Appendix — American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan
Supreme Court brief1981
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1979
Nos. “W9«14 29
AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS
INSTITUTE, INC., MILLIKEN & COMPANY,
ARKWRIGHT MILLS, SPARTAN MILLS, BLAIR
MILLS, INC., HERMITAGE, INC., DAN RIVER, INC.,
CONE MILLS CORPORATION, MAYFAIR MILLS,
SPRINGS MILLS, INC., RIEGEL TEXTILE
CORPORATION, FIELDCREST MILLS, INC., AND
WEST POINT-PEPPERELL, INC.,
Petitioners,
V.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
ROBERT H. Bork JOHN S. BATTLE, Jr.
142 Huntington Street ROBERT E. PAYNE
New Haven, Connecticut 06511 THOMAS W. MCCANDLISH
Counsel for American Textile McGuire, Woods & Battle
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. 1400 Ross Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219
GREGORY B. TOBIN Counsel for American Textile
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, SMOAK, 1 — Manufacturers Institute, Inc.
STEWART & EDWARDS and for
3920 First National Bank Tower Fieldcrest Mills, Inc.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Counsel for American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc.
(Counsel list continued on inside cover)
LL ELL TL TLL ELEY SEALER ELLIE LIAL ETE DEIR DLT NL NEL OLD ETE TTT ETE IEE ANE:
ROBERT T. THOMPSON
Gary S. KLEIN
Thompson, Mann & Hutson
The Daniel Building—Suite 2222
Greenville, S. C. 29602
Counsel for Milliken and
Company
THOMAS A. EVINS
CLYDE H. HAMILTON
Butler, Means, Evins & Browne
P. O. Box 451
Spartanburg, S. C. 29304
Counsel for Arkwright Mills
JOSEPH K. MApDpDOox, JR.
P. O. Box 5784
Spartanburg, S. C. 29304
Counsel for Spartan Mills
ROBERT T. THOMPSON
Gary S. KLEIN
Thompson, Mann & Hutson
The Daniel Building—Suite 2222
Greenville, S. C. 29602
Counsel for Blair Mills, Inc.
ROBERT T. THOMPSON
Gary S. KLEIN
Thompson, Mann & Hutson
The Daniel Building—Suite 2222
Greenville, S. C. 29602
Counsel for Hermitage, Inc.
ROGER L. TUTTLE
2291 Memorial Drive
Danville, Virginia 24541
Counsel for Dan River, Inc.
SAMUEL K. ABRAMS
BRIAN E. MORAN
Baker & Hostetler
1776 K Street, N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D. C. 20006
Counsel for Cone Mills
Corporation
H. J. ELAM, III
NEIL W. KOONCE
Cone Mills Corporation
1201 Maple Street
Greensboro, N. C. 27405
Counsel for Cone Mills
Corporation
THOMAS A. EvINS
CLYDE H. HAMILTON
Butler, Means, Evins & Browne
P. O. Box 451
Spartanburg, S. C. 29304
Counsel for Mayfair Mills
DAN M. Byrp, JR.
J. SPRATT WHITE
P. O. Box 70
Fort Mill, S. C. 29715
Counsel for Springs Mills, Inc.
FRED M. RICHARDSON
Lovic A. Brooks, Jr.
CHARLES A. EDWARDS
Constangy, Brooks & Smith
1900 Peachtree Center Building
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Counsel for Riegel Textile
Corporation
RICHARD H. MONK, JR.
C. POWERS DORSETT
West Point-Pepperell, Inc.
P. O. Box 71
West Point, Georgia 31833
Counsel for West Point-
Pepperell, Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Cotton Dust Standard (29 C.F.R. S EPEOD 6 ss bowwae 1
AFL-CIO v. Marshall and Cotton Warehouse Assoc. v.
Marshall, Nos. 78-1562, 78-1736 (D. DC, filed Oct. 29,
RP Pads CP WE 5 Ge ee ee 19
Order denying petitions for rehearing, filed Jan. 11, 1980...... 103
Order denying suggestions for rehearing en banc, filed Jan. 1 Be
IEG 5.6 6956 OUTROS MOK RIAA Os aed Cae 104
Order directing Clerk to issue mandate, filed Jan. 22, 1980.... 106
OSHA Exhibit 6, No. 18, “Byssinosis—A Study of 10,133
Textile Workers,” by Imbus and Suh ................... 108
OSHA Exhibit 42B, Supplemental Submission to Statement and
Testimony of Jack W. Whitworth, M.D. ................ 124
OSHA Exhibit 46, Statement of Charles F. Martin, M.D...... 126
OSHA Exhibit 2, Cotton Dust—Proposed Standards for
Exposure and Notice of Hearing, p. 56500 .............. 137
OSHA Exhibit 6, No. 76, Excerpts from Technological
Feasibility Assessment and Final Inflationary Impact
SI 5 i i ESE vine h tees ee eee ee 138
OSHA Exhibit 60, Statement of Hovan Hocutt, pp. 18-19,
FR BE isn oy sxe bss vase ae 152
OSHA Exhibit 62, Statement of Arthur Thomas, Attachment #1 155
OSHA Exhibit 42, Statement of Jack W. Whitworth, M.D... .. 157
OSHA Exhibit 47, Statement of Harold R. Imbus, M.D., SC.D. 172
OSHA Exhibit 63, Statement of John P. Figh .............. 188
| er rpm ins Aone ry 195
Hocutt Transcript pages 2488-89 ............ 0.0.0.0 c0eee 196
Hocutt Transcript pages 2514-15 ..........ccccssccevces 197
Pugh Tramsctigt pases ZaGG- TE. ek cc in cine benkenes 198
App. 1
CHAPTER XVII—OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
§ 1910.1043 Cotton dust.
(a) Scope and application. (1) This section applies to
the control of employee exposure to cotton dust in all work-
places, except as provided in paragraph (a) (2) of this sec-
tion.
(2) This section does not apply to: (i) The harvesting of
cotton; (ii) the ginning of cotton (Exposure to cotton dust
in cotton ginning is covered by § 1910.1046); (iii) mari-
time operations covered by 29 CFR Parts 1915, 1916,
1917, 1918; (iv) the handling or processing of woven or
knitted materials; and (v) the handling or processing of
washed cotton.
(3) This section provides mandatory requirements for
the control of employee exposure to cotton dust. The man-
datory nature of these requirements is not intended, how-
ever, to discourage or inhibit the development of different,
equally effective means of providing the required protection.
The variance provisions of section 6(d) of the Act, and
the implementing regulations in Part 1905 of this Title,
provide a mechanism for employers to obtain variances from
the provisions of this section where the employer has devel-
oped alternative procedures which are “as safe and healthful
as” those required by this section. As implemented by the
procedural regulations in Part 1905 of this Title, the vari-
ance provisions of the Act permit the flexibility which con-
tributes to efficient compliance with the standard, To aid in
the expeditious processing of variance applications, the
procedures allow, where appropriate, for the grant of interim
orders pending a decision on the merits of the variance as
well as for the consideration of variances applicable to
groups of employers. OSHA encourages interested em-
App. 2
ployers to utilize the variance provisions of the Act where
equally safe and healthful protective means are available.
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of this section:
“Assistant Secretary” means the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department
of Labor or designee;
“Blow down” means the cleaning of equipment and sur-
faces with compressed air.
“Cotton dust” means dust present in the air during the
handling or processing of cotton, which may contain a
mixture of many substances including ground up plant mat-
ter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, non-cotton plant
matter and other contaminants which may have accumulated
with the cotton during the growing, harvesting and subse-
quent processing or storage periods. Any dust present during
the handling and processing of cotton through the weaving
or knitting of fabrics, and dust present in other operations
or manufacturing processes using new or waste cotton fibers
or cotton fiber by-products from textile mills are considered
cotton dust.
“Director” means the Director of the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), U.S. De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, or designee;
“Lint-free respirable cotton dust” means particles of cot-
ton dust of approximately 15 microns or less aerodynamic
equivalent diameter;
“Vertical elutriator cotton dust sampler” means a dust
sampler which has a particle size cut-off at approximately
15 microns aerodynamic equivalent diameter when operat-
ing at the flow rate of 7.4+0.2 liters per minute;
“Yarn manufacturing” means all textile mill operations
from opening to, but not including, slashing and weaving;
“Washed cotton” means cotton which has been thoroughly
washed in hot water and is known in the cotton textile trade
App. 3
as purified or dyed. Washed cotton does not include steamed,
autoclaved cotton or cotton washed solely in solvents.
(c) Permissible exposure limits. (1) the employer shall
assure that no employee who is exposed to cotton dust in
yarn manufacturing is exposed to airborne concentrations
of lint-free respirable cotton dust greater than 200 ug/m’
mean concentration, averaged over an eight-hour period, as
measured by a vertical elutriator or a method of equivalent
accuracy and precision.
(2) The employer shall assure that no employee who is
exposed to cotton dust in the textile processes known as
slashing and weaving is exposed to airborne concentrations
of lint-free respirable cotton dust greater than 750 ug/m’
mean concentration, averaged over an eight hour period, as
measured by a vertical elutriator or a method of equivalent
accuracy and precision.
(3) The employer shall assure that no employee who is
exposed to cotton dust (except for exposures in yarn manu-
facturing and slashing and weaving covered by paragraphs
(c)(1) and (c)(2) of this section is exposed to airborne
concentrations of lint-free respirable cotton dust greater
than 500 ug/m* mean concentration, averaged over an eight-
hour period, as measured by a vertical elutriator or a method
of equivalent accuracy and precision.
(d) Exposure monitoring and measurement—(1) Gen-
eral. (i) For the purposes of this section, employee exposure
is that exposure which would occur if the employee were not
using a respirator.
(ii) ) The sampling device to be used shall be either the
vertical elutriator cotton dust sampler or a method of equiva-
lent accuracy and precision.
(iii) If an alternative to the vertical elutriator cotton
dust sampler is used, the employer shall establish equiva-
lency by demonstrating that the alternative sampling
App. 4
devices;
(a) Collect respirable particulates in the same range as
the vertical elutriator (approximately 15 microns) ;
(b) Replicate exposure data in side-by-side field com-
parisons; and
(c) Are equivalent within an accuracy and precision
range of plus or minus 25 percent for 95 percent of the
samples over the range of 0.5 to 2 times the permissible ex-
posure limit.
(2) Initial monitoring. Each employer who has a place
of employment in which cotton dust is present, shall conduct
monitoring by obtaining measurements which are representa-
tive of the exposure of all employees to airborne concentra-
tions of lint-free respirable cotton dust over an eight-hour
period. The sampling program shall include at least one
determination during each shift for each work area.
(3) Periodic monitoring. (i) The employer shall repeat
the measurements required by paragraph (d)(2) of this
section at least every six months.
ii) Whenever there has been a production, process, or
control change which may result in new or additional ex-
posure to cotton dust, or whenever the employer has any
other reason to suspect an increase in employee exposure,
the employer shall repeat the monitoring and measurements
required by paragraph (d)(2) of this section for those em-
ployees affected by the change or increase.
(4) Employee notification. (i) Within five working days
after the receipt of monitoring results, the employer shall
notify each employee in writing of the exposure measure-
ments which represent that employee’s exposure.
(ii) Whenever the results indicate that the employee’s
exposure exceeds the applicable permissible exposure limit
specified in paragraph (c) of this section, the employer
shall include in the written notice a statement that the per-
App. 5
missible exposure limit was exceeded and a description of
the corrective action taken to reduce exposure below the
permissible exposure limit.
(e€) Methods of compliance—(1) Engineering and work
practice controls. The employer shall institute engineering
and work practice controls to reduce and maintain employee
exposure to cotton dust at or below the permissible ex-
posure limit specified in paragraph (c) of this section, ex-
cept to the extent that the employer establishes that such
controls are not feasible.
(2) Whenever feasible engineering and work practice
controls are not sufficient to reduce employee exposure to
or below the permissible exposure limit, the employer shall
nonetheless institute these controls to immediately reduce
exposure to the lowest feasible level, and shall supplement
these controls with the use of respirators which shall comply
with the provisions of paragraph (f) of this section.
(3) Compliance program. (i) Each employer shall
establish and implement a written program sufficient to
reduce exposures to or below the permissible exposure limit
solely by means of engineering controls and work practices
as required by paragraph (e) (1) of this section.
(ii) The written program shall include at least the fol-
lowing:
(a) A description of each operation or process resulting
in employee exposure to cotton dust;
(6) Engineering plans and other studies used to deter-
mine the controls for each process;
(c) A report of the technology considered in meeting the
permissible exposure limit;
(d) Monitoring data obtained in accordance with para-
graph (d) of this section;
(e) A detailed schedule for development and implemen-
tation of engineering and work practice controls, including
App. 6
exposure levels projected to be achieved by such controls;
(f) Work practice program; and
(g) Other relevant information.
(iii) The employer’s schedule as set forth in the compli-
ance program, shal! project completion of the compliance
program no later than September 4, 1982,
(iv) The employer shall complete the Steps set forth in
his program by the dates in the schedule.
(v) Written programs shall be submitted, upon request,
to the Assistant Secretary and the Director, and shall be
available at the worksite for examination and copying by
the Assistant Secretary, the Director, and any affected em-
ployee or their designated representatives.
(vi) The written programs required under paragraph
(e€)(3) of this section shall be revised and updated at least
every six months to reflect the current status of the program
and current exposure levels.
(4) Mechanical ventilation. When mechanical ventila-
tion is used to control exposure, measurements which dem-
onstrate the effectiveness of the system to control exposure,
‘such as capture velocity, duct velocity, or static pressure
shall be made at least every six months. Measurements of
the system’s effectiveness to control exposures shall also
be made within five days of any change in production, proc-
ess or control which may result in any increase in airborne
concentrations of cotton dust.
(f) Use of respirators—(1) General. Where the use of
respirators is required under this section, the employer shall
provide, at no cost to the employee, and assure the use of
respirators which comply with the requirements of this para-
graph (f). Respirators shall be used in the following circum-
stances:
(i) During the time periods necessary to install or imple-
ment feasible engineering controls and work practice con-
trols;
App. 7
(ii) During maintenance and repair activities in which
engineering and work practice controls are not feasible;
(ili) In work situations where feasible engineering and
work practice controls are not yet sufficient to reduce ex-
posure to or below the permissible exposure limit; and
' (iv) In operations specified under paragraph (g) (1).
(v) Whenever an employee requests a respirator.
(2) Respirator selection. (i) Where respirators are re-
quired under this section, the employer shall select the ap-
propriate respirator from Table 1 below and shall assure
that the employee uses the respirator provided.
TABLE I
Cotton dust
concentration Required respirator
Not greater than—
(a) 5 X the applicable 1. Any dust respirator, including
permissible exposure single use.
limit.
(b) 10 X the applicable 1. Any dust respirator, except sin-
permissible exposure gle use or quarter mask; or
limit. 2. Any supplied air respirator; or
3. Any self-contained breathing ap-
paratus.
(c) 100 X the applicable 1. High efficiency particulate filter
permissible exposure respirator with a full facepiece;
limit. or nt
2. Any supplied air respirator with
full-facepiece, helmet or hood; or
3. Any self-contained breathing ap-
paratus with full-facepiece.
(d) Greater than 100 X the 1. A powered air-purifying respira-
applicable permissible tor with high efficiency particu-
exposure limit. late filter; or
2. A self-contained breathing ap-
paratus with a full-facepiece op-
App. 8
Cotton dust
concentration Required respirator
erated in pressure demand or
other positive pressure mode; or
3. A type “C” supplied air respira-
tor operated in pressure demand
or other positive pressure mode;
or
4. A combination respirator which
includes a type C supplied-air
respirator with a full-facepiece
operated in pressure or continu-
ous-flow mode and an auxiliary
self-contained breathing appar-
atus operated in pressure demand
or other positive pressure mode.
(ii) The employer shall select respirators from those
tested and approved for protection against dust by the Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) under the provisions of 30 CFR Part 11.
(iii) Whenever respirators are required by this section
for concentrations not greater than 5 x the applicable per-
missible exposure limit, the employer shall provide and
permit the employee to use, at the employee’s option, single
use dust respirator in preference to any respirator specified
in paragraph (a) of Table 1.
(iv) Whenever respirators are required by this section for
concentrations not greater than 100 x the applicable permis-
sible exposure limit, the employer shall, upon the request of
the employee, provide a powered air purifying respirator
with a high efficiency particulate filter in lieu of the respira-
tor specified in paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of Table I.
