Amicus Brief — Milwaukee v. Illinois

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979

No. 79-408

City of Milwaukee, The Sewerage Commission Of

The City of Milwaukee, And The Metropolitan

Sewerage Commission Of The County Of Milwaukee,

Petitioners,

US.

People Of The State Of Illinois And

People Of The State Of Michigan,

Respondents.

—=—_

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

STATE OF WISCONSIN

a

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE

Attorney General

DAVID J. HANSON

Deputy Attorney General

NANCY L. ARNOLD

; Assistant Attorney General

Department of Justice

114 East, State Capitol LINDA H. ROCHERT

Madison, Wisconsin 53702 Assistant Attorney General

(608) 266-1221

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,

May, 1980 State of Wisconsin

INDEX

Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............eceee 2

GURPEPR INU WUUTEIEED cece cccncavesccscccevcss 2

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................. 2

EE Ka on 6 Oa Reape noes ehacebtaearaed 6

I. The 1977 Wisconsin Judgment

Is A Major Commitment By The

Petitioner Sewerage Com-

missions To Abatement Of

Water Pollution And Will Ade-

quately Protect The Citizens Of

Illinois, Michigan, And Wiscon-

canbe On RNa hodnens 6

II. Congress Intended To Create A

Comprehensive Scheme Of

Regulation, And A Remedy

Developed Pursuant To This

Scheme Must Preempt Federal

Common Law Approaches ........... 7

III. Assuming That A Federal Com-

mon Law Nuisance Action Sur-

' vives, The District Court

Should Have Deferred To The

Judgment Of The Wisconsin

State Court Entered Pursuant

To State And Federal NPDES

Requirements And Refrained

From Imposing A _ Different

EA ERS Sn gc ic 21

A. Comity and Abstention. .......... 22

B. Lack of Emergency. .............. 26

CAPE. wah da wang antandendacieenckokneeeanes 27

TABLE OF CASES

Arizona v. California,

DA Sit WO CED So cescasevacees

Baker v. Carr,

ee Us. EBS (IGGR) io oscncescctee es

Butler v. Judge of U.S.

District Court, 116 F.2d

1023 (Oth Cir. 1061) ........5.2...

Clearfield Trust Co. v.

United States,

B18 UA. Gee (IDES) once di cee weccs.

Cochran v. Ensweiler,

372 F. Supp. 471

ere ee rrr

Committee For Jones Falls

Sewage System v. Train,

539 F.2d 1006

CRO SG SO Ken Kis ectcenversesa

E.P.A. v. Cal. ex rel

St. Water Res. Control Bd.,

ee eh errerer rr rerT

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,

BOG US. GO GD occ ccscysjenvcs

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee

599 F.2d 151, (7th Cir. 1979) .....

Illinois v. Milwaukee,

GUS UB. GE CREE) ck icccescncecsss

Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.

American Tel. & Tel. Co.,

391 F.2d 486 (2nd Cir. 1968) .....

er ee ry 23

10,13,14,16,17

ery 12,13,14,15

Juidice v. Vail,

Se Sie ee MOPEED Anke Ses des ceasnevest

Landis v. Northern American Co.,

eR | ere errr rere

Lauer v. Freudenthal,

96 Wash. 394, 165

eg: GR ee rere rere Coe

Missouri v. Illinois,

ge # BS Bh. er eee ee ere

Moore v. Sims,

De Ne EE CUEID a5. 6 been deeece cccueas

Reserve Min. Co. v. Environmental

Protection Agcy. 514 F.2d

Se I A NONE in ndc tse decdscwcecsass

Sartin v. Commissioner of Public

Safety of St. Of Minn.,

535 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1976) ............

Sewerage Commission of the City

of Milwaukee and the Metropolitan

Sewerage Commission of the

County of Milwaukee v. State

of Wisconsin Department of

Natural Resources, Case No. 152-342,

Cae, Co ee Sg. occu paadeawnccis

Texas v. Pankey,

441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) ...........

Textile Workers Union uv.

Lincoln Mills,

Se Be SU MAMIOFD 4nd ap sweaeccereedicas

lv

Page

United States v. Carson,

SiS F.2d 420 Gt Cir. 1967) nw. ccccccccccce 12,17

Wheeldin v. Wheeler,

ne I ed elbuss eos 12

White v. Husky Oil Co.,

266 F. Supp. 239

i Ci ME 65 sch wa sakeedeelendaeekyecacdan a 22

WISCONSIN STATUTES

RE BME iho 40h cub eet badewe che oenes ence 3

SO na cu wads aden ewites whew eus bodes 20

EIA SL weed otenscdscewkh ea beucke locksveineene 20

BN 54.65 a Ss eine Shiricen io bnkeis<bckanee 20

SOT sbiaewan th eskescdeweaecaldebseeesee 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES

40 C.F.R., Part 35

eS es a ck oie Sha bc nue eadehaees 18

Clean Water Act of 1977

Pub. L. No. 95-217, 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1376 . 4

Handbook on Environmental Law

Fe <2 Cs EE ot id inie cdc nweaseeebes bias 15

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,

Se Sr: OE, TEP a dikccvcccdancuecases cs 2

ee Ses es ee ED eb okkobda edad dees akeeen 13

Page

Rules of the Supreme Court of the

SFE. aE | 2

[1972] U.S. Code Con. & Ad.

