Petitioners Brief — American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan

Supreme Court brief1981

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No. 79-1429

. SAR «14 1981

(Consolidated with No. 79-1583)

Dee SCL aT Grete tee Eat ene oh ~ T MIGHAEL RGR AR

IN THE cis

Supreme Court of the TMnited Stairs

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,’

MILLIKEN & COMPANY, ARKWRIGHT MILLS, SPARTAN

MILLs, BLAIR MILLS, INC., HERMITAGE, INC., DAN

RIVER, INC., CONE MILLS CORPORATION, MAYFAIR

MILLS, SPRINGS MILLS, INC., RIEGEL TEXTILE COR-

PORATION, FIELDCREST MILLS, INcC., AND WEST POINT-

PEPPERELL, INC.,

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}

. Petitioners,

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, etal.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Ap»oeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ROBERT H. BORK NEIL J. KING

142 Huntington Street Counsel of Record

New Haven, Connecticut 06511 A. STEPHEN Hurt, JR.

ANDREW N. VOLLMER

GREGORY B. TOBIN ; Ca ld envio

OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, bole oe ae

SMOAK, STEWART AND Washi “+9 3

EDWARDS ashington, D.C. 20006

(202) 872-6000

First National Bank Tower

Two Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30383

Counsel for American Textile

Manufacturers Institute, Inc.

{Counsel for other Petitioners are listed on inside cover]

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON

The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Milliken and

Company

JOSEPH K. MADDOX, JR.

P.O. Box 5784

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Spartan Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

Gary S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON

The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Hermitage, Inc.

SAMUEL K. ABRAMS

BRIAN E. MORAN

BAKER & HOSTETLER

818 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

H. J. EvaM, III

NEIL W. KOONCE

Cone Mills Corporation

Greensboro, N.C. 27405

Counsel for Cone Mills

Corporation

DAN M. BYRD, JR.

J. SPRATT WHITE

P.O. Rox 70

Fort Mill, S.C. 29715

Counsel for Springs Mills,

Ine.

ROBERT H. BORK

142 Huntington Street

New Haven, Connecticut 06511

Counsel for Fieldcrest

Mills, Inc.

January 14, 1981

THOMAS A. EVINS

CLYDE H. HAMILTON

BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &

BROWNE

P.O. Box 451

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Arkwright Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON

The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Blair Mills, Ine.

HARLAN H. HUNTLEY

RoGeR L. TUTTLE

2291 Memorial Drive

Danville, Virginia 24541

Counsel for Dan River, Ince.

THOMAS A. EVINS

CLYDE H. HAMILTON

BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &

RROW NE

P.O. Box 451 .

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Mayfair Mills

FRED M. RICHARDSON

Lovic A. BROOKS, JR.

CHARLES A. EDWARDS

CONSTANGY, BROOKS & SMITH

1900 Peachtree Center Building

230 Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Counsel for Riegel Textile

Corporation

RICHARD H. MONK, JR.

C. POWERS DORSETT

West Point-Pepperell, Inc.

P.O. Box 71

West Point, Georgia 31833

Counsel for West Point- :

Pepperell, Inc. )

ibiedrpeter ae a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OSHA STILL HAS NOT ARTICULATED

ANY MEANINGFUL OR’ EFFECTIVE

COST-RELATED LIMITATIONS UPON ITS

STANDARD-SETTING AUTHORITY ....

Il. DETERMINING WHETHER A REASON-

III.

ABLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A STAND-

ARD IS BOTH CONSISTENT WITH CON-

GRESSIONAL INTENT AND WITHIN THE

AGENCY’S COMPETENCE ............

OSHA DID NOT MAKE A SUPPORTABLE

FINDING THAT THE COSTS OF THE

STANDARD BEAR A REASONABLE RELA-

TIONSHIP TO THE EXPECTED BENEFITS

OR EVEN THAT THE COSTS WOULD BE

Bech oo re, a che AE ONE NID tel SLES Se

Page

16

17

24

29

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

I ee HR ER Se inihe Scat qiadenahienieltnininnhwoniiies 7

AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir.

I a cele pildahettch asic ndcaciieniucnseciteeassdieiiaranintnteelicastnniieon 27

Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen

v. Connally, 387 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)...... 7

‘4 American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, Nos. 80-

ER |) Benes Sam ee ee 7

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371

Bs IE sible eciclcdrcnidichshiorbibenceictangtainsapietapebmunanne 20

Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402 (1971) ......... PH SEDER ART ETA RE A 7

EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association, 49

U.S.L.W. 4008 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1980) .................. 12, 15, 16

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) _...0........-2-...---.2---ee0e- 6

FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974) ................ 17

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-

son, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ..............2....... 11

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Ameri-

can Petroleum Institute, 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S.

PN. PRE FE A EE passim

Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir.

cites cacitl cal chen chSeedianewsaahlabenibcciecdabaibiainonanbiar nbagsistinn 7

RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566 (6th

ica lees 11,12

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 382 U.S. 194 (1947) .......... 17

Texas Independent Ginners Association v. Mar-

shall, 680 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1980) -................... 12

Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (7th

I a acrsnetececch cheat tac ea acc a 11,12

Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980)...... 8

Administrative Decisions and Reports:

Continental Can Co., [1976-1977] OSH Dec.

(CCH) 25250, 4 OSH Cas. (BNA) 1541 (1976).. 12

a

-

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Statutory Provisions:

Clean Air Act

§ 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. III 1979) ........

Consumer Product Safety Act

§ 9(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c) (1976)

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

§ 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976)

§ 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976)

§ 6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976)......

§ 6(b) (6) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (6) (A)

GOUT cen cesnalaiacnstntine tee ous G tans

Se USC. § 706(3) (C). (2096)

30 U.S.C. § 843(b) (83) (1976) 0

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1976)

Administrative Regulations:

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048 (f) (2) (v) (1979)

43: Pea. Reg. S608 C1076)

43 Fed. Reg. 27850 (1978) ........................-:....

oS Fun. Ree. 6601 (100)

45 Fed. Reg. 83448 (Dec. 18, 1980)

45 Fed. Reg. 85772 (Dec. 20,1980) _.........

Miscellaneous:

McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Dele-

gated Power, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1119 (1977)...

SOUP UD I i

Statement of Environmental Protection Agency

Administrator Douglas M. Costle......

1 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dic-

GPE SPIE cctcisnsaccdlincdicie ete a

10, 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 79-1429

(Consolidated with No. 79-1583)

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,

MILLIKEN & COMPANY, ARKWRIGHT MILLS, SPARTAN

MILLs, BLAIR MILLS, INC., HERMITAGE, INC., DAN

RIVER, INC., CONE MILLS CORPORATION, MAYFAIR

MILLs, SPRINGS MILLS, INC., RIEGEL TEXTILE Cor-

PORATION, FIELDCREST MILLS, INC., AND WEST POINT-

PEPPERELL, INC.,

~ Petitioners,

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, e¢ al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

The Brief for the Federal Respondent is a lengthy

document that attempts to explain and justify the ap-

proach that the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-

istration (“OSHA”) has taken in setting standards for

exposure to cotton dust and other toxic substances. Peti-

tioners make three broad points by way of reply.

1The Brief for the Federal Respondent, who is the Secretary of

Labor, will be referred to as the Secretary’s Brief and cited as

“OSHA Br.”

A list naming all parent companies, subsidiaries that are not

wholly owned, and affiliates of corporate petitioners in No. 79-1429

is attached as Appendix A to this Reply Brief.

2

First, perhaps the most important aspect of the Sec-

retary’s Brief is what it leaves unsaid. Despite its great

length, the Brief fails to articulate any economically

based guidelines or criteria—short of the threatened de-

struction of an entire industry—that limit the unprece-

dented power to which OSHA lays claim.

