Opposition — Milwaukee v. Illinois

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OCT 42 197

IN THE

MIP tare,

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-408

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, THE SEWERAGE COMMISSION

OF THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE, AnD THE METROPOLI-

TAN SEWERAGE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF

MILWAUKEE,

Petitioners,

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS anp PEOPLE OF

THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN OPPOSITION TO

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

WILLIAM J. SCOTT,

Attorney General of the State

of Illinois,

JOSEPH V. KARAGANIS,

SANFORD R. GAIL,

Special Assistant Attorneys

General,

KARAGANIS & GAIL LTD.,

150 North Wacker Drive,

Chicago, Illinois 60606,

(312) 782-1905.

October 11, 1979.

Gunthorp-Warren Printing Company, Chicago e Financial 6-6565

INDEX.

PAGE

SCENE I os 6's vibe DM Rs po dev o's 8 hs bP ee Vv

Co Pee Tere er ee ee eee 1

hi: EE oo x36: 404.9 VS £5 ORS Sale CORRES ORS 1

B. Defendants’ Sewage Collection System........ 2

C. The Health Hazards of Untreated Sewage..... 5

D. The Transport of Those Disease-Causing Organ-

eg Pees Teer ee ree 7

E. The Procedural History of This Case.......... 8

F. The Remedy Ordered by the District Court.... 10

G. The Decision by the Court of Appeals........ 12

menos Tor EPOMPIR GS WI... ns ccc ice ese ccee's 16

I. The District Court’s Collection Order Is Not Incon-

sistent with the Clean Water Act................ 16

A. Congress Did Not Preempt the Imposition of

More Stringent Requirements Than Those Im-

posed Under the Clean Water Act........... 16

B. The Statutory Procedure Under the Act Itself

Contradicts Milwaukee’s Arguments......... 20

II. Miiwaukee’s Evidentiary Claims Are Spurious...... 23

III. The District Court Had in Personam Jurisdiction and

Venue Was Proper in the District in Which the Claim

ON ii e888 Ak KOR TAR eke es 24

A. The District Court had in Personam Jurisdiction 24

B. Venue Was Proper in the District in Which the

EN SUNS. oo 0 5 0 CAA 8k ae be 3 8 Oe 27

RS, oC ha aU aa hes aA 5s shee see ae OO RS 29

CITATIONS.

Cases.

Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia v. U. S.,

406 F. Supp. 556 (E. D. Va. 1976)... 0. ccccccces 20

California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings,

SPO TH. BE 161 CHUNG. BPTE) vices chess cvwsccccess 20

Committee for the Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage

System v. Train, 539 F. 2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976)... .18, 20

Consolidated Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co.,

SSS FP. 26 TST CF Ce, BDGT) ow iv cews conancccccce 26

Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 22 Ill. 2d

432, 176 Mh. &. 26 761 (ISG1) 20. oc cece ccccccces 25

Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F. 2d 1137

ya. | RR etre Oar ee eer 26

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N. D. IIl.

| PES re ey oa Ona) ee ee eee ee 18

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) ...8, 27, 28

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310

GUE ney hae Ose Cacik canes seabede ak eWuee nes 25

Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Steel Corp.,

30 Ill. App. 3d 360, 323 N. E. 2d 426 (1st Dist. 1975),

Cit.. GOm. SIA UE. FTG CID TE) 0 oc cc ccveccacccess 18

Mianus River Preservation Committee v. EPA, 541 F. 2d

ee PINs poche tiae ad eV ieuke eee bs owes 17

Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)........... 23, 24

McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 543 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.

SE irae a oh aes Skewes daw bein web rie ee 26

Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N. E. 2d 673 (1957) 25

New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921)....... 23, 24

ili

Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493 (1971)

PF EO ee Fr PaCS eS PIE ee ee Poe pe 9, 25, 26, 27

Pennoyer v. Nell, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)... seve ees cess 25

People ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 40 IIl.

App. 3d 607, 352 N. E. 2d 255 (1st Dist. 1976)....18, 19

Shaffer v. Harris, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)..........000% 25

State Water Control Board v. Train, 554 F.2d 921 (4th

a Ui oe heer fad ie oes URS 21

Stream Pollution Control Board of the State of Indiana

v. U. S. Steel Corp., 512 F. 2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975) 19, 28

Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp.

Bye 8. : Ree a an oreo gees 20

U.S. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D.

Vt. 1973), aff'd 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.

es AEF TI; SIO GAs Geis CaN eed ess 20

U. S. v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784 (E. D.N. Y. 1973)... 20

U. S. v. Outboard Marine Corp., ........... F. Supp... re

ge OD ) ee eee ee Peer eer 20

U. S. ex rel. Scott v. U.S. Steel, 356 F. Supp. 556 (N. D.

i A cakes Jdbcee bea e sd eae eee were 20

Village of Glencoe v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 23°

Ill. App. 3d 868, 320 N. E. 2d 524 (1st Dist. 1974)... 18

Statutes.

Judicial Code 28 U.S.C.

NR nina y uae CNY Gale bh td bee a ae 27, 28

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.

RE SECE SOAS Faas VA 6 A Od ee ee eRe 21-22

DPR SGMPC RPE? <6 4 snses ceo se ween beeen 15, 20, 21

Bi tli liek) Seer ee peewee 15, 18, 20, 21, 23

Ebi. 5 a re, Se eee eee 21

oko hs ey as ba Me eee wa eae 11

atk Fn hw ahs ks pe ee win a eee ee 18-19, 27, 28

MN 2 isa Abs ele bie a LA DRO ee hoes 18

OMe iklka 6a ee Ka ie aa Oo ess 16-17, 21

Illinois Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 110

So ckrsrerae kk Wied SO RE ed eee aks 24-25

ie Rane eds EEN CA ETERS 24-25

Illinois Environmental Protection Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch.

111%, pars. 1001 et seq.

SS ae cule mae ee rae RC WA OEE 8-9

Eh 48 cen o A AIR ee hE eNOS a wa 8-9

Administrative Regulations.

40 C. F.R. Part 35, Subpart E, Appendix A.......... 21

fh ON SS’: SURO as gg len ee oh a 15

ey a My ok 2 ae ne em ibce aeD 24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52

Other Authorities.

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, A

Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act

MeO OE BF io 6K. on he SRA Ss a 17, 18, 19, 22

Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377... 0... ecb ccccces 27

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

I. Were the district court’s findings that viral and bacterial

II.

