Petition — Sexton v. Cleveland Athletic Club

T Supreme Court, U.S.

, eek Sk Ae oe

FEB 13 1980

ICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Vv

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term , 1979

8967957

JAMES F. SEXTON,

Petitioner,

Vs.

THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB, et al.,

Respondents

—a

—

od

a

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

JAMES F. SEXTON ye

1021 Fidelity Building ©

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Counsel for Petitioner

a _—

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979

Noo

JAMES F., SEXTON,

Petitioner,

VSe

THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB, ET AL.

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

The petitioner respectfully prays that a writ

of certiorari issue to review the judgment and

order of the Supreme Court of Ohio, entered in

this proceeding on November 16, 1979.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Ohio,

2

Eighth District, is unreported and appears at

page AS of the Appendix. The opinion of the

Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio,

is unreported and appears at page Al of the

Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio

was entered on November 16, 1979. This Court's

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 12$7(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

le Whether judicial officers of a State have

the right arbitrarily and capriciously to act in

disregard of clear and precise statutory language

so as to deny this petitioner due process of law

and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by

the Constitutions of the State of Ohio and of the >

United States.

2e Whether judicial officers of a State have

the right to undermine the jury system by denying

petitioner 's access to the Ohio courts for redress

and the right to a jury trial in disregard of the

due process and equal protection provisions of the

Constitutions of the State of Ghio and of the

United States.

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES INVOLVED

The Constitutional provisions involved are

Article. I, Sections 5 and 16, of the Constitution

of the State of Ohio and the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States. The

Constitutional provisions are set forth in the

Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case originated as an action in libel

filed on June 28, 197, in the Ohio Court of Common

Pleas for Cuyahoga County. Petitioner filed a

demand for a jury trial, which he was denied. In-

stead, the Court of Commom Pleas decided the case

adversely to petitioner on a motion for summary

h

judgment. In so deciding, the trial judge resorted

to various depositions as the basis for his de-

ciding. The evidential content of these deposi-

tions was in conflict, particularly considering

inferences deriving from circumstances surrounding

a letter claimed to have been destroyed, so that

the case excludes the consideration of circumstan-

tial evidence in a libel action. In the meantime,

an affidavit of prejudice had been filed against

the trial judge to whom the case originally had

been assigned. The Cirio statutes define the pro-

cedures to be followed in such instance. These

procedures were not followed either as to the

original affidavit filed against the first judge;

nor were they followed as to a second affidavit

filed pertaining to any judge assigned to the case

in disregard of Ohio statute. In the meantime,

the grant of summary judgment in light of a factual

dispute arising from circumstantial evidence

denied petitioner his right to a jury trial.

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE OHIO STATUTES ARE CLEAR AND PRECISE IN

DEFINING THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED

RESPECTING AFFIDAVITS OF PREJUDICE. THE

OHIO AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS CONT EM-

PLATE FAIRNESS AT ALL STAGES OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS. THAT A LITIGANT IS DENIED

SAFEGUARDS ACCORDED BY STATUTE MILITATES

AGAINST SUCH FAIRNESS.

Section 2701.03, Ohio Revised Code, defings

the procedures respecting the filing of an affida-

vit of prejudice. It states:

Naee on the filing of an affidavit (of preju-

dice) by any party to such cause or matter sit

the clerk of the court of common pleas shall

enter the fact of such filing on the trial

docket in such cause and forthwith notify

the presiding judge of the court of appeals

for the district in which such court of common

‘pleas is located. If such presiding judge

finds that such judge of the court of common

pleas is disqualified he shall forthdith

notify the chief justice of the supreme court.

The chief justice shall Gektienka and assign

some Other judge to take the place of the

judge against whom such affidavit is filed. **«#"

The statute is explicit. It has been completely

disregarded in this case and in a manner contrary

to other decided Ohio cases, thus according this

petitioner an entirely different and unequal

Standard of law. Compare Adams v. Watts, Justice

of the Peace, et al., (1940) 67 Ohio App. 81,

35 N. E. 2d 845; Tumbleson v. Noble (1959) 109 Quio

Appe 22, 164 N. E. 2d 808; Cuyahoga County Board

of Mental Retardation v. Association of Cuyahoga

County Teachers (1975), 47 Ohio App. 2d 28, 351 N.E.