Second, in an obvious reaction to the Benzene case,”

the Secretary now makes a number of concessions that

bring his construction of the Occupational Safety and

Health Act of 1970 (the “OSH Act” or “Act’”) much

closer to that of the petitioners. However, in an effort

to avoid the logic of these concessions, the Secretary

suggests that an assessment of costs and benefits in the

setting of occupational health standards is inconsistent

with congressional intent and impossible to apply in

practice. This suggestion cannot withstand analysis.

Third, both the Secretary and the Union Respondents

pretend that the record below was what they wish it had

been. The reality of the case is different, however, and

cannot be changed by respondents’ wishful thinking.

I. OSHA STILL HAS NOT ARTICULATED ANY

MEANINGFUL OR EFFECTIVE COST-RELATED

LIMITATIONS UPON ITS STANDARD-SETTING

AUTHORITY.

In the Secretary’s Brief, the agency’s lawyers have

spared no effort to explain OSHA’s approach to setting

occupational health standards and to demonstrate that

this approach reflects the application of “an adequate

and intelligible [congressional] standard to guide [OSHA]

in fulfilling [its] responsibilities’ under the Act. OSHA

Br. at 63. When all is said and done, however, OSHA’s

lawyers have been no more successful than the agency it-

self in explaining what this “adequate and intelligible

2 Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,

48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S. July 2, 1980).

Standard” is that OSHA allegedly is applying. Nor have

they been able to show how this alleged standard re-

sponds to the provisions of the legislation from which all

of OSHA’s authority is derived.

The Secretary’s Brief makes clear that OSHA con-

tinues to lay claim to what the agency characterizes as

“admittedly far reaching” authority over American in-

dustry. OSHA Br. at 63. And, despite an effort to ob-

scure the point, it seems quite evident that the only cost-

related limitation that OSHA acknowledges is the ability

of the industry as a whole to bear the costs of any one

standard without being ruined financially.

The Secretary appears to recognize that Congress did

not intend to confer upon OSHA Sweeping and unprece-

dented authority “to order changes in the way that busi-

ness is conducted” free of any meaningful and effective

economically based constraint. OSHA Br. at 63. Thus,

he acknowledges that Section 6(b) (5) of the Act contains

qualifying language (such as the term “feasible”) that

“mandates consideration of practical concerns, including

costs, in the setting of standards.” Jd. at 45. And he

concedes that this qualifying language—mirroring Con-

gress’ practical concerns—“unquestionably limits the Sec-

retary’s standard-setting authority.” Jd. However, a

careful reading of the Secretary’s Brief shows it to be

an extended exercise in question begging: Nowhere does

it explain how the Secretary construes the term “feasible”

in a manner that places an effective cost-related limita-

tion upon OSHA’s standard-setting activities,

In various places, the Brief asserts that the term

“feasible” must be construed in its most extreme sense

as meaning “capable of being done” or “capable of

achievement.” Jd. at 39, 40, 48.° Taken at face value,

*The Secretary cites Webster's Third New International Dic-

tionary for this meaning, but neglects to point out that the

dictionary also defines “feasible” as meaning “suitable,” “reason-

able,” or “practicable.” See id. at 831 (1971); 1 The Compact

Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 978 (1971).

4

this construction implies the absence of any cost-related

limitation whatsoever on OSHA’s authority, for maxi-

mum protection against a toxic substance for which

no absolutely safe level of exposure exists logically would

be “capable of achievement” by requiring that the em-

ployer cease operations altogether. Recognizing that

Congress did not intend the term “feasible” to be given

such an extreme reading, OSHA demurs and interpre’s

economic feasibility to mean that the costs must be “af-

fordable.” See, e.g., id. at 41, 49, 57. But OSHA has

never explained what it means by “affordable,” and

even after reading the Secretary’s Brief, one still does

not know how this test of “affordability” is to be applied

or how it reflects the language of the Act or the under-

lying congressional intent.*

4 The Secretary’s Brief points to a hodgepodge of miscellaneous

statutory provisions, administrative policies, and judicially-imposed

restraints that the Secretary presumably believes may, in the aggre-

gate, provide the missing cost-related restraint on OSHA’s wide-

ranging power. OSHA Br. at 55-58. But the Secretary does not

explain how one can discern in the factors he enumerates an ade-

quate and intelligible criterion to limit the delegation of congres-

sional authority to the agency. Indeed, the Secretary’s efforts

demonstrate the haphazard nature of any economic limitations short

of industry ruination that OSHA is prepared to recognize. Thus,

the Secretary observes that

limitations of technological feasibility will often limit expendi-

tures of financial resources because . . . it will often be [tech-

nologically] impossible to achieve the degree of stringency

[i.e., maximum protection] that is actually warranted by the

health data.

Id. at 57. This limitation on OSHA’s authority may be para-

phrased as follows: “When there is no additional technology on

which to spend more money, OSHA will not mandate further ex-

penditures.” Such constraint-by-default is hardly the kind of mean-

ingful and effective cost-related limit that will avoid an unlawful

delegation of legislative authority.

Moreover, this litany of factors to which the Secretary’s Brief

points as protection against irresponsible and unwise regulation is

undercut by the agency’s own statements. For example, the Secre-

tary’s Brief states that OSHA considers industry’s need to address

5

In the end, the only cost-related limit that the Secre-

tary appears to acknowledge is the possibility that a

standard might not be “economically feasible” if its im-

pact upon the “long-term profitability and competitive.

ness” of an industry would be so severely adverse that

the continued viability of the industry as a whole would

be threatened. Id. at 38, 49. When this point might

be reached and how the agency would assess the im-

pact that its standard is expected to have on produc-

tion, employment, competition, prices and trade are mat-

ters that are left entirely to speculation. Indeed, it may

well be that the agency considers any such impacts to be

largely irrelevant: In this very proceeding, OSHA’s

spokesman stated that the “most recently stated policy

of the agency is that . . . the substantive provisions of

the standard, that is those which are included to provide

protection against the hazard will not be diluted due to

considerations of economic or inflationary impact.” ®

The Secretary insists, however, that this Court need

not be troubled by the prospect that OSHA, with its open-

ended concept of “affordability,” will arbitrarily push

industries to the brink of financial ruin; nor should the

Court be concerned that OSHA will misallocate society’s

limited industrial hygiene resources, thereby providing

employees with a lower overall level of protection against

other serious health hazards in the workplace in determining

whether a particular standard is “financially affordable” and sug-

gests that, in the Cotton Dust proceeding, OSHA took account of its

“proposal for more stringent controls on workplace noise levels as a

patentially competing need for capital.” Jd. at 57 n.62. The rec-

ord indicates that this is not so. Thus, Grover Wrenn, then

OSHA’s Deputy Director for Health Standards, testified explicitly

that OSHA considered the “economic impact upon this industry ...

of the dust standard, combined with the noise standard [to be]

irrelevant to [the Cotton Dust] proceeding.” Transcript of OSHA

Hearing (“Tr.”) at 75 (emphasis added). References to exhibits

introduced during the OSHA hearing are cited as “Ex.”

5 Tr. at 73 (Grover Wrenn).

6

the host of differing health and safety risks that may

exist in the workplace. According to the Secretary, if

such misfortunes do result, they would simply reflect the

“policy judgments of Congress.” Id. at 56.

However, as demonstrated at pages 31-35 of petitioners’

opening Brief, such policy objectives cannot be attributed

to Congress, and even the Secretary appears to be some-

what uncomfortable with this argument. Consequently,

his Brief advances a second justification that appears to

be more seriously maintained. According to the Secretary,

the fact that OSHA might regulate in an unreasonable

and irresponsible manner (presumably even in a man-

ner that is at odds with the intent of Congress) is ir-

relevant, since, in the Secretary’s view, OSHA’s exer-

cise of authority under the Act has been “responsible and

practical.” OSHA Br. at 37. By regulating in this “rea-

sonable and practical fashion,” the Secretary contends,

OSHA itself “provides a meaningful brake on regulation.”

