Appendix — W. R. Grace & Co. v. E-T Industries, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1980
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United-States
October Term, 1979
No.9 ©1533
W.R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
E-T INDUSTRIES, INC. and PYRAMID ENTERPRISES,
Respondents.
W. R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
WESTERN U.S. INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation,
Respondent.
APPENDIX VOLUME.
JAMES W. GERIAK,
LYON AND LYON,
800 Wilshire Boulevard, 9th Floor,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90017,
(213) 489-1600,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Judgment Upon Defendant’s Motion for Directed
I eS ee l
aE IED ARR ck Sa Sar easy Oe a a eRe 4
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law .............. 6
Opinion of the Court of Appeals -...........000000000000.. 24
Order. Petition for Rehearing Denied and Sugges-
tion for Rehearing En Banc Rejected ................ 34
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1979
BUG siticosaastceaatt
W.R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
E-T INDUSTRIES, INC. and PYRAMID ENTERPRISES,
Respondents.
W. R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corporation,
Petitioner,
VS.
WESTERN U.S. INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation,
Respondent.
APPENDIX VOLUME.
Judgment Upon Defendant’s Motion for Directed
Verdict; FRCP 50(a).
United States District Court, Central District of Cali-
fornia.
W. R. Grace & Co., Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff,
vs. Western U. S. Industries, Inc., a corporation, De-
fendant. Civil No. 74-2088-R.
Filed: May 16, 1975.
This cause having come on for trial before the
Honorable Manuel L. Real and a duly empaneled
jury on April 22, 23, 24 and 25, and on May 6,
1975; both parties having appeared by counsel; the
plaintiff W. R. Grace & Co. having presented its case
and rested; the defendant Western U. S. Industries,
tila
Inc. having moved orally and in writing for a directed
verdict pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure on the grounds, among others: that
Design Patent 230,353 is invalid and/or unenforceable
because of the fraudulent misrepresentations made
to the Patent Office regarding the purported commercial
success of the wheel design which is the subject matter
of said patent; that the testimony and exhibits presented
by the plaintiff and all the inferences which the jury
could justifiably draw therefrom were insufficient to
support a finding that California Trademark Registra-
tion No. 52,356 is valid, or that the term “WIRE
MAG” is a valid trademark of the plaintiff, or that
the defendant has committed acts which infringe upon
said alleged trademark or dilute the value thereof,
or that the defendant has competed unfairly with the
plaintiff, or that Mr. Mochel is the sole inventor of
the subject matter of Design Patent 230,353; and that
during the representation of the plaintiff's case it was
established as a matter of law, that the wheel design
of the patent in suit taken as a whole, would have
been obvious in 1971 to a designer having ordinary
skill in the designing of custom automobile wheels:
And the Court having granted the motion of the
defendant Wesiern U. S. Industries, Inc. for a directed
verdict;
And the defendant being the prevailing party and
the Court having determined that this is an exceptional
case under Section 285 of Title 35, United States
Code, because of the fraudulent misrepresentation
of material facts regarding alleged commercial success
made to the Patent Office during the prosecution of
the application which matured into Design Patent 230,-
353, which misrepresentations constituted a serious
breach of duty to the Patent Office:
ipa
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that:
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter
of this action and over the parties hereto,
2. The plaintiff W. R. Grace & Co. is the owner
of United States Design Letters Patent 230,353,
3. The plaintiff W. R. Grace & Co. is the owner
of California Trademark Registration No. 52,356,
4. United States Design Letters Patent 230,353
is invalid and void,
5. California Trademark Registration No. 52,356
is invalid and void,
6. The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
7. The defendant Western U. S. Industries, Inc.
is awarded reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to 35
U.S.C. 285. as to the present portion of the action,
in the amount of $58,395.00, without prejudice to
the inclusion of such attorneys fees as damages in
any subsequent antitrust action, and
8. The defendant Western U. S. Industries, Inc.
shall have end recover of the plaintiff W. R. Grace
& Co., the taxable costs and disbursements of said
Defendant in the sum of $58,395, and have execution
therefor.
Dated: May 16, 1975.
/s/ Manuel L. Real
United States District Judge
Approved as to form [ ]
Disapproved as to form [|X]
Receipt acknowledged, May 12, 1975, at 4:30 p.m.
LYON & LYON
By /s/ Thomas D. Kiley
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Pe Mae
Judgment.
United States District Court, Central District of Cali-
fornia.
W.R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corp., Plaintiff
v. WESTERN U.S. INDUSTRIES, INC., a corp., De-
fendant. No. CV-74-2088-R.
W.R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corp., Plaintiff v.
E-T INDUSTRIES, INC., a corp., and PYRAMID
ENTERPRISES, INC., a corp., Defendants. No. CV-
74-2089-R.
Filed: Feb. 10, 1978.
The Court having made its findings under Rule
52(a) F.R.C.P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with preju-
dice with costs and attorneys’ fees being assessed against
Plaintiff W.R. Grace & Co.
Design Patent No. 230,353 is held invalid and
not infringed and that proper notification be given
to the U.S. Commissioner of Patents to this effect
as provided under statute.
The words “wire mag” do not have any trademark
significance and that the State trademark Registration
No. 52,356 is invalid and that appropriate notification
to this effect be given to the State of California as
well as to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
FDI, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with offices at
18451 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44112, be sub-
stituted for E-T Industries and Pyramid Enterprises,
- Inc., since FDI, Inc. is the successor to these two
corporations.
sills:
The amount of attorneys’ fees which I assess against
W.R. Grace & Co. and award to Defendants E-T
Industries and Pyramid Enterprises pursuant to this
judgment is $126,936.02, costs to be assessed as re-
quired by Local Rules.
The award is without prejudice to defendants’ pres-
ently pending claim of treble punitive damages for
antitrust violations and unfair competition in Civil Ac-
tion No. 75-1532 L entitled FDI, Inc. vs. W. R.
Grace & Co., Inc., including treble attorneys’ fees
for defending this action.
