Respondents Brief — American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan

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Nos. 79-1429 and 79-1583

JAH 44 108!

In the Supreme Court of the United States PEN

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

Ray MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL.

NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

Vv.

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

KENNETH S. GELLER

Deputy Solicitor General

BARRY SULLIVAN

Assistant to the Solicitor General

CARIN A. CLAUSS

hes Department of Justice

Solicitor of Labor Washington, D.C. 20580

BENJAMIN W. MINTZ (202) 633-2217

Associate Solicitor

(Aen et

ALLEN H. FELDMAN

DENNIS K. KADE

DIANE E. BURKLEY

JOHN A. BRYSON

Attorneys

7 TSE aes

Department of Labor

Washington, D.C. 20210

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 79-1429

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

’ Vv.

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL.

No. 79-1583

NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

v. |

RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the occupational health standard for cot-

ton dust, which is based on the conclusion of the Secre-

tary of Labor that technology exists to meet the standard

and that the costs of compliance are well. within the

capability of the textile industry, is “feasible” within

(I)

af

the meaning of Section 6(b) (5) of the Occupational

Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5).

2. Whether Section 3(8) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 652(8),

which provides that a health standard must be “reason-

ably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or health-

ful employment and places of employment,” requires the

Secretary to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and deter-

mine that the costs of a particular standard are “jus-

tified” by the expected benefits.

3. Whether the transfer and income protection pro-

vision of the cotton dust standard is a measure that is

“reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or

healthful employment” within the meaning of Section

3(8) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 652(8).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OE NTL OR PG eR OE TE CET

IIT issih thinacsinssclicaanscoeiivtaubaanitioneedtanbalbeliaiblatiae ti

SIA SERPS eta RD OR RM TREN SST RS

Bis’ MORON assassin

B. Toxic effects of cotton dust -........0..0..0.20.0------.

C. The basis for the final standard ................

1. The Secretary’s health determinations and

dust control strategy -................ CALC TN

2. The feasibility of the standard ...................

a. Technological feasibility 2.0000.

b. Economic feasibility -...............0.0......

3. The medical transfer and income protec-

PN

D. The decision of the court of appeals ..............

ke REE ao ieee ena

Argument:

I. The cotton dust standard is reasonably necessary

and appropriate because it protects against a

significant risk of material health impairment...

II. The Secretary’s response to the significant health

threat posed by cotton dust is economically justi-

fied and required by the statute _......._. ‘aliases

A. A cost-benefit test is inconsistent with the

language and legislative history of Section

cL) SPRINTS cane sae Liaitibidiistalestins

B. The requirement of Section 3(8) that a

standard be “reasonably necessary or appro-

priate” does not embody a cost-benefit test..

(II)

13

14

)

37

39

52

IV

Argument—Continued Page

C. A cost-benefit test is not necessary to pre-

vent serious economic disruptions or serious

misallocation of scarce resources for com-

bating occupational disease .......................... 55

III. The Secretary correctly concluded that the cot-

ton dust standard is economically feasible ......... 63

IV. The medical transfer and income protection pro-

vision is within the Secretary’s authority to im-

pose requirements reasonably necessary and ap-

propriate to secure healthful employment .......... 65

EERE INA Ns ER Olas Stree te Me CERN SCE ETT GNI 70

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CITATIONS

Cases:

AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 5380 F.2d 109 ..............2..22..... 39, 51

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

i 62

American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 539 F.2d

RENCE PER ERAT SLAP UN PS OEE PRO BOP SP USE OE RE 51

American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 426 F.2d

BEE i adheainsiaickistie sido Dahan sachigiapictinedeipasaninins tibsbi ticiintgeeasais 51

American Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA, 577 F.2d

825, cert. dismissed, No. 78-918 (Sept. 10,

SN, sossabbetc nab ncced quent aabicaiicencstheaieeaedsmuudoaiia 39, 51

American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d

493, aff’d on other grounds, Industrial Union De-

partment V. American Petroleum Institute, No.

TS IE GA Cher EE Tae 50

American Smelting & Refining Co. v. OSHRC, 501

| 2) | Epeaaee iii hang ciae aricieeinehniiats gecesi obsiaias noses 34

‘C.P.C. Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1829 ................ 51

Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp, 332 U.S. 480........ 53

Cotton Warehouse Ass’n Vv. Marshall, No. 79-1789

SIA SUN TIE: coheed aciecaksenaiseickaccsitnn-cu cd doasibonaicbeih stic Sasi: 27

EPA V. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, No. 79-770

RMON OI MEINE” snsciccsehonesncileesstbcianebotnladtiiindesnaanacs 37, 40, 44, 51

FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 .......... 49

V

Cases—Continued Page

FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 ............ 47

Florida Peach Growers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor,

UU: BEE I sicipichis hice iieetsabremepe cals rs Pais a, 46

Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168.. 64

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S.

Oe igieianid akiosceieeebaliucnrenicaamonieabomiacatod 47

H & H Tire Co. v. Department of Transportation,

GED Fe Me sniiditdincictntdte whine ee 54-55

Harris v. McRae, No. 79-1268 (June 30, 1980)...... 38

Industrial Union Department v. American Petro-

leum Institute (Benzene), No. 78-911 (July 2,

UID! vastecsssaclvancten eared 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 40, 45,

50, 53, 54, 56, 61, 63

Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d

er en OER aA Pee ee LL I 39, 49, 50, 63

Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co., 622 F.2d

1176, cert. denied, No. 80-471 (Dec. 15, 1980)... 52

National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC,

cl al msc ck. <i ath ta ROUTERS Nde a SR ee NEN TR ED 47

Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U. 2

fo fee nee NS Rees ee REE A Toe) By nae NERC 63

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 298 U.S. 388 ......... 62

R.M.I. Co. Vv. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566........ 51

Samson Paper Bag Co., 3 Empl. Safety & Health

Guide (CCH) {| 24,555 (June 16,1980) 52

Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509

F.2d 1301, cert. denied, 421 U.S.992..... 51

7 a Ve oR ee Ge OO es 37

Texas Independent Ginners Ass’n Vv. Marshall,

ch, LEER LRA DE BON SAM, 50

TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,

Te Me Be a a ae eee 47

Turner Co., Div. of Olin Corp. v. Sietelars of La-

BOM, Se WROD ccc een 51-52

United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141... 58

United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No.

79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980) ......... 49, 58, 68, 69

Universal Camera Corp. Vv. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474... 64

Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412

eis ge CART ao LER THON TEN 53

Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 . .38, 67, 68-69, 70

VI

Statutes and regulations: Page

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.

(Supp. ITI) 7401 et seq.:

Section 110(a) (6), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III)

I head hicesstpon tntanecanbssinailoatnighnnsncaseinedeie 69

Section 112(b) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. ITI)

elas dnsonsies in cdcronciclbahcorenethnepe 55

Section 211(c)(2)(A) and (B), 42 U.S.C.

(Supp. II) 7545(c) (2) (A) and (B) ........ 40

Consumer Product Safety Act, Section 9(c) (1)

(C) and (2) (A), 15 U.S.C. 2058 (c) (1) (C) and

RSIS SIRES SIRE Se RIS Ss oo a 54

Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42

U.S.C. (and Supp. III) 6201 et seq.:

Section 325(a), 42 U.S.C. 6295(a) _............. 40

Section 325(a), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 6295

Neen sscPlucedummoueuadasns 40

Federal Coal Mine and Health Safety Act of 1969,

ee ems SD UP OD css 69

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.:

SIs See 5) As hoe | mn Senne 40

NES oH CLE > 3 6) Amn a 51

le Sale | LC) Et) Seance cen 40

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,

I I ne aioleschiwde 54

Be RN RID UD oocci oo cnccsccenseccceseromecnostcnsess 55

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29

U.S.C. 651 et seq.:

See ay OP Gm, OR ec 46, 68

Section 2(b), 29 U.S.C. 651(b) ...............00....... 2

Section 2(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. 651(b) (5) .......... 68

Section 3(8), 29 U.S.C. 652(8) ...... 29, 50, 53, 66, 68

Section 5(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. 654(a) (1) .......... 46

Section 6({a), 29 U.S.C. 655 (a) .........00002...... 2,47, 52

Section 6(b), 29 U.S.C. 655 (b) ............00000..... 4,52

Section 6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. 655 (b) (5) ....22, 26, 27,

31, 34, 39, 47, 48, 50, 53, 55, 58, 68

VII

Statutes and regulations—Continued Page

Section 6(b) (6) (A)-(B), 29 U.S.C. 655 (b)

Ue a a 44,47

Section 6(d), 29 U.S.C. 655(d) ...........00... 44,57

Section 6(f), 29 U.S.C. 655(f) _.......... 4, 24, 46, 47

Section 6(g), 29 U.S.C. 655(g) 0... 56

Secuon 10, 29 U.E.0. G68 ..............:................... 52

Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. 35 et seq. _................ 2

MOR WRU nil hice okeGi cccesecedeccccke ccs 52

ee Ciera EN ne 3

29 C.F.R. 1910.1048 (f) (2) (v) ...-ccccccccccccceoeeoccoc---. 24, 66

Miscellaneous:

115 Cong. Rec. (1969) :

a ea Tr 48

Sy RS IEE ceric ce ete 48

Es SAN RRS EE CM NICE FRE NY Re 48

Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A

Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic

Substances Control, Ecol. L. Q. 497 (1978) ...... 62

Exec. Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661, 12663

OCS Sit nite ahr MDa EEO ASR) DON ER LO Nee 59

34 Fed. Reg. 7946, 7958 (1969) ............................ 2

41 Fed. Reg. (1976):

A tana ae a he el kB ee 60

SEE ihespestit aed Seatac, oe Set 14

Da OO a yeas 5

iT Silence a en ei ia ae 3, 30

De UNI seccneccn Se Ser se ie ve 9

De I Nisei alia arse ea a, 32

43 Fed. Reg. (1978) :

pp. 5987, 5944-5945, 5948 57

I TIPE Shes is a ee 20

ARETE NA RR eae OME, ae 3

Ec, Ge RPS RE TREE ERED Ces Eu De ae 7

SC CREE emg 4

Miscellaneous—Continued Page

Na SSPE ce oe SRT a 8

aI ona dhicalscibhanasaybeteniedsinipesaibeensateraens 2

ES CE a ane Re 4,7, 31, 32

Os a i Nias si cncindpenpehkatinnichinicnesepadinnmtens 6, 7, 8, 11, 31, 32

i MITTIN aciscincecdicitecndsisceasonstesticiecanaiocabenninbingedi 2

Be Nia tatdtiilnciinebdidipnibsslteniiandunanesnasiensanadoubiwosewthdsies 3, 30

EN EIR ae Se DEO 9

I iis ndaicdcecdethicteanesianasabbdswonchonciens 10

Cl aslenlinbapmatbioeie 33

i oda. colacannenennvcnondncincisnebeailovgnates 10, 30

eI. 8k scnctisnnsaiscrniputdsacdseoiteanensewoisaitte 30

PR EE tet telie li ctupniinisedecdimonsbaettaedinpdacneiovsetndoindss 10, 30

PWS ELST NS OAR RES PL 8, 10, 11, 36

p. 27360 ........ a ae Aaa oe ehh hae te 3,12

I i sani cnn inesp Rahiotbetnibbinusinenens 13

EE EERE TIRE See Sa enw acre rear a 18

a a aici es in ds cdaipeurnialeacians 3

a a 3

I TIE ih act acsiulinccecnicopnandncsentesiriniatabvar oboe 2

I PTT cicscretuitdeanvnrckensanseseavbacionsens 14, 16, 18, 65

Be el aia cad gs seaniua bnninaruasaaeen 16

Rae iia epielatatigeSiioeavacslepnapsteicenlag sheen 18

TS ital 18

EU TESTE ee ene SOA RIOR ae ee 17, 19, 64

a ldo 19

ARREST RSI ce ence PP 22, 23

sia de tas reac iipisicldaindinlen 22

aa hata cemitvinnsin dn atone 12, 36

Oe I air csguincnntsninianasnslabbonibaacsleaieele 28

Ms SEE SP AD ne SR md 23, 66, 67, 68

Ne REE RET RN CNN rs SR eT Re RE TC 23, 65

pp. 52988-52984, 58008 ...................... eee 57

i AG iid incllenacoiudinsimcieinctnhoveniiingaeessadietelbie 56

He TIE osctcasdccasocsiisinctnhsioaniecanseeanianpeonsudbs 57

Se ec snatced cae nianenensaihesananl 50

44 Fed. Reg. 58642, 58661 (1979) ............0000222--. 55

44 Fed. Reg. 58660-58661 (1979) ..........220222-22222... 55

45 Fed. Reg. (1980):

Miscellaneous—Continued Page

NRE IES REY PsA ete ee 56

I i 27

H.R. Rep. No. 92-1158, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) .. 54

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-700, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

Uc ied 40

Industrial Hygiene Field Operations Manual, U.S.

Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (1980) _.......0... 57-58

Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis for Standards Regu-

lating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational

Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum

Institute v. OSHA, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 115 (1980). 61

S. 2788, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) 0. 48

S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) _.... 55

S. Rep.No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ...... 54

S. Rep. No. 93-132, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) ....... 44

S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-516, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

REE ARSE IAS GS SI NEE DAN aA SIO oR OR ae OR 40

Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess., Study on Federal Regulation,

ven. ¥i.(Commm: Print 1678): 60

_Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor

and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legis-

lative History of the Occupational Safety and

Health Act of 1970 (Comm. Print 1971) _........ 1

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

So, Reet CRI AE eR Raw PML eS ZA ON Se a 39

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 19-

102)* is reported at 617 F.2d 636. The Secretary’s stand-

ard for occupational exposure to cotton dust, and the

statement of reasons supporting the standard, are pub-

lished at 43 Fed. Reg. 27350-27399 (1978), as amended

at 43 Fed. Reg. 28473-28474, 35032-35035, and 56893-

56894 (1978).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

October 24, 1979 (Pet. App. 26), and petitions for re-

hearing were denied on January 11, 1980 (Pet. App.

103-105). The petition for a writ of certiorari in No.

79-1429 was filed on March 14, 1980, and the petition for

a writ of certiorari in No. 79-1583 was filed on April

9, 1980. On October 6, 1980, the Court granted the

petition in No. 79-1583 in full and granted the petition

in No. 79-1429 limited to questions 1, 2 and 4 (J.A. 489).

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

STATEMENT

A. Introduction

Byssinosis, which is commonly known as “brown lung”

disease, is a painful and permanently disabling respira-

tory disease that is induced by the inhalation of cotton

1“Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to the petition in No. 79-

1429. “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed in this Court. “App.”

refers to the joint appendix filed in the court of appeals. “Leg.

Hist.” refers to the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.

on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative

History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Comm.

Print 1971). For convenience, we shall refer to the Secretary, the

Assistant Secretary, and the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-

ministration as “the Secretary” or “the agency.”

(

(1)

2

dust.* Most victims of byssinosis are textile workers,*

among whom the disease has been known to be wide-

spread since at least the beginning of the eighteenth

century (Pet. App. 29 & n.11). The prevalence of this

disease, which Congress found to exemplify the “magni-

tude of [our occupational health] problem” (Leg. Hist.

143), played a central role in the decision to enact the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.

651 et seg., which aims “to assure so far as possible

every working man and woman in the Nation safe and

healthful working conditions and to preserve our human

resources” (Section 2(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 651(b) ).

On May 29, 1971, the Secretary, as authorized by Sec-

tion 6(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(a), adopted a pre-

existing federal standard as the occupational health

standard for cotton dust.t* The 1971 standard identified

2 Numerous investigators have established the relationship be-

tween cotton dust and the disease. See J.A. 15-22; Pet. App. 108-

124; App. 210-217, 218-228. Despite extensive research, however,

medical science has not yet identified the particular component of

cotton dust that causes byssinosis. 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27355 (1978).

Medical science thus broadly defines “cotton dust” to include all

dust in the working environment of employees who work with

cotton, without regard to whether the origin of the dust can be

traced directly to the cotton plant, and the Secretary has adopted

that definition for regulatory purposes. 43 Fed. eg. 27354-27355

(1978).

3 The textile industry is divided into two basic operational seg-

ments: (1) yarn manufacturing, and (2) weaving of yarn into

cloth. Between 126,000 and 200,000 workers are exposed to cotton

dust each day ir yarn manufacturing operations consisting of

opening, picking, carding, drawing, roving, spinning, winding,

spooling, twisting, and warping. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27365, 27379

(1978). Many additional workers are exposed in the weaving

process (App. 517).

