Petition — Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos
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In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
Ocrozrer TERM, 1979
me 279-512
ScrnprA SteAM Navicatron Co., Lirp.,
Petitioner,
vs.
Lauro DE Los Santos and SeatTLe SrevevorE Co.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Grayvon S. Sarina
Two Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, California 94111
Attorney for Petitioner
LuGnros, BucHANAN, PAUL
& MADDEN
Roserr fl, MADDEN
Lrtnick Mctlosr & CHARLES
Mpwarp M. Keecu
Of Counsel
BOWNE-PERNAU WALSH © 1045 SANSOME ST. ¢ a.F., CA @4111 © (415) 961-7664
SUBJECT INDEX
Page
BEER PION ne 0" a Cine ane A aR 2
ESE EE Pe i i Sg Raa MRS aa: 2
SCE Rn, Ser ae Le a aL a 2
IS Niger) 0 oe ag ee na te de ee ah 3
IE I oda Po ae Ne 3
weenie see eres Mie WHR... ere ek 6
Background of the question ............................. 6
PRE RR TS et RRP ht RA re Bis 8
Importance of the question )........................000. 13
3. SERSON RE i SGP) spa nama renee can 16
STS all Ot ee) ae) my Ee | hte 17
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Page
Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., 431 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass.
ACRE SE Rees OF 7A aM meNp eee MU Tras Cera 5, 12
Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., 585 F.2d 1142 (1st Cir.
TG eS > WA RE ei En Seen PETE <r 9, 12
Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 1976
Bs Ie Ce ls TU ove eh eg os pes eek ee eS
Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd. and Twin Harbor
Stevedoring Co., 9th Cir. Nos. 77-3043 and 77-3645, decided
PN oad Sh si bn cian an oS Nae es 14, 16
Briley v. Charente Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1978) 9
Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 1977
Bee EE 8 ok a) wees ces dies ees 9,11
Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 1978 A.M.C. 1920
thd dhl As will Ghk die wih Spt wees aid Wh gie's wo 0 8
Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978) ...... 9
Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.
a ekki y WOR Cony Sha Raise d's awe eRe Ns 4 ap 5,8
Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798,
DO a, BOE COP PTD oo vce cece ceca ceues 9, 10
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, No. 78-479
ON SRNR E ROP erg epee vane y te 15, 16, 17
Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1977
PROT RF Ge sere tow acrr ree 9, 11
Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 3d Cir. Nos. 78-
2159, 78-2160 and 78-2161, decided August 24, 1979 ....... 15
ee Ns CUD se sins cane does race neven 15
Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570
F.2d 449, 1978 A.M.C. 355 (2d Cir. 1978) ............... 9, 10
Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1977 A.M.C. 1625
I yooh, Sa hp Red oh tas « xin ano hee 9, 10, 12
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964) ...............
Lawson v. United States, 9th Cir. No. 77-2510, decided August
a iy a NR a a
Lopez v. A/S, D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 1978 A.M.C. 1655
I ES ONS AGS a Aa ns tm vue bis a'd. 6 htm an 8
Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 364,
ER ie Rs Be “AR | ei nee 8,9
Matthews v. Ernst Russ Steamship Co., 7th Cir. 78-2547,
ee |S ee een ree 14, 16
lil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CAsES
Page
Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, 553 F.2d 837, 1977
PR ee Cs TED so ch ha Fed Oe wed Sea ec cua 9, 10
Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 1976 A.M.C. 551
ee 0 hee Va de vce has os bee esos od ERD 9
Prohoroff v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 640,
pe EG ER Ree i ae nn 8
Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.1979) . 9
Riddle v. Exxon Transportation Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1978
Des Ue Wi esc ey Os ein og nncedbens ceeoks 9
Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861, 1977
i CO EE Re PE Gas bo vip ny bob ce es vnc wk Seen 9
Samuels v. Empresa Lines Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884,
1076 A.M.C, 1647 (Sth Cir. 1078) ...... 0... cence. 9
Wiles v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d 1338, 1978
Me, WE Te BD doe ic koa ks se scbanece 9
Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras S.A., 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.
SS ia ped tae ers ee ee hs Bue es, sic ert a et 9, 12
Statutes
ran MARI Bac s a's caw aligias KN Pee wae kOe oe es 2
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33
Me BME nok gaa tes boc, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15
Regulation
Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring
a0 C.F. Gettion TVIGGS(aj(G) 2... 05... eee renin. 11
Miscellaneous
2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1015 (1956) ..... 11,13
H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972]
U.S. Code Cong., & Ad. News 4698 ......................
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965):
EE a sd es een sy RAS EAE PiU eM ca eS 5, 6, 8, 10, 12
POE eo ce RE ee eee ete 5, 6, 8, 10, 12
NM os o.9. gic Sac bu WAN pues x aise NS bei 10
ON 0a a. CUE Ey a co os bk MERGER idee Hue 10
S. Rep. 92-1125, 92nd Cong,., 2d Sess. ..................005. 7
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OctoBer TERM, 1979
No.
Scinpia Steam Navication Co., Lp.,
Petitioner,
Vs.
Lauro DE Los Santos and Seatrie Stevepore Co.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, first entered in this case May 1, 1979,
as to which rehearing was denied June 28, 1979.
»)
OPINIONS BELOW
The order and opinion of Judge Walter T. McGovern,
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, are not officially reported?
but are set forth in Appendix pages A-1 through A-6, infra.
The initial opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 598 F.2d 480 and is set
forth in Appendix pages B-1 through B-23, infra. The
order of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for
rehearing is not reported but is set forth in Appendix
pages C-1 through C-3, infra.
JURISDICTION
On May 1, 1979, the Court of Appeals entered its judg-
ment reversing the decision of the District Court granting
the petitioner’s summary judgment motion. A petition for
rehearing was timely filed May 15, 1979, and was denied on
June 28, 1979. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. section 1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
The question presented is whether a shipowner is re-
quired to countermand a stevedore contractor’s informed
decision regarding the safety of work methods and equip-
ment in order to avoid liability to longshoremen who are
employees of the stevedore company under the negligence
standard of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 905(b).
1They are reported at 1976 A.M.C. 2583.
3
STATUTE INVOLVED
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act, as amended in 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) :
In the event of injury to a person covered under this
chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such
person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover dam-
ages by reason thereof, may bring an action against
such vessel as a third party in accordance with the
provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer
shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages di-
rectly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties
to the contrary shall be void. If such person was em-
ployed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services,
no such action shall be permitted if the injury was
caused by the negligence of persons engaged in pro-
viding stevedoring services to the vessel. If such
person was employed by the vessel to provide ship
building or repair services, no such action shall be
permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence
of persons engaged in providing ship building or re-
pair services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel
under this subsection shall not be based upon the war-
ranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time
the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this sub-
section shall be exclusive of all other remedies against
the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff is a longshoreman who filed this action within
the diversity jurisdiction of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington to recover
damages, in addition to his workers’ compensation bene-
fits, for injuries he sustained aboard petitioner’s ship just
after the effective date of the 1972 Amendments to the
+
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
For two days, plaintiff and other longshoremen, all em-
ployees of Seattle Stevedore Company, had worked with
a winch whose brake continually malfunctioned (Appendix,
p. B-2).? Although the longshoremen complained to their
supervisors (Appendix, p. B-19), those supervisors never
relayed the complaints to the shipowner, and the plaintiff
did not contend that the shipowner ever knew of the mal-
function (Appendix, p. A-4). When a malfunction of the
brake caused a load of cargo to land unevenly and some
sacks of cargo to spill off the load, the stevedore company’s
hatch tender directed the load with the remaining sacks in
a loose pile to be raised about 15 feet. With full knowledge
of the condition of the brake and after surveying the re-
maining sacks on the load and deciding there was no dan-
ger, the hatch tender decided to allow the load to remain
suspended over the longshoremen while they cleaned up the
spill. (Appendix, pages B-2, B-3).* About ten minutes later,
more sacks fell, dislodged hecause of the slipping brake,
and injured plaintiff (Appendix, p. B-3).
The district court granted the shipowner’s summary
judgment motion, holding that the shipowner could not be
held negligent and that the longshoremen’s working under
the suspended load was so blatantly dangerous that any
pre-existing defect in the winch could not be a proximate
cause of the injury (Appendix A).
The facts set forth here are those the courts below considered to
be least favorable to the shipowner.
‘The hatch tender had testified at his deposition that it was
solely his decision whether to suspend the load over the men work-
ing below. (Deposition of Alvin H. Botler, p. 48.)
5)
The Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion which ex-
pressly rejected the decisions of the Second, Fourth and
Fifth Circuits applying standards derived from the analogy
to the duties of land-based premises owners in sections
343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)
(Appendix, pp. B-12, B-13). Instead, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in reliance on Anderson v. Iceland
Steamship Co., 431 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1977), adopted
a new standard of care under which it was said the ship-
owner might be found liable (Appendix, p. B-11). Ander-
som, a case imposing a duty on the shipowner not to
discharge cargo posing a danger to longshoremen, had,
however, been reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit. 585 F.2d 1142 (1978).