DATED: February 10, 1978.
/s/ Manuel L. Real
MANUEL L. REAL
United States District Judge
aonibiians
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
United States District Court, Central District of
California.
W. R. GRACE & CO., INC., a Corporation, Plain-
tiff, vs. WESTERN U. S. INDUSTRIES, INC., a Cor-
poration, Defendant. CV 74-2088-R
W. R. GRACE & CO., INC., a Corporation, Plain-
tiff, vs. E-T INDUSTRIES, INC., a Corporation, and
PYRAMID ENTERPRISES, INC., a Corporation, De-
fendants. CV 74-2089-R
Filed May 16, 1975.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. W. R. Grace & Co., Inc. (GRACE), is a cor-
poration organized and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the State of Connecticut, having its
principal place of business in New York City, New
York.
2. The defendants, E-T INDUSTRIES, INC. (E-
T) and PYRAMID ENTERPRISES, INC. (PYRA-
MID), are defendants in Civil Action No. 74-2089-
R and E-T’s principal place of business is in Benicia,
California; PYRAMID’s principal place of business is
in Torrance, California. They are, as of April 30,
1975, dissolved corporations that have been merged
into FDI, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, as divisions
thereof.
3. W.R. GRACE & CO., INC. filed suit against
E-T INDUSTRIES, INC. and PYRAMID ENTER-
PRISES, INC., under Civil Action No. 74-2089-R.
4. Jurisdiction and venue are proper as to the patent
infringement count under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a); however,’
as to the remaining counts, jurisdiction is lacking under
we
28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1) and (c) inasmuch as the matter
in controversy does not exceed the sum or value of
TEN THOUSAND ($10,000) DOLLARS exclusive
of interests or costs as will be explained hereafter.
5. In these proceedings, plaintiff seeks to enjoin
defendants E-T and PYRAMID from manufacturing
the accused wheels Exhibits C, CJ through CZ, on
the basis of claimed design patent infringement. Also,
damages and profits are being sought, as a result of
this alleged infringement. In addition, common law
and state trademark infringement as well as unfair
competition and dilution claims based on the alleged
trademark infringement are combined in Counts II,
III, IV, V and VI. Plaintiff's Complaint also seeks
an injunction and profits and damages for infringement
and/or misappropriation of its alleged trademark
“WIRE MAG” on the basis of use of the words “wire,”
“wire dish” and/or “wire dish” with “mag” on defend-
ants’ accused wheels.
6. E-T and PYRAMID assert that the patent is
invalid and unenforceable; that even if the patent is
considered valid there has been no infringement on
said patent; and, in addition thereto, E-T claims that
it has not infringed plaintiff's trademark “WIRE MAG”
by the use of “WIRE DISH MAG,” “WIRE DISH”
or “WIRE,” on or in connection with its wheels, and
that the trademark WIRE MAG is not a valid trade-
mark because it is descriptive and generic on the wheels
to which it is applied.
7. Custom wheels for automobiles have been manu-
factured since at least the early 60s, and such wheels
include cast aluminum, or mag wheels of various de-
signs, and they are intended to enhance the appearance
of the vehicle.
sola
8. The Mochel patent was issued on February 12,
1974 under Design Patent No. 230, 353.
9. The earliest Mochel claimed to have conceived
the wheel was April 20, 1971 (two weeks after seeing
the Chaparral wheel) but there is no evidence that
such conception was made solely by him in view of
the Japanese drawing where the wheel illustrated in
the Mochel patent is the wheel as modified by the
Japanese in Exhibits Nos. 73 and GB.
10. The Mochel patent is not only obvious over
the prior art, but it is also anticipated by the prior
art and, therefore, is invalid on the basis of both
35 U.S.C. 102 and 35 U.S.C. 103. The most pertinent
prior art is found to consist of the Chaparral wheel
as shown in Exhibits Nos. 65, O, G, F, GM, GS,
JU; E-T IV wheel as shown in Exhibit No. 151; and
the Rader and Trans-American wheels as shown in
Exhibits Nos. AJ, GR, GS, GU, GW; Wire Wheel
Exhibit P and the Thompson Patent, Exhibit AX. This
prior art is more pertinent to the Mochel patent than
the prior art that was found and cited by the Examiner
in the File Wrapper History of the Mochel patent.
11. The Chaparral wheel as illustrated in Exhibit
No. O invalidates the Mochel patent on the basis of
35 U.S.C. 102 because its differences from the Mochel
patent are insubstantial from a design standpoint. The
Chaparral wheel was designed and used by the world-
famous auto racer Jim Hall during the 1960’s. Some
of the publications of the Chaparral wheel are for
patent purposes identical to the design of the Mochel
patent. Specifically, as seen from Exhibits Nos. O,
FG, 65, the Chaparral wheel is a deep-dished wheel
having lattice work that is substantially the same as
the Mochel wheel design. As seen in Fig. 1 of the
cilia
Mochel patent, the lattice work formed by the intersect-
ing simulated wire members includes small triangularly-
shaped areas about the inner hub portion. Viewing
outwardly from the solid triangular-shapes, the next
shape is that of a small elongated diamond fol-
lowed by another triangular shape adjacent the bore
of the rim. Thus, only the small triangles adjacent
-the bore spell the difference between the Chaparral
and Mochel wheels. This slight difference between the
Mochel and Chaparral lattice work are so insubstantial
that even plaintiff's expert witness, Barris, admitted
that these small triangles formed by the lattice work
adjacent the bore are unnoticeable to the ordinary
persons, and the design at the center is established
prior to coming to this small portion of the wheel
and is not altered by that small portion of the wheel
and, therefore, is unnoticeable to the eyes of the ordi-
nary person. (Barris Dep. of Feb. 12, p. 164, lines
9-23). The Chaparral wheel was Mochel’s starting point
and admittedly at Roy Vachon’s request Mochel se-
cured a back issue of West magazine—the issue of
October 25, 1970—which at page 16 depicted an auto-
mobile referred to as the “Chaparral 2J.” Vachon re-
quested that Mochel prepare production drawings for
a “street version” of a cast wheel like the wheel depict-
ed in this magazine. Despite the substantial identity
of the Mochel design to that of Chaparral, GRACE
never disclosed its knowledge of the Chaparral wheel
to the Patent Office during the prosecution of the
Mochel patent; several of the arguments presented to
the Patent Office could not have been presented to
the Patent Office had the Patent Office known of
the Chaparral wheel, in view of the fact that the
Chaparral wheel contained the features upon which
a
the patentee Mochel based his arguments for patentabil-
ity. The five differences argued in the File Wrapper
History on pages 11 and 12 of Exhibit AT were testified
to by Harness as either being satisfied by the Chapar-
ral wheel or as being inherently functional in a casted
wheel such as the Chaparral wheel. The accentuated
deep smooth rim argued and shown at pages 14, 15
and 16 was also prior art as shown by the Trans-
American publication, Exhibit AJ, and the publications
of Chaparral, Exhibit 65, and the Firebird with the
beauty rim, Exhibit GW. Thus, the Patent Office was
misled because it just did not have the facts regarding
the prior art.
