Reply Brief — Andrulis v. United States

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WICHAFL RODAK, IR. TLEPY

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-1542

MARILYN W. ANDRULIS

and

ANDRULIS RESEARCH CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

Of Counsel: I. MICHAEL GREENBERGER

Supa & GARDNER 1800 Massachusetts

1800 Massachusetts ere agen 20086

Avenue, N.W. yore Sicha

(202) 828-2000

Counsel for Petitioners

Washington, D.C. 20036

Dated: June9, 1980

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WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

pf OP Be Nia yo fy). CA ena ae i

I. PLAIN MEANING OF § 1988 ...............0..0.00...... 1

II. UNITED STATES LIABILITY UNDER § 1988

a acsclaassbaeuabins 4

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SEE SO ec ee 1l

APPENDIX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adams v. Califano, C.A. No. 3095-70 (D.D.C.,

pe FO Ss a ee ee a ee PR ee ee 5

Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.

REA CERO gC REN aR PS SS OE ee FRO 5

Dubrow v. SBA, 345 F.Supp. 4 (C.D. Calif. 1972)... 8

Hampton v. Hanrahan, No. 77-1698 (7th Cir., Dec.

SE OO EE Sal 5

Hanrahan v. Hampton, Nos. 79-912 and 79-914

en BES Sh __ ene aa RCs Sra on noe 5,7

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) -................. rome OT

Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, No. 2781 (5th Cir.,

I 4

Mar V. Kleppe, 526 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1975) _....... 8

NAACP V. Civiletti, No. 79-1543 (petition for cert.

Oe msnas 7

NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) ........ 2

NRDC vy. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975).... 2

RFC v. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941) ............. 8

Shannon v. HUD, 577 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978) .......0.0000. eee. 7

Sierra Club v. EPA, D.C. Cir. No. 76-1073 (April

TPE IAI 7 SRR CET | Os AOE OES 2

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

WEAL v. Califano, C.A. No. 74-1720 (D.D.C.,

a ID sicker tenapapeinenianinirchenloinsnabaanalensaaiesnaas 5

Statutes & Regulations:

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C.

E, | RRRE RRO Serre tee ees MARR Oe RE 5

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) -...............0000...... 2,7

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1865(d) _.......00000...... 7

Copyrieet Act. 17 USSG. S006... .....:............ 3

Education Act Amendments of 1972, Title IX, 20

ke To | TERRIERS CS Re ie ee ED 5

Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 634(b) —............. 7

§ 505(b), Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services,

and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of

1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2983 _............ Se

Be Oe I cient lbdcslaccte ceca 8

Miscellaneous:

S. Rep. No. 94-101, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)... 6

H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.

{| ae RS PRS SERS PN oy BL Sins ONE 5

“Awarding of Attorney’s Fees,” Hearing before

the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,

Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Jus-

tice, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (Ser. No. 64) (1976).. 4

[1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 5659 _........... 3

Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights

Through the Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 80

eS ee, RRR ms SE 2

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-1542

MARILYN W. ANDRULIS

and

ANDRULIS RESEARCH CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

I, PLAIN MEANING OF § 1988

The Government in its brief in opposition (at 5) mis-

construes the position of the petitioners, as well as that

of the dissent below, by claiming that we rely upon

“necessary implication” to find that the United States

is an eligible fee-paying party under § 1988. While even

the majority below acknowledged that “statutory autori-

zation may be inferred by necessary implication from the

statutory context in which a fee provision arises” (App.

5a (emphasis added) ), it is petitioners’ essential conten-

tion here that § 1988’s requirement that fees be awarded

to the prevailing party in “any action” “could not be

broader,” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978),

2

and thus, § 1988, a fortiori, directly and plainly covers

those actions in which the United States is a party.

Petitioners’ position is supported by the fact that both

the First and D.C. Circuits have found that the term “any

party” in the Clean Air Act attorney’s fee provision, 42

U.S.C. § 7604(d), expressly covers the United States’;

that the Rehabilitation Act’s attorney’s fee provision

(§$ 505(b)), modeled by Congress after § 1988, has been-

explicitly declared by Congress to cover the United

States’; and that the leading scholarly commentary on

this question fully endorses the position of the dissent

below. Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights

Through the Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 80 Colum. L.

