Petition — Awerkamp v. United States

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No./9-1183F

ROBERT J. AWERKAMP,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

H. CARL RUNGE, JR.

RUNGE & GUMBEL, P. C.

1711 Keebler, P. O. Box 533

Collinsville, Illinois 62234

Telephone: 345-7272 (618)

Attorneys for

Robert J. Awerkamp

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 411 No. Tenth Street 63101 314-231-4477

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Questions Presented For Review .................... 2

I 2

Reasons For Granting the Writ ..................... 4

EE A On 7

Appendix

Unpublished Order, United States vs. Awerkamp No.

Se INES SO A-1l

Order Denying Petition For Rehearing En Banc ....... A-5

ee A-6

ey wna eb eb usecescees A-8

Teen ne ee ee cebeuderace A-10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir., 1972)... 5

Heligman v. United States, 407 F.2d 488 (8th cir., 1969) 6

Irwin v. United States, 561 F.2d 198 (10th Cir., oyrre... 6

In re: Hoffman Can Corporation, 373 F.2d 622 (3rd

MPA te oe Res ee kk 7

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814,

pe I eras eee 6,7

Statutes:

Sans: I sg Se 2,A-1

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No.

ROBERT J. AWERKAMP,

Petitioner,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

Petitioner, Robert J. Awerkamp, prays that a Writ of Cer-

tiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, entered on the above cap-

tioned cause on August 16th, 1979; Petition for Rehearing en

Banc being denied on November 15th, 1979.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals below was rendered in

an unpublished order rendered in United States of America vs.

Robert J. Awerkamp unpublished order No. 78-2084, entered

August 16th, 1979, as appended herein. There was no opinion

filed by the District Court. Petitioner’s motion for rehearing

was denied by the Court of Appeals a copy of which is append-

ed herein.

~~

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on August

16th, 1979. Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc was

denied on November 15th, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether the Court erred in failing to direct a verdict for

the Petitioner on Counts I, II and III of the indictment as a

result of an express grant of immunity to the Petitioner in a civil

proceeding in 1973.

Ii. Whether the Court erred in concluding that Petitioner’s

claim of Fifth Amendment privileges was not made in good

faith where it failed to examine evidence proferred in support of

that claim.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was originally brought in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Southern

Division, before the Honorable J. Waldo Ackerman, cause No.

78-CR-30008. Petitioner was indicted on four (4) counts of

willful failure to fil- income tax returns in violation of 26

U.S.C. Section 7203, in that Petitioner failed to file the required

federal income tax forms in 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974. Peti-

tioner offered into evidence 1040 forms, which had apparently

been amended and not timely filed, for the years 1971, 1972 and

1973. The return filed by Petitioner for the year 1974 contained

Petitioner’s name, his filing status, his wife’s occupation, his

claim of two (2) exemptions and an entry of the word ‘‘NONE’’

with regard to a question concerning alimony payments. The

form was unsigned and all other entries were unanswered under

claim of Fifth Amendment privilege. With regard to the 1974

return, Petitioner offered information in a sealed envelope for

a ve

in camera inspection by the trial Court in order to substantiate

his claim of a Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial Court

refused to review this information. The trial Court also refused

to grant Petitioner a directed verdict with regard to the first

three (3) counts of the indictment for which Petitioner asserted

a grant of immunity. The basis of Petitioner’s claim of a grant

of immunity arose from a declaratory judgment action in-

stituted by Petitioner in 1973 in the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois before Judge Omer Poos. In

that action, Petitioner attempted to establish the proper pro-

cedure for claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination on his tax returns. Petitioner was expressly

granted immunity by Judge Poos from prosecution for claiming

his Fifth Amendment rights for the tax years of 1971, 1972 and

1973 evidence from which grant of immunity was proferred at

the trial of the instant case. There was testimony at the trial of

this case by Internal Revenue Agent, Louis Marberry, who had

been present at the declaratory judgment action, that Judge

Poos had promised immunity to Petitioner. Government Ex-

hibit No. 5 also contains a partial transcript of Petitioner's con-

versation with Judge Poos regarding the grant of immunity.

The District Court, after a jury trial, found Appellant guilty

on May 17th, 1978, on all four (4) counts. Petitioner appealed

his conviction to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The

Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial Court in an

unpublished order dated August 16th, 1979. Petitioner filed a

Petition for Rehearing En Banc which was denied on November

15th, 1979. Petitioner now petitions this Court for a Writ of

Certiorari to review his conviction.