EASES RE SA oe 7,8,9,10,11

Wisconsin Administrative Code,

re re bi wana ¢anseanas 18-19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979

No. 79-408

City of Milwaukee, The Sewerage Commission Of

The City of Milwaukee, And The Metropolitan

Sewerage Commission Of The County Of Milwaukee,

Petitioners,

US.

People Of The State Of Illinois And

People Of The State Of Michigan,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

STATE OF WISCONSIN

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

We respectfully request the Court to refer to the

Citation of Opinions Below, the Statement of Jurisdic-

tion, the Citation of Statutory Provisions Involved,

and the Statement of the Case presented in the brief of

the City of Milwaukee, et al., filed with the Court in

this proceeding.

The State of Wisconsin, by its Attorney General,

respectfully submits this brief amicus curiae, in

support of the appeal of the City of Milwaukee, et al.,

pursuant to Rule 42 (4) of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Has the federal common law of nuisance

survived the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act of 1972 (hereinafter FWPCA)?

2. If it has, what degree of deference should a

federal court exercising that jurisdiction pay to the

national regulatory scheme established by the FWPCA

and to state action under that Act to enforce its

requirements?

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The United States Congress enacted the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.

L. No. 92-500, 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1376, to provide a

comprehensive, uniform, and national solution to the

problem of pollution of the waters of the United States.

Pursuant to sec. 402(b), 33 U.S.C. sec. 1342(b), of the

Act, the enforcement obligations of the National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System in the State

of Wisconsin were delegated to the Wisconsin Depart-

ment of Natural Resources and the Attorney General

of the State of Wisconsin. In order to fulfill those

obligations, ch. 147 of the Wisconsin Statutes was

enacted in 1974. The Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (WPDES) created by ch. 147, Wis.

Stats., is consistent with the requirements of the

federal act.

Pursuant to the requirements of these state and

federal laws, the Sewerage Commission of the City of

Milwaukee and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commis-

sion of the County of Milwaukee (hereinafter “the

Commissions”) applied for and obtained WPDES

permits from the State of Wisconsin (hereinafter “the

State”) for the operation of their sewage collection and

treatment facilities. When the Commissions violated

the requirements of those permits, issued under ch.

147, Wis. Stats., the State of Wisconsin brought suit to

enforce the requirements of the law and to secure

abatement of water pollution in the area served by the

Commissions.

On May 25, 1977, the State of Wisconsin concluded

its enforcement action in State Circuit Court against

the two Commissions with a judgment which complies

with fec ral and state water pollution laws and

standards, whch comprehensively addresses the

attainment of effluent limitations and abatement of

combined sewer overflows, and which adequately

protects the interests of residents of Illinois, Michigan,

and Wisconsin in limiting discharges of pollutants to

Lake Michigan.

On November 15, 1977, the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded a

suit brought by the State of Illinois against the City of

Milwaukee, et al., under the federal common law of

nuisance, by entering a judgment requiring the

Commissions to treat all sewage to meet certain

effluent limitations six times more stringent than

those required under the FWPCA and to construct a

system to eliminate all overflows of raw sewage from

combined sanitary and storm sewers. On April 26,

1979, the Court of Appeais for the Seventh Circuit

\eversed the order of the District Court insofar as it

imposed effluent limitations stricter than those re-

quired under the FWPCA. It affirmed that part of the

order requiring the elimination of all sewage overflows

outside the combined sewer system by July 1, 1986,

and further requiring the construction of a collection

and conveyance system for the combined sewer system

that will eliminate overflows in the combined sewer

system by December 31, 1989.

The suit in the United States District Court was

brought to address the same problems and to protect

interests identical to those resolved in the suit in state

court. While the exercise of jurisdiction by a United

States District Court in these circumstances may

appear compatible with that of Wisconsin, this is not

in fact the case. Although attempting to reach similar

goals, the remedies of the two courts may conflict in

such a fashion as to frustrate the efforts of the State of

Wisconsin and to usurp its enforcement authority.

This fact has far-reaching implications for the

State of Wisconsin and all other states with delegated

authority under the FWPCA or the Clean Water Act of

1977 (hereinafter CWA), Pub. L. No. 95-217, 33 U.S.C.

secs. 1251-1376. If other jurisdictions may rely on the

federal common law of nuisance as Illinois did here,

while choosing to ignore the opportunities provided for

participation in and enforcement through the NPDES

process, conflicting results, multiplicity of suits, and

frustration of the national goal of clean water will be

the result. Such disruption of the NPDES state

administrative and enforcement process undermines

its integrity.

Accordingly, the State of Wisconsin urges this

Court to determine what, if any, vitality the federal

common law of nuisance maintains with respect to

water pollution control suits in light of the FWPCA

and the CWA. We do not dispute that a common law

cause of action for nuisance may lie in an appropriate

case. This is not such a case. Specific standards of

pollution control have been set under comprehensive

congressional legislation. Such standards must

supersede the setting of others based on a federal

common law. Moreover, even in areas of pollution

control not specifically addressed in otherwise com-

prehensive legislation, the federal court is obliged to

fashion a remedy consistent with the congressional

program’s demands, especially where a decision is

likely to have a substantial effect on that program.

