Reply Brief — Milwaukee v. Illinois

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Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

No. 79-408 NOV 14 1980

IN THE MICHAEL RODAK, JR.. CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OctosEer TERM, 1979

City or MitwavukerE, THe SEweraGe ComMMISSION OF

THE City or MILWAUKEE, AND THE METROPOLITAN

SEWERAGE CoMMISSION OF THE County oF MILWAUKEE,

Petitioners,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE State oF ILLINOIS AND

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS IN REPLY TO BRIEFS

AMICI CURIAE OF THE UNITED STATES,

STATE OF NEW YORK AND

NEW ENGLAND LEGAL FOUNDATION

RicHarp W. CuTLER

ELWIN J. ZARWELL

(Attorney of Record)

SAMUEL J. RECHT

JAMEs H. Baxter III

ANDREW M. BaRNES

780 North Water Street

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

(414) 277-5000

Attorneys for Petitioners

the Sewerage Commission of

Of Counsel:

QuaRLEs & BRaDY

780 North Water Street

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

and

MicwakE. J. McCase

735 North Water Street

Milwaukee, Wiseonsin 53202

November 13, 1980

the City of Milwaukee and

the Metropolitan Sewerage

Commission of the County

of Milwaukee

JAMES B. BRENNAN

Room 800, City Hall

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

(414) 278-2601

Attorney for Petitioner

City of Milwaukee

Press or Braon S. ApbAmMs PaintTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

INDEX

Page

a Rar arg eae gr RAReG Gaetny= ay Die aeRO ar Pee 2

I. The Solicitor General’s Brief is Misleading .... 2

II. The Solicitor General Agrees with Milwaukee in

Selee: RIES CRO RS ec e's cee eas anes ewes 8

III. Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction,

This Case Should Have Been Referred to the

Expert Agencies Having FWPCA Authority .. 9

IV. New York Argues a Case not Before the Court 11

EES GSES SEARLE EEE Ce ae aN Pee Beat 12

CITATIONS

CasEs:

Environmental Protection Agency, et al. v. National

Sea Clammers Association, et al., Supreme Court

No. 80-12, cert. granted Oct. 20, 1980 ............ 8,9

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) . .9, 10

Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (1975) ..... 3

United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,

et al., Civil Action Nos. 79-987, 79-988, 79-989 and

SL PR AMGEGED Soiree ka uo osdi ei birds bekee uns 11

STATUTES:

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended

secon Ber (20 UB, VIZRL) . occ cece seen 8

Section 402 (33 U.S.C. § 1342) ........ oes eae 5

mecuom B00 (33 U.S.C. 4 1565)... 6 ook cece cn cses 2,8

Wisconsin Administrative Code

TRESS Rade. ENE i ba big < wi ada ¥b kee dee éas 7, 8

SP iret ales hainks wit wes «kbd bad cod bes abe eas 7, 8

ete ie eel takes bow bbe Cae Bele c 7

ii Citations (Continued)

Page

MISCELLANEOUS:

Ill. Pollution Control Bd. R. and Regs. ch. 3

PEE suk b dsr Sin ick Ra owen aad wees 8

PUG eras bah SGd das daa nk oh Oem bean 8

PG PN beh sch Swen hee eee 8

Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 (Environmental Policy Divi-

sion of the Congressional Research Service of the

Library of Congress, Committee Print 1973) ....4, 5,6

No. 79-408

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctoBER Term, 1979

City or Mitwavukege, THE SEWERAGE COMMISSION OF

THE City or MILWAUKEE, AND THE METROPOLITAN

SEWERAGE CoMMISSION OF THE County oF MILWAUKEE,

Petitioners,

Vv.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE oF ILLINOIS AND

PEoPLE OF THE StaTE OF MICHIGAN,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS IN REPLY TO BRIEFS

AMICI CURIAE OF THE UNITED STATES,

STATE OF NEW YORK AND

NEW ENGLAND LEGAL FOUNDATION

This brief of the petitioners (collectively “Milwaukee”)

replies to the briefs of the respondents’ supporting amici,

namely, the New England Legal Foundation’, the Solicitor

‘To the extent that the amicus brief of New England Legal

Foundation deals with FWPCA, as distinguished from problems

it is litigating under the Clean Air Act, its arguments are met in

the various sections of this brief and Milwaukee’s reply to re-

spondents’ brief which deal with FWPCA. The short answer to

the Foundation is that where FWPCA and federal administrative

determinations made thereunder establish permitted conduct in a

proceeding in which all interested parties have an opportunity to

be heard, it would be anomalous and unwise to afford those same

parties the opportunity to proceed in the federal courts under the

guise of a ‘‘federal common law’”’ to secure relief they chose not to

seek in the federal statutory proceedings.