12. Thompson (Exhibit AX) and Exhibit P both
teach lattice work similar to the Mochel patented design.
Specifically, the Thompson patent, as well as Exhibit
P, illustrate small triangular areas alternating with large
pentagon shaped areas at the bore of the rim.
13. The E-T IV wheel shown in Exhibit No. 151
is similar to the Rader wheel illustrated in the publica-
tions cited by the Patent Office, except that there
are substantial differences, which should be noted. First,
the E-T IV wheel teaches a combination of a deep-
dished wheel having substantially similar simulated cast
wire center to that of the Mochel patent. Second,
the E-T IV wheel has small solid triangle areas adjacent
to the inner periphery. During the prosecution of the
Mochel patent, Applicant argued that his solid triangu-
lar areas were not found in the Rader wheel shown
in the Sports Car Graphic publication Exhibit No.
91. Therefore, the E-T IV wheel also contained better
prior art than the Patent Office considered prior to
allowing the Mochel patent. These features along with
the deep clean sweep rim make the wheel more perti-
fom
nent to the Mochel patent than the Sports Car Graphic
publication Exhibit No. 91, did not show and was
not truly representative of the Trans-American wheels
that were in the prior art, since there was no clean
sweep rim shown so as to give the cross-over effect,
illustrated in the Trans-American publication Exhibit
No. AJ, which plaintiff argued in the Patent Office
was created by the use of a combination of the lattice
structure with the wide clean sweep rim. (See page
15 of Exhibit No. AT.)
14. The evidence of record showed that the patent
is invalid under 35 U.S.C. 102 since the differences,
if any, of the Mochel patent over the closest pertinent
prior art, as hereinabove set forth, are insubstantial,
and both the prior art as set forth above as well
as the Mochel patent create the same visual impression
on the eye of the ordinary observer. Mere visual inspec-
tion of the devices can be made by this court, since
there is no question of fact concerning the existence
of the prior art testimony or controverted evidence
as to what the prior art shows, such determination
can be made by the court without reference to extrinsic
controverted facts.
In rendering this decision, the court takes notice
of plaintiff's witnesses, including expert witness Barris,
who contended that the rim of the Mochel patent
washes out and does not have an effect from a design
patent standpoint on the design of the wheel to create
a distinct visual impact on the ordinary, observer. In
addition, the witnesses Barris, Mochel and Kravat all
admitted that it was obvious to combine Chaparral,
Thompson, Rader, the Dune Buggies and Voxmobile,
and Exhibit P to produce the wheel shown in the
Mochel patent and, therefore, the Mochel patent is
a
a patent covering an existing design, wherein the dif-
ferences over the prior art are insubstantial to the
eye of an ordinary observer.
15. As to “obviousness” governed by 35 U.S.C.
103, the Mochel patent is invalid since it is no more
than what an ordinary designer at the time of the inven-
tion would have done in modifying the Chaparral wheel
for street use in view of the prior art, since the dif-
ferences are substantially ordinary modifications or ex-
tractions of existing designs, or are functional and
therefore do not give rise to patentability of a design.
The testimony of Davis confirmed that the selection
of the cast wire configuration was merely functional
and depended upon the design parameters dictated by
the requirements for eliminating large spaces to pass
certain tests prescribed by SEMA, etc., and in order
to pass these and still maintain the appearance of
a wire wheel, the 45° angle with 20 spokes in the
configuration shown was selected. Further, the testi-
mony of Mochel and Harness confirmed that the taper-
ing of the lattice work was due to casting procedure,
as well as to the functional object of obtaining stretch
of the spoke. The shortening of the spokes from the
Chaparral due to greater cross-over also created greater
beam strength. (Ex. IT).
Barris, from the stand, contended that the wide
rim was not a part of the Mochel design since the
rim is functional and depends on whether a wide or
a narrow tire is used. Thus, the differences between
the prior art and the Mochel patent, if any, are pri-
marily functional rather than ornamental and the patent
is invalid under 35 U.S.C. 171.
16. The secondary factual considerations prescribed
by the Graham case are not found in this case,
4
iin.
since the alleged commercial success was never proven.
What sales were shown were shown to have been
obtained by heavy financing by GRACE through an
“easy pay” pian as well as by heavy advertising and
promotion, the first heavy advertising and promotion
ever embarked upon by Appliance Industries and made
possible by GRACE’S acquisition of Appliance. The
evidence failed to show that sales of such wheels were
profitable and therefore that there was commercial
success or that anybody recognized the patent through
licensing. In addition, the evidence failed to establish
that E-T and/or PYRAMID copied the wheel in ques-
tion. Davis testified that he had knowledge of the
Rader wheel as well as the Trans-American wheel,
together with the SEMA 5-1 specifications and the
wheels that he had seen during the period that he
worked at Cragar and was testing wheels. This was
prior to the time he designed the E-T Wire Wheel.