The shipowner petitioned for rehearing and rehearing
en banc, arguing that the standard of care derived from
the trial court opinion in Anderson received no support
from the First Circuit opinion in Anderson and placed the
Ninth Circuit in conflict not only with the Courts of Ap-
peals of the Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, as noted
by the Court (Appendix, pp. B-12, B-13), but also with
those of the First, Third and Seventh Circuits, and prob-
ably the Sixth Circuit, and with prior decisions of its own.
Denying a rehearing, the Court of Appeals conceded con-
flict with the recently decided Clemons* case in the Seventh
Circuit, but claimed that there was no conflict with either
the First or Third Circuits,’ since those Circuits, had re-
‘Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.
1979).
‘This claim was made despite the court’s having cited and ex-
ressly rejected a Third Circuit case which had embraced a re-
Gieclitesten of control standard (Appendix, p. B-21, n.7).
6
jected application of sections 343 and 343A (Appendix, pp.
C-2, C-3). The new Ninth Circuit standard, which requires
the shipowner to divine danger in the stevedore’s consid-
ered decision to operate in the face of known conditions,
remained unmodified, although it lacked support in any
other court of appeals decisions and was in conflict with
the law of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Seventh Circuits.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Writ of Certiorari should be granted because the
Court of Appeals has:
1. Rendered a decision in this case in conflict with de-
cisions on the same matter of five other Courts of Appeals,
those of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh
Circuits, by its own acknowledgement, and
2. Decided an important question of federal law which
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.
Background of the Question
The issue here arises under 33 U.S.C. section 905(b), a
subsection enacted in 1972 as one of the major reforms of
the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act at that time. By its provisions Congress ¢liminated un-
seaworthiness as a ground of recovery by the longshoreman
against the vessel and restricted his recovery to an action
for negligence, under new conditions furthering the policy
of the Act. The legislative history, supported by court
decisions since, shows that the new action for negligence is
(
to be uniform throughout the country® but not based upon
maritime doctrines.’ Rather it is to be based upon tradi-
tional standards ashore so as to “place an employee injured
aboard a vessel in the same position he would be if he were
injured in non-maritime employment ashore”. The an-
nounced policy of the changes made was to establish a
fully adequate system of compensation benefits’ and thus
assure that the employer (who has ordinarily the best op-
portunity to promote safety)” “bears the cost of unsafe
conditions ... [so as] to strengthen the employer’s incen-
tive to provide the fullest measure of on-the-job safety”™
and reduce reliance upon suits against vessels.’* More par-
ticularly it was stated that “a vessel shall not be liable...
for the manner or method in which stevedores or employees
of stevedores ... perform their work”’.*®
When longshoremen’s negligence cases began to arise
under section 905(b), there was no doubt, of course, that
the shipowner would be liable for active negligent behavior
toward the longshoreman and few eases involving such con-
6S. Rep. 92-1125, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 12; H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong., & Ad.
News 4698, 4705.
7S. Rep., supra note 6, at 10; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4703.
8Ibid; “The Committee intends . . . that the vessel shall not be
liable . . . unless it is proven to have acted or have failed to act in
a negligent manner such as would render a land-based third party
in non-maritime pursuits liable under similar circumstances.” S.
Rep., supranote 6, at 11; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4704.
athe Rep., supra note 6, at 2, 5; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4699,
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964).
"™S. Rep., supra note 6, at 2; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4699.
12See S. Rep., supra note 6, at 4.
8S, Rep., supra note 6, at 10; H.R. Rep., supra note 6, at 4703.
—
SS)
duct have reached the appellate courts.** The cases the
appellate courts were faced with were of a different charac-
ter, involving conditions of equipment or of working areas
voluntarily accepted by the stevedores or operating meth-
ods used by them, as contrasted with active negligent be-
havior of the vessels. The courts, in order to effectuate the
clear policy of the Amendments, began a quest to find in
traditional non-maritime sources a suitable definition of the
limited circumstances, if any, in which the shipowner should
shoulder burdens of preparation, supervision and oversight
for the safety of the longshoreman working aboard under
the actual control of his stevedore employer. It is that
quest which the Court will see illustrated in the decisions
listed below, with which the present case is in conflict.
The Conflicts
Prior to the decision in this case the Courts of Appeals,
in their quest for a standard limiting the shipowner’s duty
to oversee the stevedore’s safety functions, found three
principal formulas. In a number of decisions they applied
(as the District Court did in the instant case) sections 343
and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, giving ef-
fect to the provision of section 343A with respect to known
or obvious conditions by expecting that the stevedore’s
supervisors and safety organization might be relied upon
to discover and cope with such conditions.** In another
4For a case of active negligence, see Prohoroff v. Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 640, 153 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1979),
where the crew put grease on the deck.
Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 596 F.2d 746, 1979
A.M.C., 999 (7th Cir. 1979); Lopez v. A/S, D/S, Svendborg, 581 F.2d
319, 1978 A.M.C. 1655 (2d Cir. 1978); Canizzo v. Farrell Lines,
Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 1978 A.M.C. 1920 (2d Cir. 1978); Lubrano v.
Royal Netherlands Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 364, 1978 A.M.C. 826
9
group of decisions the Courts of Appeals implemented the
policy of the Act by declining to impose the duty of super-
vision upon the vessel where it was shown that the ship-
owner had relinquished full control of the situation to the
stevedore.”* In still another group of cases, which is quite
analogous to the last one, substantially the same effect is
reached by explicit resort again to the Restatement (See-
ond) of Torts, this time to sections 409 and 414, dealing
with the duties retained by those who employ independent
contractors.”
Although there is conflict in detail among the three
groups of cases just described, the same results will prob-
ably be reached in most cases under any of their standards.
More important than their differences is what they have in
(2d Cir. 1978); Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka,
Zvir, 570 F.2d 449, 1978 A.M.C. 355 (2d Cir. 1978); Ruffino v.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861, 1977 A.M.C. 1289 (2d
Cir. 1977); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 1976
A.M.C. 551 (2d Cir. 1976); Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072
(4th Cir. 1978); Riddle v. Exxon Transportation Co., 563 F.2d 1103,
1978 A.M.C. 741 (4th Cir. 1977); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners
Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 1976 A.M.C. 2048 (4th Cir. 1976); Samuels
v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 1978
A.M.C. 1647 (5th Cir. 1978); Wiles v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.,
574 F.2d 1338, 1978 A.M.C. 2427 (5th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Mitsu-
bishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 1977 A.M.C. 989 (5th Cir.
1977); Gay v. Ocean eet & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233,
1977 A.M.C. 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
**Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S$.A., 577 F.2d 798,
1978 A.M.C. 1277 (2d Cir. 1978); Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linij-
ska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449, 1978 A.M.C. 355 (2d Cir.
1978); Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1977 A.M.C.
1625 (3d Cir. 1977); Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana.
553 F.2d 837, 1977 A.M.C. 843 (2d Cir. 1977); Briley v. Charente
Steamship Co., 572 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1978); Wescott v. Impresas
Armadoras, S.A., 564 F.2d 875, 1979 A.M.C. 930 (9th Cir. 1977).
“Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979):
Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., supra note 16; Anderson v. Iceland
Steamship Co., F.2d 1142 (1st Cir. 1978); Ruffino v. Scindia
Steam Navigation Co., supra note 15.
10
common: recognition of the need for reasonable limitations
upon the circumstances when the shipowner must undertake
an active duty of care for the safety of the longshoreman,
especially in respect of safety inspections and supervision.
The decision of the court below in this case conflicts with
the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, not only in formu-
lation of standards and in results but, even more impor-
tantly, in its rejection of even the attempt to formulate
such a standard for the creation of a shipowner’s duty, for
which the other courts have sought.
The Court of Appeals below expressly rejected the au-
thority of each of the lines of cases described and cited
above. The court was “not unmindful” that the Second,
Fourth and Fifth Circuits had defined negligence in terms
of sections 343 and 343A, but nevertheless chose not to
follow them: “We decline to follow the lead of these Cir-
cuits... .” 598 F.2d at 486, Appendix, pp. B-12, B-13. Sim-
ilarly the court recognized the line of cases focusing on the
stevedore’s control and the line deriving limitation of duty
from Restatement sections 409 and 414. “[ W]e do not follow
those cases which have foeused . . . on whether the ship-
owner relinquished control of the stevedoring ....” 598 F.2d
at 490, Appendix, p. B-21. Those cases, as the court noted
in a footnote which included specific mention of sections
409 and 414, were Cor, Hickman, Hurst, and Munoz. 598
F.2d at 490 n. 7, Appendix, p. B-21.