2

General of the United States and the Attorney General of

the State of New York.

ARGUMENT

I, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S BRIEF IS MISLEADING.

The Solicitor General has shown little interest in this

ease. In his response to this Court’s initial invitation to

state the position of the United States, he suggested that

this Court deny review. When this Court granted Mil-

waukee’s petition for review, the Solicitor General assigned

the matter for briefing and argument to a junior staff

member. As a result the person principally responsible for

the brief (see the statement of the Solicitor General in

support of the motion to admit Andrew J. Levander pro

hac vice) is a staff attorney of approximately two years

standing.

This may explain why the argument that Sec. 505 of

FWPCA (§ 1365) “expressly preserves” the federal com-

mon law is based in significant measure on a purported but

incorrect quotation of Senator Muskie appearing at page

24 of the Solicitor General’s brief, vis. :

“For example, in a colloquy on the floor of the Senate,

Senator Griffin inquired whether passage of the Clean

Water Act would affect in any way the then ongoing

Reserve Mining Company litigation. 1 Leg. Hist. 191.

The Senator specifically noted that this suit, which

concerned the discharge of taconite tailings into Lake

Superior, was based in part on the federal common

law of ‘public nuisance’ (ibid.) See Reserve Mining Co.

v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). Consistent

with the position taken by EPA, Senators Muskie * and

Hart replied that the Clean Water Act would not affect

or hinder ‘the suit now pending against the Reserve

Mining Co., under the Refuse Act of 1899***[,] the

existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act or other

law.’ 1 Leg. Hist. 211 (emphasis supplied). See 1 Leg.

Hist. 191-194; Senate Hearings, Pt. 1, at 1017-1020.

3

See also 1 Leg. Hist. at 248 (similary colloquy between

Reps. Dingell and Wright).” (Emphasis in the origi-

nal.)

Footnote 32 reads:

“82 Senator Muskie was the primary author of the Clean

Water Act and his views are therefore entitled to par-

ticular weight. See, e.g., H. I. duPont deNemours & Co.

v. Train, supra, 430 U.S. at 129; Simpson v. United

States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978).”

In this fashion the Solicitor General’s brief emphasizes

the purported fact that Senator Muskie, the primary author

of the 1972 FWPCA amendments, said the suit against

Reserve Mining under “other law” would not be affected

by enactment of the amendments. In fact, the legislative

history bears out neither the argument, the quotation cited,

nor the attribution of that quotation to Senator Muskie.

Senator Muskie did not utter the phrase “or other law”;

Senator Muskie referred to “any other acts of Congress”.

The argument also attributes to Senator Griffin a refer-

ence to “the federal common law of ‘public nuisance’ ”

though Senator Griffin never mentioned federal common

law.

Senator Griffin did speak about the Reserve Mining case.’

However, his statement of concern mentioned only in pass-

ing allegations based on “violation of water quality stand-

ards and the allegation that such dumping constitutes a

public nuisance.” At no time did Senator Griffin mention

whether the water quality standards or the public nuisance

he was concerned with were federal or state in character.

His real concern was with the aspects of the suit resting

2It is significant, but not referred to by the Solicitor General’s

brief, that when the issue of the federal common law was dealt

with by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, it said:

‘*[W]e deem it unnecessary and, indeed, unwise, to also rely on

federal nuisance law.’’ Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,

532 (1975).

4

on the Refuse Act of 1899. He never inquired in respect of

common law implications, much less as to the effect on

federal, as distinguished from state, common law. He never

mentioned, and nowhere does the legislative history deal

with, “federal common law.” The significant portions of

what Senator Griffin in fact said follow.

Senator Griffin said:

“However, when these provisions [Secs. 4 and 402(k)

(§ 1342(k))] are read together, it is not altogether

clear what effect is intended with respect to pending

Federal court suits against polluters violating the

Refuse Act of 1899.

If section 402(k) were read as having retroactive effect,

then about 170 Federal suits filed against polluters

prior to the date of enactment of the bill, including

the Reserve case, could be dismissed.

It is true that the suit against Reserve Mining is also

based upon violations of water quality standards and

the allegation that such dumping constitutes a public

nuisance. However, the strongest part of the case is

based on the Refuse Act.