2d 2%. That judicial officers flagrantly and

arbitrarily disregard the clear and precise language

of this statute also is indicative that those same

judicial officers would fail to recognize a genuine

issue of facte

II. THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE

DENIES PETITIONER ACCESS TO THE OHIO COURTS

FOR JUDICIAL REDRESS AND FURTHER DENIES HIM

A JURY TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE OHIO AND

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

73 Am. Jur. 24 726, Summary Judgment, Sec-

tion kh, states:

" # # #* There are three classes of

litigation which are not usually suited for

summary disposition, namely, negligence ac-

tions, cases where motive, intent, con-

sciousness, conscience, or subjective

feelings and reactions are involved, and

equitable actions * # #."

Friedman et al. v. Meyers et al., 482 F. 2d

435 (2d Cire, 1973), to the same effect, at page

439, statess

"The other claims and defenses in the

present suit bristle with genuine issues as

Le ce Le TT A MT eT TTT NENT

to the material facts. For instance, issues

are raised as to the state of mind, intent

and knowledge of the parties. We have re-

peatedly stated that summary judgment is

particularly inappropriate where, as here,

it is sought on the basis of ‘the inferences

which the parties seek to have dram (as to)

questions of motive, intent, and subjective

feelings and reactions.' (citation of cases

omitted) # *« #,"

In accord with this view, see also Conrad v. Delta

Air Lines, Inc. 49h Fe 2d 91h, at page 918 (7th Cir.,

197k). Libel is an action particularly involving

motive, intent, and subjective feelings and

reactions, Article I, Section 16, of the Constitu-

tion of the State of CRO (Appey pgs A 27);

guarantees this petitioner access to the judicial

system for redress of grievance. Article I,

Section 5, of that same Constitution (Appe, p. A 27)

provides that such redress shall be by jury trial.

Amendment Fourteen, Constitution of the United

States (Appe, Pe 28) becomes in this regard addi-

tional Constitutional protection. For any judi-

cial officer of a State, under the circumstances

of this case, to sustain a motion for summary

judgment becomes destructive of the jury process,

the judicial system and our entire constitutional

structure.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, a writ of cer-

tiorari should issue to review the judgment and

opon of the Supreme Court of Ghio.

Respectfully submitted,

Janes F. Sexton

Counsel for Petitioner

Al

OPINION OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

(Filed October 31, 1977)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

JAMES F. SEXTON ) CASE NO. 930,708

Plaintiff )

VSe ) MEMORANDUM

THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB, ) OF DECISICN

et al

)

This matter came on for hearing before the

Def endants

Court upon the defendant Cleveland Athletic Club's

Motion for Summary Judgment, the pleadings and

accompanying documents.

It appears from the evidence that reasonable

minds can come to but one conclusion and that con-

clusion is adverse to the plaintiff. After con-

struing the evidence mst strongly in favor of

A2

plaintiff, the Court finds that there was no slan-

der or libel of the plaintiff by the defendant,

Cleveland Athletic Club, and that all statements

regarding plaintiff by members, agents and employ-

ees of the said defendant were conditionally privi-

leged.

Defendant Cleveland Athletic Club is entitled

to judgment against plaintiff James F. Sexton, and

this cause is ordered dismissed with prejudice, at

plaintiff's costs.

