Appendix — Collom v. United States
Supreme Court brief1980
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
_—-
UNITED STATES COUR F P
1 | T OF APPEALS W0V 23 1979
2 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD H. DEANE
3 CLERK, US. COURT OF APPEALS
4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
5 | Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ho. 77-1040
)
6 I -vs- )
)
7 BRUCE ANTHONY COLLOM, )
| )
8 | Defendant-Appellant. )
| ) ORDER
9 | )
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
10 )
| Plaintiff-Appellee, )
11 )
|
-vs- )
12 | ) No. 77-1034
| STEPHEN COLLOM, )
13 )
Defendant-Appellant. )
14 )
15
16 Before: CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges,
and TURRENTINE,* District Judge
17
18 The Opinion filed in this matter on June 15, 1978,
19 is withdrawn, and the attached Opinion is substituted
20 therefor.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
*Honorable Howard B. Turrentine, United States District Judge,
32 Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
PPT-Gand: ~ne
4-19-73—10004—- 908
APPENDIX "A"
so owes oo + 8S WN FS
wa —
- 9S
oo S$ 8B 3 Oe &F GS S FF SF
id Ss
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UN 1 5 1978
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD H. DEANE
CLERK, US. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
-vs- No. 77-1040
‘
BRUCE ANTHONY COLLOM,
De fendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 77-1034
Amenoe®eo
OPINION
STEPHEN COLLOM,
De fendant-Appellant.
ee ee et ee et et et eet eet ee eet ee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges,
and TURRENTINE,* District Judge
Before:
WALLACE, Circuit Judge:
Bruce Collom appeals his conviction for robbing a
federally insured savings and loan association in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). His brother Stephen Collom appeals his
conviction for aiding and abetting the robbery in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2. We affirm both convictions.
I. The Facts
On September 30, 1976, at 11:30 a.m., Bruce Collom
(Bruce) robbed the Garden Grove Federal Savings and Loan
Association in Garden Grove, California. Complying with his
demand for aber, a teller put $3,439 in cash in a paper sack
supplied by Bruce. Bruce then left the building, ran down an
*Honorable Howard B. Turrentine, United States District Judge,
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
24
26
Pt1—sSandrtone
31.29-74—100m —e21
!
| alley, and was seen leaving the area in a green Ford Mustang,
license number 247 PON, being driven by another man.
About an hour later, Eileen Hedrick was walking by
Parking Lot C on the UCLA campus, which is approximately 44
miles from the Garden Grove Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion. From the sidewalk adjacent to the lot and moments later
from the window of a nearby building, she saw Bruce and his
brother Stephen Collom (Stephen), who matched the description
of the driver of the getaway car, wiping the exterior of the
green Mustang with rags. Suspecting a burglary, Hedrick
telephoned the campus police.
Officer Malone of the UCLA Police Department received
a radio call directing him to Parking Lot C to investigate a
possible wate theft. Upon arriving at the lot, Malone saw
Stephen and Bruce stooped down at the rear of the Mustang,
license number 247 PON, with a rolled-up T-shirt between them.
As Malone stopped his car about 20 feet from them, they stood
up and began to walk away rapidly. Being aware of the high
incidence of burglary and auto theft in this area, and sus-
pecting criminal activity, he asked them to stop. They
complied.
Officer Longo then arrived, and the officers ques-
tioned the two men separately about their purpose and the
ownership of the Mustang. Bruce said that the car belonged to
his friend Debbie and that he was borrowing some tools from it.
Stephen claimed he was borrowing tools to fix his own car, but
he was unable to say where his own vehicle was located. Both
men said they were on their way to register for school.
Officer Malone noticed what appeared to be damage to the left
rear window of the Mustang, to the ignition wires, and to the
glove box. 3
Officer Stanley, who had arrived about the same time
SS ee ae ae ae lO a.
—~ 3
6
ooocUFrelc rhClUlUC OlOlUlUCTFOUhUhO1W Fo NV KF COCO SF 8eF SH
-
as Longo, asked and received Bruce's permission to examine
the T-shirt. Inside she found several cans of wax, miscel-
laneous tools, sunglasses, and a toy pistol resembling a .38
caliber revolver. After Malone and Longo questioned the men,
Longo was informed over his police radio that the Mustang
belonged to a Mr. Jones.