But the court below went much further than to reject
the specific bases on which the shipowner’s duty had pre-
viously been limited; it rejected the very idea of restric-
tion, The court quoted from a district court opinion:
11
Discussions relating to invitees, contractors, primary
and second responsibilities, obviousness of dangers,
and the relinquishment of control all have the tendency
to steer courts away from a balance of the risk of
harm against the utility of the particular conduct in
question. [598 F.2d at 488, Appendix, p. B-16, quoting
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., 435 F.Supp. 484, 496,
1977 A.M.C, 1325, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1977).]
Thus, this case presents not only specific conflicts of
standards and results with prior cases, but also an even
more fundamental conflict. American tort law generally
imposes firm limits on the duty to take affirmative action,
but does not impose such limits on the duty to act reason-
ably when one does act. As illustrated by the quotation
from Gallardo regarding the “utility of .. . conduct”, the
opinion below obliterates the distinction between the duty
to act at all and the duty to make one’s actions reasonable.
Cf. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1015, 1017,
1044-58 (1956).
This is not merely a quibble over the formulation of
similar standards. The conscientious application of any of
the rejected standards would have led to a different con-
clusion. The condition of the winch was obvious and known
to the stevedore company. Since the condition of the winch
was one which the shipowner would expect the stevedore
to report to it** and since it “was not the type of danger
“The applicable longshore regulation requires:
Any defect or malfunction of winches shall be reported imme-
diately to the officer in charge of the vessel. [Safety and
Health Regulations for Longshoring, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.53(a)
(5).]
12
that must be faced notwithstanding knowledge”,”® a court
applying standards drawn from sections 343 and 343A
would have reached a different result.
If the -ourt had followed the line of cases focusing on
relinquishment of control, for example its own Wescott
opinion which relies heavily on the Third Circuit’s Hurst
case, it would have reached a different conclusion. In the
Wescott case, the court had been persuaded that because
there was “an obvious dangerous condition”, and the steve-
dore made no attempt “to change its method of operation”
and the stevedore “of its own volition, chose to go ahead
despite the condition”, there was “no basis for imposing
any liability upon the shipowner herein”. 564 F.2d at 883,
1979 A.M.C. at 941. Such an analysis would result in a
decision in favor of the shipowner in this case.
If the court had not rejected the cases relying on sections
409 and 414 of the Restatement, it would have followed
Anderson.” In that case the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit determined that the shipowner did not owe a duty
to protect plaintiff from the danger of the cargo, because
that danger was “open, obvious and capable of being
protected against by relatively simple measures known,
available and practiced in the stevedoring trade”. 585 F.2d
at 1151. A court applying this standard would have found
that the dangers which caused Santos’ injury were like-
wise known and capable of being protected against.
*Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1242,
1977 A.M.C. 996, 1008 (5th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Mitsubishi Shin-
taku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 334, 1977 A.M.C. 989, 994 (5th Cir.
1977).
— v. Iceland Steamship Co., 585 F.2d 1142 (Ist Cir.
1978).
13
And finally, if the court below had not rejected the very
idea of imposing limits on the duty to act affirmatively
for the protection of others, the result would have been
very different indeed. Instead of announcing its standard
of care as a startling discovery which disposed of the case,
the court would have recognized its formulation of the
reasonable man standard as a mere platitude. Whenever
one has a duty, one must discharge the duty by the exercise
of reasonable care under the circumstances. See Harper &
James, supra. The court would have further recognized
that the 1972 Amendments and the relationship between
stevedore and shipowner pose issues which are not ade-
quately resolved by a negligence standard which imposes a
responsibility to act to protect the employees of the expert
stevedore contractor from the effects of the latter’s con-
sidered decisions.
Thus, if the court below had recognized the importance
of applying concepts of duty under the 1972 Amendments,
its decision would have been similar to one or more of the
lines of decisions it rejected, since those lines of cases have
sought and found workable rules for realization of the
Congressional policy and the 1972 Amendments.
Importance of the Question
The question is important first because of its nature.
It is clear from the history that Congress intended a major
reform by the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The history also indi-
cates a number of policy considerations to be given effect
in the Act, such as increased reliance upon the predicta-
bility, regularity and adequacy of compensation benefits,
the promotion of safety and the reduction of economic loss
14
through legal proceedings. 'l'o describe the longshoreman’s
new and more limited rights against the vessel, new sub-
section 905(b) provided but a single word of substance,
“negligence”, a term which has always been highly variable
in content according to the circumstances. Thoughtful
exploration and interpretation of its substance are needed
if the section is to be given shape to implement the impor-
tant policies of the Act.
The question presented is important also because of the
frequency with which it arises. The history of longshore-
men’s injury cases in this Court and the number of them
to be readily found in the law reports will remind the
Court that longshoremen’s suits against the shipowner are
potentially, and actually, numerous. The numerous appel-
late court decisions cited in footnotes to the text above,
concerning the question presented in this case, should go
far. to establish its importance.
Whether or not the summary judgment itself be rein-
stated in this case, the question of the legal standard to
be applied is important for consideration by the Court at
this time because of the effect that the lower court’s deci-
sion is already having upon other cases, not only in its own
court but in others. The doctrine of the opinion below has
been explicitly applied by other panels of the same court
in Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd. and Twin
Harbor Stev edoring Co., 9th Cir. Nos. 77-3043 and 77-3645,
decided August 20, 1979, and Lawson v. United States, 9th
Cir. No. 77-2510, decided August 21, 1979, to produce
results which could not have been reached under prior
decisions of the same or other courts of appeals. The
decision below has been cited and evidently followed also
15
in Matthews v. Ernst Russ Steamship Co., 7th Cir. 78-2547,
decided August 20, 1979, and most recently it has again
been cited and relied on in Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsbur gh
Steel Corp., 3d Cir. Nos. 78-2159, 78-2160 and 78-2161,
decided August 24, 1979.
The importance of properly defining the scope of the
shipowner’s duty to longshoremen is magnified by the deci-
sion of this Court in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
T'ransatlantique, No. 78-479 (June 27, 1979), in which a peti-
tion for rehearing is before the Court and a motion to con-
sider that petition together with this petition for certiorari
has been filed. Edmonds presents the question whether
a shipowner, responsible for only 20% of the fault, is liable
to the longshoremen for 90% of the damages where the
longshoreman was 10% at fault and the stevedore company
70%. The effect of the adoption of the virtually unlimited
scope of a shipowner’s duty in Santos must be evaluated in
the light of whether the defendant found liable under such
a standard will be able to shift the burden, or any of it, to
the party actually responsible.
This Court long ago foreclosed contribution between the
shipowner and the stevedore employer. Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 1952
A.M.C. 1 (1952). The 1972 Amendments themselves forbid
indemnity from the stevedore employer. “[T]he employer
shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or
indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the con-
trary shall be void.” If this Court is to continue to hold,
as it did in its initial decision in Edmonds, that the ship-
2133 U.S.C. § 905(b).
16
owner is liable for all the plaintiff's damages when it is
negligent at all, then a decision vastly increasing the scope
of the shipowner’s duty has a dramatic effect on shipown-
ers, stevedore companies, and the Congressional aims for
the 1972 Amendments. If the shipowner is to be held liable
virtually vicariously for a failure to supervise the inde-
pendent stevedore contractor and to be held so liable with-
out the possibility of relief by way of contribution, indem-
nity or reduction of damages for the concurrent fault of
others, drastic burdens have been imposed on the ship-
owner. Such a situation calls for careful serutiny by this
Court to determine whether the goals of the 1972 Amend-
ments have been implemented or frustrated.
RELATED CASES
The question raised by this case is the same question
expected to be raised in Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Car-
riers, Ltd. and Twin Harbor Stevedoring Co., and in Mat-
thews v. Ernst Russ Steamship Co., in both of which cases
it is expected that petitions for certiorari will shortly be
filed. The question is also intimately related, as shown
above, to the question arising under the same statute in
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, No. 78-
479, in which case attention has been called to the question
by Motion to Defer Ruling on Petition for Rehearing.
17
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit that
this Court should grant a Writ of Certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals and should consolidate
the case for hearing with other cases in which petitions
for writs of certiorari are filed raising the same questions
and should hear all such eases in conjunction with the re-
hearing of Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-
tique, No. 78-479.
Respectfully submitted,
Grayvon S. Staring
Attorney for Petitioner
LeGros, BucHanan, Paut
& Mappen
Rosert H. Mappren
Linutick McHosr & CHARLES
Epwarp M. Krecu
Of Counsel
(Appendices Follow)
Appendices
APPENDICES
Page
Opinion of District Court Granting Defendant’s Motion
ee NN SE id nse vin pos Wabi pwas cig ee o's A-1
Opinion of the Court of Appeals ..................... B-1
Opinion of the Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing .... C-l
Appendix A
Lauro de los Santos, }
Plaintiff,
Vs.
Seindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., of f
Bombay, India,
Defendant. ;
United States District Court
Western District of Washington
a
September 1, 1976
No. C74-7208,
—_—_—_——
Wa ter T’, McGovern, D.J.:
This matter comes on for consideration upon the de-
fendant Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment of dismissal] pursuant to Rule 56, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court having carefully considered the records and
files herein, including but not limited to the agreed pretrial
order, the depositions taken of plaintiff Lauro De Los
Santos, Lester Hawran, and Alvin H. Botler; plaintiff's
Memorandum of Authorities and Supplemental Memoran-
dum in opposition to the Motion; and defendant’s Memo-
randum and Reply Brief in Support of the Motion,
concludes that the defendant’s Motion should be granted.