(v) Whenever a physician determines that an employee
is unable to wear any form of respirator, including a power
App. 9
air purifying respirator, the employee shall be given the
opportunity to transfer to another position which is available
or which later becomes available having a dust level at or
below the PEL. The employer shall assure than an employee
who is transferred due to an inability to wear a respirator
suffers no loss of earnings or other employment rights or
benefits as a result of the transfer.
(vi) Until March 4, 1979, the employer shall provide
any dust respirator, including single use, to all employees
exposed to cotton dust, unless the employer has conducted
the monitoring required by paragraph (d) (2) of this section
or otherwise has monitored employee exposure. As soon
as monitoring has been conducted, the employer shall select
the appropirate respirator from Table I.
(3) Respirator program, The employer shall institute a
respirator program in accordance with § 1910.134 (b),
(d), (e), and (f) of this part.
(4) Respirator usage. (i) The employer shall assure that
the respirator used by each employee exhibits minimum face-
piece leakage and that the respirator is fitted properly.
(ii) The employer shall allow each employee who uses a
filter respirator, to change the filter elements whenever an
increase in breathing resistance is detected by the employee.
The employer shall maintain an adequate supply of filter ele-
ments for this purpose.
(iii) The employer shall allow employees who wear
respirators to wash their faces and respirator face pieces
to prevent skin irritation associated with respirator use.
(g) Work practices. Each employer shall, regardless of
the level of employee exposure, immediately establish and
implement a written program of work practices, which shall
minimize cotton dust exposure for each specific job. Where
applicable, the following work practices shall be included
in the work practices program:
App. 10
(1) Compressed air “blow down” cleaning shall be pro-
hibited, where alternative means are feasible. Where com-
pressed air “blow down” is done, zespirators shall be worn
by the employees performing the “blow down”, and employ-
ees in the area whose presence is not required to perform
the “blow down” shall be required to leave the area during
this cleaning operation.
(2) Cleaning of clothing or floors with compressed air
shall be prohibited.
(3) Floor sweeping shall be performed with a vacuum
or with methods designed to minimize dispersal of dust.
(4) Cotton and cotton waste shall be stacked, sorted,
baled, dumped, removed or otherwise handled by mechani-
cal means, except where the employer can show that it is
infeasible to do so. Where infeasible, the method used for
handling cotton and cotton waste shall be the method which
reduces exposure to the lowest level feasible.
(5) The employer shall inspect, clean, maintain, and re-
pair, all engineering control equipment and ventilation
systems including power sources, ducts, and filtration units
of the equipment.
(h) Medical surveillance—(1) General. (i) Each em-
ployer who has a place of employment in which cotton dust
is present shall institute a program of medical surveillance
for all employees exposed to cotton dust.
(ii) The employer shall assure that all medical examina-
tions and procedures are performed by or under the super-
vision of a licensed physician and are provided without cost
to the employee.
(ili) Persons other than licensed physicians, who ad-
minister the pulmonary function testing required by this sec-
tion shall complete a NIOSH approved training course in
spirometry.
App. 11
(2) Initial examinations. The employer shall provide
each employee who is or may be exposed to cotton dust
with an opportunity for medical surveillance. For new em-
ployees this examination shall be provided prior to initial
assignment. The medical surveillance shall include at least
the following:
(i) A medical history;
(ii) The standardized questionnaire contained in Appen-
dix B; and
(iii) A pulmonary function measurement, including a
determination of forced vital capacity (FVC) and ferced
expiratory volume in 1 second (FEV:), and the percentage
that the measured values of FEV and FVC differ from the
predicted values, using the standard tables in Appendix C.
The predicted FEV: and FVC for blacks shall be multiplied
by 0.85 to adjust for ethnic differences.
These determinations shall be made for each employee
before the employee enters the workplace on the first day of
the work week, following at least 35 hours after previous
exposure to cotton dust. The tests shall be repeated during
the shift, no sooner than 4 and no more than 10 hours after
the beginning of the work shift; and, in any event, no more
than one hour after cessation of exposure.
(iv) Based upon the questionnaire results, each em-
ployee shall be graded according to Schilling’s byssinosis
classification system.
(3) Periodic examinations. (i) The employer shall pro-
vide annual medical surveillance for all employees exposed
to cotton dust which shall include at least an update of the
medical history and standardized questionnaire (the ab-
breviated questionnaire, App. B-III) and the pulmonary
function measurements in paragraph (h)(2) of this sec-
tion.
(ii) Medical surveillance as required in paragraph (h)
App. 12
(3) (i) of this section shall be provided every six months for
all employees in the following categories:
(a) An FEV: of greater than 80 percent of the predicted
value, but with an FEV: decrement of 5 percent or 200 ml.
on a first working day;
(b) An FEV: of less than 80 percent of the predicted
value; or
(c) Where, in the opinion of the physician, any signifi-
cant change in questionnaire findings, pulmonary function
results, or other diagnostic tests has occurred,
(ii) An employee whose FEV: is less than 60 percent of
the predicted value shall be referred to a physician for a
detailed pulmonary examination.
(iv) A comparison shall be made between the current
examination results and those of previous examinations and
a determination made by the physician as to whether there
has been a significant change.
(4) Information provided to the physician. The em-
ployer shall provide the following information to the ex-
amining physician:
(i) A copy of this regulation and its Appendices;
(ii) A description of the affected employee’s duties as
they relate to the employee’s exposure;
(iii) The employee’s exposure level or anticipated ex-
posure level;
(iv) A description of any personal protective equipment
used or to be used; and
(v) Information from previous medical examinations of
the affected employee which is not readily available to the
examining physician.
(5) Physician’s written opinion.
(i) The employer shall obtain and furnish the employee
App. 13
with a copy of a written opinion from the examining phy-
sician containing the following:
(a) The results of the medical examination and tests;
(b) The physician’s opinion as to whether the employee
has any detected medical conditions which would place the
employee at increased risk of material impairment of the
employee’s health from exposure to cotton dust;
(c) The physician’s recommended limitations upon the
employee’s exposure to cotton dust or upon the employee’s
use of respirators including a determination of whether an
employee can wear a negative pressure respirator, and
where the employee cannot, a determination of the em-
ployee’s ability to wear a powered air purifying respirator;
and
(d) A statement that the employee has been informed
by the physician of the results of the medical examination
and any medical conditions which require further examina-
tion or treatment.
(ii) The written opinion obtained by the employer shall
not reveal specific findings or diagnoses unrelated to occu-
pational exposure.
(i) Employee education and training — (1) Training
program. (i) The employer shall provide a training program
for all employees in all workplaces where cotton dust is
present, and shall assure that each employee in these work-
places is informed of the following:
(a) The specific nature of the operations which could
result in exposure to cotton dust at or above the permissible
exposure limit;
(b) The measures, including work practices required by
paragraph (g) of this section, necessary to protect the em-
ployee from exposures in excess of the permissible exposure
limit;
App. 14
(c) The purpose, proper use and limitations of respira-
tors required by paragraph (f) of this section;
(d) The purpose for and a description of the medical
surveillance program required by paragraph (h) of this
section and other information which will aid exposed em-
ployees in understanding the hazards of cotton dust ex-
posure; and
(e) The contents of this standard and its appendices.
(ii) The training program shall be provided prior to
initial assignment and shall be repeated at least annually.
(2) Access to training materials. (i) Each employer
shall post a copy of this section with its appendices in a
public location at the workplace, and shall, upon request,
make copies available to employees.
(ii) The employer shall provide all materials relating to
the employee training and information program to the As-
sistant Secretary and the Director upon request.
(iii) In addition to the information required by para-
graph (i)(1) of this section, the employer shall include as
part of the training program, and shall distribute to em-
ployees, any materials, pertaining to the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, the regulations issued pursuant to that Act,
and this cotton dust standard, which are made available to
the employer by the Assistant Secretary.
(j) Signs. The employer shall post the following warn-
ing sign in each work area where the permissible exposure
limit for cotton dust is exceeded:
WARNING
COTTON DUST WORK AREA
MAY CAUSE ACUTE OR DELAYED LUNG INJURY
( BYSSINOSIS )
RESPIRATORS
REQUIRED IN THIS AREA
App. 15
(k) Recordkeeping—(1) Exposure measurements. (i)
The employer shall establish and maintain an accurate
record of all measurements required by paragraph (d) of
this section.
(ii) The record shall include: (a) A log containing the
items listed in paragraph IV (a) of Appendix A, and the
dates, number, duration, and results of each of the samples
taken, including a description of the procedure used to de-
termine representative employee exposures;
(b) The type of protective devices worn, if any, and
length of time worn; and |
(c) The names, social security numbers, job classifica-
tions, and exposure levels of employees whose exposure the
measurement is intended to represent.
(iii) The employer shall maintain this record for at least
20 years.
(2) Medical surveillance. (i) The employer shall estab-
lish and maintain an accurate medical record for each em-
ployee subject to medical surveillance required by paragraph
(h) of this section.
(ii) The record shall include:
(a) The name and social security number and description
of the duties of the employee;
(b) A copy of the medical examination results including
the medical history, questionnaire responses, results of all
tests, and the physician’s recommendation;
(c) Acopy of the physician’s written opinion;
(d) Any employee medical complaints related to expo-
sure to cotton dust;
(e) A copy of this standard and its appendices, except
that the employer may keep one copy of the standard and
the appendices for all employees, provided that he references
App. 16
the standard and appendices in the medical surveillance
record of each employee; and
(f) A copy of the information provided to the physician
as required by paragraph (h) (4) of this section.
(iii) The employer shall maintain this record for at least
20 years.
(3) Availability. (i) The employer shall make all rec-
ords required to be maintained by paragraph (k) of this
section available to the Assistant Secretary and the Director
for examination and copying.
(ii) The employer shall make employee exposure mea-
surement records required by this section available to
affected employees or their designated representatives for
examination and copying.
(iii) The employer shall make all records indicating a
former employee’s own exposure to cotton dust available
to the former employee or his designated representative for
examination and copying.
(iv) The employer shall make an employee’s medical
records required to be maintained by this section, available
to the affected employee or former employee or to a phy-
sician or other individual designated by such affected em-
ployee or former employees, for examination and copying.
(4) Transfer of records, (i) Whenever the employer
ceases to do business, the successor employer shall receive
and retain all records required to be maintained by para-
graph (k) of this section.
(ii) Whenever the employer ceases to do business, and
there is no successor employer to receive and retain the
records for the prescribed period, these records shall be
transmitted to the Director.
(iii) At the expiration of the retention period for the
records required to be maintained by this section, the em-
App. 17
ployer shall notify the Director at least 3 months prior to the
disposal of such records and shall transmit those records
to the Director if he requests them within that period.
(1) Observation of monitoring. (1) The employer shall
provide affected employees or their designated representa-
tives.an opportunity to observe any measuring or monitoring
of employee exposure to cotton dust conducted pursuant to
paragraph (d) of this section.
(2) Whenever observation of the measuring or monitor-
ing of employee exposure to cotton dust requires entry into
an area where the use of personal protective equipment is re-
quired, the employer shall provide the observer with and
assure the use of such equipment and shall require the ob-
server to comply with all other applicable safety and health
procedures.
(3) Without interfering with the measurement, observers
shall be entitled to:
(i) An explanation of the measurement procedures;
(ii) An opportunity to observe all steps related to the
measurement of airborne concentrations of cotton dust per-
formed at the place of exposure; and
(iii) An opportunity to record the results obtained.
(m) Effective date—(1) General. This section is effec-
tive September 4, 1978, except as otherwise provided below.
(2) Startup dates. (i) Initial monitoring. The initial
monitoring required by paragraph (d)(2) of this section
shall be completed as soon as possible but no later than
March 4, 1979.
(ii) Methods of compliance: Engineering and work prac-
tice controls. The engineering and work practice controls
required by paragraph (e) of this section shall be imple-
mented no later than September 4, 1982.
(iii) Compliance program. The compliance program re-
App. 18
quired by paragraph (e)(3) of this section shall be estab-
lished no later than September 4, 1979.
(iv) Respirators. The respirators required by paragraph
(f) of this section shall be provided no later than October
4, 1978. Until March 4, 1979, the provisions of paragraph
(£) (2) (vi) apply.
(v) Work practices. The work practices required by
paragraph (g) of this section shall be implemented no later
than December 4, 1978.
(vi) Medical surveillance. The medical surveillance re-
quired by paragraph (h) of this section shall be completed
no later than September 4, 1979.
(vii) Employee education and training. The initial edu-
cation and training required by paragraph (i) of this sec-
tion shall be completed as soon as possible but no later than
December 4, 1978.
(n) Appendices. (i) Appendices B, C, and D to this
section are incorporated as part of this section and the
contents of these appendices are mandatory.
(ii) Appendix A contains information which is not in-
tended to create any additional obligations not otherwise im-
posed or to detract from any existing obligations.
19
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested .
to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the bound volumes go to press.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 78-1562
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR & CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, e¢ al., PETITIONERS
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.,
RESPONDENTS
No. 78-1786
COTTON WAREHOUSE ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The
court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time.
20
No. 78-1979
AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,
PETITIONER
Vv.
Dr. EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF IN-
DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS; INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPART-
MENT, AFL-CIO; AND AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, CLC, INTERVENORS
No. 78-1980
AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,
PETITIONER
Vv.
Dr. EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
AFL-CIO, ETC., INTERVENORS
21
No. 78-1981
AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC.,
PETITIONER
Vv.
Dr. EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
AFL-CIO, ETC., INTERVENORS
No. 78-1982
MILLIKEN AND COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
Dr. EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR,
RESPONDENTS
No. 78-1983
ARKWRIGHT MILLS, PETITIONER
Vv.
F. RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, RESPONDENTS
22
No. 78-1984
SPARTAN MILLS, PETITIONER
Vv.
F. RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
4 FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, RESPONDENTS
No. 78-1986
BLAIR MILLS, INC., PETITIONER
v.
F. RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, RESPONDENTS
No. 78-1987
HERMITAGE, INC., PETITIONER
v.
F. RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, RESPONDENTS
23
No. 78-1988
DAN RIVER, INC., PETITIONER
v.
Dr. EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
No. 78-1989
CONE MILLS CORPORATION, PETITIONER
v.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
No. 78-1990
MAYFAIR MILLS, PETITIONER
V.
F. RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, RESPONDENTS
24
No. 78-1991
SPRINGS MILLS, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Dr. EULA BINGHAM, ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPART-
‘MENT OF LABOR AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF L.A29R, RESPONDENTS
No. 78-1992
RIEGEL TEXTILE CORPORATION, PETITIONER
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, RESPONDENTS ¢
No. 78-1993
FIELDCREST MILLS, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
F. RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND DR. EULA
BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR OC-
CUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, AND THE OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
=
No. 78-2013
AMERICAN COTTON SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER
Vv.
Dr. EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
No. 78-2014
NATIONAL COTTONSEED PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION,
PETITIONER
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EULA BINGHAM, ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, RESPONDENTS
No. 78-2016
NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, EULA BINGHAM,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR, RESPONDENTS
26
No. 78-2018
WEST POINT-PEPPERELL, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
RAY MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EULA BINGHAM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR,
RESPONDENTS
this date
<—
Argued February 14, ly Judgment entered
Decided October 24, 1979
|
George H. Cohen with whom Robert M. Weinberg,
Jeremiah A. Collins, David M. Silberman, Laurence Gold,
Judith Kincaid, J. Albert Woll, Elliot Bredhoff and
Arthur M. Goldberg were on the brief, for AFL-CIO,
et al. petitioner in No. 78-1562, and intervenors in Nos.
78-1979, 78-1980 and 78-1981.
Robert E. Payne with whom John S. Battle, Jr.,
Gregory B. Tobin, Edward W. Warren and Arthur F.
Sampson III were on the brief, for petitioners American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al. in Nos. 78-
_ 1562, 78-1979, 78-1980, 78-1981 and 78-1993.
Harlan H. Huntley and Roger L. Tuttle were on the
brief, for petitioner Dan River, Inc. in No. 78-1988.
Robert T. Thompson with whom Gary S. Klein was
on the brief, for petitioner Milliken and Company in
Nos. 78-1982, 78-1986 and 78-1987.
