Reply Brief — Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.

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Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1596

Iu the Supreme Court of the Uuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

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DONALD PAUL HODEL,

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, APPELLANT

Vv.

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.

; VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS

hy v.

DONALD PAUL HODEL,

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.

PRET TA ROY OA

y

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study

SRDS ZONE, ANU leis WOOP Sasi nccoesnncigasactncsbeneskudouains 6

Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,

In re, 14 E.R.C. 1088, appeals pending, Nos. 80-

1810 et seg. (D.D.C., filed Aug. 26, 1980) .......... 5

United States v. Polino, 181 F. Supp. 772 ................ 6

Constitution and statutes:

United States Constitution:

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (Commerce

Cf Rel BP igi Sa aap oo SMT Ls IS 2,8

a a cadence biobene 4

SE rte eae 2

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 7401 et seq..... 4

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

PU i 4

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C.

(Supp. I) 1201 et seq.:

Section 515(c), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265(c).. 3

Section 515(e), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1265 (e).. 3

Section 521, 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1271 .............. 7

Section 521 (a) (2), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1271

SSRI Sear of erent IY RAED) Be Sr TI 7,8

Section 521 (a) (3), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1271

OD RR eR SENTERO REY PPE 7,8,9

Section 522(e), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1272(e).. 5,6

Section 525 (a), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1275 (a).. 9

Section 525(c), 30 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 1275(c).. 9

Miscellaneous:

OR WOU. Team. TARO CERT) occcnnc x nccciccic ccc cctncsciccees 6

380 C.F.R. 761.5(a) (2) (i), 44 Fed. Reg. 15342

9 sp ROR CIT gS NOS AANA oe BON ODN WIN Soe ROR TTe 5

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1072, 98d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).. 4

H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.

UPI pects ieccaadpnabiaceatseisaeeeicialensadi aap ccabisliethacididaden 6

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 79-1538

DONALD PAUL HODEL,

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,* APPELLANT

Vv.

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.

No. 79-1596

VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS

Vv.

DONALD PAUL HODEL,

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.*

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

In large measure, plaintiffs’ brief fails to address

the arguments advanced by the Secretary of the

Interior in support of the Surface Mining Act. We

therefore continue to rely primarily on the views ex-

* The Secretary of the Interior has disqualified himself in

this case.

(1)

2

pressed in the principal brief for the Secretary. We

respond briefly to several of plaintiffs’ contentions

that in our view misdirect the judicial focus in this

litigation or inject an element of factual confusion‘

into the controversy.

1. In the first place, plaintiffs repeatedly attempt

to treat this case as if it were an essentially factual

dispute in which the Secretary’s success on appeal

depends on his ability to demonstrate that the dis-

trict court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous

(see, e.g., Va. Br. 2-8, 5-6, 87-40). This is inac-

curate. Plaintiffs are the parties challenging the

constitutionality of an Act of Congress, and they

therefore bear the heavy burden of establishing that

the explicit and implicit legislative findings on which

the statute is based are irrational. When the validity

of a federal statute is at stake, a district court does

not sit to try facts as it would in a criminal prosecu-

tion or a negligence suit. The court’s inquiry is of

a different character altogether. And, on appellate

review, the question is not whether the district court’s

factual findings are clearly erroneous but whether

the district court properly resolved the legal dispute

regarding the existence vel non of a rational basis

for the challenged legislative action.

2. The other main prong of plaintiffs’ attack on

the Surface Mining Act is the argument that the

Act affects “land use” and that it therefore im-

permissibly exceeds congressional power under the

Commerce Clause and invades the area reserved

to the states under the Tenth Amendment. But there

is no constitutional magic associated with the phrase

“land use.” The Constitution does not prohibit Con-

gress from passing laws affecting land use, and it

does not provide that states and local governments

may exercise exclusive control over land use regula-

3

tion. The cases on which plaintiffs rely (Va. Br. 30)

merely establish that state and local governments

enjoy broad authority to regulate land use; they do

not hold that Congress lacks power to enact meas-

ures affecting iand use, even when those measures

are rationally related to a legitimate governmental

purpose within the powers delegated to Congress by

Article I of the Constitution. In short, this case does

not turn on whether the Surface Mining Act can or

cannot be characterized as a “land use” measure.

The question is rather whether Congress may prop-

erly regulate surface mining methods in the exercise

of its Article I powers. If it can, any incidental ef-

fects on land use are irrelevant to the constitutional

dispute.

