Amicus Brief — Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.
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No. 79-1538
——
SUPREME COURT OF THE UMTED STATES
October Term, 1980
CECIL D. ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior, - Appellant
versus
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLA- |
MATION ASS®CIATION, INC., Et Al, - Appellees
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLEES’ POSITION BY PIKE
COUNTY, KENTUCKY
EUGENE F. MOONEY
Counsel of Record
University of Kentucky
College of Law
Lexington, Kentucky 40506
(606) 257-3780
GEORGE L. SEAY, JR.
JOHN ROBERT LEATHERS
ZALUSKI, SEAY and KIRKLAND
P. O. Box 495
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602
(502) 223-2104
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
WESTERFIELD-BONTE CO., 619 W. KENTUCKY-P.O. BOX 3251, LOU!SVILLE, KY.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the provisions of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, Section 915(b) and (d),
30 U.S.C. §1265(b) and (d) (1979), requiring mined land
to be restored to its approximate original contour with all
highwalls eliminated is violative of the tenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
SONI DRONE os nooo sd Soe ees a neces i
I ERT Pie er ii
Seen OE GD (05 6 eee ili—vii
Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................ 1- 2
Duamary. cf ACW osc aA ee 3- 5
Argument—The Approximate Original Contour Re-
quirement of the Act Is Unconstitutional Under
the Usery Rule as Applied. .................06. 5-26
A. The Act Forces the State and County to Re-
verse Their Land Use Policies Because of the
Approximate Original Contour Requirement
or Have Their Policies Preempted. ........ 9-12
B. The Approximate Original Contour Require-
ment Directly Displaces State Land Use
COME. 5 dives ns cent ce keek Vena 12-20
C. The Approximate Original Contour Require-
ment Adversely Affects Pike County’s Inte-
gral Governmental Operations of Traditional
Government Functions. ...............000. 20-26
EE hy veer eRy oars peter Leow 27-29
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
SEE
PAGE
Cases:
Agins v. Tiburon, ____ U.S. —_-, 100 8. Ct. 2138
ENE SREP ae eae ra eee aa 21
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033 (6th
eae Pe ibs 0565s Ke5 oho. oo 0s os hose 7
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 i) Sg eee 21
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 545 (No. 3230)
ES RD oc 3 27, 28
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).. 21
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 See ye 27
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 a 7
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 * gaara 5d, 20
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) .... 9
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
ED oi EE Gian 9
Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. 8. 556 (2088) iiss 27
James Moore, IBSMA 79-10, 1 IBSMA 216, United
States Department of Interior, Office of Hear-
ings and Appeals (July 20, DE fa oss Heed ice 19, 23
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
NCE EIS ESE AE eearae es m 27
Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869) 9
Marshal v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir.
EOS EOL ER eel pega en ae ae 11
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (3988). .... 10
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
a6 a8 0g oo 'd's bao co ccdco ces, 9
Metcalf @ Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) ... 9
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 ( RARE ee 28
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
SRST Eee Oe 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 20, 26, 27
New York v. United States, 326 U. 8. 572 (1946)... 7,9
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 DUNN ives sis tc 7
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (197 Se 9
PAGE
Public Service Co. of North Carolina v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 587 F. 2d 716
SE EN MONEE kin a0 SC Ca AN ban asyd aaa een ck 7
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
LEE Sak AUCES «bone R bRkD 4 ak dik wrk Reicks 28
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) 10
Tollage Creek Elkhorn Mining Co., IBSMA 80-32,
2 IBSMA 341, United States Department of In-
terior, Office of Hearings and Appeals (Nov. 24,
recat PRE OT EPEC OT LG PORE te Oe 19, 20, 23
Umited States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1930) ........ 28
Umited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ...... 9
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ............. 21
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) .......... 9
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ........... 7
Statutes:
hs es SNR As Be Os hk OAK s cnc cdc cvuAG cau passim
Taxing and Spending Clause .................. 9,10
Necessary and Proper Clause ................. 7,8
Rarer be ee rer oa ae 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Ris ee SOs NG Eg SAUD SN ic a's o wate pole ae & eb we 7
U.S. Const., Art. VI (Supremacy Clause) ........ 8, 10
Rs ee UN, 5h bs ho ck 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11
Sie MAIO, RR ov ie ines Oh hn Cok eo 7
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857 et seg. ............ 13
Costal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1452
OF QU aids ie RRO ROSS Chad glow ds Wowk Ch: 13
Costal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1456(3) (a) 138
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
Ee Oe OO ii ik bua id oie ea sev beo ees 13
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C.
SO NOUN 6588's 5s DA eA Tien BENE ROA Soca passim
Section 503, 30 U.S.C. §1253 (1979) ...... 10, 11, 12
Section 504, 30 U.S.C. §1254 (1979) ......... 10, 12
Vv
PAGE
Section 505, 30 U.S.C. §1255 (1979) ......... 10
Section 515, 30 U.S.C. §1265 (1979) ......... 18
Section 515(b)(3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b) (3)
SE Sia opa a Nb on deter re 4, 10, 12, 19
Section 515(c), 30 U.S.C. §1265(c) (1979) 4, 10, 14, 17
Section 515(c)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(c)(2)
SEPT bbrad eroding teeta Case 15, 17
Section 515(c)(3)(B), 30 U.S.C. §1265(c¢) (3)
ey CEE vs nip pes: ise aks. 18
Section 515(d), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (1979)... 4, 10,
14, 15, 17, 18, 19
Section 515(d)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (2)
POR Sek sino ve ve DN vactteldadeaat oe 15, 17
Section 515(d)(4), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (4)
RAMEE os obs eh gud dd ti geo pecmine oe 14
Section 515(e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (1979) ... 4, 10,
14, 15, 17, 18, 19
Section 515(e)(1), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (1)
MRT Sab s sre Metin Kae ecuaces Cae cue 15, 17
Section 515(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (2)
SUPE. Sig ia tigrcekiin tbe ee. 15
Section 515(e)(3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (3)
Case, | Ae eT ETT Cotes Saat Rr Se 17
Section 515(e)(3)(C), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (3)
Ord SEMEN os vet OR a 8 17
Section 516, 30 U.S.C. $1266 ( Pc cen <. 18
Section 528(3), 30 U.S.C. §1278(3) (1979) ... 19
Section 701(2), 30 U.S.C. §1291(2) (1979) ... 13
Section 711, 30 U.S.C. §1301 co Poop 18, 19
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.201 <5 } BRR 21
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.113 bo Pe 21