—_

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has decided on an

important question of federal law and their decision directly

conflicts with the holdings of other United States Circuit Courts

of Appeal. This Court should settle this controversy so that the

same rule of law may be uniformly applied throughout the

United States. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also

departed from the excepted and usual force of judicial pro-

ceedings so as to call for an exercise of this Court’s power of

supervision.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Government’s argu-

ment that no evidence of a grant of immunity was submitted at

trial. It is respectfully submitted that evidence supporting Peti-

tioner’s grant of immunity was adduced at trial and Petitioner,

therefore, was entitled to a directed verdict with respect to the

tax years for which the grant of immunity was given. There was

testimony at the trial of this case by Internal Revenue Agent,

Louis Marberry, who had been present at the declaratory judg-

ment action, that Judge Poos had promised immunity to Peti-

tioner.

Q: (Mr. Awerkamp) You do recall some things, all

right. Do you remember Judge Poos telling me that he

would protect me from criminal prosecution for claiining

my Fifth Amendment Rights? Do you remember him tell-

ing me that?

A: (Mr. Marberry) Yes, sir.

Further, Government Exhibit No. 5 also contained a partial

transcript of Petitioner’s conversation with Judge Poos regard-

ing the grant of immunity. (Appendix page A-7, 8). Govern-

ment Exhibit No. 5 was appended to Petitioner’s reply brief on

the appeal of this case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Petitioner contends that the grant of immunity asserted by Peti-

tioner doth at trial and on appeal was sufficiently introduced at

— oe

trial for the Court to have taken note of it and directed a verdict

for the Petitioner on Counts I, II, and III of the indictment.

Alternatively, Petitioner would argue that even should the

Court conclude that insufficient evidence to establish a grant of

immunity was introduced, the Petitioner has made the allega-

tion of a grant of immunity which has been found to be suffi-

cient to warrant a remand of a case for evidentiary determina-

tion of that issue. United States vs. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, (4th

Circ., 1972). In Carter, Defendant alleged that the prosecution

had assured him that he would not be prosecuted for the com-

mission of the crimes he divulged with the exception of a guilty

plea to a misdemeanor offense. This assurance was given in ex-

change for information leading to the apprehension of others

involved in criminal activities. The Court of Appeals vacated

Defendant’s conviction connected with crimes for which he

alleged he had been granted immunity from prosecution. The

Court states:

‘There is more at stake than just the liberty of this De-

fendant. At stake is the honor of the government, public

confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the ef-

ficient administration of justice in a federal scheme of

government. U.S. vs. Carter, supra., at 428.”

It is urged that the same considerations of sound public policy

and confidence in the judicial system apply in this case. Peti-

tioner would request that this cause be remanded for an eviden-

tiary hearing on the issue of the grant of immunity, as the Court

in Carter did, where the allegation of immunity made at the trial

level and the appellate level should have, in the normal course of

judicial proceedings, necessitated a determination of whether

Petitioner was entitled to immunity from prosecution. Peti-

ticner respectully requests the Court settle the conflict between

the Circuits as to the procedure to be followed once a Petitioner

has alleged a grant of immunity and submitted evidence in sup-

port of that grant.

ve RO

II. The Appellate Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that

his Fifth Amendment claims were made in good faith, con-

cluding that Petitioner had made what constituted a ‘“‘blanket

assertion’’ of his Fifth Amendment right on his income tax

return. Petitioner included his name, his filing status, his wife’s

occupation, his claim of two (2) exemptions and the response

‘““NONE”’ to the question concerning alimony payments. Peti-

tioner contends that the Appellate Court erred in affirming the

trial Court’s conclusion that his claims were not made in good

faith based on the trial Court’s failure to consider all the

evidence submitted to it in support of the claim of good faith.

At trial, Petitioner, in order to substantiate his claim of a

good faith assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights and to

demonstrate that completing the income tax forms with any in-

formation in addition to that which he had provided would sub-

ject him to criminal charges, tendered to the trial Court a sealed

envelope for in camera inspection. The information Petitioner

attempted to submit to the Court specified the basis for his Fifth

Amendment claims and the necessity for asserting his claim in

response to the questions on the tax form. Heligman vs. United

States, 407 F.2d 488, (8th Circ., 1963) and Jrwin vs. United

States, 561 F.2d 198, (10th Circ., 1977) made it clear that the

taxpayer may refuse to answer questions on his tax return based

on his Fifth Amendment rights and the Court, not the taxpayer,

must make a determination based upon some showing by the

taxpayer as to whether the Fifth Amendment claim is justified.

Petitioner attempted to furnish the Court with his rationale for

claiming the Fifth Amendment and the manner in which he

claimed it. The Court refused to examine the tendered

explanation.