III.

pathogens discharged by defendants contaminated Illinois

waters and that defendants’ discharges made a significant

contribution to the eutrophication of Lake Michigan

“clearly erroneous”?

Has Congress, in Public Law 92-500 as amended by Public

Law 95-217, prohibited the states from seeking the impo-

sition of more stringent treatment than the national mini-

mum levels of treatment through the use of state statutes,

federal common law or state common law?

Did the district court have in personam jurisdiction, and

was venue proper in the district in which the injury

occurred?

IN THE

Supreme Court of the GQnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-408

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, THE SEWERAGE COMMISSION

OF THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE, anpD THE METROPOLI-

TAN SEWERAGE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF

MILWAUKEE, Petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Anp PEOPLE OF

THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN OPPOSITION TO

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A. Introduction.

Petitioners City of Milwaukee, the Sewerage Commission of

the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Com-

mission of the County of Milwaukee (hereinafter referred to

collectively as “Milwaukee”) have petitioned this Court to

grant a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the appellate

court below. Basically, Milwaukee challenges the district court’s

findings of fact and the appellate court’s affirmance that Mil-

waukee discharges enormous volumes of raw, untreated human

fecal waste into Lake Michigan and that shore parallel currents

transport these wastes containing billions of bacterial and viral

pathogens (disease-causing agents) into [linois waters, thus

2

creating a major health hazard for Illinois swimmers and for

Illinois’ public water supply. Beyond challenging its liability for

creating a common law public health nuisance, Milwaukee seeks

to challenge the basic remedy ordered by the district court and

by the appellate court—i.e. that raw human fecal waste should

be collected and transported to waste treatment facilities for

treatment instead of being discharged raw into public waters.

In its petition Milwaukee seeks to gain this Court’s attention

by seriously misrepresenting the evidence presented to the dis-

trict court, the findings and logic of the district court and appel-

late court, and the state of the law.

B. Defendants’ Sewage Collection System.

To properly appreciate the enormity of the raw sewage prob-

lem caused by Milwaukee, one must understand the collection

system Milwaukee has built to transport raw human fecal wastes

from its residential or commercial source to its treatment plants.

If the public health hazard were not so great, Milwaukee’s sewage

collection system could be admired as the ultimate invention of

Rube Goldberg. Among the system’s unique features:

1. Milwaukee has consciously followed the practice

of building large sewers which would be intentionally con-

nected into smaller sewers leading to the treatment plants.

When the large sewers fill up with raw sewage, the smaller

sewers cannot handle the hydraulic load. Rather than build

larger “downstream” sewers adequately sized to carry the

hydraulic load of the large “upstream” sewers, Milwaukee

has built overflow devices to pour the raw fecal wastes

into the local rivers or into Lake Michigan.

2. Also unique to Milwaukee is their system of giant

“flushing tunnels.” The stench of the enormous volumes of

raw fecal waste discharged from these overflow devices

becomes so severe that the city maintains two giant

“flushing tunnels” to draw in clean Lake Michigan water

3

to the upyer reaches of the local rivers and to literally

“flush” the raw fecal wastes into Lake Michigan.

In Milwaukee, the basic pattern for sewage collection is by

means of a house lateral sewer connected to a municipal col-

lector sewer under the street. The municipal collector sewer then

connects to a large “interceptor” sewer system which carries

fecal waste—principally by gravity flow—to a treatment plant

for treatment (Tr. 118, Tr. 426). In Milwaukee this “inter-

ceptor’ system is called the “MIS” or Metropolitan Interceptor

System (Tr. 120, Tr. 426).

Beginning in the post-war years, Milwaukee began extending

sewer service to more and more residential and commercial

areas (Tr. 206). These new sewer extensions and the new

sewage loads from these areas were connected to the existing

interceptor system creating hydraulic overloads in the inter-

ceptor system, i.e. more sewage flow than the pipe can handle

(Tr. 139). Not the least cause of these hydraulic overloads was

defendants’ conscious practice of building larger diameter sewers

in outlying areas which were connected to smaller diameter

sewers leading to the treatment plant.’

1. On adverse examination, Mr. Weiland, Director of Engincer-

ing for the Sewerage Commission, testified:

Q. Isn’t it correct that in the development of the Metro-

politan Interceptor System, pipes of a larger capacity were

connected to pipes downstream which had a lesser capacity?

A. Yes. (Tr. 139-140.)

ok * * ue Be

Q. What size sewer does that 72-inch special section sewer

lead into?

A. I believe it is a 42-inch. (Tr. 333.)

* * ok * *

Q. And this 72-inch system in 1949 was then connected

into a 42-inch system, isn’t that right?

A. Yes. (Tr. 333-334.)

* * * a *

Q. Wasn’t the sewer built with full knowledge by the staff

that the 42-inch sewer was hydraulically undersized so that

it couldn’t handle the load of the 72-inch sewer?

(Footnote continued on next page.)

4

These hydraulic overload problems are exacerbated by rain

storms. In most of the Milwaukee metropolitan area the de-

fendants have constructed “separate” sanitary and storm sewers.

The sanitary sewers are the sewers intended to carry human fecal

wastes to the treatment plants. However, rain water from down-

spouts or storm drains is often discharged into the already hy-

draulically overloaded sanitary sewers. The result is an exacerba-

tion in both volume and duration of the raw sewage overflow.

Thus, while periods of hydraulic overload and resultant over-

flow are often associated with rainfall events, these hydraulic

overloads and resultant overflows have been known to extend

over both dry and wet periods and to result in continuous dis-

charge of raw sewage into the rivers and lake for as long as

30 days.

Also discharging into this hydraulically overloaded inter-

ceptor system are a series of collector sewers that were designed

to carry both storm and fecal (“sanitary”) wastes (“combined”

sewers). These sewers also overflow both because of hydraulic

overload in these “combined” collector sewers and because the

interceptor system into which these combined sewers discharge is

already hydraulically overloaded due to upstream hydraulic

loads.

At the present time Milwaukee maintains several hundred

overflow devices or structures throughout the metropolitan area

—both on the interceptor (MIS) system and on local collector

sewers. Overflows of raw human fecal wastes from these devices

occur approximately 50 times a year and last up to 30 days and

contain billions of gallons of fecal wastes.