Samuel K. Abrams and Brian E. Moran were on the
brief, for petitioner Cone Mills Corp. in No. 78-1989.
27
Before BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, and TAMM and
ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
BAZELON.
BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge: These consolidated
petitions’ for review challenge a new permanent health
standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust,?
which was promulgated by regulation on June 19, 1978
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
of the Department of Labor (OSHA), under section 6(b)
(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(the Act).* OSHA’s action, which rests on its determi-
nation that occupational exposure to cotton dust pre-
sents a material health hazard to workers, is attacked by
1 Petitions in addition to those on review here, see notes
4-6, infra, were filed by representatives of the cotton waste
processing industries and users of cotton batting: the Na-
tional Association of Bedding Manufacturers (No. 78-1784) ;
the National Association of Furniture Manufacturers (No.
78-1796) ; the Textile Fibers and By-Products Association
(No. 78-1985) ; the National Cotton Batting Institute (No.
78-2015) ; and, the Wolf Corporation (No. 78-2017). These
petitioners were severed from this case on November 1, 1978,
when OSHA suspended application of the standard to these
industries. See 48 Fed. Reg. 88087 (1978) ; 44 Fed. Reg. 5488
(1979).
* Standard for Occupational Exposure to Cotton Dust, 43
Fed. Reg. 27850-99 (June 19, 1978), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg.
28478-74 (June 30, 1978), 48 Fed. Reg. 35032-8385 (August 8,
1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 56893-94 (December 5, 1978) [herein-
after “the standard’’].
°83 Stat. 1594, 29 U.S.C. §655(b) (1976). The Secretary
of Labor delegated his authority to promulgate occupational
safety and health standards under 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976) to
the Assistant Secretary of Labor of Occupational Safety and
Health (“the Secretary”), who is the chief executive officer
of OSHA. References in this opinion to “the Secretary” and
“OSHA” are used interchangeably.
28
three groups of petitioners: (1) representatives of the
cotton textile industry* and (2) nontextile industries °
who claim that the standard is unwarranted and in-
feasible; and (3) their employee unions, who attack two
provisions of the standard as too lax, but support the
rest.° These very divergent claims reflect the wide va-
riety of conflicting interests that make OSHA’s task a
difficult one. On direct review,’ we uphold the standard
except for its application to the cottonseed oil industry
which we remand for clarification or reconsideration.
To assist a proper understanding of the issues, we dis-
cuss (I) the history and context of the agency’s action;
(II) the nature of our review under the Act; (III) the
*The textile industry petitioners include the American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. (ATMI) (Nos. 78-1979,
78-1980, and 78-1981) and twelve individual companies en-
gaged in the manufacture of textiles from cotton: Milliken
and Company (No. 78-1982) ; Arkwright Mills (No. 78-1983) ;
Spartan Mills (No. 78-1984) ; Blair Mills, Inc. (No. 78-1986) ;
Hermitage, Inc. (No. 78-1987); Dan River, Inc. (No. 78-
1988) ; Cone Mills Corp. (No. 78-1989) ; Mayfair Mills (No.
78-1990) ; Springs Mills, Inc. (No. 78-1991) ; Riegel Textile
Corp. (No. 78-1992); Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. (No. 78-1993) ;
and West Point-Pepperell, Inc. (No. 78-2018).
®° The non-textile industries are represented by the National
Cottonseed Products Association (No. 78-2014), the Ameri-
can Cotton Shippers Association (No. 78-2018), and the
Cotton Warehouse Association (No. 78-1786). A petition also
was filed on behalf of the entire cotton industry of the Na-
tional Cotton Council of American (NCCA) (No. 78-2016).
*The employee unions are represented by the American
Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO), its Industrial Union Department, and their affili-
ate, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
(the unions) (No. 78-1562).
’ The Act permits any person adversely affected by a health
and safety standard to challenge its validity in the courts of
appeals. 29 U.S.C. §655(f) (1976).
29
claims of the textile industry; (IV) the claims of the
non-textile industries; and (V) challenges to a few tech-
nical provisions of the standard.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Health Risks
Health impairments associated with exposure to cot-
ton dust range from acute but reversible reactions to
irreversible, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.* Cot-
ton dust exposure can produce or aggravate respiratory
symptoms characteristic of chronic bronchitis, asthma,
and emphysema.’ Further, a specific, debilitating disease
has been conclusively attributed to the effect of cotton
dust on the respiratory passages. This disease, named
byssinosis, is more commonly known in its chronic stage
as “brown lung disease.” *® This is the most serious
health hazard for cotton workers.
Although the prevalence of the disease among cotton
workers has been known for centuries," its exact etiology
°43 Fed. Reg. 27352, 87354 (1978).
* 41 Fed. Reg. 56500 (1976) ; 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-54 (1978).
1° OSHA observed that “byssinosis represents a constella-
tion of respiratory effects.” 48 Fed. Reg. 27853 (1978)
(citations omitted).
In 1705, the Italian Bernardino Ramazzi wrote that
those who hackle in the flax and hemp to prepare it for
being spun and wove, afford frequent instances of the
unwholesomeness of their trade; for there flies out of
this matter a foul mischeivous powder, that entering the
lungs by the mouth and throat, causes continual coughs
and gradually makes way for an asthma... . But in the
long run if they find their affliction grows upon them
they must look out for another trade; for ‘tis a sordid
profit that’s accompanied with the destruction of health.
B. RAMAZZINI, A TREATISE OF THE DISEASES OF TRADESMEN
(London, 1705) (quoted in J. Merchant, Epidemological
30
is still not completely understood."? The subjective nature
of many early symptoms" and variations in the com-
position of cotton dust’* have compounded the uncer-
Studies of Respiratory Disease Among Cotton Textile Work-
ers: 1970-1973 at 1 (1973), Joint Appendix (J.A.) (1497).
See also 41 Fed. Reg. 56500 (1976).
2 B.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 27352 (1978); Bouhuys, Breathing
Physiology, Environment and Lung, Disease, 418-25 9, J.A.
288-95.
183A major technique for diagnosing byssinosis is to ask
individuals about their symptoms. A. Bouhuys, Byssinosis in
the United States, 14-15, J.A. 280-81; S. Roach & R. Schilling,
A Clinical and Environmental Study of Byssinosis in the
Lancashire Cotton Industry, 17 Brit. J. INDUS. MED. 1-8
(1959), J.A. 201-203. Workers who fear losing their jobs
upon signs of ill-health or whose language facilities impair
their ability to answer questions about their symptoms may
not accurately report their health impairments.
Other workers may experience severe symptoms and yet
not be diagnosed with the disease. Compare, e.g., J.A. 2120
(testimony of Eva Bradshaw) (“Along about 5 or 10 years
before I had to come out of the mill my chest would get so
tight it felt just like an accordian that had closed down, like
it was squeezed shut as tight as it would go. I coughed all
the time, especially at work.”) with J.A. 2057-58 (supple-
mental submission of Harola Imbus of Burlington Industries)
(asserting that physicians did not diagnose Eva Bradshaw
with byssinosis).
14 The composition of cotton dust varies in different indus-
tries, plants, and stages of manufacturing. NIOSH, Criteria
for a Recommended Standard: Occupational Exposure to
Cotton Dust 86-90 (1974), J.A. 98-102. NIOSH noted that
recent epidemological and expimental evidence suggests that
the substances causing byssinosis is some unknown bio-
logically active material carried with the inorganic dust into
the lungs of exposed workers. Jd. at 96, J.A. at 108. But
NIOSH concluded that insufficient information is available to
support this theory. Jd. accord., J.A. 1216-17 (comments of
A. Bouhuys).
[Continued]
31
tainties about the actual way in which cotton dust ex-
posure causes serious health impairments. Nonetheless,
its progressively disabling symptoms are well docu-
mented.**®
Typically, a person suffering from byssinosis is ini-
tially affected by irritated air passages, coughing, breath-
lessness, and chest tightness. These symptoms are often
accompanied by decreased pulmonary functioning, evi-
denced by objective indicators. At first the symptoms
tend to last briefly, and usually remit a few days after
exposure. The symptoms recur, however, whenever an
affected individual returns to a dusty environment.
i i Sao
14 [Continued]
Therefore, OSHA applied its standard to a broad defini-
tion of cotton dust. 43 Fed. Reg. 273854. See id. at 27395, (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. 1910.1048(b) ):
“Cotton dust” means dust present in the air during the
handling or processing of cotton, which may contain
a mixture of many substances, including ground up
plant matter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, non-
cotton plant matter and other contaminants which may
have accumulated with the cotton during the growing,
harvesting and subsequent processing or storage periods.
Any dust present during the handling and processing of
cotton through the weaving or knitting of fabrics, and
dust present in other operations or manufacturing
processes using new or waste cotton fibers or cotton fiber
by-products from textile mills are considered cotton
dust.
15 F.g., J.A. 1214 (statement of A. Bouhuys); J.A. 317
(Hygiene Standards for Cotton Dust, British Occupational
Hygiene Society Committee on Hygiene Standards); J.A.
339 (R. Schilling, Byssinosis in Cotton and Other Textile
Workers). See 43 Fed. Reg. 27355 (citing more studies).
16 NIOSH, Criteria for a Recommended Standard: Occupa-
tional Exposure to Cotton Dust 238-86 (1974), J.A. 38-46
(citing studies); R. Nader, The Cotton-Mill Killer, THE
NATION (March 15, 1971), J.A. 2485. The description of the
disease that follows in text relies on these reports.
32
As the disease progresses, its symptoms become more
pronounced and painful, resembling the effects of bron-
chitis and asthma. They persist throughout the work
week, or period of exposure. During this stage, an af-
fected worker may become temporarily incapacitated and
may need to take short but frequent leaves from work.
When byssinosis reaches its advanced stage, the worker
exhibits the symptoms of emphysema and chronic bron-
chitis. Ultimately, irreversible lung damage results. A
worker afflicted with chronic byssinosis is forced into
premature retirement, often after painful efforts to re-
main on the job. Such individuals must give up all
activities that require any physical exertion. The perma-
nent lung damage caused by byssinosis makes every
breath painful and difficult. The excess strain these
breathing difficulties place on the heart often leads to
the worker’s early death from heart failure.
The actual number of persons afflicted with byssinosis
is not certain, but it is large. One study estimated that
35,000 people have “disabling loss of lung function re-
lated to their work in the cotton textile industry” alone.’
The Senate Report on the Occupational Safety and Health
Act stated that as many as 100,000 active or retired
workers suffered from the disease in 1970.'*
Studies in the record estimate that 250,000 to 800,000
workers are exposed daily to cotton dust and its attend-
17 J.A. 1214 (statement of A. Bouhuys) ; see A. Bouhuys,
et. al, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cotton Mill
Community, J.A. 3165.
18 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970), reprinted in S. REP. No.
91-1282, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT oF 1970, at 148 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as LEGIs. HIST.].
33
it risks.* As the reported incidence of the disease
sually ranges as high as 20-30% of the work force in
cotton industries,” each worker faces a substantial risk
of health impairment.”* |
B. History of Cotton Dust Regulation
Prior to the creation of OSHA, a private association
of governmental industrial hygienists placed cotton dust
on its tentative list of substances for which specific ex-
posure limits should be established.” In 1966 this organ-
ization adopted a “threshold limit value” of 1000 micro-
grams per cubic meter (1000 »g/m*) of total dust.”
The federal government first regulated cotton dust in
1968. At that time, the Secretary of Labor, acting pur-
suant to the Walsh-Healey Act,* promulgated a 1000
»g/m* maximum total dust exposure as an occupational
health requirement for public contractors.”
1° R. NADER, supra note 16, J.A. 2435 (estimating 250,000
textile workers exposed) ; Statement of Sidney M. Wolfe and
Peter Greene, Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, J.A.
3137 (estimating 800,000 cotton © orkers exposed).
» See, €.g., J.A. 230 (20%-80% of people in carding rooms
of textile mills affected with byssinosis) (A. Bouhuys,
Byssinosis in the United States) ; J.A. 241 (20% of workings
in preparation area of textile plant exhibit byssinosis symp-
toms) (J. Merchant, et. al., Byssinosis and Chronic Bronchitis
Among Cotton Textile Workers).
*1 The actual risk may vary according to the nature of
the cotton dust and the extent of an individual’s exposure.
7243 Fed. Reg. 27851 (1978) (describing American Con-
ference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists) .
28 Jd.
441 U.S.C. § 85(e) (1976). See 48 Fed. Reg. 27351 (1978).
25 The 1000 ,.g/m* total dust standard was based on a study
that was published in 1960. Conducted by Roach and Schil-
ling, the study examined cotton mills in Lancaster England.
This study is reprinted in the Joint Appendix (J.A. at 201.
34
This was an interim standard adopted upon passage
of the Act in 1970 in which section 6(a) required the
Secretary immediately to promulgate as occupational
safety or health standards all existing “established Fed-
eral Standards,” including the 1000 »g/m* standard for
cotton exposure.** These interim standards were intended
to afford workers minimal protection until the adoption
of permanent standards through OSHA’s rulemaking
proceedings.
On September 26, 1974, the Director of the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)2"
submitted to the Secretary of Labor a set of recommenda-
tions for regulating cotton dust. NIOSH recommended 2*
7629 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). See also 29 U.S.C. § 652(10)
(1976). Congressional concern over delays in regulating
cotton dust was manifest in the legislative history of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
“despite repeated warning over the years from other
countries that their cotton workers suffered from lung
disease, it is only within the past decade that we have
recognized byssinosis as a distinct occupational disease
among workers in American cotton mills.” S. REP. No.
91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1971), reprinted in
LEGIS. HIST. 148.
2729 U.S.C. § 671 (1976), establishes NIOSH within the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as a national
institute to “develop . . . recommended occupational safety
and health standards.” NIOSH’s director is authorized, on
his own initiative or at the request of the Secretary of Labor
or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
to conduct such research and experimental programs as
he determines are necessary for the development of
criteria for new and improved occupational safety and
health standards [.}
29 U.S.C. § 671(d) (1).
28 Criteria Document: Recommendations for an Occupa-
tional Exposure Standard for Cotton Dust, J.A. 1-169.
35
that cotton dust exposure be “controlled to the lowest
feasible limit which shall be less than 0.2 mg lint-free
cotton dust/cu.m.,” * or 200 »g/m?.
Shortly thereafter, OSHA published an Advanced No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking on cotton dust. OSHA re-
quested interested parties to submit their views on the
NIOSH recommendations and related issues concerning
a proposed standard.” OSHA received comments from
scientists, labor unions, industries, cotton growers, and
governmental representatives. A proposed revision, pub-
lished on December 28, 1976, called for an exposure
limit of 200 y»g/m?* of cotton dust.** OSHA provided 90
days for interested parties to submit written comments.*”
At the close of the comment period, OSHA conducted
hearings in three cities for a total of 14 days. The
comments and exhibits received before the hearings, the
written and oral testimony of the hearing participants,
and post-hearing comments and briefs comprise the in-
formal rulemaking record for the final cotton dust stand-
ard promulgated by the agency. This record exceeds
105,000 pages in length; it includes comments from 263
parties and testimony from 109 participants at the hear-
* J.A. 1974. See also 41 Fed. Reg. 565000 (1976).
39 Fed. Reg. 44769 (1974). The Advance Notice re
quested interested parties to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning “whether a new standard .. . should
be issued on the basis of the [NIOSH] criteria or any other
information” and on the contents of a proposed standard. Jd.
3141 Fed. Reg. 56498 (1967), J.A. 171.
32 Td. at 56515, J.A. at 188.
38 The hearing was conducted in Washington, D.C. on April
5-8, May 2-6, and May 16-17; in Greenville, Mississippi, on
April 12; and in Lubbock, Texas, on May 10-12, 1977.
36
ing. The Final Standard and its accompanying statement
of reasons fill 68 pages of the Federal Register.*
C. The OSHA Standard
On the basis of the massive rulemaking record, OSHA
promulgated the cotton standard in an effort to reduce
the health risks to cotton workers.** Part of the standard
sets “permissible exposure limits” (PELs) for each manu-
facturing operation and industry that exposes workers
to cotton dust.** Thus, OSHA set (1) 200 micrograms
43 Fed. Reg. 27350 (1978) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1043 (b) ).
5 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27894-418 (1978) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1048). This is the first standard promulgated
under § 6(b) (5) of the Act that does not involve a suspected
carcinogen. Earlier standards were adopted for coke oven
emissions, such as asbestos dust, see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a
(1978).
