Petition — Gonzalez v. Department of Human Resources
Supreme Court brief1980
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1979
No. 79
GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
2 Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
JAMES E. BELTON
SUSAN REES WILLIAMS
DAVID GRAY HALL
TEXAS RURAL LEGAL AID, INC.
103 East Third
Weslaco, Texas 78596
Attorneys for Petitioner
cae — +o eRe
Washington, 0.C ee CLB PUBLISHERS’ e LAW PRINTING CO. e (202) 393-0625
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Tele GE BUEROTICAGS .. occ cicessaedscaen ii
CmimOme BOLOW 6 on cc ccc ci cecescccesececess 2
ee ee ee ee 2
Question Presented .......cccccccccccccces 2
Pe. BITC LUOE oc occ cckcewese seanesencen 2
Statement of the Case .....c.c ccc ccccccece a
Reasons for Granting the Writ ............ 6
PRE fn ns Cetccepesesdceebaseasenet hs 20
Appendix
A. Final Judgment, 197th District Court
of Cameron County, Texas.......... 1A
B. Opinion and Judgment of the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, Thirteenth
Supreme Judicial District......... 1B
Cc. Order of the Texas Supreme Court..1C
D. §15.02-Involuntary Termination of
Parental Rights Statute........... 1D
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Alsager v. District Court of Polk
County, Iowa, 406 F.Supp. 10
(S.D. Iowa 1975) aff'd 545 F.2d
Bee OO 6 CAPO Ps codec cacdesrscecs 8
Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)..15
Connally v. General Construction Co.,
ae ee LADEN Ss eee ss ccsaveccdce 9
D.F. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933
(Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [lst Dist. ]
fy A Sky er a ee hs eda a 10
Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37
ee se. ewes 8
Ginsberg v. State of New York,
ee ee ee EROS acc bc oweecccese 12
Grayned v. City of Rockford,
ee ee OO ERO eee ek wees ovees 9
Higgins v. Dallas County Child
Welfare Unit, 544 S.W.2d 745
(Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1976,
Oe Perr ra eS Pe EN ae ere 10
In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal.
I ee ear is a a ae Sad eee wwe %. 0 6.0 17
In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d
ad og 6. 4 0 0 0 ee ok ee VO ee 8
iii
In re D.T., 237 N.W.2d 166 (S.D.Sup.
Ls. | Se aren rae Sa arses ae te eee ae er 8
In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851 (Vt.Sup.
bgt Oe er ee Cee eee ee Pe 17
In re People In Interest of M.M.,
529 P.2da 128 (Colo.Sup. 1974)....... 17
In the Matter of R.E.W., 545 S.W.2d
573 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [lst Dist. ]
19077. WEL DOES Wil Gs} os cece cece 10
Interest of Walter B.., 377 2.24 139
(tan Sap. LOTS)... ck kc secs ieee en 17
Matter of S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190
CALE. BUD. L976) ccc vce ceccccsccseses 17
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
ff" 3) Arn eet ee ee ee eee 14
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)........ Se ie tS
Roe v. Conn., 417 F.Supp. 769 (M.D.
SEDs des 26 66a Ok ne es Ow Sat 8,18
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
Gh py i Perr errs ee ee ke ee 15,16
Sanchez v. Texas Dept. of Human
Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.
Civ.App.--Corpus Christi, 1979, no
PRES, oS 6 6k 6a 4s wee NS eee Re 8 8 11
Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
So Sb eer eee ae ec a a eee 17
iv
Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform,
Sek: ees EW BRUT Ts 6 eta he ele le we 12
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
CROCS 6 ERE O56 eed OMS Ook Re 14,16
State v. McMasters, 259 Or. 291,
Dae eee Oe PCO ete Ds ced ok ow dw ae 8,9
State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387
2k SR 7p Ae Or oe e serene a?