The Law.
in 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S. Code, see. 901 et seq.)
became effective which eliminated causes of action of long-
A-2
shoremen against vessels based upon “unseaworthiness”
standards and instead restricted the longshoremen to ac-
tions based upon negligence theories. The pertinent lan-
guage of the Amendment, Section 905(b), states as follows:
“In the event of injury to a person covered under this
chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such
person * * * may bring an action against such vessel
as a third party * * *. The liability of the vessel under
this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty
of unseaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the
injury occurred.” [33 U.S. Code sec. 905(b).]
The divorcement between “unseaworthiness” and “negli-
gence” is complete under the law. Usner v. Luckenbach
Overseas Co., 400 U.S. 494, 1971 AMC 277 (1971). That
Congress intended to substitute negligence principles in
place of theories of maritime liability utilized in earlier
cases (such as “unseaworthiness” or “nondelegable duty”)
is well established by the legislative history of Amendment,
Section 905(b). 1972 U.S. Congressional and Administra-
tive News, 4703-4705. While there is some debate over the
appropriate standard of care a vessel owes a longshoreman
under the negligence action created by sec. 905(b), the
Court is persuaded that Congress intended to have land-
based standards of negligence be applied; these standards
are found best expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts sec. 343 and sec. 343A (1965). See, Crowshaw v.
Koninklijke Nedlloyd B.V. Rijswijk, 1975 AMC 2630, 398
F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore., 1975); Frasca v. Prudential Grace
Lines, 1975 AMC 1130, 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D.C. Md.,
1975) ; Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 1975 AMC
899, 391 F. Supp. 1143 (D.C. Md., 1975); Citizen v. M/V
Triton, 1976 AMC 509, 384 F. Supp. 198, 201, 202 (E.D.
A-3
Tex., 1974); 1A Benepicr on Admiralty sec. 112, at 6-10
(7th Ed., 1973).
It is clear under Federal land-based negligence stan-
dards that a shipowner is not liable for dangerous condi-
tions created by the stevedore’s negligence while the
stevedore was in exclusive control over the manner and
area of the work (Frasca, supra; Crowshaw, supra;
Slaughter v. 8.S. Ronde, 1974 AMC 290, 390 F. Supp. 637
(S.D. Ga., 1974)), nor is the shipowner under a duty to
warn the stevedore or his employees of dangers or open
and obvious defects which are known to the stevedore or
his employees or which are so obvious and apparent that
they may reasonably be expected to discover them. Ramirez
v. Toko Kawn K.K., 1975 AMC 85, 385 F. Supp. 644, 651
(N.D. Cal., 1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts see.
343A (1965); Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 403 (2 ed., 1964).
The Facts.
The facts of this case are generally not in dispute and
are well set out in the pretrial order and depositions taken
of plaintiff (a lonyshoreman working in the hatch at the
time of the accident), Mr. Hawran (the winch driver), and
Mr. Botler (the hatch tender). Plaintiff alleges that a
winch, which was lowering pallets loaded with sacks of
bulgar wheat into the No. 3 hatch, was defective and that
this defective winch proximately caused the plaintiff’s in-
juries. Defendant denies that the winch was defective and
asserts that, even if the winch was defective, the defective
condition was open and obvious to the plaintiff and was in
fact known by the plaintiff to be a dangerous condition;
that the defective condition was not known to the defend-
re a
A-4
ant, nor could the defendant reasonably be expected to
have known of the condition ; and that the alleged defective
condition had only a remote cause-in-fact relationship to
plaintiff's accident and was not the proximate cause
thereof.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material
fact remaining in dispute. Following an initial spillage of
sacks caused by the pallet striking the pallet jack (Pretrial
Order, Agreed Fact No. 4), the pallet was raised 15 feet
overhead by the winch operator and was left to swing
overhead of plaintiff as plaintiff worked to clean up the
spilled sacks from the hatch floor below. (Agreed Fact No.
9; Deposition of Hawran, pp. 58-59.) There is no dispute
that the premises were in exclusive control of the steve-
dores during the loading operation. Plaintiff does not con-
trovert defendant’s claim that no one from the ship’s crew
was ever informed of the winch’s condition prior to the
accident. Yet, plaintiff rests his argument on the supposi-
tion that the defendant should have known of the condition
of the winch and should have taken appropriate action to
remedy the situation, and that defendant’s failure to so
act proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. This argument
ignores the applicable principles of negligence law cited
above and contained within the Restatement (Second) of
Torts sec. 343 and sec. 343A: Even if the ship’s gear had
been defective (a condition which the Court finds the ship-
owner did not know nor should it reasonably have been
expected to know, given the exclusive control of the gear
by the stevedores during the relevant time period), the
defendant cannot be held liable under the facts of this case
A-5
as a matter of law. There is no dispute that the “Jumpi-
ness” of the winch and the positioning of the unevenly
loaded pallet after the initial spillage was open and obvious
to the plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s deposition, p. 56, line 8 through
p. 97, line 11.) Indeed, in his deposition plaintiff conceded
that the condition of the winch and the positioning of the
pallet swinging overhead seemed “dangerous” to him:
“Q. Was there some reason you started to clean up
the sacks before they moved the load overhead? Wasn’t
it dangerous to go underneath the swinging load?
A. Well, it is, yes.
Q. Did you think it was dangerous to clean up
those sacks with the pallet overhead?
A. Well, I am telling you that was dangerous, yes,
but it was the practice, we are asked to do the job, you
know, cleaning up things for our own good.”
Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 58, lines 1-5.
In a case remarkably on point, Cummings v. “Sidarma”
Soc., 409 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. La., 1976), the Court
there held that a vessel owner did not breach its duty of
care under the Longshoremen’s Act as amended where the
alleged defective condition (bales ship’s of rubber stowed
freely in void spaces between boxed cargo and the ship’s
skin) was obvious to the longshoremen, and where the po-
sition of the bales was expressed during the routine dis-
charging operation.
Here, the Court similarly finds that the manner in which
the accident occurred, the fact that plaintiff’s activities
were so dangerous and the fact that plaintiff undertook
his actions free from any direction by the defendant while
A-6
recognizing that the circumstances were so dangerous, is
such that the defendant cannot be held liable as a matter
of law. In addition to the findings above, the Court finds
that the alleged defective condition of the winch had only
a remote cause-in-fact relationship to plaintiff’s accident
and could not have been the proximate cause thereof as a
matter of law. Either finding is a sufficient basis upon which
to grant the defendant’s Motion.
Accordingly, defendant Scindia Steam Navigation Co.,
Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment of dismissal is
Granted.
Appendix B
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit
]
Lauro de los Santos,
Appellant,
vs. —
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., p NO. SE-SERS
Appellee,
Seattle Stevedore Co.,
Intervenor. ;
May 1, 1979
Rehearing Denied June 28, 1979.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Before DUNIWAY and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and
GRANT,* District Judge.
DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge:
Several 50 pound sacks of grain tumbled off a pallet,
severely injuring appellant longshoreman Lauro De Los
Santos, who was working in a ship’s hold. Santos
sued appellee shipowner Scindia Steam Navigation Co.
(“Seindia”), alleging that the accident had occurred
because the shipowner had negligently failed to repair the
winch by means of which the pallet was lowered into the
hold. The district court granted the shipowner’s motion
*The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
B-2
for summary judgment. Its opinion is reported at 1976
A.M.C. 2583. We reverse.
I. The Facts
Stated in the light most favorable to Santos, against
whom summary judgment was granted, the facts are these:
On the evening of December 10, 1972, Santos and other
longshoremen employed by the Seattle Stevedoring Com-
pany were loading a cargo of wheat into a hold in Seindia’s
vessel, the M/S JALARATNA. The longshoremen used a
winch that was part of the ship’s gear to lower wooden
pallets, each carrying seventy fifty-pound sacks of wheat,
into the hold.
The ship’s winch was unusual in that its controls were
located. on a platform more than 25 feet above the main
deck. From that point, the winch driver could not actually
see a pallet of sacks as he lowered it into the hold. He
thus had to rely upon the hatch tender to signal to him
when to start and stop the winch. Santos and three other
men were in the hold. When a pallet reached the bottom
of the hold, Santos and his co-workers would stow the
sacks. Seattle Stevedoring controlled the loading procedure.
The winch’s braking mechanism had continually mal-
functioned during the two days prior to the accident and
on the day of the accident in that, when the winch driver
tried to stop a load, the load continued to fall for several
feet before coming to a stop. The winch continued mal-
functioning on the night of the accident. As the winch
driver lowered the loaded pallet into the hold, the hatch
tender signaled him to stop its descent. The winch driver
B-3
applied the brake, but the pallet kept falling. When it
struck a pallet jack, on which it should have come to rest,
about half the sacks spilled off the pallet.