* Under Section 6(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(a), the Secretary

was authorized during an initial two-year period to adopt any

existing federal health and safety standard or any national “con-

sensus” standard. In 1969, the Secretary had set an airborne dust

concentration limit as an occupational health requirement for public

contractors under the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. 35(e) (34 Fed.

Reg. 7946, 7953 (1969) ). That limitation incorporated the recom-

3

a maximum permissible exposure level (PEL) for air-

borne concentrations of cotton dust and required that

employers meet that level through the use of feasible

engineering controls, with respirators to be used only

where the PEL could not be achieved by engineering con-

trols. 29 C.F.R. 1910.1000(e)

On June 19, 1978, after extensive informal rulemak-

ing proceedings, the Secretary promulgated a more strin-

gent health standard under Section 6(b) of the Act, 29

mendation of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial

Hygienists (ACGIH) that exposure be limited to 1,000 micrograms

of total dust per cubic meter of air (1000 ug/m*) averaged over

an eight-hour workday. “Total dust” includes both respirable and

nenrespirable dust fractions. In 1978, when the Secretary set the

present standard, he followed the weight of current scientific opin-

ion by keying the maximum exposure level to the respirable dust

fraction (43 Fed. Reg. 27355 (1978) ). ACGIH had likewise adopted

that measuring device in 1974, when it issued a revised recommen-

dation that exposure should be limited to 200 ug/m*, the standard

that the Secretary eventually adopted here for 2'i operations except

slashing and weaving. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351 (1978).

In all operations except slashing and weaving, the 1971 standard

—1000 ug/m? of total dust—is roughly equivalent to 500 ug/m? of

respirable dust, as measured by the 1978 standard. See J.A. 464-465;

App. 384; 43 Fed. Reg. 27355 (1978). Slashing and weaving are

exceptional because a substantial portion of the respirable dust

comes from starch that is used in those operations and is not harm-

ful. The Secretary set a higher permissible exposure level—750

ug/m*—in those operations. 43 Fed. Reg. 27360 (1978). See page

12, infra. See also 41 Fed. Reg. 56504 (1976).

5 “Engineering controls,” for purposes of the cotton dust stand-

ard, are mainly general and local ventilation systems designed to re-

move particulate matter from the air by using suction to capture

emission source dust, which is then conveyed to a filtration system

that screens out the particulates before recirculating the air into the

working area. General ventilation systems consist of filtration sys-

tems used in conjunction with central air conditioning equipment

(43 Fed. Reg. 27363 (1978)). Local exhaust ventilation requires

enclosure of machinery and the use of suction hoods that are placed

as close as possible to the emission source; the air is then filtered

and recirculated (id. at 27364). See J.A. 79-82.

4

U.S.C. 655(b).® The new standard sets stricter PELs

governing airborne concentrations of cotton dust in var-

ious manufacturing processes and requires a program of

prophylactic work practices, education, training, and

medical surveillance. The standard allows employers four

years within which to meet the PELs through engineer-

ing controls and requires the use of respirators in the

interim. Respirators will thereafter be required where

the PEL cannot feasibly be reached through engineer-

ing controls. The standard also provides that whenever

a physician determines that an employee is unable to

wear a respirator, the employee must be given the op-

portunity to transfer to another position having a dust

level at or below the PEL, if one is available, without

loss of pay.

Petitioners, among others, sought judicial review of

the standard under Section 6(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.

655(f). On October 24, 1979, the court of appeals up-

held the standard as applied to petitioners (Pet. App.

19-102).

B. Toxic Effects of Cotton Dust

Reliable estimates show that at least 35,000 active and

retired American textile workers are chronically disabled

as a result of disease caused by the inhalation of cotton

dust (J.A. 347; 48 Fed. Reg. 27353 (1978)).7 In addi-

6 Section 6(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(b), establishes procedures

to be followed in promulgating permanent occupational safety and

health standards. Among other things, the Secretary must provide

for notice and comment and the opportunity for a hearing. In the

present case, comments were received from 263 parties, and 109

witnesses appeared during 14 days of hearings held in three cities.

The administrative record exceeds 105,000 pages (Pet. App. 35).

7Such chronic disease is manifested in severe and continuous

shortness of breath, chronic cough, and severe and permanent loss

of lung function. The afflicted employee must often choose prema-

ture retirement despite efforts to continue working (43 Fed. Reg.

27352-27353 (1978)). Excess heart strain and death through heart

failure may also result from severe breathing incapacity (J.A. 64-

73).

5

tion, dose-response curves drawn by Dr. James Mer-

chant, Director of the Appalachian Laboratory for Safety

and Health, and his colleagues, based on studies of var-

ious textile mills, show that one quarter of yarn manu-

facturing workers manifest at least acute symptoms of

disease at exposure levels roughly equivalent to those set

by the 1971 standard.* The dose-response data also show

that 13% of those workers will manifest such symptoms

even under the 1978 PEL. See note 8, supra. These

figures underestimate the true extent of the disease, how-

ever, because workers with severe acute symptoms will

often leave their jobs rather than face further disability,

and will not be counted in worker surveys (J.A. 42-49).

Detection of acute byssinosis depends largely upon

worker complaints of chest tightness and breathlessness.

A standard questionnaire and classification system® are

generally used. The worker’s condition is classified as

grade 4 byssinosis if the symptoms occur only occas-

ionally on the first day of the work week. If the symp-

8 Dr. Merchant’s dose-response curve showed that, in the yarn

manufacturing processes, a 3% prevalence of all grades of byssi-

nosis occurred at a dust level of 50 wg/m*. At levels of 100 ug/m!3,

200 ug/m*, and 500 ug/m*, the percentages rose to 7%, 18%, and

26%. In the remaining processes (slashing and weaving), no sig-

nificant prevalence was found at 200 uwg/m*; percentages of 5%

and 15% were found at levels of 500 ug/m*® and 1000 ug/m? (43

Fed. Reg. 27355 (1978) ; J.A. 44, 46). Dr. Merchant’s figures gen-

erally accord with those of other investigators. See J.A. 56-57,

61-63; App. 376-385. Comparing his work with that of other re-

searchers, Dr. Merchant stated that “it is remarkable once dust

concentrations and different processes are taken into account, even

with the different methods used, different countries, [and] slight

differences in questionnaire, how similar the prevalence levels are

from country to country and process to process. So I think there

is a good degree of correlation between the investigations” (J.A.

437). Dr. Arend Bouhuys, Director of the Yale University Lung

Research Center, made essentially the same observation (J.A. 404).

® The classification system was develoned by Dr. Schilling in his

study of the Lancashire cotton mills (41 Fed. Reg. 56500-56501

(1976)).

6

toms frequently occur on the first day of every work

week, the condition is classified as grade 1. If the symp-

toms occur on the first day of every work week and

regularly recur on other workdays, the condition is clas-

sified as grade 2.’° Byssinotics classified in grades %

through 2 are clearly unhealthy. They suffer from

breathlessness and chest tightness, and they find that

their normal activities must be curtailed at work and at

home. One expert, who had studied byssinosis for 20

years, testified that in addition to discomfort at work,

“in the evening [the worker] finds it difficult to undergo

normal activities, he finds it difficult to walk rapidly

home, and tends to do very little” (J.A. 484).

Not only does acute byssinosis cause substantial dis-

comfort and interfere with normal activities, but it also

causes permanent health damage. While petitioners re-

peatedly assert (see, e.g., ATMI Br. 4-5, 49-51) that

acute byssinosis is “reversible,” that statement is incor-

rect, or at least imprecise. Symptoms may well subside

if a worker is removed from the dusty environment, but

the damage that has been done cannot be undone. If

workers are again exposed, “[their] ability to combat the

[disease] is most probably less than when they were nor-

mal to begin with” (J.A. 422-423) and repeated exposure

results in a “cumulative damaging effect” (J.A. 25).

Thus, even grade 1% byssinosis is a “pathological state’’

that carries “significant health effects.” 43 Fed. Reg.

27354 (1978) .*

10 The condition is classified as grade 3 if grade 2 symptoms are

accompanied by evidence of permanent incapacity, diminished pul-

monary effort tolerance or reduced ventilatory capacity.

11 As Dr. Bouhuys stated (J.A. 152-153) :

The reversible physiological changes induced by cotton dust

exposure need to be prevented and should therefore be con-

sidered in establishing a standard. The reversible effects of

cotton dust exposure on the lungs of workers constitute a re-

current insult to their lungs which is unacceptable if only for

the fact that they are associated with symptoms of cough,

chest tightness, shortness of breath, and wheezing. In addi-

oe

7

Medical science has not yet discovered the precise man-

ner in which lower grade, acute byssinosis progresses to

the level of chronic, irreversible, and disabling disease

(grade 3 byssinosis).’* Indeed, the idea of an orderly

progression may not accurately describe the route of the

disease, as Dr. Russell Harley, an ATMI expert, testified

at the hearing (J.A. 192):

[T]he assumption is often made that the disorder

progresses from % to 1 to 2 to 3 and, thus, all

grades reflect the progress of the individual’s dis-

ability. In many instances, however, there is no

progression at all. Sometimes Grade 3 seems to ap-

pear de novo or there is a jump from 1 to 3. Among

those who develop permanent disability, Grade 2

very often never occurs.

It is beyond dispute, however, that both acute and

chronic stages are attributable to inhalation of cotton

dust (43 Fed. Reg. 27352 (1978)) and that repeated

acute insults lead to chronic impairment (43 Fed. Reg.

27354 (1978) ; J.A. 153-154, 411). This progression oc-

curs because “[u]ltimately repeated bronchial construc-

tion, it is likely although not definitely established that re-

current acute effects of dust exposure contribute to the insidious

development of chronic lung disease. * * * [S]Jince the acute

effects of cotton and hemp dusts on lung function are similar,

prudence indicates the assumption that temporary hypoxemia

may also result from acute dust exposures to cotton dust. There

can be little question that any exposure which may result in

temporary disturbances of the supply of oxygen to the tissues

of the human body needs to be prevented.

12 The Secretary pointed out in the final standard that the chronic

disease caused by cotton dust is not adequately described by the

term “grade 3 byssinosis” (48 Fed. Reg. 27353 (1978)). For in-

stance, some workers demonstrate excessive rates of chronic bron-

chitis that must be deemed attributable to their dusty environment

(ibid.). Accordingly, the “suggestion that the term chronic ob-

structive pulmonary disease (COPD) [should] constitute [the]

generally accepted clinical definition of chronic lung disease * * *

has merit” (ibid.).

8

tion leads to fixed airway obstruction” (J.A. 411). The

prevention of chronic respiratory disease thus necessarily

entails the prevention of acute disease (J.A. 411; 43 Fed.

Reg. 27354 (1978) ).*

C. The basis for the final standard

On December 28, 1976, the Secretary proposed a new

occupational health standard for cotton dust. The Sec-

retary proposed, on the basis of then available health

data and considerations of technological and economic

feasibility, that the PEL should be set at 200 ug/m* for

all textile operations. The PEL was to be attained ulti-

mately through engineering controls, but respirators

would be required in the interim. Because Dr. Mer-

chant’s data showed that 13% of the relevant population

would remain unprotected even at this level, however, the

proposed rule also mandated a medical surveillance pro-

gram, specific work practices to minimize exposure, and

18 The diagnostic techniques currently available for identifying

acute respiratory disease caused by cotton dust are not wholly satis-

factory because they depend to a large extent on the accuracy of

employee responses to the standard questionnaire (see pages 5-6,

supra), and it is not uncommon for workers to conceal their symp-

toms. It is therefore “possible that one could miss true grade 2

byssinotics with a medical program that is competent, is profes-

sional, well run * * *” (J.A. 489). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 27359

(1978). Acute disease, including grade 1%, may sometimes be de-

tected through objective measurements of lung function loss (pul-

monary function decrement). A spirometer can be used to measure

lung function loss at the beginning and end of the work day, with

a decline in the volume of air expired signifying an adverse reac-

tion to dust in the working environment. The measure most com-

monly used is the Forced Expiratory Volume in the first second of

a deep breath expiration (FEV 1). See 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27354

(1978). However, some true byssinotics complain of chest tightness

and breathlessness but show no measurable deficit in pulmonary

function, while others show pulmonary function deficit without ex-

periencing breathlessness or chest tightness (J.A. 23, 24, 198, 435;

Pet. App. 119-120). There is thus no assurance that some employ-

ees are not true byssinotics despite negative results on both the

questionnaire and the pulmonary function test.

9

employee education and training (41 Fed. Reg. 56504-

56508 (1976) ).

During the extensive informal rulemaking proceedings

that followed, the textile industry conceded that a dust

exposure limit was needed, but contended that equally

effective protection could be provided at a dust level less

stringent than the proposed standard, through reliance

on respirators and medical transfers.'* The industry also

attacked the technological feasibility of the proposed PEL

as applied to textile processing operations from spinning

through weaving,” and it claimed that the standard as a

whole was not economically feasible or achievable with-

in the proposed seven-year implementation period. On

the other hand, employee representatives attacked the

standard as too lenient and advocated a 100 wg/m*® PEL

in all operations.

1. The Secretary’s Health Determinations and Dust

Control Strategy

The Secretary found overwhelming support in the rule-

making record for the proposition that textile workers

face a severe hazard of byssinosis in most operations both

at the proposed level of 200 ug/m’® and below. Even

at 200 wg/m*, workers in all operations except slashing

14 The industry advocated that the PEL be set at 500 ug/m* for

all textile operations except slashing and weaving; for those opera-

tions, the industry recommended an exposure level of 1000 ug/m?

(43 Fed. Reg. 27355-27360 (1978)). The industry claimed that

its data showed a very low prevalence of disease at 500 ug/m? in

yarn manufacturing, thus contradicting Dr. Merchant’s results.

The industry contended, therefore, that only a small number of

medical transfers would be necessary in connection with the in-

dustry’s proposed limit and that that number of transfers was

within the capability of the industry (ibid.).

16 The industry conceded that the Secretary’s proposed limit was

technologically feasible in the initial processes of opening through

roving.

10

and weaving face a 13% risk of byssinosis. At the in-

dustry’s proposed 500 wg/m® level, that risk is doubled.’

Based on the testimony of many medical witnesses

(e.g., J.A. 401-405, 411), the Secretary concluded that

the standard could not be effective unless it was aimed

at curbing all grades of byssinosis. “[B]yssinosis repre-

sents a continuum of disease,” and “the diminished state

of health of grade % byssinotics is a stage of the pro-

16 Dr. Merchant’s dose-response curve showed the existence of

risk at exposure levels approaching zero in yarn manufacturing

operations, and the record affirmatively demonstrated that no safe

level of exposure existed (43 Fed. Reg. 27358 (1978)). The in-

dustry relied upon certain other studies in attempting to show

that the prevalence of byssinosis was not as high as Dr. Merchant

suggested. The Secretary found the industry data deficient, how-

ever, because the reported prevalence of disease was not accom-

panied by adequate dust level data in many instances. For example,

the Cone Mills survey (Pet. App. 126-136) provided no dust level

data, and the Burlington and West Point Pepperell surveys gave

only “assigned” ranges (Pet. App. 161-163, 187). A dose-response

curve similar to Dr. Merchant’s could not be constructed on the

basis of such data. Moreover, the actual exposure levels in the

mills studied by the industry were generally much lower than the

500 wg/m% level that the industry advocated and often the worker

populations in such mills had been part of an on-going worker

surveillance program. That was the difficulty with respect to the

mills studied by Morgan and Weill. 43 Fed. Reg. 27356, 27358

(1978). The Secretary noted that “[t]he Weill study in particu-

lar demonstrates the difficulties inherent in analyzing epidemiologi-

cal data collected using a mixture of either very clean or very dusty

mills.” Jd. at 27358. Furthermore, the industry’s low prevalence

claim was based on data collected through a questionnaire, and the

validity of the data could depend on the manner in which the ques-

tionnaire was administered. Indeed, other investigators had noted

a rough equivalency between rates of prevalence identified by ques-

tionnaire and by pulmonary function testing (43 Fed. Reg. 27357

(1978)), whereas the industry here found a much higher rate

through pulmonary function testing, thereby casting further doubt

on the industry data (8%-11.8% vs. 1%-3%). Because of the

marked disparities between the industry’s data and those collected

by independent public health investigators, together with the defi-

ciencies in the industry’s methodology, the Secretary regarded the

industry’s data as having questionable validity (48 Fed. Reg. 27359

(1978) ).

11

gressive development with prolonged exposure to cotton

dust to an ultimately irreversible respiratory disease”

(43 Fed. Reg. 27354 (1978)). Because acute symptoms

are often disregarded by workers and may therefore go

undetected, the Secretary stated, it is necessary to protect

such workers before the condition becomes irreversible

(43 Fed. Reg. 27354 (1978)).