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.133 fp) eR een 21
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.141 2) DA GneR 21
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.183-.191 ost Pa |
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.203 tos Bae 21
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.273-.283 2) eee |
vi
PAGE
Kentucky Revised Statutes 100.303 (1971) ........ 21
Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 350 (1977) ... 22
Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.060 (1977) ........ 1i
Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.050 (1977) ........ 11
Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.090 (1977) ........ 11
Kentucky Revised Statutes 350.095-.117 (1977) .... 11
Kentucky Acts 1980, ch. 62, preamble ............. 12
Federal Regulations:
SE OE EEO vp cinkbchnstananacaduscnan 13, 14
SD CP ee CODCOD ini e sicthnes Che ved seaasas 19
90 OP Bi BIO tee) GIBTB) . winn one dives tsvnsidnads 15
90 CIB: 67OG.14(6) (3) (IDTB) .. 5. anc ceedessccs 17
ar as Re AITO oc kn cs cnsn td cwdlbennwew ce 15
80 OF Be. STSRIG(e)(1) (IBTE) on. ek cee escees 17
30 C.F.RB. $785.16(c) (4) (1979) .......ceccccccces 17
RS Bk ge | rrr 16
30 C.F.R. §816.104(b)(2) (1979) .............048. 16
Be Gore Ee CRUDE 6 o's0 ds Sc eccersenccences 17
30 C.F.R. §817.102(a) (2) (1979) ....... ccc ceecnce 16
90: OF: SERRIAD) CIRO) o 5. vedicusicscncesn 16
Be Re a Sn COME, wine seesnducavdns dveee cae 15
SO O.F ER. $696. 16(a) (39TO) oon ccs cacececccecct 16
Miscellaneous:
eg ee | re eee ee me 14, 15
44 Wed. Reg. 15291 (1979) .........cccccccecesces 15
Annual Report 1978-1979, Kentucky Departmeut of
Maeva Cee. TF, TOTO) da vc hove vi eaescecdes 25
H.R. Rep. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 106
EUED..°5 ov Cha'gs cag sXe DRL WER Rb ORO RSNA ORES 13
Hunt, “Federal and State Control of Land: A Syn-
opsis,” in Property, Wealth, Land, (M. Mc-
Dougal and D. Haber, 1948) at 70-94 .......... 27
Vil
PAGE
Industrial Resources Pike County, Kentucky, Ken-
tucky Department of Commeree, ( i a ae 25
Kentucky Aviation System Plan, Landrum and
acjeasne poh EE Oe nC I aia ap 22
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1980
No. 79-1538
Cecm D. Anprus, Secretary of the Interior, - Appellant
Vv.
Vircin1A SurRFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
Association, Inc., Er At., - - - Appellees
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLEES’ POSITION BY PIKE
COUNTY, KENTUCKY
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Pike County is a political subdivision of the State of
Kentucky. The City of Pikeville is the county seat and
major urban center.
The County and the incorporated municipalities provide
their citizens roads, streets and bridges, public sewer
and water services through municipal agencies and public
water districts, refuse collection and disposal, police and
fire protection, parks and recreational facilities.
Planning and zoning authority for all areas of the
county is exercised by the Pikeville-Elkhorn City-Pike
2
County Planning Commission. Zoning is enforced in all
areas of the county. Subdivision regulations are enforced
inside the City of Pikeville and five miles beyond the city
limits. Municipal building and housing codes are enforced
in the incorporated areas of the county. Ninety-four units
of public housing are provided by Pikeville and the County.
The 1977-78 budget for Pike County was $1.2 million,
exclusive of federal revenue sharing funds, which came
from local property tax levies and turned back portions of
the State severance tax from coal mined in the county.
Pike County occupies the easternmost tip of the State
of Kentucky and lies wholly within the Appalachian coal
fields. Entirely mountainous in topography, over 75%
of the county’s surface is mountain slope and the remainder
lies in the floodplain areas of the Big Sandy River and its
tributaries. The County, in 1977-78, was Kentucky’s largest
coal producing county. The County produced nearly 20
million tons in 1978-79 worth more than $500 million on
which nearly $26 million in severance taxes were paid.
Pike County’s economy, employment base and tax reve-
nues are solely dependent upon coal mining. The type,
quality and level of public services are thus directly de-
pendent on coal mining. County land use policies tradi-
tionally reflect the needs of its coal economy and depend
upon the local coal industry for excavation, cut and fill,
stream chanelization and much rural road construction.
Being adversely impacted by the direct and indirect efforts
of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C. §$§1201
et seq. [hereinafter “the Act”], the County wishes its views
on the constitutionality of the Act under the tenth amend-
ment to be advanced in support of Appellees.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Approximate Original Contour Requirement of
the Act Is Unconstitutional Under the Usery
Rule as Applied
The tenth amendment establishes a constitutional im-
munity for the states against the federal government and
thus reflects the dual sovereignty structure of our Constitu-
tion. This immunity prevails over commerce clause legis-
lation to the extent the latter would invade a state’s free-
dom to structure integral operations regarding their tradi-
tional governmental functions. National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). Thus Congress has no
power under the commerce clause to force, displace or
penalize states or their political subdivisions regarding
their important traditional affairs, whether or not the sub-
ject matter is in interstate commerce. This case presents
the question of whether the Act as applied in Appalachian
counties does have such a displacing effect.
A. The Act Forces the State and County to Reverse Their
Land Use Policies Because of the Approximate Orig-
inal Contour Requirement or Have Their Policies
Preempted
Federal categorical regulatory programs which are
backed up by the threat of federal preemption—unlike
categorical assistance programs—are inherently “coercive.”
The fact that the Act does not directly command state offi-
cials to do or not to do anything does not ameliorate its
inherent coercion where the threat is to preempt state con-
trol over its lands. Kentucky delegates to its counties con-
trol over land uses within their boundaries and would not
require, but for the Act, that mined land be restored to its
OT ee Re he ee
4
approximate original contour [hereinafter “AOC”] in de-
ference to the counties’ authority, needs and desires for
flat, developable land. The 1980 Kentucky General As-
sembly was coerced by the Act to adopt post-effective
statutes changing its land use policy.
B. The Approximate Original Contour Require-
ment Directly Displaces State Land Use Policy
There is a direct conflict between the state and federal
land use policies regarding AOC, a conflict which Congress
intended and wrote into the Act in the form of Sections
515(b) (3) and 515(¢), (d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b) (3),
(c), (d) and (e) (1979). These AOC provisions, with their
inflexible requirement that all highwalls be covered in all
postmining circumstances, as applied in Appalachia, permit
no meaningful variances from AOC even for valid alterna-
tive postmining land use purposes. Further, the Secretary
of the Interior [hereinafter “the Secretary”] has inter-
preted the Act and taken enforcement actions indicating
that meaningful variances will not be available under the
permanent program.