[I]t is inconceivable that the Senate would want to

emasculate the best available enforcement device now

available—the Refuse Act—and legislatively dismiss

suits pending under it.” Legislative History at 191.

Senator Muskie replied as follows:

“Section 4 provides and I quote the relevant words

pertaining to the Refuse Act:

No suit, action, or other proceedings lawfully com-

menced by or against the Administrator or any

other officer or employee of the United States in

his official capacity . . . shall abate by reason of

* All citations to the legislative history are to ‘‘A Legislative

History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,”’

prepared by the Environmental Policy Division of the Congres-

sional Research Service of the Library of Congress (Committee

Print 1973).

4)

the taking effect of the amendment made by sec-

tion 2 of this Act.

Without any question it was the intent of the con-

ferees that this provision include enforcement actions

brought under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, and any other acts of Con-

gress.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 193.

This colloquy concluded as follows:

“Mr. Griffin. I thank the manager of the bill. Certainly

that does clarify the meaning as to the intent of the

conferees, and it would clearly indicate that the suit

now pending against the Reserve Mining Co. under the

Refuse Act would not be affected by this bill.” (Em-

phasis added.) Jd. at 194.

Simultaneously, the following statement was made by

Representative Wright in the House:

“Section 4 provides and I quote the relevant words

pertaining to the Refuse Act:

‘No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully com-

menced by or against the Administrator or any

other officer or employee of the United States in

his official capacity ... shall abate by reason of the

taking effect of the amendment made by section 2

of this Act.’

Without any question it was the intent of the iain

that this provision include enforcement actions brought

under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, and any other acts of Congress.” (Em-

phasis added.) /d. at 248.

Note that the language of Senator Muskie’s response is

identical to the response of Representative Wright. Both

were responding to a question relating to the effect of

Sec. 402(k) on pending litigation under the Refuse Act of

1899. Both limited their response to the statement that

Sec. 402(k) would not preclude continuation of pending

litigation under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water Pollu-

6

tion Control Act or “any other acts of Congress.” Neither

mentioned the common law, much less the federal common

law.

After Senator Muskie spoke, later that day Senator Hart

paraphrased what Senator Muskie had said as follows:

“Alarm has been voiced that efforts to prevent en-

vironmental damage to Lake Superior involving the

discharge of taconite tailings by Reserve Mining Co.,

will be hindered by this legislation. It is my under-

standing, however, after the explanation of the Sena-

tor from Maine, that the suit now pending against the

Reserve Mining Co., under the Refuse Act of 1899 will

in no way be affected nor will any of the other counts

under the existing Federal Water Pollution Control

Act or other law.” (Emphasis added.) Jd. at 211.

Thus, not only is the attribution to Senator Muskie in-

correct, but the gravity of that incorrect attribution is

multiplied significantly by both footnoting Senator Muskie’s

primary authorship of the Act and italicizing the phrase

“other law” which is Senator Hart’s phrase, not Senator

Muskie’s phrase.

Note that the Solicitor General’s brief at 23 states:

“In addition, the contemporaneous legislative debates

and hearings demonstrate that Congress specifically

focused on the federal “common law of water pollution

abatement” (1 Leg. Hist. 688) and concluded that en-

actment of the Clean Water Act would not limit or

preclude such suits.” (Emphasis added.)

Here the word “federal” has been inserted to modify the

phrase “common law of water pollution abatement.” Mil-

waukee said in its initia] brief that the entire legislative

history failed to use that modifier. Thus, the insertion of

the modifier “federal” to introduce the mischaracterization

of the legislative history at page 24 of the Solicitor Gen-

eral’s brief adds an element to the mischaracterizations

which is cause for serious concern.

7

The Solicitor General’s brief presents other misleading

arguments. At page 7 it states:

“No regulations exist, however, regarding the allow-

able discharge of viral and bacterial pathogens, fecal

coliforms, or phosphorous and chlorine residuals.”

The obvious purpose of this statement is to suggest that

an interstice exists in FWPCA and the regulations there-

under which the federal common law should fill. In fact,

the discharge permits issued to Milwaukee under FWPCA

specifically address fecal coliforms, phosphorous and

chlorine residuals, as well as various other parameters

(e.g., BOD, suspended solids, pH, etc.) and thereby by

reference thereto address pathogens. P.Ex. 62, 63 and 64,

App. 371-454, Tr. 257. There is no interstice here.