The Secretary concluded that the best way to reduce

the prevalence and risk of disease is tc reduce dust levels

to the extent feasible through engineering controls. The

Secretary’s conclusion was supported by substantial medi-

cal and scientific evidence suggesting that reduction of

dust levels should be the main objective of the standard

(Pet. App. 51-52 & n. 87).

The Secretary rejected the industry’s plan for less

stringent dust control combined with reliance on transfers

and respirators. First, the Secretary doubted the indus-

try’s assumption of low disease prevalence at the 500

ug/m* level (see note 16, supra). Second, Dr. Merchant’s

study suggested that a quarter of the relevant population

would be diseased at that level, while the textile industry

claimed that it could transfer no more than 10% of its

workforce (J.A. 445-446). It was evident, therefore,

that transfers could not play a sufficiently major role in

employee protection.’* Third, respirators were not accept-

able because of their documented unreliability, their in-

7 The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH) had recommended, based on a thorough review of the

medical literature, that the new standard impose the lowest feasible

limit on dust concentrations, but in any event no higher than 200

ug/m® (J.A. 175). In addition to NIOSH’s recommendation, Dr.

Merchant testified that he favored a reduction to 100 ug/m?. (J.A.

52). Dr. Hans Weill recommended that the level be set between

200 ug/m® and 500 ug/m? (J.A. 156).

18 Under the industry plan, 60% of the diseased population could

not be transferred. Indeed, the Secretary concluded that it was

only at the 200 ug/m® level that the number of necessary transfers

would be within the capability of the industry (48 Fed. Reg. 27359

(1978) ).

12

ability to protect employees with impaired breathing, and

their associated safety hazards (48 Fed. Reg. 27384

(1978) ).

The Secretary also considered and rejected more strin-

gent exposure limits. In the yarn manufacturing proc-

esses, the Secretary concluded that the employee repre-

sentatives’ proposal of 100 wg/m* was not within the

“technological capabilities of the industry.” 48 Fed. Reg.

27360 (1978). With respect to weaving operations, the

Secretary noted that “engineering dust controls in weav-

ing may not be feasible even with massive expenditures

by the industry.” Ibid. See also J.A. 247-248 (necessary

changes would have required reconstruction of 90% of

the weave rooms). In this regard, one study had esti-

mated that nearly 60% of compliance costs would be

concentrated in the weaving sector and that the impact

on the industry would thus be severe (J.A. 74, 125-130).

Rather than require these apparently infeasible expendi-

tures, the Secretary determined that optimal worker pro-

tection would be served by concentrating “resources on

achieving 200 ug/m* in yarn manufacturing as rapidly

as feasible * * *.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27360 (1978). Ac-

cordingly, the Secretary set the roughly equivalent levels

of 200 ug/m’ in yarn manufacturing and 750 ug/m? in

slashing and weaving (see page 3, note 4, supra).

2. The Feasibility of the Standard

The Secretary also carefully assessed the technological

feasibility and the economic consequences of the final

standard. Before publishing his proposal, the Secretary

had contracted with Research Triangle Institute (RTI) to

conduct a technological assessment and economic impact

analysis. During the rulemaking, interested parties sup-

plied much additional technical and economic informa-

tion. The Secretary concluded on the basis of these data

that the final PEL’s—750 ug/m* in weaving and 200

ug/m® in the remaining operations—were both techno-

logically achievable and well within the financial capa-

bilities of the industry.

13

a. Technological Feasibility

The industry conceded that it could achieve the 200

ug/m* level in the initial processes, opening through rov-

ing,” through conventional dust control techniques, in-

cluding local exhaust ventilation. The industry main-

tained that it was technologically impossible, however,

to achieve that level in the later operations, spinning

through weaving,” and it therefore challenged the RTI

study’s premise that local exhaust ventilation was suit-

able for those operations. In setting the final standard,

the Secretary generally agreed that local exhaust ventila-

tion has greater limitations in operations beyond roving,

but he did not believe that the lower levels could not be

achieved (43 Fed. Reg. 27362-27363 (1978)). Indeed,

record evidence showed that dust levels in operations be-

yond roving were already quite low, although the indus-

try had not devoted much effort to dust control in these

operations.”"

In addition, other effective techniques were also avail-

able to reduce dust levels. Processes are not generally

isolated in the mills, but something as simple as closing

the door between the weave room and other processing

areas could reduce levels by preventing the migration of

dust (J.A. 83-84; see also J.A. 18). Enhanced filtration

of air circulated by the general ventilation system would

19 In these operations, the raw cotton is cleaned and formed into

strands suitable for spinning.

70In “spinning,” the processed cotton is spun into yarn. In

“winding,” “spooling,” “twisting,” and “warping,” the spun yarn

is packaged for weaving or other processing. In “slashing” and

“weaving,” the yarn is treated with sizing and woven into fabric.

21 In spinning, for example, raw data supplied by ATMI showed

that the dust levels of 30 out of 46 (65%) spinning operations

were already below 200 ug/m*. That sample included operations

spinning 100% cotton, which is conceded to be the dustiest variety

(App. 3490-3560). In weaving operations, the ATMI data showed

that 87% of the operations were within the 750 ug/m? limit (ibid.),

while data collected by Hovan Hocutt, a ventilation expert, showed

that 72% of the weave rooms already complied with the final

standard (J.A. 247-248, 465).

14

likewise prevent recirculation of contaminated air (J.A.

11, 168-169, 414). Moreover, some witnesses recognized

that dust levels in later operations would be lowered if

the earlier processes were subject to the most efficacious

cleaning (J.A. 10-11, 287, 469). Because the industry’s

projections of achievable dust levels were based solely on

_ the difficulty of using local exhaust ventilation techniques,

the Secretary concluded that the established exposure

levels were, as a general matter, within the technological

reach of the industry. 43 Fed. Reg. 27366-27367 (1978) .

b. Economic Feasibility

In the rulemaking proceedings, the assessment of the

economic impact of the 200 uwg/m* level upon the industry

was dominated by consideration of the cost cf the engi-

neering controls necessary to achieve that level. At the

outset, the Secretary had contracted with RTI to study

the economic impact of alternative standards. That

process continued with the issuance of the proposed stand-

ard and the agency’s solicitation of views as to how the

expected costs might be financed. 41 Fed. Reg. 56498

(1976). The rulemaking proceedings produced volumi-

nous information. See page 4, note 6, supra. The

quantitative and qualitative information adduced in the

rulemaking permitted the Secretary not only to compare

the dollar estimates provided by the various parties, but

also to examine critically both the methodology and the

technological and economic assumptions upon which those

estimates were based. In this way, the Secretary was

able to make an independent feasibility determination.

In simplest terms, the Secretary concluded that RTI had

based its dollar estimate on the need for greater tech-

nology than was necessary and that the industry had

underestimated the efficacy of the technology it had costed.

The RTI study estimated that $2.4 billion would be

required to meet a uniform level of 200 ug/m® in all

*2 The issue of technological feasibility is not presented in this

case (see ATMI Br. 8 n.16).

15

textile operations; that estimate included $1.3 billion in

costs attributable to meeting the 200 ug/m* level in

weaving operations, which was not required by the final

standard (J.A. 74). The industry produced the Hocutt-

Thomas cost estimates, which were based on an ATMI

survey and methodology that the industry declined to dis-

close fully (J.A. 388-397, 465-468). The industry’s sub-

mission estimated that costs of $543 million would be

required to achieve 200 ug/m* in opening through roving,

500 wg/m*® in spinning through warping, and 1000

ug/m*® in weaving (J.A. 234-251; Pet. App. 155-156).

The industry submitted no cost estimates for lower levels

in operations beyond roving, because it claimed that fur-

ther reductions were impossible.

Other parties, including the Council on Wage and

Price Stability (J.A. 333-335), presented data and in-

formation showing that existing trends toward moderni-

zation and technology changes should be considered in

assessing the economic feasibility of a standard (J.A. 266-

286). Although the RTI and industry estimates were

both premised, for instance, on a compliance strategy

that relied exclusively on “retrofitting” or adaptation of

old equipment, the record showed that on-going mod-

ernization would necessarily result in significant cost

savings.”*

*3 For example, Dr. Parker Reist of the University of North

Carolina testified that new, high-speed carding machinery was

cleaner, more productive, and less costly per unit of production.

In addition, the elimination of picking operations through use of

high speed chute feed cards constituted a significantly less costly

alternative to retrofitting. Dr. Reist explained that high-speed

cards attaining speeds of 80-120 pounds of cotton per hour had

recently become available (J.A. 298-300). For purposes of dust

control, however, air flow requirements per card remained roughly

the same (id. at 300-301). Moreover, high speed cards can be used

to provide substantially increased capacity for the same cost of

air flow. Alternatively, the number of cards can be reduced, thereby

maintaining the same total hourly capacity at lower air costs (J.A.

293-294, 300-301, 477-480). One mill found that the expense of

retrofitting 139 low-speed cards would cover the purchase of 32

16

RTI’s estimate was overstated in three other significant

respects. First, RTI derived a unit cost per machine for

applying local exhaust ventilation to achieve the 200

ug/m® level (J.A. 88-95). The Secretary had concluded,

however, that this costly technique would not be neces-

sary for some operations. In spinning through warping,

for instance, the Secretary found that many mills had

already met the 200 ug/m* level, and that necessary re-

ductions would occur because of lower dust levels in

prior operations (without additional cost) and through

isolation of processes and enhancement of the broken

ends collection system on spinning frames.% See pages

13-14, supra. Thus, RTI’s estimate that $493 million

would be required to achieve the 200 wg/m® level in spin-

ning operations was wholly unrealistic. 48 Fed. Reg.

27366-27367 (1978). Second, RTI’s estimate assumed

that all existing machinery should be taken into account,

high-speed cards with increased capacity and lower operating costs

(J.A. 304-306).

Greater dust control will also result when a mill chooses, for

production reasons, to replace traditional ring-spinning frames

with open-end spinning frames. A traditional ring-spinning frame

is difficult to control, whereas an open-end frame has built-in

controls and requires only the filtration system (J.A. 470-471).

An open-end frame also has the dust-control advantage of eliminat-

ing both the preceding roving operation and the subsequent winding

operations. One mill found that a decreased unit cost of production

resulted from this conversion (J.A. 476-477). Although open-end

spinning is not suitable for all operations, it was expected that

this new technology will grow from 5% to 30% of the spindles in

the industry (J.A. 459).

24The Hocutt-Thomas analysis estimated that enhancement of

the broken-ends collection system would cost $17.7 million (J.A.

251, 486; Pet. App. 155-156). The Secretary recognized that local

exhaust ventilation was not as applicable in weaving operations

as in other operations, but RTI’s $1.2 billion estimate for achieving

200 ug/m* in weaving depended on that technique (43 Fed. Reg.

27367 (1978); J.A. 91-95). Similarly, the Secretary found local

exhaust ventilation largely unnecessary in spinning, winding,

spooling, twisting and warping, but RTI’s estimate included $620

million for such controls (43 Fed. Reg. 27866-27367 (1978) ).

17

regardless of whether the machinery was being used to

process pure cotton, pure synthetics, or a blend. Machines

that are isolated and process pure synthetics would not

need to be controlled, however, because the ambient dust

would not contain cotton. Moreover, blends produce sub-

stantially less dust because “synthetic fibers are virtually

trashfree and contribute little’ (J.A. 9) to the ambient

air concentration (J.A. 9, 30, 50, 90-91, 133, 136-137).

RTI admitted that this incorrect assumption could have

increased its overall compliance cost estimate by 30%

(J.A. 90-91, 133, 186-187). Third, RTI assumed that the

entire industry stood on the same footing, that no prior

dust control expenditures had been made, and that dust

levels were at uniform levels throughout the industry

(J.A. 85-90).2> However, the evidence adduced at the

hearings disclosed a range of dust levels within the in-

dustry, as well as significant pre-existing compliance with

the levels prescribed in the final standard.

In addition to the RTI estimate, the Secretary had one

other comprehensive cost estimate: the Hocutt-Thomas

calculations that were based on the ATMI data. Based

on his comparison of the two estimates, the Secretary

concluded that “[s]ince ATMI estimates are based on the

most recent data, OSHA believes them to be more realistic

than those offered by * * * RTI” (48 Fed. Reg. 27373

(1978) ). While RTI had been unable to assess the extent

of current dust controls, Hocutt had the benefit of such

information reported in ATMI’s survey (J.A. 236-238).

The Hocutt-Thomas estimates also provided a reasonable

reference in cases where the record showed that RTI’s

25 While RTI had access to some data on actual dust levels and

industry efforts to implement dust control, RTI was not able to

survey the industry to determine the extent to which its projected

costs would actually have to be incurred (J.A. 418-420). This

limitation also resulted in overstatements with respect to estimates

for nonengineering costs because the record showed, for example,

that medical surveillance programs had been established in some

mills, thereby obviating the need for incurring initial costs in that

area.

18

control cost estimates were overstated. In weaving, for

example, the Secretary noted that raising the PEL to 750

ug/m*® meant that “the need for certain engineering

controls and/or amounts of air and filtration would be

changed [and] costs [would] be reduced significantly”

(43 Fed. Reg. 27371 (1978)). Because the Secretary

believed that better dust control would result from the

expense identified by Hocutt-Thomas, he “adopted the

Hocutt-Thomas estimate for slashing and weaving which

predicted a level of 1000 ug/m* instead of the RTI esti-

mate for slashing and weaving at 200 ug/m*”’ (ibid.).

Although the Hocutt-Thomas cost estimate was prem-

ised in part upon PELs that were higher than those

mandated by the final standard, the Secretary concluded

that this estimate also was overstated in several im-

portant respects. The Hocutt-Thomas estimate, like that

of RTI, was based on retrofitting costs, and it thus over-

stated actual costs to the extent that modernization and

technological innovation would otherwise occur (43 Fed.

Reg. 27372 (1978). Similarly, the Hocutt-Thomas esti-

mate did not account for the already low levels in many

operations or the fact that more stringent controls in

earlier operations would, without additional cost, re-

sult in less dust in later operations (see pages 13-14,

supra).** Finally, the Hocutt-Thomas calculations may

26 Thus, Hocutt estimated that $41 million would be required

to meet a 500 wg/m? level in winding, spooling, twisting and warp-

ing, whereas the Secretary believed that, given the already low

levels in: these operations, further reductions could be effected

through maximum cleaning in prior operations, isolation of

processes, and enhancement of general ventilation. 43 Fed. Reg.

27362-27364, 27366-27367 (1978). Hocutt also noted that dust

capture systems on winders could handle 20,000 cubic feet of air per

minute, although he costed only the price of half that volume to

achieve 500 ug/m*. He also pointed out several spooler modifica-

tions that would improve performance beyond the 500 ug/m? that

he had calculated. For twisters, Hocutt provided no estimate be-

cause he had concluded that these machines could not be controlled

with local exhaust ventilation. The cost with respect to warpers

likewise was not estimated because Hocutt stated that dust levels

19

also have included costs for machines processing synthetic

material. These overstatements tended to offset any dif-

ferences in cost attributable to the fact that the Hocutt-

Thomas estimates were premised in part upon higher

dust levels. The Secretary was unable to adjust the

Hocutt-Thomas estimates further, however, for several

reasons, including the fact that the industry refused to

disclose much of its supporting data aad methodology

(43 Fed. Reg. 27373 (1978) ). Nonetheless, based on the

record, the Secretary believed that his adjusted estimate,

amounting to $550 million in capital costs, was suff-

ciently reliable to assess the economic impact of the

standard (ibid.).

The Secretary concluded that the industry as a whole

could well afford costs in the $550 million range, to be

incurred over a four-year period. This conclusion was

based largely on RTI’s extensive analysis of the impact

of various cost levels on the industry’s structure, its

rates of return, and its profits, in light of its competitive

position with respect to synthetics and imports (J.A. 95-

150).” RTI also reported that the industry’s capacity

was currently under-utilized and that the capital required

for compliance costs thus would not displace other capi-

tal needs (43 Fed. Reg. 27377 (1978) ).

RTI examined capital costs per dollar of sales and

found these costs to be small in the yarn manufacturing

sector for both RTI’s $211.8 million (500 ug/m*) and

$984.4 million (200 wg/m*) capital requirements esti-

mates. The increase in costs amounted, respectively, to

only 1.7 and 7.8 cents per dollar of sales (J.A. 96).

Because the capital costs of the final standard for this

would be 500 ug/m3, but he did note that these machines were

amenable to some controls (J.A. 245-250).