At this point, Stephen and Bruce were placed under
arrest and taken to the UCLA police station. No Miranda
warnings were given. At the station, the two suspects were
questioned further and searched. Stephen was discovered to
have $402 in his wallet and pockets; Bruce had a total of
$3,042 in his wallet, shirt pocket, and the sleeve of his
jacket. Some of the bills found on Bruce were later identi-
fied as “bait money" which had been put in his bag at the
savings and loan. Only after the arrest did the UCLA police
learn that the robbery in Garden Grove had occurred.
Bruce was indicted by a federal grand jury for
robbing the savings and loan association; Stephen was indicted
for aiding and abetting the robbery. Both pleaded not guilty,
and both moved to suppress all the evidence taken by the UCLA
police officers. The district judge granted the motion with
respect to statements made after arrest since no Miranda
warnings had been given. In all other respects the motion was
denied. The matter then went to trial, and the jury returned
verdicts of guilty against both defendants.
On appeal, Stephen claims that the motion to suppress
should have been granted in full, that certain evidence
admitted at trial should have been excluded because the trial
judge had eenbteunty found its probative value to be out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect, and that a mistrial should
have been granted. Bruce admitted at trial that he had per-
formed the robbery, but he claims on appeal that his
31
32
PPT -Gan detone
3-19-73-—100M—1006
conviction must be reversed because the trial court wrong-
fully refused to give a requested instruction relating to his
insanity defense, because the trial court should have granted
his motion for a continuance, and because he was inadequately
:
represented by his attorney. We now consider these issués.
II. The Motion to Suppress
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the law of this circuit required a federal court to judge the
legality of a stop, arrest, or search and seizure by state
officers under both state and federal standards, violation of
either standard constituting sufficient grounds for suppres-
sion of the evidence. United States v. Solomon, 528 F.2d 88,
90 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F.2d 96,
98 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229,
235 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974); United
States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 921 (1973); Warston v. United States, 400 F.2d 25, 27
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 892 (1969). The
effect, if any, of the Federal Rules of Evidence on this rule
2
is uncertain.
However, we need not reach this question, for
we hold that under both federal and state standards, the
motion to suppress was properly denied.
Stephen argues that the motion to suppress all the
evidence--both oral and physical--taken by the UCLA police
should have been granted in its entirety for three reasons:
(1) the initial investigatory stop of Stephen and Bruce by
Officer Malone was illegal; (2) Miranda warnings should have
been given during that stop, even though an arrest had not
been made; (3) the subsequent arrest was not based on probable
cause. We find no merit in any of these contentions.
Our circuit has consistently held that an investigatory
stop short of an arrest is valid if based upon a founded
3-19-T3—100M—1006
| Or reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
E.g.,
United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1010 (1975); Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236
(9th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.
1966). The Supreme Court has recently defined reasonable
suspicion to exist when the detaining officer is "aware of
specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences
from those facts, — reasonably warrant suspicion" that the
law is being broken. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 884 (1975). Similarly, California law permits
investigatory stops when an officer has a “rational suspicion"
that “Some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place,’
that the subject under scrutiny is connected with the unusual
accivity, and that "the unusual activity is related to crime."
People v. Henze, 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 988, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545,
547 (1967): see, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 43 Cal. App. 3d 898,
902-03, 118 Cal. Rptr. 205, 207 (1974).
792 (9th Cir.
See also, United
1979).
States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789,
We have no difficulty deciding that the investigatory
stop conducted by Officers Malone, Longo and Stanley was
appropriate under both federal and state standards. The
radio bulletin directed them to investigate a possible bur-
glary of an automobile in an area plagued by such incidents.
Stephen and Bruce were found stooping down suspiciously at the
rear of the green Mustang. Upon seeing Officer Malone, they
began to retreat rapidly. The totality of these circumstances
easily justified the officer in stopping them and asking them
questions.
Stephen asserts that even though an arrest had not been
made at this point, his statements to the officers should have
been suppressed because Miranda warnings were not given. We
disagree. We-have held on numerous occasions that even though
32
3-19-73--100M— 1006 ||
|
Strawder,
| one's freedom of action is inhibited to some degree during
an investigatory detention, Miranda warnings need rot be
given prior to questioning in that circumstance. E.g.-,
United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States y. Edwards,
444 F.2d 122, 123 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 441
F.2d 539, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chase, 414
F.2d 780, 781-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 920 (1969);
Lowe _v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1969).