Rev. 346, 363-65 (1980) .*

1NRDC v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1851, 1853-54 (D.C. Cir. 1975)

(dictum) ; NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1336, n.5 (1st Cir.

1973). See also Sierra Club v. EPA, D.C. Cir. No. 76-1073

(April 27, 1979) (Federal government did not contest award

when statute merely provided “in any judicial proceeding’’).

2 The dissent stated in this regard:

“* * * Equally instructive is the fact that Congress only

recently enacted Section 505(b) of the Rehabilitation,

Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities

Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2983,

an attorneys’ fees provision which, in the words of its

sponsor, ‘parallels the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees

Awards Act of 1976... .’ 124 Cong. Rec. S. 15590 (daily

ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). The

language of Section 505(b) is virtually the same as that

of Section 1988. Section 505 (b)’s sponsor and the accom-

panying Committee Reports made it clear that this

attorneys’ Fee provision is to be used to vindicate rights

against the federal government.” (App. 21a) (Footnotes

omitted).

3In an effort to deflect attention from the critical im-

portance of this civil rights issue, the Government (at 6,

n.5) has attempted to assure this Court that the question will

3

Moreover, the attorney’s fee provision within the Copy-

right Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976), is also relevant here.

That section provides that “[t]he court in its discretion

may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any

party other than the United States or an officer thereof.

The court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to

the prevailing party as part of the costs.” (Emphasis

supplied.) As the House Report on this provision under-

scores, the significance of this language is that it “makes

clear that neither costs nor attorney’s fees can be awarded

to or against ‘the United States or any officer thereof.’ ”

[1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5779. (Em-

phasis supplied.) Were the majority’s holding below cor-

rect, such language would be unnecessary because the

reference to “any party” would not by itself even raise

the possibility of recovering fees from the United States;

moreover, Congress’ evident concern with possible liability

on the part of the federal government would make no

sense.* ;

be resolved by general attorney’s fee legislation. In so doing,

it points to legislation, pending since the passage of § 1988

in 1976, which affords a trial judge discretion to award fees

in any civil case (other than a tort action) which is lost by the

United States. 125 Cong. Rec. S. 10925 (daily ed., July 31,

1979). While this legislation did pass the Senate almost a

year ago, it is now considered highly controversial because

of a fear that it will “chill”, inter alia, United States enforce-

ment actions. Because of the breadth of the pending legis-

lation, its passage by the House is doubtful.

* Indeed, it is the Government and the majority below who

rely upon “necessary implication” to find that the United

States is not covered under the civil rights aspects of § 1988.

Section 1988, as a result of a Senate floor amendment, also

provides that in situations where the United States unsuc-

cessfully sues a private citizen in a tax case, the United States

will pay fees. The United States was mentioned in this con-

text because it was only when the United States was an un-

4d

II. UNITED STATES LIABILITY UNDER

§ 1988 STATUTES

The United States, finding no clear rationale in the

statute or the legislative history to support the under-

lying inequity of its position (7.e., that it alone among

civil rights violators need not pay attorney’s fees to pre-

vailing plaintiffs), further contends (at 8-9) that the

civil rights statutes referenced within § 1988 barely apply

to the federal government. We have, however, cited in our

petition (at 10-11, n.13) a large number of cases in which

the United States or its officials have been held liable

under four of the six civil rights statutes included within

$1988. Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General for

the Civil Division, when testifying upon § 1988, expressly

acknowledged that the civil rights statutes referenced

therein apply to the United States.°

The Committee Reports accompanying § 1988 also cite

cases brought against Cabinet officers under Title VI of

successful plaintiff that fees would be assessed. Fees were

not to be assessed in “any” IRS action. See, e.g., Key Buick

Co. V. Commisstoner, No. 2781 (5th Cir., March 19, 1980)

(“For an award of attorney’s fees to be appropriate [in tax-

payer litigation], the government must be the initiating or

moving party.”’) But, the Government and majority contend

that, because the United States was mentioned in this limited

IRS context, it must be that the failure to specify that civil

rights actions against the United States would be included

within “any [civil rights] action,” therefore means that the

United States is exempt from liability in the civil rights con-

text. For a fuller treatment of the Government’s contention in

this regard, see the dissent at App. 19a-20a, n.10.

