Appendix — Collom v. United States

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UNITED STATES COUR F P

1 | T OF APPEALS W0V 23 1979

2 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD H. DEANE

3 CLERK, US. COURT OF APPEALS

4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

5 | Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ho. 77-1040

)

6 I -vs- )

)

7 BRUCE ANTHONY COLLOM, )

| )

8 | Defendant-Appellant. )

| ) ORDER

9 | )

| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

10 )

| Plaintiff-Appellee, )

11 )

|

-vs- )

12 | ) No. 77-1034

| STEPHEN COLLOM, )

13 )

Defendant-Appellant. )

14 )

15

16 Before: CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges,

and TURRENTINE,* District Judge

17

18 The Opinion filed in this matter on June 15, 1978,

19 is withdrawn, and the attached Opinion is substituted

20 therefor.

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*Honorable Howard B. Turrentine, United States District Judge,

32 Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

PPT-Gand: ~ne

4-19-73—10004—- 908

APPENDIX "A"

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FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UN 1 5 1978

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD H. DEANE

CLERK, US. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

-vs- No. 77-1040

‘

BRUCE ANTHONY COLLOM,

De fendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

No. 77-1034

Amenoe®eo

OPINION

STEPHEN COLLOM,

De fendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges,

and TURRENTINE,* District Judge

Before:

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Bruce Collom appeals his conviction for robbing a

federally insured savings and loan association in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). His brother Stephen Collom appeals his

conviction for aiding and abetting the robbery in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm both convictions.

I. The Facts

On September 30, 1976, at 11:30 a.m., Bruce Collom

(Bruce) robbed the Garden Grove Federal Savings and Loan

Association in Garden Grove, California. Complying with his

demand for aber, a teller put $3,439 in cash in a paper sack

supplied by Bruce. Bruce then left the building, ran down an

*Honorable Howard B. Turrentine, United States District Judge,

Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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31.29-74—100m —e21

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| alley, and was seen leaving the area in a green Ford Mustang,

license number 247 PON, being driven by another man.

About an hour later, Eileen Hedrick was walking by

Parking Lot C on the UCLA campus, which is approximately 44

miles from the Garden Grove Federal Savings and Loan Associa-

tion. From the sidewalk adjacent to the lot and moments later

from the window of a nearby building, she saw Bruce and his

brother Stephen Collom (Stephen), who matched the description

of the driver of the getaway car, wiping the exterior of the

green Mustang with rags. Suspecting a burglary, Hedrick

telephoned the campus police.

Officer Malone of the UCLA Police Department received

a radio call directing him to Parking Lot C to investigate a

possible wate theft. Upon arriving at the lot, Malone saw

Stephen and Bruce stooped down at the rear of the Mustang,

license number 247 PON, with a rolled-up T-shirt between them.

As Malone stopped his car about 20 feet from them, they stood

up and began to walk away rapidly. Being aware of the high

incidence of burglary and auto theft in this area, and sus-

pecting criminal activity, he asked them to stop. They

complied.

Officer Longo then arrived, and the officers ques-

tioned the two men separately about their purpose and the

ownership of the Mustang. Bruce said that the car belonged to

his friend Debbie and that he was borrowing some tools from it.

Stephen claimed he was borrowing tools to fix his own car, but

he was unable to say where his own vehicle was located. Both

men said they were on their way to register for school.

Officer Malone noticed what appeared to be damage to the left

rear window of the Mustang, to the ignition wires, and to the

glove box. 3

Officer Stanley, who had arrived about the same time

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as Longo, asked and received Bruce's permission to examine

the T-shirt. Inside she found several cans of wax, miscel-

laneous tools, sunglasses, and a toy pistol resembling a .38

caliber revolver. After Malone and Longo questioned the men,

Longo was informed over his police radio that the Mustang

belonged to a Mr. Jones.

At this point, Stephen and Bruce were placed under

arrest and taken to the UCLA police station. No Miranda

warnings were given. At the station, the two suspects were

questioned further and searched. Stephen was discovered to

have $402 in his wallet and pockets; Bruce had a total of

$3,042 in his wallet, shirt pocket, and the sleeve of his

jacket. Some of the bills found on Bruce were later identi-

fied as “bait money" which had been put in his bag at the

savings and loan. Only after the arrest did the UCLA police

learn that the robbery in Garden Grove had occurred.