California courts applying California law have reached the sare
conclusion. People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 767, 528 P.2d l,
28, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 420 (1974); see, e.g., People v. Manis,
268 Cal. App. 2d 653, 661-69, 74 Cal. Rptr. 423, 428-33 (1969);
People v. Wheeler, supra at 903, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
Stephen claims that Officer Stanley's action in
unrolling the T-shirt was illegal because it went beyond the
scope of searches permitted during investigatory stops. It is
apparent from the record, however, that Bruce consented to
that limited search, and we do not understand either Bruce or
Stephen to argue that the consent was involuntary. Thus,
there are no grounds for concluding under federal law that the |
T-shirt and its contents were not legally examined. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-46 (1973); Davis
v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-94 (1946); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946). The result is the same
}
|
|
/
|
under California law. E.g., People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d 99,
|
|
|
106-07, 561 P.2d 1135, 1138-39, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 450-51
(1977); People v. Ruster, 16 Cal. 3d 690, 699-701, 548 P.2d
353, 358-59, 129 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158-59 (1976); People v.
34 Cal. App. Rptr.
3d 370, 376-81, 108 Cal. 901,
904-07 (1973).
We also reject Stephen's assertion that the officers
17
18
| lacked probable cause to arrest him.
This is a classic case
of founded suspicion ripening into probable cause to arrest.
See United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); United States v.
Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 974 (1977). After the initial stop, Officer Malone
observed extensive damage to the Mustang such as that which
results when someone attempts to steal or burglarize an auto-
mobile. The brothers’ explanation of their activities around
the car and their identification of its owner were extremely
dubious. Once the officers gained this additional information,
probable cause to arrest existed. "[{Ajt that moment the facts
and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information were suffi-
cient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the two men]
had committed or [were] committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
California law is similar: "Cause for arrest exists
when the facts known to the arresting officer ‘would lead a
man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscien-
tiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the
person is guilty of a crime.'" People v. DeVaughn, 18 Cal. 3d
889, 895, 558 P.2d 872, 875, 135 Cal. Rptr. 785, 789 (1977)
(quoting People v. Harris, 15 Cal. 3d 384, 389, 540 P.2d 632,
635, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1975)):; e.g., People v. Gomez,
63 Cal. App. 3d 328, 333-34, 133 Cal. Rptr. 731, 733-34 (1976);
People v. Knutson, 60 Cal. App. 3d 856, 861-63, 131 Cal. Rptr.
846, 849-50 (1976); see Cal. Penal Code § 836(3) (West 1970).
Thus, the same result would obtain when the state standard is
applied.
Since the arrest was proper, the search which disclosed
the stolen money was obviously legitimate under federal
31
32
PPI-Gandstone
3-19-T3—100M—1006
standards as incident to a lawful arrest. See United States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1973); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 755-68 (1969); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925). The same result follows under
California law. People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 69-71, 429 P.
2d 606, 610-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258-60 (1967), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968) ;
People v. Balassy, 30 Cal. App. 3d 614, 622-23, 106 Cal. Rptr.
461, 465-66 (1973); People v. Rogers, 241 Cal. App. 2d 384,
388-90, 50 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561-62 (1966); see Cal. Penal
Code § 1412 (West 1979).
We conclude, then, that the district judge's ruling
/// !
| ///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
-6b-
ao 4248 3 @2G&@ &@ GO S&S SF GO ae
oe
on the motion to suppress was correct. Except for the
failure to give Miranda warnings after his arrest, Stephen's
rights were not violated when the officers stopped and ques-
tioned him, or when they arrested and searched him. Thus, |
only the post-arrest statements, which the judge did suppress,
nial subject to exclusion.
III. The Exclusion of Evidgnce as More
Prejudicial Than Prob@tive
During the trial, Officer Longo related several
statements made to him by Stephen during the investigatory
stop, namely that he was borrowing teols from the Mustang
which belonged to a friend in order to repair his own car,
that he could not give the exact location of his own car, and
that he was going to enroll as an extension student at UCLA.
