Petition — Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos

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In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

Ocrozrer TERM, 1979

me 279-512

ScrnprA SteAM Navicatron Co., Lirp.,

Petitioner,

vs.

Lauro DE Los Santos and SeatTLe SrevevorE Co.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Grayvon S. Sarina

Two Embarcadero Center

San Francisco, California 94111

Attorney for Petitioner

LuGnros, BucHANAN, PAUL

& MADDEN

Roserr fl, MADDEN

Lrtnick Mctlosr & CHARLES

Mpwarp M. Keecu

Of Counsel

BOWNE-PERNAU WALSH © 1045 SANSOME ST. ¢ a.F., CA @4111 © (415) 961-7664

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

BEER PION ne 0" a Cine ane A aR 2

ESE EE Pe i i Sg Raa MRS aa: 2

SCE Rn, Ser ae Le a aL a 2

IS Niger) 0 oe ag ee na te de ee ah 3

IE I oda Po ae Ne 3

weenie see eres Mie WHR... ere ek 6

Background of the question ............................. 6

PRE RR TS et RRP ht RA re Bis 8

Importance of the question )........................000. 13

3. SERSON RE i SGP) spa nama renee can 16

STS all Ot ee) ae) my Ee | hte 17

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Page

Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., 431 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass.

ACRE SE Rees OF 7A aM meNp eee MU Tras Cera 5, 12

Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., 585 F.2d 1142 (1st Cir.

TG eS > WA RE ei En Seen PETE <r 9, 12

Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 1976

Bs Ie Ce ls TU ove eh eg os pes eek ee eS

Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd. and Twin Harbor

Stevedoring Co., 9th Cir. Nos. 77-3043 and 77-3645, decided

PN oad Sh si bn cian an oS Nae es 14, 16

Briley v. Charente Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1978) 9

Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 1977

Bee EE 8 ok a) wees ces dies ees 9,11

Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 1978 A.M.C. 1920

thd dhl As will Ghk die wih Spt wees aid Wh gie's wo 0 8

Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978) ...... 9

Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.

a ekki y WOR Cony Sha Raise d's awe eRe Ns 4 ap 5,8

Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798,

DO a, BOE COP PTD oo vce cece ceca ceues 9, 10

Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, No. 78-479

ON SRNR E ROP erg epee vane y te 15, 16, 17

Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1977

PROT RF Ge sere tow acrr ree 9, 11

Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 3d Cir. Nos. 78-

2159, 78-2160 and 78-2161, decided August 24, 1979 ....... 15

ee Ns CUD se sins cane does race neven 15

Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570

F.2d 449, 1978 A.M.C. 355 (2d Cir. 1978) ............... 9, 10

Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1977 A.M.C. 1625

I yooh, Sa hp Red oh tas « xin ano hee 9, 10, 12

Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring

Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964) ...............

Lawson v. United States, 9th Cir. No. 77-2510, decided August

a iy a NR a a

Lopez v. A/S, D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 1978 A.M.C. 1655

I ES ONS AGS a Aa ns tm vue bis a'd. 6 htm an 8

Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 364,

ER ie Rs Be “AR | ei nee 8,9

Matthews v. Ernst Russ Steamship Co., 7th Cir. 78-2547,

ee |S ee een ree 14, 16

lil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CAsES

Page

Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, 553 F.2d 837, 1977

PR ee Cs TED so ch ha Fed Oe wed Sea ec cua 9, 10

Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 1976 A.M.C. 551

ee 0 hee Va de vce has os bee esos od ERD 9

Prohoroff v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 640,

pe EG ER Ree i ae nn 8

Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.1979) . 9

Riddle v. Exxon Transportation Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1978

Des Ue Wi esc ey Os ein og nncedbens ceeoks 9

Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861, 1977

i CO EE Re PE Gas bo vip ny bob ce es vnc wk Seen 9

Samuels v. Empresa Lines Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884,

1076 A.M.C, 1647 (Sth Cir. 1078) ...... 0... cence. 9

Wiles v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d 1338, 1978

Me, WE Te BD doe ic koa ks se scbanece 9

Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras S.A., 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.

SS ia ped tae ers ee ee hs Bue es, sic ert a et 9, 12

Statutes

ran MARI Bac s a's caw aligias KN Pee wae kOe oe es 2

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33

Me BME nok gaa tes boc, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15

Regulation

Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring

a0 C.F. Gettion TVIGGS(aj(G) 2... 05... eee renin. 11

Miscellaneous

2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1015 (1956) ..... 11,13

H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972]

U.S. Code Cong., & Ad. News 4698 ......................

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965):

EE a sd es een sy RAS EAE PiU eM ca eS 5, 6, 8, 10, 12

POE eo ce RE ee eee ete 5, 6, 8, 10, 12

NM os o.9. gic Sac bu WAN pues x aise NS bei 10

ON 0a a. CUE Ey a co os bk MERGER idee Hue 10

S. Rep. 92-1125, 92nd Cong,., 2d Sess. ..................005. 7

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OctoBer TERM, 1979

No.

Scinpia Steam Navication Co., Lp.,

Petitioner,

Vs.

Lauro DE Los Santos and Seatrie Stevepore Co.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit, first entered in this case May 1, 1979,

as to which rehearing was denied June 28, 1979.

»)

OPINIONS BELOW

The order and opinion of Judge Walter T. McGovern,

Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington, are not officially reported?

but are set forth in Appendix pages A-1 through A-6, infra.

The initial opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 598 F.2d 480 and is set

forth in Appendix pages B-1 through B-23, infra. The

order of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for

rehearing is not reported but is set forth in Appendix

pages C-1 through C-3, infra.

JURISDICTION

On May 1, 1979, the Court of Appeals entered its judg-

ment reversing the decision of the District Court granting

the petitioner’s summary judgment motion. A petition for

rehearing was timely filed May 15, 1979, and was denied on

June 28, 1979. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. section 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented is whether a shipowner is re-

quired to countermand a stevedore contractor’s informed

decision regarding the safety of work methods and equip-

ment in order to avoid liability to longshoremen who are

employees of the stevedore company under the negligence

standard of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s

and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 905(b).

1They are reported at 1976 A.M.C. 2583.

3

STATUTE INVOLVED

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation

Act, as amended in 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) :

In the event of injury to a person covered under this

chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such

person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover dam-

ages by reason thereof, may bring an action against

such vessel as a third party in accordance with the

provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer

shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages di-

rectly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties

to the contrary shall be void. If such person was em-

ployed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services,

no such action shall be permitted if the injury was

caused by the negligence of persons engaged in pro-

viding stevedoring services to the vessel. If such

person was employed by the vessel to provide ship

building or repair services, no such action shall be

permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence

of persons engaged in providing ship building or re-

pair services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel

under this subsection shall not be based upon the war-

ranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time

the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this sub-

section shall be exclusive of all other remedies against

the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff is a longshoreman who filed this action within

the diversity jurisdiction of the United States District

Court for the Western District of Washington to recover

damages, in addition to his workers’ compensation bene-

fits, for injuries he sustained aboard petitioner’s ship just

after the effective date of the 1972 Amendments to the

+

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,

33 U.S.C. § 905(b).

For two days, plaintiff and other longshoremen, all em-

ployees of Seattle Stevedore Company, had worked with

a winch whose brake continually malfunctioned (Appendix,

p. B-2).? Although the longshoremen complained to their

supervisors (Appendix, p. B-19), those supervisors never

relayed the complaints to the shipowner, and the plaintiff

did not contend that the shipowner ever knew of the mal-

function (Appendix, p. A-4). When a malfunction of the

brake caused a load of cargo to land unevenly and some

sacks of cargo to spill off the load, the stevedore company’s

hatch tender directed the load with the remaining sacks in

a loose pile to be raised about 15 feet. With full knowledge

of the condition of the brake and after surveying the re-

maining sacks on the load and deciding there was no dan-

ger, the hatch tender decided to allow the load to remain

suspended over the longshoremen while they cleaned up the

spill. (Appendix, pages B-2, B-3).* About ten minutes later,

more sacks fell, dislodged hecause of the slipping brake,

and injured plaintiff (Appendix, p. B-3).

The district court granted the shipowner’s summary

judgment motion, holding that the shipowner could not be

held negligent and that the longshoremen’s working under

the suspended load was so blatantly dangerous that any

pre-existing defect in the winch could not be a proximate

cause of the injury (Appendix A).

The facts set forth here are those the courts below considered to

be least favorable to the shipowner.

‘The hatch tender had testified at his deposition that it was

solely his decision whether to suspend the load over the men work-

ing below. (Deposition of Alvin H. Botler, p. 48.)

5)

The Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion which ex-

pressly rejected the decisions of the Second, Fourth and

Fifth Circuits applying standards derived from the analogy

to the duties of land-based premises owners in sections

343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)

(Appendix, pp. B-12, B-13). Instead, the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit, in reliance on Anderson v. Iceland

Steamship Co., 431 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1977), adopted

a new standard of care under which it was said the ship-

owner might be found liable (Appendix, p. B-11). Ander-

som, a case imposing a duty on the shipowner not to

discharge cargo posing a danger to longshoremen, had,

however, been reversed by the Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit. 585 F.2d 1142 (1978).