As noted above, Milwaukee has developed a unique system

for ridding itself of the obnoxious odors and disease hazard

(Footnote ccntinued from preceding page.)

A. Yes.

Q. And the staff for the commissions went ahead and built

the sewer without at that time providing for adequate hydraulic

capacity, isn’t that correct?

A. Yes. (Tr. 334.)

5

represented by these raw sewage overflows. The overflows dis-

charge either into Lake Michigan or into local rivers which

then flow into Lake Michigan. In storms the rivers’ flow is

sufficient to move the fecal wastes from the rivers into Lake

Michigan. To assist the rivers’ flow in dry weather defendants

maintain huge “flushing” tunnels. These tunnels draw clean

Lake Michigan water into the upper reaches of the river and use

that water to literally “flush” the fecal wastes out into Lake

Michigan.

C. The Health Hazards of Untreated Sewage.

The raw sewage discharged by Milwaukee contains enormous

numbers of pathogenic” organisms, both bacteria and viruses.

Any urban center like Milwaukee contains persons who are

infected with pathogens and who are shedding bacterial and

viral pathogens through their feces (Tr. 3101, 2174). A single

gram—1/454 pound—of human feces from an infected indi-

vidual can contain literally millions of viruses (Tr. 10278).

Depending on the level of disease within the community, raw

sewage can contain from approximately seven thousand to

several hundred thousand viruses per liter (Tr. 2180).

Bacteria and viruses are two totally different pathogenic

groups. Within the bacteria group there are hundreds, if not

thousands, of different strains of pathogenic bacteria. For ex-

ample, two common pathogenic bacteria associated with fecal

matter are Salmonella and Shigella. Salmonella has over 400

different subtypes, and Shigella has over 600 different sub-

types (Tr. 3053). Indeed, the total number of bacterial patho-

gens is not really known (Tr. 3053).

Bacterial pathogens cause diseases of severe discomfort and

sometimes serious complications. Basically, when ingested these

organisms cause intense diarrhea (Tr. 3054). Other bacteria—

2. The noun “pathogen” or the adjective “pathogenic” refers to

the disease-causing nature of these organisms (Tr. 2155).

6

known as “opportunistic” pathogens—can create serious sec-

ondary infections in injured persons or serious illness in the very

young or elderly (Tr. 3055).

The other and perhaps more serious group of pathogens

found in fecal wastes are viruses. Viruses which pass from the

body in feces are called “enteric” viruses (Tr. 2149).

A virus is an incredibly small object measuring less than one

millionth of an inch in diameter (Tr. 10171). Many people

who get infected by enteric viruses do not show any disease

symptoms. Viruses simply multiply in the lining of the gut and

are excreted with the feces without causing any disease symp-

toms (Tr. 2157). A thousand people may become infected

before one shows a clinical symptom of the disease. Yet these

asymptomatic infected carriers pass on just as many viruses as

a diseased person (Tr. 2145, 2157, 2174). Thus, thousands of

people can become infected and become carriers and multipliers

of an enteric viral disease without any indication of the disease

being present.

Actual disease symptoms only appear when a particular virus

enters the bloodstream through the lymph glands (Tr. 2143)

and attacks a “target” organ, such as the heart, lungs, brain or

central nervous system (Tr. 2157). Polio is an enteric virus that

attacks the tissue of the spinal cord (Tr. 2161, 2165). Coxsackie

virus causes pleurodynia—a disease of the covering of the lungs

which causes a great deal of inflammation and pain (Tr. 2164).

Coxsackie B virus has as its target organ the muscle tissue of the

heart causing such diseases as pericarditis (Tr. 2167) and

myocarditis. Myocarditis is a particularly severe and sometimes

fatal heart disease in young children (Tr. 2160). Coxsackie

viruses also have been found to increase the incidence of birth

defects (Tr. 2167) and are suspected of triggering diabetes in

susceptible individuals (Tr. 13211). Hepatitis A is an enteric

virus which attacks the liver (Tr. 2168).

The common denominator of all these enteric viruses is

that they leave the body of a carrier by means of the feces

7

(Tr. 2147). Thus, fecal material is a necessary link in the

transmission of the virus to the next victim. This is called

“fecal-oral transmission” (Tr. 2155).

Viruses are incredibly difficult to detect with accuracy. The

common test is to place suspected viral fluid on a bed of animal

or human embryo tissue. If the tissue on the cell becomes in-

fected, the number of infected areas are counted as plaque-

forming units (Tr. 2179). Unfortunately, this test is very

inaccurate and will not detect known viruses. For example,

Hepatitis A cannot be grown or isolated with the test (Tr.

10193). Many viruses will only grow in certain types of cell

tissue and will not show up in other virus tests at all (Tr.

12134, 12320). Moreover, because viral particles are not

distributed uniformly through a volume of liquid, it is possible

to completely miss substantial quantities of viruses under stand-

ard testing techniques (Tr. 12333).

D. The Transport of Those Disease-Causing Organisms

to Illinois Waters.

The Court of Appeals below summarized the district court’s

findings regarding transport of these disease-causing organisms

as follows:

The district court found that the defendants dump sub-

stantial quantities of pathogen-containing sewage into Lake

Michigan each year, that the lake currents carry the patho-

gens into Illinois waters, where they may infect drinking

water supplies and pose a danger to swimmers, and there-

fore that defendants’ actions pose a significant risk of in-

jury to Illinois residents. These findings are not clearly

erroneous. Rule 52, Fed. R. Civ. P. (Appendix A-26 to

A-27.)

The district court found that “bacteria and viruses number-

ing literally in the millions are transported live and intact

from Milwaukee to Illinois waters.” [Tr. 14217.] This

finding is not clearly erroneous. (Appendix B-10.)

8

There is no need here to extensively discuss the evidence of

transport of these pathogens. The Court of Appeals discusses

the evidence at length. (See Appendix A-29 to A-30; B-10 to

B-25.) It is sufficient to observe that even defendants’ own

experts—based on their own tests in Lake Michigan—admitted

that Milwaukee’s sewage is carried by prevailing currents into

Illinois waters several times a year (Tr. 7175; 8931).

E. The Procedural History of This Case.

Milwaukee’s enormous discharges of raw sewage into Lake

Michigan and thence into Illinois waters led Illinois to bring

an original action before this Court in 1971. In 1972 this

Court held that Milwaukee was not a state for purposes of

mandatory original jurisdiction by the Supreme Court over

actions between the states under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).