Section 3(8) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) defines the
term “occupational safety and health standard” to mean
a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption
or use of one or more practices, means, methods, opera-
tions, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate
to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment.
The Act requires employers to “comply with occupational
safety and health standards promulgated” under the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2), in addition to their general duty to
furnish employment and a place of employment “free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm... .” 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a) (1).
%°The proposed and final standards both set limits for
exposure to cotton dust particles that are both lint-free and
small enough to be breathed. These respirable particles can
be measured in microns over a given time period. Relying on
what it found to be “the most persuasive testimony” in the
record, OSHA used a 15-micron cut-off point to separate
37
2r cubic meter (200 »g/m*) as the PEL for lint-free
espirable cotton dust in yarn manufacturing; (2) 750
pg/m* for slashing and weaving operations in the cotton
industry; and (3) 500 »g/m® for all other processes in
the cotton industry and for all non-textile industries that
expose workers to cotton dust.*”
Implementation of the standard depends primarily on
the adoption of engineering and work practice controls
by employers. OSHA established a four-year implemen-
tation period during which employers are expected to
achieve compliance. If an employer establishes that the
required controls are infeasible, he can obtain an admin-
istrative variance from the standard,** but he must make
respirators available to protect his employees until he
achieves compliance.” The standard also requires em-
respirable from non-respirable particles. 43 Fed. Reg. 27355
(1978). Once this cut-off size was determined, the rulemaking
participants agreed that the verticle elutriator, a machine
that screens airborne particles, is the best sampling device
currently available. It separates particles larger than 15
microns from the remaining, “respirable” portion of dust.
Id. at 27382-84. The verticle elutriator cotton sampling
device eliminated from the sample all non-respirable par-
ticles, including cotton fly and lint fibers. See J.A. 129. In its
final standard, OSHA designated the verticle elutriator “or a
method of equivelent accuracy and precision” as the means
for measuring dust levels, averaged over an eight-hour
period. 43 Fed. Reg. 27895 (1978) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1910.48(c)). Also specified that the measuring de-
vices “should operate at a flow rate of 7.4+0.2. liters per
minute. Id. at 27398 (sampling equipment).
57 Id. at 27895 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1048(c) ).
88 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27395 (1978) (§ 1910.1048(e) of the
standard); 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b) (6) (A) (1976) (variance
procedures). See text at note 235 infra.
8° 48 Fed. Reg. 27396 (1978) (§ 1910.1048(f) of the stand-
ard) ; id. at 273886.
38
ployers to monitor employees’ exposure to cotton dust, to
provide medical surveillance and employee education, and
to post warning signs about the health risks.
Before examining petitioners’ objections, we consider
the limits of our review.
II. Scope or REVIEW
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 is
one of a number of recent Congressional statutes that
designates the stringent “substantial evidence” test for
judicial review of notice-and-comment rulemaking.” The
explicit language of the Act,*! its legislative history,*
and its application by the courts ** confirm that regula-
*0See Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1974, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(4) (3) (A) (1976) ; Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(c) (1976); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(C) (1) (B) (i) (1976).
“The OSH Act, §6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976),
assigns the scope of review for any challenge to a standard
issued under § 6 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655:
The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive
if supported by substantial evidence in the record con-
sidered as a whole.
“2H. Rep. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1970)
(Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House),
reprinted in LEGIS. HISTORY at 1189. See Assoc. Indus. v.
Dep’t of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Friendly, J.) (discussing legislative history).
**In Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1974), this court rejected the claim that the sub-
stantial evidence test adopted in the Act should apply only to
factual determinations. This view would leave policy judg-
ments behind a challenged health and safety standard review-
able only under the arbitrary and capricious test. 499 F.2d
at 473. Instead, this court concluded that under the Act,
policy inferences along with factual determinations must not
escape “exacting scrutiny” even though inferences cannot
be strictly verified. Id. at 475. See also Assoc. Indus. v. Dep’t
of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1973).
39
tions promulgated under the Act are to be upheld on
review if supported by “substantial evidence on the rec-
ord considered as a whole.” “4
The substantial evidence test provides for more rigor-
ous scrutiny than the usual “arbitrary and capricious” “
test applicable to informal rulemaking.** Although Con-
gress required this more rigorous judicial review, it
nevertheless delegated unusually broad discretionary au-
“#29 U.S.C. §655(f) (1976). The requirement of sub-
stantial evidence “on the record considered as a whole”
means that reviewing courts must take into account not just
evidence that supports the agency’s decision, but also coun-
tervailing evidence. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 481-82 (1951). Yet this requirement does not alter
the court’s fundamental duty to uphold the agency’s “choice
between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court
would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter
been before it de novo.” Id. at 488.
*° See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)
(1976). Until the last decade, this was the standard of
review typically applied to informal rulemaking. See K.
DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.6 (1978). It re-
mains as a basic standard of review, along with other criteria
of legality and constitutionality, even when the substantial
evidence test applies. Z.g., May Trucking Co. v. United States
and ICC, 593 F.2d 1349, 1852 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
** In application, however, the lines between the two tests
are far from clear. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
review of informal agency action must be “thorough, prob-
ing, in-depth” and “searching and careful”—even where
the substantial evidence test does not apply. This court con-
cluded in Greater Boston Telephone Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that even in reviewing agency
adjudication, the essential requirement is reasoned decision
making. See generally Assoc. Indus. v. Dep’t of Labor, 487
F.2d 341, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1978) (convergence between “sub-
stantial evidence” and “arbitrary or capricious” criteria).
40
thority to regulate against possible harms.*’ We have al-
ready resolved this seeming anomaly in Industrial Union
Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There
we concluded that the reviewing court’s task under the
Act is to provide a careful check on the agency’s deter-
minations without substituting its judgment for that of
the agency.** Congress apparently created an “uneasy
partnership” between the agency and the reviewing court
to check extravagant exercises of the agency’s authority
** The substantial evidence test was adopted in the Act
apparently as a compromise when the House relinquished its
advocacy of formal agency proceedings and adopted the Sen-
ate’s informal rulemaking provision. See H. REP. No. 91-1765.
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970), reprinted in Lxecis. Hist. at
1189. See also Industrial Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
at 473; Assoc. Indus. v. Dep’t of Labor, 487 F.2d at 348-49
(discussing legislative history of scope of review provision).
*8In Industrial Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, this court con-
strued the substantial evidence review in terms of the de-
mands to be made by the reviewing court:
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful iden-
tification by the Secretary, when his proposed standards
are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow
one course rather than another. Where that choice pur-
ports to be based on the existence of certain determinable
facts, the Secretary must, in form as well as substance,
find those facts from evidence in the record. By the same
token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy judg-
ments where no factual certainties exist or where fats
alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and
go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.
499 F.2d at 475-76.
* Assoc. Indus. v. Dep’t of Labor at 354. This partnership
is uncomfortable for the courts chiefly because the record
produced by informal rulemaking is not easily suited to close
judicial scrutiny. See Florida Growers Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1974). The record gen-
erally is a compendium of letters, studies, reports, and state-
ments, untested by the adversary process. Reflecting the
41
to reguiate risk.” Our role in this partnership is to ensure
that the regulations resulted from a process of reasoned
decisionmaking consistent with the agency’s mandate from
Congress." By statute, this process must include notice to
interested parties of issues presented in the proposed rule.”
The agency must also provide opportunities for these parties
to offer contrary evidence and arguments."
OSHA adopted additional procedures to improve its
decisionmaking process.“ A qualified hearing examiner
legislative nature of informal rulemaking, the record often
does not even display the full range of considerations before
the agency when the decision was made. Pedersen, Formal
Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 62
(1975). Furthermore, the decision necessarily rests on policy
considerations authorized by the agency’s mandate. Judicial
review of such considerations cannot be identical to review
of factual determinations.
5° Congress wanted the Secretary to protect workers not
only against known harms, but also against risks of harms
not entirely understood. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970), reprinted in Lecis. HIST. at 144
(discussing need to regulate organophosphates and chlori-
nated hydrocarbons). _
5! Universal Camera v. NLRB, supra at 488; E: hyl Corp.
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976).
52 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b) (2), (8) (1976).
58 Id.
% The OSH Act requires the Secretary to follow these pro-
cedures in promulgating health and safety standards under
§ 655 of the Act:
1) publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register,
§ 655 (b) (2);
[Continued]
42
must preside at oral hearings on proposed standards. A
verbatim transcript of the hearing is required, and cross-
examination is permitted. These procedures, which were
followed in this case, transform OSHA’s action into
“hybrid” rulemaking, and produce a record more sus-
ceptible to rigorous judicial review than the more usual
informal rulemaking record.**
% [Continued]
2) opportunity for interested parties to submit “written
data or comments” within thirty days after publication
of the proposed rule, § 655 (b) (2);
3) opportunity for interested parties to submit “written
objections to the proposed rule .. . and request[] a
public hearing on such objections,” § 655 (b) (3);
4) publication in the Federal Register of time and place
for hearing scheduled on objections to proposed stand-
ard, § 655(b) (3); and
5) promulgation of final rule, or decision not to issue one,
within sixty days after period permitted for written
comments, or within sixty days after completion of
hearing, § 655 (b) (4).
These provisions add to the minimal procedures required by
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
The agency also requires that all relevant information, in-
cluding submissions and testimony, must be considered in
formulating the final standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1911.18 (a) (1)
(1978). The statement of basis and purpose for the final
standard must describe “the significant issues which have
been faced, and .. . the rationale for their solution.” 29
C.F.R. § 1911.18(b) (1978).
5° See K. DAVIS, 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 4538
(1978).
**In describing the additional procedures, the agency noted
@ congressional expectation that the rulemaking would be
on the basis of a record “to which a substantial evidence test,
where pertinent, may be applied.” 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15(a)
(1978).
43
The tasks of this reviewing court are thus to ensure
that the agency has (1) acted within the scope of its
authority; °’ (2) followed the procedures required by
statute and by its own regulations;"* (3) explicated the
bases for its decision; (4) adduced substantial evidence
in the record to support its determinations."
The meaning of “substantial evidence” in this context
is problematic. Factual proof about particular health
risks may not be substantial in the traditional sense
simply because the medical and scientific communities do
not yet completely understand the nature of threatening
diseases. To protect workers from material health im-
pairments, OSHA must rely on predictions of possible
future events and extrapolations from limited data. It
may have to fill gaps in knowledge with policy considera-
tions. Congress recognized this problem by authorizing
the agency to promulgate rules on the basis of the “best
available evidence.” ® OSHA’s mandate necessarily re-
quires it to act—even if information is incomplete—
57 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
415 (1971); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 745 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd,
407 F.2d 330, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1968); 5 U.S.C. § 706(a) (C)
(1976).
58 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
417 (1971); Friends of the Earth v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm’n, 485 F.2d 1031, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 5
U.S.C, § 706(2) (D) (1976).
5° See note 40 supra. We have also described these three
elements as review of (1) the agency’s interpretation of its
authorizing statute; (2) procedural integrity; and (8) the
substantive basis for the agency’s decision. Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976). The best available evi-
dence in an area of changing technology and incomplete scien-
tific data may leave gaps in knowledge that require policy
judgments in constructing the health and safety standard. In
44
when the best available evidence indicates a serious threat
to the health of workers." Thus, a court entrusted with
the rigorous “substantial evidence” review must examine
not only OSHA’s factual support, but also the “judg-
ment calls” and reasoning that contribute to its final
decision.” Otherwise, an agency’s claim of ignorance
would clothe it with unreviewable discretion.
Therefore, the reviewing court must examine both fact-
ual evidence and the agency’s policy considerations set
forth in the record. To facilitate this review of the
record, the agency must pinpoint the factual evidence
ans the policy considerations upon which it relied.*. This
requires explication of the assumptions underlying pre-
dictions or extrapolations,“ and of the basis for its
recent statutes Congress has defined “evidence” to mean “any
matter in the rulemaking record.” E.g., Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c) (1) (B) (1976).
* 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976). A suit was filed in 1975
charging unlawful delay in modification of the then-existing
standard. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union,
et al. v. Secretary of Labor, No. 75-2157 (D.C., filed Dec. 24,
1975).
$2 499 F.2d at 475; 487 F.2d at 348.
* See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
* With regard to environmental rulemaking, this court held
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence
difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it
is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations
designed to protect the public health, and the decision
that of an expert administrator, we will not demand
rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. Such
proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary
purpose of the statute is to be served. . . . The Adminis-
trator may apply his expertise to draw conclusion from
suspected, but not completely substantiated, relationships
45
esolution of conflicts and ambiguities.“ In enforcing
chese requirements, the court does not reach out to re-
solve controversies over technical data. Instead, it seeks
to ensure public accountability. Explicit explanation for
the basis of the agency’s decision not only facilitates
proper judicial review but also provides the opportunity
for effective peer review, legislative oversight, and public
between facts, from trends among facts, from probative
preliminary data not yet certifiable as ‘fact,’ and the like.
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (cita-
tions omitted). See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722,
740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (reasons and explanations, but not
findings, required for predictions used in risk regulation).
66 [W]hen the Secretary is obliged to make policy judg-
ments where no factual certainties exist or where facts
alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and
go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.
499 F.2d at 476.
66 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Bazelon, C.J., and McGowan, J., concurring); Internat’l
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in result). From their stance
outside of both scientific and political debates, courts can help
to ensure that decisionmakers articulate the basis for their
decisions. But once courts step beyond that role and endeavor
to judge the merits of competing expert views, they leave the
terrain they know. In so doing, the judiciary may mislead
the public into believing it provides an expert check on deci-
sions that in fact it does not fully comprehend.
Thus, a court applying the substantial evidence test to a
numerical standard considers “whether the agency’s numbers
are within a ‘zone of reasonableness,’ not whether its numbers
are precisely right.” Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 107
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Similarly, the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by
substantial evidence. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
510 F.2d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1975); accord Bayside Enter-
prises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 248, 802 (1976).
46
education. This requirement is in the best interest of
everyone, including the decisionmakers themselves. If
the decisionmaking process is open and candid, it will in-
spire more confidence in those who are affected. Further,
by opening the process to public scrutiny and criticism, we
reduce the risk that important information will be over-
looked or ignored. Instructed by these ends, this court
on review will “combine supervision with restraint.” ™
III. CHALLENGES BY THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
The textile industry petitioners acknowledge that tex-
tile workers who are exposed to cotton dust may risk
contracting byssinosis.“* Their challenge focuses on the
regulatory approach OSHA has chosen to reduce that
risk. Specifically, they ask us to find that OSHA’s regula-
tory approach is not “reasonably necessary” to protect
textile workers from the admitted danger posed by cot-
ton dust.” Further, they ask us to find that approach
technologically and economically infeasible.”
A. Challenge to the Regulatory Approach
OSHA chose a “dust control strategy” that requires
engineering and work practice controls to limit worker
exposure to the “lowest feasible [cotton] dust levels”
within four years.”
8" Public Serv. Comm’n v. FPC, 511 F.2d 338, 355 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
%8 See, e.g., Joint Brief Textile Petitioners at 2-3; 8-9 [here-
inafter cited as Textile Brief] (“[t]he development of bys-
sinosis has been associated with the inhalation of an unknown
element in the dust generated by the handling or processing
of cotton”); id. at 18 (referring to “the slowly progressive
health hazard presented by exposure to ‘cototon dust’ ”’).
°° Textile Brief at 54-65.
7 Id. at 18-20, 29-34, 37-54.
™1 See text at notes 37-39.
47
The textile industry rejects OSHA’s approach as un-
necessarily expensive. The industry contends that workers
can be fuily protected from “ ‘material impairment of
[their] health or functional capacity’” by a higher per-
missible exposure level coupled with a medical surveil-
lance program.” The industry’s alternative would permit
an exposure level of 500 »g/m* in all cotton manufactur-
ing operations except weaving, for which a PEL of
1000 »g/m? is proposed. This alternative would also re-
quire workers to wear respirators or accept transfers to
lower exposure work areas if medical surveillance shows
that they are suffering from byssinosis symptoms “which,
with years of continued exposure, could lead to [material
health] impairment.” ™ |
The textile industry petitioners claim that OSHA failed
to seriously consider their alternative or to provide ade-
quate reasons for rejecting it. The industry also claims
that the regulatory approach adopted by OSHA is not
permitted by the Act. We disagree with both claims.