Id. at 48.

Under this novel theory, Congress presumably need not

provide any meaningful or effective constraint upon the

exercise of agency authority; instead, the legislature and

the courts may simply trust the regulators to do the right

thing. Trusting the regulators, however, is not a substi-

tute for requiring them to adhere to adequate and in-

telligible congressional standards,* particularly when

the power to which an agency lays claim is as extrava-

gant and “admittedly far reaching” as it is here. Indeed,

the requirement of meaningful and intelligible statutory

criteria is intended to prevent precisely the uncanalized

agency discretion that the Secretary seeks and thereby

to preserve two fundamental elements of our govern-

mental and administrative system: (1) the constitutional

6 See Benzene, 48 U.S.L.W. at 5031-32; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541

F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (statement of Leventhal, J.),

cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ; McGowan, Congress, Court, and

Control of Delegated Power, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 1166 (1977).

7

Separation of powers,’ and (2) the ability of courts ef-

fectively to protect against unauthorized agency action.®

Moreover, there is solid ground for disputing the Sec-

retary’s view that OSHA has regulated in a “reasonable,”

“responsible and practical manner.” Putting aside the

present dispute, one need look no further than the Ben-

zene proceeding for a case in point. In that instance,

OSHA mandated the expenditure of more than $500

million without attempting to determine whether there

existed any significant health risk that might be re-

duced by its enormously costly standard. See Benzene,

48 U.S.L.W. at 5026, 5031, 5034 (plurality opinion). In-

stead, the agency required industry to carry the virtually

impossible burden of proving a negative—i.e., “the exist-

ence of a safe level of exposure.” Jd. at 5035. In so do

ing, OSHA, as a plurality of this Court noted, avoided

its “threshold responsibility” and “exceeded [its] power,”

id., hardly an indication of “responsible” regulation.®

In short, the actions OSHA has taken pursuant to its

own construction of its statutory authority demonstrate

‘A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,

529-30 (1935).

8 See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401

U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d 807,

818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1976). See gen-

erally Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally,

337 F. Supp. 737, 754-60 (D.D.C. 1971) (3-judge court).

® This same unreasonable and irresponsible approach to regula-

tion is evidenced in OSHA’s generic cancer policy, 45 Fed. Reg.

5001 (1980), which would impose a host of costly requirements

(including a reduction of exposures to the lowest feasible level)

“whenever there is a certain quantum of proof ... that a sub-

stance causes cancer at any exposure level.” Benzene, 48 U.S.L.W.

at 5032 n.51 (plurality opinion). Belatedly recognizing these prob-

lems, OSHA recently indicated that it plans to “reformulat[e]”

the cancer policy. Motion [of OSHA] To Hold Proceedings in

Abeyance Pending Administrative Republication of Generic Cancer

Standard at 4, American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, Nos. 80-3018,

et al. (5th Cir., filed Dec. 22, 1980).

8

why Congress must adequately delimit the power it

grants to administrative agencies rather than delegating

wide-ranging authority simply on the basis of an agency’s

assurances that it can be trusted.’®

II. DETERMINING WHETHER A REASONABLE RE-

LATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THE COSTS

AND BENEFITS OF A STANDARD IS BOTH

CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

AND WITHIN THE AGENCY’S COMPETENCE.

Despite his professed admiration for the manner in

which OSHA has exercised its authority, the Secretary

appears to recognize that the OSH Act should be con-

strued so as to avoid the constitutional questions that

would be raised by a delegation of authority on the basis

of trust. This recognition has led him to make a number

of concessions regarding the proper interpretation of the

Act and the underlying congressional intent. These con-

10 The wage guarantee provision of the Standard, 29 C.F.R.

§ 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v) (1979), Pet. App. at 8-9, is a further ex-

ample of why OSHA cannot be trusted to delimit its own authority.

Conceding that wage guarantee authority is not expressly granted

in the OSH Act—as it is in other legislation such as the Federal

Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 843(b) (3)

(1976)—respondents suggests that such authority can be implied

from Section 6(b) (7), which authorizes OSHA, “[w]here appro-

priate, [to] prescribe suitable protective equipment and control or

technological procedures.” See Union Br. at 52. But one is hard

put to perceive how a requirement that employers guarantee the

wages of their employees can be deemed to be “suitable protective

equipment [or] control or technological procedures.” Moreover,

respondents concede that Congress did not intend for employers to

continue the regular pay of workers who absent themselves from

employment. They contend, however, that the congressional con-

cern did not extend to situations where the employee does not cease

working altogether but, instead, performs less valuable work re-

quiring a lower level of skill, effort or responsibility. The legisla-

tive history canvassed by this Court in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,

445 U.S. 1 (1980), indicates that Congress’ concern was not so

narrow. Rather, Congress intended that the Act not be read to

9

cessions (which are joined in by the Union Respondents)

move the Secretary and the Unions much closer to accept-

ing the construction of the Act urged by petitioners.

For one thing, the Secretary and the Unions appear to

have embraced the more balanced and pragmatic read-

ing of the statute that petitioners have urged from the

outset. Thus, after reviewing the legislative history, the

Secretary concludes that the language of the Act should

be construed “in a reasonable and practical fashion,” that

the qualified language of Section 6(b) (5) does indeed

“mandate[] consideration of practical concerns, includ-

ing costs, in the setting of standards,” and that Section

6(b) (5) “unquestionably limits the Secretary’s standard-

setting authority.” OSHA Br. at 45, 48."

Moreover, the respondents appear to have accepted

petitioners’ contention that an OSHA standard is valid

only if it (i) addresses a significant risk of material

health impairment that would exist in the absence of the

standard and (ii) is expected to achieve a significant re-

duction in that risk."2 And they acknowledge Congress’

recognition that OSHA must address a host of new and

varying health and safety risks in the workplace and is

require that employers compensate a worker for a job that the

worker is not performing. The wage guarantee provision of the

Standard imposes just such a requirement.

"The Union Respondents reach essentially the same conclusion

when they quote Senator Dominick for the proposition that Congress

intended OSHA to take steps that are “feasible and practical” in

enacting occupational health standards. Brief for Union Respond-

ents (“Union Br.”) at 34. The Union Respondents describe Senator

Dominick as “a principal participant in shaping § 6(b) (5).” Zd. at

28.

Thus, the Secretary acknowledges that an OSHA standard

must be shown to produce “benefits [that] are significant,” OSHA

Br. at 45, in the sense that it will “substantially reduce” a “sig-

nificant risk of material health impairment.” Jd. at 27. The Union

Respondents agree with this formulation, stating that an OSHA

standard should be one that “eliminates or substantially reduces”

a “significant risk of . . . health impairment.” Union Br. at 27.

A

10

not able to focus its attention and society’s resources

upon a narrow spectrum of such risks. At this point,

however, the agreement between the parties ends.

Petitioners contend that OSHA cannot protect em-

ployees “so far as possible,’ see 29 U.S.C. § 651(b),

against the multiplicity and variety of workplace health

and safety hazards if it takes no account of the economic

impact of a standard short of the point at which the

destruction of an entire industry is threatened. Peti-

tioners read the Act and the legislative history as evi-

dencing a congressional expectation that OSHA would

regulate more wisely—that it would assess the health

protection benefits of its standards in light of the costs

involved—in order to guard against serious misalloca-

tions of the finite resources that are available for the

protection of worker safety and health. If the costs of

a single standard are wholly disproportionate to the re-

duction in health risk that is expected from the standard,

that reduction in risk (and the attendant health protec-

tion benefits) cannot, in petitioners’ view, be deemed sig-

nificant. Such a standard is inconsistent both with the

“resonably necessary or appropriate” requirement of Sec-

tion 3(8) of the Act and with the “practical concerns”

_-—underlying the qualified language of Section 6(b) (5).