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 769
Cee ee Li ko eh ERE ARE Clie eek ee 14
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
Pea dbs se a wt ed wae ee 12,15
STATUTES :
Tex.Family Code Ann.:
Section 15.02( Supe. 1979)... cick ceeds 2
Section 15.02(1)(D) (Supp.1979)..... z;
aeH, 7¢20,42
Be cee Ck BRAT COS oso os ke PE KOS ok eke 2
MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES:
A.B.A. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
PROJECT: STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE
Aer MO. LEROY Eee. cb den hha euk Kets 19
Boskey v. McCue, "Alternative Standards
for Termination of Parental Rights,"
9 Seton Hall L.Rev. 1 (1978)....... t
Vv
Goldstein, "Medical Care for the
Child At Risk: On State Supervention
of Parental Autonomy, "86 Yale L.J.
645 (1977) .. csv ccs ce eee eee nein ae 7
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child,
(1973). cece suet sh eee eee ioe st
Note: "State Intrusion Into Family
Affairs: Justifications and Limita-
tions," 26 Stanford L.Rev. 1383
(1974)... ws2etewe eu ue eee tenn
Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf
of 'Neglected' Children: Standards
for Removal of Children From Their
Homes, Monitoring the Status of
Children in Foster Care, and Termi-
nation of Parental Rights," 28
Stanford L.Rev. 623 (1976)....6,7,8,11
Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf
of 'Neglected' Children: A Search
for Realistic Standards," 27 Stanford
L.Rev. 965 (1978). cs005 0540s Fe ee
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1979
NO. 79
GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,
Petitioner
V.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN’ RESOURCES,
Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
TEXAS COURTS OF CIVIL APPEALS,
THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
The Petitioner, Guadalupe H. Gonzalez,
respectfully prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment of
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District,
entered on May 3, 1979, which judgment was
refused review by the Supreme Court of
Texas on September 12, 1979, upon a
determination that the judgment of the
Court of Civil Appeals presented no error
requiring reversal.
2
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Civil
Appeals is reported at 581 S$.W.2d 522.
That opinion and the judgment of the Court
of Civil Appeals is set forth in Appendix
B, 2meee. The judgment of the 197th
Judicial District Court and the order of
the Texas Supreme Court are set forth in
Appendices A and C, respectively, infra.
JURISDICTION
By order entered on September 12, 1979,
the Supreme Court of Texas refused
Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error
to review the opinion and judgment of the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals. The judgment
and opinion of the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals entered May 3, 1979, is therefore
the judgment of the highest court of Texas
in which a decision could be had. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. Section
1257(3).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
a
WHETHER SECTION 15.02(1)(D) OF THE TEXAS
INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF #£PARENTAL
RIGHTS STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED TO
PETITIONER.
Il.
WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER'S
PARENTAL RIGHTS, ABSENT A SHOWING THAT
TERMINATION WAS THE LEAST DRASTIC MEANS
OF PROTECTING HER CHILDREN, CONSTITUTED
AN IMPERMISSIBLE INTRUSION UPON PETITI-
ONER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HER CHILDREN.
STATUTE INVOLVED
Section 15.02, Tex.Fam.Code Ann., (Supp.
1979, provides in relevant part:
A petition requesting termination of the
parent-child relationship with respect
to a parent who is not the petitioner
may be granted if the Court finds:
(1) the parent has:
2. Fe
(D) knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed the child to remain in
conditions or surroundings which
endanger the physical or emotional
well-being of the child,...
ze & ®
and
(2) termination is in the best
interest of the child,...
zx k
The statute is set out in its entirety in
Appendix D, infra.
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 16, 1978, the State of Texas
officially decreed that Mrs. Guadalupe H.
Gonzalez was no longer the mother of five
of her nine children. Seven of Petitioner
Gonzalez' children, then aged one to four-
teen years, had been seized by State offi-
cers on April 15, 1976, and scattered among
several foster homes. The State accused
the Petitioner of neglécting her children.