In In re: Hoffman Can Corporation, 373 F.2d 622, (3rd

Circ., 1967), the Court found that requiring the submission of a

sealed envelope containing information substantiating Ap-

pellants’ claims of their Fifth Amendment rights to be an overly

intrusive manner of determining the propriety of asserting the

—

Fifth Amendment. In this case, Petitioner voluntarily proffered

material for the Court’s inspection and to aid it in its determina-

tion of whether the Petitioner was justified in asserting his Fifth

Amendment rights. In essence, Petitioner invoked his privilege

in the presence of the trial judge and the trial judge was required

to evaluate the Petitioner’s invocation. Jn re: Hoffman Can

Corporation, supra. As the Court in In re: Hoffman Can Cor-

poration, supra., noted with respect to Fifth Amendment claims

‘(S)uch claims peculiarily require a judgment based

upon a delicate weighing of all surrounding

circumstances.”’ Jn re: Hoffman Can Corporation, supra.,

at page 628.

The trial judge here cannot be said to have weighed all the sur-

rounding circumstances including the peculiarities of the par-

ticular case. Hoffman vs. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71S. Ct.

814, 95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951).

It should also be noted that Petitioner’s good faith was fur-

ther manifested by the maintaining of a declaratory judgment

action which he brought to establish the proper procedure for

asserting his Fifth Amendment rights. Petitioner acted in

reliance on the outcome of those proceedings when asserting his

Fifth Amendment rights.

Petitioner respectfully requests this Court determine, as an

important question of federal law, the proper procedure for a

Petitioner to present to the Court an order for the Court to con-

sider and evaluate all evidence of good faith, his basis for assert-

ing a Fifth Amendment claim.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant this Writ

of Certiorari in order to determine the questions raised in this

Petition.

—

First, Petitioner’s allegation and submission of evidence in

support of a grant of immunity requires an evidentiary deter-

mination, in the interests of sound public policy and consistency

among the Circuits, whether Petitioner was granted immunity.

If Petitioner was granted immunity from prosecution Counts I,

II and III of the indictment, then this Court should make a

determination of whether the trial Court erred in refusing to

grant a directed verdict for the Petitioner on Counts I, I and III

of the indictment.

Second, in the interests of developing a defined and consis-

tent federal law this Court should grant a Writ of Certiorari in

this case to determine the proper procedure for a Petitioner to

submit to the trial Court evidence of his good faith in asserting

his Fifth Amendment rights on federal income tax returns.

For the foregoing reasons this Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RUNGE & GUMBEL, P.C.

By: H. Carl Runge, Jr.

1711 Keebler, P.O. Box 533

Collinsville, Illinois 62234

Telephone: 345-7272 (618)

Attorney for Robert J.

Awerkamp

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APPENDIX

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Unpublished Order Not To Be Cited Per Circuit Rule 88

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued April 6, 1979

August 16, 1979

Before

Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild, Chief Judge

Hon. Robert A. Sprecher, Circuit Judge

Hon. Walter E. Hoffman*, Senior District Judge

No. 78-2084

United States of America, On appeal from the

Plaintiff-Appellee, United States District

Court for the

VS. Southern District of

j Illinois, Southern

Robert J. Awerkamp, Division

Defendant-Appellant, No. 78-Cr.-30008

J. Waldo Ackerman,

J Judge

ORDER

This is an appeal by Robert J. Awerkamp from his jury con-

viction on four counts of willfully failing to file his income tax

returns for the years 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974, in violation of

26 U.S.C. §7203. Awerkamp was sentenced to one year im-

prisonment on Count One and imposition of sentence on

Counts Two, Three, and Four was suspended. He was also

given five years of probation to commence after any parole

supervision on Count One.

*The Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, Senior United States District

Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

in ell es

On appeal, Awerkamp argues that the trial judge failed to in-

struct the jury as to his right to claim his Fifth Amendment

privilege on his tax returns, failed to instruct the jury that the

‘‘willful’’ element charged in the information should be defined

as including ‘‘bad purpose’’ or ‘‘evil motive,’’ and failed to

direct a verdict for him on Counts One, Two, and Three of the

inform*tion based on an alleged grant of immunity. For the

following reasons, we reject these arguments and affirm the

district court.