The shipowner petitioned for rehearing and rehearing

en banc, arguing that the standard of care derived from

the trial court opinion in Anderson received no support

from the First Circuit opinion in Anderson and placed the

Ninth Circuit in conflict not only with the Courts of Ap-

peals of the Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, as noted

by the Court (Appendix, pp. B-12, B-13), but also with

those of the First, Third and Seventh Circuits, and prob-

ably the Sixth Circuit, and with prior decisions of its own.

Denying a rehearing, the Court of Appeals conceded con-

flict with the recently decided Clemons* case in the Seventh

Circuit, but claimed that there was no conflict with either

the First or Third Circuits,’ since those Circuits, had re-

‘Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.

1979).

‘This claim was made despite the court’s having cited and ex-

ressly rejected a Third Circuit case which had embraced a re-

Gieclitesten of control standard (Appendix, p. B-21, n.7).

6

jected application of sections 343 and 343A (Appendix, pp.

C-2, C-3). The new Ninth Circuit standard, which requires

the shipowner to divine danger in the stevedore’s consid-

ered decision to operate in the face of known conditions,

remained unmodified, although it lacked support in any

other court of appeals decisions and was in conflict with

the law of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and

Seventh Circuits.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Writ of Certiorari should be granted because the

Court of Appeals has:

1. Rendered a decision in this case in conflict with de-

cisions on the same matter of five other Courts of Appeals,

those of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh

Circuits, by its own acknowledgement, and

2. Decided an important question of federal law which

has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

Background of the Question

The issue here arises under 33 U.S.C. section 905(b), a

subsection enacted in 1972 as one of the major reforms of

the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation

Act at that time. By its provisions Congress ¢liminated un-

seaworthiness as a ground of recovery by the longshoreman

against the vessel and restricted his recovery to an action

for negligence, under new conditions furthering the policy

of the Act. The legislative history, supported by court

decisions since, shows that the new action for negligence is

(

to be uniform throughout the country® but not based upon

maritime doctrines.’ Rather it is to be based upon tradi-

tional standards ashore so as to “place an employee injured

aboard a vessel in the same position he would be if he were

injured in non-maritime employment ashore”. The an-

nounced policy of the changes made was to establish a

fully adequate system of compensation benefits’ and thus

assure that the employer (who has ordinarily the best op-

portunity to promote safety)” “bears the cost of unsafe

conditions ... [so as] to strengthen the employer’s incen-

tive to provide the fullest measure of on-the-job safety”™

and reduce reliance upon suits against vessels.’* More par-

ticularly it was stated that “a vessel shall not be liable...

for the manner or method in which stevedores or employees

of stevedores ... perform their work”’.*®

When longshoremen’s negligence cases began to arise

under section 905(b), there was no doubt, of course, that

the shipowner would be liable for active negligent behavior

toward the longshoreman and few eases involving such con-

6S. Rep. 92-1125, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 12; H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441,

92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong., & Ad.

News 4698, 4705.

7S. Rep., supra note 6, at 10; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4703.

8Ibid; “The Committee intends . . . that the vessel shall not be

liable . . . unless it is proven to have acted or have failed to act in

a negligent manner such as would render a land-based third party

in non-maritime pursuits liable under similar circumstances.” S.

Rep., supranote 6, at 11; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4704.

athe Rep., supra note 6, at 2, 5; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4699,

Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring

Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964).

"™S. Rep., supra note 6, at 2; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4699.

12See S. Rep., supra note 6, at 4.

8S, Rep., supra note 6, at 10; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4703.

—

SS)

duct have reached the appellate courts.** The cases the

appellate courts were faced with were of a different charac-

ter, involving conditions of equipment or of working areas

voluntarily accepted by the stevedores or operating meth-

ods used by them, as contrasted with active negligent be-

havior of the vessels. The courts, in order to effectuate the

clear policy of the Amendments, began a quest to find in

traditional non-maritime sources a suitable definition of the

limited circumstances, if any, in which the shipowner should

shoulder burdens of preparation, supervision and oversight

for the safety of the longshoreman working aboard under

the actual control of his stevedore employer. It is that

quest which the Court will see illustrated in the decisions

listed below, with which the present case is in conflict.

The Conflicts

Prior to the decision in this case the Courts of Appeals,

in their quest for a standard limiting the shipowner’s duty

to oversee the stevedore’s safety functions, found three

principal formulas. In a number of decisions they applied

(as the District Court did in the instant case) sections 343

and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, giving ef-

fect to the provision of section 343A with respect to known

or obvious conditions by expecting that the stevedore’s

supervisors and safety organization might be relied upon

to discover and cope with such conditions.** In another

4For a case of active negligence, see Prohoroff v. Kawasaki Kisen

Kaisha, Ltd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 640, 153 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1979),

where the crew put grease on the deck.

Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746, 1979

A.M.C., 999 (7th Cir. 1979); Lopez v. A/S, D/S, Svendborg, 581 F.2d

319, 1978 A.M.C. 1655 (2d Cir. 1978); Canizzo v. Farrell Lines,

Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 1978 A.M.C. 1920 (2d Cir. 1978); Lubrano v.

Royal Netherlands Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 364, 1978 A.M.C. 826

9

group of decisions the Courts of Appeals implemented the

policy of the Act by declining to impose the duty of super-

vision upon the vessel where it was shown that the ship-

owner had relinquished full control of the situation to the

stevedore.”* In still another group of cases, which is quite

analogous to the last one, substantially the same effect is

reached by explicit resort again to the Restatement (See-

ond) of Torts, this time to sections 409 and 414, dealing

with the duties retained by those who employ independent

contractors.”

Although there is conflict in detail among the three

groups of cases just described, the same results will prob-

ably be reached in most cases under any of their standards.

More important than their differences is what they have in

(2d Cir. 1978); Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka,

Zvir, 570 F.2d 449, 1978 A.M.C. 355 (2d Cir. 1978); Ruffino v.

Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861, 1977 A.M.C. 1289 (2d

Cir. 1977); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 1976

A.M.C. 551 (2d Cir. 1976); Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072

(4th Cir. 1978); Riddle v. Exxon Transportation Co., 563 F.2d 1103,

1978 A.M.C. 741 (4th Cir. 1977); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners

Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 1976 A.M.C. 2048 (4th Cir. 1976); Samuels

v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 1978

A.M.C. 1647 (5th Cir. 1978); Wiles v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.,

574 F.2d 1338, 1978 A.M.C. 2427 (5th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Mitsu-

bishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 1977 A.M.C. 989 (5th Cir.

1977); Gay v. Ocean eet & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233,

1977 A.M.C. 996 (5th Cir. 1977).

**Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S$.A., 577 F.2d 798,

1978 A.M.C. 1277 (2d Cir. 1978); Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linij-

ska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449, 1978 A.M.C. 355 (2d Cir.

1978); Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1977 A.M.C.

1625 (3d Cir. 1977); Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana.

553 F.2d 837, 1977 A.M.C. 843 (2d Cir. 1977); Briley v. Charente

Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1978); Wescott v. Impresas

Armadoras, S.A., 564 F.2d 875, 1979 A.M.C. 930 (9th Cir. 1977).

“Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979):

Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., supra note 16; Anderson v. Iceland

Steamship Co., F.2d 1142 (1st Cir. 1978); Ruffino v. Scindia

Steam Navigation Co., supra note 15.

10

common: recognition of the need for reasonable limitations

upon the circumstances when the shipowner must undertake

an active duty of care for the safety of the longshoreman,

especially in respect of safety inspections and supervision.

The decision of the court below in this case conflicts with

the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, not only in formu-

lation of standards and in results but, even more impor-

tantly, in its rejection of even the attempt to formulate

such a standard for the creation of a shipowner’s duty, for

which the other courts have sought.

The Court of Appeals below expressly rejected the au-

thority of each of the lines of cases described and cited

above. The court was “not unmindful” that the Second,

Fourth and Fifth Circuits had defined negligence in terms

of sections 343 and 343A, but nevertheless chose not to

follow them: “We decline to follow the lead of these Cir-

cuits... .” 598 F.2d at 486, Appendix, pp. B-12, B-13. Sim-

ilarly the court recognized the line of cases focusing on the

stevedore’s control and the line deriving limitation of duty

from Restatement sections 409 and 414. “[ W]e do not follow

those cases which have foeused . . . on whether the ship-

owner relinquished control of the stevedoring ....” 598 F.2d

at 490, Appendix, p. B-21. Those cases, as the court noted

in a footnote which included specific mention of sections

409 and 414, were Cor, Hickman, Hurst, and Munoz. 598

F.2d at 490 n. 7, Appendix, p. B-21.