17. The Mochel patent is invalid and unenforceable
since Mochel, Merritt and/or Harness jointly ard sev-
erally, as well as GRACE, are guilty of unclean hands
and/or fraud in their conduct before the Patent Office
which included, among other things, the following repre-
sentations that affected the proceedings in the Patent
Office such as:
(a) Witholding information pertaining to the
Chapparal wheel and Trans-American wheels.
(b) Filing of the Merritt Affidavits despite the
fact that he never checked the accuracy of
the affidavits and they were in fact grossly
inaccurate and misleading. The first affidavit
argued commercial sales of a particular wheel
shown to the Patent Examiner and such wheel
not only was never sold, but the sales repre-
(c)
(d)
willis
sented to the Patent Office were not of wheels
that were alike in character to the one shown
to the patent Office. The sales included small
sized wheels which did not have deep smooth
rims. Also, the sales were made on the basis
of an “easy payment” plan, admittedly
brought into effect for the first time by
GRACE’S heavy financial resources after ac-
quisition of Appliance Industries.
The arguments and proceedings in the Patent
Office completely mischaracterized the Rader
wheel as being stepped despite the fact that
GRACE an/or its employees knew or should
have known that Rader combined the center
of its wheels with rims having “clean sweeps”
as shown in the Trans-American wheels which
were pictured in the Mochel company file
and were mentioned to Harness per Exhibits
AJ and IT. Further, it was common knowl-
edge throughout the industry that smooth
deep rims could be united with different cen-
ters as per Mochel’s and Barris’ testimony.
Withholding information pertaining to the
Chaparral wheel was fraudulent in view of
the fact that the very features shown by
the Chaparral wheel and argued at points 1-5
on pages 14 and 15 of the Mochel File
Wrapper History are shown in the Chaparral
wheel or are inherently functional in a casted
simulated wire wheel structure of the type
embodied in the Chaparral wheel. (Harness’
testimony.) This was also fraudulent because
the Chaparral wheel was the starting point
for Mochel in early April 1971 just two
me oe
weeks prior to April 20th, the alleged date of
conceiving the patented wheel. (Mochel testi-
mony. )
(e) Merritt's second Affidavit giving the appear-
ance that the advertising of Appliance is mini-
mal is certainly grossly fabricated since the
record brought out that Merritt, a CPA and
lawyer, did not check the records of the
company, but filed an Affidavit that he knew
was “mistaken.” The Affidavit was changed,
and he considered the Affidavit for a long
period of time. The facts and circumstances
of his testimony brought out that not only
should he have known of the expenditure
of approximately $60,000 for advertising and
promotion because he was President of his
division (Exs. JY1 and JY2) and his com-
pany kept books in the ordinary course of
business and he was privy to same. He re-
ceived correspondence and comments from
customers of different magazines as well as
industry people in the trade about the dif-
ferent ads they ran in different magazines.
All these factors show circumstances that es-
tablish the bad faith of Merritt in signing
the particular Affidavits involved.
20. There is no infringement of the Mochel patent
by the accused wheels of E-T or PYRAMID because
the wheels manufactured by E-T and PYRAMID are
not deceptively similar to the ordinary observer. The
proceedings in the Patent Office preclude interpreting
the Mochel design from being read on the defendants’
wheels, since such interpretations recaptures what plain-
tiff admitted was in the public domain during the
ae Se
proceedings. Further, if there are any features of the
Mochel design that are utilized, they are primarily
functional! features, and utilization of such features does
not prove misappropriation of a design. In this case,
there is no conflicting evidence on the configuration
of the E-T wheels accused to infringe. The arguments
in the Patent Office as weil as the configuration of
the wheel shown in the patent establish that the shape
of the rim is different, E-T’s spokes are rounded and
appear to be overlapping at the intersection, as op-
posed to the Mochel wheels which are flat.
Also, E-T uses oval-shaped lug bolt apertures with
a patented UNI-LUG feature which means that their
wheels are universal as compared to the Mochel wheels
which are only for one bolt diameter. The difference
in appearance as well as the absence of contrary evi-
dence and the proceedings in the Patent Office dictate
a conclusion that the wheels in question do not infringe.
A comparison of E-T and PYRAMID’s wheels with
the Chaparral wheel as illustrated in Exhibit 65 shows
that E-1’s wheels more fully proximate or are closer
to the Chaparral wheel than to the patented design.
Also, the Trans-American wheels shown with the dif-
ferent types of rims in Ex. AJ, including the stepped
type of steel rim that E-T uses, would certainly be
closer to the E-T wheel than it is to the patented
design. Thus, E-T’s two-piece wheel does not infringe
but rather its design is patterned after the prior art.
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The presumption of validity regarding design
patents is weak, since the expertise normally required
in the Patent Office when dealing with complex utility
patents is not required in determining the similarity
of two designs “in the eye of an ordinary observer”,
’
titans
For a design patent to be valid, it must be (1) new,
(2) original, (3) ornamental, (4) non-obvious, (5)
not primarily for purposes of serving functional or
utilitarian purposes. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (1970).
The design patent in question is not new, is not
original, is not ornamental, nor is it uncbvious. Accord-
ingly, it is invalid under 35 U.S.C. §171, 35 U.S.C.
§102 and 35 U.S.C. §103.
2. The presumption of validity flowing from the
grant of a patent is greatly weakened if not destroyed
when pertinent prior art has not been cited by the
Patent Office. A patent is not entitled to a presump-
tion of validity over prior art which the Examiner
did not cite. In this case, where the prior art is exempli-
fied by Thompson Exhibit AX; Chaparral Exhibits
O, 65, and GM; E-T IV Exhibit 151, and Rader
and Trans-American wheels, Exhibits AJ, GS, GU,
the closest pertinent prior art found in the Pa ent
Office and cited by the Examiner in the File Wrapper~
History was not as close as the prior art uncovered
by defendants. Moreover, if the Patent Office would
have known about the art uncovered by the defendants,
the arguments in the Patent Office could never have
been made to obtain the allowance of the patent. Ac-
cordingly the plaintiff has not carried its burden of
proof that the Patent Office considered the non-cited
prior art prior to the issuance of the patent. Thus,
the presumption invalid. J. B. Manufacturing Corp.
v. Ajax Hardware Manufacturing Corp., 287 F.2d 228
(9th Cir. 1961); Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Smith Dwy-
er Inc., 322 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1963).