, C. The Approximate Original Contour Requirement Ad-
versely Affects Pike County’s Integral Operations Re-
garding Governmental Functions
The intended and applied effect of the AOC provisions
directly affects Pike County’s land use control authority
and indirectly affects its governmental structure and opera-
tions regarding public services and facilities, housing and
private commercial development, revenues, and its long-
range economic development plans and prospects. Pike
County's traditional reliance on private coal industry ex-
Hy)
cavation activities to create level, developable land for
itself and private surface owners has been and will con-
tinue to be defeated completely by the AOC requirement
of the Act as applied in Appalachia.
ARGUMENT
The Approximate Original Contour Requirement of
the Act Is Unconstitutional Under the Usery
Rule as Applied
“The Tenth Amendment expressly declares the consti-
tutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system.” Fry v. United
States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). The tenth amend-
ment expresses the dual sovereignty structure of govern-
mental authority embodied in our Constitution and carves
out an area of state immunity from Article I exercises of
power by Congress:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes
of sovereignty attaching to every state government.
which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but because the Consti-
tution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
matter. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S.
833, 845 (1976).
Modern constitutional doctrine marking the boundary be-
tween tenth amendment immunity and the commerce clause
was formulated by this Court in Usery. The Court stated,
“We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments oper-
ate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
6
functions, they are not within the authority granted Con-
gress by Art. I, §8, cl. 3.” Jd. at 852. Following Usery
it is clear that the central issue in cases presenting clashes
between state immunity under the tenth amendment and
Congress’ powers under the commerce clause is whether the
congressional legislation as applied displaces state “funce-
tions essential to separate and independent existence.”
Id. at 845.
The criteria employed in Usery to determine the con-
stitutional effect of challenged wage and hour provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act when applied to the states
and their political subdivisions were: 1) the increased
operating costs imposed on states, cities and counties lead-
ing to “forced relinquishment of important governmental
activties” Id. at 847, 2) displacement of state policies re-
garding integral governmental operations, relating to tradi-
tional local governmental functions such “as fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation” Jd. at 851;' and 3) direct or indirect penaliza- -
tion of States for structuring the conduct of their tradi-
tional affairs in a manner at variance with Congress’
policy choices.
This tenth amendment immunity extends to the integral
governmental functions of the states’ political subdivisions,
placing them also “beyond the reach of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause” just as if these operations
were performed by the state itself. Jd. at 855 n. 50.
The Usery case stands on far broader constitutional
ground than the Secretary would allow. The Usery rule is
1This list of traditional governmental functions are examples
only and ‘‘not an exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and
(Footnote continued on next page)
-
—
7
that admittedly valid commerce clause legislation, even
when accompanied by formal necessary and proper clause
findings, cannot be applied to displace, directly or in-
directly, in any substantial matter the free exercise of state
powers relating to “functions essential to separate and in-
dependent existence.” Id. at 845. This aspect of inter-
governmental immunity complements the states’ absolute
immunity from suit prohibited by the eleventh amendment ;
their immunity from direct federal taxes, New York vy.
United States, 326 U. 8. 572 (1946) ; and the absolute rights
conferred by Article IV §3 of the United States Constitu-
tion. It reflects the federalism considerations underlying
their executive branch immunity from the Sherman Act
prohibitions under Parker vy. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) ;
the protection of their judical proceedings from undue in-
terference by the federal judiciary, Younger vy. Harris, 401
U. S. 37 (1971), and respect for the economic regulatory
legislative enactments. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. §. 726
(1963). When commerce clause legislation clashes with
tenth amendment immunities any substantial invasion by
Congress of states’ traditional governmental functions
raises a presumption of unconstitutionality which can be
overcome only by the highest national considerations.
The Secretary attempts to avoid the thrust of the tenth
amendment claim here by first asserting that the Act does
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
support activities . . . of state and local governments’’ which
may be similarly protected. Usery at 851n.16. The case-by-case
process of inclusion and exclusion has begun. Municipal operation
of an airport is protected, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598
F. 2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) ; operation of state oil and gas business
is not. Public Service Co. of North Carolina v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 587 F. 2d 716 (5th Cir, 1979),
8
not “coerce” the states at all because its commands concern-
ing AOC are directed to private citizens and not state offi-
cials, and then by contending that the provisions of AOC
are not directed at the states’ land use powers and only
incidentally affect them. He rests his case primarily on
Congress’ power under the commerce clause. That reliance
is misplaced.?
2Well-settled precedent and conventional analysis establishing
the reach of Congress’ powers under the commerce clause over
private commercial conduct do not control this case. The issue
here is not whether in exercise of its commerce clause powers
Congress can impose such reclamation requirements on privately
conducted surface coal mining operations as it deems ‘‘necessary
and proper’’ to regulate interstate commerce or protect the en-
vironment, and thus castle this judgment behind the supremacy
clause, but whether in so doing it directly or indirectly displaces
state policy choices in the constitutionally protected areas dr the
state’s traditional governmental functions, viz, local control over
long-term land uses. Consequently, formal necessary and proper
clause ‘‘findings’’ by Congress that the AOC requirement ‘‘affects
commerce’’ or is in a ‘‘class of activities’ affecting commerce, or a
stated congressional ‘‘purpose’’ to ‘‘direct’’ surface coal mining
operations into areas where ‘‘reclamation is feasible’’ and away
from areas where it is not, and the fact—if it be one—that the
AOC requirement is thus the ‘‘heart of the Act’’, are neither con-
trolling nor even particularly relevant. To the contrary, the tenth
amendment immunity issue must be first resolved before the con-
ventional commerce clause-supremacy clause issues can arise at all.
Constitutional principles applicable to the seope of Congress’ power
to regulate commerce do not decide and bear only peripherally on
the scope of the tenth amendment immunity. Congress could not
bind this court directly by ‘‘finding’’ or ‘‘declaring’’ that AOC or
its inflexible ‘‘highwall’’ requirements do not infringe on tenth
amendment reserved powers, nor can it do so indirectly by ‘‘find-
ing’’ that uncovered highwalls ‘‘affect commerce’’ and thus (im-
pliedly) do not infringe upon the tenth amendment powers. The
constitutional test of the validity of the impact of Congressional
commerce clause legislation which impacts the tenth amendment
(Footnote continued on next page)
9
A. The Act Forces the State and County to Reverse Their
Land Use Policies Because of the Approximate Orig-
inal Contour Requirement or Have Their Policies
Preempted
Appellants seek to distinguish this case from the Usery
rule by asserting that the Act does not coerce the states
because its provisions are directed not to “States qua
States,” but only to the actions of private citizens. That
cosmetic feature of the Act does not take the Act out from
under the Usery rule nor the broader constitutional prin-
cipes on which Usery rests. Commerce clause regulatory
legislation backed by the threat of federal preemption of
traditional areas of state control—the categorical regula-
tory program—stands on altogether different constitutional
footings than the taxing and spending clause categorical
assistance programs.