This Court did hold, however, that Illinois could bring an

original action against Milwaukee in the federal district court

under the doctrine of federal common law nuisance. Illinois v.

City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).

In 1972 Illinois filed a complaint in federal District Court

seeking to abate Milwaukee’s fecal discharges.* The complaint

was in three counts. Count I charged Milwaukee with the

creation of a federal common law nuisance. Count II charged

Milwaukee with violation of statutory prohibitions against water

pollution contained in the Illinois Environmental Protection

Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 111% § 1001 et seq.*

3. In addition to the raw sewage discharges, Illinois also sought

relief against the discharge of improperly and inadequately treated

sewage that reached Milwaukee’s two treatment plants. The remedial

order of the district court regarding such treatment and the over-

turning of that order on the basis of extra-record factual assump-

tions is the subject of the State of Illinois’ Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari, filed October 5, 1979 (No. 79-571).

4. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 111%, § 1012 states in part:

No person shall:

(a) Cause or threaten or allow the discharge of any con-

taminants into the environment in any State so as to cause

(Footnote continued on next page.)

9

Count III charged Milwaukee with the creation of a common

law nuisance under Illinois law pursuant to the remedy articu-

lated in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493

(1971).

The case came to trial in January, 1977. After hearing months

of testimony and reviewing hundreds of exhibits, the district

court entered judgment finding defendants’ discharges con-

stituted:

(a) afederal common law nuisance;

(b) acommon law nuisance under Illinois state law;

(c) a violation of the Illinois Environmental Protection

Act which prohibits any acts which may cause water

pollution in Illinois (Appendix F-2, F-24).

The basis of defendants’ liability was two-fold. First, the

district court found that Milwaukee’s enormous discharges of

raw and partially treated sewage created a serious health hazard

to the residents of the State of Illinois (Appendix F-6 to F-8;

F-15. See Court of Appeals decision and order, Appendix A-26

to A-27; B-2 to B-25).

As a second basis of liability, the district court found that

Milwaukee’s discharges contained huge amounts of phosphorus

and other nutrients which are accelerating eutrophication of

Lake Michigan and are causing taste and odor problems, un-

(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

or tend to cause water pollution in Illinois, either alone

or in combination with matter from other sources, or so

as to violate regulations or standards adopted by the Pol-

lution Control Board under this Act. (Emphasis added. )

Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 111%, § 1003(n), defines “water pollution” as:

[S]uch alteration of the physical, thermal, chemical, biological

or radioactive properties of any waters of the State, or such

discharge of any contaminant into any waters of the State, as

will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters

harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or

welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,

recreational, or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, wild

animals, birds. fish, or other aquatic life. (Emphasis added)

10

pleasant bathing conditions and a hostile environment to aquati«

life (Appendix F-16 to F-20). :

F. The Remedy Ordered by the District Court.

The remedy ordered by the district court is rather simple in

its logic and evidentiary basis:

1. Collection. The district court ordered that all of the

raw sewage be collected for treatment instead of being

discharged raw into Lake Michigan.

2. Treatment. The district court then ordered that all

of the raw sewage—once collected—be treated to destroy

the disease-causing organisms in the sewage.°

Several important procedural observations are necessary here.

The district court did not select or dictate the method or the

time schedule for achieving collection of sewage. The evidence

had established several methods for effective collection. These

methods included:

1. Sewer separation, i.e. taking the storm drainage—

intentional or unintentional—out of the sanitary sewer

and leaving the adequately sized sanitary sewer to carry

the sewage to the plants. |

2. Collection, Storage, Treatment (CST). Rather

than separate the storm drainage from the sanitary waste,

the design here is to collect the mixture of storm water

and sewage, store it, and then gradually pump the stored

wastes for treatment.

The district court did not select or order a particular method

of collection:

5. The level of treatment ordered by the district court is not at

issue in Milwaukee’s Petition. As noted below the appellate court

reversed the district court’s treatment order on the extra-record and

erroneous factual assumption that “secondary” treatment—estab-

lished as a minimum treatment by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1251 et seq., would destroy viruses. The appellate court’s action

is the subject of the State of Illinois’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

1]

... 1am not going to order any particular method to be

employed at this time. I am interested in results. The

methods are a matter of design. (Decision of July 29,

1977.) (Appendix F-26.)

Milwaukee—not the district court—then proceeded to select

a collection, storage, treatment (CST) system as the basis of

collection. The Judgment Order of which Milwaukee now

complains was prepared by Milwaukee lawyers and engineers

(with plaintiffs’ participation) and submitted to the district court

for approval on November 14, 1977.

Milwaukee not only selected the method of collection; Mil-

waukee also selected the timetable for collection and elimination

of raw sewage overflows. This timetable calls for a staged

program of overflow correction which will be completed by

1989.° Indeed, having negotiated the timetable with plaintiffs,

having stipulated as to the feasibility of the timetable (Appendix

E-2), and having submitted the timetable to the district court,

Milwaukee can hardly complain about the timetable.

Moreover, there is an additional procedural aspect of the

district court’s order which deserves attention here. Throughout

its appeal before the Seventh Circuit and in its petition here,

Milwaukee continues to assert extra-record boxcar numbers

as to the hundreds of millions of additional dollars the remedy

ordered by the district court (and affirmed by the Court of

Appeals) will cost beyond the program purportedly established

by Wisconsin under the NPDES‘ permit. (See, e.g. Milwaukee

petition, p. 22.) Yet the Judgment Order specifically provides

for evidentiary hearings in the district court if Milwaukee wishes

to modify the Judgment Order to allow a lower-cost remedy.

6. Note that under the Clean Water Act, so often misquoted

by Milwaukee, the outside deadline for Publicly Owned Treatment

Plants to achieve secondary or more stringent treatment is 1983, a

far tighter deadline than that included by Milwaukee in the Order

it now challenges.

7. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 33 U. S. C.

§§ 1341-1344.

12

Should defendants develop information which establishes

in defendants’ opinion that separation of all or part of

the system is a preferred alternative, which will provide a

collection and treatment level equal to or better than that

required herein then defendants may apply to the Court

for modification of this paragraph to provide therefor.

(Judgment Order.) (Appendix D-4.)