3. The Mochel patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C.
$102 since the differences between it and the prior
art, if any, are insubstantial and the designs created
by the prior art create the same visual impression
on the eye of an ordinary observer. Duplex Straw
Dispenser Co. v. Harold Leonard & Company, Inc.,
229 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.Cal. 1964); Schwinn Bicycle
Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 995
(9th Cir. 1970). |
4. As a matter of law, the differences, if any be-
tween the design of the Mochel patent and the prior
art are obvious and under 35 U.S.C. §103 since they
amount to mere routine modifications of existing designs
shown in the prior art as exemplified by the Thompson
patent, E-T IV, Chaparral, Rader, and Trans-American
wheels. A new impression upon the eye cannot be
produced by small differences between the design in
question and the prior designs. Such s:nall differences
are well within the creative ability of an ordinary
designer. Thus, on the basis of pre-existing design and
minor diferences, this patent is invalid. J. B. Manufac-
turing Corp. v. Ajax Hardware Manufacturing Co.,
287 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1961). There must be a
substantial difference in design over the prior art in
order that the design be patentable. Minor or small
differences which do not produce a new impression
upon the eye are not enough to create novelty. Duplex
Straw Dispenser Co. v. Harold Leonard & Co:, 229
F. Supp. 401-403 (C.D.Cal. 1964).
5. When the differences between the prior art are
functional rather than ornamental as in this case, the
patent is invalid based on 35 U.S.C. §171. Schwinn
Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444
F.2d 295 (1970); Payne Metal Enterprises Ltd. v.
McFee, 382 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1967); Bentley v.
Sunset House Distributing Corp., 359 F.2d 140-145
(9th Cir. 1966).
6. No amount of secondary considerations pre-
scribed by the Graham case can breathe life into an
invalid patent. Accordingly, there is no need to go
into the Graham secondary considerations in this case.
Payne Metal Enterprises, Ltd. v. McPhee, 382 F.2d
541 (9th Cir. 1967).
7. Merritt, Mochel and Harness are guilty of fraud
and the patent is unenforceable since they and Grace
knew or should have known that the Patent Office’s
issuance of the patent would have been affected by
the non-disclosure of the Chaparral and Trans-American
wheels which contained simulated cast wire wheels hav-
ing deep dish centers with clean sweep rims. These
were the structural features that were relied on so
heavily for patentability on pages 11 through 15 of
the Mochel patent File Wrapper History and they as
reasonable men should have brought this prior art
to the Patent Office’s attention. This should have been
even more evident to Mochel and Harness, since Mochel
wrote Harness a note telling him, in effect, that
he did not feel his wheel was patentable over the
Chaparral and Trans-American wheels. (Ex. IT) In-
termountain Research & Engineering Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., .... F. Supp. ..... 171 U.S.P.Q. 577 (C.D, Cal.,
1971).
8. As a matter of law, the plaintiff should have
known that reckless and inaccurate misrepresentations
concerning advertising promotion and sales of the pat-
ented wheel would have affected the Patent Office’s
decision to allow the Mochel patent in what was
termed by the Patent Office as a “close case”. The
Patent Office’s rejection at page 22 of defendants’
Exhibit AJ stated:
“In close cases the manner in which the pub-
lic receives an invention is sometimes persuasive
eee ee ee ee
a en
that patentable invention existed . . . commercial
success, however, often results from sources other
than that which is resultant from invention, which
is believed to be the case herein . . . the claim
is again rejected.” (emphasis ours )
Merritt’s false affidavit in response to this rejection
fell into the category of a misrepresentation which
he knew or should have known was false and he
knew or should have known that it would have affected
the decision of awarding the patent to plaintiff. Merritt
was an officer of the plaintiff corporation; and the
corporation kept books in the ordinary course of busi-
ness which he admitted he was privy to and the books
indicated the amount of advertising that Appliance
Industries had done in the period in question. Such
actions on the part of Merritt are especially outrageous
and fraudulent, when it is borne in mind that Merritt
is a CPA and attorney; and accordingly, must be
held to a higher standard of care in executing affi-
davits, where the affidavit appears to be executed
on the basis of his personal knowledge. Further, in
this case, the representations regarding “commercial
success with very little advertising” were at the very
foundation of the patent grant and were constantly
relied upon by the applicant to obtain the patent.
This leaves no room whatsoever for speculation that
_ such actions on the part of Merritt in underplaying
the advertising did affect, the outcome in issuance
of the patent in suit. (See pages 22, 23, 24, 25,
38 of Mochel File Wrapper History, Ex. AT).
9. In this case, infringement can be determined
as a matter of law, due to the fact that the question
of infringement is a matter of construction of uncontro-
verted evidence and no extrinsic evidence is needed
a | ae
to explain terms of art or to apply descriptions. Oxnard
Canners v. Bradley, 194 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1952);
Dolgoff v. Kaynar Co., 18 F.R.D. 424 (S.D. Cal.