Finally, we urge this Court to declare for the benefit of

local, state, and federal government that, even where a

federal court might properly exercise federal common

law jurisdiction in the water pollution area, when the

responsible state authorities are clearly fulfilling their

enforcement obligations under the national regulatory

scheme, the federal court must defer to the State’s

expertise in establishing the remedy.

This Court should be very wary of suggestions

that the remedy imposed by the State, pursuant to

congressional mandate, is not adequate. After all, the

citizens of Milwaukee, Kewaunee, Manitowoc,

Sheboygan, Racine, and Kenosha, Wisconsin, have as

much interest in clean Lake Michigan water for

drinking and recreation as do citizens of Illinois.

Indeed, being closer to the source of the alleged

pollution they and their state government have more

reason to be concerned than does Illinois.

ARGUMENT

I. The 1977 Wisconsin Judgment

Is A Major Commitment By The

Petitioner Sewerage Com-

missions To Abatement Of

Water Pollution And Will Ade-

quately Protect The Citizens Of

Illinois, Michigan, and Wiscon-

sin.

Legal action by the State to enforce federal and

state water pollution requirements culminated on May

25, 1977, in the entry of a detailed stipulation between

the State and the Commissions which is incorporated

in the Wisconsin Judgment. [The Sewerage Commis-

sion of the City of Milwaukee and the Metropolitan

Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee uv.

State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources,

Case No. 152-342, Cir. Ct., Dane County.] The commit-

ment made by the Commissions extends over several

decades and represents a major undertaking in terms

of federal, state, and local dollars expended and level

of treatment achieved.

The Wisconsin Judgment is divided into sections,

each of which addresses a different aspect of the water

pollution problem in Milwaukee. In brief summary, the

Wisconsin Judgment requires the Commissions to

comply with applicable effluent limitations, to

eliminate any dry weather bypassing within the

service area, to eliminate all wet weather bypassing, to

correct all combined sewer overflows, and to restrict all

sources of additional waste flow into the system, all by

prescribed deadlines. Each deadline established is

specifically related to the others, so that constant

maximum effort based upon established priorities is

assured.

The Wisconsin Judgment is a comprehensive and

balanced approach to the sources of water pollution

within the control of the two Commissions. It requires

the Commissions to undertake long-term, complex

abatement efforts and to complete projects and

components of those projects in compliance with a

detailed and carefully developed schedule of deadlines.

The Wisconsin Judgment exemplifies the complex and

large scale nature of water pollution abatement in a

major metropolitan area. But more importantly in the

current context, it exemplifies the State of Wisconsin’s

determination to fulfill its obligations to the citizens of

Wisconsin as well as other states to secure and

maintain clean water within its jurisdiction, and to

fully and adequately enforce the requirements of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act and _ the

NPDES/WPDES program.

II. Congress Intended To Create A

Comprehensive Scheme Of

Regulation, And A Remedy

Developed Pursuant To This

Scheme Must Preempt Federal

Common Law Approaches.

Wisconsin submits that the statutory pattern

created by Congress and the legislative history to the

Act shows it intended that there be a single federal

decision-maker directing a comprehensive program of

abatement of industrial and municipal discharges to

the nation’s navigable waters. Ad hoc approaches to

solving the problems of pollution of our nation’s

waters were specifically rejected:

Water pollution control in the past has all

too often been sporadic, inconsistent, and

improvised on an ad hoc basis. The major

purpose of this legislation is to establish a

8

comprehensive long-range policy for the

elimination of water pollution, making it clear

to industry and municipalities alike the pollu-

tion control performance which will be ex-

pected over the next decade. At the same time,

the bill provides a mechanism for generating

sound, detailed information on the costs which

will be associated with the later stages of the

control program, and allow subsequent Con-

gresses to evaluate the success of the policy

enunciated in this bill.

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3758 (emphasis

added).

The key to accomplishing Congress’ long-range

goals lay in its charge to EPA to establish and then

apply direct discharge limitations to all polluters of the

nation’s waters. It directed EPA to develop these

limitations based on the best pollution control

technology which industry was capable of produc-

ing. The technological standards, once established in

the administrative process,'/ would provide

1/That it intended EPA, and EPA alone, to assume

the responsibility of developing the necessary

technological expertise to develop a sound program of

regulation is evident from the remarks of the Senate

Committee on Public Works (in reference to the

“citizen suit” provision of the Act):

Section 505 would not substitute a “com-

mon law” or court-developed definition of

water quality. An alleged violation of an

effluent control limitation or standard, would

not require reanalysis of technological in [sic]

other considerations at the enforcement stage.

These matters will have been settled in the

administrative procedure leading to the es-

9

“manageable and precise benchmarks for enforce-

ment,” Jd. at 3747, and courts would be relieved of the

difficult technological inquiries and determinations

required in this area.?/ Congress’ wisdom in this

regard is amply illustrated by the following remarks of

the District Court Judge:

Ordinarily, when the trier of fact weighs

evidence and attempts to come to factual

conclusions, he does so in the light of his own

experience and his own observations and his

own common sense. Not only is this proper to

do, it is something that we specifically instruct

juries to do in every jury case.