Bruce was indicted by a federal grand jury for

robbing the savings and loan association; Stephen was indicted

for aiding and abetting the robbery. Both pleaded not guilty,

and both moved to suppress all the evidence taken by the UCLA

police officers. The district judge granted the motion with

respect to statements made after arrest since no Miranda

warnings had been given. In all other respects the motion was

denied. The matter then went to trial, and the jury returned

verdicts of guilty against both defendants.

On appeal, Stephen claims that the motion to suppress

should have been granted in full, that certain evidence

admitted at trial should have been excluded because the trial

judge had eenbteunty found its probative value to be out-

weighed by its prejudicial effect, and that a mistrial should

have been granted. Bruce admitted at trial that he had per-

formed the robbery, but he claims on appeal that his

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3-19-73-—100M—1006

conviction must be reversed because the trial court wrong-

fully refused to give a requested instruction relating to his

insanity defense, because the trial court should have granted

his motion for a continuance, and because he was inadequately

:

represented by his attorney. We now consider these issués.

II. The Motion to Suppress

Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,

the law of this circuit required a federal court to judge the

legality of a stop, arrest, or search and seizure by state

officers under both state and federal standards, violation of

either standard constituting sufficient grounds for suppres-

sion of the evidence. United States v. Solomon, 528 F.2d 88,

90 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F.2d 96,

98 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229,

235 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974); United

States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

412 U.S. 921 (1973); Warston v. United States, 400 F.2d 25, 27

(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 892 (1969). The

effect, if any, of the Federal Rules of Evidence on this rule

2

is uncertain.

However, we need not reach this question, for

we hold that under both federal and state standards, the

motion to suppress was properly denied.

Stephen argues that the motion to suppress all the

evidence--both oral and physical--taken by the UCLA police

should have been granted in its entirety for three reasons:

(1) the initial investigatory stop of Stephen and Bruce by

Officer Malone was illegal; (2) Miranda warnings should have

been given during that stop, even though an arrest had not

been made; (3) the subsequent arrest was not based on probable

cause. We find no merit in any of these contentions.

Our circuit has consistently held that an investigatory

stop short of an arrest is valid if based upon a founded

3-19-T3—100M—1006

| Or reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

E.g.,

United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 422 U.S. 1010 (1975); Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236

(9th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.

1966). The Supreme Court has recently defined reasonable

suspicion to exist when the detaining officer is "aware of

specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences

from those facts, — reasonably warrant suspicion" that the

law is being broken. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422

U.S. 873, 884 (1975). Similarly, California law permits

investigatory stops when an officer has a “rational suspicion"

that “Some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place,’

that the subject under scrutiny is connected with the unusual

accivity, and that "the unusual activity is related to crime."

People v. Henze, 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 988, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545,

547 (1967): see, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 43 Cal. App. 3d 898,

902-03, 118 Cal. Rptr. 205, 207 (1974).

792 (9th Cir.

See also, United

1979).

States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789,

We have no difficulty deciding that the investigatory

stop conducted by Officers Malone, Longo and Stanley was

appropriate under both federal and state standards. The

radio bulletin directed them to investigate a possible bur-

glary of an automobile in an area plagued by such incidents.

Stephen and Bruce were found stooping down suspiciously at the

rear of the green Mustang. Upon seeing Officer Malone, they

began to retreat rapidly. The totality of these circumstances

easily justified the officer in stopping them and asking them

questions.

Stephen asserts that even though an arrest had not been

made at this point, his statements to the officers should have

been suppressed because Miranda warnings were not given. We

disagree. We-have held on numerous occasions that even though

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|

Strawder,

| one's freedom of action is inhibited to some degree during

an investigatory detention, Miranda warnings need rot be

given prior to questioning in that circumstance. E.g.-,

United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1975),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States y. Edwards,

444 F.2d 122, 123 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 441

F.2d 539, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chase, 414

F.2d 780, 781-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 920 (1969);

Lowe _v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1969).