1955); Del Francia vy. Stanthony Corp., 278 F.2d
745 (9th Cir. 1960); Hansen v. Colliver, 282 F.2d
66 (9th Cir. 1960). The proceedings in the Patent
Office preclude interpreting the Mochel patented design
to include defendants, E-T and PYRAMID’S, accused
wheels, because such interpretation would recapture
what plaintiff admitted was in the public domain, during
the prosecution of the Mochel application in the Patent
Office. During the course of the proceedings at pages
14 and 15 of Exhibit AT, the Mochel File Wrapper
History, one of the arguments made by the plaintiff
in attempting to overcome the prior art was:
“Incidentally, in discussing this wheel with experts
at Appliance Industries, Counsel for Applicant
was informed of another difference over the Rader
wheel, of reference. The wheel of this Application
offers a “deep-dish” design with a clean sweep
from the rim to the center. This is shown for
example in Figure 4. The illustration of the Rader
wheel shows a “shallow-dish” design with a couple
of “steps” from the rim to the center. As to this
feature, the Rader wheel is not believed to teach
the clean sweep design of the instant wheel. The
difference is really shown best in perspective view,
and Counsel for Applicant is enclosing on an
attachment hereto (Exhibit A) one of the photo-
graphs shown to the Examiner at the interview.
This photograph clearly shows the “deep-dish” fea-
ture.”
On the basis of the file wrapper estoppel as a matter
of law, I hold that the interpretation of the patent
a en
was narrowed following a rejection on the basis of
prior art patents, the effect being to insert a narrower
interpretation of the design having limitations prevent-
ing them from reading on the prior art patents. In
view of the heavy reliance placed in the Patent Office
on the smooth deep rim, and, in view of the fact
that the defendants used the commercially available
stepped rim which is like an ordinary OEM steel rim
which is highly polished. Stimulant Products, Inc. v.
Vibrex Corp., 161 U.S.P.Q. 513 (C.D.Cal. 1969) no
infringement can be asserted against defendants.
10. There is no evidence of record that the general
public has come to recognize the term “WIRE MAG”
as a trademark owned by plaintiff, and all of plaintiff's
Counts II, III, IV, V and VI depending on the trade-
mark significance of “WIRE MAG” should be dis-
missed.
11. Defendants, E-T and PYRAMID, are entitled
to judgment dismissing Count I in view of the fact
that the Mochel patent in suit is both invalid and
not infringed.
12. This is an exceptional case within the meaning
of 35 U.S.C. §282 where both fraud and bad faith
have been established by the evidence of record. Ac-
cordingly, on the basis of this being an exceptional
case, defendants are entitled to recover their costs
including reasonable attorney’s fees in defending this
action.
13. Under Rule 41(b) F.R.C.P. defendants can
move to dismiss a case where the plaintiff has not
proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence.
A judgment thus rendered is a decision on the merits
of the case. Moon vy. Dulles, 237 F.2d 241 (9th
|
Cir. 1956); Young v. United States, 111 F.2d 823
(9th Cir. 1940); Ellis v. Carter, 328 F.2d 573 (9th
Cir. 1963). As a matter of law GRACE has failed :o
prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States of America v. Huck Manufacturing Com-
pany, 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964). In Barr
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 149 F.2d 634
(9th Cir. 1945), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
“To us, the rule embodies sound common sense,
it would be absurd to waste the Court’s time
and to impose upon the parties, both waste of
their time and that of their counsel and the wit-
nesses, together with the unnecessary expense in
offering the defendant’s evidence which, with rea-
sonably efficient advocacy, would not do more
than enlarge the record.” (emphasis added )
Rule 41(b) was meant to be used in situations like
the case at bar. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for
E-T and PYRAMID to put in any further evidence
to sustain their case. The needless expense as well
as the Court time involved in presenting E-T’s defense
and GRACP’S rebuttal is certainly unwarranted.
14. Any finding of fact entered into herein- which
may be considered in whole or in part as a conclusion
of law shall be so deemed and treated as if set forth
as a conclusion of law herein and any conclusion
of law entered herein which may be construed in whole
or in part as a finding of fact shall be so deemed
and treated.
/s/ Manuel L. Real
MANUEL L. REAL, JUDGE .
Entered:
—24—
Opinion.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
W. R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corporation, v.
WESTERN U. S. INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation,
Appellee. No. 75-2574.
W. R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corporation, Appel-
lant, v. E-T INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation, and
PYRAMID ENTERPRISES, INC., a corporation, Ap-
pellees. No. 75-2563.
Filed: Oct. 9, 1979.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.
Before: CHAMBERS and GOODWIN, Circuit
Judges, and FITZGERALD%*, District Judge.
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
W. R. Grace & Co. appeals judgments of dismissal
and the award of attorney’s fees against it in consoli-
dated actions that Grace brought against two defendants
for patent infringement. We affirm.
Grace owns Design Patent No. 230,353, for a custom
automobile wheel. In one action, Grace sued Western
U. S. Industries, Inc. (Western). In the other action,
Grace sued E-T Industries, Inc. and Pyramid Enter-
prises, Inc. for infringement. (E-T and Pyramid are
both divisions of FDI, Inc., and will be referred to
jointly hereafter as E-T.)
Mochel, an employee of Appliance Industries, Inc.,
was instructed by his superior to design a “street ver-
sion” of a wheel depicted in a magazine artist’s rendi-
*The Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, United States District
Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
Binns
tion of a Chaparral race car. Mochel borrowed much
from the Chaparral design, but he made some changes.
For example, rather than having the spokes of the
wheel meet at the outer rim, he had them crisscross
a short distance away from the rim, toward the center
of the wheel. The effect was to eliminate starlike
“points” from the rim area and create small triangles
there instead. In addition, he increased the number
of spokes, changed their draft angle, and thickened
them toward the back of the wheel.
In September 1971, Appliance applied for a patent
on Mochel’s design. Appliance then assigned its rights
in the design to Grace, incident to a liquidation and
takeover of Appliance by Grace. This assignment set
in motion a two-year application process in which
the Patent Examiner twice rejected the design as un-
patentable.
The first rejection came in November 1972. The
examiner rejected the design as obvious in view of
the prior art. He cited the Rader wheel, which ap-
peared in a 1965 issue of Sports Car Graphic magazine,
and also cited a patent issued to one Chandler.