>“Awarding of Attorney’s Fees,” Hearing before the House

Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the

Administration of Justice, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (Ser. No.

64) at 176-77 (Assistant Attorney General Lee stated: “Ac-

tions under the statutes involved have been brought against

both Federal officers and private individuals.”)

5

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d—one of

the statutes covered by § 1988.° Indeed, one week before

petitioners filed for attorney’s fees in this action, the

United States entered into a consent decree in litigation

brought against it under Title VI and Title IX of the Ed-

ucation Act Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681)

(also covered by § 1988) and agreed therein to the award

of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs pursuant to, inter alia,

§ 1988.7 Finally, in this very case, the United States con-

sented to a settlement pursuant to civil rights claims

covered by § 1988, and this Court’s recent decision in

Hanrahan v. Hampton, No. 79-912 & 79-914 (June 2,

1980), also makes it clear that a civil rights action covered

by § 1988 could properly proceed against United States’

officials.

In short, the Government’s contention that it is rea-

sonable for it alone to be exempt from § 1988’s sweep

on the ground that the § 1988 statutes have little or no

applicability to the United States is wholly unsupportable.

Ill. CURRENT CONFLICT

The Government’s effort (at 7) to dismiss the fact

that there is presently a conflict among the Circuits on

the § 1988 issue is equally unpersuasive. At the time the

instant petition was filed, the Seventh Circuit had

awarded fees against the United States, inter alia, under

§ 1988 in Hampton v. Hanrahan, No. 77-1698 (December

15, 1979) at 13. It did so (despite the fact that the

federal defendants there were only sued in their personal

* See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5, 7

(1976) (citing Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), and

Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en

banc) ).

7 See, e.g., Adams v. Califano, C.A. No. 3095-70 (D.D.C.,

May 3 and 5, 1978); WEAL v. Califano, C.A. No. 74-1720

(D.D.C., May 3, 1978).

6

capacities) by relying upon that portion of Hutto v.

Finney, 487 U.S. 678, 693, 700 (1978), which held that

fees may not be awarded under § 1988 against govern-

mental defendants in their personal capacity unless there

is a showing of bad faith. Since bad faith had not been

shown in Hampton on the part of any state or federal

official, the Seventh Circuit awarded the fees against all

of the governmental instrumentalities represented by the

defendants there, including the United States.

On February 7, 1980, the United States petitioned for

rehearing claiming that § 2412 barred an award against

the United States and urged (at page 15 of the petition)

that the Seventh Circuit “should clarify . . . its order to

show that only the state and not the federal government

can be liable for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” The

Seventh Circuit, however, in an April 15, 1980, order

attached as an Appendix hereto merely struck a portion

of a paragraph from its opinion explaining why it

awarded the fees against the governmental bodies, and

stood by its ruling “that one-third of the fees award

should be paid by the federal defendants ... .” Since,

as the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, Hutto does not

permit fees in this context to be paid by governmental

officials sued as individuals, the import of the judgment

was that the United States had to pay its share of the

fees in question. Such a judgment is consistent with that

portion of the Senate Report accompanying § 1988 which

provided that when a governmental official is sued and

no bad faith is shown fees “will be collected from the

official, in his official capacity, from funds of his agency

or under his control, or from the . . . government

(whether or not the agency or government is a named

party).” S. Rep. No. 94-101, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5

(footnote omitted).

While it is true that this Court recently reversed the

Seventh Circuit fee award on other grounds (i.e., it was

7

premature), Hanrahan v. Hampton, Nos. 79-912 & 79-

914 (June 2, 1980), the Seventh Circuit’s position that

fees could be awarded against the United States was

clearly unaffected by that decision, and a conflict thus

persists.