Not so, say respondents. In their view, as long as the

costs of a-standard stop just short of ruining an entire

industry, Congress’ “practical concerns” are satisfied,

even if the costs of the standard are wholly dispropor-

tionate to the resulting health benefits. To justify this ex-

treme reading of the Act, respondents claim that the in-

terpretation urged by petitioners would require OSHA to

13 Thus, the Secretary points out that Congress was aware of the

variety of health hazards in the workplace and was “concerned

that those [hazards] would be replicated geometrically due to the

rapid introduction of new and yet untested chemicals and processes.”

OSHA Br. at 41. The Union Respondents also call attention to

Congress’ awareness of the multiplicity of potential new health

risks that would have to be addressed by OSHA. See Union Br.

at 39 n.64.

11

perform a rigidly formal cost-benefit calculation that

places a dollar value on employee lives or health. OSHA

Br. at 59. See also id. at 38, 45, 59-62; Union Br. at

39-40 n.64,

There is no foundation for this claim. Employee life

and health need not be valued in monetary terms and

rigidly balanced against the costs of proposed regulatory

actions. Congress did intend, however, that OSHA would

spend society’s industrial hygiene resources wisely. To

do so, OSHA must determine whether the health pro-

tection benefits of its standards bear a reasonable re-

lationship to the level of resources that must be committed

to achieve those benefits—resources that necessarily will

be unavailable to achieve other health and safety ob-

jectives in the workplace."

14 As noted at pages 41-47 of the opening Brief for Petitioners,

the weight of relevant judicial precedent supports a construction

of the Act that requires that the health protection benefits bear a

reasonable relationship to the costs of an OSHA standard. The

Secretary’s Brief inaccurately states, OSHA Br. at 50, that the issue

of whether OSHA “must perform a cost-benefit analysis in setting

standards .. . was first considered by the District of Columbia

Circuit in connection with the asbestos standard in Industrial

-Union Department vy. Hodgson,” 499 F.2d 467 (1974). In fact, the

affected industry did not challenge the asbestos standard in court,

and the question of OSHA’s obligation to perform a cost-benefit

analysis of any sort was never raised—let alone decided—in that

case.

Moreover, the fact that the Secretary “disagree[s],” OSHA Br.

at 52 n.56, with the decisions of the Seventh Circuit in Turner Co.

v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (1977) and of the Sixth Circuit

in RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566 (1979), does not

mean that those cases do not support petitioners’ position in the

present case or that they are not persuasive. The Secretary also

suggests that the Turner and RMI decisions required OSHA to

show a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits only

because the hazard addressed was not seriously debilitating or

life-threatening. OSHA Br. at 52 n.56. This position is wholly

illogical: Rather than making a cost-benefit assessment inappropri-

ate, variations in the seriousness of the hazard are precisely the

type of consideration that should be taken into account in assessing

12

Determining whether the benefits of a standard bear

a reasonable relationship to its costs does not require

the establishment of some bright line test for deciding

whether any particular standard is cost-justified. Rather,

as this Court recognized in a reldted context, Congress

understands that agencies may engage in a more “ ‘limited

cost-benefit analysis’ ”’ with the objective of assuring that

the risk reduction benefits of a standard are not wholly

out of proportion to its costs. Similarly, in setting aside

the application of OSHA’s Cotton Dust Standard to the

ginning industry, the Fifth Circuit pointed out the dis-

tinction between a “formal cost-benefit analysis [which]

demands that regulatory benefits exceed their costs” and

the OSH Act’s more limited requirement “that the ex-

pected costs of OSHA regulations be reasonably related

to the expected benefits.” Texas Independent Ginners

Association v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 411 n.44 (5th Cir.

1980).

Indeed, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (a

federal agency that also is charged with protecting health

and safety) recently proposed a rule describing the meth-

odology that it plans to utilize in performing cost-benefit

assessments under Section 9(c) of the Consumer Product

the relationship between costs and benefits. In any event, the

purported distinction is groundless: Cotton dust has not been

shown to be life-threatening, and the reference in the Turner

opinion upon which the Secretary relies does not limit the decision

to “life-threatening” hazards. Moreover, the Occupational Safety

and Health Review Commission and OSHA itself consider noise

exposure—the health hazard involved in Turner—to be a “harmful

physical agent,” which, like cotton dust, is governed by Section

6(b) (5) of the Act. See Continental Can Co., [1976-1977] OSH

Dec. (CCH) 25250, 25255-56, 4 OSH Cas. (BNA) 1541, 1546-47

(1976). Furthermore, the court in RMI relied on decisions involv-

ing OSHA’s Benzene Standard and other cases involving life-

threatening hazards. 594 F.2d at 571-72.

15 FPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 49 U.S.L.W. 4008, 4010

n.10 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1980) (quoting the remarks of Senator Muskie

regarding “best practicable technology” standards of the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972).

13

Safety Act (“CPSA”). 45 Fed. Reg. 85772 (Dec. 20,

1980). The proposal states that “the Commission is not

required to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis prior to

issuing a consumer product safety rule” and will not do

so. 45 Fed. Reg. at 85773, col. 2.2* However, the Commis-

sion does plan to perform a cost-benefit assessment to

determine whether the “expected benefits of a rule bear a

reasonable relationship to the anticipated costs.” Id. The

proposal goes on to explain that

[t]his test . . . does not require the Commission to

find that the quantifiable costs are outweighed by

the quantifiable benefits but rather to determine that

the total benefits, in the judgment of the Commis-

sion, justify the costs.

Id. In short, Congress, the courts and other agencies all

have recognized that a responsible determination of

whether the costs of regulatory action bear a reasonable

relationship to the expected benefits is a sensible, useful

and practical exercise that need not involve either a sub-

jective valuation of life and health or a precise balanc-

ing of benefits and costs in strict monetary terms.?”

Respondents’ resistance to responsible cost-benefit as-

sessment also reflects their view of other health, safety

and environmental legislation. But consideration of such

other statutes shows that this view is unjustified.

16 Thus, contrary to the Secretary’s suggestion, the Consumer

Product Safety Act cannot be distinguished from the OSH Act on

the ground that either the language or legislative history of the

CPSA “specifically requir[es] that costs be justified by benefits.”

OSHA Br. at 54. The language of Section 9(c) of the CPSA

quoted on page 54 of the Secretary’s Brief clearly does not “spe-

cifically requir[e]” any such thing. And the Commission itself

states that the “legislative history of the CPSA indicates that the

Commission is not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior

to promulgating a consumer product safety rule.” 45 Fed. Reg. at

85773, col. 2 (emphasis added).

17 See also Brief for Petitioners at 41-47.

14

For example, the Secretary concedes that “it was per-

haps appropriate for [EPA] to engage in balancing risks

against costs” to determine whether the public health

is protected against carcinogens by an “ample margin of

safety” under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. OSHA

Br. at 55 n.59. According to the Secretary, however,

a similar exercise is not appropriate under the OSH Act,

since Section 6(b) (5) of that Act “gave guidance to the

Secretary with respect to how he should weigh the eco-

nomic consequences of regulation.” Jd. Presumably, the

Secretary is referring to the qualified language of Section

6(b) (5), including the term “feasible,” which the Sec-

retary acknowledges reflects “practical concerns” and

imposes “unquestionabl[e] limits” on OSHA’s standard-

setting authority. Jd. at 45. The Secretary’s distinction

is spurious, because the language of Section 112 of the

Clean Air Act is, if anything, less reflective of such prac-

tical concerns or limits and more absolute in its focus on

health protection than Section 6(b) (5)—let alone Section

3(8)—of the OSH Act. Consequently, if it is “appropri-

ate for [EPA] to engage in balancing risks against

costs,” it must be even more appropriate for OSHA to

engage in such an exercise as part of its standard-setting

activities.'®

Furthermore, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 (the “Water Act’), 33 U.S.C.

