S.C. §1301 (1979), empowers the Secretary

to ‘‘authorize departures in individual cases on an experimental

basis from the environmental protection performance standards’’

of Section 515, 30 U.S.C. §1265 (1979), and 516, 30 U.S.C. §1266

(1979), ‘‘in order to allow . . . post-mining land use for in-

dustrial, commercial, residential, or public use (including recrea-

tion facilities. . . .’’ These narrow ‘‘experimental practices’’

exemptions must provide environmental protection to the land

equal to the normal requirements, must not be larger or more

numerous than necessary to determine ‘‘the effectiveness or eco-

nomic feasibility’’ of the experimental practice, and must meet

(Footnote continued on next page)

19

The Secretary’s enforcement actions under the interim

program indicate clearly the effect of his permanent pro-

gram regulations regarding the Section 015(b) (3), 30

U.S.C. §1265(b) (3) (1979), highwall requirement in Sec-

tions 515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e) (1979),

variance situations. In Tollage Creek Elkhorn Mining

Co., IBSMA 80-32, 2 IBSMA 341, United States Depart-

ment of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals (Nov.

24, 1980), the Interior Board of Surface Mining Appeals

held that the Act and regulations compelled it to uphold

an OSM notice of violation issued to Tollage Creek Elkhorn

Mining Co. for failure to cover highwalls left uncovered

as portions of an access road to a proposed commercial] tree

farm in Pike County for which Tollage Creek had been

formally granted a postmining land use variance by the

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

the minimum standards of the Act for public health and safety.

The legislative history makes abundantly clear that Congress in-

tended the ‘‘experimental practices’’ exemption to be available for

departures from the AOC requirement for postmining land uses,

While the Secretary has granted a few Section 711, 30 U.S.C.

§1301 (1979), exemptions from some of the prescribed mining

performance standards, he has not granted any ‘‘experimental

practices’’ reclamation exemptions for departures from the ‘‘high-

wall’’ aspect of the AOC requirement.

OSM has also declined to honor the Kentucky ‘‘on-site con-

struction exemption’’ which exempts from the full permit and per-

formance standards of the interim State surface mining law bona

fide construction exeavation which incidentally encounters coal.

James Moore, IBSMA 79-10, 1 IBSMA 216, United States Depart-

ment of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals (July 20,

1979). The permanent program regulations further severely re-

strict the Section 528(3), 30 U.S.C. §1278(3) (1979), exemption

for ‘‘the extraction of coal as an incidental part of Federal, State

or local government-financed highway or other construction’’. 30

CFR Part 707 (1979).

20

State regulatory agency. The uncontradicted proof was

that the access road and exposed highwalls were com-

pletely safe, well engineered and would cause absolutely no

environmental harm whatsoever, and the Administrative

Law Judge had so found. He held, however, that he was

bound by the Act and regulations to require that all high-

walls in all circumstances be eliminated. The Board on

appeal reluctantly affirmed, noting:

It is with difficulty that we have reached the result in

this case. Commonsense and fairness would appear to

require an opposite result. The Federal law seems

inescapable, however. Had Congress been presented

with the factual situation herein, where elimination of

the highwall would not benefit the environment but

only burden the operator or landowner, it may have

provided in the Act for some exception to the rigid

backfilling requirement. Apparently, it was not.

Clearly, it did not. We are constrained to affirm the

Chief Administrative Law Judge. Id. at 352.

C. The Approximate Original Contour Requirement Ad-

versely Affects Pike County’s Integral Governmental

Operations of Traditional Governmental Functions

The thrust of the Usery rule is that commerce clause

legislation is unconstitutional as applied where the effect

of the federal legislation displaces “state choices as to how

state governmental operations should be structured” or

“force the States to remake such choices themselves” Usery

at 853 (declining to overrule Fry v. United States, 421

U. S. 542 (1975) on this ground). The record in this case

is replete with examples of the precise effect of the AOC

requirement on counties in Southwest Virginia, and it

similarly, directly and immediately displaces Pike County’s

land use control authority regarding the configuration of

21

land for purposes of residential housing development, com-

mercial development and the construction of public

facilities.

A “traditional governmental function” of States is con-

trol over the use of land within their boundaries.” This is

not disputed.

In Kentucky the land use control power js delegated by

the State to the counties and cities, KRS 100.201 (1971).