First, OSHA gave serious attention to the medical
studies conducted by the textile industry and proffered to
support the industry’s alternative."* These studies pur-
72 Td. at 57 (emphasis in original) ; id. at 21.
*8 Id. at 21-22. The industry claims that its approach will
provide protection comparable to OSHA’s strategy in that
neither completely eliminates the occurance of early byssinosis
symptoms. /d. at 16-17.
74 Fd. at 54-64.
"S The industry relies on the following studies: (1) Burling-
ton Industries, Inc., study of 12,519 workers from 1970-1976
(Joint Appendix (J.A.) 2035; (2) West Point-Pepperell, Inc.
study of 9,181 workers ‘n 1973 (J.A. 1987, 2005); (3) study
by Dr. W.K.C. Morgan of 720 workers (J.A. 2008); (4) study
by Dr. Hans Weill, an OSHA witness, with complete data on
418 workers (J.A. 1235, 1240); (5) study by Cone Mills
Corporation of 6,631 workers (J.A. 2012). These studies are
discussed at length in OSHA’s statement of reasons. See 48
Fed. Reg. 27355-57 (1978).
48
port to show that medical surveillance programs at vari-
ous textile plants have already afforded workers a level of
protection comparabie to that offered by OSHA’s approach.
The record shows that OSHA specifically addressed and
scrutinized these studies, and concluded that their valid-
ity aad largely been discredited.» OSHA’s judgment on
76 See generally, 43 Fed. Reg. 27355-57. OSHA found the
industry studies deficient on many grounds. First, the pre-
valence of byssinosis reported at the studied mills tended to
be low, but these mills had experienced dust reduction prior to
implementation of medical surveillance. Consequently, the
mills studies by the textile industry lacked a necessary pre-
condition—a dust level of at least 500 pge/m*—validly to test
the industry’s contention that their proposal would be as effec-
tive as OSHA’s lower PELs in reducing the prevalence of
byssinosis.
OSHA also identified substantial, unexplained differences
between the percentage of workers who reported subjective
byssinosis symptoms and the percentage of those showing
pulmonary function decrements indicative of the disease. The
textile industry refers to workers’ subjective health reports
but not to the objective, pulmonary function measurements.
The Union petitioners note that workers sometimes falsely
deny byssinosis symptoms for fear of losing their jobs if
their employer learns that their health is impaired. AFL-
CIO, American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al.,
Petitioners Reply Brief and Brief in Intervention at 42 n.55
{hereinafter Union Reply Brief}.
OSHA also criticized the industry studies on a number of
other grounds. 43 Fed. Reg. 27356-57. First, none of the
studies had been subjected to peer review through publication
in scientific journals. None of them produced dose-response
data, that is, data charting medical responses to different dust
levels. The populations studied may not be representative of
the entire affected population. Finally, the validity of the
studies could not be verified because the textile industry de-
clined to furnish the underlying data, and in some cases,
failed to produce the authors of the studies for cross-examina-
tion at the hearing. Consequently, OSHA concluded that
these studies provided iisufficient basis for the regulation.
ae
this issue is sufficiently supported on this basis.”
Besides this careful treatment of the medical surveil-
lance proposal, OSHA rejected the industry’s proposed
reliance on job transfers and respirators to protect
workers suffering from acute symptoms of byssinosis on
the basis of testimony in the record and express policy
considerations.”* The industry was unable to show that
job transfers would be available in sufficient number to
respond to the likely prevalence of byssinosis in plants
with dust levels at the 500 »g/m* proposed by the in-
dustry.” Further, the agency found uncontradicted testi-
mony in the record that respirators can cause severe
physical discomfort and create safety problems of their
own.” OSHA concluded that the industry’s proposal in-
™ Our task is not to resolve the controversy over the studies,
but to determine if the agency received and fairly responded
to challenges. It did so here in its consideration of the indus-
try’s studies. Its explicit identification of flaws in the studies
can, inter alia, alert future participants to the quality of re
search it seeks as a basis for its regulations.
78 43 Fed. Reg. 27384 (1978).
7 OSHA, relying on dose-response data submitted by Dr.
Merchant, found that 25% of the workers exposed to a 500
pg/m* PEL would develop byssinosis. At this prevalence rate,
it is doubtful that all of the affected workers could be moved
to a low exposure area. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Imbus,
Medical Director, Burlington Industries (J.A. 3379-80) noting
that 10% was the maximum number of workers who could be
reassigned through a medical surveillance and job transfer
approach).
® OSHA carefully explained why it rejected “a control
strategy involving principal reliance on respiratory protec-
tion[] to reduce the cost of compliance”:
(RJespirators have many disadvantages which preclude
primary reliance or co-reliance on respiratory protection
on an equal basis with engineering and work practice
controls. The many difficulties .. . were enumerated at
50
appropriately placed the burden of compliance on the
employees.*' On this express policy ground; and on the
basis of the evidence in the record, OSHA reasonably re-
jected these elements in the industry alternative.
Finally, the textile industry argues that the agency’s
effort to reduce workers’ cotton dust exposure to the
lowest feasible level is not “reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate.” * This argument rests on the claim that the
agency need not guard against the acute but reversible
symptoms of byssinosis because they do not themselves
constitute a “material impairment of health.” ® We find
the hearing . . . because of difficulties in face fit, it is
difficult to know whether the respirator actually provides
adequate protection; respirators, by interfering with vi-
sion, hearing, and mobility, can cause safety problems;
some employees cannot wear respirators because of
breathing difficulties.
43 Fed. Reg. 27384 (1978).
%\ Id. (“it is not appropriate to place the burden of compli-
ance principally on the employee, as would be the case if
respiratory protection were the principal means of reducing
employee exposure.”’).
* Textile Brief at 21, 55. “Reasonably necessary or appro-
priate” is language from the statutory definition of an “occu-
pational safety and health standard.” See § 652(8) (defining
“occupational safety and health standard” as requiring con-
ditions or practices “reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe or healthful employment and places of employ-
ment”). Apparently, the thrust of the textile industry’s argu-
ment on this point is not that OSHA lacks the power to
promulgate a standard that reduces worker exposure to the
lowest feasible leveis. Rather, the industry argues that OSHA
inadequately explained why “it chose to apply its full range
of powers” instead of accepting the industry’s less stringent
alternative. Id. at 63-64.
88 See id. at 57-59. The Act does not itself define “material
impairment.” Although testimony at the rulemaking hearing
described the acute symptoms of byssinosis as “a serious health
31
that this claim and its attendant argument must fall in
the face of the agency’s evidence and reasons.
The agency adopted a “dust control strategy” after
finding conclusive evidence of a causal relation between
exposure to cotton dust and the contraction of respira-
tory diseases, such as byssinosis. The agency acknow-
ledged gaps in medical understanding of the specific
causal relationship between cotton dust and disease.™
Nonetheless, the agency’s mandate requires it to protect
workers’ health even before the resolution of ali medical
and scientific uncertainties about the particular health
risk.* Further, OSHA heard several witnesses conclude
that at present,” there is no basis for any programs of
prevention and control of byssinosis other than those based
on prevention of exposure to respirable cotton dust.” *
Virtually without exception, key textile industry witnesses
along with public health experts rejected medical surveil-
lance as an alternative to dust reduction.” Accordingly,
hazard,” Hearing Transcript at 168 (testimony of Dr. Bou-
huys), we do not here need to decide whether these symptoms
constitute “material impairment” for the purposes of the Act.
Instead, we find adequate support. in the record for the
agency’s choice of the dust control strategy effectively to pro-
tect workers from byssinosis, which is conceded by all to
cause material impairment in its chronic stage.
* See note 16 supra.
8 See H. Rep. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 18 (1970),
reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at 848 (OSHA not to “be paralyzed
by debate surrounding diverse medical opinion”). See also
Soc’y of Plastics v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
% 43 Fed. Reg. 27355 (1978).
8? The textile industry’s leading witness, Dr. Imbus of Bur-
lington Industries, acknowledged that “[m]edical surveillance
programs are not a substitute for diligent efforts to control
dust.” J.A. 396.
[Continued]
52
the agency adduced considershle evidence to support its
dust control strategy.
The agency’s approach, which is similar to its strategy
in regulating asbestos,® is authorized by the primary pur-
pose and by the special mandate of the Act. Section 2(b)
sets out the Act’s broad protective purpose: “to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions.” Toward
this end, section 6(b) (5) authorizes OSHA to set perm-
anent standards for occupational exposure to “toxic ma-
terials or harmful physical agents” at the level
which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health
or functional capacity even if such employee has regu-
lar exposure to the hazard dealt with by such stand-
ard for the period of his working life.*
Contrary to the industry’s view, this mandate does not
restrain the agency from acting to prevent irreversible
health damage until workers actually suffer the early
symptoms of byssinosis. Instead;it is a mandate to reduce
87 [Continued]
The need for a dust control strategy was a constant theme
of expert testimony. Drs. Merchant and Bouhuys, for exam-
ple, both recommended PELs well below the 500 g/m? level
proposed by the textile industry. At the hearing, Dr. Bouhuys
and NIOSH recommended a 200 pZ/m* PEL. J.A. 1233, 1448.
Dr. Merchant recommended a PEL of 100 pe/m*. J.A. 369.
Even Dr. Weill, who appeared on behalf of the textile indus-
try, declined to endorse the industry’s proposed PEL. Instead
he recommended that the PEL be set somewhere between 200
pg/m* and 500 pg/m*. J.A. 1237.
See 29 C.F.R. 1910.938a (1978); Industrial Union Dep’t
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing
asbestos standard).
29 U.S.C. § 655 (b) (5) (1976).
53
the risk of that irreversible damage—especially for those
workers who have regular exposure to the causal agent,
cotton dust. In the present case, OSHA adequately docu-
‘mented the risk of such damage attributable to continued
exposure to cotton dust. Medical experts testified on the
record that the early, acute symptoms of byssinosis
weaken the worker’s pulmonary system and increase his
susceptibility to the adverse effects of subsequent cotton
dust exposure.” We therefore uphold OSHA’s decision to
reduce the prevalence of chronic byssinosis through regu-
lations stringent enough to reduce even the occurence of
the reversible acute stage of the disease.
B. Feasibility of the Standard
All parties acknowledge that OSHA must evaluate
technological and economic feasibility in setting perman-
ent standards under section 6(b) (5) of the Act. These
considerations set constraints on the agency’s mandate to
assure employees “the highest degree of health and
safety.” In light of petitioners’ claims, we must ex-
amine the record to ensure that OSHA has not exceeded
its mandate by neglecting these constraints.
We are assisted here by this court’s interpretation of
the feasibility requirement in Industrial Union Dep’t,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson. In that case, we concluded that
° F.g., J.A. 1218.
* § 6(b) (5); 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1975). The Secretary
is to promulgate a health and safety standard “which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment
or health or function capacity. ... In addition to the attain-
ment of the highest degree of health and safety protection
for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest avail-
able scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards,
and experience gained under this and other health and safety
laws.” (emphasis added).
54
the feasibility requirement reflects Congress’ recognition
that employees would not be protected if their employers
were put out of business.*? This possibility is all too real
if the agency inflexibility requires protective devices un-
available under existing technology or otherwise makes
financial viability impossible.** At the same time, we con-
cluded, standards do not become infeasible simply because
they may impose substantial costs on an industry, force
the development of new technology, or even force some
employers out of business.** Otherwise the Act’s commit-
ment to protect workers might be forever frustrated.
In this case, the textile industry petitioners contend
that the record does not support OSHA’s findings of
technological and economic feasibility. First, they argue
that the standard is technologically infeasible for the
spinning through weaving stages of textile manufactur-
ing.* Further, they argue that the record does not sup-
2 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
at (5
* “Tt would appear to be consistent with the purposes of
the Act to envisage the economic demise of an employer who
has lagged behind the rest of the industry in protecting the
health and safety of employees and is consequently financially
unable to comply with new standards as quickly as other
employers.” Id. at 478.
* Textile Brief at 20, 28-34. According to the industry, the
production of fabric from cotton involves twelve distinct man-
ufacturing operations, falling into three general stages. Id.
at 7.
During the first stage, raw cotton is cleaned and prepared
for spinning into yarn. This first stage involves opening,
picking, carding, drawing, and roving the cotton. The second
stage transforms the prepared cotton into yarn and packages
it for subsequent processing. The principal operation in this
stage is spinning, during which the prepared cotton slivers
are elongated. The next operations in this stage consolidate
units of spun yarn and prepares them for weaving by twist-
ing, winding, spooling, and warping. The third stage of oper-
55
port the agency’s finding that the standard is economically
feasible. In addition, they argue that “OSHA failed to
satisfy its obligation seriously to weigh even its grossly
understated costs against the benefits sought to be se-
cured by the Standard.” *
Our review of these challenges is not designed to re-
solve the. technical and economic debates. Our duty is
simply to determine from close scrutiny of the entire
record whether the feasibility of the standard is ade-
quately supported by data and policy considerations. In
addition, the agency must have considered and responded
to serious challenges to the claim of feasibility. On both
counts, we find that OSHA has performed its task ade-
quately.
1. Technological feasibility
The textile industry does not argue that the exposure
level set for the intial stages of textile manufacturing is
technologically infeasible.” Its attack is limited to the
feasibility of the level set for the later stages of spinning
through weaving,” and to the. four-year deadline for
ations involves slashing and weaving. Slashing adds sizing to
the yarn; weaving then interlaces two sets of yarn to produce
a woven fabric. Under the cotton dust standard, the first two
stages are classified together as “yarn manufacturing.” Id.
at 7-8.
% Jd. at 21. The Unions also challenge the standard under
the feasibility requirement, but unlike the textile industry
petitioners, they argue that the exposure level set by the agency
is not the lowest one feasible. We consider this challenge in
note 150 infra.
7 Id. at 25 (“general principles of dust control ... are ex-
pected generally to yield compliance in the operations from
opening through roving” stage.
Id. at 24-35 (challenging technological feasibility of 200
pg/m* set for spinning through warping and 750 »g/m? set
for slashing and weaving).
7%
56
compliance.”
Judging the technological feasibility of a particu-
lar agency goal is beyond the expertise of the judiciary
especially where the assessment involves predictions of
technological changes.
Instead, our task on review is to find whether the
agency sufficiently supported its feasibility determination
with material in the record. Here, the agency’s position
is supported with evidence that existing dust control
techniques can bring about compliance in the textile
industry.’
First, OSHA points to evidence in the record that
many employers already are in compliance with the 200
pg/m* PEL set for spinning through warping operations.
This finding at least in part refutes the industry’s charge
that on technological grounds it cannot meet the re-
quired exposed level for these operations. Notably, three-
fourths of the spinning operations described in the in-
dustry’s own study had dust levels below the 200 »g/m*
level and others were very close to voluntary compliance.’™
The textile industry does not contend that the looms
or frames not yet in compliance in any way differ from
those already complying with the new PEL. Rather, the
industry asserts that the noncomplying mills run dustier
% Jd. at 34-37. See Part V infra for our consideration of
this claim.
100 These measures include improving generai ventilation,
and requiring better maintenance of equipment. OSHA also
recommended more thorough cleaning of the cotton in the
opening and cleaning processes, and better dust control in
the opening through roving stages or isolation of these
operations. See 48 Fed. Reg. 27363-65 (1978). See also J.A.
3607-08, 1145 (improving general ventilation); J.A. 80
(equipment maintenance); J.A. 1886 (cleaning of cotton) ;
J.A. 2445 (dust control) ; and J.A. 551 (isolation of certain
procerses.
101 See, e.g., J.A. 3490-8560; 2008-2011. See generally 48
Fed. Reg. 27362-68 (1978).
57
cotton. This contention, as OSHA answers, is belied by
the record, for the requisite PEL has been met in spin-
ning operations running 100% coarse cotton, which is the
dustiest variety.’
There is also evidence that some mills have achieved low
dust levels in the twisting, winding, spooling, and warp-
ing operations..* OSHA admits that these operations
have been studied less than spinning, apparently because
these operations generate very little cotton dust. The
agency nevertheless obtained evidence that existing dust
control principles can be adapted to these operations as the
need arises.’