Pursuant to the Judgment Order, Milwaukee has recently

submitted cost figures to the State of Illinois which show that

a combination of separation and CST (Collection/Storage/

Treatment) is the lowest cost alternative. The recently sub-

mitted cost figures show that defendants can achieve a higher

level of protection than the district court’s order at a cost less

than or the same as the system agreed to by defendants in their

state consent decree. The reason for this dramatic improvement

is simple—with separation the rainfall does not get into the

sanitary sewer. Thus, there will be no overflows even under

the most intense storm.

Illinois does not wish to debate these extra-record issues

before this Court. Suffice to say that defendants’ claims of

enormous cost differentials are not supported in the record and

that the Judgment Order expressly provides a fact-finding

mechanism for lower cost collection alternatives in the district

court. Factual disputes with preliminary discovery and attendant

adversarial examination are best decided by district courts and

not on extra-record pronouncements by counsel on appeal.

G. The Decision by the Court of Appeals.

On appeal of the Judgment Order by Milwaukee, the Court

of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding of liability on

the federal common law nuisance count.® In reviewing the issue

8. The Appellate Court declined to consider the state statutory

common law counts (Appendix A-46 n. 53), a matter raised in

Illinois’ Petition for Certiorari.

26

exercise jurisdiction over these defendants on claims arising

under State common law nuisance, the Court said:

The courts of Ohio, under modern principles of the scope

of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, have a

claim as compelling as any that can be made out for this

Court to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant con-

troversy, and they would decide it under the same common

law of nuisance upon which our determination would have

to rest. In essence, the State has charged Dow Canada

and Wyandotte with the commissions of acts, albeit beyond

Ohio’s territorial boundaries, that have produced and, it

is said, continue to produce disastrous effects within Ohio’s

own domain. While this Court, and doubtless Canadian

courts, if called upon to assess the validity of any decree

rendered against either Dow Canada or Wyandotte, would

be alert to ascertain whether the judgment rested upon

an even-handed application of justice, it is unlikely that

we would totally deny Ohio’s competence to act if the

allegations made here are proved true. See, e.g., /nterna-

tional Shoe Co. Vv. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

401 U.S. at 500.

The second issue, whether the discharge of pathogens into

Illinois waters constitutes the commission of a tortious act in

Illinois, is also well settled. For purposes of the [linois long-

arm statute, “a tort is committed in the place where the injury

occurs.” McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 543 F.2d 26, 28

(7th Cir. 1976); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509

F. 2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1975); Consolidated Laboratories,

Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir.

1967).

The District Court so plainly had jurisdiction that the issue

is not worthy of certiorari.

13

of liability, the appellate court engaged in an extensive review

of the evidence and applied the “clearly erroneous” standard

of Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.

On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed

the district court’s order that all sewage be collected. The ap-

pellate court gave three reasons for its affirmance:

1. Of primary significance was the repeated admission

by defendants that discharge of raw sewage was not an

acceptable long-term alternative to collection and treat-

ment:

It is doubtful whether anyone, layman or expert,

would argue that the discharge of raw sewage into

public waters is a satisfactory alternative to collection

and treatment of sewage, even though it may be

conceded that it may take time to fund and provide

collection and treatment facilities, and therefore the

raw sewage discharges may have to be endured for

the short term. Donald Weiland, Director of Engi-

neering for the Sewerage Commission of the City

of Milwaukee, flatly stated that discharging raw sew-

age into public waters as a permanent solution to

sewage overloads was not “sound sanitary engineering

practice.”

Q. As a design engineer responsible for de-

signing sewers with adequate hydraulic capacity,

do you consider it sound sanitary engineering

practice to design and install overflow devices

which are intended to permit the discharge of

raw sewage as a permanent solution to hydraulic

overloads on an interceptor system?

A. Certainly not.

[Tr. 201.] Similarly, Dale Lundy, a hydraulic and

sanitary engineering consultant called by plaintiffs,

testified that collection and treatment is “considered

preferable” to discharge of raw sewage. [Tr. 907.]

Defendants point to nothing in the record that would

even suggest that the discharge of raw sewage into

public waters is either an acceptable long range solu-

14

tion to the problem of disposing of human wastes or

a practice that can be regarded as safe. (Appendix

A-34 to A-35.)

2. The appellate court also noted the inherent illogic

in requiring municipalities to build and operate massive

treatment plants to meet specific effluent limitations if in

the same area the same municipalities could discharge raw

sewage at will from the collection system:

It would be senseless to prohibit the discharge of

effluent from publicly owned treatment works not

meeting the secondary treatment requirements of

§ 301(b)(1)(B), if raw sewage can nonetheless be

discharged at will from overflow points before it

reaches the treatment works. (Appendix A-32 to

A-33.)

3. Finally, the appellate court noted that the consent

decree signed by Milwaukee with the State of Wisconsin®

was virtually open-ended and set no specific dates by

which al! overflows would be eliminated (Appendix A-34).

In contrast the appellate court noted that defendants had

stipulated as to the feasibility of the completion date re-

quirements in the federal Judgment Order:

Defendants concede the feasibility of the completion

date requirements. (Appendix A-38.)

On the question of what treatment is necessary to destroy

viruses, the appellate court had doubts about the need for the

degree of treatment ordered by the district court. Rather than

apply the “clearly erroneous” standard to the evidentiary basis

of the district court’s treatment remedy or alternatively to re-

mand for the taking of additional evidence, the appellate court

9. Milwaukee’s NPDES permits simply allowed overflows to

occur without any treatment or collection requirements. All the

permits contained was an ill-defined obligation to “initiate programs

leading to elimination or control of overflows” (Appendix A-33).

As the federal trial was coming to a close, Milwaukee entered into

a secretly negotiated “consent” agreement with the State of Wis-

consin (DX 1311) which Milwaukee then and now claims bars

more specific federal court action.

15

adopted the “secondary” treatment limits imposed by § 301 (b)

(1)(B) of the Clean Water Act. The appellate court adopted

the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s definition

of secondary treatment (40 C.F.R. Part 133) as that level

of treatment sufficient to destroy virus, on the extra-record as-

sumption that EPA had concluded the “30/30” secondary limit

was sufficient to destroy virus.