The said defendant's counsel is asked to pre-

pare a suitable judgment entry, submit it to plain-

tiff 's counsel, and then tramsmit it to the under-

signed for signing.

s/ Merle Hoddinott, Dillon

(Sitting by assignment

from Monroe County)

Box 563

Woodsfield, Ohio 3793

A3

JUDGMENT ENTRY OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

(Filed December 29, 1977)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

JAMES F. SEXTON ) CASE NO. 930,708

Plaintiff )

‘VSe )

THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB, ) JUDGMENT ENTRY

et al

)

This action came on for hearing before the

Defendants

court upon the defendant, The Cleveland Athletic

Club's Motion for Summary Judgment, the pleadings

and accompanying documents on the 28th day of

Cctober, 1977, and the issues having been duly

heard with all parties having participated in the

oral hearing and a decision having been duly ren-

dered, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the plain

tiff take nothing, that the action be dismissed on

the merits with prejudice at plaintiff's cost and

Al

that judgment be entered for the defendant, The

Cleveland Athletic Club, for the costs of the ac-

tions

s/ Merle Hoddinott, Judge

(Sitting by assignment

from Monroe County)

Box 563

Woodsfield, Ohio

AS

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

(Filed July 12, 1979)

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

NO. 38990

JAMES F. SEXTON )

APPELLANT ) JOURNAL ENTRY

-vs- ) AND

THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB ) OPINION

APPELLEE )

STILLMAN, Jo3

This cause came on to be heard upon the plead-

ings and the transcript of the evidence and the re-

cord in the Common Pleas Court, and was argued by

counsel for the partiess and upon consideration,

the court finds no error prejudicial to the appel-

lant and therefore the judgment of the Common

Pleas Court is affirmed. Each assignment of error

A6

was reviewed and upon review the following disposi-

tion made:

In July of 1973, appellant, James Sexton, ap-

plied for membership in The Cleveland Athletic

Club, a private organization located in downtown

Cleveland. His application Was processed in ac~-

cordance with the club's standard admission pro-

ceduree On September 13, 1973, appellant was noti-

fied by letter that the Club's Admissions Committee

had failed to take any action with respect to his

application. |

On June 28, 197k, appellant instituted an ac-

tion for slander and libel by filing a complaint

against appellee, The Cleveland Athletic Club, in

the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. In his

complaint, appellant alleged as follows:

1. The defendant is a corpération organized

and existing under and by virtue of the laws

of the State of Ohio.

2e The plaintiff filed an application for

|

A7 A8

membership in the defendant organization on damages in the amount of $50,000.00 as a result

which plaintiff was advised no action was of the alleged defamation on the part of appel-

taken. : | leee Appellant also stated that he was entitled

3. Plaintiff made written inquiry as to to punitive damages in the amount of $25,000.00.

the nature of any remarks made to its member- : The case was assigned to Judge Lloyd 0.

ship committee concerning this plaintiff. Browne On August 5, 197h, appellant filed an

Plaintiff.received no reply to said written amended complaint that added two "John Doe" de-

inquiry e fendants. The lawsuit was later dismissed as to

4. Plaintiff states, on information and these defendants because service of process had

belief, that remarks slanderous and libelous never been made upon them,

to this plaintiff were made to said membership Appellee filed a motion to dismiss en failure

committee and by said committee were published to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

and circulated among the members of said com The motion was overruled on March 12, 1975.

mittee. ° : Subsequently, appellee filed an answer to ap-

S- Plaintiff states, on information and be-~ pellant's complaint. In this pleading, appellee

lief, that said remarks were false and injuri- admitted that it is an Ohio corporation, that ap-

ious to the employment and profession of the pellant had inquired as to whether any comments

plaintiff, who is an attorney and also is certi- | regarding his application for membership had been

fied to practice accountancy. | made to appellee's Membership Committee, and that

Appellant further asserted that he had sustained | Appellant had received no response to his request

A9

for information. Appellee denied the remaining

allegations contained in appellant's complaint.

On November 20, 1975, appellant filed a docu-

ment entitied "Affidavit of Prejudice". In this

affidavit, appellant maintained that Judge Brom

had "exhibited a bias and prejudice" against ap-

pellant. Appellant's reasons for this contention

were as follows:

Motions presently before the Court were filed

by plaintiff on October 31, 1975, and deposited

pursuant to said judicial officer's instruction

in the Clerk's office at 1560 East 21st Street,

Cleveland, Ghio, so that consideration could

be given by said judicial officer immediately

thereto in view of the trial date set by said

judicial officer. Said judicial officer fur-

ther by registered letter dated November 13,

1975, was advised that plaintiff was not

asking @ continuance and was readying his

case for trial. Said preparation involves

£10:

time and monetary cost with the result that

any continuance mde by said judicial officer

on November 2), 1975, evidences deliberate

bias and prejudice, with the further result

that going forward by trial evidences de-

liberate bias and prejudice because it has

denied plaintiff his discovery and other

rights by said judicial officer's fa ling

to act on discovery and other motions prior

to the said trial date, . « oe «

Thereafter, Judge Brown voluntarily disqualified

himself from acting in the proceeding. The case

was reassigned to Judge Robert L. Simmons.

Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment

on November 21, 1975. Appellee asserted that the

amended complaint and eight depositions demn-

strated that there was no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that appellee was entitled to

judgment as a miter of law. Appellant submitted

a brief in opposition to appellee's motion.

All

The trial court denied the motion for summary

judgment. The court ruled that the motion was pre- )

mature because appellant had not yet completed )

discovery.

On December 10, 1976, the case was transferred

to Judge Joseph J. Nahra. The action was subse-

quently assigned to Judge Frederick M. Coleman.

Appellee renewed its motion for summary judg-

ment on June 23, 1977. The motion was based upon

the eight original depositions, three continued

depositions and six additional depositions. All

but one of these depositions were taken by appel-

lant.

Thereafter, appellant filed a brief in op-

position to the motion for summary judgment. On

October 5, 1977, appellant filed a document cap-

tioned "Plaintiff's Affidavit In Opposition To

Motion for Summary Judgment And Affidavit of :

Prejudice". With respect to the claim of preju-

dice, appellant stated as follows:

Al2

The administrative handling of this lawsuit

by this court of common pleas has been highly

prejudicial to plaintiff, as is apparent from

any examination of the record herein. The

administrative handling of a case includes

the assignment of a case to a judge. Upon

the filing of an affidavit of prejudice, the

provisions of Section 2701.03, Ohio Revised

Code, become controlling; and such an affi-

davit already has been filed in this case.

The provisions of the statute are mandatory

and neither a judge of the court of common

pleas nor its clerk have the re to

disregard the plain provisions of that sta-

tute. In the meantime, without the stasube

being followed, there has been a succession

of judges in the cases Judge Brown, Judge

Simmons, Judge Naka, Judge Coleman, and

plzintiff now is advised that the case is

to be assigned to a visiting judge. Plain-

A13

tiff finds it unusual for Judge Coleman to

disqualify himself unless there is a reason.

If there is a reason, then he should have

taken no action in the case. The case now

is to be assigned to a visiting judge, ap-

parently indicating that there will be a

bias and prejudice in favor of the Cleveland

Athletic Clui, with a consequent bias and

prejudice against the plaintiff, in the event

a local judge is assigned to the case.

e e o It is quite apparent that plaintiff has

prejudiced by the failure of this court of

common pleas and of its clerk to follow the

provisions of Section 2701.03, iio Revised

Code, as it applies to judicial conduct. AS

& consequence, any judicial officer of the

court of common pleas who proceeds to take

any action in this case is doing so contrary

to statute and is without jurisdiction, Any

further delay by appeal of a decision on a

Bo rah a knit See

Al,

motion for summary judgment would be parti-

cularly prejudicial to this lawsuit. Plain-

tiff therefore constitutes this his affidavit

of bias and prejudice against any judge of

the court of common shai or any clerk or

other official under his direction, making

an assignment of a judge to this case, be he

a visiting judge or otherwise, and plaintiff

further makes this an affidavit of bias and

prejudice against any judge, visiting or

otherwise, assigned by a judge of the court

of common pleas or under his direction, as

having a bias and prejudice in favor of the

Cleveland Athletic Club and a bias and preju-

dice against plaintiff.

The case was transferred to Judge Merle

Hoddinott, who conducted a hearing on the motion

for summary judgment on October 28, 1977, and

subsequently ordered that the action be dismissed

on the merits with prejudice. The decision was

:

Als | 3 | A16

journalized on December 29, 1977. JUDGE DECING (sic) A CASE WHEN AN AFFIDAVIT

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. : OF PREJUDICE WAS OUTSTANDING AGAINST HIM,

Five errors have been assigned: eg Since the first and fifth assignments of error are

I. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED BY | interrelated, they are being considered together.