27 While the Secretary disagreed with RTI’s cost estimates be-

cause of certain incorrect assumptions about the current state of

dust control in the industry, as well as strategies necessary to

achieve further dust control, RTI’s analysis of the industry’s

ability to handle various levels of costs was based on unrelated

data that were not subject to the same criticism.

20

sector were estimated at $467 million, it was clear that

increased costs per dollar of sales would be small. RTI

also calculated the price increases that would be re-

quired, given various compliance costs, to maintain the

previous rate of return on investment. For the $211

million in capital costs that RTI estimated for a 500

ug/m* dust level, necessary price increases ranged from

less than 0.1 cent per dollar of sales to 1.6 cents per

dollar of sales. Given the $984 million costs RTI antici-

pated for a 200 wg/m* dust level, the necessary price

increases ranged from 0.5 cents to 6.8 cents per dollar

of sales (J.A. 97-102) .*8

In addition, RTI examined the competitive posture of

cotton and the textile industry. RTI judged competition

from synthetics not to be significant. Synthetics had pen-

etrated the market to its limits, and there remained an

irreducible demand for cotton products. Moreover, the

price differential was unlikely to remain so heavily in

favor of synthetics in view of the escalating costs of

petroleum (43 Fed. Reg. 27350, 27370 (1978) ) .28

RTI also noted that import restrictions were in force

under a number of textile trade agreements and that the

annual allowable rate of growth of imports was set in the

most recent agreement at the 6%-7% range. Moreover,

international monetary changes since 1971 had resulted

in sharply increased levels of American textile exports

28 In weaving, the final standard was calculated to increase costs

by only slightly more than 0.13 cents per dollar of sales (J.A. 124).

28a RTI noted that synthetics had gradually achieved a 70% share

of domestic fiber consumption, but that factors other than the

price differential between cotton and synthetic fiber would govern

any further shifts. It is difficult and costly for a mill to change

the ratio of cotton to synthetics in its processing machinery. More-

over, fluctuations in consumer demand for major cotton products—

men’s wear and home furnishings (sheets and towels) —is relatively

independent of price (J.A. 140-146). Arthur Figh, a leading tex-

tile financial expert and vice-president of the Chase-Manhattan

Bank, agreed that synthetics were unlikely to displace cotton any

further (J.A. 474-475).

21

(J.A. 146-150). RTI concluded that small changes in the

relative prices of domestic and foreign textile products

would have “very little impact” on the domestic textile

industry, “and, in general, the trade agreements dampen

the effects on domestic markets of small changes in rela-

tive prices” (J.A. 150).

In charting the maximum potential inflationary im-

pact, as well as the long-run economic consequences on

employment levels and cotton products demand, RTI as-

sumed the occurrence of the necessary price increases that

it had calculated. RTI found that these long-term effects

would be minimal even for costs as high as $984 million.”

Thus, as ATMI contends (ATMI Br. 27), RTI did per-

form analyses that assumed a full pass-through of costs,

but, significantly, RTI concluded that the long-term detri-

mental effects of such price increases were not significant.

In view of this conclusion and of RTI’s determination that

interfiber and international competition were not con-

stricting factors, RTI’s judgment that prices would rise

over time to generate revenues that would cover costs

(J.A. 172-173) was fully warranted.

By comparing ratios of costs to annual profits, RTI also

analyzed the short term effect of compliance costs with

respect to financing. These ratios indicated both the in-

ternal availability of funds and the industry’s ability to

?° Using a price elasticity analysis, RTI calculated that price in-

creases due to $984.4 million in compliance costs would decrease

demand by only 3%-4% and that compliance costs of $211 million

would lead to a demand decrease less than 1% (J.A. 113-124). Thus,

only a small decrease in demand would result from $467 million in

compliance costs, and the impact on cotton growers would be mini-

mal. National Cotton Council’s contrary assertion (Br. 20-22) is

based on the grossly inaccurate assumption that compliance costs

would exceed $2 billion. Moreover, National Cotton Council’s con-

tention (Br. 16) that RTI erroneously used short-term elasticities is

insubstantial. RTI explained that long-term elasticities were un-

available (J.A. 114-115). In addition, RTI’s judgment that com-

petition from synthetics and imports was not significant meant that

the long-term effects of price increases would not differ substantially

from those calculated from short-term elasticities.

22

borrow from external sources. Although RTI assumed

for these calculations that prices would rise to maintain

pre-standard profits, this assumption was supported by

studies showing relatively small short-run demand price

elasticities, indicating a capacity for passing on cost in-

creases through price increases (J.A. 113-120).* These

ratios were substantial for the nearly $2.4 billion in capi-

_tal costs that RTI had estimated for a 200 uwg/m! level,

especially in the weaving sector, but they were sig-

nificantly smaller for the $221 million estimated for a 500

ug/m* level. The cost effects were an element in the Sec-

retary’s feasibility determination that led to the decision

to set a higher limit in weaving operations (J.A. 125-

130). As the Secretary explained, the estimated costs of

the final standard—$550 million—fell between those fig-

ures, and the unfavorable ratios identified by RTI ac-

cordingly would decline dramatically (48 Fed. Reg. 27378

(1978) ).

On the basis of these calculations, the Secretary con-

cluded that the $550 million compliance costs required

by the final standard were within the industry’s financial

ability, given a four-year period for implementation of

engineering controls, and would have an adverse impact

on only a few marginal firms (48 Fed. Reg. 27378

(1978) ). The Secretary also concluded that the standard

meets the statutory criteria set forth in Section 6(b) (5)

of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5), because the standard’s

requirements are necessary to provide the required pro-

tection and are economically and technologically feasible

(43 Fed. Reg. 27378-27379 (1978)). The Secretary re-

jected the contention that he was required to perform a

cost-benefit analysis after he had determined that the

8° RTI also determined that, given the extreme assumption that

no price increases could occur, all sectors of the yarn manufac-

turing industry would remain profitable, on the average, for the

low costs of the 500 ug/m? level, and only one sector would ex-

perience negative return for the large costs of the 200 ug/m? level

(J.A. 97-99).

23

new standard would yield appreciable benefits ** and that

it was feasible. The Secretary noted that Congress had

performed a categorical “cost-benefit” analysis in this

area, striking the balance to provide for the maximum

feasible protection against significant risks of material

health impairment. Because the Secretary concluded that

the standard fulfilled Congress’ mandate, he had no au-

thority to weigh necessarily speculative costs and benefits

to promulgate a different standard (43 Fed. Reg. 27378

(1978) ).

3. The Medical Transfer and Income Protection

Provision

Respirators will be widely used for a substantial in-

terim period under the final standard. Consequently, the

Secretary addressed the difficulties involved in the use of

respirators and established protections for employees

who are unable to use them (43 Fed. Reg. 27386-27387

(1978) ; J.A. 164-166, 217-218, 312-315, 316-319, 320-

321).*° Whether an employee can wear a respirator is

a determination that must be made by a physician, but

experience with past medical screening programs has

shown that many workers deny or minimize work-related

health problems because they fear being discharged or

transferred to lower paying jobs (J.A. 210-212, 218-220,

323-324, 435-436). Thus, the Secretary recognized that

accurate information could be obtained and health ade-

quately protected only if employees understood that they

would not be adversely affected because of their candor

(43 Fed. Reg. 27387 (1978)). Moreover, the Secretary

31 A qualified calculation based on Dr. Merchant’s dose-response

data showed that the new standard would prevent nearly 5,000 new

cases of byssinosis each year (43 Fed. Reg. 27379 (1978) ).

32 While it was generally agreed (J.A. 314-315, 323-324, 383-384)

that such persons should be transferred, the industry contended that

transfers should be limited to workers who manifest grade 3 symp-

toms, that transfers should be voluntary, and that the workers’

pre-transfer pay and benefits should not be guaranteed (J.A. 383-

384, 446-447).

24

recognized that income protection is necessary to fulfill

Congress’ intent to place safety costs upon employers,

rather than employees (ibid.) Finally, the Secretary

determined that transfers only of grade 3 byssinotics—

that is, those workers who had already contracted chronic

disease—would not satisfy the prophylactic purposes of

the Act. Accordingly, the Secretary provided in the

standard that when a physician determines that an em-

ployee cannot wear a respirator, the employee must be

allowed to transfer to another position having a dust

level at or below the PEL, if one is available, with no

redttion in wages or employment rights. 29 C.F.R.

1910.1043 (f) (2) (v) (Pet. App. 8-9).

D. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On petition for review under 29 U.S.C. 655(f), the

court of appeals upheld the cotton dust standard as ap-

plied to petitioners. The court observed that the ap-

propriate standard of review is whether substantial evi-

dence in the record as a whole supports the Secretary’s

determinations and that its role is “to ensure that the

agency has (1) acted within the scope of its authority;

(2) followed the procedures required by statute and by

its own regulations; (3) explicated the bases for its de-

cision; [and] (4) adduced substantial evidence in the

record to support its determinations” (Pet. App. 43;

footnotes omitted).

The court of appeals extensively reviewed the record

in light of petitioners’ contentions. The court concluded

that the Secretary had justifiably relied upon the Mer-

chant dose-response data and that the Secretary’s deter-

mination that the standard should seek to eliminate acute

byssinosis, as a means of eliminating the chronic dis-

ease, was based on the law and the evidence (Pet. App.

46-53).

Although the industry claimed that the Secretary had

ignored its proposed alternative, the court of appeals

found that the Secretary had carefully considered that

plan and had correctly concluded, on the basis of sub-

25

stantial evidence, that the industry’s studies were deficient

(Pet. App. 47-49). The court noted in addition that the

Secretary, in disfavoring respirators, had acted on the

basis of uncontradicted evidence of health risk and pur-

suant to the express statutory policy of placing the bur-

den of compliance on employers (id. at 49-50). Likewise,

the Secretary had properly rejected the unsupported as-

sumption that sufficient jobs existed to permit large

seale reliance on a transfer program (id. at 49). The

court also found extensive evidence showing the neces-

sity for principal reliance upon a stringent dust control

strategy (id. at 51-52).

The court of appeals found ample proof of technological

feasibility, based on technical data and dust readings

submitted by the industry, RTI, and NIOSH, all of which

showed that certain firms within the textile industry had

already substantially complied with the requirements of

the standard (Pet. App. 55-61). With respect to economic

feasibility, she court concluded that the Secretary had

“marshal [led] sufficient support and analysis for [his] de-

cision to use the industry’s capital cost estimate” (id. at

65). In the court’s view, the evidence supported the con-

clusion that RTI’s cost estimates were overstated to the

extent that they were based on the retrofitting of old

machines, without taking account of new machinery that

would be installed in the ordinary course (id. at 63).

Moreover, the Secretary’s assessment that the costs es-

timated by the industry would result in greater dust re-

duction than the industry had assumed also justified the

conclusion that “even the industry capital estimates were

exaggerated * * *” (id. at 65). Given the unavailability

of more precise data and estimates, due in part to the

industry’s refusal to cooperate, the court found that the

Secretary had reasonably relied on the industry’s cost

estimate, as adjusted (id. at 65-66).

The court of appeals further concluded that the Secre-

tary had properly relied on evidence showing that in-

dustry revenues would rise to cover compliance costs

26

(Pet. App. 67-69). While recognizing that the standard

might result in the closing of some marginal firms, the

court noted that the feasibility of a standard must be de-

termined by reference to the industry as a whole. Thus,

the court found substantial evidence to support the Secre-

tary’s determination that the standard would not affect

the viability of the textile industry.

The court of appeals also squarely rejected the conten-

tion that the Secretary was required to perform a cost-

benefit analysis to show either that the standard was

feasible or that it was “reasonably necessary or appro-

priate” (Pet. App. 69-77). The court noted that Congress

had already struck the balance between cosis and bene-

fits in Section 6(b) (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655 (b) (5),

and that, in contrast to other statutes, neither the lan-

guage nor the legislative history of the Act contained any

suggestion of a cost-benefit test. Congress had clearly

rejected attacks premised on the ground that the Act was

too expensive and had directed “that any severe risk to

employee health must be eliminated or reduced if feasible

means to do so exist” (Pet. App. 74) (emphasis sup-

plied). Thus, the court was not free to impose the ad-

ditional requirement of a cost-benefit test.

Finally, the court of appeals upheld the Secretary’s

authority to assure the successful implementation of the

respirator and medical surveillance program by requiring

income protection for transferred employees. The court

found that this provision was “reasonably necessary or

appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment”

because, absent the provision, employees who are unable

to wear respirators “would be forced to suffer continuing

exposure to impermissibly high dust levels or else risk

disadvantageous transfers, or even risk losing their jobs”

(Pet. App. 97). This cost, like other costs of health pro-

tection, was appropriately assigned to the employer (id.

at 97-98) .*

83 The court of appeals remanded the standard, as applied to the

cottonseed processing industry, for a reassessment of its economic

impact on those employers (Pet. App. 86-93). Although the court

27

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Secretary set the present cotton dust standard,

which was upheld in relevant part by the court of ap-

peals, based on his determination that the prior stand-

ard presented a significant risk of material health

impairment that the new standard would substantially

reduce. The cotton dust standard therefore meets the

threshold requirement identified in Industrial Union De-

partment v. American Petroleum Institute (“Benzene”),

No. 78-911 (July 2, 1980). In accordance with the

statutory mandate that “the standard [be set] which

most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the

basis of the best available evidence, that no employee

will suffer material impairment of health or functional

capacity even if [he] has regular exposure to the hazard

dealt with by such standard for the period of his working

life” (Section 6(b) (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655 (b) (5)),

the Secretary considered voluminous technological and

economic evidence and concluded that the requirements of

the standard are feasible. The Secretary also considered

alternatives submitted by the industry and employee

representatives. The industry alternative was rejected

because it did not provide the degree of protection re-

quired by the statute, and the employee representatives’

alternative was rejected because it was not feasible. The

Secretary’s determinations were based on substantial evi-

dence, as the court of appeals correctly held, and the judg-

ment below should be affirmed.

upheld the standard as applied to cotton classers and warehouses,

the Secretary has since suspended application of the standard to

these employers pending administrative reconsideration of the

health risk in light of this Court’s decision in Industrial Union

Department v. American Petroleum Institute, No. 78-911 (July

2, 1980). See 45 Fed. Reg. 50328-50329 (July 29, 1980). Accord-

ingly, the Secretary acquiesced in a writ of certiorari to vacate

the judgment as to these employers and to remand the standard

to the agency. See Cotton Warehouse Ass'n Vv. Marshall, No. 79-

1789 (Oct. 6, 1980).

28

Petitioners challenge the standard on three grounds,

all of which lack merit. First, petitioners contend that

the Secretary must not only meet the Benzene test and

then determine that the standard is economically and tech-

nologically capable of achievement, but that he must also

conduct a cost-benefit analysis and determine, with re-

spect to each standard, that the anticipated costs bear a

“reasonable relationship” to the anticipated benefits. The

language and scheme of the Act provide no basis for

that contention, and the extensive legislative history of the

Act contains not a single suggestion that the Secretary

must weigh costs and benefits in setting standards. More-

over, because Congress did not contemplate that the

Secretary would weigh costs and benefits, there is noth-

ing in the Act or legislative history to guide the Secretary

in ascertaining whether a “reasonable relationship” exists

or in determining what value he should place on human

life and freedom from suffering. At bottom, petitioners’

argument speaks only to public policy considerations.

Whatever the merit of that argument, it is one that must

be addressed to Congress.

Second, petitioners contend that the Secretary’s econ-

omic feasibility determination was not based on “substan-

tial evidence.” While the Secretary had voluminous

evidence concerning that question, petitioners apparently

challenge his determination on the ground that he relied

on parts of various cost estimates, rather than on the

totality of a single submission. The record shows that the

Secretary carefully considered the evidence and tested the

assumptions underlying the various estimates, and that

his conclusions were fully reasoned and fully explained.

The Act clearly requires that the Secretary base his de-

cision on “the best available” evidence, and there is no

reason to believe that Congress intended for him to ab-

dicate his judgment by accepting or rejecting one or

another submission in its entirety. Rather, the Secretary

is required to analyze critically the evidence that he re

ceives, as he did here.

29

Finally, petitioners assert that the Secretary lacks au-

thority to require the transfer to other available jobs,

without loss of pay, of workers who cannot wear res-

pirators. The Secretary found that the respirator pro-

gram would not be effective in protecting against the risk

of disease without a transfer and income protection pro-

vision, because workers in unhealthful workplaces who

are unable to use respirators are unlikely to come forward

with that information if they would thereby face unem-

ployment or, at the very least, transfer to a lower-paying

job. Moreover, transfers without income protection would

place the costs of compliance on workers, contrary to

Congress’ intention that that burden should rest on em-

ployers. The Secretary thus properly concluded that the

transfer and income protection provision is a measure

“reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or

healthful employment.” Section 3(8) of the Act, 29

U.S.C. 652 (8).