California courts applying California law have reached the sare

conclusion. People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 767, 528 P.2d l,

28, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 420 (1974); see, e.g., People v. Manis,

268 Cal. App. 2d 653, 661-69, 74 Cal. Rptr. 423, 428-33 (1969);

People v. Wheeler, supra at 903, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 207.

Stephen claims that Officer Stanley's action in

unrolling the T-shirt was illegal because it went beyond the

scope of searches permitted during investigatory stops. It is

apparent from the record, however, that Bruce consented to

that limited search, and we do not understand either Bruce or

Stephen to argue that the consent was involuntary. Thus,

there are no grounds for concluding under federal law that the |

T-shirt and its contents were not legally examined. See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-46 (1973); Davis

v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-94 (1946); Zap v. United

States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946). The result is the same

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under California law. E.g., People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d 99,

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106-07, 561 P.2d 1135, 1138-39, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 450-51

(1977); People v. Ruster, 16 Cal. 3d 690, 699-701, 548 P.2d

353, 358-59, 129 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158-59 (1976); People v.

34 Cal. App. Rptr.

3d 370, 376-81, 108 Cal. 901,

904-07 (1973).

We also reject Stephen's assertion that the officers

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| lacked probable cause to arrest him.

This is a classic case

of founded suspicion ripening into probable cause to arrest.

See United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); United States v.

Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

434 U.S. 974 (1977). After the initial stop, Officer Malone

observed extensive damage to the Mustang such as that which

results when someone attempts to steal or burglarize an auto-

mobile. The brothers’ explanation of their activities around

the car and their identification of its owner were extremely

dubious. Once the officers gained this additional information,

probable cause to arrest existed. "[{Ajt that moment the facts

and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of

which they had reasonably trustworthy information were suffi-

cient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the two men]

had committed or [were] committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio,

379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

California law is similar: "Cause for arrest exists

when the facts known to the arresting officer ‘would lead a

man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscien-

tiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the

person is guilty of a crime.'" People v. DeVaughn, 18 Cal. 3d

889, 895, 558 P.2d 872, 875, 135 Cal. Rptr. 785, 789 (1977)

(quoting People v. Harris, 15 Cal. 3d 384, 389, 540 P.2d 632,

635, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1975)):; e.g., People v. Gomez,

63 Cal. App. 3d 328, 333-34, 133 Cal. Rptr. 731, 733-34 (1976);

People v. Knutson, 60 Cal. App. 3d 856, 861-63, 131 Cal. Rptr.

846, 849-50 (1976); see Cal. Penal Code § 836(3) (West 1970).

Thus, the same result would obtain when the state standard is

applied.

Since the arrest was proper, the search which disclosed

the stolen money was obviously legitimate under federal

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3-19-T3—100M—1006

standards as incident to a lawful arrest. See United States

v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1973); Chimel v. California,

395 U.S. 752, 755-68 (1969); Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925). The same result follows under

California law. People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 69-71, 429 P.

2d 606, 610-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258-60 (1967), rev'd on

other grounds sub nom. Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968) ;

People v. Balassy, 30 Cal. App. 3d 614, 622-23, 106 Cal. Rptr.

461, 465-66 (1973); People v. Rogers, 241 Cal. App. 2d 384,

388-90, 50 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561-62 (1966); see Cal. Penal

Code § 1412 (West 1979).

We conclude, then, that the district judge's ruling

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on the motion to suppress was correct. Except for the

failure to give Miranda warnings after his arrest, Stephen's

rights were not violated when the officers stopped and ques-

tioned him, or when they arrested and searched him. Thus, |

only the post-arrest statements, which the judge did suppress,

nial subject to exclusion.

III. The Exclusion of Evidgnce as More

Prejudicial Than Prob@tive

During the trial, Officer Longo related several

statements made to him by Stephen during the investigatory

stop, namely that he was borrowing teols from the Mustang

which belonged to a friend in order to repair his own car,

that he could not give the exact location of his own car, and

that he was going to enroll as an extension student at UCLA.

Although the trial judge had properly refused to suppress

these statements as illegally obtained, Stephen's counsel

again sought to block their admission by a timely objection

and assertion that the testimony was ‘evelevant.” A sidebar

conference followed in which Stephen claims the district judge

finally ruled that the statements were inadmissible under

Federal Rule of Evidence 403° as being more prejudicial than

probative. The government disputes this. Thus, we are not

asked to decide whether the ruling was correct, but to deter-

mine just what the ruling was.