But the court below went much further than to reject

the specific bases on which the shipowner’s duty had pre-

viously been limited; it rejected the very idea of restric-

tion, The court quoted from a district court opinion:

11

Discussions relating to invitees, contractors, primary

and second responsibilities, obviousness of dangers,

and the relinquishment of control all have the tendency

to steer courts away from a balance of the risk of

harm against the utility of the particular conduct in

question. [598 F.2d at 488, Appendix, p. B-16, quoting

Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., 435 F.Supp. 484, 496,

1977 A.M.C, 1325, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1977).]

Thus, this case presents not only specific conflicts of

standards and results with prior cases, but also an even

more fundamental conflict. American tort law generally

imposes firm limits on the duty to take affirmative action,

but does not impose such limits on the duty to act reason-

ably when one does act. As illustrated by the quotation

from Gallardo regarding the “utility of .. . conduct”, the

opinion below obliterates the distinction between the duty

to act at all and the duty to make one’s actions reasonable.

Cf. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1015, 1017,

1044-58 (1956).

This is not merely a quibble over the formulation of

similar standards. The conscientious application of any of

the rejected standards would have led to a different con-

clusion. The condition of the winch was obvious and known

to the stevedore company. Since the condition of the winch

was one which the shipowner would expect the stevedore

to report to it** and since it “was not the type of danger

“The applicable longshore regulation requires:

Any defect or malfunction of winches shall be reported imme-

diately to the officer in charge of the vessel. [Safety and

Health Regulations for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.53(a)

(5).]

12

that must be faced notwithstanding knowledge”,”® a court

applying standards drawn from sections 343 and 343A

would have reached a different result.

If the -ourt had followed the line of cases focusing on

relinquishment of control, for example its own Wescott

opinion which relies heavily on the Third Circuit’s Hurst

case, it would have reached a different conclusion. In the

Wescott case, the court had been persuaded that because

there was “an obvious dangerous condition”, and the steve-

dore made no attempt “to change its method of operation”

and the stevedore “of its own volition, chose to go ahead

despite the condition”, there was “no basis for imposing

any liability upon the shipowner herein”. 564 F.2d at 883,

1979 A.M.C. at 941. Such an analysis would result in a

decision in favor of the shipowner in this case.

If the court had not rejected the cases relying on sections

409 and 414 of the Restatement, it would have followed

Anderson.” In that case the Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit determined that the shipowner did not owe a duty

to protect plaintiff from the danger of the cargo, because

that danger was “open, obvious and capable of being

protected against by relatively simple measures known,

available and practiced in the stevedoring trade”. 585 F.2d

at 1151. A court applying this standard would have found

that the dangers which caused Santos’ injury were like-

wise known and capable of being protected against.

*Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1242,

1977 A.M.C. 996, 1008 (5th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Mitsubishi Shin-

taku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 334, 1977 A.M.C. 989, 994 (5th Cir.

1977).

— v. Iceland Steamship Co., 585 F.2d 1142 (Ist Cir.

1978).

13

And finally, if the court below had not rejected the very

idea of imposing limits on the duty to act affirmatively

for the protection of others, the result would have been

very different indeed. Instead of announcing its standard

of care as a startling discovery which disposed of the case,

the court would have recognized its formulation of the

reasonable man standard as a mere platitude. Whenever

one has a duty, one must discharge the duty by the exercise

of reasonable care under the circumstances. See Harper &

James, supra. The court would have further recognized

that the 1972 Amendments and the relationship between

stevedore and shipowner pose issues which are not ade-

quately resolved by a negligence standard which imposes a

responsibility to act to protect the employees of the expert

stevedore contractor from the effects of the latter’s con-

sidered decisions.

Thus, if the court below had recognized the importance

of applying concepts of duty under the 1972 Amendments,

its decision would have been similar to one or more of the

lines of decisions it rejected, since those lines of cases have

sought and found workable rules for realization of the

Congressional policy and the 1972 Amendments.

Importance of the Question

The question is important first because of its nature.

It is clear from the history that Congress intended a major

reform by the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and

Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The history also indi-

cates a number of policy considerations to be given effect

in the Act, such as increased reliance upon the predicta-

bility, regularity and adequacy of compensation benefits,

the promotion of safety and the reduction of economic loss

14

through legal proceedings. 'l'o describe the longshoreman’s

new and more limited rights against the vessel, new sub-

section 905(b) provided but a single word of substance,

“negligence”, a term which has always been highly variable

in content according to the circumstances. Thoughtful

exploration and interpretation of its substance are needed

if the section is to be given shape to implement the impor-

tant policies of the Act.

The question presented is important also because of the

frequency with which it arises. The history of longshore-

men’s injury cases in this Court and the number of them

to be readily found in the law reports will remind the

Court that longshoremen’s suits against the shipowner are

potentially, and actually, numerous. The numerous appel-

late court decisions cited in footnotes to the text above,

concerning the question presented in this case, should go

far. to establish its importance.

Whether or not the summary judgment itself be rein-

stated in this case, the question of the legal standard to

be applied is important for consideration by the Court at

this time because of the effect that the lower court’s deci-

sion is already having upon other cases, not only in its own

court but in others. The doctrine of the opinion below has

been explicitly applied by other panels of the same court

in Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd. and Twin

Harbor Stev edoring Co., 9th Cir. Nos. 77-3043 and 77-3645,

decided August 20, 1979, and Lawson v. United States, 9th

Cir. No. 77-2510, decided August 21, 1979, to produce

results which could not have been reached under prior

decisions of the same or other courts of appeals. The

decision below has been cited and evidently followed also

15

in Matthews v. Ernst Russ Steamship Co., 7th Cir. 78-2547,

decided August 20, 1979, and most recently it has again

been cited and relied on in Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsbur gh

Steel Corp., 3d Cir. Nos. 78-2159, 78-2160 and 78-2161,

decided August 24, 1979.

The importance of properly defining the scope of the

shipowner’s duty to longshoremen is magnified by the deci-

sion of this Court in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale

T'ransatlantique, No. 78-479 (June 27, 1979), in which a peti-

tion for rehearing is before the Court and a motion to con-

sider that petition together with this petition for certiorari

has been filed. Edmonds presents the question whether

a shipowner, responsible for only 20% of the fault, is liable

to the longshoremen for 90% of the damages where the

longshoreman was 10% at fault and the stevedore company

70%. The effect of the adoption of the virtually unlimited

scope of a shipowner’s duty in Santos must be evaluated in

the light of whether the defendant found liable under such

a standard will be able to shift the burden, or any of it, to

the party actually responsible.

This Court long ago foreclosed contribution between the

shipowner and the stevedore employer. Halcyon Lines v.

Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 1952

A.M.C. 1 (1952). The 1972 Amendments themselves forbid

indemnity from the stevedore employer. “[T]he employer

shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or

indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the con-

trary shall be void.” If this Court is to continue to hold,

as it did in its initial decision in Edmonds, that the ship-

2133 U.S.C. § 905(b).

16

owner is liable for all the plaintiff's damages when it is

negligent at all, then a decision vastly increasing the scope

of the shipowner’s duty has a dramatic effect on shipown-

ers, stevedore companies, and the Congressional aims for

the 1972 Amendments. If the shipowner is to be held liable

virtually vicariously for a failure to supervise the inde-

pendent stevedore contractor and to be held so liable with-

out the possibility of relief by way of contribution, indem-

nity or reduction of damages for the concurrent fault of

others, drastic burdens have been imposed on the ship-

owner. Such a situation calls for careful serutiny by this

Court to determine whether the goals of the 1972 Amend-

ments have been implemented or frustrated.

RELATED CASES

The question raised by this case is the same question

expected to be raised in Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Car-

riers, Ltd. and Twin Harbor Stevedoring Co., and in Mat-

thews v. Ernst Russ Steamship Co., in both of which cases

it is expected that petitions for certiorari will shortly be

filed. The question is also intimately related, as shown

above, to the question arising under the same statute in

Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, No. 78-

479, in which case attention has been called to the question

by Motion to Defer Ruling on Petition for Rehearing.

17

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit that

this Court should grant a Writ of Certiorari to review the

decision of the Court of Appeals and should consolidate

the case for hearing with other cases in which petitions

for writs of certiorari are filed raising the same questions

and should hear all such eases in conjunction with the re-

hearing of Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-

tique, No. 78-479.

Respectfully submitted,

Grayvon S. Staring

Attorney for Petitioner

LeGros, BucHanan, Paut

& Mappen

Rosert H. Mappren

Linutick McHosr & CHARLES

Epwarp M. Krecu

Of Counsel

(Appendices Follow)

Appendices

APPENDICES

Page

Opinion of District Court Granting Defendant’s Motion

ee NN SE id nse vin pos Wabi pwas cig ee o's A-1

Opinion of the Court of Appeals ..................... B-1

Opinion of the Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing .... C-l

Appendix A

Lauro de los Santos, }

Plaintiff,

Vs.

Seindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., of f

Bombay, India,

Defendant. ;

United States District Court

Western District of Washington

a

September 1, 1976

No. C74-7208,

—_—_—_——

Wa ter T’, McGovern, D.J.:

This matter comes on for consideration upon the de-

fendant Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.’s Motion for

Summary Judgment of dismissal] pursuant to Rule 56, Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court having carefully considered the records and

files herein, including but not limited to the agreed pretrial

order, the depositions taken of plaintiff Lauro De Los

Santos, Lester Hawran, and Alvin H. Botler; plaintiff's

Memorandum of Authorities and Supplemental Memoran-

dum in opposition to the Motion; and defendant’s Memo-

randum and Reply Brief in Support of the Motion,

concludes that the defendant’s Motion should be granted.

The Law.

in 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S. Code, see. 901 et seq.)

became effective which eliminated causes of action of long-

A-2

shoremen against vessels based upon “unseaworthiness”

standards and instead restricted the longshoremen to ac-

tions based upon negligence theories. The pertinent lan-

guage of the Amendment, Section 905(b), states as follows:

“In the event of injury to a person covered under this

chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such

person * * * may bring an action against such vessel

as a third party * * *. The liability of the vessel under

this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty

of unseaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the

injury occurred.” [33 U.S. Code sec. 905(b).]

The divorcement between “unseaworthiness” and “negli-

gence” is complete under the law. Usner v. Luckenbach

Overseas Co., 400 U.S. 494, 1971 AMC 277 (1971). That

Congress intended to substitute negligence principles in

place of theories of maritime liability utilized in earlier

cases (such as “unseaworthiness” or “nondelegable duty”)

is well established by the legislative history of Amendment,

Section 905(b). 1972 U.S. Congressional and Administra-

tive News, 4703-4705. While there is some debate over the

appropriate standard of care a vessel owes a longshoreman

under the negligence action created by sec. 905(b), the

Court is persuaded that Congress intended to have land-

based standards of negligence be applied; these standards

are found best expressed in the Restatement (Second) of

Torts sec. 343 and sec. 343A (1965). See, Crowshaw v.

Koninklijke Nedlloyd B.V. Rijswijk, 1975 AMC 2630, 398

F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore., 1975); Frasca v. Prudential Grace

Lines, 1975 AMC 1130, 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D.C. Md.,

1975) ; Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 1975 AMC

899, 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D.C. Md., 1975); Citizen v. M/V

Triton, 1976 AMC 509, 384 F. Supp. 198, 201, 202 (E.D.

A-3

Tex., 1974); 1A Benepicr on Admiralty sec. 112, at 6-10

(7th Ed., 1973).

It is clear under Federal land-based negligence stan-

dards that a shipowner is not liable for dangerous condi-

tions created by the stevedore’s negligence while the

stevedore was in exclusive control over the manner and

area of the work (Frasca, supra; Crowshaw, supra;

Slaughter v. 8.S. Ronde, 1974 AMC 290, 390 F. Supp. 637

(S.D. Ga., 1974)), nor is the shipowner under a duty to

warn the stevedore or his employees of dangers or open

and obvious defects which are known to the stevedore or

his employees or which are so obvious and apparent that

they may reasonably be expected to discover them. Ramirez

v. Toko Kawn K.K., 1975 AMC 85, 385 F. Supp. 644, 651

(N.D. Cal., 1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts see.

343A (1965); Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 403 (2 ed., 1964).

The Facts.

The facts of this case are generally not in dispute and

are well set out in the pretrial order and depositions taken

of plaintiff (a lonyshoreman working in the hatch at the

time of the accident), Mr. Hawran (the winch driver), and

Mr. Botler (the hatch tender). Plaintiff alleges that a

winch, which was lowering pallets loaded with sacks of

bulgar wheat into the No. 3 hatch, was defective and that

this defective winch proximately caused the plaintiff’s in-

juries. Defendant denies that the winch was defective and

asserts that, even if the winch was defective, the defective

condition was open and obvious to the plaintiff and was in

fact known by the plaintiff to be a dangerous condition;

that the defective condition was not known to the defend-

re a

A-4

ant, nor could the defendant reasonably be expected to

have known of the condition ; and that the alleged defective

condition had only a remote cause-in-fact relationship to

plaintiff's accident and was not the proximate cause

thereof.

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plain-

tiff, the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material

fact remaining in dispute. Following an initial spillage of

sacks caused by the pallet striking the pallet jack (Pretrial

Order, Agreed Fact No. 4), the pallet was raised 15 feet

overhead by the winch operator and was left to swing

overhead of plaintiff as plaintiff worked to clean up the

spilled sacks from the hatch floor below. (Agreed Fact No.

9; Deposition of Hawran, pp. 58-59.) There is no dispute

that the premises were in exclusive control of the steve-

dores during the loading operation. Plaintiff does not con-

trovert defendant’s claim that no one from the ship’s crew

was ever informed of the winch’s condition prior to the

accident. Yet, plaintiff rests his argument on the supposi-

tion that the defendant should have known of the condition

of the winch and should have taken appropriate action to

remedy the situation, and that defendant’s failure to so

act proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. This argument

ignores the applicable principles of negligence law cited

above and contained within the Restatement (Second) of

Torts sec. 343 and sec. 343A: Even if the ship’s gear had

been defective (a condition which the Court finds the ship-

owner did not know nor should it reasonably have been

expected to know, given the exclusive control of the gear

by the stevedores during the relevant time period), the

defendant cannot be held liable under the facts of this case

A-5

as a matter of law. There is no dispute that the “Jumpi-

ness” of the winch and the positioning of the unevenly

loaded pallet after the initial spillage was open and obvious

to the plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 56, line 8 through

p. 97, line 11.) Indeed, in his deposition plaintiff conceded

that the condition of the winch and the positioning of the

pallet swinging overhead seemed “dangerous” to him:

“Q. Was there some reason you started to clean up

the sacks before they moved the load overhead? Wasn’t

it dangerous to go underneath the swinging load?

A. Well, it is, yes.

Q. Did you think it was dangerous to clean up

those sacks with the pallet overhead?

A. Well, I am telling you that was dangerous, yes,

but it was the practice, we are asked to do the job, you

know, cleaning up things for our own good.”

Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 58, lines 1-5.

In a case remarkably on point, Cummings v. “Sidarma”

Soc., 409 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. La., 1976), the Court

there held that a vessel owner did not breach its duty of

care under the Longshoremen’s Act as amended where the

alleged defective condition (bales ship’s of rubber stowed

freely in void spaces between boxed cargo and the ship’s

skin) was obvious to the longshoremen, and where the po-

sition of the bales was expressed during the routine dis-

charging operation.

Here, the Court similarly finds that the manner in which

the accident occurred, the fact that plaintiff’s activities

were so dangerous and the fact that plaintiff undertook

his actions free from any direction by the defendant while

A-6

recognizing that the circumstances were so dangerous, is

such that the defendant cannot be held liable as a matter

of law. In addition to the findings above, the Court finds

that the alleged defective condition of the winch had only

a remote cause-in-fact relationship to plaintiff’s accident

and could not have been the proximate cause thereof as a

matter of law. Either finding is a sufficient basis upon which

to grant the defendant’s Motion.

Accordingly, defendant Scindia Steam Navigation Co.,

Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment of dismissal is

Granted.

Appendix B

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit

]

Lauro de los Santos,

Appellant,

vs. —

Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., p NO. SE-SERS

Appellee,

Seattle Stevedore Co.,

Intervenor. ;

May 1, 1979

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1979.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Before DUNIWAY and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and

GRANT,* District Judge.

DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge:

Several 50 pound sacks of grain tumbled off a pallet,

severely injuring appellant longshoreman Lauro De Los

Santos, who was working in a ship’s hold. Santos

sued appellee shipowner Scindia Steam Navigation Co.

(“Seindia”), alleging that the accident had occurred

because the shipowner had negligently failed to repair the

winch by means of which the pallet was lowered into the

hold. The district court granted the shipowner’s motion

*The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior United States District

Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.

B-2

for summary judgment. Its opinion is reported at 1976

A.M.C. 2583. We reverse.

I. The Facts

Stated in the light most favorable to Santos, against

whom summary judgment was granted, the facts are these:

On the evening of December 10, 1972, Santos and other

longshoremen employed by the Seattle Stevedoring Com-

pany were loading a cargo of wheat into a hold in Seindia’s

vessel, the M/S JALARATNA. The longshoremen used a

winch that was part of the ship’s gear to lower wooden

pallets, each carrying seventy fifty-pound sacks of wheat,

into the hold.

The ship’s winch was unusual in that its controls were

located. on a platform more than 25 feet above the main

deck. From that point, the winch driver could not actually

see a pallet of sacks as he lowered it into the hold. He

thus had to rely upon the hatch tender to signal to him

when to start and stop the winch. Santos and three other

men were in the hold. When a pallet reached the bottom

of the hold, Santos and his co-workers would stow the

sacks. Seattle Stevedoring controlled the loading procedure.

The winch’s braking mechanism had continually mal-

functioned during the two days prior to the accident and

on the day of the accident in that, when the winch driver

tried to stop a load, the load continued to fall for several

feet before coming to a stop. The winch continued mal-

functioning on the night of the accident. As the winch

driver lowered the loaded pallet into the hold, the hatch

tender signaled him to stop its descent. The winch driver

B-3

applied the brake, but the pallet kept falling. When it

struck a pallet jack, on which it should have come to rest,

about half the sacks spilled off the pallet.