Although the trial judge had properly refused to suppress
these statements as illegally obtained, Stephen's counsel
again sought to block their admission by a timely objection
and assertion that the testimony was ‘evelevant.” A sidebar
conference followed in which Stephen claims the district judge
finally ruled that the statements were inadmissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403° as being more prejudicial than
probative. The government disputes this. Thus, we are not
asked to decide whether the ruling was correct, but to deter-
mine just what the ruling was.
During the sidebar conference, the prosecutor made
an offer of proof and each side explained its position.” The
judge then said, "I think [the prosecutor] is right, it shows
that they are trying to disengage themselves from the getaway
car." When defense counsel protested further that the testi-
mony was cumulative and prejudicial, the judge responded, "I
think it is prejudicial, and I think its probative value is
outweighed by whatever prejudicial effect it might have."
pe—100M—e21
No more was said on the subject at the sidebar con-
ference, and after an unrelated matter was discussed, the
prosecutor continued his examination of Officer Longo by
asking almost immediately, “What did you say to him, Mr.
Stephen Collom, and what did he say to you in this conversa-
tion?" Officer Longo then related the substance of their
conversation. There was no objection or motion to strike,
and the matter was apparently not raised again until this
appeal.
We are thus faced with a confusing record. Stephen
claims that the judge meant to sustain his objection, as evi-
denced by the judge's last remark on the subject. The govern-
ment, however, argues that the judge intended to admit the
testimony in accordance with his statement that "[the prose-
cutor]) is right."
For several reasons we are convinced that the trial
judge intended to overrule the objection. First, although
the judge's back-to-back, flatly contradictory statements were
puzzling, neither the prosecutor, who appeared to have won the
point until the judge's final comment, nor defense counsel
sought clarification. It thus seems likely that the judge
inadvertently said the reverse of what he meant, and that the
lawyers understood his true intent from his entire statement.
Second, immediately after the sidebar conference the prosecu-
tor openly asked the very question to which Stephen's counsel
claims the judge had sustained his objection. Yet, neither
the judge nor Stephen's counsel said anything. One would
fully expect one of the two to speak up had the prosecutor
blatantly ignored a ruling made just seconds earlier. Third,
a few moments prior to this incident the judge had permitted,
over objection, Officer Malone to relate his conversation with
Bruce during the investigatory stop. It seems probable that
ee. ae ee ee ee ee a er a Or ee
gf
he therefore intended to admit the analogous statements by
Stephen to Officer Longo.
We conclude that the judge simply misstated his deci-
stood at the time. That decision, as we now interpret it,
was clearly correct for the very reasons initially stated by
the judge.
Iv. The Motion for Mistrial
After the jury had been instructed, Stephen's
attorney moved for a mistrial based on three alleged errors
by the district judge: (1) the failure to answer a question
from the jury; (2) the prejudicial withdrawal of an instruc-
tion previously given to the jury; (3) the failure, once the
instruction was withdrawn, adequately to present Stephen's
theory of the case in the remainder of the instructions.
Shortly after the case had been submitted to the
jury, a written question was sent from the jury to the judge
asking, "Is aiding and abetting after the fact constitute a
violation of the law?" [sic]. In response, the judge rein-
structed the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting, and
he specifically invited them to ask further questions should
the need arise. Stephen argues that this was not adequately
responsive to the question and that a mistrial was the appro-
priate remedy.
"The necessity, extent and character of additional
instructions are matters within the sound discretion of the
trial court." Wilson v. United States, 422 F.2d 1303, 1304
(9th Cir. 1970). Accord, United States v. Beasley, 476 F.2d
164, 166 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973); Allen
v. United States, 186 F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
1 &
Ql U.S. 948 (1951); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.24a
85, 91 (9th Cir. 1945). The district judge acted well within
sion to overrule the objection, and that the attorneys so under
his discretion in this case. The meaning the jury attached
to the words “after the fact" in the question is unclear
Since there had been no "accessory after the fact" charge or
other instruction using that phrase. While the judge was free
to do so, attempting to respond to the question directly
would have risked further confusion. The judge therefore
acted appropriately in merely rereading the previously given
aiding and abetting instructions and inviting further ques-
tions should the confusion persist. The mistrial motion was
properly denied insofar as it relied on this incident.