When this conflict is added (a) to the obvious con-

fusion over this question—as evidenced by the United

States’ conceding the issue at the trial level in the com-

panion case below * and in other litigation (see text ac-

companying n.7, supra)—and (b) to the question’s direct

impact upon the construction of other fee statutes which

do not expressly mention the United States by name

(such as the Clean Air (42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)) and Water

(33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)) Acts and the Rehabilitation Act

(see n.2, supra)), it is clear that this important matter

is ripe for dispositive treatment by this Court.*

IV. SECTION 634(b)

Petitioners also have asked this Court to examine the

question of whether the “sue and be sued” clause within

§ 634(b) of the Small Business Act would permit a

§ 1988 award against the Small Business Administra-

8 NAACP v. Civiletti, No. 79-1543 (petition for certiorari

pending).

® The Government also places great reliance (at 5-7) upon

the fact that this Court has already once before denied certi-

orari in a case raising the issue presented here. Shannon

v. HUD, 577 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1002

(1978). The Third Circuit, however, did not have the bene-

fit either of this Court’s decision in Hutto v. Finney, supra, or,

as evidenced by the fact that Shannon was a two-page per

curiam opinion, many of the arguments advanced by peti-

tioners below and fully considered by the split panel of the

District of Columbia Circuit. We respectfully suggest this

case and its companion provide the Court with a much fuller

record to resolve the issue than that found in Shannon.

8

tion (“SBA”), even if § 1988 by itself did not provide

a general waiver against the United States. The Govern-

ment responds (at 9-10) that the question is meritless

because § 634(b) does not provide for attorney’s fees.

However, we rely upon § 634(b) solely as an “express

statutory consent” ’ to suit which places the SBA “upon

an equal footing with private parties’ "' for purposes

of the incidents of litigation. If SBA is on such an equal

footing, it must, as is true of every other private party,

pay fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff under § 1988.

Hence, $$ 634(b) and 1988 read together satisfy the

need for a statutory waiver for attorney’s fees found in

28 U.S.C. § 2412.

The Government also argues (at 9) that, since peti-

tioners’ suit was one for injunction and since § 634(b)

bars injunctive relief against the SBA, our contention

that fees should be awarded pursuant to § 634(b) is

“frivolous.” As the Government knows full well, how-

ever, it has been widely held that when the SBA “Ad-

ministrator acts beyond the scope of his authority 15

U.S.C. §634(b) does not preclude injunctive relief.”

Dubrow v. SBA, 345 F.Supp. 4, 7 (C.D. Calif. 1972). It

was on this basis that the district court below, over the

Government’s objection, entered a temporary restraining

order against that agency. Transcript of Proceedings,

November 11, 1977."* In any event, the complaint in this

action was for damages as well as injunctive relief, and

we no longer seek to use § 634(b) for injunctive relief,

but solely to obtain fees. The payment of attorney’s fees

by SBA is not a form of relief barred by $ 634(b).

10 Mar V. Kleppe, 526 F.2d 867, 870 (10th Cir. 1975).

11 RFC v. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1941).

12 Indeed, if § 634(b) were a bar to relief, the United States

could have presented it as a defense below rather than settling

the litigation by permanently placing petitioners in the § 8(a)

program. :

9

V. UNDERLYING FACTS

The questions presented in the petition are strictly

legal in nature and do not rest upon the underlying facts.

However, the Government, in an obvious effort to cast

a cloud over the petition, has suggested (at 2-3) by in-

nuendo that petitioners never properly belonged in the

§$8(a) program. It is difficult in a reply brief to fully

address these assertions which are either misstatements

of fact ** or a gross distortion of the record. Suffice it

to say, that the Government, two days prior to having

to answer detailed discovery requests about the way in

which the § 8(a) program was operated, settled the un-

derlying case by acknowledging in a consent order that

the decision to admit petitioners to the § 8(a) program,

which was reviewed at seven different SBA levels (J.A.

74-75), consisted of

“proper and correct findings and conclusions which

support [petitioners’] reinstatement to the § 8(a)

13 For example, the Government states (at 2) that Dr.

Marilyn Andrulis “holds an Associate Professorship in Chem-

istry ....” Dr. Andrulis does not now hold, nor has she ever

held, such a position, and there is nothing in the record of this’

case which so states.