§$§ 1251 et seg. (1976), on which respondents rely, OSHA

Br. at 40 n.44; Union Br. at 1b-3b, also supports the posi-

tion of petitioners. Under the Water Act, EPA -is di-

18J—n its most recently proposed standard under Section 112 of

the Clean Air Act, EPA determined not to control benzene emis-

sions from a particular vent, because it concluded that the energy-

consumption “impact [of doing so] outweighs the benefit from

controlling this vent.’ Benzene Emissions from Ethylbenzene/

Styrene Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 83448, 83451, cols. 2-3 (Dec. 18, 1980).

EPA also rejected a more stringent control option for this car-

cinogen after assessing “the relatively small health benefits that

would be gained and the costs of requiring [the] more stringent

option.” Id. at 83457, col. 2.

15

rected to premulgate one set of effluent standards re-

flecting the “best practicable control technology” (“BPT”’)

and another set reflecting the “best available technology

economically achievable’ (“BAT”). As the Secretary

points out, OSHA Br. at 40 n.44, BPT standards (in con-

trast to BAT standards) reflect a consideration of costs

in relation to effluent reduction benefits. See EPA v.

National Crushed Stone Association, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4009-

4010.

A comparison of the OSH Act and the Water Act shows

that OSHA standards more closely resemble BPT than

BAT standards. Thus, the qualified language (including

the term “feasible”) used to describe OSHA standards

is similar to the term “practicable” that Congress used

in describing BPT.’* Moreover, economic capability is

relevant to determining whether a variance should be

granted from a BAT limitation, but is not considered by

the agency in determining whether to grant a variance

from a BPT standard under the Water Act” or from

an occupational health standard under the OSH Act.®!

Thus, OSHA standards, in significant respects, re-

semble BPT standards under the Water Act. And both

the language and the underlying statutory schemes of the

respective statutes suggest that Congress intended that

19 In a Statement on the National Crushed Stone decision, EPA

Administrator Douglas M. Costle explained that in establishing

BPT standards, EPA “determine[s] what levels of water pollution

control are both practical and affordable.” (Emphasis added.)

These are precisely the same terms that the Secretary uses to

describe what Congress meant by the term “feasible” in Section

6(b) (5) of the OSH Act. See pages 3-4, 9 supra. (Copies of Mr.

Costle’s Statement have been lodged with the Court.)

20 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 49 U.S.L.W. at

4010, 4013.

21 See Union Br. at 35 (discussing the temporary variance pro-

vision of Section 6(b) (6) (A) of the OSH Act).

16

OSHA standards, like the BPT standards they resemble,

would reflect an assessment of benefits in light of costs.”

III. OSHA DID NOT MAKE A SUPPORTABLE FIND-

ING THAT THE COSTS OF THE STANDARD BEAR

A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE EX-

PECTED BENEFITS OR EVEN THAT THE COSTS

WOULD BE “AFFORDABLE.”

Respondents apparently do not dispute petitioners’ con-

tention that OSHA made no attempt to determine whether

the health protection benefits that might be expected

from the Cotton Dust Standard bear a reasonable re-

lationship to the Standard’s costs. Rather, they argue

that OSHA was not required to make any such deter-

mination. Nonetheless, OSHA’s lawyers have presented

an extended factual discussion and analysis that pre-

sumably is intended to indicate that the record below

would have supported such an agency finding had one

been made.

Even if the factual analysis presented by the agency’s

lawyers were correct, however, the Cotton Dust Stand-

ard could not be sustained. For the possibility that the

record below might have supported a finding that the

agency never made is legally irrelevant. As a plurality

of this Court observed in the Benzene case: “The stand-

ard must, of course, be supported by the findings actually

22 Since the relationship of costs and benefits is not considered

in formulating BAT standards under the Water Act, economic

capability is relevant to applications for a variance from BAT

limitations. By contrast, economic capability need not be considered

by the agency in ruling on applications for a variance from BPT

limitations, since Congress expected that the relationship between

costs and benefits would have been considered when the BPT

standard was formulated in the first instance. See EPA v. National

Crushed Stone Ass’n, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4011. The scheme of the OSH

Act reflects this same rationale—i.e., economic hardship is not a

qualification for a temporary variance, since the relationship be-

tween costs and benefits should have been considered when the

OSHA standard was initially formulated.

17

made by the Secretary, not merely by findings that we

believe he might have made.” 48 U.S.L.W. at 5035.”

In any event, the record below would not have sup-

ported a finding that the benefits of the Cotton Dust

Standard bear a reasonable relationship to its costs.

Indeed, the record in this case cannot support even the

finding of “affordability” that the agency purports to

have made.

A. The Assessment of Costs

The opening Brief for Petitioners argued that OSHA

never made a supportable determination either of how

much its Standard would cost or of the economic impact

that a standard having such costs would have on the

affected industries and the economy as a whole. Recogniz-

ing the seriousness of this claim, the Secretary devotes

many pages to refuting it but ultimately cannot explain

away the fundamental flaws in OSHA’s treatment of

costs.

A substantial part of the economic argument in the

Secretary’s Brief is designed to justify OSHA’s rejec-

tion of the cost estimate made by its own contractor,

RTI. Whatever the merits of the argument on this point,

however, the fact is that OSHA rejected the RTI analysis

of costs. Consequently, RTI’s cost estimate cannot be, and

was not, used to support OSHA’s determination of costs

in the present case.

What OSHA did use to support its cost estimate was

the Hocutt-Thomas study, which estimated the capital

costs of a standard that was much less stringent than

the one OSHA adopted. The Secretary’s Brief acknowl-

edges this point, see OSHA Br. at 19, and attempts to

justify OSHA’s action on the grounds that (i) Hocutt

and Thomas overstated the costs of the less stringent

28 This is simply a restatement of familiar doctrine. See, e.9.,

FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 880, 397 (1974); SEC v. Chenery

Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).

18

standard that they had analyzed and (ii) the Secretary

was justified in presuming that this “overstated” cost of

a less stringent standard “was sufficiently reliable to

assess the economic impact of the [more stringent] stand-

ard” OSHA ultimately adopted. Jd. Neither branch of

this argument withstands analysis.

The first of the three reasons that the Secretary ad-

vances in support of the conclusion that the Hocutt-

Thomas cost estimate was overstated is that it was

based upon the cost of dust control through retrofitting.

Id. at 18. In fact, OSHA recognized “the validity of

estimating compliance costs for retrofit controls” but

suggested that “replacement of conventional machines

with newer equipment” would reduce the number of

machines that would have to be retrofitted or controlled.

43 Fed. Reg. 27350, 27372, col. 3 (1978). The record

clearly refutes this suggestion.

OSHA identified only four items of “newer equip-

ment’”—automatic opening equipment, chute-fed systems

for carding, high speed cards, and open-end spinning

frames, id. at 27364-67—that it suggested might reduce

the need for retrofitting. But the record showed that

this equipment clearly could not produce a cost saving

in comparison to the retrofitting assumed by Hocutt and

Thomas. Thus, after reviewing the comparative costs,

RTI, concluded that “no economic advantage is realized

in the area of dust control by the installation of auto-

matic opening equipment.” ** This same conclusion holds

true where automatic opening equipment is used with

chute-fed systems for low speed cards—an arrangement

that RTI found to be “not economically feasible.” Ex.

144 at 3.

Similarly, no significant saving could be expected from

the use of high speed cards, since high speed cards al-

ready process eighty percent of the cotton consumed in

the textile industry, id. at 2, and certain yarns cannot

24 Ex. 144 at 5. See also id. at 3, 8. OSHA did not reject RTI’s

conclusion on this point.