The remaining two arguments in support of the mis-
trial motion stem from the withdrawal from the jury of an
instruction previously given. When he had concluded his
charge to the jury, the judge asked the attorneys out of the
hearing of the jury if they had any objections or further
requests. At this late time, Stephen's attorney asked the
judge to instruct the jury that "the circumstances of [Bruce's]
sanity may be taken into account in determining whether or not
Stephen Collom is guilty of aiding and abetting." Over the
prosecutor's objection, the following instruction was added
to the charge already given:
In determining the guilt or
innocence of Stephen Collom you
may consider the mental condition
of his brother, Bruce Anthony
Collom, at the time of the com-
mission of the offense.
The jury, not surprisingly, was confused by the instruction
and asked the judge about it after the case had been submitted
to them. On reconsideration, the judge decided that the
instruction had been improvidently given and, over defense
counsel's objection, he told the jury to disregard it. At the
same time, he reminded them that the remainder of the charge
was still in effect, and he reread his previous instructions
-10-
sel OrlllmsSrlUCc OOlUCUCNOOUCUClCU Oe mUmUmCEUCc OO .UCsEC(“‘<é‘i K:SCOCKKC COURUmUC KC ( ‘i CC OHKUlClCOTRlCUUCOOrmUCRCCNSCUMHLESY lOO
concerning the elements of each offense, the government's
burden of proof, the defendants’ presumption of innocence, and
the rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime does not
establish aiding and abetting. He also offered to reread any
other instruction the jury might desire. In response to his
question, the jury assured the court that they would com-
pletely disregard the withdrawn instruction.
Stephen claims prejudice from this incident in two
related arguments. First, he claims that the withdrawal of
one instruction and subsequent rereading of other instructions
unfairly emphasized the points in the niin favorable to the
government. Second, he asserts that once the instruction had
been withdrawn, a legitimate theory of defense was no longer
covered by the instructions as a whole, and that the jury
would believe they must disregard the possible effect of
Bruce's insanity on Stephen's opportunity to form a criminal
intent.
The trial judge was unquestionably correct when he
decided that the instruction was improperly before the jury.
At best it was highly confusing and failed to convey accur-
ately the intended theory of defense; at worst it incorrectly
suggested that Bruce's insanity could negate Stephen's
criminal intent. "Where the court has given an erroneous
instruction, it may be withdrawn or explained by the court so
as to remove error which otherwise might be present. But the
withdrawal must leave no doubt in the minds of the jury as to
what the court ultimately declares the law to be." Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Kelley, 74 F.2d 80, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1934).
Accord, Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Bailey, 190 F.2d 812, 815
(Sth Cir. 1951); Hansen v. St. Joseph Fuel Oil & Mfg. Co., 181
F.2d 880, 885 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 452 F.2d 1117, 1119 (lst Cir.
lle
1971) (no prejudice to defendant where court immediately
withdrew erroneous instruction in emphatic terms). The
district judge met this standard in this case. Only a single,
brief instruction was involved, and the jurors explicitly
agreed to "handle [their] deliberations as though that last
instruction was never given." The remaining instructions
were clear and consistent, and the judge wisely sought to
blunt the focus necessarily given to the stricken sentence by
reading several other of his basic instructions. These
included points favorable to Stephen, specifically the princi-
ples that the defendant is presumed to be innocent, that the
government bears the burden of proof, and that mere presence
at the scene of the crime is not aiding and abetting. The
need to withdraw a jury instruction is, of course, always an
unfortunate incident in a criminal trial. But we think it was
done here so as to minimize the possibility of substantial
prejudice to the accused.
' With respect to Stephen's complaint that his theory
of defense was excluded, he correctly argues that a defendant
is entitled to jury instructions on a legitimate theory of
defense if there is evidence before the jury to support it.
United States v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 697 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821, 1095 (1973); Charron v. United States,
412 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1969); Perkins v. United States,
315 F.2d 120, 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 916
(1963). It is equally true, however, that "a defendant has
no right to have a jury instructed precisely in the language
he requests." Charron v. United States, supra, 412 F.2d at
660. As long as the theory is adequately presented by the
instructions as a whole, there is no error. See United
States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1978).