The hatch tender then had the winch driver raise the
pallet, carrying the remaining sacks in a loose pile and not
fastened down, about fifteen feet up so that Santos and the
other men could clean up the spilled sacks. After the winch
driver had raised the pallet, the hatch tender looked over
the remaining sacks. He thought that they looked stable
enough that he concluded that no more sacks would spill
off and endanger the men cleaning-up below. N evertheless,
about ten minutes later several more sacks fell off the
pallet and landed on Santos.
The parties disagree about what caused those sacks to
work loose and fall. The district court accepted the ship-
owner’s position that the pallet had swung back and forth,
and that this swinging loosened the sacks. Santos points
to deposition testimony which indicates little if any swing-
ing. He relies upon testimony tracing the accident to fur-
ther malfunctioning of the winch’s braking mechanism. The
winch driver explained that even though he had the con-
trols set to hold the pallet stationary, the pallet began
slipping down into the hold three or four times during the
ten minutes, requiring him to pull it back up again each
time so that it would not interfere with the cleanup. Santos
argues that the defective condition of the ship’s winch
caused the repeated slipping, and that this slipping and
pulling back up caused the additional sacks to work loose
and fall.
B-4
II. The Applicable Law
The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act defines the rights of longshoremen injured while
taking part in stevedoring operations. Just before Santos’
accident, Congress had passed the Longshoremen’s and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub.L. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.
The Amendments made sweeping changes in the legal
relationships among injured longshoremen, stevedores, and
shipowners. Before the Amendments, an injured longshore-
man could sue a shipowner for negligence, and also for
breach of a warranty of seaworthiness, a form of liability
without fault. Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 1946, 328
U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099. If the longshoreman
could establish that he had been injured by unsafe con-
ditions aboard the ship, he recovered even if the shipowner
had not been negligent. Under Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 1956, 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232,
100 L.Ed. 133, the vessel owner could in turn seek indem-
nity against the stevedore company when a substandard
performance by the stevedore or its longshoremen had
brought the unseaworthy conditions into play. The injured
longshoreman could not sue the stevedore, but he was
entitled to workers’ compensation type benefits without
regard to fault.
Under the 1972 Amendments, the injured longshoreman
lost his action against the shipowner for unseaworthiness,
but in return Congress granted the longshoreman signifi-
eantly higher compensation benefits. Congress also ended
the shipowner’s right to indemnity from the stevedore.
The shipowner had less need for indemnification because
B-5
the abolition of the unseaworthiness action left it liable
only when an injured longshoreman could prove it negli-
ent. House Report No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin.News, pp.
4698-4705; Senate Report No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pp. 8-12; Davison v. Pacific Inland Nav. Co., Ine., 9 Cir.,
1978, 569 F.2d 507, 511-13. Note, “The Injured Longshore-
man v. The Shipowner After 1972: Business Invitees, Land-
Based Standards, and Assumption of Risk,” 28 Hastings
L.J. 771, 773-79 (1977). [hereafter, “The Injured Long-
shoreman”] Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 1974,
417 U.S. 106, 113, fn. 6, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 40 L.Ed.2d 694.
The Act as amended explicitly preserves the injured
longshoreman’s right to sue the shipowner for negligence.
33 U.S.C. §905(b) provides that:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this
chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such
person ... may bring an action against such vessel
as a third party. . . . The liability of the vessel under
this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty
of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the
injury occurred... .
In the case at bar, Santos alleged that Scindia had been
negligent within the meaning of § 905(b), and that Scindia’s
negligence had proximately caused his injuries. He timely
asserted his right to have the facts tried to a jury.
[1] When a party moves for summary judgment under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, all of the facts and all reasonable infer-
ences to be drawn from those facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the party against whom the motion
is made. The trial court may grant the motion for sum-
B-6
mary judgment only when no material questions of fact
remain. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.,
1962, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458; United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 1962, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993,
8 L.Ed.2d 176; United States v. Perry, 9 Cir., 1970,
431 F.2d 1020, 1022; Radobenko v. Automated Equipment
Corporation, 9 Cir., 1975, 520 F.2d 540, 548; United States v.
Bissett-Berman Corporation, 9 Cir., 1973, 481 F.2d 764, 767.
Furthermore, we have emphasized that “‘[i]ssues of negli-
gence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudica-
tion.’” Arney v. United States, 9 Cir., 1973, 479 F.2d 653,
660. See also Leaf v. United States, 9 Cir., 1978, 588 F.2d
733, 736.
Here, Santos contends that the district court granted
the motion for summary judgment only after resolving a
number of disputed material facts against him. Santos
also argues that the district court applied an incorrect
legal standard when it explicitly adopted the standard of
negligence set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§§ 343 and 343A. To pass upon these contentions, we must
begin by determining what showing of negligence § 905(b)
requires when an allegedly dangerous condition of the ship
or its gear injures a longshoreman.'
The Act does not define “negligence.” Davis v. Inca
Compama Naviera, S.A., W.D. Wash., 1977, 440 F.Supp.
1In Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A. Panama, 9 Cir., 1977,
564 F.2d 875, 883, we quoted Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir.,
1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1251, 1252, for the proposition that a vessel
owner owes no duty to protect longshoremen against defects in the
equipment the longshoremen and stevedore bring aboard. In this
case, it is undisputed that the winch was part of the ship and thus
provided for use by the vessel owner.
B-7
448, 451; Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, N.D.
Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 484, 492. In Davison v. Pacific
Inland Navigation Co., Inc., 9 Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 507,
908-09, fn. 1, we specifically reserved the question of what
standard of negligence is to be used in a case brought under
the Act. We noted there that courts which have already
considered the question have applied different standards.
Santos’ appeal requires us to arrive at a standard.
While the legislative history is not entirely clear, we
read the House and Senate Committee Reports, cited su pra,
as calling upon the federal courts to fashion a negligence
standard responsive to five specific concerns. Cf. Gallardo
v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, supra, 435 F.Supp. at
491, 493.
First, Congress was concerned about safety. The Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare protested that
longshoring had an injury frequency rate “well over four
times the average for manufacturing operations,” and
called for safer working conditions when it insisted that
“every appropriate means be applied toward improving
the tragic and intolerable conditions which take such a
heavy toll upon workers’ lives and bodies. . . .” Senate
Report at 2. The Amendments sought to strengthen
economic incentives “to provide the fullest measure of on-
the-job safety.” House Report at 4699. The higher com-
pensation benefits were meant to “assure that the employer
bears the cost of unsafe conditions.” Senate Report at 2.
“Permitting actions against the vessel based on negligence”
was meant to “meet the objective of encouraging safety.”
House Report at 4704. Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Mariti-
B-8
mas Argentinas, 5 Cir., 1978, 573 F.2d 884, 888 (“promotion
of shipboard safety ...a primary focus” of the negligence
action) ; Marant v. Farrel Lines, Inc., 3 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d
142, 149, fn. 3 (coneurring opinion); Davis v. Inca Com-
pana Naviera, S.A., W.D. Wash., 1977, 440 F.Supp. 448,
454, fn. 14. “Congress was concerned that the vessel owner
not become lax in doing what it should reasonably be
required to do to prevent injuries to the longshoremen.”
Lucas v. “Brinknes” Schiffahrts Ges. E.D.Pa., 1974, 379
F.Supp. 759, 769 (three-judge court).
Second, to assure uniformity Congress specified that it
“intend[ed] that legal questions . . . be determined as a
matter of Federal law.” House Report at 4705. In Wescott
v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A. Panama, 9 Cir., 1977, 564
F.2d 875, 882, we held that federal law continues to govern
lawsuits between an injured longshoreman and a ship-
owner. See also, Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976,
545 F.2d 854, 861-63; Gow v. Flota Mercante Grancolom-
biana S.A., 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d 798, 800-801, fn. 1; Birrer
v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, D.Ore., 1974, 386
F.Supp. 1105.
Third, Congress wanted to make certain that it had really
done away with longshoremen’s actions based upon unsea-
worthiness. Concerned that some courts might continue
holding vessels strictly liable for unsafe conditions by
simply relabeling unseaworthiness “negligence,” Congress
emphasized that it intended the courts to define “negli-
gence” in accordance with the land-based traditions of not
imposing liability without regard to actual fault. Gallardo,
supra, 435 F.Supp. at 492; Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping
B-9
Co., S.D.Tex., 1975, 394 F.Supp. 1189, 1192-194; The
Injured Longshoreman, supra, at 778-79; Lucas v. “Brink-
nes” Schiffahrts Ges, supra, 379 F.Supp. at 767-68, 771-72.
The Committee thus reported that they had “rejected the
thesis that a vessel should be liable without regard to its
fault.” Senate Report at 8. Houtise Report at 4702. Rather,
Congress concluded that,
it would be fairer to all concerned and fully consistent
with the objective of protecting the health and safety
of employees who work on board vessels for the liabil-
ity of vessels as third parties to he predicated on neg-
ligence, rather than the no-fault concept of seaworthi-
ness. This would place vessels in the same position,
insofar as third party liability is concerned, as land-
based third parties in non-maritime pursuits.