102 J.A. 3532, 3538-40, 8544.
108 J.A. 792-98, 1887; 43 Fed. Reg. 27867 (1978).
14 See 43 Fed. Reg. at 27367 (“Levels in [winding, spool-
ing, twisting, and warping] are currently very low and are
not expected to present a compliance problem”) (citations to
the record omitted).
105 See, e.g., J.A. 2240-41. Thus OSHA acknowledged that
the
industry has had less experience with specific controls
past roving. OSHA recognizes these difficulties and fur-
ther recognizes that increased effort may be necessary
in some instances to achieve compliance with the exposure
limits prescribed for the textile operations. Yet, the evi-
dence in the record demonstrates the feasibility of adopt-
ing dust centrol principles, proven successful in other
operations, to new stages of the process.
82 Fed. Reg. 27362 (1978). The agency also concluded gen-
erally that “inherent operational difficulties found in some
operations may require increased effort to reduce dust levels
to 200 ».g/m*; however, OSHA agrees with RTI’s assessments
and concludes that the vast majority of workplaces will be
able to comply with little difficulty.” Id. at 27367. (“RTT” is
the Research Triangle Institute which completed the ‘“Tech-
nological Feasibility Assessment and Final Inflationary Im-
pact Statement” for OSHA. J.A. 457
58
Similarly, the PEL set for slashing and weaving oper-
ations apears reasonable in light of the record. The in-
dustry’s own chief witness estimated that 72% of the
weaving operations met the requirement of 750 y»g/m*
when studied. OSHA also cited a study in the record
that identified three basic approaches to permit com-
pliance by the remaining mills in these operations: (1)
isolating the weaving rooms; (2) separating room vent-
ilation systems; and (3) installing local exhaust ventila-
tion equipment.?”
Thus, for each operation of textile manufacturing, the
agency established evidence of present compliance and
existing control measures capable of increasing compli-
ance. The agency therefore concluded that a
combination of specific control measures . .. the
adoption and modification of general dust controls,
and further utilization of technological developments
. .. already underway, should achieve compliance for
the textile industry.’
The industry objects that OSHA drew unwarranted
generalizations from dust measurements at small num-
bers of plants’ and from expert testimony on general
106 Testimony of Hovan Hocutt, J.A. 3929-3920. Other evi-
dence submitted by the industry suggests that compliance
may be even more widespread for the weaving operations. Of
32 weaving operations studied, 28 were below 750 »g/m*, and
no reading was greater than 870 »g/m*. J.A. 3490-3560. And
these measurements were taken ore recent improvements
in dust control. See J.A. 3490-3560.
10743 Fed. Reg. 27367 (1978) (summarizing Research
Triangle Institute (RTI) Technological Feasibility Assess-
ment and Final Inflationary Impact Statement, IV-14-16
(1976), J.A. 1, 550-552).
108 43 Fed. Reg. 27362.
109 OSHA’s brief merely cites several instances where dust
levels in [the twisting, winding, spooling and warping]
59
principles of dust control."° We agree that OSHA might
have improved the quality of the record with more ex-
tensive studies at different mills arid over different periods
of time.’' Further study, however, would have added sub-
stantial additional cost and delay to an already costly
and prolonged rulemaking proceeding."? Rather than
directing the agency to wait for the best evidence, the
OSH Act requires the agency to develop standards based
upon “the best available evidence.” * This court will
not require further survey research from the agency
especially where it has made an informed decision to rely
operations are at or below 0.5 mg/m!® or 0.2 mg/m.
None of these references prove, or even suggest, that
the required 0.2 mg/m! either exists on a constant basis
or is being achieved by the application of dust control
equipment.
Textile Reply Br. at 8.
110 Textile Br. at 29.
41 It also would have been helpful to the court if OSHA
had more fully delineated the methodological assumptions
underlying some of the studies on which it relied. A more
logical and systematic explanation of the inferences drawn
from studies would have facilitated our review. Nonetheless,
the agency did adequately explain the factual and policy
considerations informing its judgments.
%2The Unions and the North Carolina Public Interest
Research Group filed suit in 1975 to prevent what they con-
tended was unlawful delay in promulgation of the standard.
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, et al. v.
Secretary of Labor, No. 75-2157 (D.C.D.C.). The district
court judge repeatedly admonished the government to prom-
ulgate the standard without) improper delay. See Transcript
of Proceedings on June 6, 1978. Secretary of Labor Marshall
makes reference to this suit in his May 24, 1978 “Memo-
randum ... to President Carter Urging Issuance of Cotton
Dust Standard.” 8 BNA Occupational Safety and Health
Reporter 54-55 (June 8, 1978).
"13 Section 6(b) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976).
. 60
on other credible sources of information, such as the ex-
tensive expert testimony, written comment and briefs, and
research studies used here.'"™*
Indeed, other circuits have upheld permanent health
standards supported by less extensive and persuasive
evidence than that present here. Those courts have up-
held similar OSHA standards that require compliance
with PELs that had never before been attained,™* or that
had been reached only at the “newest, cleanest” plants."*
Here, OSHA has shown that much of the textile industry
already has demonstrated its ability to comply with the
cotton dust standard. It also points to evidence in the
record that little, if any, technological innovation will be
necessary for compliance to be reached in the entire in-
«In its “Proposed Standards and Notice of Hearing,”
OSHA said that it
recognizes that many of the matters considered in this
proposal are controversial and that gaps exist in the
available scientific evidence. OSHA believes, however,
that in this case we are dealing with an agent or agents
that are extremely harmful to man. The existence of
unanswered questions cannot be permitted to delay the
process of proposing a standard for protecting workers
exposed to cotton dust, as tens of thousands of workers
are believed to suffer from the effects of exposure. OSHA
hopes that the public participation which is invited will
help to fill whatever gaps exist.
41 Fed. Reg. 56508 (1976).
15 Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509, F.2d
1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
136 American Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 677 F.2d 825,
833, 834 (3d Cir. 1978), petitions for cert. pending, Nos. 78-
918, 78-919 (upholding OSHA’s standards for coke oven
emissions on the basis of reductions in emission levels at
some plants; concluding that the industry “could with some
self-confidence and determination develop ‘their own tech-
nological potentialities’ and achieve a variety of improve-
ments.”’).
61
dustry.” Thus, the agency’s finding of technological
feasibility here is even more persuasive than findings
affirmed in other cases that require the creation of new
technology.
In sum, the agency fairly considered and took account
of objections to its assessment of technological feasibility
for the textile industry.* The agency linked its deter-
mination .to evidence and policy considerations in the
record. We support its judgment.
2. Economic Feasibility
The petitioners concede that OSHA’s estimate of $550
million in capital costs would be economically feasible
for the textile industry, but they claim that OSHA’s es-
timate grossly understates the actual costs the industry
will incur if the standard goes into effect. To evaluate
this claim, we must first consider the accuracy of OSHA’s
cost estimate and then review its feasibility determination.
117 OSHA noted one instance in which technological innova-
tion would assist compliance with the cotton dust standard.
Conversion of mills from traditional “ring” spinning to
“open end” spinning would reduce the dust exposure to
workers, yet, as OSHA acknowledged, ring spinning is not
yet practical for all textile mills. 48 Fed. Reg. 27367 (1978).
The agency concluded that “present general principles of
ventilation control coupled with proven and applied control
strategies” would be sufficient to bring the spinning opera-
tions into compliance, and technological innovation would
simply be encouraged. Jd.
118 OSHA stated that it found unpersuasive the testimony
of the textile industry’s chief expert witness, Hovan Hocutt.
The agency observed that Hocutt’s experience derived pri-
marily from his knowledge of the opening through roving
operations, while the standards governing the operations of
spinning through weaving gave rise to the most serious
challenges. Further, the agency concluded that Hocutt “seemed
to view each process in isolation and completely and con-
sistently ignored the possibilities of dust control [other than
through local exhaust equipment.]” OSHA Br. at 106, n.84.
62
a. Accuracy of cost estimates
OSHA derived its cost estimates from two principal
sources: the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) estimates
for the entire textile process’® and industry estimates
for part of the textile process.’ OSHA tried to account
for the divergence between the estimates from these two
sources by exploring the assumptions each employed.!”"
After examination, the agency decided that both sets of
estimates are overstatements, and chose to rely on what it
regarded the best portions of each estimate.’
All parties agreed that the largest cost imposed by the
standard is the capital cost of engineering controls.
OSHA found the RTI capital cost figures to be overstated
on several bases.’** OSHA concluded that RTI inappro-
19 Research Triangle Institute, Cotton Dust: Technological
Feasibility Assessment and Final Inflationary Impact State-
ment VI- V-129 & Appendices B, C & D (1976) (prepared
for OSHA) (reprinted at J.A. Vol I at 619-750, 801-995 &
Appendices B, C & D)). See also “Technological Feasibility
and Economic Impact of Regulations for Cotton Dust: Testi-
mony to be Presented by The Research Triangle Institute at
Public Hearing,” (1977) (reprinted at J.A. Vol. II, 1820-80.
120 See Statement of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice President
of Engineering Pneumafil Corporation, J.A. Vol. II, 2228-47 :
Statement of Arthur Thomas, Senior Vice President, The
Bahnson Company, J.A. Vol. II at 2248-57.
121 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27370-27880.
122 OSHA’s estimate of total compliance costs for the textile
industry is based on the industry estimates for capital costs
and annualized costs, and the RTI estimates for costs of
medical surveillance and other non-capital expenditures. 43
Fed. Reg. 27373 (1978) ; id. at 27380 (Table 8).
#28 QSHA also criticized the RTI estimates of annualized
capital costs for failing to take account of the investment
tax credit. Jd. at 27371. The estimates also assumed a high
interest rate, but OSHA found this an acceptable reflection
of the industry’s external financing situation. Thus, OSHA
concluded that the RTI estimates of annualized capital costs
were calculated on a “conservatively high basis.” Jd.
63
priately included estimates for plants processing blends
between cotton and synthetics.’ Further, OSHA found
that RTI neglected the cost advantages available when
compliance is achieved through moderizing rather than
retrofitting the machinery.'* RTI also assumed industry-
wide compliance with the old standard of 1,000 pg/m*,'2¢
Thus, RTI estimated only the incremental cost necessary
to achieve compliance with the new PEL. This estimate
necessarily was inaccurate, as some of the industry had
not yet complied with the old standard, while other plants
already had met the stricter new standard.” Further,
industry witnesses testified that “substantial amounts of
[recommended] controls are, in fact, in operation.” 128
OSHA found the industry’s capital cost estimates to
be overstated as well. Like RTI, the industry estimated
only the costs of retrofitting old machines; it did not con-
sider replacing them with new machines that are more
productive and generate less dust.) Similarly, the in-
124 OSHA excluded from its final standard equipment pro-
ducing synthetic fibers because it does not generate cotton
dust. Yet such equipment was included in the RTI estimates
for cotton blend plants. 43 Fed. Reg. 27370 (1978). On the
basis of RTI calculations, OSHA found that exclusion of
equipment used to produce synthetics could reduce compliance
costs by as much as 30 percent. Jd. at 27372, 27380 Table I
& n.4; OSHA Brief at 113.
25 43 Fed. Reg. 27870-71 (citing testimony of Pr. Parker
C. Reist that the cost of control declines with more productive,
new machines).
126 Td. at 27370. The existing standard set the cotton dust
exposure level at 1000 »g/m*. See TAN 27 supra (history
of the standard).
127 43 Fed. Reg. 27870.
"28 Id. (testimony of Harold Imbus and Hovan Hocutt).
120 The agency included this statement in its reasons for
concluding that the AMTI estimate was exaggerated:
While OSHA recognizes the validity of estimating com-
pliance costs for retrofit controls, OSHA also recognizes
64
dustry “may have included some equipment which is
used exclusively for synthetics” and thus inappropriately
included in cotton dust control cost estimates.’* The
agency also noted that the industry estimates failed to
account for improvements in technology that can reason-
ably be expected during the four-year compliance period.’
Finding both sets of capital cost estimates in the
record to be exaggerated, the agency chose to rely on
the substantially lower industry estimate. Unlike the RTI
study, the industry’s assessment reflected concrete data
on actual industry dust levels and use of controls.'*2
Ironically, it is now the industry that challenges the
accuracy of its own data.** The textile industry peti-
tioners argue that OSHA’s reliance on the industry’s
capital cost estimate is invalid because it is “wholly
unrelated to the exposure limits set by the Standard.” ™
The industry notes that its $550 million figure was ad-
vanced as the projected capital cost of compliance with
a PEL of 200 »g/m* in opening through roving, 500
yg/m* in spinning through warping, and 1000 ,»g/m® in
the existing trend toward replacement of conventional
machines with newer equipment which is more productive
and produces less dust and which would lead to the
prediction of fewer machines to be retrofitted or to be
controlled [.]
43 Fed. Reg. 27372.
130 Jd.
181 Jd.
182 AMTI cost estimates were based on a recent survey it
conducted. 43 Fed. Reg. 27371 (1978). OSHA concluded,
“Since AMTI estimates are based on more recent data, OSHA
believes them to be more realistic than those offered by
(RTI].” Id. at 27373.
183 Textile Brief at 39.
184 Textile Brief at 41.
65
Slashing and weaving.’* Thus, for spinning through
weaving, the industry’s estimate assumed a PEL require-
ment higher than the ones ultimately adopted—the 200
»g/m* level for spinning through warping and 750 p»g/m*
in slashing and weaving. The textile industry contends
that by ignoring this fact, OSHA’s final standard is based
on a grossly understated cost estimate.
OSHA, however, marshals sufficient support and analy-
sis for its decision to use the industry’s capital cost esti-
mate. Contrary to the industry’s claim that this estimate
is “wholly unrelated” to the PELs in the final standard,
OSHA’s technological assessment concluded that little
more than the dust control measures assumed by the
industry would be necessary to achieve the final PEL.'**
OSHA also explained that even the industry capital esti-
mates were exaggerated because they included some un-
necessary costs.** Thus, OSHA reasonably viewed the
industry’s figure as an overstated estimate for exposure
levels set slightly kigher than those in the agency’s final
standard.
Since the only other available figure was the far less
accurate RTI estimate * the agency’s ultimate reliance
on the industry’s capital cost estimate is reasonable. The
RTI estimate lacked a basis in the industry’s actual dust
reduction. It also presumed a PEL for weaving and
slashing far lower than the final PEL, which more nearly
188 43 Fed. Reg. 27371, 27380 Table I & n.1 (1978).
18° OSHA Brief at 112 (discussing determination that local
exhaust ventilation would not be necessary for spinning and
twisting operations).
187 See TAN 129 supra.
188 See TAN 182 supra.
66
approximated the exposure level and control technology
assumed by the industry.’
The very nature of economic analysis frequently im-
poses practical limits on the precision which reasonably
can be required of the agency. This is especially the
case where, as here, the industry chooses to withhold
from the agency part of the data underlying the indus-
try’s cost estimates.’* OSHA’s mandate authorizes it to
promulgate standards on the basis of the “best available
evidence.” ** We find that OSHA reasonably evaluated
the cost estimates before it, considered criticisms of each,
and selected suitable estimates of compliance costs.”
18° OSHA concluded:
Most of the changes from the proposal in this final regu-
lation have cost reducing effects. The principal cost re-
ducing change is the increase in the permissible exposure
level from 200 to 750 ,. g/m! for slashing and weaving. In
some cases of control costs this difference in cost as a
result of the higher PEL is not assessed. However, in
other cases of control costs, such as slashing and weaving,
because the need for certain engineering controls and/or
amounts of air and filtration would be changed costs were
shown to be reduced significantly. For this reason OSHA
has adopted the [AMTI] estimate for slashing and weav-
ing which predicted a level of 1,000 pg/m$ instead of the
RTI estimate for slashing and weaving at 200 pe /mé.
43 Fed. Reg. 27371 (1978).
© The industry declined to give the agency access to its
survey data or its detailed estimation methodology. 438 Fed.
Reg. 27373; OSHA Brief at 113. This impaired the agency’s
ability to construct more accurate cost estimates once it found
both the industry and RTI estimates inaccurate.
141 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b) (5) (1976).
142 See note 182 supra. OSHA decided to rely on the RTI
estimates for the cost of non-engineering provisions, such as
monitoring workers’ health and providing respirators as
needed. 43 Fed. Reg. 27372 (1978). OSHA considered these
67
b. Feasibility of compliance costs
The actual test for economic feasibility has yet to be
fully developed by the courts.* This court has suggested
that the costs cannot be “prohibitively expensive” for
Congress would not have intended OSHA to make “finan-
cial viability generally impossible” for a regulated in-
dustry.’