The hatch tender then had the winch driver raise the

pallet, carrying the remaining sacks in a loose pile and not

fastened down, about fifteen feet up so that Santos and the

other men could clean up the spilled sacks. After the winch

driver had raised the pallet, the hatch tender looked over

the remaining sacks. He thought that they looked stable

enough that he concluded that no more sacks would spill

off and endanger the men cleaning-up below. N evertheless,

about ten minutes later several more sacks fell off the

pallet and landed on Santos.

The parties disagree about what caused those sacks to

work loose and fall. The district court accepted the ship-

owner’s position that the pallet had swung back and forth,

and that this swinging loosened the sacks. Santos points

to deposition testimony which indicates little if any swing-

ing. He relies upon testimony tracing the accident to fur-

ther malfunctioning of the winch’s braking mechanism. The

winch driver explained that even though he had the con-

trols set to hold the pallet stationary, the pallet began

slipping down into the hold three or four times during the

ten minutes, requiring him to pull it back up again each

time so that it would not interfere with the cleanup. Santos

argues that the defective condition of the ship’s winch

caused the repeated slipping, and that this slipping and

pulling back up caused the additional sacks to work loose

and fall.

B-4

II. The Applicable Law

The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-

tion Act defines the rights of longshoremen injured while

taking part in stevedoring operations. Just before Santos’

accident, Congress had passed the Longshoremen’s and

Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972,

Pub.L. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.

The Amendments made sweeping changes in the legal

relationships among injured longshoremen, stevedores, and

shipowners. Before the Amendments, an injured longshore-

man could sue a shipowner for negligence, and also for

breach of a warranty of seaworthiness, a form of liability

without fault. Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 1946, 328

U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099. If the longshoreman

could establish that he had been injured by unsafe con-

ditions aboard the ship, he recovered even if the shipowner

had not been negligent. Under Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.

Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 1956, 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232,

100 L.Ed. 133, the vessel owner could in turn seek indem-

nity against the stevedore company when a substandard

performance by the stevedore or its longshoremen had

brought the unseaworthy conditions into play. The injured

longshoreman could not sue the stevedore, but he was

entitled to workers’ compensation type benefits without

regard to fault.

Under the 1972 Amendments, the injured longshoreman

lost his action against the shipowner for unseaworthiness,

but in return Congress granted the longshoreman signifi-

eantly higher compensation benefits. Congress also ended

the shipowner’s right to indemnity from the stevedore.

The shipowner had less need for indemnification because

B-5

the abolition of the unseaworthiness action left it liable

only when an injured longshoreman could prove it negli-

ent. House Report No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,

reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin.News, pp.

4698-4705; Senate Report No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,

pp. 8-12; Davison v. Pacific Inland Nav. Co., Ine., 9 Cir.,

1978, 569 F.2d 507, 511-13. Note, “The Injured Longshore-

man v. The Shipowner After 1972: Business Invitees, Land-

Based Standards, and Assumption of Risk,” 28 Hastings

L.J. 771, 773-79 (1977). [hereafter, “The Injured Long-

shoreman”] Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 1974,

417 U.S. 106, 113, fn. 6, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 40 L.Ed.2d 694.

The Act as amended explicitly preserves the injured

longshoreman’s right to sue the shipowner for negligence.

33 U.S.C. §905(b) provides that:

In the event of injury to a person covered under this

chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such

person ... may bring an action against such vessel

as a third party. . . . The liability of the vessel under

this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty

of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the

injury occurred... .

In the case at bar, Santos alleged that Scindia had been

negligent within the meaning of § 905(b), and that Scindia’s

negligence had proximately caused his injuries. He timely

asserted his right to have the facts tried to a jury.

[1] When a party moves for summary judgment under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, all of the facts and all reasonable infer-

ences to be drawn from those facts must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the party against whom the motion

is made. The trial court may grant the motion for sum-

B-6

mary judgment only when no material questions of fact

remain. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.,

1962, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458; United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 1962, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993,

8 L.Ed.2d 176; United States v. Perry, 9 Cir., 1970,

431 F.2d 1020, 1022; Radobenko v. Automated Equipment

Corporation, 9 Cir., 1975, 520 F.2d 540, 548; United States v.

Bissett-Berman Corporation, 9 Cir., 1973, 481 F.2d 764, 767.

Furthermore, we have emphasized that “‘[i]ssues of negli-

gence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudica-

tion.’” Arney v. United States, 9 Cir., 1973, 479 F.2d 653,

660. See also Leaf v. United States, 9 Cir., 1978, 588 F.2d

733, 736.

Here, Santos contends that the district court granted

the motion for summary judgment only after resolving a

number of disputed material facts against him. Santos

also argues that the district court applied an incorrect

legal standard when it explicitly adopted the standard of

negligence set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts,

§§ 343 and 343A. To pass upon these contentions, we must

begin by determining what showing of negligence § 905(b)

requires when an allegedly dangerous condition of the ship

or its gear injures a longshoreman.'

The Act does not define “negligence.” Davis v. Inca

Compama Naviera, S.A., W.D. Wash., 1977, 440 F.Supp.

1In Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A. Panama, 9 Cir., 1977,

564 F.2d 875, 883, we quoted Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir.,

1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1251, 1252, for the proposition that a vessel

owner owes no duty to protect longshoremen against defects in the

equipment the longshoremen and stevedore bring aboard. In this

case, it is undisputed that the winch was part of the ship and thus

provided for use by the vessel owner.

B-7

448, 451; Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, N.D.

Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 484, 492. In Davison v. Pacific

Inland Navigation Co., Inc., 9 Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 507,

908-09, fn. 1, we specifically reserved the question of what

standard of negligence is to be used in a case brought under

the Act. We noted there that courts which have already

considered the question have applied different standards.

Santos’ appeal requires us to arrive at a standard.

While the legislative history is not entirely clear, we

read the House and Senate Committee Reports, cited su pra,

as calling upon the federal courts to fashion a negligence

standard responsive to five specific concerns. Cf. Gallardo

v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, supra, 435 F.Supp. at

491, 493.

First, Congress was concerned about safety. The Senate

Committee on Labor and Public Welfare protested that

longshoring had an injury frequency rate “well over four

times the average for manufacturing operations,” and

called for safer working conditions when it insisted that

“every appropriate means be applied toward improving

the tragic and intolerable conditions which take such a

heavy toll upon workers’ lives and bodies. . . .” Senate

Report at 2. The Amendments sought to strengthen

economic incentives “to provide the fullest measure of on-

the-job safety.” House Report at 4699. The higher com-

pensation benefits were meant to “assure that the employer

bears the cost of unsafe conditions.” Senate Report at 2.

“Permitting actions against the vessel based on negligence”

was meant to “meet the objective of encouraging safety.”

House Report at 4704. Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Mariti-

B-8

mas Argentinas, 5 Cir., 1978, 573 F.2d 884, 888 (“promotion

of shipboard safety ...a primary focus” of the negligence

action) ; Marant v. Farrel Lines, Inc., 3 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d

142, 149, fn. 3 (coneurring opinion); Davis v. Inca Com-

pana Naviera, S.A., W.D. Wash., 1977, 440 F.Supp. 448,

454, fn. 14. “Congress was concerned that the vessel owner

not become lax in doing what it should reasonably be

required to do to prevent injuries to the longshoremen.”

Lucas v. “Brinknes” Schiffahrts Ges. E.D.Pa., 1974, 379

F.Supp. 759, 769 (three-judge court).

Second, to assure uniformity Congress specified that it

“intend[ed] that legal questions . . . be determined as a

matter of Federal law.” House Report at 4705. In Wescott

v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A. Panama, 9 Cir., 1977, 564

F.2d 875, 882, we held that federal law continues to govern

lawsuits between an injured longshoreman and a ship-

owner. See also, Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976,

545 F.2d 854, 861-63; Gow v. Flota Mercante Grancolom-

biana S.A., 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d 798, 800-801, fn. 1; Birrer

v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, D.Ore., 1974, 386

F.Supp. 1105.

Third, Congress wanted to make certain that it had really

done away with longshoremen’s actions based upon unsea-

worthiness. Concerned that some courts might continue

holding vessels strictly liable for unsafe conditions by

simply relabeling unseaworthiness “negligence,” Congress

emphasized that it intended the courts to define “negli-

gence” in accordance with the land-based traditions of not

imposing liability without regard to actual fault. Gallardo,

supra, 435 F.Supp. at 492; Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping

B-9

Co., S.D.Tex., 1975, 394 F.Supp. 1189, 1192-194; The

Injured Longshoreman, supra, at 778-79; Lucas v. “Brink-

nes” Schiffahrts Ges, supra, 379 F.Supp. at 767-68, 771-72.