These powers may be exercised by cities, counties or reg-

ional planning units, KRS 100.113 (1971) ; with planning

commissions, KRS 100.133 (1971), appointed by mayors

and county judges. KRS 100.141 ( 1971). A comprehensive

plan is required, KRS 100.183-191 (1971); and the units

may exercise the power to zone, KRS 100.203 ( 1971) ; regu-

late subdivisions, KRS 120.273-283 (1971) ; and require con-

struction permits to insure compliance, KRS 100.303 (1971).

Pike County has exercised this delegated power by estab-

lishing a joint planning commission, comprehensive plan,

and a zoning ordinance for Pikeville and for an area five

miles outside its municipal boundaries.

The State of Kentucky through its own administrative

agency regulates the temporary land uses of surface coal

mining operations in the interest of environmental protec-

tion and thereby prescribes the attendant temporary land

This Court noted in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n. 18

(1975), that ‘‘zoning laws and their provisions, long considered

essential to effective urban planning, are peculiarly within the

province of the State and local legislative authorities’. How

essential to the separate and independent existence is suggested by

the range of permissible objectives sanctioned by this Court:

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. 8. 365 (1926) (encourage

industrial development) ; Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. 8. 1 (1974)

(dictate the social character of neighborhoods) ; Agins v. Tiburon,

—— U.S. ___, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980) (restrict urbanization).

22

uses. KRS Chapter 350 (1977). Long-term land use of the

mined area after the surface mining operation reclamation

is completed is subject only to local control. Further,

Kentucky’s statutory reclamation requirements concern-

ing those aspects of long-term land configuration directly

prohibited by the Act—allowing highwalls to be left ex-

posed, mountaintops and contour mining benches left flat

in order to form large tracts of useable flat land in

mountainous counties—represents a clear State policy

choice in furtherance of county land-use needs, controls and

policies. This policy choice reflects a carefully balanced

State deference to the long-term social and governmental

needs of Pike County and its citizens—coal operators,

environmentalists and surface owners alike. Specificaily,

Kentucky policy would not require highwalls and benches

resulting from contour mining to be covered, inter alia,

and would allow valley hollow fills to be situated adjacent

thereto in order that developable flat land may be created

by surface mining in counties where it is sorely needed and

public revenues are chronically short.

Pike County has already experienced and will continue

to suffer from the direct and indirect effects of the Act

regarding its land uses. Some examples are:

1. Commercial Development. The Tollage Creek

variance, described supra, was granted by the State in

order that a commercial tree farm be established in Pike

County. This economic development would add jobs, tax

base and taxable activities in the county. This venture

has been thwarted by the rigid highwall-covering require-

ment. Other like proposals will be similarly forstalled

reducing job potential and tax revenue.

2. Public Facilities. Pursuant to the Kentucky Avia-

tion System Plan, Landrum and Brown (1977), Pike County

23

has undertaken to construct a new $10 million regional air-

port on a mountaintop situated some eleven miles north of

Pikeville. The land is to be donated to the county by

private owners and the site is to be prepared at no cost to

the county by a private surface coal mining operation

acting under a state permit. This site preparation origi-

nally was to be performed under a Kentucky “on-site con-

struction exemption” but the decision in James Moore,

thwarted that plan. Consequently, the county decided to

proceed under an alternative postmining land use variance

granted by the State during the interim program. The

variance and essential access road, and thus the entire

venture, like that in Tollage Creek, are jeopardized by the

Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.

3. Housing. In Dr. ©. Theodore Koebel’s work, 1979

Housing Report for Kentucky, University of Louisville

Urban Studies Center (1979), he noted:

Housing shortages most likely have started to occur in

several counties in Kentucky, with severe, chronic

shortages occurring in Southeast Kentucky. ,

The region as a whole had a level of housing starts

between 1970-1977 that would have housed only 56

percent of the increase in households. Mobile homes

accounted for more than 50 percent of the total hous-

ing production in Breathitt, Harlan, Knox, Leslie,

Magoffin, Perry, and Pike counties. Even with a mas-

give reliance on mobile homes, it is doubtful that hous-

ing production in Southeast Kentucky would have

been sufficient to avoid a severe housing shortage there.

Id. at 59.

Pike County’s serious an@ growing housing shortage is

either caused or exacerbated by the severe and chronic

lack of suitable residential construction sites. Over 75%

24

of the surface of the county is occupied by “steep slopes”,

and most of the remainder is situated in floodplains of the

Big Sandy River and its tributaries. The number of house-

holds grew over 25% during the period 1970-1980. Id. at

340. The result is heavy reliance on mobile homes to meet

the housing demand. During the period 1970-1978 of the

nearly 7000 housing units added to the housing stock in

Pike County (599% increase) 92% were mobile homes.