Here, the agency had evidence in its record that the
industry would be able to pass compliance costs on to
consumers.'** Although the record also contained testi-
mony suggesting that older and smaller firms might bear
a disproportionate financial burden,™* it does not support
the industry’s claim of infeasibility. Even if a few
firms are forced to shut down, the standard is not neces-
sarily economically infeasible. As this court observed in
Industrial Union,
It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of
the Act to envisage the economic demise of an em-
ployer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry
in protecting the health and safety of employees and
estimates to be overstated because they failed to account for
compliance with these provisions in some plants prior to the
standard, id. at 7372-73, but as the industry offered little
evidence on non-engineering costs, OSHA reasonably relied
on the RTI estimates.
8 Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibil-
ity in Regulating Toxic Substances Under the 7
Safety and Health Act, 7 Ecouocy L. Q. 285, 285-86 (1978).
‘#* Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
478 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
45 43 Fed. Reg. 27370 (RTI assumed that costs of compli-
ance will be passed on).
46 Id. at 27377-78 (citing testimony of Arthur Figh, Vice
President, Chase Manhattan Bank).
68
is consequently financially unable to comply with
new standards as quickly as other employers.'*’
Here the agency expressly concluded “that although some
marginal employers may shut down rather than comply,
the industry as a whole will not be threatened by the
capital requirements of the regulation.” ***
Of course, the agency’s underlying cost estimates are
not free from imprecision. Nonetheless, on reviewing
the record we believe that OSHA fairly considered all
the economic data submitted before constructing its esti-
mates. The agency responded to significant criticisms of
the cost estimates it used, and explained the economic
impact it projected for the textile industry. As a result,
this court is satisfied that OSHA has substantial support
in the record for its cost estimates and findings of eco-
nomic feasibility for the textile industry. The position
of the union petitioners on this issue ™*® buttresses
147 Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
478 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
148 43 Fed. Reg. 27378 (1978). Further, alleged changes in
the market structure of the industry do not signify economic
infeasibility especially here, where the agency observed that
textile manufacturing already tends toward increasing con-
centration. Jd.
4° In Industrial Union, this court observed that “Congress
does not appear to have intended to protect employees by put-
ting their employers out of business.” 499 F.2d at 478. The
Union here submits that its support of the cotton dust stand-
ard “demonstrates that it will have no such result.” Union
Reply Brief at 25. See American Iron and Steel Institute v.
OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1978), petitions for
cert. pending, Nos. 78-911, 78-1036 (court attaches signifi-
cance to Union support in determining economic feasibility
of OSHA standard).
69
4
OSHA’s conclusion that the standard will not put the
industry out of business.’
3. Cost-Benefit and Cost-E ffectiveness Analysis
Industry petitioners would have this court impose an
additional constraint on OSHA’s authority to determine
standards. They claim that under the feasibility require-
ment, OSHA must demonstrate that “the benefits of the
standard are in proportion with the costs which it im-
poses.” '*! This amounts to a claim that no standard
may be promulgated under section 6(b) (5) of the Act
absent a formal cost-benefit analysis.“ The industry
150 The Union’s assessment is not, however, determinative
of the entire standard’s economic feasibility. We must reject
the Union’s contention that the 750 »g/m* PEL which OSHA
set for slashing and weaving operations must be remanded
because it is not the lowest feasible exposure level. See Union
Brief at 42. The record contains dose-response data showing
reduced symptoms of byssinosis in the weaving area. 48 Fed.
Reg. 27360 (1978) (discussing J.A. 218, 247, 361). OSHA
determined that the presence of sizing in the weaving rooms
tends to dilute the cotton dust and therefore allows for a
greater permissible exposure level. Further, the technological
obstacles to achieving a 200 »g/m* PEL in the weaving area
pose extreme compliance costs. Meeting these costs would
impede the industry’s ability to achieve the 200 pg/m® level
where it is more essential—in the opening through warping
operations. Id.; see J.A. 2241-48. Thus, the agency reason-
ably adopted a higher PEL in slashing and weaving to permit
compliance in the earlier stages of textile manufacturing
where the dust exposure poses a more serious threat to health.
181 Textile Brief at 53. In the industry’s view, OSHA’s fail-
ure to evaluate costs against benefits renders the agency’s
finding of economic feasibility invalid. Jd. Similar arguments
are made by National Cotton Counsel of America (NCCA),
see NCCA Supplemental Brief at 15-16, and the petitioners
from nontextile industries, see Nontextile Brief at 62-64.
152 Cost-benefit analysis involves calculating the costs and
benefits of various programs to compare their net present
70
similarly argues that OSHA must justify the expense
imposed by its standard by comparing it with the in-
dustry’s proposed alternative.!™
OSHA agrees that a systematic evaluation of costs
and benefits is to be encowraged within the limits of
available estimation techniques,’ yet it contends that
such analysis is not required. OSHA argues that the OSH
values. E. QUADE, ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS 26-27
(1975). A study by The National Academy of Sciences con-
cluded that cost-benefit analysis
is not a rule or formula which would make the decision
or predetermine the choice for the decision maker. Rather,
it refers to the systematic analysis and evaluation of al-
ternative courses of action drawing upon the analytical
tools and insights provided by economics and decision
theory. It is a framework and a set of procedures to help
organize the available information.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING FOR
REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 39 (1975)
(report prepared by National Research Council).
188 Textile Brief at 54, 56 (citing section 3(8) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. §652(8) (1976)). Essentially, petitioners here
claim that the agency should have conducted an analysis of
the cost-effectiveness of both the agency’s dust control strategy
and the industry’s proposed alternative. In contrast to cost-
benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness is only used to compare
alternatives for reaching the same goal. Like cost-benefit,
cost-effectiveness analysis often raises intractable problems in
obtaining the requisite measures that enable comparison.
QUADE, supra note 152 at 25-28. Although the two kinds of
analysis differ, the petitioners raise essentially the same claim
with each one: they ask us to find OSHA’s failure to employ
these methods a fatal flaw in its proceedings.
14 43 Fed. Reg. 27378 (1978). The agency noted that “al-
though the benefits of the standard cannot rationally be quan-
tified in dollars, OSHA has given careful consideration to the
question of whether these substantial] costs are justified in
the light of the hazards of exposure to cotton dust.” Jd. at
27379.
71
Act constrains its regulation of dangerous substances
“only by the limits of feasibility.” ** We agree. We also
find that no additional constraint is imposed by the Act’s
definition of a health or safety standard as “reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment.” ** The language of the Act and the clear
intention of Congress permit no other conclusion.
Other statutory schemes explicitly require such par-
ticular kinds of analysis. In the Clean Air Act, for
example, Congress required the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to perform a “cost benefit analysis” before
prohibiting the manufacture or sale of a fuel or fuel
additive which endangers public health or welfare.’*'
Some Congressional Acts require a showing of “unreason-
able risk” prior to regulation.*** The legislative histories
of these acts have led the courts to construe this pro-
vision to require regulatory agencies to balance costs
and benefits of proposed action.'*
165 Td, at 27378.
186 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
187 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c) (2) (B) (1976). See also Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136
(bb) (1976) (determining “unreasonable risk to man or the
environment” includes consideration of “economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide’).
188 E.g., Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1261s (1976) (article is mechanical hazard if it presents
“unreasonable risk of personal injury or illness”) ; Consumer
Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c) (2) (A) (1976)
(rule must be “reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce
an unreasonable risk of injury”); Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1976) (requirements may be im-
posed if chemical presents “unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment’).
159 F’.g., Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 559
F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted) :
The requirement that the risk [posed by mechanical haz-
ards] be “unreasonable” necessarily involves a balancing
72
In the OSH Act, in contrast, Congress itself struck
the balance between costs and benefits in the mandate to
the agency. Section 6(b)(5) unequivocally mandates
OSHA to /
set the standard which most adequately assures, to
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best avail-
able evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity.’
Thus Congress concluded that the benefits of health pro-
tection warranted the expense of an effective standard.’
test like that familiar in tort law: The regulation may
issue if the severity of the injury that may result from
the product, factored by the likelihood of the injury, off-
sets the harm the regulation itself imposes upon manu-
facturers and consumers.
See also Aqua Slide “N” Dive v. Consumer Product Safety
Comm’n, 569 F.2d 831, 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1978) (using For-
ester balancing test definition for “unreasonable risk’) ; id.
at 845 (Wisdom, J., concurring) (requiring substantial evi-
dence for Commission’s cost-benefit analysis) .
As OSHA points out, when Congress wishes to require
cost-benefit analysis, it does so explicitly; when it wishes a
feasibility constraint instead, it so states. See OSHA Brief
at 121 n.96 (citing legislative history of Mine Safety and
Health Amendments of 1977, where Congress rejected amend-
ments that would insert cost-benefit analysis).
160 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976) (emphasis added).
161 Senator Eagleton, for example, stated during floor de-
bates on the Act that
The Costs that will be incurred by employers in meeting
the standards of health and safety to be established under
this bill are, in my view, reasonable and necessary costs
of doing business. Whether we, as individuals are moti-
vated by simple humanity or by simple economics, we
can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon an
unsafe or unhealthy workplace.
LEGIs. HIsT. at 1150-51 (from the Congressional Record,
Senate, Dec. 16, 1970).
4
73
In the legislative debates on the Act, Senator Yarborough
who sponsored the bill responded in no uncertain terms
to the claim that the proposed legislation would be too
expensive :*”
We are talking about people’s lives, not the indif-
ference of some cost accountants. ... We are talking
about assuring our American workers who work with
deadly chemicals that when they have accumulated
a few years seniority they will not have accumulated
lung congestion and poison in their bodies, or some-
thing that will strike them down before they reach
retirement age.’
In contrast to the Acts for which Congress contemplated
a cost-benefit requirement, the legislative history of the
OSH Act contains no reference to this kind of economic
analysis.’
162 Senator Yarborough preceded the statement quoted in
text with this comment:
[W]hen Congressman O’Hara and I introduced into the
House and Senate the first comprehensive occupational
health and safety bill, we drew the critical fire of several
organizations who claim that legislation of this type is
too expensive.
One may well ask too expensive to whom? Is it too
expensive for the company who for lack of proper safety
equipment loses the service of its skilled employees? Is
it too expensive for the employee who loses his hand or
leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the widow trying
to raise her children on meager allowance under work-
man’s compensation and social security? And what about
the man—a good hard-working man—tied to a wheel
chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That is what
we are dealing with when we talk about industrial safety.
LEGIS. HIST. at 510.
163 Jd. (emphasis added).
164 Instead, Congress anticipated severe costs from the
health and safety standards and provided a program of loans
74
Instead, Congress determined in the OSH Act that any
severe risk to employee health must be eliminated or
reduced if feasible means to do so exist.’ This calls for
a two-step analysis by the agency: (1) determining
whether health impairment is threatened by the suspect
substance, and (2) determining whether the selected
strategy is to protect workers from this risk is both tech-
nologically and economically feasible. Nothing in the stat-
ute or its legislative history requires a further determi-
nation that the costs of the standard bear a “reasonable”
relationship to its benefits.*** Nor may this court impose
to small businesses seriously affected by OSHA standards.
See section 28 of the Act (amending section 7(b) of the
Small Businesses Act, 15 U.S.C. § 636 (1976) ); Cong. Record
(Senate) (Nov. 17, 1970), Lecis. HIsT. at 525-26 (remarks
of Sen. Dominick).
165 The House Report concluded:
Even the price of one life is too expensive when a mean-
ingful occupational safety and health law could save
many lives. .. . The well-being of every American work-
ing man and woman is an essential human right which
we can no longer deny.
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1970),
reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at 865.
166 Petitioners mistakenly believe that cost-benefit or cost-
effectiveness analysis is mandated by the “reasonably neces-
sary or appropriate” language in the Act’s definition of health
and safety standards. In another context, this court con-
strued the familiar “necessary or appropriate” provision as
authorizing ‘“‘an agency to use means of regulation not spelled
out in detail, provided the agency’s action conforms with
the purposes and policies of Congress and does not contravene
any terms of the Act.” Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC,
879 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In this light, the “rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate” language grants OSHA
considerable discretion in adopting protective strategies to
guard against particular health risks. While cost-benefit and
cost-effectiveness analyses are techniques that can assist
evaluations of such strategies, they are not required by the
Act’s provisions.
75
additional procedural requirements.’ Indeed, the only
authorities cited by petitioners are not binding on this
circuit,‘ and in any event, they are not persuasive in
this context.’
#7 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 485 U.S.
519, 524 (1978), this court may not require OSHA to conduct
cost-benefit analysis unless the agency or Congress officially
requires this procedure. Such analysis is certainly not man-
dated in explicit terms by the statute. Nor is it implicated in
the extra-statutory procedures OSHA followed in promulgat-
ing the cotton dust standard. See TAN 54-55 supra (discus-
sing OSHA’s additional procedures) ; Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking Procedure: When May Something More
Formal Be Required?, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 781, 811 (1978).
168 Petitioners rely on Turner Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 561
F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977) (noise abatement enforcement ac-
tion) and three cases of another circuit, American Petroleum
Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 4981 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3554 (Feb. 20, 1979) (Nos. 78-911, 78-
1036) ; Aqua Slide “N” Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission, 569 F.2d 831, 844 (5th Cir. 1978)
(swimming pool slides) ; and Florida Peach Growers Ass’n
v. Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) (pesticide
residue). See Textile Brief at 37-38, 53-59.
This court, however, is bound by its construction of the
feasibility requirement in Industrial Union Department v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (asbestos
dust), which has been adopted in American Iron & Steel
Inst. v. OSHA, 477 F.2d 825, 835-36 (3d Cir. 1978) (coke
oven emissions), petitions for cert. pending, Nos. 78-918,
78-919; AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 580 F.2d 109 (38d Cir. 1975)
(revoking rule against permitting any workers’ hands in
machine dies). See TAN 92-94 supra.
16° Petitioners’ reliance on American Petroleum, supra, is
especially unpersuasive. The Fifth Circuit there based its
holding on its earlier interpretation of an entirely different
statutory scheme in Aqua Slide “N” Dive Corp. v. Consumer
Product Safety Commission, supra. Aqua Slide involved the
Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (c) (2) (A)
(1976), which employs the “unreasonable risk” language
76
Further, cost-benefit analysis would not necessarily
improve agency health and safety determinations.”
These techniques require the expression of costs, benefits
and performance in often arbitrary, measureable terms.”
They may hide assumptions and qualifications in the
that courts have construed to require a balancing test. See
n.158 supra. No such language appears in the OSH Act pro-
visions under which the cotton dust standard was issued.
Congress apparently drew the sensible conclusion that con-
sumers often may be in a better position than workers to
estimate and avoid risks. Petitioners’ view that the “rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate” language requires cost-
benefit analysis, Textile Brief at 55, is similarly misguided.
See TAN 156 supra.
Finally, petitioners mistakenly rely on two more cases
from other circuits that have little relevance to this case.
Florida Peach Growers Association v. Dep’t of Labor, supra,
concerned the issuance of emergency standards under § 6(c)
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §)655(c) (1976). Turner Co. v. Sec’y
of Labor, supra, similarly is inapposite. It involved the appeal
of an enforcement proceeding against a single manufacturer
under an existing noise standard. Although requiring a cost-
effectiveness analysis by the agency the Seventh Circuit in
Turner Co. explicitly endeavored to distinguish the noise
regulated in that case from other hazards that pose “serious
debilitating threats.” Id. at 86. Just such a serious risk is
posed by cotton dust exposure.
170 See P. Schuck, Regulation: Asking the Right Questions,
11 NaT’L J. 711, 711 (1979) :
Cost-benefit analyses are also invariably flawed. The rea-
sons for this are well-known: the difficulty of identifying
and quantifying many costs and benefits; the inevitably
arbitrary nature of valuations of human life or health ;
. . . the problem of interpersonal and intergenerational
comparisons of utility; and many others.
171 The National Academy of Sciences report, supra at 39-
44, identifies this measurement problem and the general diffi-
culty of estimating uncertain effects as serious shortcomings
of cost-benefit analysis. For a similar view, see QUADE, supra
at 25-26.