The Committee thus reported that they had “rejected the

thesis that a vessel should be liable without regard to its

fault.” Senate Report at 8. Houtise Report at 4702. Rather,

Congress concluded that,

it would be fairer to all concerned and fully consistent

with the objective of protecting the health and safety

of employees who work on board vessels for the liabil-

ity of vessels as third parties to he predicated on neg-

ligence, rather than the no-fault concept of seaworthi-

ness. This would place vessels in the same position,

insofar as third party liability is concerned, as land-

based third parties in non-maritime pursuits.

The purpose of the amendments is to place an em-

ployee injured aboard a vessel in the same position he

would be if he were injured in non-maritime employ-

ment ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage

action is concerned, and not to endow him with any

special maritime theory of liability or cause of action

under whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called,

such as “unseaworthiness”, “non-delegable duty”, or

the like. House Report at 4703. Senate Report at 10.

[2] Under the former law, some unsafe conditions which

supported an unseaworthiness action might also have sup-

ported a negligence action. Because of the overlap between

the two doctrines, Congress feared that its abolition of the

unseaworthiness action might lead some post-Amendment

courts to conclude that if a set of facts would have

amounted to unseaworthiness, Congress meant to preclude

a recovery based upon negligence. After collecting a num-

B-10

ber of cases to illustrate situations in which the unsea-

worthiness doctrine would no longer apply, the Committees

carefully cautioned that their listing of disapproved cases

was “not intended to reflect a judgment as to whether re-

covery on a particular factual setting could have been pred-

icated on the vessel’s negligence.” Senate Report at 10.

House Report at 4703-4704. Thus, consistent with Congress’

intention to apply the land-based traditions of no liability

without regard to fault, it is perfectly possible under the

new law for an unseaworthy condition to give rise to a neg-

ligence recovery when a vessel fails “to take appropriate

corrective action where it knows or should have known

about a dangerous condition.” House Report at 4704, Sen-

ate Report at 10; Solsvik v. Maremar Compania Naviera,

S.A., W.D.Wash., 1975, 399 F.Supp. 712, 715; Slaughter v.

Ronde, S.D.Ga., 1974, 390 F.Supp. 637, 641, aff’d per cur-

tam, 5 Cir., 1975, 509 F.2d 973.

[3] Fourth, Congress “intend[ed] that the admiralty

concept of comparative negligence, rather than the common

law rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in cases

where the injured employee’s own negligence may have

contributed to causing the injury.” House Report at 4705.

Senate Report at 12. Thus, a longshoreman’s carelessness

reduces but does not necessarily bar his recovery. Shellman

v. Umted States Lines, Inc., 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d 675, 676-

77, fn. 1; Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co., D.Mass., 1977, 431

F.Supp. 869, 872.

Finally, Congress “intend[ed] that the admiralty rule

which precludes the defense of ‘assumption of risk’ in an

action by an injured employee shall also be applicable.”

House Report at 4705, Senate Report at 12. Davis, supra,

440 F.Supp. at 454.

B-11

Ill. The Applicable Standard.

[4] We adopt the following standard of negligence for

purposes of 33 U.S.C. §905(b) actions:

A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to long-

shoremen working on or near the vessel caused by con-

ditions on the vessel if, but only if, the shipowner

(a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care

would discover, the condition, and should realize that

it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such long-

shoremen, and

(b) the shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care

under the circumstances to protect the longshoremen

against the danger.

See House Report at 4704; Senate Report at 10-11. Cf.

Anderson v. Iceland 8.8. Co., D.Mass., 1977, 431 F.Supp.

869, 873. We believe that the standard we adopt responds

to all five of Congress’ concerns. It will promote safety

within a comparative negligence framework while avoiding

both liability without fault and the defenses of contribu-

tory negligence and assumption of risk. See Gallardo,

supra, 435 F.Supp. at 498.

*The cited Committee Reports illustrated how the negligence

standard described by Congress would apply in an actual case:

So, for example, where a agente slips on an oil spill

on a vessel's deck and is injured, the proposed amendments to

Section 5 would still permit an action against the vessel for

negligence. To recover he must establish that: 1) the vessel put

the foreign substance on the deck, or knew that it was there,

and willfully or negligently failed to remove it; or 2) the for-

eign substance had been on the deck for such a period of time

that it should have been discovered and sechoeedl: by the vessel

in the exercise of reasonable care by the vessel under the cir-

cumstances. House Report at 4704; Senate Report at 10-11.

The structure of Congress’ illustration supports the standard of neg-

ligence we adopt today.

B-12

In adopting the “reasonable care under the cireum-

stances” standard, we are not unmindful of the fact that the

Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have defined “negli-

gence” under § 905(b) in terms of a landowner’s duty to in-

vitees under Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343 and

§ 343A.° See Davison v. Pacific Island Navigation Co., Inc.,

9 Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 507, 508, n.1.* We decline to follow the

SThese sections of the Restatement provide, in relevant part:

TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS OF

LAND TO INVITEES

§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by

Possessor

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm

— to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only

, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would dis-

cover the condition, and should realize that it involves an un-

reasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the

danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against

the danger.

§ 343A. Known or Obvious Dangers

(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical

harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land

whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor

should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obvious-

ness.

‘Cases adopting Restatement §§ 343 and 343A include Canizzo v.

Farrell Lines, Inc., 2 Cir., 1978, 579 F.2d 682, 684-85; Samuels v.

Empresa-Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 5 Cir., 1978, 573 F.2d 884,

885-86; Wiles v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 5 Cir., 1978, 574 F.2d

1339, 1240; Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands Steamship Co., 2 Cir.,

1978, 572 F.2d 364, 366; Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp.,

Panama, 4 Cir., 1978, 540 F.2d 757, 758-59 (per curiam), aff g

D.Md., 1975, 391 F.Supp. 1143; Brown wv. Mitsubishi Shintaku

Ginko, 5 Cir., 1977, 550 F.2d 331, 333-34; Gay v. Ocean Transport

¢> Trading, Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546, F.2d 1233, 1238; Napoli v. [Trans-

pacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 2 Cir., 1976, 536 F.2d 505,

508-509; Bovia v. S/S Agia Erini, E.D.La., 1977, 433 F.Supp. 1020,

1022; Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd B.V. Rijswijk, D.Ore., 1975,

398 F.Supp. 1224, 1229; Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,

D.Md., 1975, 394 F.Supp. 1092, 1097-98, 1100-01; Birrer v. Flota

B-13

lead of those Circuits for three reasons.

First of all, § 343(b) and § 343A place limitations on a

landowner’s liability to an invitee inconsistent with Con-

gress’ explicit direction to reject common law rules of con-

tributory negligence and assumption of risk in favor of

applying the admiralty concept of comparative negligence.*

Mercante Grancolombiana, D.Ore., 1974, 386 F.Supp. 1105, 1112.

Cf. Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d

798; Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., 2 Cir. 1977, 559

F.2d 861; Castel v. Moller, A.P., N.D.Cal. 1977, 441 F.Supp. 851;

Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, E.D.Tex., 1974, 380 F.Supp.

222, 226-27.

*The Comments explaining § 343(b) and § 343A(1) show that

these limitations on liability are based upon the substance of the

proscribed defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of

risk. Section 343A, comment e, for example, explains that:

In the ordinary case, an invitee who enters land is entitled to

nothing more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers

he will encounter if he comes. If he knows the actual condi-

tions, .. . and the dangers involved . . ., he is free to make an

intelligent choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is

sufficient to justify him in incurring the risk b entering or

remaining on the land. The possessor of the iad may reason-

ably assume that he will protect himself by the exercise

ordinary care, [i. e., avoid contributory negligence] or that he

will voluntarily assume the risk of harm if he does not succeed

in doing so. Reasonable care on the part of the possessor there-

fore does not ordinarily require precautions, or even warning,

against dangers which are known to the visitor, or so obvious

to him that he may be expected to discover them.

(emphasis added)

In like fashion § 343, comment b limits the possessor’s duty sim-

ply to putting the invitee in a position where the invitee “may de-

cide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation [to en-

counter the danger], or may protect himself against the danger if he

does accept it.” See also, § 343, comment d, § 343A, comment d,

and § 496C, comment d. Cf. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 61,

394 (4th Ed., 1971).

The Restatement’s standard of care incorporates the proscribed

defenses into its definition of the possessor’s duty when it allows the

possessor to count on his invitees to discover conditions, realize their

dangers, and then protect themselves against the dangers. To apply

the limitations of § 343(b) and § 343A (1) to negligence suits ae

the Amendments would violate the legislative intent behind

B-14

We also fear that these limitations on liability would un-

dercut Congress’ intention to reduce the frequency of acci-

dents by creating economic incentives to provide safer

working conditions. Davis, supra, 440 F.Supp. at 454-55;

D. Robertson, “Negligence Actions by Longshoremen

Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,”

7 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 447, 473.°

Secondly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kermarec v.