ARGUMENT

I. THE COTTON DUST STANDARD IS REASON-

ABLY NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE BE-

CAUSE IT PROTECTS AGAINST A SIGNIFICANT

RISK OF MATERIAL HEALTH IMPAIRMENT

In Industrial Union Department v. American Petro-

leum Institute (“Benzene”), No. 78-911 (July 2, 1980),

a plurality of the Court held that the Secretary may

promulgate a new OSHA standard only when he has met

the threshold burden of showing that the existing stand-

ard exposes employees to a significant risk of material

health impairment that the new regulation will reduce

(slip op. 31-32; slip op. 2 (Powell, J., concurring) ). As

the plurality noted, the Secretary must be afforded sub-

stantial discretion in determining whether risks are sig-

nificant: “[W]hile the Agency must support its finding

that a certain level of risk exists by substantial evidence,

we recognize that its determination that a particular

level of risk is ‘significant’ will be based largely on policy

30

considerations” (slip op. 45 n.62).*% The cotton dust

standard clearly meets the threshold requirement identi-

fied in Benzene,

The previous standard for cotton dust allowed an ex-

posure level of 1000 ug/m* of total dust, or approxi-

mately 500 uwg/m* of respirable dust, in most textile

operations. See page 3, note 4, supra. The dose-

response curve based on the studies of Dr. Merchant and

his colleagues, which the Secretary determined to be “the

most thorough and objective evaluation of byssinosis

prevalence in the United States textile industry” (43 Fed.

Reg. 27355 (1978) ),* indicated that workers exposed at

that level face a one in four risk of contracting some

grade of byssinosis and a one in 15 risk of grade 2

byssinosis (ibid.; J.A. 40; 41 Fed. Reg. 56504 (1976) ).

The risk of grade 3 byssinosis (chronic disease) is far

34 The plurality also remarked that “OSHA is not required to

support its finding that a significant risk exists with anything ap-

proaching scientific certainty” (slip op. 45). Rather, the Secretary

must be afforded “some leeway where [his] findings must be made

on the frontiers of scientific knowledge” (ibid.). See also slip op. 2

(Burger, C. J., concurring) ; slip op. 3-4 (Powell, J., concurring).

35 While industry representatives criticized various aspects of

the Merchant studies (see pages 9-10, supra), the Secretary

concluded that Dr. Merchant’s findings provide ‘“‘a reliable assess-

ment of [the] health risk to cotton textile workers from cotton

dust” (43 Fed. Reg. 27357 (1978)). The Secretary noted that “the

Merchant data has been published and subject to peer review for

several years without any major reported challenge to its basic

soundness” (ibid.). Indeed, only Dr. Moon Suh of Burlington In-

dustries presented any colorable criticism of the Merchant study

and, as the Secretary pointed out, Dr. Suh’s criticisms were con-

vincingly rebutted at the hearing by Dr. Merchant and others.

See 43 Fed. Reg. 27357-27358 (1978). As the Secretary stated,

“the dose-response data of Merchant, supported by numerous other

studies * * *, is the best available evidence and * * * it provides

the Agency with sufficient evidence upon which to take action * * *.”

43 Fed. Reg. 27358 (1978). Contrary to ATMI’s contention (ATMI

Br. 14-15), the Secretary’s standard was based not merely on “pol-

icy,” but on documentation of serious disease.

31

greater than one in 1000.** That risk is manifestly sig-

nificant. See Benzene, supra, slip op. 44-45. Likewise, as

demonstrated at some length above (see pages 4-12,

supra), it is beyond question that byssinosis constitutes

a “material impairment of health or functional capacity”

in both its acute and chronic forms. Thus, the Secretary

reasonably determined that the previous cotton dust

standard presented an unacce;table risk of material im-

pairment.**

36 Dr. Bouhuys estimated that out of a total population of 235,000

retired and 200,000 active textile workers, 35,000 are permanently

disabled (J.A. 154-155; 43 Fed. Reg. 27353 (1978) ).

37In assessing the risks posed by cotton dust, the Secretary

properly considered all grades of byssinosis for several reasons.

First, the Secretary found, based on the evidence (J.A. 152-153,

421-423, 434-435), that “grade 14 byssinosis and associated pul-

monary function decrements are significant health effects in them-

selves and should be prevented so far as possible” (43 Fed. Reg.

27354 (1978)). Second, the Secretary also found, based on sub-

stantial scientific testimony (see pages 6-8, supra; J.A. 151-152),

that the prevention of chronic disease necessarily requires the pre-

vention of grade 1% byssinosis and other acute responses to cotton

dust because byssinosis is a “continuum of disease,” and persons

manifesting acute symptoms are more susceptible to chronic disease.

In many cases, therefore, further exposure “progresses inevitably to

the chronic irreversible respiratory diseases associated with cotton

dust exposure” (43 Fed. Reg. 27354 (1978)). See note ll, supra.

The Secretary’s determination to set a standard designed to elim-

inate these acute symptoms therefore constitutes a sound and justi-

fiable policy of prevention. See Benzene, supra, slip op. 45. More-

over, as the court below correctly concluded (Pet. App. 52-53),

Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5), not only permits

but requires the Secretary to act to prevent chronic disease by

protecting workers from the milder forms of byssinosis. That sec-

tion directs the Secretary to set permanent standards for occup-

tional exposure to “toxic materials or harmful physical agents” at

the level “which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,

on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will

suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even

if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by

such standard for the period of his working life” (emphasis added).

For many workers, a lifetime of exposure at current levels will

result in chronic debilitating, often fatal disease.

32

Although the new standard will not wholly eliminate the

risk of byssinosis, the Secretary found that it.would sub-

stantially reduce that risk. According to the Merchant

studies, the new PEL would halve—to 13% —the preva-

lence of all grades of byssinosis for workers in all op-

erations except slashing and weaving. Given the estimated

125,000 to 200,000 persons at work in those portions of

the industry (J.A. 154; 43 Fed. Reg. 27353 (1978) ),

this reduction would represent a substantial increase in

health benefits. Moreover, the record evidence also in-

dicated that the new standard would eliminate many cases

of chronic disease (41 Fed. Reg. 56505 (1976); 43 Fed.

Reg. 27354 (1978)). For example, Dr. Arend Bouhuys,

Director of the Yale University Lung Research Center,

stated that “it is also probable that implementation of the

[200 wg/m*] standard would greatly decrease the preva-

lence of disabling chronic lung disease among cotton tex-

tile workers in the future” (J.A. 152; see also J.A. 411).

Indeed, petitioners do not contest the validity of the

Secretary’s judgments that the previous standard pre-

sented a significant risk of material health impairment or

that various provisions of the new standard will reduce

that risk. Apart from their assertion that the Act re-

quires a cost-benefit analysis (see pages 37-63, infra),

the thrust of petitioners’ attack on the new standard

rests on their assertion (ATMI Br. 11-12, 39-40) that

the Secretary’s standard is no more effective than the in-

dustry alternative, which combines a 500 ug/m* PEL

with reliance on medical surveillance, employee transfers,

and widespread respirator use. Both the Secretary and

the court of appeals correctly rejected petitioners’ factual

assertion that their alternative would be equally or ap-

proximately as effective in curbing byssinosis.**

38 Petitioners’ contention that the industry alternative would be

equally effective is based on certain dubious factual assertions. In

the main, petitioners rejected the Merchant data upon which the

Secretary relied, focusing instead on industry studies that purported

to show a much lower prevalence of byssinosis among textile work-

ers. The assessment of those conflicting data obviously required ap-

33

The Secretary’s rejection of the industry alternative

was based principally on the recognition that a 26% risk

of »yssinosis exists at the 500 ug/m® dust level advocated

by the industry.*® While the Secretary’s standard would

plication of the agency’s expertise, and the Secretary’s judgment

Should not lightly be set aside. As the court of appeals remarked,

“OSHA gave serious attention to the medical studies * * * proffered

to support the industry’s alternative * * * and concluded that their

validity had largely been discredited” (Pet. App. 47-48). The court

below carefully reviewed the Secretary’s extensive discussion of the

industry’s studies (see 43 Fed. Reg. 27356-27359 (1978) ), sum-

marized the Secretary’s reasons for rejecting those studies (Pet.

App. 48 n.76), and concluded that the Secretary’s “judgment on this

issue is sufficiently supported on this basis” (id. at 48-49).

8° The validity of Dr. Merchant’s risk estimate was challenged

at the hearing by Dr. Moon Suh of Burlington Industries (see note

35, supra). Dr. Suh’s contentions were thoroughly ventilated at the

hearing and decided adversely to petitioners (ibid.). Petitioners’

present reliance (ATMI Br. 9 n.19) on Dr. Suh’s assertions is

therefore unjustified.

ATMI also seeks to discredit (ATMI Br. 8-9 & nn. 18, 19) the

Merchant data on the ground that they measure only prevalence

rather than dose-response, and that the prevalence of the disease

observed by Dr. Merchant may be related to “presumably higher”

dust exposures in the past. Dr. Merchant testified, however, that

he carefully designed his study to minimize that problem by choos-

ing mills in which’ “the process had been stable, where the machin-

ery in place had been stable and had not been changed recently,

[and where] the population was relatively stable. So we felt we

could minimize the major differences in dust levels in the past”

(J.A. 437-438). Although Dr. Merchant and the agency both

acknowledged “some weaknesses” in data, such as the small size

of some of the populations studied, Dr. Merchant concluded that the

data could be used to draw valid dose-response curves with ac-

cepted statistical techniques. That conclusion was thoroughly tested

at the hearing, and the Secretary concluded that it was supported

by the weight of scientific opinion (see pages 5, 10, supra). While it

is true, as ATMI observes (ATMI Br. 9 n.19), that Dr. Merchant

stated that his data could not be used to make a conclusive de-

termination as to the prevalence of byssinosis in the entire textile

industry, that is irrelevant. The objective of the study was to de-

velop dose-response data and, for this purpose, Dr. Merchant sought

to “get a good distribution of the dust over a large variety of dust

34

eliminate the risk for 13% of the affected population, the

industry alternative would simply attempt to identify,

through medical surveillance, those employees who have

already exhibited symptoms of acute byssinosis and would

permit those employees to transfer before their disease be-

came demonstrably chronic. See generally J.A. 383-384.

This industry alternative proposal is unsatisfactory for

' several reasons.

First, the plan is based on the invalid assumption (see

page 8, note 13, supra), that a bright line separates

chronic and acute forms of the disease. Second, the plan

ignores the fact that persons suffering from acute by-

ssinosis are materially impaired (see page 30, note 35,

supra), and it does nothing to prevent the onset of that

condition. Third, the plan assumes, contrary to the opin-

ions expressed by the industry’s own experts, that medi-

cal surveillance can be a useful primary method of disease

control at a 500 ug/m* exposure level, rather than simply

a useful secondary control measure.** Fourth, the plan’s

measurements” (J.A. 485). These conditions were available at

the mills that Dr. Merchant studied and he was thus able to

“find striking dose-response relationships” (J.A. 485). In sum, the

Secretary acted here on the “best available evidence,” as required

by the statute. 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5). See Benzene, supra, slip op. 45.

*° Medical surveillance as a primary means of combating disease

was repeatedly disfavored in the rulemaking proceeding, even by

Dr. Imbus, the industry’s principal medical expert. Dr. Imbus

stated that “[mJedical surveillance programs are not a substitute

for diligent efforts to control dust” (J.A. 60), and that, “in order

for a medical surveillance program to provide any real protection

you must first of all have a manageable situation” (ibid.). Dr.

Imbus recounted one area in an all-cotton plant with a 400 ug/ms

dust level, where there was significant incidence of symptoms and

decrement of FEV; he noted that “[e]ven though dust levels here

do not look inordinately high, it is obvious that further action needs

to be taken to lower them, and medical surveillance is strictly an

interim measure” (id. at 59). See J.A. 439-441, 445 (Dr. Imbus;

Dr. Merchant). See also American Smelting & Refining Co. Vv.

OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 515 (8th Cir. 1974) (“[Bliological monitor-

ing did not eliminate or even reduce the hazard; it merely disclosed

it. * * * Workers should not be subjected to hazardous concentra-

35

reliance on transfers and respirators is simply unreal-

istic even on its own terms. The number of transfers the

industry can easily accommodate is necessarily low and

would be far below the number necessary at the PEL

that the industry proposed. Dr. Harold Imbus testified

that “in my experience I don’t think [the number of

workers who could transfer] could be a very high per-

centage. Certainly somewhere less than 10 percent, at

any rate” (J.A. 446). Respirators are also unsatis-

tions of airborne lead; biological monitoring should complement

* * * safe air, but is not a substitute for a healthful working envir-

onment.”’).

The shortcomings of any medical surveillance program are obvi-

ous. Workers may be less than totally candid in reporting symptoms

of chest tightness and breathlessness (see J.A. 436, 485), and in-

creasing familiarity with questionnaires may alter responses (J.A.

410-412). See also Pet. App. 30 n.13. Pulmonary testing may also

fail to disclose symptoms of acute byssinosis (J.A. 192-194, 435).

Moreover, the success of a medical surveillance program depends

upon the abilities and training of the persons administering the pro-

gram and “(t]he ability of all manufacturers to implement a high

quality medical surveillance program * * * is a problem” (J.A. 436).

For example, many workers testified that test results had been with-

held from them (J.A. 209-216, 218-220), which would signify a mis-

understanding of the gravity of acute byssinosis by persons ad-

ministering such tests. In addition to the usual problems associ-

ated with medical surveillance programs, the industry proposal pre-

sented further problems by suggesting that principal reliance should

be placed on pulmonary function testing, with questionnaires to be

used only when such tests showed a deficit (J.A. 383-384). The in-

dustry’s “active and effective medical surveillance program” (ATMI

Br. 11) would therefore fail to detect many persons suffering from

the disease. See note 13, supra.

*! Edward Baier, Deputy Director of NIOSH, and Dr. Merchant

expressed similar views. Baier remarked that “only a small pro-

portion of the workers can be effectively reassigned * * *” (J.A.

175) and Dr. Merchant stated that “[i]f you have a significant pro-

portion of your people affected there may not be adequate jobs at

low dust levels * * *” (J.A. 440-441). The Secretary took such

factors into account. The Secretary acknowledged that, under his

standard, 13% of textile employees would still be affected by the

disease, but he concluded that it “is not beyond the capacity of a

36

factory as a primary means of combating this disease, as

the record showed (J.A. 165-166, 316-322; App. 2374),

because they are both unreliable and, like voluntary trans-

fers, place responsibility for compliance on employees,

rather than on employers. As the Secretary noted (438

Fed. Reg. 27384 (1978) ):

Some hearing participants recommended a control

strategy involving principal reliance on respiratory

protection, to reduce the cost of compliance. How-

ever, respirators have many disadvantages which pre-

clude primary reliance or co-reliance on respiratory

protection on an equal basis with engincering and

work practice controls. The many difficulties with

respiratory protection were enumerated at the hear-

ing by respirator expert Bruce Held (Tr. 483) [J.A.

412-413]: because of difficulties in face fit, it is dif-

ficult to know whether the respirator actually pro-

vides adequate protection; respirators, by interfering

with vision, hearing, and mobility, can cause safety

problems; some employees cannot wear respirators

because of breathing difficulties. Finally, it is not

appropriate to place the burden of compliance prin-

cipally on the employee, as would be the case if

respiratory protection were the principal means of

reducing employee exposure.

In sum, the Secretary demonstrated that the previous

standard exposed employees to a significant risk of ma-

terial health impairment, which the new standard will

substantially reduce. Although the industry contends that

it suggested a far less costly alternative, the record

shows that the Secretary justifiably found that that al-

ternative was not nearly as effective.

typical plant to move those [still] affected to a low exposure area.”

43 Fed. Reg. 27359 (1978). The industry alternative could not

possibly achieve these beneficial results. Thus, the court of appeals

correctly concluded that “[t]he industry was unable to show that

job transfers would be available in sufficient number to respond to

the likely prevalence of byssinosis in plants with dust levels at the

500 ug/m® proposed by the industry” (Pet. App. 49).