> |

19

be processed on high speed cards. Id.; Tr. 2458 (Hovan

Hocutt). In any event, it is undisputed that the cost of

dust control for high speed cards is virtually the same

as for low speed cards. Ex. 144 at 4; Tr. 2376-77, 2436,

2463-65 (Hovan Hocutt) .*

The final item of “newer equipment” identified by

OSHA was open-end spinning frames. But OSHA itself

rejected any suggestion that open-end spinning should be

considered as a possible cost saving under the Standard.

The agency concluded that, because of “the uncertainty

involved in awaiting the development of a long staple

open end spinning frame, . . . control strategies must

be implemented which rely upon what can be done with

existing [ring spinning] equipment.” 43 Fed. Reg. at

27367, col. 1.26

26 Even if some cost saving might otherwise be possible, it would

remain theoretical rather than real in light of the excess capacity

that currently exists in the textile industry. For there is no incen-

tive to install new production equipment in these early operations

unless overall capacity is increased in subsequent operations as

well. Tr. 2975-81 (Dr. Parker Reist). But there is no incentive

to increase overall capacity in an industry that already has excess

capacity. Moreover, the only evidence in the record of a company

that actually purchased and installed the new equipment that

OSHA identified for opening and carding showed that overall

costs increased. Tr. 2591 (James Chapman).

76 Even if the “new” production equipment identified by OSHA

were both (i) likely to be installed within the four-year compliance

period and (ii) likely to result in less expensive dust control if

installed (neither of which assumptions is correct), it could not

be viewed as a ground for concluding that the Hocutt-Thomas

estimate of $550 million was an overstatement. For if such equip-

ment is installed to achieve compliance with the Standard, the cost

of the equipment would have to be included as a cost of compliance.

And, quite apart fren the cost of controlling the dust generated by

these new machines, the cost of the equipment itself would be ap-

proximately four times the total capital cost estimated by Hocutt

and Thomas. Thus, the estimated capital cost of automatic opening

equipment and chute-fed high speed cards is $818 million. J.A. at

263-65 (L.K. Fitzgerald). An additional $1.3 billion would be

20

Thus, OSHA has not identified any new production

equipment that might replace existing equipment at’ a

cost saving that Hocutt and Thomas ignored. Nor does

the record present any basis for concluding that control

costs will be reduced by unspecified “improvements in

technology that are likely to continue during the period

for compliance.” 48 Fed. Reg. at 27372, col. 3. To the

contrary, the only testimony on this point, that of Hovan

Hocutt (who OSHA recognized as an expert in dust con-

trol technology), was that for the next seven years little

new technology could be expected that would make com-

pliance less expensive in spinning through weaving. 43

Fed. Reg. at 27860, col. 2; J.A. at 459-63; Tr. 2431.

The Secretary’s second ground for characterizing the

Hocutt-Thomas estimate as an overstatement is that

it “did not account for the already low levels in many

operations or the fact that more stringent controls in

earlier operations would, without additional cost, result

in less dust in later operations.” OSHA Br. at 18.

Although OSHA’s lawyers make this claim in the Sec-

retary’s Brief, the fact is that OSHA itself did not

include any such rationale in its enumeration of reasons

for believing that the Hocutt-Thomas estimate was an

overstatement. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 27372-73. Conse-

quently, this post hoc rationalization of counsel must be

rejected.”

The findings that OSHA did make demonstrate why

this belated suggestion of the agency’s lawyers is un-

founded. For example, OSHA recognized that it would be

difficult to implement the standard in

required to replace just thirty percent of the 15 million ring

spindles in the industry, Ex. 1438, App. D, since one open-end spindle

would replace four ring spindles at an average cost of $1,200 per

spindle. Tr. 2697 (L. K. Fitzgerald).

27 See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.

156, 168 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196.

21

certain operations, such as spinning, where the ap-

plication of ventilation controls may involve unusual

difficulties, significant innovation or indeed neces-

sitate more than improvement in existing technology.

Id, at 27363, col. 1. OSHA’s view that these difficulties

could be surmounted rested on its belief that “a major

effort to solve the dust control problem in spinning” could

be made, because a modification of the exposure limit in

weaving would permit the industry to “focus more re-

Sources on spinning operations.” Jd. at 27367, col. 2.

Clearly, this “major effort” involving the “focus [of]

more resources on spinning” indicates an expectation

that, if the required exposure level in spinning could be

achieved at all, it would certainly not be “without addi-

tional cost.” OSHA Br. at 18.28

28 There is also absolutely no support in the record for the sug-

gestion that reducing dust levels in the operations of opening

through roving would permit industry to achieve the new exposure

limit in spinning or subsequent operations. To the contrary, the

record showed that it is “uncommon” for spinning operations to

be located in the same room with (or to have the same ventilation

system as) the operations that occur before spinning. Ex. 6-17 at

429 (Dr. Merchant); Ex. 6-109 (NIOSH) ; Tr. 1023-24 (Dr. Mer-

chant) ; Tr. 2013 (Dr. John Neefus) ; Tr. 2330 (Dr. John Hatcher).

Consequently, the reduction of dust levels in such earlier operations

would not be expected to have a favorable impact on dust levels in

spinning.

Moreover, the existence of “low levels” of cotton dust, OSHA Br.

at 18, in various operations that were sampled does not justify

an expectation that such levels could be maintained in the future

without further dust control equipment. The record clearly demon-

strates that cotton dust levels are a direct function of (1) the

quality and coarseness of the cotton being processed, (2) the con-

figuration of the production machinery, and (3) the nature of the

textile product being produced. Tr. 2454-55, 2478-79 (Hovan Ho-

cutt); Tr. 2702-04 (L. K. Fitzgerald). Consequently, unless OSHA

intends to freeze the sampled workplaces into precisely the same raw

material usage and production configuration that obtained at the

time of the sampling (a result that would be drastically inconsistent

with industry practice), the existence of “low levels” in a particular

workplace at a particular time does not indicate that the exposure

limits prescribed by the Standard can be met in that workplace—let

22

The final ground that the Secretary advances for be-

lieving that the Hocutt-Thomas estimate was an over-

statement is that their “calculations may also have in-

cluded costs for machines processing synthetic material.”

OSHA Br. at 18-19 ‘emphasis added). But the fact is

that Hocutt and Thomas did not assign compliance costs

to any equipment that was used exclusively for synthetics

and was located in an area where cotton was not also

processed. See J.A. at 236-37. There is no reason for

OSHA or the Secretary to speculate otherwise.”

In sum, none of the three reasons advanced by the

Secretary supports the conclusion that the Hocutt-Thomas

cost estimate was overstated.*! But even if it were over-

stated, neither the agency nor its lawyers have been able

to explain what basis there was for OSHA to believe that

the Hocutt-Thomas estimate of the capital costs of a

much less stringent standard “was sufficiently reliable to

alone others—without the need for additional controls. For the

“low level” of dust that may exist when one quality of cotton or

cotton-synthetic blend is processed can be drastically increased

when another quality of cotton is processed (or a different final

product is produced) on the same equipment.

29 Since the Standard defines “cotton dust” as any “dust present

in the air during the handling or processing of cotton,” Pet. App.

at 2, dust produced by a machine processing synthetics must be

controlled if it is located in an area where cotton also is handled

or processed even though on a separate machine. And, of course,

dust produced by a machine processing cotton-synthetic blends is

covered by the Standard.

30 The agency earlier protested that ATMI had failed to produce

the data that would permit OSHA to form a judgment on this

question. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 27372, col. 3. The Secretary now

acknowledges, however, that ATMI did in fact supply the survey

data, OSHA Br. at 64 n.70, and the questionnaires comprising that

data clearly segregate cotton from synthetic processing machinery.

See J.A. at 391-92.