Right to Claim Fifth Amendment

The evidence at trial showed that the defendant had not filed

an income tax return for the years 1971, 1972, and 1973. The

records of the IRS did show that a document had been filed by

Awerkamp in 1974. The document was a Form 1040 on which

Awerkamp claimed the Fifth Amendment for all entries on the

form except for his name, his filing status (married filing

separately), his wife’s occupation (housewife), his claim of two

exemptions and his entry of the word ‘‘none’’ concerning

alimony payments. The form was not signed or dated. He also

claimed the Fifth Amendment on the form in refusing to give

the first names of his children.

We note that appellant’s brief does not point to any requested

instruction concerning the right to claim the Fifth Amendment

on tax returns. Assuming such an instruction was requested, it

was properly refused.

Appellant relies on United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259

(1927), and Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), for

the proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination can

be claimed on income tax returns. Appellant is correct.

However, the claimed privilege discussed in Su/livan and Garner

must be made for a specific reason. The withheld information

must lead to discovery of a crime, United States v. Sullivan,

supra, at 263, and a person can claim the privilege for certain _

ey =

specific information but cannot refuse to make any return at all,

Garner v. United States, supra, at 650. In Garner, the Court

stated that certain information would be so neutral as to cause

the privilege to be claimed rarely, if ever. 424 U.S. at 650, n.3.

Appellate courts which have considered blanket declarations

of the Fifth Amendment privilege, such as Awerkamp made in

his 1974 return, are unanimous in holding that such blanket

declarations are failures to file a return as required by law.

United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (Sth Cir. 1978); United

States v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1975) cert. den. 423

U.S. 842, reh. den. 423 U.S. 991; United States v. Daly, 481

F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973) cert. den. 414 U.S. 1064; United States

v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1970) cert. den. 400 U.S. 824.

Our decision in United States v. Jordan, supra, makes it clear

that a Fifth Amendment claim must be valid in order to be con-

sidered in a 26 U.S.C. §7203 prosecution and that to be valid

““the taxpayer, cannot assert the privilege to every question ask-

ed by the examiner, most of which are innocuous on their

face.’’ 508 F.2d at 752, quoting, United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d

at 30. Awerkamp’s return was devoid of financial information

and it is clear from its face that it was not made in good faith. It

was not even signed. Such a claim of the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination is not valid and the district

judge properly refused to instruct the jury that it was valid.

Willful Element of Charge

The claim that the element of willfulness in a 26 U.S.C. §7203

is defined as ‘‘bad purpose’’ or ‘‘evil motive’’ is frivolous. The

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Poinponio, 429.

U.S. 10 (1976) reh. den. 429 U.S. 987, held that willfulness in an

income tax prosecution does not require proof of a motive other

than an intentional violation of a known legal duty.

— = wen

Alleged Grant of Immunity

Awerkamp claims that United States District Court Judge

Omer Poos (now deceased) told him in connection with a

declaratory judgment action brought by Awerkamp over his

1971 and 1972 taxes, that he would not be prosecuted for claim-

ing his Fifth Amendment rights for tax years 1971 and 1972.

Appellant produced no evidence of such a grant at trial; he did

not tender a transcript of the proceeding.

Awerkamp’s own quotations from the transcript of that pro-

ceeding, contained in a trial brief he filed, clearly shows that

Judge Poos merely informed Awerkamp that the IRS could not

force him to appear before an IRS agent and give testimony

against himself. The district judge correctly refused to direct a

verdict on the basis of Awerkamp’s unfounded claim.

AFFIRMED.

— <j

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

November 15, 1979

Before

Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild, Chief Judge

Hon. Robert A. Sprecher, Circuit Judge

Hon. Walter E. Hoffman*, Senior District Judge

No. 78-2084

5

United States of America, On appeal from the

Plaintiff-Appellee, United States District

Court for the

vs. Southern District of

{ Illinois, Southern

Robert J. Awerkamp, Division

Defendant-Appellant, No. 78-Cr.-30008

J. Waldo Ackerman,

7 Judge

ORDER

Treating the ‘‘Petition for Rehearing En Banc’’asa petition

for rehearing under Rule 40, F.R.AP., the members of the

original panel having voted to DENY,

Treating the petition as a suggestion for rehearing en banc

under Rule 35, F.R.A.P., no judge** in regular active service

having requested a vote thereon,

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing

en banc is hereby, DENIED.

*Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, Senior District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia, is sitting by designation, and did not par-

ticipate in the consideration of en banc rehearing.

**Circuit Judge Harlington Wood, Jr. did not participate in the

consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc.