As emphasized in Illinois’ petition, the appellate court had

no record support for this assumption. Indeed, all the evidence

in the record was to the contrary—i.e. that a 30/30 limit would

allow billions of viruses to be discharged daily from defendants’

plants. Moreover, by unquestioningly accepting “secondary”

treatment (i.e. 30/30) as the basis for applying its “common

law of the statute” theory (A-21, A-23, A-46), the appellate

court ignored the entire statutory mechanism under Sections

303, 302 and 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act’? for

imposing more stringent effluent limitations on public and pri-

vate point sources to protect valuable water quality resources,

such as Lake Michigan. This question of treatment levels is

discussed extensively in Illinois’ petition and need not be dis-

cussed further here.

10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313; 1312; 1311(b)(1)(C).

16

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S COLLECTION ORDER [S NOT

INCONSISTENT WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT.

In a rather disjointed argument unsupported by citations to

legal authority, Milwaukee attempts to characterize the district

court’s order that raw sewage be collected as contradictory to

the Congressional policy set forth in the Clean Water Act.

Milwaukee submits a melange of arguments—all of which are

erroneous.

A. Congress Did Not Preempt the Imposition of More

Stringent Requirements Than Those Imposed Under the

Clean Water Act.

A careful reading of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1251 et seq. clearly establishes Congress’ intent to allow the

imposition of requirements more stringent than those required

by the Act and to preserve all remedies—both statutory and

common law—which existed prior to the statute.

Defendants have ignored Section 510 of the 1972 Amend-

ments, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, which expressly allows a state or

political subdivision to impose more stringent requirements:

1370. State authority. Except as expressly provided in

this Act, nothing in this Act shall (1) preclude or deny

the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or

interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or

limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any

requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution;

except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation,

effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or

standard of performance is in effect under this Act, such

State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not

17

adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation,

effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or

standard of performance which is less stringent than the

effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,

prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of per-

formance under this act; or (2) be construed as impairing

or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the

States with respect to the waters (including boundary

waters) of such States.

The House Public Works Committee stated:

The Committee considers section 510 to be of extreme im-

portance in assuring the States of the right to adopt or

enforce provisions at least as strict as those established in

this legislation. Thus, the Committee rejected in most in-

stances suggestions for preemption by the Federal Govern-

ment and preempted the States only where the situation

warranted it based upon the urgent need for uniformity

such as in section 312(f) relating to marine sanitation

devices. Vol. 1 Congressional Research Service, A Legisla-

tive History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1972, 823. (Hereinafter cited as “Legislative

History”; emphasis added.)

Since the passage of the 1972 Amendments, the courts have

uniformly recognized the rights of states or local subdivisions

to require more stringent requirements than the national mini-

mum.

By contemplation of minimum federal standards, however,

Congress did not intend to relegate the States to the status

of enforcement agents for the executive branch of the

federal government. To the contrary, it is indisputable that

Congress specifically declined to attempt a preemption of

the field in the area of water pollution legislation, and as

much as invited the States to enact requirements more strin-

gent than the federal standards. Mianus River Preservation

Comm. Vv. E.P.A , 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1976).

Such tougher state requirements can be imposed by state statu-

tory requirements or as the result of state common law nuisance

18

actions." See, Committee for Jones Falls v. Train, 539 F. 2d

1006, 1009 n. 9 (4th Cir. 1976); see also, Metropolitan Sani-

tary District v. United States Steel Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d 360,

323 N. E. 2d 426, 434 (1st Dist. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S.

976 (1976); People ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp.,

40 Ill. App. 3d 607, 352 N. E. 2d 225, 229 (1st Dist. 1976);

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F.Supp. 298 (N. D. IIl.

1973); Cf., Village of Glencoe v. Metropolitan Sanitary District,

23 Ill. App. 3d 868, 320 N. E. 2d 524 (1st Dist. 1974).

Nor did Congress in any way seek to restrict this right to

more stringent standards in the 1977 Amendments. In the

Senate Report on the 1977 Amendments, the Senate Public

Works Committee states:

There is nothing in these new provisions which in any

way preempts the rights of States to have more stringent

water quality standards or associated effluent limitations;

...S. Rep. No. 95-370, p. 43, 4 Legislative History, 676.

Just as states and their political subdivisions were entitled to

require more stringent discharge requirements under the Act,

so also were their various pre-existing common law and statu-

tory remedies preserved. Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,

creates a specific statutory cause of action for any citizen—

regardless of standard—to enforce any effluent limits imposed

by the Act. By its express terms the cause of action created

by Section 505 is limited to enforcing the specific limits set

under the FWPCA. Section 505 does not create any right to

enforce obligations not in the Act.

Milwaukee seeks to characterize a common law nuisance

action as an action brought under § 505 and therefore subject

to the permit defenses of § 402(k). However, common law

11. Indeed, under the Clean Water Act, the EPA Administrator

must take cognizance of these more stringent standards and incor-

porate them into the EPA permit. Under § 301 of the FWPCA,

a publicly-owned treatment works must meet “any more stringent

limitation” beyond secondary treatment established pursuant to any

state or other federal law. § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311

(b)(1)(C).

19

nuisance actions are not statutory actions brought under § 505.

Stream Pollution Control Board v. United States Steel Corp.,

512 F.2d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1975).

Congress wanted to make clear that Section 505 did not bar

any other action which might exist—as here—under common

law or statute. Section 505(e) of the 1972 Amendments states:

(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which

any person (or class of persons) may have under any

statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent

standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including

relief against the Administrator or a State agency). 33

U.S.C. § 1365(e).

The House Report on the 1972 Amendments states:

Subsection (e) provides that the right of persons (or class

of persons) to seek enforcement or other relief under

any statute or common law is not affected. 1 Legislative

History 821.

Likewise, the Senate Report says:

It should be noted, however, that the section would speci-

fically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law.

Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would

remain available. Compliance with requirements under this

Act would not be a defense to a common law action for

damages. 2 Legislative History 1499.

As the Illinois Appellate Court held in rejecting an argument

by United States Steel Corporation identical to that made by

defendants here:

The clear intent of Congress to allow the states or their

political subdivisions the primary responsibility for en-

forcing their own, more stringent standards by common

law nuisance actions [citations omitted] or the equally clear

intent of our legislature to confer that responsibility on the

Attorney General [citations omitted] would be thwarted

by a stay of these proceedings. People ex rel. Scott v. United

States Steel Corp., 352 N.E.2d at 228-229. (Emphasis

added. )

20

All federal courts which have considered the question uni-

formly refused to strike common law nuisance claims on the

grounds that they had been pre-empted by the Clean Water

Act. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Vv. Jennings,

594 F. 2d 181, 193 (9th Cir. 1979); Township of Long Beach

v. City of New York, 445 F.Supp. 1203, 1214-15 (D.N. J.