The nature of the subject matter here,

however, is such that my own experience and

observations in life are of relatively little use to

me. It is well known to all of us that the

arcane subject matter of some of the expert

testimony in this case was sometimes over the

tablishment of such effluent control provision.

Therefore, an objective evidentiary standard

will have to be met by any citizen who brings

an action under this section.

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3745 (emphasis

added).

2/Congress specifically noted that the courts simply do

not have the technological resources to assume the role

of developing pollution control standards:

Enforcement of pollution regulations [once

established by the EPA under the statutory

scheme] is not a technical matter beyond the

competence of the courts. The citizen suit

provision is consistent with principles underly-

10

heads of all of us to one height or another. I

would certainly be less than candid if I did not

acknowledge that grasp of some of the

testimony was less complete than I would like

it to be, but short of enrolling in a university

course directed toward a reorientation of my

entire education and spending the years that

that would involve, I know of no remedy for

the problem.

P-Ap. F-3 and 4.

The Court of Appeals noted that Congress left the

door open for states to adopt standards more stringent

than those set by EPA and concluded that precise

uniformity was not a congressional goal. Illinois v.

City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162, 164 (7th Cir.

1979). State-setting of stricter standards, however, is in

keeping with the overall congressional scheme in a

way that court-setting of standards is not. All state

standards are adopted according to federal statutory

guidelines and the state’s programs are under con-

tinuing federal regulatory guidance. State-set stricter

standards are a logical part of the uniform statutory

scheme because they promote more vigorous anti-

pollution efforts where circumstances warrant. Such

standards, however, are set under the continuing

supervision of the single federal oversight agency by a

state agency with expertise and long-term responsibili-

ty. The critical management roie assigned to the states

ing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,

that is the development of clear and iden-

tifiable requirements. Such requirements

should provide manageable and precise

benchmarks for enforcement.

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3747.

11

is consistent with the development of a uniform,

“comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination

of water pollution.” [1972] U. S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 3758.3/ The common denominator in the process

is supervision by the EPA and ultimate control by

Congress. When litigants call upon courts to establish

discharge limitations without regard to the con-

gressional program, the courts, if they proceed, do so

without the technological, expertise forged in the

administrative process, and without the guidance of

the expert regulatory body.*/

The ad hoc problem-solving urged on the court in

this case creates uncertainty and disarray and

represents just the kind of approach Congress was

seeking to avoid. It also contravenes basic interests of

federalism, which demand that independent judicial

remedies fashioned under a federal common law give

way to congressional judgment expressed in com-

prehensive legislation.

The traditional sources of federal law are the

federal constitution, treaties, and statutes. In Erie R.

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), this Court

3/It is also consistent with Congress’ stated policy

to “recognize, preserve and protect the primary

responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent,

reduce, and eliminate pollution.” Sec. 1251 (b).

4/Ad hoc judicial creation and enforcement of

controls without regard to the FWPCA is inconsistent

with the further objective of the Act to ‘“mak[e] it clear

to industry and municipalities alike the pollution

control performance which will be expected over the

next decade.”

[1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3758.

12

declared that there is no general federal common law.

Although some federal common law has developed to

resolve significant federal problems not addressed by

traditional federal law sources and not appropriately

resolved by resort to the varying laws of the 50 states,

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363

(1943), Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353

U.S. 448 (1957), independent judicial determination of

applicable rules of law remains the exception, not the

rule. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). A

comprehensive congressional scheme _ supersedes

regulation by way of resort to common law standards.

And even where federal statutes are silent, courts are

obliged to adhere to the policy expressed by Congress

in comprehensive legislative programs. Illinois v.

Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972); United States v.

Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967).

Some federal common law of nuisance has emerg-

ed in the specific context of interstate pollution

controversies where needed to fill in gaps in legislation

and to provide a uniform rule of decision where the

alternative is to apply the laws of the various states.

In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), this

Court held that an interstate dispute over water rights

had to be resolved pursuant to the comprehensive

scheme of allocation created by Congress, rather than

according to common law rules of equitable apportion-

ment. On the other hand, no comprehensive con-

gressional scheme existed to resolve the interstate

pollution dispute presented in Texas v. Pankey, 441

F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) and, accordingly, the court

turned to the federal common law to ensure a uniform

basis for decision: “Federal common law and not the

varying common law of the individual States is, we

think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a

basis for dealing in uniform standard with the

environmental rights of a State against improper

impairment by sources outside its domain.” Pankey at

13

241 (emphasis added). However, just “[a]s the field of

federal common law has been given necessary expan-

sion into matters of federal concern ... (where no

applicable federal statute exists ...),” Pankey at 240, so

does the field of federal common law necessarily

contract where Congress has expressed its will in

comprehensive legislation: “Until the field has been

made the subject of comprehensive legislation or

authorized administrative standards, only a federal

common law basis can provide an adequate means for

dealing with [these problems] ...” Pankey at 241.

This Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91

(1972), declared the existence of a federal common law

right of action to abate pollution of interstate waters.

This decision, the State submits, was a direct and

necessary response to the many procedural and

substantive inadequacies of the then-existing federal

statutes in this area. The pre-1972 Federal Water

Pollution Control Act did not mandate minimum

effluent discharge standards; the Act simply authoriz-

ed each state to adopt “water quality criteria

applicable to interstate waters or portions thereof’

within the state, see 33 U.S.C. sec. 1160 (c) (1). This

Court has described enforcement procedures under the

Act as “cumbrous,” “long,” and “drawn out.” Illinois

v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at 158, quoting E.P.A. v. Cal.

ex rel St. Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202

(1976) and Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103. Only

the federal government, through the Secretary of

Interior and the Attorney General, could seek court

enforcement of the Act. There was no mechanism by

which the states or private citizens could seek direct

enforcement. Therefore, at the time this Court decided

Illinois v. Milwaukee, the Act provided no authority for

Illinois to enforce its provisions against an entity of a

neighboring state. Moreover, as this Court noted, “[t]he

remedy sought by Illinois [was] not within the precise

scope of remedies prescribed by Congress.” Illinois v.

14

Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, the Court

turned then to the common law as a “necessary

expedient” to resolve the interstate pollution controver-

sy brought before it. Committee For Jones Falls

Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir.

1976).

With the passage of the new Act, such resort to

common law theories is no longer necessary. Enforce-

ment procedures have been “greatly strengthen|ed].”

Illinois _v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at 158. Now, any

“person ... having an interest which is or may be

adversely affected” has a right to sue to secure

compliance with the Act against any person alleged to

be in violation, sec. 505(g). States may invoke the

power of the EPA to abate pollution originating

outside their borders; under sec. 505(h) the EPA’s aid

in such cases is obligatory. Section 505(h) also gives

the governor of any state the right to file civil suit

against regulatory officials if they fail to enforce an

effluent standard set under the Act.

The new Act also constituted a major revision in

substantive terms. It declared unlawful all discharges

of pollutants, except as authorized under National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)

permit. Direct discharge limitations, based on

technology, are prescribed by EPA and authorized

state agencies for all industrial and municipal dis-

chargers of pollutants into the nation’s waterways.

Opportunities are provided for other affected states to

comment on the appropriateness of the limitations to

be imposed on any discharger, secs. 402 (b) (3), (5).

This Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at

107, foresaw the time where “new federal laws and

new federal regulations may ... preempt the field of

federal common law of nuisance.” In fact that time

has arrived. The Act’s procedural and substantive

15

gaps have been filled. States now have both effective

enforcement authority under the Act and appropriate

opportunities to participate in the administrative

standard-setting process in other states. The remedy

sought by Illinois — the setting of effluent standards

and limitations — is now within “the precise scope of

remedies prescribed by Congress.” The _ current

statutory scheme nullifies both the reason and the

necessity for resort to federal common law to set

standards and limitations to control discharges of

pollutants into interstate waters.

Accordingly, “federal common law [in this area] of

course must give way to federal statutes.” Handbook

on Envirdnmental Law (West Pub. Co. 1977) at p.

154.5/

Because the Court of Appeals reasoned that the

Act did not expressly govern the matter of control of

overflow discharges, Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at

170, it concluded that the Act did not limit the relief

available to correct combined sewer overflows under a

5/The author of the Handbook also concluded that

“(t]he immediate reach of Illinois v. Milwaukee was

narrowed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972. Application of the federal

common law in the future requires the courts to be

alert to whether Congress has made a clear choice in

confining the range of available remedies.”

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also

expressed reluctance to fashion federal common law in

light of the comprehensiveness of the amended

FWPCA. In Reserve Min. Co. v. Environmental

Protection Agcy, 514 F.2d 492, 532 (8th Cir. 1975),

which involved an action brought by the United States

and the State of Minnesota against a_ taconite

16

common law theory. However, it acknowledged that

even where a statute does not expressly govern a

particular case, a court “should look to its policies and

principles for guidance,” Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599

F.2d at 164. Wisconsin submits that congressional

policy concerning combined sewer overflows as ex-

pressed in other provisions of the Act and especially as

administered in the NPDES permit system should

have guided the court in fashioning relief here.

As recognized by the Court of Appeals, regulation

of combined sewer overflows is implicit in the

provisions of the Act prohibiting discharges for public

treatment works not meeting secondary treatment

requirements, Id. Accordingly, the discharge permits

issued to Milwaukee required it to “‘initiate’ programs

‘leading to the elimination or control of all discharge

overflow and/or bypass points.’” Jd. Moreover, the

state court suit brought to enforce the provisions of

Milwaukee’s permits imposed a comprehensive obliga-

tion on the city to correct the problem of overflows

from its combined sewer system. Jd. The plan for

correction requires the expenditure of many millions of

dollars over a period of many years, and it is

inextricably intertwined with other provisions of the

judgment requiring upgrading of Milwaukee’s sewage

processing company to prevent the company from

continuing the discharge of wastes into Lake Superior,

the court of appeals declared:

The district court also found that Reserve’s

discharge into Lake Superior constituted a

nuisance under the federal common law of

nuisance ... Because relief may appropriately

rest on provisions of the FWCPA and on a

violation of the Refuse Act, we deem it

unnecessary and, indeed, unwise to also rely

on federal nuisance law.