3. Plaintiffs’ criticism (Va. Br. 31-33) of the

“Steep-slope” variance procedure in Section 515(e) of

the Act is unavailing. Plaintiffs complain that Section

515(e) does not offer a meaningful opportunity for

divergence from the “approximate original contour”

requirement because the statute in any event requires

that the highwalls of reclaimed mining cuts be com-

pletely covered. This objection is both premature and

incorrect. Plaintiffs have not identified a single in-

stance in which the statutory obligation to cover the

highwall has prevented a mine operator from making

profitable use of a variance. Moreover, there is no

reason to believe, as an a priori matter, that, after

the highwall has been completely covered, flat bench

land will not remain in sufficient quantities to per-

mit commercial or residential development. In addi-

tion, plaintiffs’ argument ignores the availability of

variances under Section 515(c) of the Act, the pro-

vision governing variances when the mountaintop

removal mining method is used. Finally, and perhaps

most important, plaintiffs simply refuse to acknowl-

4

edge that, once statutorily required reclamation has

been released, the mined lands may be used for any

purpose whatever. If flat bench land is truly as

valuable as plaintiffs contend, there should be no

financial impediment to the reestablishment of flat

areas on the sites of old mining cuts, once those areas

have been restored and stabilized in the manner de-

scribed by Congress.

4. Plaintiffs further contend (Va. Br. 33-35) that

the Surface Mining Act is unconstitutional because

“less intrusive means” could have been used by Con-

gress to control the adverse effects of surface mining.

Indeed, plaintiffs suggest that, even before enactment

of the Surface Mining Act, the salutary aims of the

statute were adequately served by the Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C. (Supp. I) 7401 et seg., and the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.

The short answer to this argument is that Congress

rejected it. The effectiveness of existing laws in deal-

ing with a problem identified by Congress is ordi-

narily a matter committed to legislative judgment.

At least in situations where no racial, ethnic, or

otherwise suspect classifications are involved and no

First Amendment interests are implicated, Congress

is not obliged to proceed by adopting the minimal form

of regulation that arguat-y could suffice to produce

the desired result. And, in any event, here Congress

expressly considered the effectiveness of existing legis-

lation and concluded that additional measures were

necessary to deal with the adverse effects of surface

mining operations. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 93-1072,

93d Cong., 2d Sess. 123-124 (1974). Plaintiffs’ argu-

ment therefore is neither factually nor legally ade-

quate to justify invalidation of the Surface Mining

Act.

5

5. Plaintiffs’ discussion (Va. Br. 48) of the “valid

existing rights” provision in Section 522(e) of the

Act is misleading. Under Section 522(e), the re-

strictions on surface mining operations near roads,

schools, churches, parks, public buildings, and ceme-

teries are expressly made “subject to valid existing

rights.” Plaintiffs assert (Va. Br. 48) that this ex-

ception “applies only to specific surface mining opera-

tions for which all required permits were issued prior

to August 3, 1977, the effective date of the Act * * *.”

The language of Section 522(e) does not say that

“valid existing rights” may be recognized only where

all required permits were obtained before August 3,

1977. Plaintiffs cite no authority for their interpreta-

tion, but it is apparently based on 30 C.F.R. 761.5

(a) (2) (i), 44 Fed. Reg. 15342 (1979), a regulation

promulgated to implement Section 522(e) during the

Act’s permanent phase. That regulation, however, has

been remanded to the Secretary by the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, the court

vested with exclusive jurisdiction to review the reg-

ulations promulgated under the Surface Mining Act.

See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Liti-

gation, 14 E.R.C. 1083, 1091 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980),

appeals pending, Nos. 80-1810 et seg. (D.C. Cir., filed

Aug. 26, 1980). The Secretary did not appeal this

aspect of the district court’s decision, and the regula-

tion is not now effective. (Even before the decision,

the Secretary did not interpret the regulation to make

pre-enactment issuance of all necessary permits a sine

qua non for recognition of “valid existing rights”

under Section 522(e). The regulation was intended

to provide only that one way in which a mine opera-

tor could conclusively establish his “valid existing

rights” was to show that all necessary permits had

6

been obtained before passage of the Act. 44 Fed.

Reg. 14993 (1979).) The Secretary is now consider-

ing the appropriate content of a revised regulation on

the subject. The limited legislative history of Section

522(e) makes it reasonably clear that Congress used

the phrase “valid existing rights” to include more

than those surface mining operations that had ac-

tually received permits before the date of the statute.

See H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 95

(1977), citing United States y. Polino, 131 F. Supp.

772 (N.D. W. Va. 1955).

6. Plaintiffs’ comments regarding the Tucker Act

and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental

Study Group, Inc., 488 U.S. 59 (1978), misinterpret

the Court’s opinion in that case. Appellees in Duke

Power objected to the Price-Anderson Act on two

theories. They contended that the statute violated

both the Due Process Clause and the Just Compensa-

tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 438 U.S. at

69. The Court ruled that th potential availability

of a Tucker Act remedy in the Court of Claims for

any uncompensated taking of property effected by the

challenged statute did not deprive the district court

of jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. 1331, to consider ap-

pellees’ constitutional claims. 4388 U.S. at 71 n.15.