In January 1973, Grace responded to the rejection
by pointing out five alleged differences between the
prior art cited and the Mochel design. In a February
1973 interview with the examiner, Grace showed photos
of a Mochel-style wheel on an automobile. In March
1973, Grace amended its response to point out a sixth
difference and to give sales figures for the pictured
wheel. The sales figures were submitted in an effort
to show that Grace had enjoyed commercial success
in marketing the design, thus bolstering its case for
patentability.
a” a
In April 1973, the examiner again rejected the ap-
plication. In addition to the Rader and Chandler wheels
cited in the prior rejection, the examiner also referred
to Burchard and Hibbard patents. Answering Grace’s
assertion of commercial success, the examiner said that,
while such information is relevant in close cases, ap-
parently impressive sales could be explained by factors
other than novelty of design. Thus, the commercial
success argument was rejected.
On July 3, 1973, Grace again responded. In another
attempt to distinguish the prior art, it declared that
it had created a novel combination of prior art elements
in addition to its new elements. Returning to its earlier
commercial-success argument, Grace submitted five affi-
davits from distributors of its wheels and an affidavit
by Floyd Merritt, president of its Appliance division.
These documents were to become crucial in the trial
of these cases.
The affidavits of the distributors were virtually identi-
cal; all asserted that “[wle [the distributor] have no
particular advertising campaign as such for any of
these wheels.” The Merritt affidavit declared: “Our
major advertising so far has been a one-page ad in
Car Craft, when we first offered the Wire Mag wheel,
in 1972.” The trial court later held the Merritt affidavit
to be false.
Between June 1972 and July 1973, Grace had run
18 advertisements for the Mochel wheels, spending
more than $56,000 to reach consumer and industry
audiences. In addition to several ads in Car Craft
(maximum amount spent per ad: $3,470) were four
ads in Hot Rod magazine, three of which were full
pages and two of which cost more than $9,000 each,
|
—27—
and an $8,000 ad in Motor Trend. While Car Craft’s
circulation is about 300,000, Motor Trend’s is more
than 600,000, and Hot Rod’s is more than 800,000.
Also included in the $56,000 advertising expense was
$15,800 spent for the production and printing of thou-
sands of promotional kits, which included poster-size
reproductions of one of its full-page color ads.
After Grace filed the controversial affidavits, Grace
petitioned the examiner to “make the subject application
special”, thereby accelerating its processing. On October
4, 1973, the examiner allowed the patent to issue.
Grace commenced these actions, and demanded a
jury trial in both. In the action gainst E-T, the demand
was made later than 10 days after the last pleading
was filed. Because the demand failed to comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 38, Grace moved for relief under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). The trial court could have
granted a jury trial, in its discretion, despite Grace’s
failure to make timely demand. The court denied the
motion and tried the two cases together, but to different
finders of fact: the E-T case to the trial judge, the
Western case to the jury.
After the close of Grace’s case, the court directed
a verdict for Western and entered a judgment of dismis-
sal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for E-T. The court
found the design patent to be anticipated, obvious,
authored by parties other than Mochel, procured by
fraud on the Patent Office, and not infringed. The
court also awarded fees and costs to both defendants
on the ground that the case was “exceptional” within
the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 285, the attorney’s fees
section of the patent statute. This appeal followed.
—23—
The “Unclean Hands” Defense
The Supreme Court has made fraud on the Patent
Office in the procurement of a patent an equitable
defense to an infringement action. Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Ma-
chinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). In Precision Instru-
ment, the Court quoted as its “guiding doctrine” the
equitable maxim that “he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands.” 324 U.S. at 814. It stressed
that patent monopolies are “issues of great moment
to the public,” 324 U.S. at 815, particularly suited
to “the equity court’s use of discretion in refusing
to aid the unclean litigant.” Jd. See also Keystone
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240
(1933).
That fraud on the Patent Office is also a defense
to an action for damages caused by patent infringement
is indicated by Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled on other
grounds, Standard Oil of California v. United States,
429 US. 14, 18 (1976). There, the fraud was an
article written by the plaintiff’s attorney, but fraud-
ulently represented to be by another author. Not only
did the article deceive the Patent Office, but it also
deceived the Third Circuit, which in 1932 reversed
a district court’s finding of patent invalidity and ordered
an accounting for damages. 59 F.2d 399. Several years
later the fraud was uncovered, and the Third Circuit
reversed itself and recalled its old mandate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s
turnabout. It declared that “[h]ad the District Court
learned of the fraud on the Patent Office at the original.
infringement trial, it would have been warranted in
—29—
dismissing Hartford’s case.” 322 U.S. at 250. It then
held that the Third Circuit judgment of 1932 must
be vacated, and that therefore “the case now stands
in the same position as though Hartford’s corruption
_ had been exposed at the original trial. In this situation,
the doctrine of the Keystone case, supra, requires that
Hartford be denied relief.” 322 U.S. at 250-51. See
Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(fraud as complete defense to damages action under
“unenforceability” language of 35 U.S.C. § 282(1)).
See also Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Ma-
chinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
(fraud on Patent Office as basis of claim under section
2 of Sherman Act); Monolith Portland Midwest Co.
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 407 F.2d
288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969) (dictum).
In the case before us, several factual grounds sup-
ported the trial court’s determination that as a matter
of law Grace had committed fraud on the Patent Office,
and thus could not enforce its patent. Among them
was the filing of the Merritt affidavit, which represented
there had been minimal advertising for the Mochel
wheels, while actually there was advertising far in excess
of the single Car Craft advertisement discussed in the
affidavit.
On appeal, Grace disputes these rulings. It declares
that, at least insofar as it was a defense to patent
validity, the question of fraud should have been left
to the jury. Grace also argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of fraud in any event,
and that the court erred in excluding evidence highly
probative of the state of mind of Merritt and other
agents of Grace.
="
Merritt, president of Appliance, swore in his affidavit
that the company’s “major advertising so far [as
of July 1973] has been a one-page ad in Car Craft.”