If “coercion” is required in these “categorical regula-
tory” programs at all, the Act is clearly coercive. More
accurately, all federal categorical regulatory programs are
inherently coercive because they rest on the threat of fed-
eral preemption.®
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
immunities is not only that the legislation must have a ‘‘rational
basis’’ under the necessary and proper clause but the legislation
must also survive the more stringent arbitrariness principle of the
fifth amendment. Usery at 841. Resolution of the tenth amend-
ment issue in this case is controlled by the constitutional principles,
criteria and reasoning of McCulloch v. Maryiand, i7 U. 8S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819); National Association of Cities v. Usery, 426
U. 8. 833 (1976) ; New York v. United States, 326 U. 8. 572 (1946) ;
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); and Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869) ; and not by those
of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. 8. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) ; United States
v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) ; Wickard v. Fiburn, 317 U. 8. 111
(1942) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241
(1964) ; and Perez v. United States, 402 U. 8. 146 (1971).
10
The applicable principles here do not rest on the mere
fortuity that in Usery the challenged FLSA amendments
were coercive because expressly directed at state and local
governmental officials as employers implementing state
policy choices regarding public employees’ wage levels and
hours of work. This Court made clear that the constitu-
tional vice in Usery was not the direct federal commands
to state officials, and not merely the monetary costs imposed
on the states directly by those commands, but was instead
the consequent “forced relinquishment” of state preroga-
tives. If the form of the invasion is determinative, Con-
gress can easily and deftly avoid all tenth amendment limi-
tations by the simple expedient of refraining from ordering
8Congress may confer on federal citizens whatever monetary
benefits it chooses pursuant to its Article I §8 clause I power to
tax and spend for the ‘‘general welfare’’ and may enlist the states
without coercion to act as its agent in distributing the federal
largesse through voluntarily enacted state categorical assistance
programs without preempting or invading the tenth amendment
powers of the state. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. 8. 447 (1923). Categorical
regulatory programs, on the other hand, rest on Congress’ power to
regulate the conduct of federal citizens directly through exercise
of some affirmative grant in the constitution, coupled with the
preemptive effect given its legislation by the supremacy clause.
U.S. Const. art. VI. If voluntary participation by the states is
a constitutional factor at all in categorical regulatory schemes,
then the integral threat of federal preemption which must underlie
these programs provides the necessary ‘‘coercion’’. It is clear that
both a state regulatory program under Section 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253
(1979) of the Act or a federal program under Section 504, 30
U.S.C. §1254 (1979), must enforce Section 515(b) (3) and Sections
515(¢c), (d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b)(3), (ce), (d) and (e)
(1979), exactly as written, and unless the state program does so
the subject will be preempted. §505, 30 U.S.C. 1255 (1979). This
presents no ‘‘choice’’ at all. It is clear the State of Kentucky felt
it was ‘‘eoerced’’ by the Act. See p. 12, infra.
11
state and local officials directly to do or not to do some-
thing. This contention—the heart of the Secretary’s posi-
tion on this issue—was obviously rejected by this Court in
Usery. Mr. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Usery recites many
existing examples of when federal law directly prohibits
state and local officials from taking particular actions with-
out transgressing the tenth amendment issues. Usery at
880. These instances of direct federal commands to state
officials qua state officials are not automatically invalidated
by the Usery rule, but the reason is not because they are not
coercive but instead because they may or may not adversely
affect integral governmental operations in performance of
traditional state functions. Marshal v. City of Sheboygan,
077 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978).
Kentucky’s strip mining law prior to the Act contained
most of the elements reflected in the federal law, and, allow-
ing for relative differences in stringency, regulated strip
mining operations by substantially the same requirements
as appear in Title V of the Act. Thus Kentucky regulated
the method of mining operations: drainage control and the
disposal of spoil, KRS 350.090 (1977) ; required backfilling,
regrading, and revegetation, KRS 350.095-.117 (1977) ; and
employed a permit application process, KRS 350.060 (1977) ;
required reclamation bond, KRS 350.060 (1977); and pro-
vided administrative inspection and citation procedures to
enforce these requirements, KRS 350.050 (1977).
State policy regarding the AOC requirement of the Act,
however, is exactly contrary to federal policy. The Ken-
tucky General Assembly in 1978 and 1980 amended the Ken-
tucky statute to make it sufficiently consistent with the Act
to meet the requirements of Section 503, 30 U.S.C. §1253
(1979), in order to seek “primacy” under the Act. In so
12
legislating, however, the 1980 Kentucky General Assembly
knew it was being coerced:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky objects particularly
to the mandatory and inflexible requirement that all
surface mined land must be returned to its approximate
original contour with all highwalls completely covered
in all circumstances . . . and if not coerced by the
threatened denial of primacy by the federal office of
surface mining, the State would choose to address these
matters by measures of its own devising. Kentucky
Acts 1980, ch. 62, preamble.
and expressly reserved the option to challenge the require-
ment in court.
B. The Approximate Original Contour Require-
ment Directly Displaces State Land Use Policy
There is a direct and necessary conflict between the ex-
press land use provisions of the Act and the land use
policies of Kentucky regarding the environmental protec-
tion performance standards of both the interim [Section
503, 30 U.S.C. §1253 (1979)] and permanent [Section 504,
30 U.S.C. §1254 (1979) ] programs that all highwalls created
on surface mined lands be covered and the land returned to
AOC. No exceptions to AOC are permitted by the Act.‘
Section 515(b)(3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(b)}{3) (1979), re-
quires all surface coal mining operations “as a minimum to
compact . . . and grade in order to restore the approxi-
‘This aspect of explicit and direct land use control in the Act
distinguishes it from other federal environmental protection cate-
gorical regulatory schemes. Clearly, the obvious interstate impact
dimensions to air and water pollution provide an adequate basis
for comprehesive commerce clause legislation. In contrast with
(Footnote continued on next page)
13
mate original contour of the land with all highwalls, . . ,
eliminated”. (Emphasis added. )5
This AOC concept of the Act embodies two distinct and
separate requirements:
1) the “configuration” requirement that the mined area
must be backfilled and graded so that it “closely
resembles” the pre-mining configuration of the land;
2) the “highwall” requirement that “all highwalls [must
be] eliminated.’¢
Congress deliberately chose this direct displacement, there
was nothing “incidental” about it. H.R. Rep. No. 95-493,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 106 (1977).