The purpose of the amendments is to place an em-
ployee injured aboard a vessel in the same position he
would be if he were injured in non-maritime employ-
ment ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage
action is concerned, and not to endow him with any
special maritime theory of liability or cause of action
under whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called,
such as “unseaworthiness”, “non-delegable duty”, or
the like. House Report at 4703. Senate Report at 10.
[2] Under the former law, some unsafe conditions which
supported an unseaworthiness action might also have sup-
ported a negligence action. Because of the overlap between
the two doctrines, Congress feared that its abolition of the
unseaworthiness action might lead some post-Amendment
courts to conclude that if a set of facts would have
amounted to unseaworthiness, Congress meant to preclude
a recovery based upon negligence. After collecting a num-
B-10
ber of cases to illustrate situations in which the unsea-
worthiness doctrine would no longer apply, the Committees
carefully cautioned that their listing of disapproved cases
was “not intended to reflect a judgment as to whether re-
covery on a particular factual setting could have been pred-
icated on the vessel’s negligence.” Senate Report at 10.
House Report at 4703-4704. Thus, consistent with Congress’
intention to apply the land-based traditions of no liability
without regard to fault, it is perfectly possible under the
new law for an unseaworthy condition to give rise to a neg-
ligence recovery when a vessel fails “to take appropriate
corrective action where it knows or should have known
about a dangerous condition.” House Report at 4704, Sen-
ate Report at 10; Solsvik v. Maremar Compania Naviera,
S.A., W.D.Wash., 1975, 399 F.Supp. 712, 715; Slaughter v.
Ronde, S.D.Ga., 1974, 390 F.Supp. 637, 641, aff’d per cur-
tam, 5 Cir., 1975, 509 F.2d 973.
[3] Fourth, Congress “intend[ed] that the admiralty
concept of comparative negligence, rather than the common
law rule as to contributory negligence, shall apply in cases
where the injured employee’s own negligence may have
contributed to causing the injury.” House Report at 4705.
Senate Report at 12. Thus, a longshoreman’s carelessness
reduces but does not necessarily bar his recovery. Shellman
v. Umted States Lines, Inc., 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d 675, 676-
77, fn. 1; Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co., D.Mass., 1977, 431
F.Supp. 869, 872.
Finally, Congress “intend[ed] that the admiralty rule
which precludes the defense of ‘assumption of risk’ in an
action by an injured employee shall also be applicable.”
House Report at 4705, Senate Report at 12. Davis, supra,
440 F.Supp. at 454.
B-11
Ill. The Applicable Standard.
[4] We adopt the following standard of negligence for
purposes of 33 U.S.C. §905(b) actions:
A vessel is subject to liability for injuries to long-
shoremen working on or near the vessel caused by con-
ditions on the vessel if, but only if, the shipowner
(a) knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care
would discover, the condition, and should realize that
it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such long-
shoremen, and
(b) the shipowner fails to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances to protect the longshoremen
against the danger.
See House Report at 4704; Senate Report at 10-11. Cf.
Anderson v. Iceland 8.8. Co., D.Mass., 1977, 431 F.Supp.
869, 873. We believe that the standard we adopt responds
to all five of Congress’ concerns. It will promote safety
within a comparative negligence framework while avoiding
both liability without fault and the defenses of contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk. See Gallardo,
supra, 435 F.Supp. at 498.
*The cited Committee Reports illustrated how the negligence
standard described by Congress would apply in an actual case:
So, for example, where a agente slips on an oil spill
on a vessel's deck and is injured, the proposed amendments to
Section 5 would still permit an action against the vessel for
negligence. To recover he must establish that: 1) the vessel put
the foreign substance on the deck, or knew that it was there,
and willfully or negligently failed to remove it; or 2) the for-
eign substance had been on the deck for such a period of time
that it should have been discovered and sechoeedl: by the vessel
in the exercise of reasonable care by the vessel under the cir-
cumstances. House Report at 4704; Senate Report at 10-11.
The structure of Congress’ illustration supports the standard of neg-
ligence we adopt today.
B-12
In adopting the “reasonable care under the cireum-
stances” standard, we are not unmindful of the fact that the
Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have defined “negli-
gence” under § 905(b) in terms of a landowner’s duty to in-
vitees under Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343 and
§ 343A.° See Davison v. Pacific Island Navigation Co., Inc.,
9 Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 507, 508, n.1.* We decline to follow the
SThese sections of the Restatement provide, in relevant part:
TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS OF
LAND TO INVITEES
§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by
Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
— to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only
, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would dis-
cover the condition, and should realize that it involves an un-
reasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against
the danger.
§ 343A. Known or Obvious Dangers
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obvious-
ness.
‘Cases adopting Restatement §§ 343 and 343A include Canizzo v.
Farrell Lines, Inc., 2 Cir., 1978, 579 F.2d 682, 684-85; Samuels v.
Empresa-Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 5 Cir., 1978, 573 F.2d 884,
885-86; Wiles v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 5 Cir., 1978, 574 F.2d
1339, 1240; Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands Steamship Co., 2 Cir.,
1978, 572 F.2d 364, 366; Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp.,
Panama, 4 Cir., 1978, 540 F.2d 757, 758-59 (per curiam), aff g
D.Md., 1975, 391 F.Supp. 1143; Brown wv. Mitsubishi Shintaku
Ginko, 5 Cir., 1977, 550 F.2d 331, 333-34; Gay v. Ocean Transport
¢> Trading, Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546, F.2d 1233, 1238; Napoli v. [Trans-
pacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 2 Cir., 1976, 536 F.2d 505,
508-509; Bovia v. S/S Agia Erini, E.D.La., 1977, 433 F.Supp. 1020,
1022; Croshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd B.V. Rijswijk, D.Ore., 1975,
398 F.Supp. 1224, 1229; Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,
D.Md., 1975, 394 F.Supp. 1092, 1097-98, 1100-01; Birrer v. Flota
B-13
lead of those Circuits for three reasons.
First of all, § 343(b) and § 343A place limitations on a
landowner’s liability to an invitee inconsistent with Con-
gress’ explicit direction to reject common law rules of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk in favor of
applying the admiralty concept of comparative negligence.*
Mercante Grancolombiana, D.Ore., 1974, 386 F.Supp. 1105, 1112.
Cf. Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d
798; Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., 2 Cir. 1977, 559
F.2d 861; Castel v. Moller, A.P., N.D.Cal. 1977, 441 F.Supp. 851;
Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, E.D.Tex., 1974, 380 F.Supp.
222, 226-27.
*The Comments explaining § 343(b) and § 343A(1) show that
these limitations on liability are based upon the substance of the
proscribed defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Section 343A, comment e, for example, explains that:
In the ordinary case, an invitee who enters land is entitled to
nothing more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers
he will encounter if he comes. If he knows the actual condi-
tions, .. . and the dangers involved . . ., he is free to make an
intelligent choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is
sufficient to justify him in incurring the risk b entering or
remaining on the land. The possessor of the iad may reason-
ably assume that he will protect himself by the exercise
ordinary care, [i. e., avoid contributory negligence] or that he
will voluntarily assume the risk of harm if he does not succeed
in doing so. Reasonable care on the part of the possessor there-
fore does not ordinarily require precautions, or even warning,
against dangers which are known to the visitor, or so obvious
to him that he may be expected to discover them.
(emphasis added)
In like fashion § 343, comment b limits the possessor’s duty sim-
ply to putting the invitee in a position where the invitee “may de-
cide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation [to en-
counter the danger], or may protect himself against the danger if he
does accept it.” See also, § 343, comment d, § 343A, comment d,
and § 496C, comment d. Cf. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 61,
394 (4th Ed., 1971).
The Restatement’s standard of care incorporates the proscribed
defenses into its definition of the possessor’s duty when it allows the
possessor to count on his invitees to discover conditions, realize their
dangers, and then protect themselves against the dangers. To apply
the limitations of § 343(b) and § 343A (1) to negligence suits ae
the Amendments would violate the legislative intent behind
B-14
We also fear that these limitations on liability would un-
dercut Congress’ intention to reduce the frequency of acci-
dents by creating economic incentives to provide safer
working conditions. Davis, supra, 440 F.Supp. at 454-55;
D. Robertson, “Negligence Actions by Longshoremen
Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,”
7 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 447, 473.°
Secondly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kermarec v.
Compagnie General T'ransatlantique, 1959, 358 U.S. 625,
§ 905(b) because it would, in substance if not in form, give defend-
ant shipowners the benefits of a partial or absolute bar to liability
having the characteristics of a defense based upon contributory
negligence or implied assumption of risk or both. Brown v. Ivarans
Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 863-64, fn. 10; Hurst v. Triad
Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1250, fn. 35; Davis, supra,
440 F.Supp. at 453-55; Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp. at 494; Espi-
noza v. United States Lines, Inc., §.D.N.Y., 1978, 444 F.Supp. 405,
410; Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1977, 279 Or. 477, 494-97, 369
P.2d 1040, 1050-51 (in banc); The Injured Longshoremen, supra,
28 Hastings L.J. 780-81; cf. Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading
Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546 F.2d 1233, 1241-242.