1978); U. S. v. Outboard Marine Corp.., ............ F. Supp. ........ ,

12 ERC 1346, 1348 (N. D. Ill. 1978); Board of Supervisors of

Fairfax County, Virginia v. U. S., 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E. D.

Va. 1976); U. S. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp.

110, 120 (D. Vt. 1973); U. S. v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784,

794 (E. D.N. Y. 1973); U.S. ex rel. Scott v. U. S. Steel, 356

F. Supp. 556, 559 (N. D. Ill. 1973); U.S. v. Ira S. Bushey &

Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd 487 F. 2d

1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. den., 417 U. S. 976 (1974). Cf.,

Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage

System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).

Milwaukee cites Jones Falls, supra, as supporting the principle

of preemption. However, that court held that a federal common

law nuisance claim is barred where the alleged pollution was

wholly intrastate. 539 F.2d at 1010. Moreover, Jones Falls

did recognize that the Clean Water Act did not preempt state

common law nuisance actions, even if state common law

nuisance actions imposed stricter standards. Jd. at 1009 and n. 9.

B. The Statutory Procedure Under the Act Itself Contradicts

Milwaukee’s Arguments.

Apart from the express provisions of the Clean Water Act

preserving the rights of states to impose more stringent require-

ments than those imposed by the Act, the statutory scheme of

the Act itself contradicts Milwaukee’s arguments:

1. While Congress has authorized the EPA Administra-

tor to extend the deadline for publicly-owned treatment

plants to meet secondary [§ 301(b) (1) (B)] or more strin-

21

gent limits imposed pursuant to § 301 (b) (1) (C)**—where

federal funds have not been available—this deadline can

only be extended to “no later than July 1, 1983.” 33 U. S.C.

§ 1311(i)(1). Congress did not authorize extensions be-

yond 1983. Here, by contrast, the district court’s order is

much more lenient, calling for completion by 1989.

2. Apart from the express statutory extension to no

later than 1983, the absence of federal funding is not a

defense to a discharger’s failure to meet pollution limits.

State Water Control Board v. Train, 554 F. 2d 921, 924-

927 (4th Cir. 1977). Availability of federal funding under

Title II of the Clean Water Act is not and cannot be a

defense to compliance with Title [l—either as to the

secondary limits of § 301(b)(1)(B) or the more stringent

limits of § 301(b)(1)(C).

3. The “cost-effective” analysis which Milwaukee cites

so blithely does not relate to exemptions from the require-

ments of Title III. The “cost-effective” analysis require-

ment is simply that if federal funds are requested, federal

funds granted under Title II be used for the least cost

alternative which achieves the limitations imposed by

Title II]. Under Title II the results must be the same—

achievement of the effluent limits of § 301(b)(1)(B) or

§ 301(b)(1)(C). Cost-effective analysis simply requires

that those limits be achieved in the least cost way if federal

grants are used to fund the achievement of these limits.

See 40 C. F. R. Part 35, Subpart E, Appendix A.

Indeed, § 217 of the Clean Water Act—cited by Mil-

waukee—is directly related to selection of the least cost

alternative to meet the Title III requirements. The legisla-

tive history of that section discloses Congress’ concern

that the pre-1977 cost-effectiveness guidelines had a strong

bias toward funding conventional treatment in meeting the

12. Water quality related effluent limits imposed pursuant to

the procedures of § 303 or § 302 or more stringent limits imposed

under state law are preserved under § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.

22

requirements of the Act. The basic purpose of § 217 was

to require identification of innovative alternatives such as

recycling of waste and beneficial uses of sewage as least-

cost alternative means of meeting Title III limits. See

S. Rep. 370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 40; H. Rep. 280, 95th

Cong., Ist Sess., 73 (1977).

Neither Illinois nor the district court had any quarrel

with the principle that Milwaukee should be allowed to

pursue the least cost alternative in collecting its raw sew-

age. Indeed, as discussed above, the Judgment Order—

drafted in concert by Milwaukee and Illinois—provides for

modification to allow lower cost methods of collection to

be installed if Milwaukee can establish that such methods

are feasible. Moreover, Milwaukee has recently informed

Illinois that it has developed such lower cost alternatives

and wishes to submit these lower cost alternatives to the

district court pursuant to the modification provisions of

the Judgment Order. The preliminary cost information

provided by Milwaukee indicates that separation of the

sewers provides the least cost alternative to accomplishing

the district court’s collection order and that such costs are

less than or approximately the same as the costs of meeting

the open-ended consent decree with Wisconsin.’*

4. Apart from the minimum requirements of the Act,

the Act provides special procedures for protecting pure

bodies of water such as Lake Michigan. Under the Act,

each body of water is given individualized analysis to de-

termine its desired uses and water quality needs. From this

assessment of the desired uses and water quality needs,

effluent limits tailored to the specific water quality needs

of the receiving body of water can be fashioned. These

limits are called “water quality related effluent limitations”

13. Again, these cost questions are properly placed before the

district court under the Judgment Order rather than placed as bare

allegations in a petition for certiorari.

23

and are mandated by § 303 and § 302 of the Act and

by § 301(b)(1)(C).

Thus, contrary to Milwaukee’s assertions—all municipalities

are not to be treated alike. For example, dischargers into marine

waters may have different effluent limits than dischargers into

pure bodies of fresh water such as Lake Michigan. Each lake

or river and its water quality needs are assessed on their own

individualized merits."*

II.

MILWAUKEE’S EVIDENTIARY CLAIMS ARE SPURIOUS.

Milwaukee has taken snatches of the district court’s findings

and concocted a series of evidentiary claims that have little

relationship to reality. It is sufficient to note that each of the

defendants’ evidentiary arguments was exhaustively examined

by the appellate court and rejected. Both the district court and

the appellate court found clear and convincing evidence of

Milwaukee’s liability (Appendix F-15; F-23; A-27). The ap-

pellate court’s exhaustive analysis of the evidence is contained

at pages B-2 through B-27 of the Appendix.