ENTERING A DECISION IN THE CASE WITH- R. C. Section 2701.03 is concerned with the dis-

OUT A COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS qualification of a trial court judge. This statute

OF SECTION 2701.03, OHIO REVISED CODE. provides

II. THE COURT CF COMMON PLEAS ERRED BY When a judge of the court of common pleas

DECIDING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is interested in a cause or matter pending be-

WHEN THE FACTS WERE IN DISPUTE. fore the court, is related to, or has a bias

IiI. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED BY | or prejudice either for or against, a party

DECIDING A CASE ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY to such matter or cause or to his counsel,

JUDGMENT WHEN THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 3 or is otherwise disqualified to sit in such

FAILED TO MAKE SERVICE UPON THE PLAIN- cause or matter, on the filing of an affi-

TIFF-APPELLANT OF ALL DOCUMENTS UPON . davit by any party to such cause or setter,

WHICH THE MOTION WAS BASED. | : or by the counsel of any party, setting

IV. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED BY forth the fact of such interest, bias,

DENYING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HIS RIGHT prejudice, or disqualification, the clerk of

TO A JURY TRIAL. | of the court of common pleas shall enter the

V. THE COURT CF COMMON PLEAS ERRED BY A fact of such filing on the trial docket in °

{

Al7

in such cause and forthwith notify the pre=

siding judge of the court of appeals for the

district in which such court of common pleas

is located. If such presiding judge finds

that such judge of the court of common pleas

is disqualified he shall forthwith notify the

chief justice of the supreme court. The

chief justice shall designate and assign some

other judge to take the place of the judge

against whom such affidavit is filed. The

judge so assigned shall try such mtter or

cause€e Such affidavit shall be filed not

less than three days prior to the time set

for the hearing in such matter or cause.

(Emphasis added)

We conclude thet compliance with the above provi-

sions was not required in the present Case.

Initially, appellant filed an affidavit of preju-

against Judge Brown. Judge Brown promptly

disqualified himself from acting in the mtter,

Als

thereby alleviating the necessity for a proceeding

pursuant to R. C. Section 2701.03.

The action was subsequently assigned to

Judges Simmons, Hahra, and Coleman. Appellant did

not challenge their authority to act in the case

until after he had discovered that the lawsuit was

to be transferred to yet another judge. At that

point, appellant submitted another affidavit of

prejudice which contained broad allegations

unsupported by any concrete facts.

A reading of R. C. Section 2701.03 indicates

that the statute contemplates that a party filing

an affidavit of prejudice mst set forth specific

facts which demonstrate interest, bias, or preju-

dice on the part cf a judge. In the instant case,

appellant failed to do so. Therefore, the trial

court (Judge Hoddinott) did not err in disregarding

the second affidavit of prejudice and rendering a

decision on the merits of the case.

For the foregoing reasons, the first and fifth

ag

assignments of error are overruled.

Concerning the second assignment of error,

Civil Rule 56(C) provides in pertinent part:

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith

if the pleading, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, written admissions, affida-

vits, transcripts of evidence in the pending

case, and written stipulations of fact » if

any, timely filed in the action, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a mtter of law. No evidence

or stipulation may be considered except as

stated in this rule. A summary judgment

shall not be rendered wmiless it appears from

such evidence or stipulation and only there—

from, that reasonable minds can come to but

one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse

to the party against whom the motion for

Summary judgment is made, such party being

A20

being entitled to have the evidence or stipu-

lation construed mst strongly in his favor,

The instant action is concerned with the torts

of libel and slender. Libel is defined as a false

and malicious publication made with the intent to

injure a person's reputation or expose him to

public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or

disgrace, or to affect him adversely in his trade

or provessione Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Ince Ve

E. W. Scripps Coe (197h), 43 Ohio Appe 2d 105.

The elements of slander are identical to those

of libel except that slander involves an oral

statement rather than a written publication.