Interestingly, this very same argument was advanced

by Illinois in its May 10, 1979 Application for Rehearing

and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc to the Court of

Appeals. There Illinois claimed that neither federal regu-

lations nor the discharge permit limitations were designed

to protect the public health. In response to that claim, the

EPA itself came forward with an affidavit from Mr. Charles

Sutfin, now Director of EPA’s Region V Water Division,

who drafted EPA’s “secondary treatment” standards ap-

plicable to publicly owned treatment works. That affidavit

shows that the pertinent federal regulations were designed

to accomplish the removal or inactivation of pathogens in

treatment plant effluent so as to protect the public health.

See Response of Defendants-Appellants to Petition for

Rehearing with Appendix, dated May 29, 1979, at Ap. 5-6.

Similarly, the State of Wisconsin specifically addresses

pathogen removal or inactivation when _ establishing

NPDES permit limitations. Jd. at Ap. 7-8. Finally, appli-

cable Wisconsin water quality and treatment standards

promulgated pursuant to FWPCA are expressly designed

to protect the public health. Sections NR 102.02-102.03,

103.06, 110.23, 210.09, Wis. Adm. Code.

8

The Solicitor General’s brief does go on to admit at

the same page 7 that the matters which are before this

Court on this Petition for Certiorari are covered by

FWPCA. At footnote 15 on page 7, he specifically says:

“Such overflows [from combined storm and sanitary

sewers] must be covered by a permit and must comply

with Sections 301(b)(1)(A) and 301(b)(2).” *

The Solicitor General’s brief at 14-15 argues that the

EPA believes that the federal common law is an important

tool to advance the goals of FWPCA. But the Solicitor

General fails to state that the EPA, which is committed

by Sec. 201 of FWPCA (§ 1281) to fund the goals of the

Act, is resisting to the utmost paying for any court-

imposed requirements which exceed the requirements that

the EPA or qualified states impose under FWPCA. Can

the Solicitor General and the EPA have it both ways?

Il. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AGREES WITH MILWAUKEE IN

THIS COURT’S CASE 80-12.

The Solicitor General’s position in this case is contrary

to statements made in his petition for certiorari in En-

vironmental Protection Agency, et al. v. National Sea

Clammers Association, et al., No. 80-12, cert. granted

October 20, 1980. There, in responding to the Court of

Appeals’ decision establishing an implied right of action

under FWPCA, which action is not subject to the proce-

dural requirements of Sec. 505, the Solicitor General

stated at 15:

“This focus [in FWPCA] on agency enforcement is

undermined by the decision of the court of appeals... .

*The Solicitor General’s brief at 8n.16 incorrectly asserts that

Illinois has established a higher water quality standard for Lake

Michigan than has Wisconsin. In fact, both states have established

a water quality standard of ‘‘fishable, swimmable and drinkable.”’

See Sec. NR 103.06, Wis. Adm. Code (and related Sees. NR 102.02

(3), (4) and (5), Wis. Adm. Code) and Ill. Water Poll. Control

Bd. Rules and Regs. ch. 3, Part 206 (and related Parts 203 and

204, Ill. Water Poll. Control Bd. Rules and Regs.).

9

Under the court of appeals’ decision, even when EPA

is diligently pursuing a court action against an alleged

violator, a private litigant will be free to bring a sec-

ond action, which may be in a different court because

it is not subject to the venue requirements of the

statutory provisions.”

The general problem posed by the Solicitor General in

National Sea Clammers is the same problem present in

this case. Whether the authority of the “private litigant”

to pursue the second action is implied from the provisions

of FWPCA or is based upon the federal common law, the

problem is the same. Were it not for the asserted avail-

ability of a sovereign immunity defense to a federal com-

mon law action, the Solicitor General would undoubtedly

have included an objection to such an action in its petition

in National Sea Clammers. Again the Solicitor General

would have it both ways.

Ill. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION,

THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE

EXPERT AGENCIES HAVING FWPCA AUTHORITY.

The Solicitor General argues against primary jurisdic-

tion referral because (1) nuisance claims are within the

conventional experience of the federal courts, and (2) this

case does not call upon the special expertise of the EPA,

relying principally upon Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,

426 U.S. 290 (1976). (Solicitor General’s Brief at 29-30

n.40.) °

However, the District Court candidly stated that it did

not understand the technical evidence. Pet. App. F-3 and 4.

This is the very problem calling for referral.

5 Michigan’s brief also addresses primary jurisdiction at 19-20.

10

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra at 303-304, is not

dispositive. There the Court stated:

“Even when common-law rights and remedies survive

. ..1t may be appropriate to refer specific issues to an

agency for initial determination where...