Defendants repeatedly cite New York v. New Jersey, 256

U.S. 296 (1921), and Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496

(1906), as if the facts in those situations were identical to those

in the instant case. But in each of those cases the plaintiff state

was allowing its own dischargers to discharge equal or greater

14. Without getting into a name-calling match with EPA—

which is just the kind of feud Milwaukee seeks to engender—neither

EPA nor Wisconsin has done a water quality needs analysis of Lake

Michigan from the standpoint of virus or bacteria as required by

§ 303 of the Clean Water Act. The only forum which has ever re-

lated Lake Michigan water quality needs regarding virus and bac-

teria and which has worked back to impose water quality based

effluent limits was the district court in this case. It should be noted

that the principal witnesses before the district court urging collection

of raw wastes and effective treatment were EPA’s top experts on

virus and bacteria.

24

amounts of sewage into the same watercourse, contaminating

the same water:

Where as here, the plaintiff has sovereign powers and de-

liberately permits discharges similar to those of which it

complains, it not only offers a standard to which the de-

fendant has the right to appeal, but as some of those dis-

charges are above the intake of St. Louis, it warrants the

defendant in demanding the strictest proof that the plain-

tiffs own conduct does not produce the result, or at least

so conduce to it that courts should not be curious to

apportion the blame. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496,

522 (1906). (Emphasis added.)

In New York v. New Jersey, the complaining state allowed

New York City to dump into the same waters seven times the

volume of sewage (all untreated) as the proposed New Jersey

discharge which was treated. 256 U.S. at 303.

Here, by contrast, Illinois has either completed or has under

construction programs which have already eliminated or will

eliminate all uncollected and untreated sewage discharges to

Lake Michigan.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION,

AND VENUE WAS PROPER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH

THE CLAIM AROSE.

As a final matter, Milwaukee has suggested that the case

should have been dismissed because the District Court was

without in personam jurisdiction over the defendants and further

because venue was improper. These are disposed of easily.

A. The District Court Had in Personam Jurisdiction.

A district court’s jurisdiction over the person of a non-

resident defendant is dependent upon the extra-territorial service

statute of the forum State. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). In this case

the Illinois “long arm” statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110, 94 16

25

and 17, control. Section 17, which lists the actions of a de-

fendant by which it submits to the jurisdiction of an Illinois

court, includes “[t]he commission of a tortious act within”

Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court has construed this provision

to include acts done in other states which result in injury in

Illinois, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 22 Ml.

2d 432, 176 N. E.2d 761 (1961), and has stated that the

long arm statute authorizes “the extension of jurisdiction over

nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due

process clause.” Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp.,

supra, 176 N.E. 2d at 763; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378,

143 N. E. 2d 673, 679 (1957).

Confronted with this authoritative construction of the Illinois

statute, Milwaukee is reduced to arguing (1) that its discharge

of raw sewage and disease-causing organisms into Illinois waters

does not constitute a sufficient “minimal contact” with Illinois

to support in personam jurisdiction; and (2) that in any event

this does not constitute commission of a tortious act in Illinois.

Milwaukee’s first argument comes 100 years too late. In

the era of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), attempts by

states to exercise jurisdiction over persons outside of their

territorial limits were invalid. This archaic doctrine, as well

as the entire conceptual framework which supported it, have

of course been rejected. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U. S. 310 (1945); Shaffer v. Harris, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

The relevant inquiry is whether the actions of the defendant

establish “certain minimum contacts with [the forum State]

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice’.” [citation omitted]

International Shoe, supra 326 U.S. at 316.

This Court has addressed this question in the context of

interstate and international water pollution in Ohio v. Wyan-

dotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971). Ohio had

charged Michigan and Canadian corporate defendants with pollu-

tion of Lake Erie. Deciding that Ohio State courts could

27

B. Venue Was Proper in the District in Which the

Claim Arose.

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which permits

suit in either the “judicial district where all defendants reside,

or in which the claim arose . . .”. The Court’s 1972 opinion in

this case noted that this provision gives some “flexibility” to

venue in this case. Jllinois v. Milwaukee, supra, 406 U.S. at

108 n. 10.

Milwaukee contends that venue was improper in the Northern

District of Illinois, and advances three reasons: (1) that the

nuisance “arose” in Wisconsin; (2) that § 505 of the Clean

Water Act places venue exclusively in the Eastern District of

Wisconsin; and (3) that a municipality may only be sued in

the District in which it is located. Each of these arguments is

wholly specious.

1. Under the federal common law of nuisance an action

“arises” in the place where the injury occurs. Illinois v.

Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 108 n. 10; Ohio v. Wyandotte

Chemicals Corp., supra, 401 U.S. at 500. This general

principle is consistent with the traditional view of tort law,

which holds that “[t]he place of the wrong is in the state

where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for

an alleged tort takes place.” Restatement, Conflict of

Laws, § 377 (1934). This claim arose in Illinois.

2. Section 505(c)(1) is inapplicable to this action by

its very terms:

Any action respecting a violation by a discharge

source of an effluent standard or limitation or an

order respecting such standard or limitation may be

brought under this section only in the judicial district

in which such source is located. 33 U.S.C. § 1365

(c)(1).

This action was neither (a) respecting an effluent standard

or limitation, nor (b) brought under the citizen suit pro-

28

visions of § 505. See Stream Pollution Control Board v.

United States Steel, supra, 512 F.2d at 1041. The venue

limitations of § 505(c) are simply irrelevant.

3. Venue of an action against a municipality, based

on the federal common law, is governed by § 1391(b),

which allows it to be brought where the claim arose.

Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 108 n. 10. Milwaukee’s

arguments to the contrary are based upon either pre-

1966 cases, which construed a different statute, or on

a single case involving suit against actions by Congress,

in which special consideration limited venue to the Dis-

trict of Columbia.

Venue in this case was properly in the Northern District

of Illinois.

15. The language “or in which the claim arose,” which provides

flexibility and a choice of venue, was added by P.L. 89-714, § 1

(1966).

29

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,

filed by the City of Milwaukee, the Sewerage Commission of

the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Com-

mission of the County of Milwaukee, should be denied.

October 11, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM J. SCOTT,

Attorney General of the State

of Illinois,

JOSEPH V. KARAGANIS,

SANFORD R. GAIL,

Special Assistant Attorneys

General,

KARAGANIS & GAIL LTD.,

150 North Wacker Drive,

Chicago, Illinois 60606,

(312) 782-1905.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition — Milwaukee v. Illinois · 451 U.S. 304 | Frix