31 In addition, for two operations (twisting and warping) Hocutt

and Thomas assigned no cost whatsoever to complying with an

exposure limit of 0.56 mg/m*. Pet. App. at 152-56. This zero cost

estimate for such operations can hardly be deemed an “overstate-

23

assess the economic impact of the standard” that OSHA

ultimately adopted. OSHA Br. at 19. The Secretary

asserts, without reference to the record, that the alleged

Hocutt-Thomas

overstatements tended to offset any differences in

cost attributable to the fact that the Hocutt-Thomas

estimates were premised in part upon higher dust

levels.

Id. But even if this were so, the fact is that OSHA made

no attempt to quantify these “differences in cost,” and

the record contains no basis whatsoever for concluding

that these “differences” (whatever they might be) would

be offset by any overstatements that Hocutt and Thomas

may have made. When all is said and done, the agency’s

estimate of costs is nothing but bald speculation.”

Having failed to develop a responsible or supportable

estimate of what its Standard would cost, OSHA was

not in a position to analyze the impact that the Standard

it actually adopted would have on the affected industries

or the economy as a whole. Moreover, as the Secretary

concedes, the analysis of economic consequences that

OSHA did perform was based upon the assumption that

compliance costs would be passed through fully in the

form of price increases—an assumption that OSHA’s

contractor, RTI, characterized as “extreme.” Pet. App.

at 44; OSHA Br. at 21.** Because OSHA had no sup-

ment” of compliance costs for the even lower exposure limit ulti-

mately adopted.

82 The suggestion that OSHA could do nothing more than specu-

late because “industry refused to disclose much of its supporting

data and methodology,” OSHA Br. at 19, is frivolous. As the

Secretary now acknowledges, see note 30 supra, ATMI did supply

the survey data. The only information that was deleted from the

approximately 2,000 pages that were provided to OSHA, J.A. at

388-93; Exs. 171 & 176, was confidential data which, by agree-

ment with OSHA, the industry withheld in order to prevent identi-

fication of specific plants.

83 As noted in petitioners’ opening Brief, this extreme assumption

was unjustified. See Brief for Petitioners at 29. Even if one were

24

portable estimate of what the Standard would cost and

pursued an analysis based on an extreme assumption,

it could not rationally conclude that the Standard would

be “affordable’—whatever the agency might mean by

that term—much less that the expected health benefits of

the Standard would be reasonably related to its costs.

B. The Assessment of Health Benefits

Although respondents devote many pages of their Briefs

to an analysis of health issues, they cannot disguise the

fact that OSHA made no determination that the health

benefits of its Standard would bear a reasonable re-

lationship to its costs. Instead, echoing the approach

it followed in the Benzene Standard proceeding, OSHA

simply announced “that the benefits of the proposed stand-

ard are likely to be appreciable” and declined “to carry

out further exercises toward more precise calculations of

benefit.” 43 Fed. Reg. at 27379, col. 3.

Respondents’ lawyers now attempt to supply the “more

precise calculations of benefit” that OSHA, believing

such calculations to be irrelevant, declined to make. Their

Briefs are replete with mathematical assessments of what

the respondents claim the Standard would produce in the

way of health benefits. See, e.g., Union Br. at 11, 42;

OSHA Br. at 32. But they do not refer to any instance

in which OSHA itself made such findings. And with

good reason: Such findings never were made by the

agency. Consequently, whatever one might say about the

validity of the benefit calculations presented by the

to assume that the then-existing textile trade agreements would

continue indefinitely—a speculative assumption at best—textile

imports would grow at a rate that exceeds the growth rate of the

domestic industry. Pet. App. at 199-201 (John P. Figh). This

would result in “greater penetration from the imports” and “de-

cided pressure on the ability to raise prices.” Jd. at 199, 201. More-

over, as pointed out by the American Farm Bureau Federation,

interfiber competition has continued to increase, with man-made

fibers taking a growing share of the market from cotton. See

Amicus Curiae Brief of American Farm Bureau Federation in

Support of Petitioners at 9-10 & n.6.

25

lawyers for the Secretary and Union Respondents, those

benefit calculations have no relevance here, since the

Standard must rest upon findings made by the agency,

not those made by its lawyers after the fact.™

Moreover, even if they were relevant, the benefit calcu-

lations made by respondents’ lawyers are simply not

supportable. What respondents have done is to suggest

that the benefits of the Standard can be determined simply

by applying the prevalence rates reported in the studies

of Dr. Merchant to populations of workers who respond-

ents claim might be exposed to cotton dust in the textile

industry. See, eg., OSHA Br. at 32; Union Br. at 11.

While this may be an interesting exercise, it has little

relevance to determining the benefits that might be ex-

pected from OSHA’s Standard.*

For one thing, Dr. Merchant’s study reports prevalence

rates and does not show the probability that workers ex-

posed to specified levels of cotton dust will develop bys-

sinosis. See Brief for Petitioners at 9. And even in

terms of prevalence, Dr. Merchant’s findings cannot prop-

erly be applied to the industry as a whole. As Dr. Mer-

chant himself stated: “Clearly no inference... . can be

drawn as to the prevalence of byssinosis in the entire U.S.

textile industry ....” J.A. at 435. The Secretary ac-

4 See pages 16-17 & n.23 supra.

35 Respondents’ Briefs also make repeated references to an

estimate by Dr. Arend Bouhuys that 35,000 individuals may have

disabling lung function related to their employment in the cotton

textile industry. See, e.g., OSHA Br. at 4, 31 n.86; Union Br. at 2.

This figure cannot be credited. As Dr. Bouhuys admitted, it is “an

extrapolation from limited data and should not be considered as

anything but a crude estimate.” J.A. at 155. Even a casual reading

of his statement reveals how “crude” and unjustified Dr. Bouhuys’

extrapolation and estimate really is. Thus, his analysis assumes

that 200,000 workers are employed in “dusty jobs” (a term he

does not define) in the cotton textile industry and that all of these

are 45 years of age or older. Id. at 154. It also extrapolates charac-

teristics of an admittedly “limited” study population (645 active and

retired workers) to a putative population at risk of 425,000 active

and retired workers. Jd.

26

knowledges Dr. Merchant’s statement but claims that

it is “irrelevant.” OSHA Br. at 33 n.39. But it clearly

is not irrelevant: There was good reason for Dr. Mer-

chant to caution against inferring that the prevalence

rates found in his study could be applied to the entire

textile industry.”

Thus, even if Merchant’s predicted prevalence rates are

accepted at face value (and petitioners contend that they

cannot be*’), they could not be used as respondents’

36 Thus, Dr. Merchant’s study was concluded by the time that the

cotton dust exposure limits that the new Standard supersedes took

effect for the industry as a whole at the end of May 1971. See

OSHA Br. at 2. Consequently, it does not reflect the effect of

the exposure limits that have prevailed since that time. More-

over, Dr. Merchant studied workers at three cotton and two

cotton-synthetic blend plants, whereas the more typical ratio of

plants in the industry is the reverse-—with cotton-synthetic blend

plants predominating over plants that process only cotton. For

example, the 1971 study of Burlington Industries’ plants revealed

that thirteen of the plants processed cotton-synthetic blends, while

only six processed all cotton. Ex. 71, Part IV, Report III, Table 1. A

similar ratio prevailed when West Point-Pepperell commenced its

general medical surveillance program in 1973. Tr. 1648-49 (Dr.

Jack Whitworth). Since byssinosis prevalence rates are generally

found to be substantially lower in ¢otton-synthetic blend plants

than in all-cotton plants, see id. at 1696-97, the results of a study

in which all-cotton plants were overrepresented would give a skewed

picture of prevalence rates in the industry as a whole.