—"

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT SUBMITTED AS GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT NO. 5 AND

APPENDED TO PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

THE COURT: You can always maintain your Constitutional

rights, nobody can force you to surrender them. (TR 71)

THE COURT: True, they can’t require him to violate his

Constitutional rights, . . . (TR 73)

MR. AWERKAMP: Yes, Your Honor, they have ordered

me to bring my books and records and give testimony. THE

COURT: Well, all you have to do is appear before them, and say

I will not do it, because it might tend to incriminate me and

violate my rights under the Sth Amendment of the Constitution

of the United States. (TR 73-74)

THE COURT: Nobody can compel you to waive your Con-

stitutional rights. (TR 75)

THE COURT: Well, the only interpretation that I give the

Constitution is that it means what it says. ... you can’t be re-

quired to incriminate yourself by giving that evidence. (TR 76)

THE COURT: .. . and you are always required to obey the

law unless it infringes on your constitutional rights . . . I think

your constitutional rights to not give testimony against yourself

are always adequately protected. (TR 77)

THE COURT: .. . but I don’t think I could punish you nor

could anybody punish you by requiring you to waive the con-

stitutional rights, . . . (TR 80)

MR. AWERKAMP: (In referring to Hill v. Philpott, 445

F.2d 144) . . .I felt that their reasoning was that the Govern-

ment had no right to use a man’s records against himself. THE

COURT: I will be inclined to agree with you. (TR 82)

|

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THE COURT: That’s the only—but I couldn’t compel you

to give testimony against yourself, because that’s a constitu-

tional right that I have to protect. (TR 83)

THE COURT: Well, you’ll be protected by this Court

against a criminal case from anybody trying to indulge /sic/

something against your constitutional rights. MR.

AWERKAMP: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: No

doubt about that. (TR 84)

THE COURT: Well, would you be willing to, if he comes in

and talks to you, to give him the privilege of being not pros-

ecuted for the violation of a constitutional right? MR.

HOENIG (attorney for the Government): No, Your Honor, I

have no authority to do that. THE COURT: Then you don’t

have that authority, then I don’t think you can go that far. MR.

HOENIG: I myself don’t. The situation is that if—if the

man—if Mr. Awerkamp does have a legitimate fear of self-

incrimination as to each—. THE COURT: That isn’t for you to

question. He is the man that has the constitutional right to raise

it. And if he has the fear, and he is relying on his constitutional

right, you can’t go beyond that. (TR 86)

Mr. HOENIG: Now the question comes whether or not he

legitimately has this fear or whether he just makes a blanket

privilege—. THE COURT: (Interposing) That isn’t a question

for you to raise, I don’t think. (TR 87)

THE COURT: This man can claim that constitutional right

any time he wants to. MR. HOENIG: He can. THE COURT:

And nobody can prevent him from claiming it. You can’t, you

can’t disobey—. MR. HOENIG: (Interposing) We are not try-

ing—we are not saying that he does not have the right to invoke

the 5th Amendment privilege. THE COURT: That’s what he

has done then. MR. HOENIG: But what we are saying is that he

can only invoke it if, if he is in legitimate fear of criminal pro-

secution, and—. THE COURT: (Interposing) That isn’t what

a eS ee

the Constitution says. The Constitution says nobody can be

compelled under guise of law to give testimony against

themselves. MR. HOENIG: That’s true, in fear, but again we

have to determine, the Court—it’s the discretion of the Court to

determine—. THE COURT: (Interposing) No, it is not the

Court’s discretion, it is what the Constitution says. (TR 89-90)

ict ee Sioa

THE LAW

I. Whether the Court erred in failing to direct a verdict for

the Petitioner on Counts I, II and III of the indictment as a

result of an express grant of immunity to the Petitiner in a civil

proceeding in 1973.

United States vs. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, (4th Circ., 1972)

II. Whether the Court erred in concluding that Petitioner’s

claim of Fifth Amendment privileges was not made in good

faith where it failed to examine evidence proffered in support of

that claim.

Heligman vs. United States, 407 F.2d 488, (8th Circ., 1969)

Irwin vs. United States, 561 F.2d 198, (10th Circ. 1977)

In re: Hoffman Can Corporation, 373 F.2d 622, (3rd

Circ., 1967)

Hoffman vs. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71S. Ct. 814, 95

L. Ed. 1118 (1951)

— A-10 —

STATUTES

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a

Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public

danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 7203, Title 26 U.S.C,

Section 7203

Wilful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, or Pay Tax

Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax

or taxes or required by this title or by regulations made under

authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required

under authority of Section 6015), keep any records, or supply

any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or

taxes, make such return, keep such records, or supply such in-

formation, at the time or times provided by law or regulations,

shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of

a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not

more than $10,000.00, or imprisoned not more than one (1)

year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.