See, Fawcett ve Gs C. Murphy & Co. (1976),

46 Chio St. 2d 245.

In order to prevail in an action for libel

or slander, the plaintiff mst prove the following:

1) that the claimed words were published or

spoken; 2) that the words were published or

spoken by the defendant; 3) that the words were

A21

published or spoken intentionally and maliciously;

that the words were communicated to one or more

persons other than the parties to the lawsuit;

5) that the words were damaging. 3 (hio Jury

Instructions Chapter 329.

In an action for libel or slander, it is es-

Sential that the plaintiff set forth the words which

he claims were defamatory. Van Ingen v. Newton

(1857), 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 746. If the plain-

tiff fails to do so, there cannot be any factual

issues for resolution. In such a situation, it

is apparent that the defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

In the instant case, appellmt did not set

forth the remarks which he maintains were libelous

and slanderous. The complaint, amended complaint,

and depositions are all devoid of any reference to

the alleged defamatory language. Therefore, the

_ entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee was

appropriate.

A22

The second assignment of error is not well

taken.

Regarding the third assignment of error,

Civil Rule 56, which is concerned with summary

judgment, provides that affidavits in support of

a motion for summary judgment must be served upon

the opposing party. However, the rule does not

require a party filing a motion for sumary judg-

ment to serve depositions upon his opponent.

In the case at bar, appellee did not submit

any affidavits in support of its motion for sum

mary judgment. The motion was based upon the

pleadings and numerous depositions. Appellee

was not required to serve the depositions upon

appellant.

The third assignment of error is overruled.

Turning to the fourth assignment of error,

it is well settled that an entry cf summry judg-

ment in a case in which there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact does not constitute a

A23

denial of the right to a jury trial. Houck ve

Ross (1973), 3 Ohio St. 2d 77.

In the present case, there were no factual

issues to be determined. Thus, in entering sum

mary judgment for appellee, the trial court did

not infringe upon appellant's right to a jury

trial.

The fourth assignment of error is without

merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment hereto-

fore rendered.

It is ordered that appellee recover of appel-

lant its costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds

for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue

out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court

to carry this judgment into executio,

A certified copy of this entry shall consti-

A2h,

tute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules

of Kppellate Procedure. Exceptions.

s/ SAULG. STILLMAN

JUDGE

PARRINO, Ce. Jey and

PATTON, J., CONCUR.

A25

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

THE STATE OF OHIO?)

1979 TERM

City of Columbus ) To wits: November 16, 1979

James F. Sexton,

Appe Llant

VSe

The Cleveland Athletic Club,

et ales

Appellees.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 79-1282

MOTION FOR AN ORDER

DIRECTING THE COURT

OF APPEALS FOR CUYA-~

HOGA COUNTY TO CER-

TIFY ITS RECORD

It is ordered by the Court that this motion

is overruled.

A26

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

THE STATE OF OHIO 1979 TERM

City of Columbus ) To wits November 16, 1979

James F. Sexton, Now 79=1282

Appellant ) APPEAL FROM THE COURT

VSe OF APPEALS FOR CUYA»

)

THE CLEVELAND ATHLETIC CLUB HOGA COUNTY

et ale, )

)

)

Appellees

This cause, here on appeal as of right from

the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, was con-

sidered in the manner prescribed by law, and, no

motion to dismiss such appeal having been filed,

the Court sua sponte dismisses the appeal for the

reason that no substantial constitutional question

exists herein.

A27

ARTICLE I, SECTION 5, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE

OF OHIO

Se Trial by jury.

The right of trial by jury shall be invio-

late, except that, in civil cases » laws may be

passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict

by the concurrence of not less: than three-fourths

of the jury.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 16, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE

OF OHIO

16. Redress in courts

All courts shall be open, and every person,

for an injury done him in his land, goods, person,

or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of

law, and shall have justice administered without

denial or delay. Suits may be brough against the

state, in such courts and in such manner, as may

be provided by law.

A28

AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION I, CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or en-—

force any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor shall my State deprive any person of life ’

liberty, or property, without due process of law;

nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.