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the Act, however, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857 et 8€q., ex-
haustively regulating emissions of air contaminants, contains no
direct federal land use requirements or prohibitions; and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq., con-
tains no direct federal land use provisions. Even the federal
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §1452 et seq., provides
that federally permitted activities effecting land use in the coastal
zone must comply with the State approved plan 16 U.S.C. §1456
(3) (a).
°The definition of ‘‘approximate original contour’’ (AOC) in
Section 701 (2), 30 U.S.C. §1291(2) (1979), is: ‘that surface
configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined
area so that the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access
roads, closely resembles the general surface configuration of the
land prior to mining and blends into and complements the drain-
age pattern of the surrounding terrain, with all highwalls and spoil
piles eliminated. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
°The term ‘‘highwalls’’ is not defined in the Act. The Secre-
tary’s regulations define the word as “‘the face of exposed over-
burden and coal in an open cut of a surface coal mining activity or
for entry to underground mining activities.’’ 30 CFR §701.5
(1979). 4
14
The Secretary asserts by way of justification for AOC
that because there are such statutory variances available
the Act provides “flexibility” and thereby avoids unfairness
or arbitrariness. These general assertions are misleading
because they are essentially inaccurate. Upon examina-
tion in light of the facts and the Secretary’s regulations,
statutory variances dwindle to nonexistence in the moun-
tainous counties of Appalachia.
A variance from the “configuration” requirement is
provided by Section 515(c), 30 U.S.C. §1265(¢) (1979), for
mountaintop removal mining operations, and by Sections
515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e) (1979), for
contour mining operations on “steep slopes”.? These
variances theoretically permit the mined land to be left
flat or gently rolling for approved postmining land uses.
7Steep slopes are defined by the Act as those ‘‘above twenty
degrees or such lesser slope as may be defined by the regulatory
authority after consideration of soil, climate or other characteris-
ties of a region or state’. §515/ )(4), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (4)
(1979).
This distinction between steep and non-steep slopes for pur-
poses of authorizing a variance from the configuration aspect of
the AOC requirement is irrational if the requirement is intended
as an environmental protection measure. There would seem to be
more need and less danger to public health, safety and the environ-
ment from landslides, sedimentation and erosion—and thus ample
justification—for a variance from AOC for non-steep slopes where
such occurrences would be rare, and just the contrary for steep
slopes. As if acknowledging this anomally the Secretary’s regula-
tions define ‘‘steep slopes’’ in the statutory language, 30 CFR
§701.5 (1979), (or such lesser slope . . . region or state) and
his official comments coyly intimate that the qualifying phrase
permits the regulatory authority to classify slopes Jess than twenty
degrees as ‘‘steep’’ for purposes of broadening the Section 515(d)
and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e) (1979), variance. 44 Fed.
Reg. 15084 (1979).
15
In reality, however, there is no meaningful variance from
the “configuration” requirement for contour mining on the
steep slopes in Pike County despite theoretical availability
in the Act because of the absolute “highwall elimination”
requirement.
There are no statutory variances from the “highwall”
requirement. No highwalls remain in mountaintop removal
operations, Section 515(c)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(¢) (2)
(1979), 30 CFR §785.14(b) (1979) ; but highwalls must be
eliminated in all contour mining operations on steep slopes,
Section 515 (d)(2) and (e)(1), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d)(2) and
(e)(1) (1979); 30 CFR 6785.16 (1979). The Secretary
takes the position that:
The intention of the Act was not to provide loopholes
by which operations might be conducted without
eliminating the highwall. The variance provision per-
mits the operator to regrade the (sic) effected area to
a steeper angle than the original topography; how-
ever, the stability of the backfilled materia] must be
assured and the highwall must be eliminated by back-
filling or reduction. OSM believes that the drafters of
Section 515(e)(2) meant what they wrote, when they
provided that the variance would be from “approxi-
mate original contour,” and not from the highwall
covering requirement, which is a separate requirement
of Section 515(d)(2) of the Act. 44 Fed. Reg. 15084
(1979).
See also 30 CFR §826.15 (1979) and the Secretary’s official
comment thereto at 44 Fed. Reg. 15291 (1979).
The “highwall” requirement of AOC effectively fore-
closes in Pike County, Kentucky, all possible application of
the Section 515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e)
(1979), variances for alternative postmining land uses.
The geophysical facts foreclose configuration variances if
16
highwalls must be covered in all instances. The angle of
repose for spoil material in Pike County (which are pre-
dominantly sandstone and shale composition) even when
mechanically compacted, is both physically and legally a
fifty-percent slope [lv:2h (50 percent) plus a minimum
static safety factor of not more than 1.3]. 30 CFR §816.102
(b) (1979) and 30 CFR $816.104(b)(2) (1979) (thin over-
burden); 30 CFR §826.12(b) (1979) (performance stand-
ards for steep slopes) ; 30 CFR §826.15(a) (1979) (limited
variances for contour mining of steep slopes); and 30
CFR §817.102(a)(2) (1979) (underground mining). <A
normal height highwall in Pike County (40 to 90 feet)
covered by a fifty-percent slope backfill will effectively
cover 50 to 80 percent of the surface of a normal width
contour mining bench in Pike County (60 to 120 feet wide)
thereby reducing the potential flat land remaining for post-
mining land use purposes to a narrow (15 to 30 feet wide)
curving, strip extending around a mountain contour for
1500 to 5000 linear feet. A theoretical statutory variance
from the “configuration” aspect of AOC is, practically
speaking, unavailable in Pike County, Kentucky, in light
of the de facto “configuration” effect of the “highwall
elimination” requirement, from which there is no variance
possible.
All surface coal mining in Pike County is done on
steep, rough, undeveloped mountain land, some previously
mined, not suitable in its original configuration for any
public or economic use other than mining, or perhaps,
forestry. Left flat after mining it is suitable for agri-
cultural uses in remote areas, and for public or economic
uses when located near urbanized areas.®
8The only authorized postmining land uses for which ‘‘con-
figuration’’ variances may be granted are ‘‘industrial, commercial,
(Footnote continued on next page)
17
Variances from the configuration requirement of AOC
in contour mining operations on steep slopes cannot be
granted unless “the watershed control of the area is im-
proved” Section 515(e)(1) and (e)(3)(C), 30 U.S.C.
§1265(e)(1) and (e)(3)(C) (1979). The administrative
interpretation of this requirement is that the postmining
land use must affirmatively reduce total suspended solids
and reduce flood hazards within the watershed by reducing
total flow as compared to the pre-mining hydrologic situa-
tion. 30 CFR §785.16(c)(4) (1979).