14 The record of this case includes findings of the National

Research Council, the National Academy of Science, and the

United States Civil Rights Commission showing that women

scientists are heavily discriminated against in employment

and in the federal contracting process. J.A. 65-66. Dr. An-

drulis showed, when applying to the §8(a) program, that

she in fact experienced both kinds of discrimination. She

especially showed that she faced that discrimination in her

prior employment before she founded her own company. J.A.

64-65. The Government then could not have stated the

opposite of the truth with greater precision when it claimed

(at 2) that Dr. Andrulis founded ARC “after enjoying a

series of high level positions ... .” (Emphasis added.)

10

program and which support a further finding that

the problems experienced by [petitioners] in ob-

taining government contracts are not common in

kind or degree to those of other small businesses.”

J.A. 106-07.

While the Government did originally contest the ques-

tion whether petitioners had “prevailed” on their civil

rights claims for purposes of § 1988, the Justice Depart-

ment ultimately informed the court of appeals shortly

before oral argument that it no longer wished to press

that issue. App. 32a-33a.

It shou!d also be noted that in Senate hearings a high

level SBA official testified:

“(Ijf the Andulis [sic] case is typical of the

treatment given women-owned business entrepreneurs

by procurement officials, the documentation of such

will meet the eligibility test for being socially dis-

advantaged and qualified to receive 8(a) contracts

under the existing administrative authority.” J.A.

76.

The SBA decision to terminate petitioners from the

$8(a) program was expressly criticized by the House

during investigations of that program (J.A. 83) as well

as by the United States Civil Rights Commission (J.A.

87). Indeed, the SBA Administrator acknowledged dur-

ing a Congressional investigation that petitioners were

fully eligible for the program. J.A. 83. Moreover, the

ownership makeup and net worth of the owners of the

company placed petitioners well within the mainstream

of the 1485 participants within the §8(a) program.

J.A. 80-81. Indeed, their net worth at the time of their

admission was within the lower quartile of all program

participants. J.A. 80.

To the extent, however, that this Court is concerned

about the factual underpinnings of this case, the undis-

11

puted affidavit of Dr. Marilyn W. Andrulis is included

within the Joint Appendix (at 60-89) filed with the

court of appeals, and that Joint Appendix has been

lodged by petitioners with the Clerk of this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated here and in the petition, the

writ should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

I. MICHAEL GREENBERGER

1800 Massachusetts

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 828-2000

Of Counsel: Counsel for Petitioners

SHEA & GARDNER

1800 Massachusetts

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Dated: June9, 1980

Appendix

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Chicago, Illinois 60604

April 15, 1980

Before

Hon. THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge

Hon. LUTHER M. SWYGERT, Circuit Judge

Hon. WILBUR F. PELL, JR., Circuit Judge

Nos. 77-1698, et al.

IBERIA HAMPTON, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vs.

EDWARD HANRAHAN, et al.,

Defendants-A ppellees.

On Petitions for Rehearing

ORDER

On consideration of the motions filed by the state and

federal defendants, respectively, for rehearing and sug-

gestions for rehearing en banc of the order with respect

to the award of attorney fees issued on December 12,

1979, 7

IT IS ORDERED that the penultimate paragraph on page

13 of that order be amended to read as follows:

Plaintiffs’ attorneys fail to suggest how the fees

should be apportioned between defendants. We hold

that one-third of the award should be paid by the

2a

federal defendants and two-thirds should be paid by.

the state defendants.

The remaining portion of that paragraph is deleted.

IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the state defendants-

appellees’ petition for rehearing and suggestion for re-

hearing en banc concerning attorney fees is hereby

DENIED.

IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the federal defendants-

appellees’ petition for rehearing and suggestion for re-

hearing en banc is hereby DENIED.

IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the motion filed by the

United States to intervene is hereby DENIED.

PELL, Circuit Judge, concurring.

ee ks

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Reply Brief — Andrulis v. United States · 447 U.S. 922 | Frix