Stephen's novel theory about the effect of his
-12-
oo &@ &ai a@oaame & & S&F Go & wD
brother's sanity on his own criminal intent was adequately
covered by the other instructions. The jury was carefully
instructed on the requirements for criminal intent, and they
were told that one's mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not constitute aiding and abetting. In his closing
sieienniet Stephen's attorney himself argued his theory in
terms of the "mere presence” instruction. To the extent his
theory was legally acceptable, the jury was adequately
instructed and the charge they ultimately received permitted
them to accept it. ;
Vv. The Insanity Instructions
Bruce admitted that he committed the robbery, choosing
to defend himself solely on the ground that he was legally
insane when the event occurred. The district judge gave the
insanity instruction announced by this court in Wade v. United
States, 426 F.2d 64, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc),
supplemented with an instruction explaining the meaning of
"wrongfulness" as used in Wade. See United States v. Sullivan,
544 F.2d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. McGraw,
515 F.2d 758, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1975). The relevant part of
the charge, with the explanation of wrongfulness emphasized,
was as follows:
In determining the issue of sanity
I further instruct you that a person
is considered legally insane, and
therefore not responsible for crimi-
nal conduct, if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental di-
sease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the——
moral wrongfulness of his conduct, or
to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law.
i Now, for the ses of the in-
sanity defense, wrongfulness means
aoe eee ether than cri
moral wrongfulness rather than crimi-
-——
nal wrongfulness.
(Emphasis added).
eerewvwsi@:? of ~~ ww wr
ee ne
, | oe 2 ee oe a Oe Oe ee,
Bihallone
}—100M—€21
reason to disapprove its use here or to require more.
Bruce does not object to these instructions, but he
claims that reversible error occurred when the judge failed to
include an additional instruction discussed in United States
v. Sullivan, supra, 544 F.2d at 1055:
You are instructed that the defen-
dant lacked substantial capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct, even if he knows his act
to be criminal, but commits it be-
cause of a delusion that it was
morally justified.
The district court rejected this instruction, saying
that there had been no evidence that Bruce had acted under a
a
— a
———— >
delusion when he had robbed the bank and that the instruction
was therefore not proper. On appeal, Bruce vigorously contends
that the jury was presented with evidence of delusional
behavior by Bruce, giving him the right to the requested
instruction. We need not consider whether there was evidence
of delusion before the jury. The instruction given was suffi-
cient even if such evidence was presented.
Bruce insists on a specific instruction which was
approved for fact situations similar to those in Sullivan, but
he misconstrues the holding of that case. There we stated
that it must be made clear to a jury considering an insanity
defense that "“wrongfulness” means moral, as opposed to crimi-
nal, wrongfulness. Bruce overlooks that in Sullivan we con-
cluded that either one of two instructions would have been
sufficient to meet the Wade standard in that case. 544 F.2d
at 1055-56. Bruce complains because one of these instructions
was not given here; in fact, as can be seen in the portion of
the jury charge emphasized in the text above, the district
judge gave the alternative approved instruction. We see no
Bruce appears to argue that "a delusion that [a
criminal act] is morally justified" is somehow distinct from
-14-
- oe N
a ee ~~ |
ne |
ir
lacking "Substantial capacity ... to appreciate the moral
wrongfulness of [one's] conduct." Thus, if there is evidence
of such delusions, he would insist that a delusion instruction
must be given in addition to the standard Wade statement. But
in Wade we expressly pointed out that a delusion that a crime
was morally justified was covered by the insanity instruction
we there adopted. 426 F.2d at 71-72. Likewise, we explained
in Sullivan that our use in a prior case of the word "delusion"
has added no additional element to the concept of insanity
encompassed in the Wade instruction. 544 F.2d at 1055 & n.l.
VI. Remaining Issues
Bruce raises two final issues: (1) that the district
judge erred in failing to grant him a continuance just before
trial, and (2) that he was inadequately represented by counsel.
On November 23, 1976, the day trial was to begin,
Bruce's attorney moved for a continuance claiming that his
client's mental condition had prevented them from communicat-
ing effectively, and that more preparation time was needed.
The motion was denied. After the jury was empaneled that day,
however, the judge did recess the case for a full seven days.
Although a motion for a continuance was denied, Bruce
nevertheless received an additional week to prepare for trial.
We think it borders on the frivolous to complain of the denial.
In any event, "{i)t is axiomatic that the granting of a con=
tinuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge
and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion." United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 572
(9th Cir. 1977). Accord, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575,
589 (1964); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744-45 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 889 (1978); McConney v.