17

treatment facilities and requiring the city to coordinate

a district-wide eifort to correct overflow problems in

the separate sewer systems of nearby municipalities.®/

Correction of combined sewer overflows is an

integral part of the comprehensive remedial program

ordered by the State to implement congressional

policy as expressed in comprehensive legislation. In

contrast, the remedy ordered by the district court and

sustained on appeal, which disregards the judgment of

the state as to both the substantive relief measures

required and the carefully-planned schedule by which

they must be completed, can only disrupt the NPDES

state enforcement process. Wisconsin believes that

such undermining of its efforts should not be lightly

approved, for “[w]here a decision is likely to have a

substantial effect on the implementation of a federal

program, then a federal court should declare a rule

consistent with the program’s demands.” United

States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967).

The remedy ordered by the district court also

undermines the comprehensive administrative process

of regulation created by Congress to resolve issues of

interstate pollution. That process requires states to

6/It is important to understand how the Wisconsin

Judgment requirement that Milwaukee correct all

combined sewer overflows differs from the requirement

of the Illinois district court to eliminate all combined

sewer overflows. The regulations established by EPA

under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 require preparation of a detailed

Facilities Plan, an overall analysis of the pollution

abatement problems to be addressed with an analysis

of the technological alternatives available as remedies.

The purpose of the Facilities Plan preparation is to

determine the most “cost-effective” means of providing

the abatement necessary. “Cost-effective” has been

18

notify other states when permits which may affect

their interests are proposed, issued, or modified.

Congress has also required that such affected state, on

request, be afforded a hearing on any permit applica-

tion or the terms and conditions incorporated into any

issued permit or permit modification.’/

The State of Illinois receives notice of all permit

actions affecting Lake Michigan. It received notice of

the original permits proposed for the Milwaukee

treatment plants in 1974, and notice again when those

permits were issued in late 1974 and early in 1975.

Similarly, the State of Illinois received notice of the

Department’s intention to reissue permits to South

Shore and Jones Island in 1978, and notice of the

actual reissuance of those permits in 1978.

One of the terms and conditions of the permits

issued to Milwaukee was an obligation to initiate

measures to control combined sewer overflows. Illinois

defined in 40 C.F.R. Part 35, Appendix A (1979), to

mean:

b. Cost-effectiveness analysis. An

analysis performed to determine which waste

treatment management system or component

part will result in the minimum total resources

costs over time to meet Federal, State, or local

requirements.

The State of Wisconsin’s definition of “cost-

effectiveness” is in accord with the federal. Section NR

110.03 (3), Wis. Adm. Code, defines the concept as

follows:

“Cost-effective analysis” means a syste-

matic comparison of alternative means of

meeting state water quality standards, effluent

limitations or other treatment standards in

19

clearly had many opportunities to comment on the

remedial steps required to resolve the combined sewer

overflow problem, yet it never took any of these

opportunities to “make its case” against Milwaukee in

the administrative forum. At no time did Illinois

submit comments to the Department of Natural

Resources on the Milwaukee permits, participate in

permit hearings, or seek a hearing on its own motion.

The State of Illinois has totally refused to utilize that

administrative forum, with its technical expertise,

which remains available to it for purposes of making

its case. It chose instead to present its case in the

judicial forum, where the expertise does not exist, and

in so doing ignored the forum for resolution of these

issues which Congress clearly intended. It seems

reasonable that the congressional purpose of develop-

ing effective pollution control programs through

application of sound technology forged in the ad-

ministrative process should not be defeated by

remedies created outside that process. The regulatory

order to identify the alternative which will

minimize the total resources costs over the

planning period. These resources costs include

monetary costs and environmental as well as

other non-monetary costs.

At the completion of the Facilities Planning

process the precise remedy to the combined sewer

overflows will be determined by the Wisconsin Depart-

ment of Natural Resources and Department of Justice

as required by the Wisconsin Judgment based on the

comprehensive and detailed analysis of the problem

and the available remedies. In contrast, the order of

the Illinois court was based on limited information as

to both the nature of the problem as well as the

technological alternatives available and the remedial

benefit of each such alternative.

20

process created by Congress to resolve these issues

must govern as to the remedial measures to be

imposed. See Iuy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. &

Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 491 2nd Cir. (1968).

Moreover, in this case, not only has Congress

provided a comprehensive statutory program of regula-

tion inconsistent with a common law patchwork, but

also the specific problem presented to the federal court

for decision had been addressed and resolved in the

state court. The case for congressional preemption

must be even stronger where, as here, congressional

policy has already been applied at the time the federal

judiciary is called upon to act.

The remedy imposed by the State represents

application of the highest scientific expertise, conforms

to the long-range goals set by Congress, and is

consistent with uniform, orderly administration and

enforcement of our nation’s water pollution control

program. The judgment of the federal court leads to

regulatory chaos. Progress toward consistent, uniform

improvement in water quality demands that solutions

to problems of water pollution flowing directly from

the congressional mandate preempt. conflicting

procedures.