Variances in mountaintop removal operations must be
predicated upon authorized postmining land use plans and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
agricultural, residential or public facility ( including recreational
facilities)’’ for mountaintop removal operations, Section 515(c)
(2), 80 U.S.C. §1265(¢)(2) (1979); and for **industrial, com-
mercial, residential or public facilities ( including recreational
facilities)’’ for contour mining operations on steep slopes under
Section 515(d) (2), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) (2) (1979). There is no
explanation or justification given in the Act or its legislative
history for expressly authorizing a variance for an agricultural
postmining land use in mountaintop removal mining operations but
not in contour mining operations on steep slopes. The postmining
land use potential is the same in both mining circumstances, and
the language, structure and requirements of Sections 515(¢), (d)
and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(¢), (d) and (e) (1979), are so similar as
to suggest that the omission of ‘‘agricultural’’ from the list of
authorized land uses of Section 515(e) (3), 30 U.S.C. §1265(e) (3)
(1979), is either the result of a typographical error or Congres-
sional inadvertence. Whether deliberate or otherwise, the dis-
tinction is irrational. In Pike County the omission is crucial be-
cause contour mining on steep slopes is virtually the only feasible
method available, and agriculture is the most feasible alternative
post-mining land use. The Secretary has nevertheless rigorously
sutured the distinction into his regulations. Compare 30 CFR
§785.14(¢)(1) (1979) (mountaintop removal), with 30 CFR
§785.16(¢)(1) (1979) (contour mining on steep slopes), and 30
CFR §816.133 (1979) (postmining land uses).
18
“appropriate assurances” regarding, inter alia, “compati-
bility with adjacent land uses”, “expected need and mar-
ket”, “investment in necessary public facilities”, private
financial capability for completion and supporting com-
mitments from public agencies. Section 515(c)(3)(B),
380 U.S.C. §1265(c)(3)(B) (1979). No such statutory re-
quirements (regarding “appropriate assurances” for com-
patibility, economic feasibility, financial commitments, etc.)
are expressed in the Act for variances to support postmin-
ing land uses in contour mining operations.
The relatively small size of normal contour mining;
permit areas in Pike County, together with the fact that
outcrop coal deposits suitable for extraction by “steep
slope” mining methods are situated throughout the county
miles from any source of water, sewer or other “public
facilities”, dictates that Section 515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C.
§1265(d) and (e) (1979), variances for “industrial, com-
mercial, residential or public use (including recreational
facilities)” postmining land uses are not available in Pike
County. The Secretary’s savage restriction by adminis-
trative interpretation of already narrow statutory vari-
ances belies his assertions here that variances soften the
impact of the AOC requirement.®
Section 711, 30 U.S.C. §1301 (1979), empowers the Secretary
to ‘‘authorize departures in individual cases on an experimental
basis from the environmental protection performance standards’’
of Section 515, 30 U.S.C. §1265 (1979), and 516, 30 U.S.C. §1266
(1979), ‘‘in order to allow . . . post-mining land use for in-
dustrial, commercial, residential, or public use (including recrea-
tion facilities. . . .’’ These narrow ‘‘experimental practices’’
exemptions must provide environmental protection to the land
equal to the normal requirements, must not be larger or more
numerous than necessary to determine ‘‘the effectiveness or eco-
nomic feasibility’’ of the experimental practice, and must meet
(Footnote continued on next page)
19
The Secretary’s enforcement actions under the interim
program indicate clearly the effect of his permanent pro-
gram regulations regarding the Section 015(b) (3), 30
U.S.C. §1265(b) (3) (1979), highwall requirement in Sec-
tions 515(d) and (e), 30 U.S.C. §1265(d) and (e) (1979),
variance situations. In Tollage Creek Elkhorn Mining
Co., IBSMA 80-32, 2 IBSMA 341, United States Depart-
ment of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals (Nov.
24, 1980), the Interior Board of Surface Mining Appeals
held that the Act and regulations compelled it to uphold
an OSM notice of violation issued to Tollage Creek Elkhorn
Mining Co. for failure to cover highwalls left uncovered
as portions of an access road to a proposed commercial] tree
farm in Pike County for which Tollage Creek had been
formally granted a postmining land use variance by the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the minimum standards of the Act for public health and safety.
The legislative history makes abundantly clear that Congress in-
tended the ‘‘experimental practices’’ exemption to be available for
departures from the AOC requirement for postmining land uses,
While the Secretary has granted a few Section 711, 30 U.S.C.
§1301 (1979), exemptions from some of the prescribed mining
performance standards, he has not granted any ‘‘experimental
practices’’ reclamation exemptions for departures from the ‘‘high-
wall’’ aspect of the AOC requirement.
OSM has also declined to honor the Kentucky ‘‘on-site con-
struction exemption’’ which exempts from the full permit and per-
formance standards of the interim State surface mining law bona
fide construction exeavation which incidentally encounters coal.
James Moore, IBSMA 79-10, 1 IBSMA 216, United States Depart-
ment of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals (July 20,
1979). The permanent program regulations further severely re-
strict the Section 528(3), 30 U.S.C. §1278(3) (1979), exemption
for ‘‘the extraction of coal as an incidental part of Federal, State
or local government-financed highway or other construction’’. 30
CFR Part 707 (1979).
20
State regulatory agency. The uncontradicted proof was
that the access road and exposed highwalls were com-
pletely safe, well engineered and would cause absolutely no
environmental harm whatsoever, and the Administrative
Law Judge had so found. He held, however, that he was
bound by the Act and regulations to require that all high-
walls in all circumstances be eliminated. The Board on
appeal reluctantly affirmed, noting:
It is with difficulty that we have reached the result in
this case. Commonsense and fairness would appear to
require an opposite result. The Federal law seems
inescapable, however. Had Congress been presented
with the factual situation herein, where elimination of
the highwall would not benefit the environment but
only burden the operator or landowner, it may have
provided in the Act for some exception to the rigid
backfilling requirement. Apparently, it was not.
Clearly, it did not. We are constrained to affirm the
Chief Administrative Law Judge. Id. at 352.
C. The Approximate Original Contour Requirement Ad-
versely Affects Pike County’s Integral Governmental
Operations of Traditional Governmental Functions
The thrust of the Usery rule is that commerce clause
legislation is unconstitutional as applied where the effect
of the federal legislation displaces “state choices as to how
state governmental operations should be structured” or
“force the States to remake such choices themselves” Usery
at 853 (declining to overrule Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975) on this ground). The record in this case
is replete with examples of the precise effect of the AOC
requirement on counties in Southwest Virginia, and it
similarly, directly and immediately displaces Pike County’s
land use control authority regarding the configuration of
21
land for purposes of residential housing development, com-
mercial development and the construction of public
facilities.
A “traditional governmental function” of States is con-
trol over the use of land within their boundaries.” This is
not disputed.
In Kentucky the land use control power js delegated by
the State to the counties and cities, KRS 100.201 (1971).