During the sidebar conference, the prosecutor made

an offer of proof and each side explained its position.” The

judge then said, "I think [the prosecutor] is right, it shows

that they are trying to disengage themselves from the getaway

car." When defense counsel protested further that the testi-

mony was cumulative and prejudicial, the judge responded, "I

think it is prejudicial, and I think its probative value is

outweighed by whatever prejudicial effect it might have."

pe—100M—e21

No more was said on the subject at the sidebar con-

ference, and after an unrelated matter was discussed, the

prosecutor continued his examination of Officer Longo by

asking almost immediately, “What did you say to him, Mr.

Stephen Collom, and what did he say to you in this conversa-

tion?" Officer Longo then related the substance of their

conversation. There was no objection or motion to strike,

and the matter was apparently not raised again until this

appeal.

We are thus faced with a confusing record. Stephen

claims that the judge meant to sustain his objection, as evi-

denced by the judge's last remark on the subject. The govern-

ment, however, argues that the judge intended to admit the

testimony in accordance with his statement that "[the prose-

cutor]) is right."

For several reasons we are convinced that the trial

judge intended to overrule the objection. First, although

the judge's back-to-back, flatly contradictory statements were

puzzling, neither the prosecutor, who appeared to have won the

point until the judge's final comment, nor defense counsel

sought clarification. It thus seems likely that the judge

inadvertently said the reverse of what he meant, and that the

lawyers understood his true intent from his entire statement.

Second, immediately after the sidebar conference the prosecu-

tor openly asked the very question to which Stephen's counsel

claims the judge had sustained his objection. Yet, neither

the judge nor Stephen's counsel said anything. One would

fully expect one of the two to speak up had the prosecutor

blatantly ignored a ruling made just seconds earlier. Third,

a few moments prior to this incident the judge had permitted,

over objection, Officer Malone to relate his conversation with

Bruce during the investigatory stop. It seems probable that

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he therefore intended to admit the analogous statements by

Stephen to Officer Longo.

We conclude that the judge simply misstated his deci-

stood at the time. That decision, as we now interpret it,

was clearly correct for the very reasons initially stated by

the judge.

Iv. The Motion for Mistrial

After the jury had been instructed, Stephen's

attorney moved for a mistrial based on three alleged errors

by the district judge: (1) the failure to answer a question

from the jury; (2) the prejudicial withdrawal of an instruc-

tion previously given to the jury; (3) the failure, once the

instruction was withdrawn, adequately to present Stephen's

theory of the case in the remainder of the instructions.

Shortly after the case had been submitted to the

jury, a written question was sent from the jury to the judge

asking, "Is aiding and abetting after the fact constitute a

violation of the law?" [sic]. In response, the judge rein-

structed the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting, and

he specifically invited them to ask further questions should

the need arise. Stephen argues that this was not adequately

responsive to the question and that a mistrial was the appro-

priate remedy.

"The necessity, extent and character of additional

instructions are matters within the sound discretion of the

trial court." Wilson v. United States, 422 F.2d 1303, 1304

(9th Cir. 1970). Accord, United States v. Beasley, 476 F.2d

164, 166 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973); Allen

v. United States, 186 F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

1 &

Ql U.S. 948 (1951); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.24a

85, 91 (9th Cir. 1945). The district judge acted well within

sion to overrule the objection, and that the attorneys so under

his discretion in this case. The meaning the jury attached

to the words “after the fact" in the question is unclear

Since there had been no "accessory after the fact" charge or

other instruction using that phrase. While the judge was free

to do so, attempting to respond to the question directly

would have risked further confusion. The judge therefore

acted appropriately in merely rereading the previously given

aiding and abetting instructions and inviting further ques-

tions should the confusion persist. The mistrial motion was

properly denied insofar as it relied on this incident.