Compagnie General T'ransatlantique, 1959, 358 U.S. 625,

§ 905(b) because it would, in substance if not in form, give defend-

ant shipowners the benefits of a partial or absolute bar to liability

having the characteristics of a defense based upon contributory

negligence or implied assumption of risk or both. Brown v. Ivarans

Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 863-64, fn. 10; Hurst v. Triad

Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1250, fn. 35; Davis, supra,

440 F.Supp. at 453-55; Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp. at 494; Espi-

noza v. United States Lines, Inc., §.D.N.Y., 1978, 444 F.Supp. 405,

410; Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1977, 279 Or. 477, 494-97, 369

P.2d 1040, 1050-51 (in banc); The Injured Longshoremen, supra,

28 Hastings L.J. 780-81; cf. Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading

Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546 F.2d 1233, 1241-242.

From the point of view of an injured plaintiff, to use a definition

of shipowner’s duty which incorporates assumption of risk may well

be worse than allowing the shipowner to plead assumption of risk

as an affirmative defense. If assumption of risk came into play as an

affirmative defense, the shipowner would have the burden of prov-

ing that the longshoreman assumed the risk. On the other hand, be-

cause the longshoreman has the burden of proving the shipowner’s

breach of duty, to incorporate absence of assumption of risk into

the definition of duty would force the injured plaintiff to bear the

burden of proving that he did not assume the risk. See The Injured

Longshoreman, supra, 781, fn. 90.

‘In urging us to affirm the district court’s application of Restate-

ment §§ 343(b) and 343A, Scindia relies heavily upon Judge Or-

rick’s use of the business invitee standard in Ramirez v. Toko

Kaium K.K., N.D. Cal., 1974, 385 F.Supp. 644. We note that in

Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., N.D. Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 484,

and in Darwin v. United States, N.D.Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 501,

Judge Orrick explicitly modified his Ramirez approach to reject the

use of the business invitee standard. In many a our approach

follows Judge Orrick’s thoughtful analysis in Gallardo.

b-15

630-32, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, supports our selection

of a “reasonable care under the circumstances” approach.

Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., N.D.Pa., 1978,

452 F.Supp. 841, 844. In Kermarec, the plaintiff had come

on board defendant shipowner’s vessel to pay a social visit

to a crew member. As he was leaving, the plaintiff injured

himself in a fall caused by a defective stairway runner. The

plaintiff then sued the shipowner, alleging unseaworthiness

and negligence.

Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts began by

ruling out any recovery based upon unseaworthiness, just

as we must rule out an unseaworthiness recovery under

§ 905(b). The lower courts then set aside the plaintiff’s jury

verdict based upon negligence on the ground that the plain-

tiff had been a mere licensee rather than an invitee. A unan-

imous Supreme Court reversed. Refusing to incorporate

the common law of invitees into admiralty, the Court set

forth its own negligence standard:

the owner of a ship... owes to all who are on board for

purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the

, duty of exercising reasonable care under the circum-

stances of each case. 358 U.S. at 632, 79 S.Ct. at 410.

(emphasis added)

The Court saw the common law moving toward “ ‘impos-

ing... a single duty of reasonable care in all circum-

stances’ ” 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550. It then

explained that the real property tort law of invitees had

been

inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a

culture which traced many of its standards to a heri-

tage of feudalism, 358 U.S. at 630, 79 S.Ct. at 410.

be as

B-16

and that in an effort to adopt that law to do justice in a

modern industrialized society,

common-law courts had found it necessary to... create

...asemantic morass... [of] increasingly subtle ver-

bal refinements, . . . subclassifications ... [and]...

fine gradations in the standards of care. 358 U.S. at

630-31, 79 S.Ct. at 410.

Invoking the admiralty tradition of “simplicity and prac-

ticality,” the Court decided to spare the federal courts from

having to join in the “confusion and conflict” by simply

adopting the better rule towards which the common law

was evolving, albeit “unevenly and with hesitation.”

The Kermarec reasoning applies just as fully today, Fs-

pinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., S.D.N.Y., 1978, 444

F.Supp. 405, 413-14, especially in light of the fact that the

trend in the law of invitees relied upon in Kermarec has

continued. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 1968, 69 Cal.2d

108, 79 Cal.Rptr. 97, 448 P.2d 561. As Judge Orrick put it

in Gallardo:

[this] Court rejects resort to terminology which pre-

vents inquiry into the reasonableness of conduct under

the circumstances of a given case. Discussions relating

to invitees, contractors, primary and second responsi-

bilities, obviousness of dangers, and relinquishment of

control all have the tendency to steer courts away from

a balance of the risk of harm against the utility of the

particular conduet in question. 435 F.Supp. at 496.

Accord, Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., supra,

452 F.Supp. at 844.

Finally, because the legislative history of § 905(b) never

refers to the Restatement and never used real property tort

B-17

law terms such as “invitee,” we feel confident that our adop-

tion of a “reasonable care under the circumstances” ap-

proach is not an “impingement upon legislative policy.”

Kermarec, supra, 358 U.S. at 630, fn. do, 79 S.Ct. 406. Ac-

cord, Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp. at 492, 496; Espinoza,

supra, 444 F.Supp. at 413-14; cf. Brown v. Ivarans Rederi,

A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 863.

While Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., Inc., 9

Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 507, 508-09, fn. 1, left “for another day”

the defining of negligence and duty, that case and our ear-

lier decision in Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S. A. Pan-

ama, 9 Cir., 1977, 564 F.2d 875, are both consistent with

the standard that we adopt. In each, we held that, under the

circumstances, there was no evidence that the shipowner

knew or should have known of the dangers involved. It is

also possible to read those cases as holding that the negli-

gence of the longshoremen or the stevedore or both was the

sole proximate cause of the injury. We cannot conclude as

a matter of law that that is so in the ease at bar.

In adopting the “reasonable care under the circum-

stances” standard, we cannot accept the idea that an in-

jured longshoreman cannot recover because he should have

demanded that the stevedore halt further loading opera-

tions until the stevedore could arrange to improve the work-

ing conditions. We agree with those courts which recognize

that longshoremen “face trouble for delaying work.” Nap-

oli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 2 Cir.,

1976, 536 F.2d 505, 509; Davis, supra, 440 F.Supp. at 452;

Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546

F.2d 1233, 1241, fn. 17, reaffirming, Brock v. Coral Drilling,

Inc., 5 Cir., 1973, 477 F.2d 211, 215.

B-18

[5] Under the rule of comparative negligence, the con-

tributory negligence of an injured longshoreman reduces

but does not preclude recovery. And in Dodge v. Mitsui

Shintaku Ginko KK Tokyo, 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d 669, and

Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d

675, we held that “a longshoreman who has received in-

juries caused by the concurring negligence of his stevedore

and the shipowner can recover the full amount of his dam-

ages from the shipowner.” Dodge, supra, 528 F.2d at 673;

Shellman, supra, 528 F.2d 679-81. Thus, the contributory

negligence of the longshoreman’s employer or fellow long-

shoremen will not preclude or diminish recovery through

a theory of imputed contributory negligence. It is the long-

shoreman’s own negligence that will reduce his recovery

from the negligent vessel under the Amended Act.

IV. The Standard Applied.

{6] Having determined the standard of care required

of a shipowner subject to an injured longshoreman’s third

party action under §905(b), we must reverse the district

court’s summary judgment dismissing Santos’ action. The

following district court “findings” decided reasonably dis-

putable factual issues against Santos. We reverse because

these issues are material under the negligence standard

set forth above, and cannot be decided on a motion for

summary judgment.

[7] First, the district court found that the shipowner

had not been told about the malfunctioning winch, did not

know that it did not work properly, and cor!ld not reason-

ably have been expected to know that the winch was de-

B-19

fective. There was evidence, however, that the winch had

malfunctioned for two days prior to the day of the acci-

dent, that the winch failed to stop properly with almost

every load, that the shipowner’s representatives had been

back and forth in the vicinity of the loading operation dur-

ing the two days prior to the accident, and that both the

winch driver and the hatch tender had complained to su-

periors whose job it was to communicate problems to the

shipowner’s representatives in the vicinity of the loading

operations. If members of the ship’s crew knew, or should

have known, about the allegedly defective condition of the

winch, their actual or constructive knowledge is imputed

to the vessel by respondeat superior. See, e. g., Davis,

supra, 440 F.Supp. at 450-51; Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp.

at 496.

[8] The standard set forth above recognizes that a

shipowner ignorant of an unreasonably dangerous condi-

tion may be negligent in not protecting longshoremen

against it, if “the exercise of reasonable care would [have]

discover[ed] the condition.” Within these bounds it is

correct to say that the “shipowner [has] a duty to use rea-

sonable care to provide a safe place to work.” Brown v. Iva-

rans Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 860, fn. 6(a) ;

House Report at 4707, Senate Report at 10; Solsvik v.

Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., W.D.Wash., 399 F.Supp.

712, 715. Cf., West v. United States, 1959, 361 U.S. 118,

123, 80 S.Ct. 189, 4 L.Ed.2d 161; Migut v. Hyman Michaels

Co., 6 Cir., 1978, 571 F.2d 352, 356; Hess v. Upper Missis-

sippit Towing Corp., 5 Cir., 1977, 559 F.2d 1030, 1033. By

this we do not mean an absolute or non-delegable duty to

B-20

provide a safe place. That notion is gone with unseaworthi-

ness. We only mean that under the circumstances of a par-

ticular case, failure to repair dangerous equipment or

conditions may be negligent.