United States, 421 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 821 (1970). We find no abuse of discretion here.
Our court is currently considering en banc what
constitutes adequate assistance of counsel. Cooper v.
Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, rehearing en bane granted, No.
74-2998 (9th Cir. June 28, 1977). Even without the guidance
that case may ultimately provide, however, we have no diffi-
culty concluding that Bruce was adequately represented in
this case under any of the relevant tests euebenel.. ‘Bruce
complains of his attorney's failure to obtain certain informa~
tion about his history of mental illness. He overlooks the
fact that a great deal of such evidence was effectively put
before the jury, including the testimony of two personal
friends, a vocational counselor, and a psychiatrist who had
interviewed Bruce and collected information on his history.
In addition, the jury was shown an 80-minute video tape of
Bruce being interviewed by a clinical psychologist. Perhaps
more background material could have been gathered, but we are
convinced from the record that Bruce did not suffer from
inadequate representation.
The convictions of both Bruce Collom and Stephen
Collom are affirmed.
3-19-T3—100M— 1008
| United States v. Collom
Nos. 77-1040/1034
FOOTNOTES
l. In his brief, Bruce also incorporates by reference all the
arguments raised by Stephen on appeal. It is unclear to us
what he expects to gain by so doing. At trial, Bruce admittex
that he robbed the bank, choosing to make the insanity argu-
ment the sole basis of his defense. Thus, even were we to
suppress the evidence objected to by Stephen or grant Stephen
his mistrial, it is not at all certain that Bruce's convictio”
would be affected. Since we reject Stephen's arguments,
however, we need not decide how a contrary decision would
have affected Bruce.
2. The admissibility of evidence in federal trials conducted
after July 1, 1975, the effective date of the Federal Rules,
see Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, is primarily governed
by Rule 402, which provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by
Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
3. In dealing with the investigatory-stop issue, we have
spoken in terms of a “founded suspicion" while the Supreme
Court has referred to a “reasonable suspicion." United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at 882. As we have ex-
plained elsewhere, however, “there is no substantial differ-
ence between the doctrine of ‘founded suspicion’ used by this
court, and the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test announced in
Brignoni-Ponce." United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476,
477 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976).
4. He also objected on the grounds that Miranda warnings
///
///
///
! should have preceded this questioning.
however, the trial judge had already correctly decided this
-la-
As we have said,
ae ee Se eS a
, ow -¥
on
.-ea 2a &® OD KR SF BB BS a S&S ke BY
il
Nos. 77-1040/1034
issue against Stephen at the pretrial hearing on the motion
to suppress.
5. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evi-
dence.
6. Counsel for Stephen argued that the testimony was rele-
vant only to show that Stephen may have stolen the car, a
crime for which he was not then on trial, and that putting
this evidence before the jury was "prejudicial on a side
issue." The prosecutor responded that the testimony was
highly relevant as proof that Stephen was trying to explain
away his connection with the getaway car, thus implicating
him in the robbery.
7. The various proposed standards for constitutionally
acceptable assistance of counsel have been formulated in the
following ways:
(1) whether counsel's performance
was "so poor and incompetent as to
make the trial a farce or mockery
of justice"; (2) “whether the cir-
cumstances show a denial of funda-
mental fairness"; and (3) whether
there was a "lack of effective aid
in the preparation and trial of
the case -- lack of counsel likely
to render reasonably effective :
assistance."
United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1977),
*
’ ee
28
LAWRENCE & LAWRENCE
& LAW CORPORATION
1454 WILSHIRE BLVO.
PENTHOUSE
TEVERLY HILLS, CAL.
90212
LEPHONE: 275-S114
o ont oo ao fF Ww WD KF
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1979
NO. 77-1040
BRUCE ANTHONY COLLOM,
7etitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SULL LAWRENCE, a member of the Bar of this Court, certifies
that pursuant to Rule 33 he served the within Motion for Leave
to Proceed in Forma Pauneris and the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on
the counsel for Respondent by enclosing a copy thereof in an
envelope, postage prepaid addressed to:
The Honorable Robert H. Bork
Solicitor General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington,D.C. 20530
and depositing same in the United States
California, on April 2, 1980, and further certifies that all
parties required to be served have been served.
mails at Beverly Hills, |
Counsel for Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.