The remaining two arguments in support of the mis-

trial motion stem from the withdrawal from the jury of an

instruction previously given. When he had concluded his

charge to the jury, the judge asked the attorneys out of the

hearing of the jury if they had any objections or further

requests. At this late time, Stephen's attorney asked the

judge to instruct the jury that "the circumstances of [Bruce's]

sanity may be taken into account in determining whether or not

Stephen Collom is guilty of aiding and abetting." Over the

prosecutor's objection, the following instruction was added

to the charge already given:

In determining the guilt or

innocence of Stephen Collom you

may consider the mental condition

of his brother, Bruce Anthony

Collom, at the time of the com-

mission of the offense.

The jury, not surprisingly, was confused by the instruction

and asked the judge about it after the case had been submitted

to them. On reconsideration, the judge decided that the

instruction had been improvidently given and, over defense

counsel's objection, he told the jury to disregard it. At the

same time, he reminded them that the remainder of the charge

was still in effect, and he reread his previous instructions

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concerning the elements of each offense, the government's

burden of proof, the defendants’ presumption of innocence, and

the rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime does not

establish aiding and abetting. He also offered to reread any

other instruction the jury might desire. In response to his

question, the jury assured the court that they would com-

pletely disregard the withdrawn instruction.

Stephen claims prejudice from this incident in two

related arguments. First, he claims that the withdrawal of

one instruction and subsequent rereading of other instructions

unfairly emphasized the points in the niin favorable to the

government. Second, he asserts that once the instruction had

been withdrawn, a legitimate theory of defense was no longer

covered by the instructions as a whole, and that the jury

would believe they must disregard the possible effect of

Bruce's insanity on Stephen's opportunity to form a criminal

intent.

The trial judge was unquestionably correct when he

decided that the instruction was improperly before the jury.

At best it was highly confusing and failed to convey accur-

ately the intended theory of defense; at worst it incorrectly

suggested that Bruce's insanity could negate Stephen's

criminal intent. "Where the court has given an erroneous

instruction, it may be withdrawn or explained by the court so

as to remove error which otherwise might be present. But the

withdrawal must leave no doubt in the minds of the jury as to

what the court ultimately declares the law to be." Chicago,

B. & Q. R. Co. v. Kelley, 74 F.2d 80, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1934).

Accord, Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Bailey, 190 F.2d 812, 815

(Sth Cir. 1951); Hansen v. St. Joseph Fuel Oil & Mfg. Co., 181

F.2d 880, 885 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).

Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 452 F.2d 1117, 1119 (lst Cir.

lle

1971) (no prejudice to defendant where court immediately

withdrew erroneous instruction in emphatic terms). The

district judge met this standard in this case. Only a single,

brief instruction was involved, and the jurors explicitly

agreed to "handle [their] deliberations as though that last

instruction was never given." The remaining instructions

were clear and consistent, and the judge wisely sought to

blunt the focus necessarily given to the stricken sentence by

reading several other of his basic instructions. These

included points favorable to Stephen, specifically the princi-

ples that the defendant is presumed to be innocent, that the

government bears the burden of proof, and that mere presence

at the scene of the crime is not aiding and abetting. The

need to withdraw a jury instruction is, of course, always an

unfortunate incident in a criminal trial. But we think it was

done here so as to minimize the possibility of substantial

prejudice to the accused.

' With respect to Stephen's complaint that his theory

of defense was excluded, he correctly argues that a defendant

is entitled to jury instructions on a legitimate theory of

defense if there is evidence before the jury to support it.

United States v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 697 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 821, 1095 (1973); Charron v. United States,

412 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1969); Perkins v. United States,

315 F.2d 120, 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 916

(1963). It is equally true, however, that "a defendant has

no right to have a jury instructed precisely in the language

he requests." Charron v. United States, supra, 412 F.2d at

660. As long as the theory is adequately presented by the

instructions as a whole, there is no error. See United

States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1978).