From the point of view of an injured plaintiff, to use a definition
of shipowner’s duty which incorporates assumption of risk may well
be worse than allowing the shipowner to plead assumption of risk
as an affirmative defense. If assumption of risk came into play as an
affirmative defense, the shipowner would have the burden of prov-
ing that the longshoreman assumed the risk. On the other hand, be-
cause the longshoreman has the burden of proving the shipowner’s
breach of duty, to incorporate absence of assumption of risk into
the definition of duty would force the injured plaintiff to bear the
burden of proving that he did not assume the risk. See The Injured
Longshoreman, supra, 781, fn. 90.
‘In urging us to affirm the district court’s application of Restate-
ment §§ 343(b) and 343A, Scindia relies heavily upon Judge Or-
rick’s use of the business invitee standard in Ramirez v. Toko
Kaium K.K., N.D. Cal., 1974, 385 F.Supp. 644. We note that in
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., N.D. Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 484,
and in Darwin v. United States, N.D.Cal., 1977, 435 F.Supp. 501,
Judge Orrick explicitly modified his Ramirez approach to reject the
use of the business invitee standard. In many a our approach
follows Judge Orrick’s thoughtful analysis in Gallardo.
b-15
630-32, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, supports our selection
of a “reasonable care under the circumstances” approach.
Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., N.D.Pa., 1978,
452 F.Supp. 841, 844. In Kermarec, the plaintiff had come
on board defendant shipowner’s vessel to pay a social visit
to a crew member. As he was leaving, the plaintiff injured
himself in a fall caused by a defective stairway runner. The
plaintiff then sued the shipowner, alleging unseaworthiness
and negligence.
Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts began by
ruling out any recovery based upon unseaworthiness, just
as we must rule out an unseaworthiness recovery under
§ 905(b). The lower courts then set aside the plaintiff’s jury
verdict based upon negligence on the ground that the plain-
tiff had been a mere licensee rather than an invitee. A unan-
imous Supreme Court reversed. Refusing to incorporate
the common law of invitees into admiralty, the Court set
forth its own negligence standard:
the owner of a ship... owes to all who are on board for
purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the
, duty of exercising reasonable care under the circum-
stances of each case. 358 U.S. at 632, 79 S.Ct. at 410.
(emphasis added)
The Court saw the common law moving toward “ ‘impos-
ing... a single duty of reasonable care in all circum-
stances’ ” 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550. It then
explained that the real property tort law of invitees had
been
inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a
culture which traced many of its standards to a heri-
tage of feudalism, 358 U.S. at 630, 79 S.Ct. at 410.
be as
B-16
and that in an effort to adopt that law to do justice in a
modern industrialized society,
common-law courts had found it necessary to... create
...asemantic morass... [of] increasingly subtle ver-
bal refinements, . . . subclassifications ... [and]...
fine gradations in the standards of care. 358 U.S. at
630-31, 79 S.Ct. at 410.
Invoking the admiralty tradition of “simplicity and prac-
ticality,” the Court decided to spare the federal courts from
having to join in the “confusion and conflict” by simply
adopting the better rule towards which the common law
was evolving, albeit “unevenly and with hesitation.”
The Kermarec reasoning applies just as fully today, Fs-
pinoza v. United States Lines, Inc., S.D.N.Y., 1978, 444
F.Supp. 405, 413-14, especially in light of the fact that the
trend in the law of invitees relied upon in Kermarec has
continued. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 1968, 69 Cal.2d
108, 79 Cal.Rptr. 97, 448 P.2d 561. As Judge Orrick put it
in Gallardo:
[this] Court rejects resort to terminology which pre-
vents inquiry into the reasonableness of conduct under
the circumstances of a given case. Discussions relating
to invitees, contractors, primary and second responsi-
bilities, obviousness of dangers, and relinquishment of
control all have the tendency to steer courts away from
a balance of the risk of harm against the utility of the
particular conduet in question. 435 F.Supp. at 496.
Accord, Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., supra,
452 F.Supp. at 844.
Finally, because the legislative history of § 905(b) never
refers to the Restatement and never used real property tort
B-17
law terms such as “invitee,” we feel confident that our adop-
tion of a “reasonable care under the circumstances” ap-
proach is not an “impingement upon legislative policy.”
Kermarec, supra, 358 U.S. at 630, fn. do, 79 S.Ct. 406. Ac-
cord, Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp. at 492, 496; Espinoza,
supra, 444 F.Supp. at 413-14; cf. Brown v. Ivarans Rederi,
A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 863.
While Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., Inc., 9
Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 507, 508-09, fn. 1, left “for another day”
the defining of negligence and duty, that case and our ear-
lier decision in Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S. A. Pan-
ama, 9 Cir., 1977, 564 F.2d 875, are both consistent with
the standard that we adopt. In each, we held that, under the
circumstances, there was no evidence that the shipowner
knew or should have known of the dangers involved. It is
also possible to read those cases as holding that the negli-
gence of the longshoremen or the stevedore or both was the
sole proximate cause of the injury. We cannot conclude as
a matter of law that that is so in the ease at bar.
In adopting the “reasonable care under the circum-
stances” standard, we cannot accept the idea that an in-
jured longshoreman cannot recover because he should have
demanded that the stevedore halt further loading opera-
tions until the stevedore could arrange to improve the work-
ing conditions. We agree with those courts which recognize
that longshoremen “face trouble for delaying work.” Nap-
oli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 2 Cir.,
1976, 536 F.2d 505, 509; Davis, supra, 440 F.Supp. at 452;
Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 5 Cir., 1977, 546
F.2d 1233, 1241, fn. 17, reaffirming, Brock v. Coral Drilling,
Inc., 5 Cir., 1973, 477 F.2d 211, 215.
B-18
[5] Under the rule of comparative negligence, the con-
tributory negligence of an injured longshoreman reduces
but does not preclude recovery. And in Dodge v. Mitsui
Shintaku Ginko KK Tokyo, 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d 669, and
Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 9 Cir., 1975, 528 F.2d
675, we held that “a longshoreman who has received in-
juries caused by the concurring negligence of his stevedore
and the shipowner can recover the full amount of his dam-
ages from the shipowner.” Dodge, supra, 528 F.2d at 673;
Shellman, supra, 528 F.2d 679-81. Thus, the contributory
negligence of the longshoreman’s employer or fellow long-
shoremen will not preclude or diminish recovery through
a theory of imputed contributory negligence. It is the long-
shoreman’s own negligence that will reduce his recovery
from the negligent vessel under the Amended Act.
IV. The Standard Applied.
{6] Having determined the standard of care required
of a shipowner subject to an injured longshoreman’s third
party action under §905(b), we must reverse the district
court’s summary judgment dismissing Santos’ action. The
following district court “findings” decided reasonably dis-
putable factual issues against Santos. We reverse because
these issues are material under the negligence standard
set forth above, and cannot be decided on a motion for
summary judgment.
[7] First, the district court found that the shipowner
had not been told about the malfunctioning winch, did not
know that it did not work properly, and cor!ld not reason-
ably have been expected to know that the winch was de-
B-19
fective. There was evidence, however, that the winch had
malfunctioned for two days prior to the day of the acci-
dent, that the winch failed to stop properly with almost
every load, that the shipowner’s representatives had been
back and forth in the vicinity of the loading operation dur-
ing the two days prior to the accident, and that both the
winch driver and the hatch tender had complained to su-
periors whose job it was to communicate problems to the
shipowner’s representatives in the vicinity of the loading
operations. If members of the ship’s crew knew, or should
have known, about the allegedly defective condition of the
winch, their actual or constructive knowledge is imputed
to the vessel by respondeat superior. See, e. g., Davis,
supra, 440 F.Supp. at 450-51; Gallardo, supra, 435 F.Supp.
at 496.
[8] The standard set forth above recognizes that a
shipowner ignorant of an unreasonably dangerous condi-
tion may be negligent in not protecting longshoremen
against it, if “the exercise of reasonable care would [have]
discover[ed] the condition.” Within these bounds it is
correct to say that the “shipowner [has] a duty to use rea-
sonable care to provide a safe place to work.” Brown v. Iva-
rans Rederi A/S, 3 Cir., 1976, 545 F.2d 854, 860, fn. 6(a) ;
House Report at 4707, Senate Report at 10; Solsvik v.
Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., W.D.Wash., 399 F.Supp.
712, 715. Cf., West v. United States, 1959, 361 U.S. 118,
123, 80 S.Ct. 189, 4 L.Ed.2d 161; Migut v. Hyman Michaels
Co., 6 Cir., 1978, 571 F.2d 352, 356; Hess v. Upper Missis-
sippit Towing Corp., 5 Cir., 1977, 559 F.2d 1030, 1033. By
this we do not mean an absolute or non-delegable duty to
B-20
provide a safe place. That notion is gone with unseaworthi-
ness. We only mean that under the circumstances of a par-
ticular case, failure to repair dangerous equipment or
conditions may be negligent.