77
seeming objectivity of numerical estimates. Especially
where a policy aims to protect the health and lives of
thousands of people, the difficulties in comparing widely
dispersed benefits with more concentrated and calculable
costs may overwhelm the advantages of such analysis.!”
OSHA considered the alternative proposed by the in-
dustry and found it inadequate to protect against the
health risk at issue. We recognize that the agency’s
control strategy is costly. But it is the result of long
and comprehensive investigation by the agency assisted
by extensive public participation.” We find that the
health risk posed by cotton dust warranted agency ac-
tion, and that the final standard chosen by the agency is
technologically and economically feasible for the textile
industry within the meaning of the Act.!
IV. NON-TEXTILE INDUSTRIES
In the final standard, OSHA set a permissible ex-
posure level of 500 »g/m* for all non-textile industries
covered by the standard.’ Three such industries here
172 Not only are the benefits of the regulation dispersed
over thousands of people, they are also spread over lifetimes.
The delayed effect of cotton dust exposure causes one of the
difficulties in estimating its harm. In directing OSHA to
promulgate standards on the basis of the “best available evi-
dence,” 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976), Congress wished to
avoid administrative paralysis caused by experts’ debates.
H.R. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970), Legis.
Hist. at 848. Certainly, it would not have wanted adminis-
trative paralysis caused by debate over a standard’s cost and
benefits.
178 See TAN 80-84 supra.
174 See TAN 97-150 supra.
5 43 Fed. Reg. 27360, 27895 (1978) (§ 1919.1043 (c) (8) )
(standard for all workplaces except yarn manufacturing and
slashing and weaving).
78
challengé the standard:' (1) the cottonseed oil mills,
which process cottonseed and its byproducts; (2) the
cotton warehouses, which store raw, baled cotton; and
(3) the classing offices, which classify samples of cotton
fiber.'77
The non-textile petitioners claim that OSHA failed
to establish that their workers risk material health im-
pairment and that the PEL set for these industries is
arbitrary. Further, they claim that the standard is in-
feasible on both technological and economic grounds.
A. Health Risks and Permissible Dust Exposure
Petitioners do not dispute that their employees are
exposed to cotton dust,’”* often at higher levels than in
textile mills. They assert, however, that the work
processes, dust composition, and worker exposure to dust
in nontextile industries differ significantly from the
textile industry.’” In this way, petitioners seek to chal-
lenge OSHA’s general position that exposure to cotton
176 See also note 1 supra.
117 Non-Textile Brief at 4. OSHA explained that the
standard applies to
all non-textile industries including but not limited to:
warehousing, compressing of cotton lint, classing and
marketing, using cotton yarn (i.e., knitting), reclaiming
and marketing of textile manufacturing waste, delinting
of cottonseed, marketing and converting linters, reclaim-
ing and marketing of gin motes and batting, yarn felt
manufacturing using waste cotton fibers and by products.
43 Fed. Reg. 27360 (1978).
178 Instead, petitioners argue that the composition of the
dust in their workplaces differs from the dust in textile mills,
Non-Textile Brief at 34-38.
179 F.g., Non-Textile Brief at 33.
79
dust poses a serious hazard to workers regardless of
where the dust is encountered.'”
The exact nature of the health hazard posed by cotton
dust remains subject to medical debate.*' The agency
had before it conclusive evidence that dust found in textile
mills causes debilitating disease; ‘** it also had some evi-
dence of related, though less severe, health impairments
among workers in nontextile industries.“* Although pe-
titioners point to differences among the industries,
OSHA’s mandate requires it ot protect workers in all
industries." We find that OSHA fulfilled this mandate
by reasonably relying on medical evidence from the tex-
tile industry’* and evidence of health impairments
189 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27860-61 (1978).
181 Petitioners claim that the bract and leaf-like trash is the
element in cotton dust most likely to cause disease. Non-
Textile Brief at 34. On this theory, petitioners attempt to
distinguish the dust in their industries from the dust in the
textile mills. Jd. at 35-39. In so doing, petitioners rely on
some studies that were not in the rulemaking record, id. at 34
n. 103, and ignore others actually in the record that contra-
dict their conclusion, see, e.g., J.A. 12.1 (Dr. Bouhuys). The
agency fully explains the nature of the debate. 48 Fed. Reg.
27354 (1978). This court will not reach beyond the record
to displace the agency’s judgment that conclusive evidence is
not yet available to isolate the causal agent.
182 See Part III supra.
183 F’.g., Report on the Evaluation of Respiratory Effects of
Cottonseed Dust Inhalation (1976) (Jones & Weill study),
J.A. 408-35 (acute broncho-constrictor effect in cottonseed oil
mill employees); Testimony of Dr. Martin Barman, J.A.
2972 (1978) (pulmonary function decrements in warehouse
employees)
18429 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1976).
185 Courts have approved OSHA’s extrapolations from evi-
dence of carcinogens in one industry to another, related in-
dustry, ¢.g., Soc’y of Plastics v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1810
80
among nontextile workers.'* The differences in the in-
dustries that were cited by petitioners do not undermine
the agency’s determination.
(2d Cir. 1975) (fabricators of products using PVC resins).
This court has permitted an agency to draw on studies of one
carcinogent to regulate another, related substance. EDF v.
EPA, 578 F.2d 68, 83-85, (D.C. Cir. 1978) (approving extra-
polation from knowledge about highly chlorinated poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBS) to less chlorinated PCBs).
Petitioners claim that this case is inapplicable here because
the court relied on the “ample margin of safety” section
307(a) of provision in Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. 38 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1976). Non-
Textile Reply Brief at 16-17. For the purposes of permitting
extrapolations, OSHA’s duty to ensure that “no employee will
suffer material impairment of health,” 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b) (5),
is no less protective than the “ample margin of safety” pro-
vision. Further, deference to agency expertise and recogni-
tion of administrative feasibility also contributed to this
court’s approval of the agency’s use of inference and extra-
polation in EDF v. EPA. Id. at 46-48. These considerations
apply with equal force here. See also American Federation
of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d at 115 (reviewing court does
not sit to determine “scientific superiority” of agency’s extra-
polations).
186 OSHA pointed to foreign studies of severe health im-
pairments in nontextile industries, e.g., Noweir, et al., Ex-
posure to dust in the Cottonseed Oil Extraction Industry, 19
ARCH. ENVIRON. HEALTH 99 (1969), J.A. 3210 (byssinotic
symptoms in 35 out of 110 cottonseed oil mill workers) ;
Barnes & Simpson, Ventilary Capacity Changes on Expsoure
to Cotton Dust, MED. J. OF AUSTRALIA, 897 (May 25, 1968),
J.A. 3218 (chest tightness and wheezing among workers in
delinting and cottonseed storage industries). Petitioners criti-
cize OSHA’s reliance on these studies because the foreign
plants differ from domestic ones. J.A. 3319; Non-Textile
Brief at 23-26.
OSHA also had evidence of lung impairments in domestic
nontextile industries, but generally these effects were less
severe. (E£.g., Statement of Dr. K. D. McMurrain, J.A. 2719.
(reviewing Jones and Weill Study of cottonseed oil mills).
81
The agency did acknowledge that health effects in
the nontextile industries appear to be less prevalent and
less severe than in the textile mills,* but concluded that
the individual nontextile workers still run the risk of
material health impairment. The agency reasoned that
high worker turnover and movement in the workplace,
rather than a lesser risk from exposure to dust, may
explain the less severe aggregate pattern of disease.’
We find no reason to disturb this judgment in favor of
the more dubious conclusion that the nontextile work-
ers are not endangered.
Moreover, the agency took account of the pattern of
health effects when it raised the final PEL for the non-
textile industries to 500 »g/m* from the proposed 200
pg/m*® level." The agency fairly concluded that the in-
dustries’ data lent guidance to the permissible dust ex-
posure level, but did not cast doubt on the agency’s evi-
dence of health risks to nontextile workers.’
187 43 Fed. Reg. 27361 (1978).
188 Id. (citing Statement of Phillip J. Wakelyn, National
Cotton Council of American, J.A. 2698-2704, and other testi-
mony in the record).
18° 43 Fed. Reg. 27355 (1978).
19 Id. The industry challenges the PEL as arbitrary. OSHA
admits that “in the absence of detailed dose-response data, the
risk to workers from cotton dust generated in many segments
of the non-textile industry cannot be precisely defined.” Jd.
Yet OSHA’s mandate calls for standards “expressed in terms
of objective criteria and of performance desired” whenever
practicable. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (5) (1976). To this end,
the agency reasonably selected the PEL of 500 pg/m*. The
agency explained that this level for only respirable dust is
roughly equivalent to the pre-existing theshold limit of 1.0
mg/m of total dust. 43 Fed. Reg. 27361 (1978). See TAN
24-26 supra. Although expressing reservations, Merchant
suggested 500 »g/m* as “not an unreasonable approach”
pending further study. Tr. 1297, J.A. 3696. We agree.
82
OSHA thus explained the evidence it used, the rea-
sons for its conclusions, and its responses to the in-
dustries’ evidence and objections. When agencies are
entrusted with regulating risks on the frontiers of scien-
tific and medical knowledge, we cannot ask for more.’
Petitioners nevertheless argue that we should find it
arbitrary and unreasonable for OSHA to set the standard
before NIOSH completes its study of the nontextile in-
dustries.*? Certainly, OSHA should take advantage of
the ongoing research of NIOSH and other major in-
quiries into occupational health and safety. But by law,
OSHA need not wait for NIOSH recommendations before
protecting against occupational health risks.’ Nor are
191 See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) :
Where .. . the regulations turn on choices of policy, on
an assessment of risks, or on predictions dealing with
matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, we will
demand adequate reasons and explanations, but not “find-
ings” of the sort familiar from the world of adjudication.
In Soc’y of Plastics v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1308, the Second
Circuit observed that “though the factual finger poinis, it
does not conclude.” Nonetheless, the court concluded that
OSHA is authorized ‘“‘to act even in circumstances where ex-
isting methodology or research is deficient.” Jd.
192 Non-Textile Brief at 42-44; Non-Textile Reply Brief at
10-14. Petitioners cite a NIOSH statement that identifies the
limitations existing studies on non-textile cotton dust exposure.
Non-Textile Brief at 42-44 (citing NIOSH Supporting State-
ment: Characteristics of Byssinosis in Segments of the Cot-
ton Industry—Mattresses and Cotton Matting, Cottonseed Oil,
Waste Recyclers, Cotton Warehousers and Cotton Classifica-
tion Officers, J.A. 3036). NIOSH’s criticisms were written to
justify its decision to study the area, not to dispute the health
risk posed by cotton dust in the non-textile industries.
198 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976). Indeed, the Secretary may
initiate the regulatory process on the basis of information
submitted in writing to him by any interested person. 29
. 83
such recommendations conclusive.* A legitimate chal-
lenge to a health and safety standard can be raised as
new data emerges,’ but OSHA did not exceed its au-
thority by regulating as soon as it knew of the risks of
material health impairment from dust exposure.’
B. Feasibility
Judgments about the technological capabilities and fi-
nancial positions of the industries affected by the stand-
U.S.C. § 655(b) (1). OSHA is to base its standards on the
“latest available scientific data in the field,” 29 U.S.C. § 655
(b) (5), but it is not required to wait for mae that is not yet
available.
1% NIOSH was created to assist OSHA in carrying out its
general purposes and in fulfilling the research and training
provisions of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1978). This court
determined that OSHA must consider all information made
available by interested parties and experts, so determinations
of NIOSH are only one factor in OSHA’s deliberations. 499
F.2d at 476-77.
19% An agency has a duty to revise its standards in light of
new information. See Public Service Comm’n v. FPC, 511
F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1975). OSHA has commendably com-
mitted itself to reviewing the standard it set for cotton gins
“at the end of five years, or earlier if sufficient evidence of the
need for a specific exposure limit is presented.” 43 Fed. Reg.
27424 (1978) (standard to appear at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1046,
1928.21). It would seem advisable for it to undertake a simi-
lar commitment for the non-textile standard at issue here.
196 There seems no limit to petitioners’ claim that OSHA
has to wait for a pending study before promulgating the
standard. After that study, there would always be another
study, and then another, that could be deemed necessary con-
tribution to the regulation. Congress did not intend OSHA to
“be paralyzed by debate surrounding diverse medical opinion.”
H.Rep. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 18 (1970), reprinted
in LEGIS. HIST. at 848. Rather, at OSHA concluded in this
instance, “[p]rotection of employees cannot await resolution
of all the points of scientific debate.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27355
(1978).
84
ard depend on the evidence for each one, so we examine
evidence on the warehouse, classing office, and cotton-
seed oil mill industries.
1. Warehouses and Classing Offices
The warehousing industry does not dispute the feasi-
bility of the standard. Indeed, OSHA determined that
most warehouses are already in compliance with the
standard now that the final PEL for that industry has
been raised to 500 »g/m*.’* For those portions of the
industry not in compliance, the record indicates that im-
proved ventilation and housekeeping will adequately as-
sure compliance.’*®
OSHA also reasonably concluded that most classing
offices ** are “substantially in compliance” with the 500
pg/m* PEL. Where dust control is necessary, the rec-
1743 Fed. Reg. 27868 (1978); J.A. 2961 (Statement of
Phillip Wakelyn) ; J.A. 3008 (Nat’l Cotton Council of Ameri-
ca, Economic Impact of OSHA’s Proposed Cotton Dust Stand-
ard on Cotton Warehouses, 1977) (hereinafter cited as NCCA
Warehouse Study). The industry and the agency both calcu-
lated exposure levels on a time-weighted basis, that is, aver-
aged over a work day, because workers move in and out of
dusty areas over the course of a day. NCCA Warehouse
Study, J.A. 3010; Statement of Phillip Wakelyn, J.A. 2962;
43 Fed. Reg. 27395 (1978) (§ 1910.1043(c) (3) ).
198 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27368; NCCA Warehouse Study, J.A.
3009-11.
19 Classing offices classify grades of raw cotton by examin-
ing small samples. See TAN 177 supra.
200 43 Fed. Reg. 27362 (1978). This finding is supported in
the record. See J.A. 2839-40 (Hodgkins, Dep’t of Agricul-
ture, Control of Dust Levels in Cotton Classing Offices). As in
warehouses, dust exposure in classing offices is calculated on
a time-weighted basis. J.A. 3132 (Statement of American
Cotton Shippers Association); 43 Fed. Reg. 27395 (1978)
(§ 1910.1043(c) (3) ).
85
ord supports OSHA’s finding that minor ventilation modi-
fications can effectively reduce dust exposure in classing
offices to the requisite level.”
Thus we uphold the agency’s finding that dust control
is both technologically and economically feasible for ware-
housing and classing offices. These two industries claim,
however, that non-engineering controls required by
OSHA—medical surveillance and provision of respirators
—will impose burdensome and unjustified costs.2? Con-
gress itself rejected this claim. It authorized the agency
to regulate even if industries become financially bur-
dened,™ so long as the burden is not “prohibitively ex-
pensive.” ** OSHA need not “justify” its health and
safety standards through a cost-benefit analysis ?* as the
petitioners imply. Rather, OSHA must simply establish
the risk of material health impairment and demonstrate
the economic and technological feasibility of its standard
for the regulated industries. We hold that it has satis-
fied these requirements for the warehousing and classing
office industries.
1 See 43 Fed. Reg. 27368 (1978) ; J.A. 2339-40 (Hodgkins,
Dep’t of Agriculture, Control of Dust Levels in Cotton Class-
ing Offices) .
72 Non-Textile Brief at 60-62. As these petitioners main-
tain that OSHA failed to demonstrate a material health
hazard in either the warehousing or classing office industries,
they argue that the costs of complying with the standard are
“completely unjustified.” Jd. at 63.
28 See TAN 93-99 supra.
7 Industrial Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
26 See TAN 155-74 supra.
26 See TAN 166 supra.
86
2. Cottonseed Oil Mills
Perhaps the most hotly contested aspect of the stand-
ard is its feasibility for the cottonseed oil industry.
OSHA admits that considerable effort will be required
for this industry to comply with the standard. We find
that OSHA has adequately demonstrated the technologi-
cal feasibility of the standard for this industry, but
the record does not sufficientiy establish its economic
feasibility.
First, the record does sufficiently support the agency’s
conclusion that existing methods of dust control will
permit compliance with the dust exposure level set for
this industry. OSHA reli
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