Stephen's novel theory about the effect of his

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brother's sanity on his own criminal intent was adequately

covered by the other instructions. The jury was carefully

instructed on the requirements for criminal intent, and they

were told that one's mere presence at the scene of the crime

does not constitute aiding and abetting. In his closing

sieienniet Stephen's attorney himself argued his theory in

terms of the "mere presence” instruction. To the extent his

theory was legally acceptable, the jury was adequately

instructed and the charge they ultimately received permitted

them to accept it. ;

Vv. The Insanity Instructions

Bruce admitted that he committed the robbery, choosing

to defend himself solely on the ground that he was legally

insane when the event occurred. The district judge gave the

insanity instruction announced by this court in Wade v. United

States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc),

supplemented with an instruction explaining the meaning of

"wrongfulness" as used in Wade. See United States v. Sullivan,

544 F.2d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. McGraw,

515 F.2d 758, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1975). The relevant part of

the charge, with the explanation of wrongfulness emphasized,

was as follows:

In determining the issue of sanity

I further instruct you that a person

is considered legally insane, and

therefore not responsible for crimi-

nal conduct, if at the time of such

conduct, as a result of mental di-

sease or defect, he lacks substantial

capacity either to appreciate the——

moral wrongfulness of his conduct, or

to conform his conduct to the require-

ments of the law.

i Now, for the ses of the in-

sanity defense, wrongfulness means

aoe eee ether than cri

moral wrongfulness rather than crimi-

-——

nal wrongfulness.

(Emphasis added).

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reason to disapprove its use here or to require more.

Bruce does not object to these instructions, but he

claims that reversible error occurred when the judge failed to

include an additional instruction discussed in United States

v. Sullivan, supra, 544 F.2d at 1055:

You are instructed that the defen-

dant lacked substantial capacity to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct, even if he knows his act

to be criminal, but commits it be-

cause of a delusion that it was

morally justified.

The district court rejected this instruction, saying

that there had been no evidence that Bruce had acted under a

a

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delusion when he had robbed the bank and that the instruction

was therefore not proper. On appeal, Bruce vigorously contends

that the jury was presented with evidence of delusional

behavior by Bruce, giving him the right to the requested

instruction. We need not consider whether there was evidence

of delusion before the jury. The instruction given was suffi-

cient even if such evidence was presented.

Bruce insists on a specific instruction which was

approved for fact situations similar to those in Sullivan, but

he misconstrues the holding of that case. There we stated

that it must be made clear to a jury considering an insanity

defense that "“wrongfulness” means moral, as opposed to crimi-

nal, wrongfulness. Bruce overlooks that in Sullivan we con-

cluded that either one of two instructions would have been

sufficient to meet the Wade standard in that case. 544 F.2d

at 1055-56. Bruce complains because one of these instructions

was not given here; in fact, as can be seen in the portion of

the jury charge emphasized in the text above, the district

judge gave the alternative approved instruction. We see no

Bruce appears to argue that "a delusion that [a

criminal act] is morally justified" is somehow distinct from

-14-

- oe N

a ee ~~ |

ne |

ir

lacking "Substantial capacity ... to appreciate the moral

wrongfulness of [one's] conduct." Thus, if there is evidence

of such delusions, he would insist that a delusion instruction

must be given in addition to the standard Wade statement. But

in Wade we expressly pointed out that a delusion that a crime

was morally justified was covered by the insanity instruction

we there adopted. 426 F.2d at 71-72. Likewise, we explained

in Sullivan that our use in a prior case of the word "delusion"

has added no additional element to the concept of insanity

encompassed in the Wade instruction. 544 F.2d at 1055 & n.l.

VI. Remaining Issues

Bruce raises two final issues: (1) that the district

judge erred in failing to grant him a continuance just before

trial, and (2) that he was inadequately represented by counsel.

On November 23, 1976, the day trial was to begin,

Bruce's attorney moved for a continuance claiming that his

client's mental condition had prevented them from communicat-

ing effectively, and that more preparation time was needed.

The motion was denied. After the jury was empaneled that day,

however, the judge did recess the case for a full seven days.

Although a motion for a continuance was denied, Bruce

nevertheless received an additional week to prepare for trial.

We think it borders on the frivolous to complain of the denial.

In any event, "{i)t is axiomatic that the granting of a con=

tinuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge

and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of

discretion." United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 572

(9th Cir. 1977). Accord, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575,

589 (1964); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744-45 (9th

Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 889 (1978); McConney v.

United States, 421 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

400 U.S. 821 (1970). We find no abuse of discretion here.

Our court is currently considering en banc what

constitutes adequate assistance of counsel. Cooper v.

Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, rehearing en bane granted, No.