7/Wisconsin statutory sections securing these

rights include secs. 147.09, 147.11, 147.13, and 147.20,

Wis. Stats.

21

III. Assuming That A Federal Com-

mon Law Nuisance Action Sur-

vives, The District Court

Should Have Deferred To The

Judgment Of The Wisconsin

State Court Entered Pursuant

To State And Federal NPDES

Requirements And Refrained

From Imposing A _ Different

Remedy.

The Seventh Circuit specifically considered and

rejected the argument that the enactment of the

FWPCA had preempted the federal common law of

nuisance in the area of water pollution. Should this

Court sustain that determination, a question of equal if

not greater importance remains: how are the two

authorities to operate effectively in the same arena?

Municipalities across the nation will suffer much

confusion and unnecessary expense if guidelines on

the use of federal common law are not developed by

this Court. Similarly, those states such as Wisconsin

which are charged with fulfilling their obligations

under the national NPDES scheme will find their

efforts frustrated, subject to collateral attack, and

possibly countermanded by federal courts which

choose to fashion remedies completely independent of

those imposed by the state.°/

8/It is the State’s position that compliance with

state law is required regardless of whether federal

financial assistance can be made available. However,

the State agrees that in a situation such as that faced

by Milwaukee, where the pollution abatement program

necessary to comply with the law will extend over

several decades and cost hundreds of millions of

dollars, cost to the taxpayers can and should be

22

The abatement program developed by the State of

Wisconsin pursuant to the comprehensive NPDES

regulatory scheme must preempt the ad hoc problem

solving engaged in by the federal court. Basic

principles of abstention and comity demand that

independent judicial approaches to problem-solving in

this area give way to programs developed under

congressional authorization.

A. Comity and Abstention.

Had the State of Wisconsin initiated its action

against the Milwaukee Commissions prior to the filing

of the federal action, we would emphatically assert

that the doctrine of abstention required the federal

court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.

Abstention is proper for reasons of judicial

economy so that one lawsuit will suffice to dispose of

the problem, rather than permitting two with the

possibility of conflicting results as well as multiple

costs. White v. Husky Oil Co., 266 F. Supp. 239 (D.

Mont. 1967). Equitable restraint should be exercised by

a federal court where granting of relief would adverse-

ly affect the results of a state court action. Sartin v.

Commissioner of Public Safety of St. Of Minn., 535

F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1976). Further, it is the duty of a

federal court to avoid unseemly conflict with a state

court. Landis v. Northern American Co., 299 U.S. 248

(1936). Implicit in these pronouncements is the notion

recognized in the timetable established for compliance.

The Wisconsin Judgment specifically treats the issues

of compliance with the requirements and means of

financing separately and in this fashion by es-

tablishing priorities and interrelated deadlines for the

projects. The federal court’s disregard for cost and

priorities imposed by Wisconsin threatens the State’s

carefully laid plans for abatement.

23

that an action involving substantially the same

question is pending in another forum which can

provide an adequate remedy. Butler v. Judge of U.S.

District Court, 116 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1941). Neither

the parties in the state court nor the issues need be

identical. Landis.

Abstention is an equitable doctrine founded on the

court’s exercise of judicial discretion, to be exercised

when the federal district court believes that some asset

peculiar to the state court’s jurisdiction will most likely

aid in adjudicating the merits of the litigation.

Cochran v. Ensweiler, 372 F. Supp. 471, 473 (D.C. Ind.

1974). Although it is clear that the doctrine of

abstention is not normally invoked when, as here, the

federal action was initiated first, the guiding principles

of that doctrine and the doctrine of comity strongly

support the State’s position that substantial deference

to the state court and the NPDES requirements was

required when the federal court reached the point of

establishing the proper remedy. The “asset peculiar to

the state court’s jurisdiction” in this case is that it had

already imposed a remedy consistent with tne re-

quirements of the federal and state NPDES programs

to solve the identical problem the federal court action

sought to resolve. Federal court invocation of the

comity principle at the point of establishing the

remedy would have had substantial value here in

securing uniformity of decision and remedy. Lauer v.

Freudenthal, 96 Wash. 394, 165 P. 98 (1917).

Our constitutional system recognizes the principle

of deference by one branch of government to another

within each branch’s sphere of influence. Congress, a

coordinate’ political department, has constitutional

authority to regulate and protect interstate waterways.

The specialized nature of the _ subject requires

deference. The correction of overflows from combined

sanitary and storm sewers, for example, involves

24

technical determinations to which the courts bring

little expertise. The district court admitted it found the

data presented incomprehensible. Congress gave the

EPA the primary task of administering the program,

and gave it authority, in turn, to delegate this

responsibility to the various states. The expertise

employed by the State of Wisconsin Department of

Natural Resources in designing a remedy for the water

pollution problem here was employed pursuant to the

delegation of authority from the EPA and ultimately

the Congress. The remedy imposed on Milwaukee

derived, then, from the congressional mandate. The

state court judgment was entered pursuant to the

comprehensive federal scheme embodied in federal

statutes.