The evidence shows that this statement was made solely
to dispel the expressed suspicions of the Patent Examin-
er that allegedly healthy sales of the Mochel wheels
were due to forces other than novelty of design. Prior
to the filing of this affidavit, and five others from
distributors also representing the lack of any advertising
campaign “as such”, the examiner had steadfastly re-
fused to approve the patent. Following the filing of
this material, and a motion by Grace to accelerate
the proceedings, the patent was granted. Grace admitted
that its purpose in submitting the distributors’ affidavits
was to convey the idea that it had engaged in only
a small amount of advertising; the only logical inference
is that its purpose in filing the Merritt affidavit was
identical. The Patent Office’s reversal of its two earlier
rejections upon receipt of these highly misleading affi-
davits leaves no doubt that they were material to,
and a substantial cause of, the patent grant. There
is overwhelming and undisputed evidence that the result
was just what Grace intended. Therefore, the only
issue that would even arguably merit jury consideration
on a record such as this is the question of state
of mind, or scienter.
A leading case discussing the scienter requirement
for a finding of fraud on the Patent Office is this
court’s 1969 decision in Monolith Portland Midwest
Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co., supra. There,
the court awarded attorney’s fees to defendants in
a patent infringement suit on the ground that the
plaintiff had committed fraud on the Patent Office.
Monolith Portland’s view of the duty of patent appli-
cants to be frank with the Patent Office, however,
clearly has import beyond the attorney’s fees context,
It is also instructive on the question of scienter when
defendants seek to assert fraud on the examiner as
an affirmative defense. We held that the applicant
did not have to be certain his or her statement was
false or misleading in order to have failed in the
duty of disclosure. The court found it sufficient that
the plaintiffs “course of conduct * * * reveals a
calculated recklessness about the truth.” 407 F.2d at
297.
Merritt admits he erred in the affidavit, but insists
it was only because he personally misunderstood his
subordinates’ reports about the advertising. Grace thus
argues that there was a jury question presented on
scienter. It is important to remember, however, that
the pla.atiff and patent holder here is not Merritt,
but a corporation, Grace. Under well established agency
doctrines a corporate principal is considered to know
what its agents discover concerning those matters in
which the agents have power to bind the principal.
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272. And
even when an agent has no reason to know the falsity
of the representations he or she makes, the principal
is liable if it knows the falsity and has reason to
know the agent would make the statement. See Restate-
een
ment (Second) of Agency § 256. Under these rules,
Grace clearly must answer for intentional or reckless
misrepresentation as a matter of law. The evidence
was undisputed that some agent of Grace had to know
about the corporation’s advertising for the wheels: thus,
Grace must be said to have known it. And even if
we assume that Merritt himself harbored no doubts
about the truth of his affidavit—a dubious assumption
on this record—the corporation, which knew the truth
and had ample reason to know of Merritt’s actions
and statements, must be said as a matter of law to
have known that the statements were false. In Acme
Precision Products, Inc. vy. American Alloys Corp.,
422 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1970), the court followed
Walker Process Equipment Co. v. Food Machinery
& Chemical Corp., supra, and held that a corporation
could be held liable under the antitrust laws for fraud
on the Patent Office. The court held as a matter
of law that the corporation knew of the falsity of
its patent procurement tactics:
“It is a well settled principle that knowledge
of officers and key employees of a corporation,
obtained while acting in the course of their em-
ployment and within the scope of their authority,
is imputed to the corporation itself * * *.” 422
F.2d at 1398.
With fraud on the Patent Office thus established, the
Eighth Circuit remanded for a determination of other
issues relevant to the antitrust cause of action.
In the case before us, Grace, through its Appliance
division, was properly charged as a matter of law
with knowledge of the extensive advertising program
for the Mochel wheels. The statement of Appliance’s
president in an acknowledged effort to persuade the
| wee
Patent Office was therefore fraud on the Patent Office.
The infringement actions were properly dismissed as
a matter of law on that ground.’
Attorney’s Fees
Grace also challenges the trial court’s finding that
the case was an “exceptional” one, in which the pre-
vailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees under 35
U.S.C. § 285. The attorney’s fees issue presents the
same questions as the defense of fraud on the Patent
Office, but this court’s standard of review is less strin-
gent. The trial court’s findings of fraud are reviewed
closely because the directed verdict took the question
from the jury. On the award of attorney’s fees, this
court defers to the trial court’s discretion in determining
fraud. See, e.g., SSP Agricultural Equipment, Inc. v.
Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir.
1979). Cases involving fraud, “calculated recklessness”,
or bad faith in dealings with the Patent Office are
precisely the “exceptional” cases for which section 285
is designed. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp., supra. In light of this
legal principle, the standard of review, and the evidence
summarized above, there was no abuse of discretion
in the award of attorney’s fees in this case.
Affirmed.
1Since we affirm the trial court on the affirmative defense
of fraud, we need not reach the issue whether the trial
court erred in refusing to grant the jury trial in the E-T
case while allowing it in the Western case. Fraud on the
Patent Office is a complete defense, and since the trial court
properly held there was fraud as a matter of law, no jury
determination of any issue was needed. Grace has not shown
that the trial court’s decision to split the factfinding chores
led Grace to present its case any differently than if both
cases were tried to the jury.
a
Order.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
W.R. GRACE & CO., INC., a corporation, Ap-
pellant, v. E-T INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation
and PYRAMID ENTERPRISES, INC., a corporation,
Appellees. No. 75-2563.
W. R. GRACE & CO., Inc., a corporation, Appel-
lant, v. WESTERN U. S. INDUSTRIES, INC., a cor-
poration, Appellee. No. 75-2574.
Filed: Dec. 27, 1979.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.
Before: CHAMBERS and GOODWIN, Circuit
Judges, and FITZGERALD*, District Judge.
On November 6, 1979, appellant filed its petition
for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion
for en banc rehearing, and no judge of the court
has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing
en banc. Fed R. App. P. 35(b).
The petition for rehearing is denied and the sug-
gestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.
*The Honorable James Martin Fitzgerald, United States
District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
~-sststate ele
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.