74-2998 (9th Cir. June 28, 1977). Even without the guidance

that case may ultimately provide, however, we have no diffi-

culty concluding that Bruce was adequately represented in

this case under any of the relevant tests euebenel.. ‘Bruce

complains of his attorney's failure to obtain certain informa~

tion about his history of mental illness. He overlooks the

fact that a great deal of such evidence was effectively put

before the jury, including the testimony of two personal

friends, a vocational counselor, and a psychiatrist who had

interviewed Bruce and collected information on his history.

In addition, the jury was shown an 80-minute video tape of

Bruce being interviewed by a clinical psychologist. Perhaps

more background material could have been gathered, but we are

convinced from the record that Bruce did not suffer from

inadequate representation.

The convictions of both Bruce Collom and Stephen

Collom are affirmed.

3-19-T3—100M— 1008

| United States v. Collom

Nos. 77-1040/1034

FOOTNOTES

l. In his brief, Bruce also incorporates by reference all the

arguments raised by Stephen on appeal. It is unclear to us

what he expects to gain by so doing. At trial, Bruce admittex

that he robbed the bank, choosing to make the insanity argu-

ment the sole basis of his defense. Thus, even were we to

suppress the evidence objected to by Stephen or grant Stephen

his mistrial, it is not at all certain that Bruce's convictio”

would be affected. Since we reject Stephen's arguments,

however, we need not decide how a contrary decision would

have affected Bruce.

2. The admissibility of evidence in federal trials conducted

after July 1, 1975, the effective date of the Federal Rules,

see Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, is primarily governed

by Rule 402, which provides:

All relevant evidence is admissible,

except as otherwise provided by the

Constitution of the United States, by

Act of Congress, by these rules, or by

other rules prescribed by the Supreme

Court pursuant to statutory authority.

Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible.

3. In dealing with the investigatory-stop issue, we have

spoken in terms of a “founded suspicion" while the Supreme

Court has referred to a “reasonable suspicion." United States

v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at 882. As we have ex-

plained elsewhere, however, “there is no substantial differ-

ence between the doctrine of ‘founded suspicion’ used by this

court, and the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test announced in

Brignoni-Ponce." United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476,

477 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976).

4. He also objected on the grounds that Miranda warnings

///

///

///

! should have preceded this questioning.

however, the trial judge had already correctly decided this

-la-

As we have said,

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on

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il

Nos. 77-1040/1034

issue against Stephen at the pretrial hearing on the motion

to suppress.

5. Rule 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may

be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confu-

sion of the issues, or misleading

the jury, or by considerations of

undue delay, waste of time, or need-

less presentation of cumulative evi-

dence.

6. Counsel for Stephen argued that the testimony was rele-

vant only to show that Stephen may have stolen the car, a

crime for which he was not then on trial, and that putting

this evidence before the jury was "prejudicial on a side

issue." The prosecutor responded that the testimony was

highly relevant as proof that Stephen was trying to explain

away his connection with the getaway car, thus implicating

him in the robbery.

7. The various proposed standards for constitutionally

acceptable assistance of counsel have been formulated in the

following ways:

(1) whether counsel's performance

was "so poor and incompetent as to

make the trial a farce or mockery

of justice"; (2) “whether the cir-

cumstances show a denial of funda-

mental fairness"; and (3) whether

there was a "lack of effective aid

in the preparation and trial of

the case -- lack of counsel likely

to render reasonably effective :

assistance."

United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1977),

*

’ ee

28

LAWRENCE & LAWRENCE

& LAW CORPORATION

1454 WILSHIRE BLVO.

PENTHOUSE

TEVERLY HILLS, CAL.

90212

LEPHONE: 275-S114

o ont oo ao fF Ww WD KF

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979

NO. 77-1040

BRUCE ANTHONY COLLOM,

7etitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

SULL LAWRENCE, a member of the Bar of this Court, certifies

that pursuant to Rule 33 he served the within Motion for Leave

to Proceed in Forma Pauneris and the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on

the counsel for Respondent by enclosing a copy thereof in an

envelope, postage prepaid addressed to:

The Honorable Robert H. Bork

Solicitor General of the United States

Department of Justice

Washington,D.C. 20530

and depositing same in the United States

California, on April 2, 1980, and further certifies that all

parties required to be served have been served.

mails at Beverly Hills, |

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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