These powers may be exercised by cities, counties or reg-
ional planning units, KRS 100.113 (1971) ; with planning
commissions, KRS 100.133 (1971), appointed by mayors
and county judges. KRS 100.141 ( 1971). A comprehensive
plan is required, KRS 100.183-191 (1971); and the units
may exercise the power to zone, KRS 100.203 ( 1971) ; regu-
late subdivisions, KRS 120.273-283 (1971) ; and require con-
struction permits to insure compliance, KRS 100.303 (1971).
Pike County has exercised this delegated power by estab-
lishing a joint planning commission, comprehensive plan,
and a zoning ordinance for Pikeville and for an area five
miles outside its municipal boundaries.
The State of Kentucky through its own administrative
agency regulates the temporary land uses of surface coal
mining operations in the interest of environmental protec-
tion and thereby prescribes the attendant temporary land
This Court noted in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n. 18
(1975), that ‘‘zoning laws and their provisions, long considered
essential to effective urban planning, are peculiarly within the
province of the State and local legislative authorities’. How
essential to the separate and independent existence is suggested by
the range of permissible objectives sanctioned by this Court:
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. 8. 365 (1926) (encourage
industrial development) ; Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. 8. 1 (1974)
(dictate the social character of neighborhoods) ; Agins v. Tiburon,
—— U.S. ___, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980) (restrict urbanization).
22
uses. KRS Chapter 350 (1977). Long-term land use of the
mined area after the surface mining operation reclamation
is completed is subject only to local control. Further,
Kentucky’s statutory reclamation requirements concern-
ing those aspects of long-term land configuration directly
prohibited by the Act—allowing highwalls to be left ex-
posed, mountaintops and contour mining benches left flat
in order to form large tracts of useable flat land in
mountainous counties—represents a clear State policy
choice in furtherance of county land-use needs, controls and
policies. This policy choice reflects a carefully balanced
State deference to the long-term social and governmental
needs of Pike County and its citizens—coal operators,
environmentalists and surface owners alike. Specificaily,
Kentucky policy would not require highwalls and benches
resulting from contour mining to be covered, inter alia,
and would allow valley hollow fills to be situated adjacent
thereto in order that developable flat land may be created
by surface mining in counties where it is sorely needed and
public revenues are chronically short.
Pike County has already experienced and will continue
to suffer from the direct and indirect effects of the Act
regarding its land uses. Some examples are:
1. Commercial Development. The Tollage Creek
variance, described supra, was granted by the State in
order that a commercial tree farm be established in Pike
County. This economic development would add jobs, tax
base and taxable activities in the county. This venture
has been thwarted by the rigid highwall-covering require-
ment. Other like proposals will be similarly forstalled
reducing job potential and tax revenue.
2. Public Facilities. Pursuant to the Kentucky Avia-
tion System Plan, Landrum and Brown (1977), Pike County
23
has undertaken to construct a new $10 million regional air-
port on a mountaintop situated some eleven miles north of
Pikeville. The land is to be donated to the county by
private owners and the site is to be prepared at no cost to
the county by a private surface coal mining operation
acting under a state permit. This site preparation origi-
nally was to be performed under a Kentucky “on-site con-
struction exemption” but the decision in James Moore,
thwarted that plan. Consequently, the county decided to
proceed under an alternative postmining land use variance
granted by the State during the interim program. The
variance and essential access road, and thus the entire
venture, like that in Tollage Creek, are jeopardized by the
Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
3. Housing. In Dr. ©. Theodore Koebel’s work, 1979
Housing Report for Kentucky, University of Louisville
Urban Studies Center (1979), he noted:
Housing shortages most likely have started to occur in
several counties in Kentucky, with severe, chronic
shortages occurring in Southeast Kentucky. ,
The region as a whole had a level of housing starts
between 1970-1977 that would have housed only 56
percent of the increase in households. Mobile homes
accounted for more than 50 percent of the total hous-
ing production in Breathitt, Harlan, Knox, Leslie,
Magoffin, Perry, and Pike counties. Even with a mas-
give reliance on mobile homes, it is doubtful that hous-
ing production in Southeast Kentucky would have
been sufficient to avoid a severe housing shortage there.
Id. at 59.
Pike County’s serious an@ growing housing shortage is
either caused or exacerbated by the severe and chronic
lack of suitable residential construction sites. Over 75%
24
of the surface of the county is occupied by “steep slopes”,
and most of the remainder is situated in floodplains of the
Big Sandy River and its tributaries. The number of house-
holds grew over 25% during the period 1970-1980. Id. at
340. The result is heavy reliance on mobile homes to meet
the housing demand. During the period 1970-1978 of the
nearly 7000 housing units added to the housing stock in
Pike County (599% increase) 92% were mobile homes.
Id. at 341. At the time of the survey in 1979 there were
only some 800 mobile home sites available in the county.
During this same eight-year period only 503 permanent
single family dwellings and 70 multi-family units were
added to the Pike County housing stock. Jd. at 341.
The single most crippling factor lying behind and con-
tributing to the Pike County housing shortage, now and in
the future, is the lack of building sites—a factor which must
be overcome in the future in order to solve the problem.
Practically the entire surface of Pike County is underlain
with coal. Surface coal mining operations in the future
could provide the vital excavation, cut and fill work neces-
sary to create residential building sites from “steep slopes”
as it has traditionally. The Act and regulations embodying
the AOC requirement, together with the lack of any mean-
ingful variances because of the highwall requirement, fore-
stall such developments in the future. Pike County pres-
ently has over 9000 mobile homes serving as temporary
housing and has an immediate need for over 12,000 perma-
nent housing units which cannot be constructed for want of
building sites out of the floodplain area.
4. County Revenue. Pike County has a coal-based local
economy and its budget revenues are tied directly and in-
directly to coal production. Pike County’s public revenues
come from federal revenue sharing, local taxes on real
25
property and its share of the severance taxes collected by
the State on coal mined in the County. Total property tax
assessments for Pike County in 1979 were approximately
$1 billion, Annual Report 1978-1979, Kentucky Department
of Revenue (Dec. 1, 1979) at A-44-45, of which some $400
million was real property. Jd. at A-51. Three-fourths of
this was residential, commercial and industrial realty and
the remaining one-fourth was mineral rights and unmined
coal, farms and undeveloped acreage. The County received
two-thirds of its locally generated revenues for 1979 from
local property taxes. Industrial Resources, Pike County,
Kentucky, Kentucky Department of Commerce (1978) at 26.