But, because of the Tucker Act option, the Court

found it unnecessary to address the merits of appel-

lees’ Just Compensation Clause argument or the pro-

priety of granting equitable relief to remedy an un-

compensated taking. Jd. at 94 n.39. The Court’s

approach in Duke Power thus supports the view

expressed in the Secretary’s principal brief (Br. 58-

60) that any taking of a particular parcel of prop-

erty allegedly effected by the Surface Mining Act is

not unconstitutional unless just compensation is un-

available and that therefore declaratory and injunc-

tive relief should not be awarded unless and until

7

the plaintiff or plaintiffs allegedly injured by a par-

ticular taking have established that their legal reme-

dies are inadequate. The Secretary did not assert

that the possibility of a monetary recovery under the

Tucker Act defeats the jurisdiction of this Court or

the district court; he suggested only that, where the

Tucker Act option has not been explored, it may be

premature for this Court to resolve the merits of the

taking question.

7. Plaintiffs contest (Va. Br. 52) the accuracy of

the Secretary’s statement (Br. 62) that “[p]laintiffs

did not allege that they, or any one of them, received

a summary cessation order under Section 521(a) (2)

or suffered loss as a result. Nor was any such show-

ing of harm made at trial.” In challenging this as-

sertion, plaintiffs rely solely on three cessation orders

issued to plaintiff Paramont Mining Corporation.

See J.S. App. 65a-66a. But no allegations regarding

those cessation orders are contained in plaintiffs’

complaint, and the record is silent on the question

whether the orders were summary cessation orders

issued under Section 521(a)(2) or ordinary cessa-

tion orders issued after a notice of violation and

expiration of an abatement period under Section 521

(a) (3). See the general explanation of the cessation

order procedures at pages 60-62 of the Secretary’s

principal brief. The district court’s amended order

enjoins Section 521 of the Act “only insofar as [it]

relate[s] to summary issuance of cessation orders”

(J.S. App. 2a; emphasis in original). Plaintiffs

did not attempt to introduce the Paramont cessation

orders into evidence, and the trial testimony does

not disclose the nature of the orders. See Pr. Tr.

131-137; Tr. 683-686."

1“Py, Tr.” refers to the transcript of the preliminary

hearing in February 1979.

8

In fact, an examination of the three cessation or-

ders issued to Paramont reveals that only one of the

three orders was issued under Section 521(a) (2);

the remaining two orders were issued under Section

521(a) (3). The one summary cessation order (No.

78-I-15-1, issued Aug. 16, 1978) was issued because

Paramont allegedly was conducting surface mining

operations in an area for which it had not obtained

a permit. No evidence in the record shows that Para-

mont suffered any significant financial loss as a re-

sult of the issuance of that cessation order.®

The district court’s mistaken conclusion that Para-

mont had suffered a great financial loss as the result

of the issuance of a summary cessation order was

based on an order issued on January 4, 1979 (No.

79-I-19-1). See Tr. 684-685. An examination of that

cessation order reveals, however, that it was issued

under Section 521(a)(3) and not under Section 521

(a)(2). It was not, in other words, a summary

cessation order. The order was issued for the failure

to abate a violation concerning which a notice of

violation had been issued on November 27, 1978.*

The notice stated that abatement should be completed

2Copies of the three orders have been lodged with the

Clerk of this Court.

8 An administrative law judge ruled that the summary

cessation order was improper because the lack of a permit

did not necessarily establish the “imminent danger” to health

and safety or the reasonable expectation of “significant,

imminent environmental harm” required by Section 521

(a) (2) as a precondition for summary administrative action.

A copy of the administrative law judge’s decision and order

has been lodged with the Clerk of the Court.

* A copy of that notice of violation (No. 78-I-19-7) has also

been lodged with the Clerk of this Court.

9

by December 27, 1978. At any time after November

27, 1978, Paramont was entitled to request a public

hearing under Section 525(a) of the Act and to re-

quest temporary relief from the Secretary under

Section 525(c). It did not do so. Whatever harm

Paramont may have suffered after issuance of the

Section 521(a)(3) cessation order on January 4,

1979, it was not attributable to the summary cessa-

tion order procedure attacked in this litigation and

invalidated by the district court. The Paramont

cessation orders therefore provide no support for

plaintiffs’ challenge to the accuracy of the statements

made in the Secretary’s opening brief.

For these reasons, and the reasons stated in the

principal brief for the Secretary, the judgment of the

district court should be reversed as to all questions

before the Court, except the Commerce Clause ques-

tion raised by plaintiffs’ appeal in No. 79-1596. In

that respect, the judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

FEBRUARY 1981

WV. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1981 338091 257

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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