37

II. THE SECRETARY’S RESPONSE TO THE SIGNIFI-

CANT HEALTH THREAT POSED BY COTTON

DUST IS ECONOMICALLY JUSTIFIED AND RE-

QUIRED BY THE STATUTE

As we have demonstrated above, the Secretary satisfied

the Benzene threshold requirement in promulgating the

cotton dust standard. The question thus presented is one

that the plurality expressly reserved in that case: what

further criteria must the Secretary use in determining

the degree of protection that the statute requires in

setting a particular standard. Petitioners contend (ATMI

Br. 36-47; NCC Br. 22-23) that the statute requires the

Secretary to weigh costs and benefits and to determine

that there is a “reasonable relationship” between the two

factors. Otherwise, they assert, a standard could drive an

industry to the brink of ruin or result in a serious mis-

allocation of limited resources under the Secretary’s defi-

nition of “economically feasible’ (AMTI Br. 31).

Petitioners’ submission should be rejected for two rea-

sons. As a factual matter, there is no evidence to indi-

cate that the Secretary’s administration of the Act, which

has been carried out in a responsible and practical man-

ner, will lead to such results. See pages 55-58, infra.

More important, neither the language of the statute

nor its legislative history contains any suggestion that

Congress intended to impose upon the Secretary the duty

to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in setting health stand-

ards for toxic substances.*? Rather, the Secretary’s statu-

42 In some statutes, Congress has expressly determined that ad-

ministrative agencies should perform a cost-benefit analysis in carry-

ing out the legislative policy. On other occasions, Congress has not

imposed such a requirement. See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed

Stone Ass’n, No. 79-770 (Dec. 2, 1980). The decision whether to

require that regulations be cost-justified is clearly within the prov-

ince of the legislative branch, and it is not the role of the courts

to make that policy judgment anew. As the Court remarked in

TVA V. Hill, 347 U.S. 153, 194 (1978): “Our individual appraisal

of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously se-

lected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of inter-

38

tory duty is clear: he must set standards that protect

against significant risks of material harm to employee

health, to the extent such protection is technologically and

economically feasible.

To be sure, in determining the feasibility of a stand-

ard, the Secretary is obliged to consider the financial

health and viability of an industry. But that is far dif-

ferent from requiring an individualized and heavily sub-

jective balancing of costs and benefits in every case. A

decision to engraft such a requirement upon this statu-

tory scheme would not be consistent with either the

legislative design or the proper function of the Court in

construing this remedial legislation. See Whirlpool Corp.

v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 18 (1980).

In enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act,

Congress was not unaware of the need to give appropriate

attention to practical considerations in enforcement of the

statutory scheme. Congress therefore chose the term

“feasible” to moderate the stringency of standards prom-

ulgated under the Act. Congress was likewise aware that

costs and benefits would have to be balanced, and it struck

the balance itself; it determined that a “reasonable re-

lationship” exists when costs are feasible and their

expenditure will reduce a significant risk of material

health impairment. If the Secretary were required to

make his own determination of a “reasonable relation-

ship” between the cost and benefits of a particular stand-

ard, he would necessarily be empowered to strike the

balance at a different and often less protective point than

preting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned

and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to

an end.” See also Benzene, supra, slip op. 2 (Burger, C.J., con-

curring); Harris v. McRae, No. 79-1268 (June 30, 1980), slip op.

26. Whatever the intrinsic value of cost-benefit analysis, and we

think petitioners grossly overstate both its practicability and its

utility in this context, Congress neither explicitly nor implicitly re-

quired the Secretary to employ that technique in prescribing stand-

ards governing exposure to toxic substances in the workplace.

39

Congress intended.* Neither the language nor the

legislative history of the Act countenances such a scheme.

A. A cost-benefit test is inconsistent with the language

and legislative history of Section 6(b)(5)

1. The principal provision of the Act governing health

standards for toxic substances, Section 6(b) (5) of the

Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5), is emphatic in its mandate:

“The Secretary * * * shall set the standard which most

adequately assures, to the extent feasible, * * * that no

employee will suffer material impairment of health or

functional capacity even if such employee has regular

exposure to the [regulated toxic substance] for the pe-

riod of his working life’ (emphasis added). The lan-

guage of Section 6(b) (5) contains no hint of a cost-

benefit requirement. The role that the costs of a standard

are intended to play is expressed in the phrase “to the

extent feasible,” and the ordinary meaning of “feasible”

is “capable of being done.” See Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 831 (1976). The word does not

refer to the desirability or benefit of doing something;

it refers, instead, to the ability to do something.“ Cost-

*8 A cost-benefit analysis would not always yield a less protective

standard. If an industry’s production process were extremely haz-

ardous and its product readily replaceable, it might be that closing

most or all of the industry would be cost-beneficial. But Congress

clearly did not grant the Secretary the authority to regulate in

that fashion. The courts have uniformly construed the feasibility

limitation as prohibiting the Secretary from protecting workers by

putting most of their employers out of business. American Iron &

Steel Institute v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.

dismissed, No. 78-918 (Sept. 10, 1980); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530

F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union Department v.

Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The scheme that

Congress directed the Secretary to follow—reduction of significant

risks at feasible costs—is something quite different from that im-

plied by conventional cost-benefit balancing tests.

*# Congress has consistently employed the word “feasible” in

health and safety legislation with this difference in mind, including

in one statute enacted the same week as OSHA. Section 211(c) (2)

40

benefit analysis, on the other hand, involves a specific

method for assessing the desirability of proposed actions.

In setting OSHA standards, the Secretary has first

determined the level of protection at which employees

will no longer face a significant risk of material harm;

he has then determined whether that level is technologi-

cally and economically capable of achievement. If he

finds that the level of protection is not technologically

and economically feasible, the provisions of the standard

(A) and (B) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate,

control or prohibit automobile fuel additives. Control or prohibition

of additives that endanger the public health is permitted after the

agency has considered “other technologically or economically feasi-

ble means of achieving emission standards * * *.” In contrast,

control or prohibition of additives that may impair effective opera-

tion of emission control devices is permitted only after consideration

of “a cost benefit analysis” comparing device performance with and

without the control or prohibition. 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7545

(c)(2)(A) and (B) (emphasis added). See Benzene, supra, slip

op. 23 n.27 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“This approach demonstrates

a legislative awareness of the difference between a feasibility con-

straint and a constraint based on weighing costs and benefits’).

Later Congresses have also recognized this difference. For pur-

poses of the 1977 effluent limitations established by the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Congress re-

quired the “best practicable control technology currently available,”

which was to be determined by consideration of, inter alia, ‘the

total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent

reduction benefits to be achieved” (33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314

(b)(1)(B)). With respect to the 1987 effluent limitations, how-

ever, Congress required the “best available technology economically

whievable”; while “costs” were to be considered, no direct compari-

son of costs and benefits was required. See EPA v. National

Crushed Stone Ass'n, supra, slip op. 5-6. And Section 325(a) of

the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. 6295,

which requires the promulgation of energy conservation standards,

specifies that a standard must be “economically justified.” A stand-

ard was economically justifiable only if the Secretary found that

the benefits of the standard outweighed its costs and that the stand-

ard was “economically feasible.” “Feasibility” was defined as “ca-

pable of being carried out.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-516, 94th Cong.,

Ist Sess. 172 (1975) ; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-700, 94th Cong., 1st

Sess. 172 (1975). But see 42 U.S.C. (Supp III) 6296.

41

must be adjusted. Requiring the Secretary to adjust the

standard further through the cost-benefit technique that

petitioners advocate would necessarily violate the “no-

material-impairment” mandate of the statute by depriv-

ing employees of protection that is “feasible.”

2. The cost-benefit gloss advocated by petitioners can-

not be justified by resort to legislative history. That

history unambiguously reflects Congress’ determination

that, in the case of toxic substances, affordable costs of

reducing significant risks of material harm are cate-

gorically outweighed by the benefits derived from the

prevention of premature death, disability, and disease.

Congress’ concern with the pernicious effects of exposure

to toxic substances in the workplace was a pri

impetus for passage of the Act. Leg. Hist. 142-143, 159-

160, 411-415, 503, 510, 845-846, 1061. Congress con-

demned the continued unregulated presence in the work-

place of the so-called “silent killers” such as cotton

dust, toxic substances whose harmful effects had been

fairly documented; Congress was also concerned that

those effects would be replicated geometrically due to the

rapid introduction of new and yet untested chemicals and

processes, *®

45 Leg. Hist. 1044-1045 (remarks of Rep. Udall).

46 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated

(Leg. Hist. 142-143) :

Occupational diseases which first commanded attention at

the beginning of the Industrial Revolution are still undermin-

ing the health of workers. Substantial numbers, even today,

fall victim to ancient industrial poisons such as lead and mer-

cury. Workers in the dusty trades still contract various res-

piratory diseases. Other materials long in industrial use are

only now being discovered to have toxic effects. In addition,

technological advances and new processes in American indus-

try have brought numerous new hazards to the workplace.

* * * [N]Jew materials and processes are being introduced into

industry at a much faster rate than the present meager re-

sources of occupational health can keep up with. It is esti-

mated that every 20 minutes a new and potentially toxic chemi-

cal is introduced into industry. New processes and new

42

Congress recognized that the boldness of its legislation

would have to match the seriousness of the problems pre-

sented. The Act would thus have to fill the “unconscion-

able gap between the minimal protection being given to

[employees] and the protection they need” (Leg. Hist.

1045 (remarks of Rep. Udall)). Generally, the level of

protection would have to be more stringent than that

provided by the previously voluntary consensus stand-

ards.*7 With respect to toxic substances, Congress made

clear that workers should remain healthy even if they

spent their entire working lives in the industry. It was

not acceptable to expect workers to be harmed, perhaps

irreparably, and then move on to safer employment. As

Senator Dominick remarked (Leg. Hist. 502-503; em-

phasis added) :

[W]hat we are doing now is to say that the Secre-

tary has got to use his best efforts to promulgate

the best available standards, and in so doing, that

sources of energy present occupational health problems of

unprecedented complexity.

Recent scientific knowledge points to hitherto unsuspected

cause-and-effect relationships between occupational exposures

and many of the so-called chronic diseases—cancer, respira-

tory ailments, allergies, heart disease, and others.

* * * * *

Studies of particular industries provide specific emphasis

regarding the magnitude of the problem. For example, despite

repeated warnings over the years from other countries that

their cotton workers suffered from lung disease, it is only

within the past decade that we have recognized byssinosis as

a distinct occupational disease among workers in American

cotton mills.

See also id. at 844-846 (House Report).

47 The House Report emphasized the minimalist character of

national consensus standards (Leg. Hist. 848) :

Voluntary standards set by the consensus method represent

the lowest common denominator of change in the status quo

that is necessary to achieve acceptance. Now that we have

chosen the force of law to command acceptance of safety and

health regulations, this method should not apply.

43

he should take into account that anyone working in

toxic agents or physical agents which might be harm-

ful may be subjected to such conditions for the rest

of his working life, so that we can get at something

which might not be toxic now, if he works in it a

short time, but if he works in it the rest of his life

it might be very dangerous; and we want to make

sure that such things are taken into consideration in

establishing standards * * *.

Congress was not unmindful that these requirements

would entail substantial compliance costs. Senator Eagle-

ton characterized these costs as “reasonable and neces-

sary costs of doing business” (Leg. Hist. 1150) because

“we can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon

an unsafe or unhealthy worksite” (id. at 1151). Senator

Yarborough, a principal sponsor of the legislation, echoed

this understanding, stating that the cost of compliance

was “the price we should pay for the 80 million workers

of America” (id. at 444). Senator Yarborough also re-

sponded to the assertion by some critics that the costs

of protection would be too great. He noted that the in-

creased costs “would be put into consumer goods” (id.

at 444), and further stated (id. at 510):

One may well ask too expensive for whom? * * *

Is it too expensive for the employee who loses his

hand or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the

widow trying to raise her children on meager allow-

ance under workmen’s compensation and _ social

security? * * *

on * a *

We are talking about people’s lives, not the in-

difference of some cost accountants. We are talking

about assuring the men and women who work in

our plants and factories that they will go home after

a day’s work with their bodies intact.

Congress anticipated that new standards could pur-

chase greater protection only through greater costs, but

it was not prepared to allow feasible standards to be

44

relaxed to accommodate particular employers. For in-

stance, Congress recognized that small firms might face

relatively greater economic burdens, but it refused to ease

those burdens by lowering standards. Instead, Congress

chose to assist such firms through government loans.

Leg. Hist. 525-526; 15 U.S.C. 686(b) (5). See S. Rep.

No. 93-132, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973). Moreover,

Congress explicitly provided that temporary variances

from a standard could not be based on economic hardship.

29 U.S.C. 655(b) (6) (A)-(B); Leg. Hist. 1188, 1201.

Compare 29 U.S.C. 655(d). To guarantee the continued

existence of every employer would permit employers who

have lagged behind in safety and health protection to

perpetuate their competitive advantage and frustrate the

achievement of the legislative purpose.** See EPA v.

National Crushed Stone Ass’n, supra, slip op. 14-18.

Congress recognized that the standards to be imposed

might significantly increase the cost of doing business,

but it adjudged that the costs nonetheless should be

imposed so long as they were feasible for the industry

as a whole.

No Member of Congress so much as suggested that,

because of cost-benefit considerations, the Secretary must

tolerate risks of material health impairment, caused by

toxic substances, when those risks could be eliminated

feasibly. Given the length and thoroughness of the legis-

lative inquiry prior to passage of the Act, the omission

48 Congress found little natural economic incentive for employers

to invest capital in safety and health protection. Because employees

often move from job to job, “an employer investing in current occu-

pational health precautions would receive no future benefits, not

even in the reduction of workmen’s compensation costs. He might

be paying for the past neglect of another employer. Uniform en-

forcement will also reduce or eliminate the disadvantage that a

conscientious employer might experience where inter-industry or

intra-industry competition is present.” Leg. Hist. 854 (House Re-

port). Moreover, “many employers—particularly smaller ones—

simply cannot make the necessary investment in health and safety,

and survive competitively, unless all are compelled to do so.” Leg.

Hist. 144 (Senate Report).

45

of any reference to a matter as significant as a cost-

benefit analysis “cannot be deemed inadvertent.” Ben-

zene, supra, slip op. 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Petitioners support their contention that the statute

requires a cost-benefit justification principally by ref-

erence to qualifying language contained in the Act:

“most adequately” assures, “to the extent feasible,” that

no “material” impairment will occur (ATMI Br. 31-34).

The Secretary does not dispute that this language man-

dates consideration of practical concerns, including costs,

in the setting of standards. Neither Congress nor the

Secretary has ever contended that this legislation does

or should license the agency to attempt to achieve ab-

solute occupational safety and health. But neither do

these qualifying phrases insist upon a balancing of costs

and benefits as the assurance that standards will be

realistic.

A standard can “most adequately” assure protection

when the benefits to be produced are significant and the

costs are feasible. Furthermore, “material” impairment

plainly refers to the severity of the health or safety con-

sequences and to the degree of risk of suffering those

consequences. Benzene, supra, slip op. 31-33 n.48. The

concept of “material impairment” unquestionably limits

the Secretary’s standard-setting authority. Assessing the

gravity and likelihood of adverse health consequences,

however, does not logically entail a comparison of those

consequences with the costs of avoiding them.** Hence, |

Congress’ decision that “the” standard must protect

against “material” impairment, rather than “any” im-

pairment, does not suggest that avoidance of a “ma-

49 For example, two substances may be equally likely to cause

cancer. It may cost very little to minimize exposure to one, while

it may be difficult and very costly to prevent exposure to the other.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention (ATMI Br. 38-40), it makes

little sense to regard the potential impairment caused by unregu-

lated exposure to one substance as more “material,” or the risk of

one as less “significant,” than the other.

46

terial” impairment must be justified on a cost-benefit

basis.

3. The pattern and structure of the Act as a whole

also demonstrate that Congress did not intend health

protection in this area to depend on an individualized

balancing of costs and benefits with respect to every

standard. Congress’ express purpose was to create safe

and healthful workplaces “so far as possible” (Section

2 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 651). The Act imposes on em-

ployers the general duty to furnish workplaces “which

are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are

likely to cause death or serious physical harm * * *”

(Section 5(a) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 654(a) (1)). It

5° The legislative history indicates that Congress substituted the

term “material impairment” for “any impairment” to ensure that

the Secretary would not be required to regulate trifling or remote

hazards such as mosquito or black-fly bites. Leg. Hist. 345 (re-

marks of Sen. Dominick). Petitioners also rely (ATMI Br. 34) on

the compromise reached by the conference committee, which re-

sulted in the use of the “substantial evidence” scope of judicial

review, rather than the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. See

Section 6(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(f). The substantial evidence

standard reflects a legislative judgment that the Secretary should

develop standards on a relatively formalized basis by providing a

hearing and a record capable of review. Leg. Hist. 298-299, 884,

1053. But these procedural concerns do not show that Congress

intended to protect industries from all costs that were not, in their

view, “reasonably related” to benefits. Florida Peach Growers

Ass’n V. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974), cited

by petitioners (ATMI Br. 34), suggests only that Congress was

concerned about avoiding the imposition of “arbitrary burdens” on

employers (489 F.2d at 128). The Fifth Circuit cites no legislative

history to elucidate the manner in which a burden might be “arbi-

trary,” and the sole reference relied on by ATMI here is totally in-

apposite. ATMI relies (ATMI Br. 34 n.70) on the remarks of Sena-

tor Cook with respect to the “arbitrary and capricious” test for

judicial review. Leg. Hist. 342-344. But these remarks related to

judicial review of the Secretary’s veto of a state plan for regulating

occupational health, not to judicial review of an occupational health

standard or to the prospect that costs might be out of proportion

to benefits. Jbid. Accordingly, this legislative compromise sheds no

light on the issue whether a standard must satisfy a cost-benefit test.