The trial court should have deferred to the

legislative judgment and accepted as its guide the

decision of the Congress regarding what is necessary

to protect interstate waters. At the very least it was

incumbent upon the federal court to inform itself of the

requirements of the Wisconsin Judgment and to reach

a determination as to that remedy’s ability to meet the

needs of the plaintiffs, Illinois and Michigan. Absent

such an evidentiary determination regarding the

state’s remedy, the federal court was unable to

determine the need for it to act. Had such an inquiry

been made and had the court been satisfied, as we

submit it would, that the state remedy was sufficient,

it should then have deferred to that expertise in

establishing the remedy. Failing to do so, a federal

court risks interruption and frustration of the national

pollution abatement process which Congress intended

to establish.

This principle of deference is akin to the separa-

tion of powers doctrine and is best explained in terms

of its similarity to the political question doctrine under

’

25

which courts decline to decide issues more properly

resolved by another branch of government.

Prominent on the surface of any case held to

involve a political question is found a textually

demonstrable ‘constitutional commitment of

the issue to a coordinate political department;

or a lack of judicially discoverable and

manageable standards of resolving it; or the

impossibility of deciding without an initial

policy determination of a kind clearly for

nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a

court’s undertaking independent resolution

without expressing lack of the respect due

coordinate branches of government; or an

unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a

political decison already made; or the poten-

tiality of embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on

one question.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). |

This Court has declared “in the abstention

context,” that “the federal court should not exert

jurisdiction if the plaintiffs had an opportunity to

present their federal claims in the state proceedings.”

Moore v. Sims, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2378 (1979), quoting

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (emphasis in

original). Under similar principles, Wisconsin submits,

Illinois should have utilized the opportunities available

to participate in the state permit-issuing process. The

NPDES/WPDES program provided an adequate ad-

ministrative forum for consideration of the water

pollution and public health related issues raised by

Illinois. Illinois chose to ignore this process and

instead go to the federal court.

26

B. Lack of Emergency.

Under well-settled principles of equity

jurisprudence, injunctive relief should be granted only

when the right to relief is clear. Missouri v. Illinois,

180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901). Moreover, ‘{t]he Younger

doctrine, which counsels federal court abstention when

there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong

policy against federal intervention in state judicial

processes in the absence of great and immediate

irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff.” Moore v.

Sims, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2377 (1979). Plainly, there was no

compelling need for the court to impose the remedy it

did. There was no sudden, dramatic increase in the

rate or amount of effluents discharged into the lake, no

sudden decrease in water quality near Chicago

attributable to Milwaukee, and no evidence of a water-

borne outbreak of disease among Chicago residents.

Furthermore, the remedy, involving tremendous add-

tional costs to Milwaukee area residents, was imposed

without evidence that commensurate additional

benefits would accrue to Illinois.

Similarly, we suggest that under established

principles of abstention, comity and judicial deference

to legislative judgment a court is obliged to act, if at

all, with great restraint. We respectfully suggest that if

this Court finds that the federal common law of

nuisance survives the federal Act, the Court must

fashion and require strict adherence to a rule limiting

exercise of jurisdiction in these cases to genuine

emergency cases, imposing liability only on a clear

and convincing showing of a clear and present (not

potential) danger, and fashioning a remedy only where

the link between the remedy and the harm to be

alleviated is beyond dispute and the responsible state

government has clearly failed to act. No such showing

was made in this case. These circumstances dictate

that the District Court should have _ permitted

27

Milwaukee to proceed to implement the remedy

imposed by the state court according to the schedule

approved by that court.

CONCLUSION

The federal common law remedy fashioned by the

District Court below was unwarranted in light of the

comprehensiveness of the 1972 Amendments to the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Pursuant to the

Act, EPA has prescribed technologically-based direct

discharge limitations for all point sources of pollution,

and these controls are more than adequate to protect

the nation’s interstate waters. Moreover, the Act now

provides mechanisms whereby both State governments

and private citizens can seek direct enforcement of

these standards. There is, therefore, no need for a

District Court to fashion a common law remedy. It is a

well accepted principle of law that federal common law

remedies must give way to those prescribed by

Congress in comprehensive legislation.

Even if the 1972 Amendments have not preempted

the federal common law of nuisance regarding control

of pollutants in the circumstances of this case, the

District Court should, nevertheless, have deferred to

the judgment of the Wisconsin State Court entered

pursuant to the State and Federal NPDES re-

quirements. The remedy imposed by the State Court

comprised a thorough solution to the identical problem

before the District Court. Since this remedy was

derived from the federally prescribed standards for

water pollution control and imposed to implement

congressional policy, basic principles of comity and the

federal interest in securing uniformity of decision

should have prompted the District Court to defer to the

State Court’s judgment.

28

The Court of Appeals’ ruling should be reversed

insofar as it affirms the District Court’s order relating

to combined sewage overflows.

Respectfully submitted,

KB. OL Lied

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE

Attorney General

DAVID J. HANSON

Deputy Attorney General

NANCY L. ARNOLD

Assistant Attorney General

LINDA H. BOCHERT

Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,

State of Wisconsin

Department of Justice

114 East, State Capitol

Madison, Wisconsin 53702

: (608) 266-1221

May, 1980

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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