37 See Brief for Petitioners at 10-11. The Secretary’s criticisms

of various studies that were inconsistent with Dr. Merchant’s re-

sults is unfounded. For example, the Secretary states that, in two

of these other studies (those of Dr. Weill and Dr. Morgan), dust

levels “were generally much lower than” 0.5 mg/m*. OSHA Br. at

10 n.16. But the fact is that 40 percent of the employees in the

yarn preparation areas studied by Drs. Weill and Morgan were ex-

posed to dust levels above 0.5 mg/m*. See J.A. at 162 (Dr. Hans

Weill) ; Ex. 39, Tables 1 & 2 (Dr. Morgan) ; Ex. 48a (Dr. Morgan).

(Employees working with “synthetic” materials as shown in Ex. 43a

were excluded from Dr. Morgan’s study.) By contrast, less than

25 percent of the workers in the yarn preparation areas studied by

Dr. Merchant were exposed to dust levels above 0.5 mg/m*. J.A.

at 38, Group 3. By the same token, the fact that there was a large

27

lawyers use them here—a point that the agency itself may

have recognized implicitly when it failed to make the cal-

culations in which its lawyers now engage. Moreover,

even this unjustified use of the Merchant study by re-

spondents’ lawyers does not show that the Standard is

likely to produce any substantial health benefits beyond

those that could be realized at far lower cost through

implementation of medical surveillance programs with

more moderate exposure limits. For respondents’ math-

ematical manipulations take no account of the impact that

a medical surveillance program would have on reduc

ing the incidence of byssinosis (particularly the serious

grades) at the permissible exposure levels that were

proposed by the industry.**

None of the workers studied by Dr. Merchant had par-

ticipated in a medical surveillance program; consequently,

the results reported by Dr. Merchant do not indicate how

the prevalence of byssinosis would vary from one exposure

level to another if the employees involved participated

range of dust levels in the Weill study is not a ground for rejecting

it. If it were, the Merchant study might have to be rejected as well,

since Dr. Merchant selected his plants for study on the basis of

“extremes of exposure.” Id. at 27.

38 Respondents persist in suggesting that even the mild, re-

versible and nondisabling symptoms of byssinosis constitute a

“material impairment of health” within the meaning of the OSH

Act. See OSHA Br. at 31 (acute form of byssinosis constitutes

“material impairment of health”); Union Br. at 5, 44. Since the

court below did not find that these symptoms constitute “material

impairment of health” within the meaning of the Act, Pet. App.

at 50-51 n.83, 617 F.2d at 654 n.83, the Standard cannot be sup-

ported on the basis of respondents’ characterization of these re-

versible and nondisabling symptoms. We would also note that in its

recent policy statement allowing partial-shift wearing of respira-

tors under the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA distinguished between

the hazards presented by exposure to carcinogens and the less

serious hazard presented by cotton dust even at a level that exceeds

the “ ‘lowest feasible level’ of exposure.” (Copies of the OSHA

News Release describing the new respirator policy have been

lodged with the Court.)

28

in a medical surveillance program, supplemented by res-

pirator use and employee transfer in appropriate cases,

This is a crucial point, since even OSHA acknowledged

that such a program of medical surveillance is likely to re-

duce the incidence of byssinosis significantly.”

In sum, respondents’ lawyers have attempted to supply

health benefit findings that the agency itself failed to

make. And in making these findings for the agency,

respondents’ lawyers manipulate the record in ways that

are simply unjustified. The simple fact is that OSHA

itself did not perform the kind of health benefit assess-

ment that respondents’ lawyers would have wished, and

the record below cannot be altered by the mathematical

sleight of hand performed by the agency’s lawyers after

the proceeding has been long closed.

- 89 See 48 Fed. Reg. at 27359, col. 3; Brief for Petitioners at 15,

49. Indeed, the Secretary in part attributes the disparity in the

prevalence rates found in the Weill and Morgan studies on the

one hand, and in the Merchant study on the other, to the fact that

the employees studied by Weill and Morgan “had been part of an

on-going worker surveillance program,” while the employees studied

by Merchant had not. OSHA Br. at 10 n.16. And OSHA agreed

that pulmonary function testing utilized as part of a medical

surveillance program would diminish the likelihood that pulmonary

impairment would occur. As stated by OSHA: “These tests will

ensure that any significant change from the baseline determination

will become apparent before material impairment occurs.” 41 Fed.

Reg. 56498, 56502, col. 1 (1976).

29

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in the Brief for

Petitioners, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should

be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to

grant the petitions for review and vacate the Standard.

ROBERT H. BorK

142 Huntington Street

New Haven, Connecticut 06511

GREGORY B. TOBIN

OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,

SMOAK, STEWART AND

EDWARDS

First National Bank Tower

Two Peachtree Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30388

Respectfully submitted,

NEIL J. KING

Counsel of Record

A. STEPHEN Hut, Jr.

ANDREW N. VOLLMER

WILMER & PICKERING

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 872-6000

Counsel for American Textile

Manufacturers Institute, Inc.

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GARY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON

The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Milliken and

Company

JOSEPH K. MAppox, Jr.

P.O. Box 5784

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Spartan Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON

The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Hermitage, Inc.

THOMAS A. EVINS

CLYDE H. HAMILTON

BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &

BROWNE

P.O. Box 451

Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

Counsel for Arkwright Mills

ROBERT T. THOMPSON

GarRY S. KLEIN

THOMPSON, MANN & HUTSON

The Daniel Building

Suite 2222

Greenville, S.C. 29602

Counsel for Blair Mills, Inc.

HARLAN H. HUNTLEY

ROGER L. TUTTLE

2291 Memorial Drive

Danville, Virginia 24541

Counsel for Dan River, Inc.

30

SAMUEL K. ABRAMS THOMAS A. EVINS

BRIAN E. MORAN CLYDE H. HAMILTON

BAKER & HOSTETLER BUTLER, MEANS, EVINS &

818 Connecticut Ave., N.W. BROWNE

Washington, D.C. 20006 P.O. Box 451

E 1 Spartanburg, S.C. 29304

ar a nese Counsel for Mayfair Mills

Cone Mills Corporation

Greensboro, N.C. 27405 poe ee prema

Counsel for Cone Mills CHARLES A. EDWARDS

Corporation CONSTANGY, BRooKsS & SMITH

1900 Peachtree Center Building

DAN M. BYRD, JR. 230 Peachtree Street, N.W.

J. SPRATT WHITE Atlanta, Georgia 30303

P.O. Box 70 ‘ P

Fort Mill, S.C. 29715 Counsel for Riegel Textile

Corporation

Counsel for Springs Mills,

Inc. RICHARD H. MONK, JR.

C. POWERS DORSETT

ROBERT H. BORK West Point-Pepperell, Inc.

142 Huntington Street P.O. Box 71

* New Haven, Connecticut (6511 West Point, Georgia 31833

Counsel for Fieldcrest Counsel for West Point-

Mills, Inc. Pepperell, Inc.

January 14, 1981

la

APPENDIX A

Catawba-Charlab, Inc.

Cliffside Railroad Company

Schaeffer Engineering

Societe Francaise des Fabrications-RIBY

Establissements Schaeffer & CIE

Societe des Impressions Sur

La Societe Cotonniere Ivoirenne

Societe Beninoise des Textiles

Blue Bell Cote d’Ivoire

Impressions de Textiles de la Republique

Popularie de Congo

Sonitextil (Societe N igerienne des Textiles)

Amoskeag Company

Crossley Karastan Carpet Mills, Ltd.

Fieldcrest Ireland, Ltd.

Lantor International Limited

Lantor of Australia Pty. Limited

Wool Filters International

Firet, B.V.

CODI International, B.V.

CODI GmbH

Lantor Nonwoven of South Africa (Proprietary) Limited

Lantor Hong Kong Limited

Lantor (U.K.) Limited

Owners of over 50% of Springs Millis, Inc.’s common

stock also own large interests in the Bank of Lancaster

and the L & C Railroad. Springs Mills disclaims these

companies are affiliated.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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