47

is not enough that a workplace be “reasonably free” of

hazards; it must be as free of serious hazards as pos-

sible. See National Realty and Construction Co. v.

OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265-1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Likewise, in choosing among alternative existing stand-

ards during the first two years after the Act became

effective, the Secretary was required to “promulgate the

standard which assures the greatest protection of the

safety or health of the affected employees” (Section 6 (a)

of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(a)). Where a new standard

deals with toxic substances, Section 6(b) (5) requires that

the Secretary adopt “the” standard that “most adequately

assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best

available evidence, that no employee will suffer material

impairment of health or functional capacity even if such

employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with

by such standard for the period of his working life”

(29 U.S.C. 655(b) (5)). Finally, variances may be ob-

tained, but only on limited grounds that do not include

financial hardship. 29 U.S.C. 655(b) (6) (A)-(B), 655

(f). Leg. Hist. 1188, 1201.

The statute thus was designed to ensure the highest

possible degree of employee protection against significant

risks of material harm, particularly in the case of toxic

substances. The urgent call for highly protective stand-

ards to prevent significant risks of material impairment

derived from a lifetime of exposure, the refusal to allow

variances for economic hardship, and the provision of

economic relief only through loans for small businesses,

all show that Congress carefully considered and limited

the role that cost considerations should play here, a role

that does not include the lowering of feasible standards.

There is no warrant to read into this statute “what

Congress has studiously omitted.” FTC v. Simplicity

Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959). See Transamerica

Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979) :

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69,

78-79 (1979).

48

Petitioners contend, however, that the Secretary’s view

of his mandate would push the industry to the brink of

ruin (ATMI Br. 31). In our view, Congress’ insertion

of the feasibility requirement was specifically designed to

preclude that draconian result and to assure that stand-

ards would be “reasonable” and “practical.” We agree

that the economic feasibility requirement limits the Sec-

retary’s authority to set standards for toxic substances.

Moreover, were an economic feasibility test as ineffectual

as the industry suggests, Section 6(b) (5) would be a

harsh provision indeed. Consistent with the intent of

Congress, however, the Secretary has construed the

“capable of achievement” criteridn in a reasonable and

practical fashion that provides a meaningful brake on

regulation.™

51 Accordingly, petitioners’ argument is not advanced even if, as

they assert (ATMI Br. 32-33), Congress regarded the terms “rea-

sonable” and “practical” as a gloss on “feasible,” because the Secre-

tary’s application of the feasibility limitation results in reasonable

and practical standards. Petitioners rely in the main on the re-

marks of Senator Javits, the original author of the feasibility

amendment, to suggest that the term was meant to include some-

thing in the nature of “reasonableness” or “practicality.” But

petitioners’ reading of the legislative history is deficient because

Senator Javits did not use those words to describe his amendment.

Senator Javits introduced the Nixon Administration’s originai bill

(S. 2788, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ), which would have required

the board responsible for issuing health and safety standards to

submit its proposals to certain organizations for a report on “the

technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of such stand-

ard.” Leg. Hist. 38-39; 115 Cong. Rec. 22511 (1969). Contrary

to ATMI’s assertion, Senator Javits did not “describe” the report

in terms of “reasonableness” and “practicality.” The “description”

of the report was made by President Nixon in his message concern-

ing the Administration bill. See 115 Cong. Rec. 22511, 22517

(1969). Senator Javits specifically disassociated himself from the

Administration’s bill on a variety of issues, stating that “it may be

desirable to go somewhat further than this bill does in strengthen-

ing the hand of the Federal Government in this area” (id. at

22512). Significantly, when Senator Javits actually described his

feasibility amendment, he consistently used only the word “feasi-

ble”; he never equated “feasible” with “reasonable” or “practical”

49

As the court stated in Industrial Union Department v.

Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974), Congress

did not “intend[] to protect employees by putting their

employers out of business.” The Secretary’s overall pur-

pose, therefore, is to assure that the industry is able

to finance the costs of compliance, as well as other “rea-

sonable and necessary costs of doing business” (Leg.

Hist. 1150). At bottom, the Secretary must determine

that the industry will maintain long-term profitability and

competitiveness. Cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320

U.S. 591, 605 (1944). See also United Steelworkers of

America Vv. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15,

1980), slip op. 144. It is against these benchmarks that

the Secretary makes his economic feasibility determina-

tion, and he does in fact perform an extensive economic

analysis involving a wide variety of factors in develop-

ing standards.

Thus, the Secretary’s consideration of economic feasi-

bility is far different from the industry’s characterization,

which implies that application of the feasibility test could

result in nearly bankrupting an industry. As is evident

from the Secretary’s analysis of the impact of the cotton

dust standard (see pages 14-22, supra; pages 63-65,

infra), numerous economic factors were taken into ac-

count in making the determination of economic feasibility

in this case. The Secretary closely examined the availa-

bility of capital to the industry, the extent to which cap-

(Leg. Hist. 197, 418). Furthermore, Senator Javits stated that the

Senate Committee bill was “an improvement over * * * the Admin-

istration bill, which contains no criteria for standards at all (id.

at 197).” Hence, rather than believing that he had incorporated

criteria contained in the Administration bill, Senator Javits thought

that that bill lacked any such criteria. Similarly, petitioners’ refer-

ence (ATMI Br. 34-35) to congressional remarks on the need for a

“balanced” bill is of little additional significance; Congress did

indeed create a “balanced” bill. It balanced the economic conse-

quences against the health of the nation’s employees, but it did not

authorize the agency to overturn that balance by means of a cost-

benefit test.

50

ital was required for other purposes, the industry’s profit

history, the industry’s ability to absorb costs or pass them

on to the consumer, the impact of higher costs on demand,

and the impact on competition with substitutes and

imports.”

With the exception of the Fifth Circuit, no court

of appeals has held that the Secretary must perform a

cost-benefit analysis in setting standards to regulate

employee exposure to toxic substances in the workplace."

The issue was first considered by the District of Columbia

Circuit in connection with the asbestos standard in In-

dustrial Union Department v. Hodgson, supra. In that

case, the court noted that the feasibility requirement man-

dates that the Secretary steer his course between the

often opposing poles of preserving an industry’s financial |

viability and declining to reinforce the competitive ad-

vantage of firms that have failed to expend resources on

safety (499 F.2d at 478; footnote omitted) :

This qualification is not intended to provide a route

by which recalcitrant employers or industries may

avoid the reforms contemplated by the Act. Standards

may be economically feasible even though, from the

52 Where technologies are not fully developed, the analysis is

necessarily more complicated. For example, in the lead standard, the

agency listed six additional factors that may appropriately enter

such determinations. 43 Fed. Reg. 54474-54476 (1978).

538 See American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th

Cir. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, Industrial Union Department v.

American Petroleum Institute, No. 78-911 (July 2, 1980). Accord,

Texas Independent Ginners Ass’n V. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 412-413

(5th Cir. 1980).

54 Petitioners apparently do not contest the accuracy of this state-

ment (see ATMI Br. 41), but suggest that some significance should

be attributed to the fact that other courts have not “considered

explicitly the nature of the economic impact assessment that is

required * * * to comply with Section 3(8) as well as Section

6(b) (5) of the Act” (ibid.). Whatever weight should be given to

Section 3(8), it should not be assumed that the courts were unaware

of that section. Petitioners’ argument also rests on two cases that

are inapposite here. See page 51, note 56, infra.

51

standpoint of employers, they are financially burden-

some and affect profit margins adversely. Nor does

the concept of economic feasibility necessarily guar-

antee the continued existence of individual employers.

It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of

the Act to envisage the economic demise of an em-

ployer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry

in protecting the health and safety of employees and

is consequently financially unable to comply with new

standards as quickly as other employers.

Accord, AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d

Cir. 1975) ; American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA,

577 F.2d 825, 836 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, No.

78-918 (Sept. 10, 1980). See Society of Plastics Industry,

Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421

U.S. 992 (1975).°° This test for economic feasibility is

both reasonable and fully consistent with the congressional

intent to provide the greatest protection possible against

significant risks of material harm.**

55 This test has also been approved in other safety and health

contexts. The 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, for example, provide that 19838 effluent limitations

should be based on “the best available technology economically

achievable” (33 U.S.C. 1811(b) (2) (A)). The courts have held that

a standard is “economically achievable” even if it is costly and may

close some marginal plants, so long as the costs may reasonably be

borne by the industry as a whole. See American Iron and Steel

Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1051-1052 (3d Cir. 1975); CPC

Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1829, 1841-1342, 1344 (8th Cir. 1976) ;

American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 589 F.2d 107, 119-120,

139-140 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Moreover, contrary to ATMI’s sugges-

tion (ATMI Br. 44 n.88), the 1983 limitations were not to be set

on a cost-benefit basis. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n,

No. 79-770 (Dec. 2, 1980), slip op. 5-6.

56 Petitioners rely (ATMI Br. 42) on two cases construing the

word “feasible” in the OSHA noise standard (29 C.F.R. 1910.95

(b) (1)), which requires that employers utilize “feasible administra-

tive or engineering controls” to reduce employee exposure to noise.

See Turner Co., Div. of Olin Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d

82 (7th Cir. 1977) ; RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566

(6th Cir. 1979). In Turner, however, the court premised its decision

52

B. The requirement of Section 3(8) that a standard be

“reasonably necessary or appropriate” does not

embody a cost-benefit test

There is no merit to petitioners’ additional contention

(ATMI Br. 36-38) that a cost-benefit test may be in-

on the fact that the noise standard had originally been promulgated

under the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. 35 et seg., which contained

no requirement that standards be feasible, and that it was subse-

quently adopted as a national consensus standard under 29 U.S.C.

655(a) also without consideration of feasibility (561 F.2d at 85),

The Seventh Circuit reasoned that fairness required that a cost-

benefit analysis be applied in enforcing the standard in these cir-

cumstances (ibid.). We disagree. At most, this calls for interpret-

ing “feasibility” to include consideration of cost—not to require a

balancing of costs and benefits. Second, the court of appeals relied

on its determination that noise appeared to be far less significant

than other hazards that pose “serious debilitating threats” or are

“life-threatening.” Id. at 86. It was only “[i]n this perspective”

that the court required the Secretary to weigh costs and benefits

before regulating noise levels. In RMI, the Sixth Circuit followed

Turner. The present context is significantly different because the

cotton dust standard aims at a serious, debilitating and life-

threatening hazard and was developed after full consideration of

feasibility.

For similar reasons, ATMI’s reliance (ATMI Br. 44-45) on the

decisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

is misplaced. The Secretary, not the Commission, is the official en-

trusted by Congress with the responsibility to study occupational

health and safety hazards and to set remedial standards. The Com-

mission has neither the authority nor the expertise to investigate

occupational health hazards or to decide how best to regulate them.

The Commission’s function is to adjudicate alleged violations of the

standards that the Secretary has set. Compare Section 6(b) of the

Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(b), with Section 10 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 659. In-

deed, Congress rejected the proposal to delegate standard setting

power to an independent commission (see Leg. Hist. 148, 462, 1186-

1187, 1191, 1192, 1201-1202), and the Commission’s construction

cannot bind the Secretary. Cf. Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products

Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1180-1183, 1186-1188 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

No. 80-471 (Dec. 15, 1980). In any event, the most recent pro-

nouncement of the Commission shows that its three members hold

widely differing views concerning the meaning of the term “feasi-

ble.” Samson Paper Bag Co., 3 Empl. Safety & Health Guide

(CCH) {[ 24,555 (June 16, 1980).

53

ferred from the statute’s definition of a health standard.

Section 3(8) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 652(8), provides that

a standard must be “reasonably necessary or appropriate

to provide safe or healthful employment.” This phrase

means only that the regulation must be aimed at reduc-

ing significant risks of material harm (see Benzene,

supra, slip op. 35), must adhere to the criteria laid down

elsewhere in the statute, and must be rationally related

to the legislative goals in passing the Act.

The statute must be construed as a harmonious whole.

As we have shown above (see pages 39-47, supra), the re-

quirement of a cost-benefit anaylsis is not reconcilable

with Section 6(b) (5) of the Act, the principal provision

relating to standards for toxic substances. Moreover, the

legislative history contains nothing to warrant the con-

clusion that Section 3(8), in contrast to Section 6(b) (5),

was intended to incorporate a requirement that costs and

benefits be weighed. Indeed, while Section 6(b) (5) was

the subject of vigorous debate prior to passage of the

Act, Section 3(8) received virtually no comment.*"

There is no basis, therefore, for clothing Section 3(8)

with a substantive requirement so inconsistent with that

supplied in Section 6(b) (5). To do so would “ ‘impute to

Congress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it

sought to promote with the other.’” Weinberger v.

Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 681 (1973),

quoting Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp, 332 U.S. 480,

489 (1947).

Nor does the plurality opinion in Benzene suggest a

contrary conclusion. While the plurality held that Sec-

tion 3(8) requires a threshold finding of a significant

risk of harm, the plurality also found that threshold to be

implied in Section 6(b) (5)’s reference to “toxic” sub-

57 All but one of the original bills contained a definition of

“occupational safety and health standard” that was either similar

or identical to that eventually enacted. Leg. Hist. 3, 35, 78, 532,

601, 631, 683, 725, 768, 937. The legislative history appears to

contain no reference to these provisions, however, except in the

section-by-section analyses of the committee reports.

54

stances, “harmful” physical agents, and “material” im-

pairment. Moreover, the plurality relied on general com-

ments in the legislative history concerning the conceded

impossibility of eliminating all risks. Benzene, supra,

slip op. 31-33, 36-38. In contrast, petitioners’ cost-benefit

test is not consistent with the statute’s “no material im-

pairment” provision, either on its face or in light of the

legislative history.

Petitioners’ reliance (ATMI Br. 48) on other statutes

containing language similar to “reasonably necessary or

appropriate,” and judicial interpretations of such lan-

guage, is also misplaced because significant differences

exist in the language, legislative histories and regulatory

purposes of those statutes. The Consumer Product Safety

Act (CPSA), for example, requires that, as a predicate to

finding that a particular “rule * * * is reasonably neces-

sary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of in-

jury,” the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)

must determine “the need of the public for the consumer

products subject to such rule, and the probable effect of

such rule upon the utility, cost, or availability of such

products to meet such need.” 15 U.S.C. 2058(c) (1) (C),

(c) (2) (A).°§ That language, specifically requiring that

costs be justified by benefits, is not found in either the

text or the legislative history of the Occupational Safety

and Health Act. A further critical distinction between

58 The legislative history of the CPSA expressly indicates the

congressional intent that standards would be determined by balanc-

ing these considerations: “It is generally expected that the determi-

nation of unreasonable hazard will involve the Commission in

balancing the probability that risk will result in harm and the

gravity of such harm against the effect on the product’s utility,

cost, and availability.” H.R. Rep. No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.

83 (1972). See S. Rep. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972).

59 The regulatory purposes of the National Traffic and Motor

Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., on which petitioners

rely (ATMI Br. 44 n.88), are similarly distinguishable. For exam-

ple, the vehicle safety standard reviewed in H&H Tire Co. v. De-

partment of Transportation, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972), was

designed to make retreaded tires safer, but the costs thus created

threatened to make retreads unavailable to those consumers who

55

the two statutes must also be noted: the risks and benefits

of a consumer product accrue to the same party, the con-

sumer, who can choose to avoid the risk. Employees, on

the other hand, rarely have such a choice—they must bear

the risk of occupational health hazards, while benefits

accrue largely to employers and consumers. Although the

Secretary’s authority is limited to eliminating “sig-

nificant” risks, it does not follow that this limitation has

the same content as the “unreasonable” risk limitation

placed on the CPSC.