During 1978-79 over $500 million worth of coal was pro-
duced in Pike County on which over $25 million in sever-
ance taxes were paid to the State. Annual Report 1978-1979,
at 104. Pike County received approximately one-third of
its locally generated revenues from severance tax turnback
funds in 1979, which is expected to increase in future years
if coal mining increases in the County. In addition, the
County was significantly, if indirectly, benefitted by some
$14 million funding of the State Energy Road Fund and
Coal Impact Road Fund which constructed new State high-
ways in Kastern Kentucky, including Pike County. Id.
at 1109.
There can be little doubt that the challenged provisions
of the Act affect these traditional governmental functions
of Pike County both now and in the future. The immediate
impact of the AOC requirement would reverse State and
county land use policies regarding the creation of eco-
nomically developable flat land by means of surface coal
mining operations, disrupt long-settled legal relationships
between the State and Pike County regarding land use con-
26
trols and long-term land uses of surface mined land, and
force relinquishments by the County of its traditional re-
liance on privately conducted surface coal mining activities
for excavation, cut and fill work to create sites for houses,
roads, airports, and other public facilities. Because of this
impact Pike County must reallocate scarce county budget
monies to perform this work at public expense, alter its
own internal organization and augment its own work force
to perform the work itself or forego the benefits which
would otherwise be generated for its citizens.
To the extent the AOC requirement thwarts or inhibits
private residential construction and commercial develop-
ments in the County, the County will suffer diminished
property tax revenues because undeveloped hillside land
will not be converted into more highly taxable land. Sever-
ance tax turnback revenues to the County will be depressed
to the extent the AOC requirement inhibits surface coal
mining operations in the County. These losses of revenue
must be recouped by new taxes or increased tax rates on
the real property tax base, or the diminution in County
revenues translated into lower levels of “traditional govern-
mental services,” poorer schools and fewer public facilities.
The precise effect the rigid AOC requirement will have
in application to Pike County would be more tedious than
illuminating to describe. Nor is it necessary:
We do not believe particularized assessments of actual
impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented
the dispositive factor is that Congress has at-
tempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to
prescribe . . . [the land use policies] . . . to be
[exercised] by the States in their capacities as sover-
eign governments. Usery at 852-853,
27
CONCLUSION
Invading directly the constitutional, social and economic
base of power of the state, the AOC requirement of the Act
is more destructive of dual sovereignty than the FLSA
amendments struck down in Usery. Police power control
over the private use of land within its borders lies closer
to the heart of a state’s separate and independent existence
than does its unilateral control over the wages and hours of
its employees.
Every twig in the Hofeldian “bundle of sticks” making
up private ownership rights to land is created by the juris-
prudence of the states, Hunt, “Federal and State Control
of Land: A Synopsis,” originally appearing in M. Me-
Dougal & D. Haber, Property, Wealth, Land 70-94 (Michie
Publ. Co.) (1948); rights to land can be transferred only
pursuant to the situs states’ laws, Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. 8.1
(1909) ; Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942) ;
and these principles predate our federal Constitution.
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
The dual sovereignty concept begins with the recogni-
tion that our fundamental legal rights to privately-owned
land are exclusively created, shaped.and protected by the
states under our unique federalist system. The right to
own and use land is one of these basic constitutiona! rights
under the exclusive protective control of the states which
has been consistently recognized by this Court throughout
history. Mr. Justice Washington gave voice to this premise
in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 545 (No. 3230) (C.C.
E.D. Pa., 1823) expounding on the privileges and immun-
ities of State citizens included under the clause of Arti-
cle IV:
28
“what these fundamental principles are it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
may, however, be comprehended under the following
general heads: Protection by the government; the en-
joyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind . . . the right
of a citizen of one State . . . to take hold and dis-
pose of property, either real or personal . . . sub-
ject nevertheless to such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”
Id. at 547.
Even the Civil War amendments, while conferring broad
new constitutional powers on the central government, did
not destroy the dual sovereignty structure of our federalist
government. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872). The constitutional difference between the first and
second Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the New Deal era
was the attempt by Congress in the former to regulate
directly the use of land. Compare United States v. Butler,
297 U. S. 1 (1930); and Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38
(1939).
29
The provisions of the Act before the court again assault
the citadel of State sovereignty, this time in the name of
environmental protection, by directly displacing the exclu-
sive power of the states’ to control the configuration and
long-term uses of land within their borders. Those provi-
sions are and should be declared unconstitutional.
Respectfully POS 4
C...% ‘ shi Seeman
Evucene F. Moonry
Counsel of Record
University of Kentucky
College of Law
Lexington, Kentucky 40506
(606) 257-3780
Grorcr L, Szay, Jr.
JoHN Rosert LeatHers
ZaLuski, Seay anp KirKLAND
213 St. Clair Street
Post Office Box 495
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602
(502) 223-2104
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Datep: December 19, 1980
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joliq snoiwe
NOS. 79-1558, 80-231 & 79-1596
se
. IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Appellant,
V.
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
Appellees.
CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Appellant,
. #
STATE OF INDIANA, ET AL.,
Appellees.
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
Appellants,
V.
CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Appellee.
ses r
On Appeal from the United States District Courts for the
Western District of Virginia and Southern District of Indiana
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS IN
SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
JUSTIN ANDREW KEVER
MARK WHITE Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys General of Texas
P.O. Bux 12548, Capitol Station
JOUN W FAINTER, JR. Austin, Texas 78711
First Assistant (512) 479-8191
RICHARD FE. GRAY. II Attorneys for the State of Teras
Executive Assistant
EEE BL >
echtene
NLR Ot BOM Le
NOS. 79-1538, 80-231 & 79-1596
** &
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
s* *
CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Appellant,
V.
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
Appellees.
**¢*
CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Appellant,
V.
STATE OF INDIANA, ET AL.,
Appellees.
ses
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
Appellants,
CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Appellees.
On Appeal From the United States District Courts for the Western
District of Virginia and Southern District of Indiana
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS IN
SUPPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
In January of 1978 the Railroad Commission of Texas
challenged the treatment of prime farmlands under the
federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
-2-
1977 by filing two actions which were subsequently
settled on terms acceptable to the Railroad Commission.
State of Texas v. Andrus and Bergland, Civil Action No.
A-78-CA-35 (W.D. Texas); State of Texas v. Andrus,
Civil Action No. 78-0171 (D.D.C.). Nevertheless, the
Railroad Commission believes the constitutional
arguments presented here by the Commonwealth of
Virginia to be substantial and meritorious and
respectfully urges this honorable Court to affirm the
decisions of the district court.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK WHITE
Attorney General of Texas
JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
First Assistant
RICHARD E. GRAY, III
Executive Assistant
JAMES R. MEYERS
Assistant Attorney General
JUSTIN ANDREW KEVER
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
(512) 479-8191
Attorneys for the State of Texas
96ST.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.