[9] A “shipowner’s duties to the longshoremen .. .
{do not] end when it turn[s] the vessel over to the steve-
dore in a safe condition.” Bess v. Agromar Line, 4 Cir.,
1975, 518 F.2d 738, 741-42, fn. 8. On the trial of this action,
it may develop that the malfunctioning of the braking
mechanism began only after the stevedore commenced
loading operations. In this connection we note that while
a less rigorous duty to inspect may apply where full in-
spection would interfere with the work of the stevedore,
the duty to inspect does not automatically cease once steve-
dores have come aboard for the first time. Slaughter v.
Ronde, S.D.Ga., 1974, 390 F.Supp. 637, aff'd per curiam,
5 Cir., 1975, 509 F.2d 973. Compare Gallardo, supra, 435
F.Supp. at 496; Espinoza, supra, 444 F.Supp. at 412-13. In
Congress’ example of the longshoreman slipping on the
oily deck, Congress did not limit the phrase
substance had been on the deck for such a period of
time that it should have been discovered and removed
by the vessel in the exercise of reasonable care by the
vessel under the circumstances
to oil spilled before the first longshoreman came aboard.
Second, the district court found that the stevedore had
exclusive control of the gear and the premises during the
relevant time period. Under the standard we have adopted,
control would be relevant to the extent that it might limit
B-21
the shipowner’s opportunities to inspect for dangerous
conditions or to remedy such conditions. We agree that in
some cases, control may play a critical role in determining
the appropriate standard of care. Nevertheless, we do not
follow those cases which have focused exclusively or pri-
marily on whether the shipowner relinquished control of
the stevedoring to the employer of the injured longshore-
man. Instead, we focus on the reasonableness of the ship-
owner’s conduct in the light of his practical opportunities
to discover defective conditions and remedy them.’
Showing that the stevedore or Santos’ fellow longshore-
men had control to show their concurrent negligence would
not be relevant after Dodge, supra, and Shellman, supra,
unless that control could fairly be said to help prove a sole
or superseding cause.
While the admitted facts portion of the pretrial order
states that the stevedore was in “control of the loading,”
that stipulation would not require a jury to conclude that
the stevedore had exclusive control of the gear and prem-
7Cases focusing on relinquishment of control include Cox v. Flota
Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 2 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d 798; Briley
v. Charente S.S. Co., Ltd., 5 Cir., 1978, 572 F.2d 498, 500; Hickman
v. Jugoslavenska Linijska, Etc., 2 Cir., 1978, 570 F.2d 449, 451-52;
Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237, 1249-253;
Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 2 Cir., 1977, 553
F.2d 837, 840-41. See also, Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 409,
414 (1965); Talliercio v. A/S D/S Svenborg & D/S of 1912 A/S,
S.D.N.Y., 1978, 451 F.Supp. 949, 951-52; Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd.,
§.D.Ga., 1978, 449 F.Supp. 1016, 1020-021; Valle v. Jugoslavenska
Linejska Provibda, $.D.N.Y., 1977, 434 F.Supp. 608, 611-12; Cro-
shaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, D.Ore., 1975, 398
F.Supp. 1224, 1229-231. Cf. Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd., O/Y, 4. Cir.,
1978, 576 F.2d 1072, 1079-080, quoting Riddle v. Exxon Transporta-
tion Company, 4 Cir., 1977, 563 F.2d 1103, 1111-112; Teoflovich
v. Amico Mediterranean Pacific Lines, C.D.Cal., 1976, 415 F.Supp.
732,739.
B-22
ises. From the record before us, it is not at all clear that
the shipowner did not maintain ultimate control over the
ship and its gear during the loading. Far from concluding
that only the stevedore could have had the defective winch
repaired, we cannot be certain from the record that the
stevedore had any authority to repair it.
Third, the district court held that the initial spillage was
“caused by the pallet striking the pallet jack.” Santos ar-
gued the broader view that the defective braking mecha-
nism caused the initial spillage by failing to stop the pallet
before it struck the pallet jack. Since the winch driver’s
deposition testimony supports this broader view, the im-
portance of the braking mechanism as a “cause” of the
initidi spillage should have been left for the jury.
Fourth, the district court emphasized that after the
lengshoremen raised the partially spilled pallet they left
it to-swing back and forth overhead. The amount of swing-
ing, if any, matters a great deal because Santos claims
that the remaining sacks of wheat did not loosen because
the pallet swung back and forth but because the winch’s
defective braking mechanism let the pallet keep creeping
_ down, thus requiring the winch driver to keep jerking the
pallet back up to the desired height. Since some of the
deposition testimony suggested little if any swinging, the
amount of swinging as compared with the amount of ver-
tical movement caused by the allegedly defective winch
should have been left for the jury.
Finally, the district court applied Restatement (Second)
§ 343 and § 343A which, as we have seen, incorporate the
substance of the defenses of contributory negligence and
B-23
assumption of risk. In applying those sections, the court
concluded that the “jumpiness” of the winch was open and
obvious, and that both because the plaintiff’s activities
were dangerous, and because the plaintiff recognized some
of the dangers, he could not recover as a matter of law.
These findings also require reversal. They demonstrate
that the district court actually relied upon the limiting pro-
visos, §§ 343(b) and 343A, in deciding to grant summary
judgment. Thus, its mistaken view of the law cannot be
said to have been harmless error.®
As an alternate ground of decision, the district court
concluded that the “defective condition of the winch had
only a remote cause-in-fact relationship to plaintiff’s acci-
dent and could not have been the proximate cause thereof
as a matter of law.” Because the district court based this
conclusion in part on factual findings which we have just
indicated should have been left for trial, we cannot sustain
the district court’s dismissal on this alternate ground. We
thus do not consider whether, if we had sustained the fac-
tual findings, we would have agreed that the defective con-
dition could not have been found a proximate cause of the
accident as a matter of law.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
‘We note that the standard we adopt today is very similar to the
standard set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 and
§ 343A, minus the limitations placed on recovery under those pro-
visions by § 343(b) and § 343A(1). Had the district court not relied
on the limiting provisions of the Restatement invitee rule, the error
of law may ‘have been harmless. However, as we have noted, the
district court did rely on the limiting provisos.
Appendix C
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Lauro de los Santos, ‘
Appellant,
sb No. 76-3225
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.,
OPINION
Appellee,
Seattle Stevedore Co.,
Intervenor.
[June 28, 1979]
On Petition for Rehearing
Before: DUNIWAY and CHOY, Circuit J udges,
and Grant,* District Judge
Per Curiam:
In its petition for a rehearing and suggestion of a rehear-
ing in bance, appellee Scindia calls our attention to the fact
that Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., D. Mass., 1977,
431 F'. Supp. 869, was reversed by the First Circuit, 1978,
585 F.2d 1142. However, the First Circuit expressly declined
to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 343 and 343A
as the standard of care, because the injury occurred on the
dock, not on the ship. The court looked to § 414A of the
*The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
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Restatement, which deals with a landowner’s liability for
activities dangerous to those outside the land. In comment-
ing on Restatement ${§ 343 and 343A the court said that
they incorporate “the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk.” (p. 1147) That is precisely the
reason why we do not adopt them as the appropriate stand-
ard in this case.
In our opinion, we said that the Second, Fourth and
Fifth Circuits “have defined ‘negligence’ in terms of a land-
lord’s duty to invitees under Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 343 and § 343A.” Scindia says that we should add
the First, Third, Seventh and probably the Sixth Circuits
to the list. Scindia is right about the Seventh, Clemons v.
Mitsu O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 7 Cir., 1979, ...... | aaa
(No. 78-1812, April 16, 1979). Scindia is wrong about the
others.
As to the First Circuit, it cites Anderson v. Iceland
Steamship Co., supra, which expressly does not adopt
§§ 343 and 343A. As to the Third, Scindia cites Marant v.
Farrell Lines, Inc., 3 Cir., 1977, 550 F.2d 142, and Hurst v.
Triad Shipping Co., 3 Cir., 1977, 554 F.2d 1237. Neither
case is in point. Marant does not mention §§ 343 and 343A
at all. Hurst expressly declines to rely on §¢ 343 and 343A.
See fn. 35, 554 F.2d at 1248. It uses §¢ 409-29, which deal
with an employer’s duty to control the activities of an
independent contractor. As to the Sixth, Scindia cites
Migut v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 6 Cir., 1978, 571 F.2d 352,
356. It is obviously not in point. There, the shipowner’s
liability to the longshoreman had been settled, and the
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question was whether the shipowner or the charterer should
bear the cost. The opinion in the case does not mention
$$ 343 and 343A.
The petition for a rehearing is denied.
The suggestion of a rehearing in banc has been trans-
mitted to the judges who are in regular active service,
and no judge in regular active service, or judge who was
a member of the panel, has requested a vote on the
suggestion.
The suggestion of a rehearing in banc is rejected.
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