C. A cost-benefit test is not necessary to prevent seri-

ous economic disruptions or serious misallocation

of scarce resources for combating occupational

disease

The recurring Aheme of petitioners’ argument is that

only the imposifion of a cost-benefit requirement can pre-

vent a serioug misallocation of societal resources. Even

if there were a realistic possibility that the statute might

would supposedly benefit from the standard. Jd. at 355. In light of

Congress’ unambiguously stated intent that retreads were to remain

available, the likely result of the regulation could not be “appropri-

ate” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 1892(f) (3). Ibid. Moreover,

the legislative history of that statute indicates that the agency was

to consider not only feasibility, but also “reasonableness of cost.”

S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966).

Petitioners also rely (ATMI Br. 45) on the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency’s decision to consider the cost of further reducing

risks posed by airborne carcinogens in determining whether a

national emission standard provides an “ample margin of safety.”

44 Fed. Reg. 58642, 58661 (1979); 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 7412

(b) (1) (B). In discussing this decision (44 Fed. Reg. 58660-58661)

(1979) ), EPA noted that the elimination of all risks posed by air

pollutants was impossible and concluded that Congress could not

have intended this requirement to force the closing of major indus-

tries. The Secretary, of course, pursues the same policy in setting

OSHA standards. The critical distinction, however, is that Con-

gress, in Section 6(b) (5) of the Act, gave guidance to the Secre-

tary with respect to how he should weigh the economic conse-

quences of regulation. That guidance is less obvious in EPA’s

“ample margin of safety” requirement. .Once EPA had determined

that its statutory discretion permitted the consideration of costs,

it was perhaps appropriate for the agency to engage in balancing

risks against costs. No such discretion exists here.

56

result in a misallocation of resources, it would provide

no basis for the courts to overrule the policy judgments

of Congress. See page 37, note 42, supra. In any event,

the Secretary’s construction and administration of the

statute has not resulted in the misapplication of resources

and does not threaten to put industries to the brink of

ruin (see pages 48-51, supra). The regulatory process

guards against such misallocations in numerous ways.

First, Section 6(g) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(g), pro-

vides that, “[i]n determining the priority for establishing

standards under this section, the Secretary shall give due

regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety

and health standards for particular industries, trades,

crafts, occupations, businesses, workplaces or work en-

vironments.” To the extent possible, therefore, in deter-

mining where the need for prompt rulemaking is the

greatest, the Secretary assesses relative risks, costs, and

benefits. The Secretary’s obligation to address hazards

in the order of their severity provides substantial assur-

ance that resources will be applied in a rational manner.

See 45 Fed. Reg. 5284-5285 (1980).

Second, the Secretary may regulate only significant

risks of material harm. See Benzene, supra, slip op. 29.

That limitation likewise assures that resources will be

devoted to eliminating or reducing only substantial threats

to employee health. Third, the statute permits the

Secretary to select the least expensive means of com-

pliance that will provide an adequate level of protec-

tion.” That general principle is underscored by the vari-

ance provision of the Act, which permits employers to

use alternative compliance methods that are as “safe and

© Of course, the Secretary may not choose a less costly standard

that does not provide the level of protection required by the statute.

In the case of the cotton dust standard, the Secretary rejected the

industry’s alternative on that ground. By contrast, the Secretary

found in the lead standard rulemaking proceedings that engineering

and non-engineering controls provided equally effective compliance

methods. Thus, the lead standard permits employers to achieve the

PEL through either, or a combination, of these methods. 43 Fed.

Reg. 52990 (1978).

57

healthful” as those provided by the general standard.

Section 6(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(d).

Fourth, a standard aimed at reducing exposure to

one harmful substance frequently will also protect against

many other harmful substances because engineering con-

trols generally remove all air contaminants.*' Fifth.

limitations of technological feasibility will often limit ex-

penditures of financial resources because, as here (see

pages 12-14, supra), it will often be impossible to

achieve the degree of stringency that is actually war-

ranted by the health data. Sixth, the standard must be

financially affordable, a requirement that obligates the

Secretary to consider the costs of the standard in light

of the industry’s overall financial condition and compet-

ing needs for capital, including the need to protect

against more serious health hazards.”

Seventh, the Secretary gives additional consideration to

financial costs in determining the period of time that

Should be allowed for compliance. In the present case,

for instance, the Secretary allowed the industry four

years in which to institute engineering controls; in the

lead standard, the Secretary provided for periods ranging

from five to ten years. See 43 Fed. Reg. 52983-52984,

53008 (1978). Finally, the Secretary’s enforcement. pol-

icy takes account of financial hardship on an individ-

ualized basis. The Industrial Hygiene Field Opera-

tions Manual, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (1980), provides that,

based on an employer’s economic situation, the Secretary

*1 For instance, compliance with the lead standard by primary

lead smelters will achieve substantial compliance with the arsenic

standard. See 43 Fed. Reg. 54354, 54494 (1978). Likewise, engi-

neering controls required by the coke oven emissions standard will

also reduce benzene levels. 48 Fed. Reg. 5937, 5944-5945, 5948

(1978).

® The textile industry objected to the cotton dust standard by

pointing to OSHA’s proposal for more stringent controls on work-

place noise levels as a potentially competing need for capital (J.A.

258-261). The Secretary pressed forward with the present stand-

ard, however, because of his judgment that byssinosis is a more

urgent health problem in this industry.

58

may extend the period within which a violation must be

corrected.” Compare United Steelworkers of America v.

Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980), slip

op. 161-163.

One need look no further than the present case for an

apt illustration of the reasonableness and practicality

of the Secretary’s regulatory approach. Although the

RTI study suggested that the 200 ug/m* PEL would not

drive the industry to the brink of bankruptcy, RTI also

determined that the cost impact of the proposed level

would be severe in the weaving sector, because it might

require the physical reconstruction of 90% of all weave

rooms. The Secretary therefore concluded that the 200

ug/m* level was not feasible for weaving and that the

750 ug/m*® level was all that could reasonably be re-

quired.

It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the

Secretary’s approach to regulation in this area bears

little resemblance to the version portrayed by petition-

ers,“ and it is not likely to result in a serious misalloca-

tion of resources. Indeed, the Secretary’s administration

of the statute, when viewed in its entirety, shows that the

Secretary takes into account cost implications to the

fullest extent permitted by the Act. At bottom, peti-

tioners’ quarrel is with the fact that the statute does

®3 The manual provides (ch. 1, § I(4) (b)):

The employer’s economic cost of correction is generally not con-

sidered to be a factor in the issuance of a citation.

(1) However, if the cost of implementing effective engineer-

ing, administrative or work practice controls, cr combination,

would so seriously jeopardize the employer’s financial condi-

tion so as to result in the probable shutdown of the establish-

ment or a substantial part of it, an extended correction date

may be set.

** Nor must the Secretary’s interpretation of Section 6(b) (5) be

abandoned on the hypothetical ground that he might someday

promulgate a standard the costs of which would be entirely dispro-

portionate to the benefits. “[T]o put an extreme case is not a good

test of the fair and just interpretation of any statute.” United

States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 164 (1841) (Story, J.).

59

not go so far as they would like: it does not authorize

a cost-benefit analysis in the standard-setting deter-

mination.

For their part, petitioners would engraft upon the

statute a balancing test that would require the Secretary

to determine whether the benefits of a standard bear a

“reasonable relationship” to its costs. Apparently in rec-

ognition of the fundamental problems with that ap-

proach, petitioners quickly add that they do not mean to

Suggest any need for a “rigidly formal cost-benefit caleu-

lation that places a dollar value on employee lives or

health” (ATMI Br. 39.). But there is no other way

to perform a meaningful cost-benefit analysis.“ Unless

there was agreement as to the dollar value of the benefits

to be gained, any determination that costs and benefits

are “reasonably related” would be arbitrary. Hence,

placing a value on human life and freedom from suf-

fering is an indispensable part of petitioners’ program.

At all events, any attempt to employ cost-benefit analy-

sis in this area would have to overcome a number of

serious obstacles. As just noted, if costs and benefits

are to be compared, they must be computed in the same

65 A “formal” cost-benefit analysis may be characterized as one

that seeks to weigh the costs and benefits of a particular course of

action by computing and comparing the net present values of both

the costs and the benefits. As applied to the setting of occupational

health standards, the benefits of improved health would have to be

valued in monetary terms and then compared with the costs asso-

ciated with the regulation.

In any event, petitioners’ assertion (ATMI Br. 39) that a cost-

benefit analysis would not “predetermine the decisions that OSHA

must make” is disingenuous at best. Under petitioners’ theory, the

results of such an analysis would necessarily dictate the ultimate

determination. If the results showed that costs were not “reason-

ably related” to benefits, the standard would have to be adjusted.

Otherwise, the exercise is pointless.

66 We do not mean by this that analyses of the costs and benefits

of achieving a given level of regulatory stringency are useless or

should be avoided in contexts where they are warranted. In some

contexts, they provide valuable information, and their use has been

encouraged by the President. Exec. Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg.

12661, 12663 (1978).

60

units, which means that benefits must be assigned a dol-

lar value. Even the assessment of the dollar costs of

avoiding lost wages and medical expenses, which are al-

ready valued quantitatively, would be a prodigious under-

taking. To be accurate, these calculations would require

comprehensive data on the affected workforce, including

age and earnings profiles, medical histories, postretire-

ment experience, and premature death tables. Cost in-

formation concerning an employer’s increased workers’

compensation and medical insurance premiums, direct

health care costs, and indirect productivity losses re-

sulting from excess absenteeism, worker turnover, and

other related inefficiencies also would have to be taken

into account. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46751 (1976); 45 Fed.

Reg. 5248 (1980). Even if reliable data were available

for an entire industry, which is unlikely, there remain

the insurmountable problems of placing a wholesale eco-

nomic value on the pain, suffering, and premature deaths

that will be visited upon the workforce of an industry,

which is necessarily composed of persons with widely dif-

ferent characteristics and circumstances.*

* Pain and suffering attendant to group illness and injury are

not easily reducible to monetary terms. 41 Fed. Reg. 46751 (1976) ;

45 Fed. Reg. 5248 (1980). There is no generally accepted method

for valuing such considerations, even implicitly. See Senate Comm.

on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Study on Federal

Regulation, Vol. VI, at XXIV (Comm. Print 1978). Attempts have

been made, however, to attach a value to life itself for this type of

analysis. One such approach, the “human capital” approach, calcu-

lates the value of an individual life by computing the present value

of future income as a measure of the individual’s contribution to

the national economy. Because this valuation system depends on

earning levels, it leads to lower values on the lives of retired work-

ers, women, and other low wage groups such as textile workers. This

calculation also necessarily assumes that there is no other value to

human life than producing income to maximize the gross national

product. Another type of valuation has attempted to analyze wage

rates for high risk jobs and to utilize the so-called “risk premium”

paid for such jobs as a measure of a life. This analysis necessarily,

and probably incorrectly, assumes that employees have the freedom

to move to lower-risk jobs and that they have adequate knowledge

to make a well-informed choice. It was for these reasons that the

61

Moreover, there would have to be general agreement

whether a stream of health benefits and saved lives ex-

tending into the future should be ignored, discounted to

present value, or otherwise calculated. A cost-benefit

analysis of the cotton dust standard, for example, would

surely have to consider more than the current employees

in the industry. The permanent technological health im-

provements required by the standard would benefit untold

millions of future employees as well. See Benzene, supra,

slip op. 15 n.22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Another defect in traditional cost-benefit analysis is

that it cannot account for those considerations of equity

that underlay the very concept of occupational health

regulation. While the cost-benefit technique has gained

some adherents as an allegedly value-free method for

dealing with all manner of difficult questions, this tech-

nique originated in the context of investment capital de-

cisions, where costs and benefits not only were already

expressed in dollars, but also accrued to the same party.

In occupational health regulation, however, employees

bear the risk of occupational disease, while consumers

and employers may acquire some benefit if the risk is not

curbed. See 45 Fed. Reg. 5249 (1980). The unequal

distribution of costs and benefits in this context neces-

sarily raises the question of this statute’s purpose and

its determination of what is equitable; the mere cal-

culation of costs and benefits cannot supply that answer.®

Secretary concluded that there was no adequate methodology to

quantify the value of a life. 41 Fed. Reg. 46751 ( 1976); 45 Fed.

Reg. 5248 (1980). These problems are necessarily compounded, of

course, when the calculations purport to give some economic value

to large numbers of lives. See generally Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis

for Standards Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational

Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 60

B.U.L. Rev. 115 (1980).

68 In addition to the problems inherent in attributing a dollar

value to benefits, a cost-benefit analysis depends for its accuracy on

the quality of available information concerning the extent of the

risk. While the agency had the benefit of the comprehensive dose-

response curve derived from Dr. Merchant’s data in the case of

cotton dust, this may well be the exception rather than the rule.

Quantitative risk assessments typically yield only crude and inexact

62

Clearly, petitioners’ technique for determining the ap-

propriate stringency of a standard is not the panacea that

they claim it to be. As the court of appeals concluded

(Pet. App. 76-77; footnotes omitted) :

[C]ost-benefit analysis would not necessarily im-

prove agency health and safety determinations. These

techniques require the expression of costs, benefits

and performance in often arbitrary, measureable

terms. They may hide assumptions and qualifica-

tions in the seeming objectivity of numerical es-

timates. Especially where a policy aims to protect

the health and lives of thousands of people, the dif-

ficulties in comparing widely dispersed benefits with

more concentrated and calculable costs may over-

whelm the advantages of such analysis.

The Secretary assessed the benefits of the cotton dust

standard, which he found to be “appreciable,” and he

found the costs to be both economically and technologic-

ally feasible. Thus, the test established by Congress was

satisfied. Petitioners’ alternative would assure no better

result.

In light of this conclusion, it follows that Section 6

(b) (5), as construed and applied by the Secretary, does

not constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative

power. Cases such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.

v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Re-

fining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1985), are inapposite

because the Secretary has not been given broad, un-

canalized authority to restructure the entire economy.

On the contrary, the statute directs the Secretary to

numerical indicators of risk because large numbers of uncertainties

are involved. Although there may be substantial evidence of risk as

a qualitative matter, numerical figures assigned to different ex-

posures could well be erroneous by several orders of magnitude.

Thus, a great degree of uncertainty would be implicit in any cost-

benefit calculation in this context. On the cost side, moreover, the

agency’s experience with the vinyl chloride regulation shows that

predictions of anticipated expenses may be grossly inflated when

compared to actual expenses. See Doniger, Federal Regulation of

Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic

Substances Control, 7 Ecol. L.Q. 497 (1978).

63

carry out the legislative mandate for a safe and health-

ful workplace but not “to protect employees by putting

their employers out of business * * * by making financial

viability generally impossible.” Industrial Union De-

partment v. Hodgson, supra, 499 F.2d at 478. OSHA,

like other regulatory bodies, is empowered to order

changes in the way that business is conducted, but that

authority is not the roving commission that petitioners

suggest; it is an authority to enforce the terms of a

specific statute, which the Secretary has done in a man-

ner that avoids unreasonable results and serious misal-

locations of resources.

Although the Secretary’s authority in the area of

occupational health and safety is admittedly far reach-

ing, it is no greater than Congress thought necessary

to combat a serious and complex—but precise—national

problem, whose manifestations exist in extraordinary va-

riety. The statutory language provides an adequate and

intelligible standard to guide the Secretary in fulfilling

these responsibilities. And in administering the statute,

the Secretary must follow a procedure that requires the

making of a record so that Congress, the courts, and the

public may determine whether the statutory criteria

have been faithfully observed. See Opp Cotton Mills,

Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941); Ben-

zene, supra, slip op. 2 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

III. THE SECRETARY CORRECTLY CONCLUDED

THAT THE COTTON DUST STANDARD IS ECO-

NOMICALLY FEASIBLE

Petitioners’ attack on the feasibility limitation as an

illusory and meaningless restraint on the agency’s au-

thority rests in large part on their faulting of the Sec-

retary’s economic feasibility analysis in this case. How-

ever, these essentially factual arguments were rejected

by the court of appeals, which concluded that substan-

tial evidence supported the Secretary’s determination that

the cotton dust standard would not threaten the indus-

try’s position as a viable, competitive economic entity

(Pet. App. 61-69). Although petitioner National Cotton

Council asks this Court to reconsider whether substan-

64

tial evidence supports the Secretary’s determination of

economic feasibility, it has not met its burden of showing

that the substantial evidence test was “misapprehended

or grossly misapplied” by the court of appeals. Golden

State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 172 (1973),

quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,

491 (1951).

Petitioners do not dispute that the Secretary had vo-

luminous information for his consideration in determin-

ing economic feasibility. Rat

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