Id. at 341. At the time of the survey in 1979 there were

only some 800 mobile home sites available in the county.

During this same eight-year period only 503 permanent

single family dwellings and 70 multi-family units were

added to the Pike County housing stock. Jd. at 341.

The single most crippling factor lying behind and con-

tributing to the Pike County housing shortage, now and in

the future, is the lack of building sites—a factor which must

be overcome in the future in order to solve the problem.

Practically the entire surface of Pike County is underlain

with coal. Surface coal mining operations in the future

could provide the vital excavation, cut and fill work neces-

sary to create residential building sites from “steep slopes”

as it has traditionally. The Act and regulations embodying

the AOC requirement, together with the lack of any mean-

ingful variances because of the highwall requirement, fore-

stall such developments in the future. Pike County pres-

ently has over 9000 mobile homes serving as temporary

housing and has an immediate need for over 12,000 perma-

nent housing units which cannot be constructed for want of

building sites out of the floodplain area.

4. County Revenue. Pike County has a coal-based local

economy and its budget revenues are tied directly and in-

directly to coal production. Pike County’s public revenues

come from federal revenue sharing, local taxes on real

25

property and its share of the severance taxes collected by

the State on coal mined in the County. Total property tax

assessments for Pike County in 1979 were approximately

$1 billion, Annual Report 1978-1979, Kentucky Department

of Revenue (Dec. 1, 1979) at A-44-45, of which some $400

million was real property. Jd. at A-51. Three-fourths of

this was residential, commercial and industrial realty and

the remaining one-fourth was mineral rights and unmined

coal, farms and undeveloped acreage. The County received

two-thirds of its locally generated revenues for 1979 from

local property taxes. Industrial Resources, Pike County,

Kentucky, Kentucky Department of Commerce (1978) at 26.

During 1978-79 over $500 million worth of coal was pro-

duced in Pike County on which over $25 million in sever-

ance taxes were paid to the State. Annual Report 1978-1979,

at 104. Pike County received approximately one-third of

its locally generated revenues from severance tax turnback

funds in 1979, which is expected to increase in future years

if coal mining increases in the County. In addition, the

County was significantly, if indirectly, benefitted by some

$14 million funding of the State Energy Road Fund and

Coal Impact Road Fund which constructed new State high-

ways in Kastern Kentucky, including Pike County. Id.

at 1109.

There can be little doubt that the challenged provisions

of the Act affect these traditional governmental functions

of Pike County both now and in the future. The immediate

impact of the AOC requirement would reverse State and

county land use policies regarding the creation of eco-

nomically developable flat land by means of surface coal

mining operations, disrupt long-settled legal relationships

between the State and Pike County regarding land use con-

26

trols and long-term land uses of surface mined land, and

force relinquishments by the County of its traditional re-

liance on privately conducted surface coal mining activities

for excavation, cut and fill work to create sites for houses,

roads, airports, and other public facilities. Because of this

impact Pike County must reallocate scarce county budget

monies to perform this work at public expense, alter its

own internal organization and augment its own work force

to perform the work itself or forego the benefits which

would otherwise be generated for its citizens.

To the extent the AOC requirement thwarts or inhibits

private residential construction and commercial develop-

ments in the County, the County will suffer diminished

property tax revenues because undeveloped hillside land

will not be converted into more highly taxable land. Sever-

ance tax turnback revenues to the County will be depressed

to the extent the AOC requirement inhibits surface coal

mining operations in the County. These losses of revenue

must be recouped by new taxes or increased tax rates on

the real property tax base, or the diminution in County

revenues translated into lower levels of “traditional govern-

mental services,” poorer schools and fewer public facilities.

The precise effect the rigid AOC requirement will have

in application to Pike County would be more tedious than

illuminating to describe. Nor is it necessary:

We do not believe particularized assessments of actual

impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented

the dispositive factor is that Congress has at-

tempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to

prescribe . . . [the land use policies] . . . to be

[exercised] by the States in their capacities as sover-

eign governments. Usery at 852-853,

27

CONCLUSION

Invading directly the constitutional, social and economic

base of power of the state, the AOC requirement of the Act

is more destructive of dual sovereignty than the FLSA

amendments struck down in Usery. Police power control

over the private use of land within its borders lies closer

to the heart of a state’s separate and independent existence

than does its unilateral control over the wages and hours of

its employees.