‘the limited functions of review by the judiciary

[would be] more rationally exercised, by prelimi-

nary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the

circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies

that are better equipped than courts by specializa-

tion, by insight gained through experience, and by

more flexible procedure.’ Far East Conference v.

United States, 342 U.S. at 574-575, 96 L.Ed 576,

72 S.Ct. 492.

See also United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra,

at 64, 1 L.Ed.2d 126, 77 S.Ct. 161, 426 U.S. at 303-304.”

The Court went on to point out that in the Nader case

(contrary to the situation here) the expertise of the

agency involved would not be helpful in resolving the issues

before the Court. 426 U.S. at 305-306.

As pointed out in Milwaukee’s initial brief at 11, here

Illinois had actual notice of, and could have participated

in, the NPDES permit proceedings (including a public

hearing) where all of the technical matters could have been

heard and determined by the qualified expert administra-

tive agencies specifically created for that purpose.

Even if those proceedings were not dispositive of the

issues presented, the agencies’ expert input, based upon

an extensive record on the precise issues now before the

Court (including whether the discharges did in fact affect

Illinois, how serious any potential risk actually was, and

whether the benefits of potential remedies justified the cost

thereof) would have provided the specific expertise the Dis-

trict Court admittedly lacked on the issues it decided.

11

IV. NEW YORK ARGUES A CASE NOT BEFORE THE COURT.

The brief amicus curiae of the Attorney General of the

State of New York is directed to an issue not before this

Court. In its “Statement of Interest” New York exposes its

true concern: “In certain circumstances, a federal common

law public nuisance action may be the only path open to a

state government which seeks to resolve an apparent inter-

state conflict.” (Emphasis supplied.) N.Y. Brief at 1. The

brief then offers a “hypothetical” fact situation involving

toxic waste disposal. Jd. at 1-2. The burden of the brief is

to establish that the states retain the option of going to

federal court to seek a remedy for an injury which an

administrative agency acting under federal statutes does

not address. Jd. at 20. Thus, the New York brief is really

addressed to the so-called “Love Canal” case. See the cita-

tions to United States v. Hooker Chemicals € Plastics

Corp., et al., Civil Action Nos. 79-987, 79-988, 79-989 and

79-990 (W.D.N.Y.) at page 9 of New York’s brief.

“Love Canal” does not entail the discharge of “conven-

tional pollutants” (BOD, suspended solids, fecal coliform

and pH) by a publicly owned treatment works or other

publicly maintained point source pursuant to and in accord-

ance with a discharge permit issued in compliance with

the provisions of the FWPCA. It is not, and should not be,

incumbent upon Milwaukee to brief, argue and prevail in

every imaginable hypothetical fact situation, regardless

of the presence or absence of regulation or statute in the

premises, in order to prevail in the present certiorari pro-

ceeding pending before this Court on a narrow issue under

a specific statutory scheme.

A decision favorable to Milwaukee, limited as it should

be to the issues before this Court, will in no way decide

the so-called “hypothetical” fact situation argued by New

York. In contrast to the “Love Canal” situation, we here

deal with permittees under an all pervasive federal statute

12

and federal regulatory scheme directed to the precise mat-

ters before the Court. New York’s case is not before the

Court.

CONCLUSION

The briefs of the respondents’ supporting amici add little

if any illumination to the issues before the Court. In each

instance they are calculated to advance a position of the

writer in an area of the law or under a statute not pre-

sented here and not controlled by a decision directed to

the relatively narrow issues that are presented. On this

basis Milwaukee respectfully suggests that those briefs

should be used only as guideposts to mark the outer pe-

rimeters of the issues before the Court and the limits of

the decision rendered.

Respectfully submitted,

Ricuarp W. CuTLER

ELWIN J. ZARWELL

(Attorney of Record)

SAMUEL J. RECHT

JaMeEs H. Baxter III

ANDREW M. BaRNES

780 North Water Street

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

(414) 277-5000

Attorneys for Petitioners

the Sewerage Commission of

Of Counsel: the City of Milwaukee and

Quantas & Baapy the Metropolitan Sewerage

780 North Water Street Commission of the County

; . : of Milwaukee

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

and JAMES B. BRENNAN

MicnHakEt J. McCaBEe Room 800, City Hall

735 North Water Street Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

November 13, 1980

(414) 278-2601

Attorney for Petitioner

City of Milwaukee

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