[9] A “shipowner’s duties to the longshoremen .. .

{do not] end when it turn[s] the vessel over to the steve-

dore in a safe condition.” Bess v. Agromar Line, 4 Cir.,

1975, 518 F.2d 738, 741-42, fn. 8. On the trial of this action,

it may develop that the malfunctioning of the braking

mechanism began only after the stevedore commenced

loading operations. In this connection we note that while

a less rigorous duty to inspect may apply where full in-

spection would interfere with the work of the stevedore,

the duty to inspect does not automatically cease once steve-

dores have come aboard for the first time. Slaughter v.

Ronde, S.D.Ga., 1974, 390 F.Supp. 637, aff'd per curiam,

5 Cir., 1975, 509 F.2d 973. Compare Gallardo, supra, 435

F.Supp. at 496; Espinoza, supra, 444 F.Supp. at 412-13. In

Congress’ example of the longshoreman slipping on the

oily deck, Congress did not limit the phrase

substance had been on the deck for such a period of

time that it should have been discovered and removed

by the vessel in the exercise of reasonable care by the

vessel under the circumstances

to oil spilled before the first longshoreman came aboard.

Second, the district court found that the stevedore had

exclusive control of the gear and the premises during the

relevant time period. Under the standard we have adopted,

control would be relevant to the extent that it might limit

B-21

the shipowner’s opportunities to inspect for dangerous

conditions or to remedy such conditions. We agree that in

some cases, control may play a critical role in determining

the appropriate standard of care. Nevertheless, we do not

follow those cases which have focused exclusively or pri-

marily on whether the shipowner relinquished control of

the stevedoring to the employer of the injured longshore-

man. Instead, we focus on the reasonableness of the ship-

owner’s conduct in the light of his practical opportunities

to discover defective conditions and remedy them.’

Showing that the stevedore or Santos’ fellow longshore-

men had control to show their concurrent negligence would

not be relevant after Dodge, supra, and Shellman, supra,

unless that control could fairly be said to help prove a sole

or superseding cause.

While the admitted facts portion of the pretrial order

states that the stevedore was in “control of the loading,”

that stipulation would not require a jury to conclude that

the stevedore had exclusive control of the gear and prem-

7Cases focusing on relinquishment of control include Cox v. Flota

Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d 798; Briley

v. Charente S.S. Co., Ltd., 5 Cir., 1978, 572 F.2d 498, 500; Hickman

v. Jugoslavenska Linijska, Etc., 2 Cir., 1978, 570 F.2d 449, 451-52;

Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1249-253;

Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 2 Cir., 1977, 553

F.2d 837, 840-41. See also, Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 409,

414 (1965); Talliercio v. A/S D/S Svenborg & D/S of 1912 A/S,

S.D.N.Y., 1978, 451 F.Supp. 949, 951-52; Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.,

§.D.Ga., 1978, 449 F.Supp. 1016, 1020-021; Valle v. Jugoslavenska

Linejska Provibda, $.D.N.Y., 1977, 434 F.Supp. 608, 611-12; Cro-

shaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, D.Ore., 1975, 398

F.Supp. 1224, 1229-231. Cf. Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd., O/Y, 4. Cir.,

1978, 576 F.2d 1072, 1079-080, quoting Riddle v. Exxon Transporta-

tion Company, 4 Cir., 1977, 563 F.2d 1103, 1111-112; Teoflovich

v. Amico Mediterranean Pacific Lines, C.D.Cal., 1976, 415 F.Supp.

732,739.

B-22

ises. From the record before us, it is not at all clear that

the shipowner did not maintain ultimate control over the

ship and its gear during the loading. Far from concluding

that only the stevedore could have had the defective winch

repaired, we cannot be certain from the record that the

stevedore had any authority to repair it.

Third, the district court held that the initial spillage was

“caused by the pallet striking the pallet jack.” Santos ar-

gued the broader view that the defective braking mecha-

nism caused the initial spillage by failing to stop the pallet

before it struck the pallet jack. Since the winch driver’s

deposition testimony supports this broader view, the im-

portance of the braking mechanism as a “cause” of the

initidi spillage should have been left for the jury.

Fourth, the district court emphasized that after the

lengshoremen raised the partially spilled pallet they left

it to-swing back and forth overhead. The amount of swing-

ing, if any, matters a great deal because Santos claims

that the remaining sacks of wheat did not loosen because

the pallet swung back and forth but because the winch’s

defective braking mechanism let the pallet keep creeping

_ down, thus requiring the winch driver to keep jerking the

pallet back up to the desired height. Since some of the

deposition testimony suggested little if any swinging, the

amount of swinging as compared with the amount of ver-

tical movement caused by the allegedly defective winch

should have been left for the jury.

Finally, the district court applied Restatement (Second)

§ 343 and § 343A which, as we have seen, incorporate the

substance of the defenses of contributory negligence and

B-23

assumption of risk. In applying those sections, the court

concluded that the “jumpiness” of the winch was open and

obvious, and that both because the plaintiff’s activities

were dangerous, and because the plaintiff recognized some

of the dangers, he could not recover as a matter of law.

These findings also require reversal. They demonstrate

that the district court actually relied upon the limiting pro-

visos, §§ 343(b) and 343A, in deciding to grant summary

judgment. Thus, its mistaken view of the law cannot be

said to have been harmless error.®

As an alternate ground of decision, the district court

concluded that the “defective condition of the winch had

only a remote cause-in-fact relationship to plaintiff’s acci-

dent and could not have been the proximate cause thereof

as a matter of law.” Because the district court based this

conclusion in part on factual findings which we have just

indicated should have been left for trial, we cannot sustain

the district court’s dismissal on this alternate ground. We

thus do not consider whether, if we had sustained the fac-

tual findings, we would have agreed that the defective con-

dition could not have been found a proximate cause of the

accident as a matter of law.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

‘We note that the standard we adopt today is very similar to the

standard set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 and

§ 343A, minus the limitations placed on recovery under those pro-

visions by § 343(b) and § 343A(1). Had the district court not relied

on the limiting provisions of the Restatement invitee rule, the error

of law may ‘have been harmless. However, as we have noted, the

district court did rely on the limiting provisos.

Appendix C

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

Lauro de los Santos, ‘

Appellant,

sb No. 76-3225

Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.,

OPINION

Appellee,

Seattle Stevedore Co.,

Intervenor.

[June 28, 1979]

On Petition for Rehearing

Before: DUNIWAY and CHOY, Circuit J udges,

and Grant,* District Judge

Per Curiam:

In its petition for a rehearing and suggestion of a rehear-

ing in bance, appellee Scindia calls our attention to the fact

that Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., D. Mass., 1977,

431 F'. Supp. 869, was reversed by the First Circuit, 1978,

585 F.2d 1142. However, the First Circuit expressly declined

to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 343 and 343A

as the standard of care, because the injury occurred on the

dock, not on the ship. The court looked to § 414A of the

*The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior United States District

Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.

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Restatement, which deals with a landowner’s liability for

activities dangerous to those outside the land. In comment-

ing on Restatement ${§ 343 and 343A the court said that

they incorporate “the defenses of contributory negligence

and assumption of risk.” (p. 1147) That is precisely the

reason why we do not adopt them as the appropriate stand-

ard in this case.

In our opinion, we said that the Second, Fourth and

Fifth Circuits “have defined ‘negligence’ in terms of a land-

lord’s duty to invitees under Restatement (Second) of

Torts, § 343 and § 343A.” Scindia says that we should add

the First, Third, Seventh and probably the Sixth Circuits

to the list. Scindia is right about the Seventh, Clemons v.

Mitsu O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 7 Cir., 1979, ...... | aaa

(No. 78-1812, April 16, 1979). Scindia is wrong about the

others.

As to the First Circuit, it cites Anderson v. Iceland

Steamship Co., supra, which expressly does not adopt

§§ 343 and 343A. As to the Third, Scindia cites Marant v.

Farrell Lines, Inc., 3 Cir., 1977, 550 F.2d 142, and Hurst v.

Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237. Neither

case is in point. Marant does not mention §§ 343 and 343A

at all. Hurst expressly declines to rely on §¢ 343 and 343A.

See fn. 35, 554 F.2d at 1248. It uses §¢ 409-29, which deal

with an employer’s duty to control the activities of an

independent contractor. As to the Sixth, Scindia cites

Migut v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 6 Cir., 1978, 571 F.2d 352,

356. It is obviously not in point. There, the shipowner’s

liability to the longshoreman had been settled, and the

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question was whether the shipowner or the charterer should

bear the cost. The opinion in the case does not mention

$$ 343 and 343A.

The petition for a rehearing is denied.

The suggestion of a rehearing in banc has been trans-

mitted to the judges who are in regular active service,

and no judge in regular active service, or judge who was

a member of the panel, has requested a vote on the

suggestion.

The suggestion of a rehearing in banc is rejected.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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