Every twig in the Hofeldian “bundle of sticks” making

up private ownership rights to land is created by the juris-

prudence of the states, Hunt, “Federal and State Control

of Land: A Synopsis,” originally appearing in M. Me-

Dougal & D. Haber, Property, Wealth, Land 70-94 (Michie

Publ. Co.) (1948); rights to land can be transferred only

pursuant to the situs states’ laws, Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. 8.1

(1909) ; Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942) ;

and these principles predate our federal Constitution.

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).

The dual sovereignty concept begins with the recogni-

tion that our fundamental legal rights to privately-owned

land are exclusively created, shaped.and protected by the

states under our unique federalist system. The right to

own and use land is one of these basic constitutiona! rights

under the exclusive protective control of the states which

has been consistently recognized by this Court throughout

history. Mr. Justice Washington gave voice to this premise

in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 545 (No. 3230) (C.C.

E.D. Pa., 1823) expounding on the privileges and immun-

ities of State citizens included under the clause of Arti-

cle IV:

28

“what these fundamental principles are it would per-

haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They

may, however, be comprehended under the following

general heads: Protection by the government; the en-

joyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire

and possess property of every kind . . . the right

of a citizen of one State . . . to take hold and dis-

pose of property, either real or personal . . . sub-

ject nevertheless to such restraints as the government

may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”

Id. at 547.

Even the Civil War amendments, while conferring broad

new constitutional powers on the central government, did

not destroy the dual sovereignty structure of our federalist

government. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36

(1872). The constitutional difference between the first and

second Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the New Deal era

was the attempt by Congress in the former to regulate

directly the use of land. Compare United States v. Butler,

297 U. S. 1 (1930); and Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38

(1939).

29

The provisions of the Act before the court again assault

the citadel of State sovereignty, this time in the name of

environmental protection, by directly displacing the exclu-

sive power of the states’ to control the configuration and

long-term uses of land within their borders. Those provi-

sions are and should be declared unconstitutional.

Respectfully POS 4

C...% ‘ shi Seeman

Evucene F. Moonry

Counsel of Record

University of Kentucky

College of Law

Lexington, Kentucky 40506

(606) 257-3780

Grorcr L, Szay, Jr.

JoHN Rosert LeatHers

ZaLuski, Seay anp KirKLAND

213 St. Clair Street

Post Office Box 495

Frankfort, Kentucky 40602

(502) 223-2104

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Datep: December 19, 1980

—*

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joliq snoiwe

NOS. 79-1558, 80-231 & 79-1596

se

. IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

Appellant,

V.

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Appellees.

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

Appellant,

. #

STATE OF INDIANA, ET AL.,

Appellees.

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Appellants,

V.

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

Appellee.

ses r

On Appeal from the United States District Courts for the

Western District of Virginia and Southern District of Indiana

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS IN

SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

JUSTIN ANDREW KEVER

MARK WHITE Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys General of Texas

P.O. Bux 12548, Capitol Station

JOUN W FAINTER, JR. Austin, Texas 78711

First Assistant (512) 479-8191

RICHARD FE. GRAY. II Attorneys for the State of Teras

Executive Assistant

EEE BL >

echtene

NLR Ot BOM Le

NOS. 79-1538, 80-231 & 79-1596

** &

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

s* *

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

Appellant,

V.

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Appellees.

**¢*

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

Appellant,

V.

STATE OF INDIANA, ET AL.,

Appellees.

ses

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Appellants,

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

Appellees.

On Appeal From the United States District Courts for the Western

District of Virginia and Southern District of Indiana

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS IN

SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

In January of 1978 the Railroad Commission of Texas

challenged the treatment of prime farmlands under the

federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

-2-

1977 by filing two actions which were subsequently

settled on terms acceptable to the Railroad Commission.

State of Texas v. Andrus and Bergland, Civil Action No.

A-78-CA-35 (W.D. Texas); State of Texas v. Andrus,

Civil Action No. 78-0171 (D.D.C.). Nevertheless, the

Railroad Commission believes the constitutional

arguments presented here by the Commonwealth of

Virginia to be substantial and meritorious and

respectfully urges this honorable Court to affirm the

decisions of the district court.

Respectfully submitted,

MARK WHITE

Attorney General of Texas

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.

First Assistant

RICHARD E. GRAY, III

Executive Assistant

JAMES R. MEYERS

Assistant Attorney General

JUSTIN ANDREW KEVER

Assistant Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

(512) 479-8191

Attorneys for the State of Texas

96ST.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Amicus Brief — Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. · 452 U.S. 264 | Frix