Over Petitioner's vigorous objections, a
jury in the 197th District Court of Cameron
County, Texas, found that she had neglected
her children in the circumstances condemned
by Section 15.02(1)(D) of the Texas Family
Code and that termination of the family
relationship was in the "best interest" of
her five youngest children. The strongest
evidence in support of the verdict showed
that the children were frequently at home
alone or in the care of their godmother,
that the home was not kept very clean, that
the utilities had been terminated for
nonpayment, that the children on occasion
wore dirty clothes, that the Petitioner had
"consorted" with men who had physically
abused her, and that the children had lice,
5
two were underdeveloped, while one also had
internal parasites and secondarily infected
scabies sores. None of the acts of neglect
had occurred more recently than twenty-seven
months prior to the trial.
Petitioner's trial pleadings raised
objections that the grounds pled for termin-
\ation were unconstitutionally vague and that
ermination was not the least drastic
means available to adequately protect her
children. The trial court overruled Petiti-
oner's objections to the special jury issues
and motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, each of which encompassed her
vagueness challenge as well as her objection
that it was not shown that termination was
necessary to protect her children.
The Court of Civil Appeals rejected the
vagueness challenge and overruled without
comment the "least drastic means" point of
error, 1 although the State had conceded
the legal theory of that point of error.
By her Point of Error No. 7, Petitioner
contended: The trial court erred in
denying Respondent's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, as there was
no sufficient evidence that no other,
less drastic, alternatives to termination
existed.
Petitioner raised the same assignments of
error on application for writ of error to
the Texas Supreme Court, which refused
review on a finding of no reversible error.
The children have remained in foster
care pending this appeal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Dependency and termination proceedings
are the vehicle through which the state,
acting in its capacity as parens patriae,
protects minor children from parental abuse
and neglect. The statutes which authorize
these proceedings have received little scru-
tiny from this Court, although contemporary
scholars uniformly decry their vague lang-
uage and overreaching character. The
Texas termination of parental rights statu-
2. See Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf
of 'Neglected' Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards," 27 Stanford L.Rev.
985 (1975); Wald, “State Intervention on
Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: Stand-
ards for Removal of Children From Their
Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children
tute is typical of these statutes.
I. SECTION 15.02(1)(D) OF THE ‘TEXAS
INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PAREN-
TAL RIGHTS STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIO-
NALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE AND AS APP-
LIED TO PETITIONER.
Texas provides that parental rights may
be terminated if the parent has "knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed the child to
remain in conditions or surroundings which
endanger the physical or emotional well-
being of the child." Most state statutes
define neglect and grounds for termination
in similarly imprecise language, 7 and the
result has been widespread confusion and
inc onsistency in their enforcement and app-
lication. Professor Wald, who has extensi-
in Foster Care, and Termination
of Parental Rights," 28 Stanford
L.Rev. 623 (1976); Note: "State
Intrusion Into Family Affairs:
Justifications and Limitations," 26
Stanford L.Rev. 1383 (1974); and,
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child,
1973). See, generally, Goldstein,
"Medical Care for the Child at Risk,
On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy," 86 Yale L.J. 645 (1977).
3. Id.
8
vely analyzed this problem, characterizes
termination of parental rights as a "“hap-
hazard process," . ultimately dependent
upon the personal values of social workers
and judges.
Thus, in Oregon, South Dakota, and
Maryland the parent-child relationship may
be extinguished based on statutory language
Similar to the statutes struck down by
courts in Arkansas, Iowa and Alabama. _ 5
is not uncommon to find courts resisting
vagueness challenges to these laws based
upon concern that greater specificity will
4 Wald, supra, 28 Stanford at 688-699,
at m.2%
See State v. McMasters, 259 Or. 291
S60 2.26 567 (2971); In xe D.ft:, 237
N.W.2d 166 (S.D.Sup. 1975); and, In re
Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968)
which upheld the constitutionality of
the statutory language challenged for
vagueness. Compare to Alsager v. Dis-
trict Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F.
Supp.10 (S.D. Iowa 1975) aff'd 545 F.2d
1137 (8th Cir. 1976); Roe v. Conn, 417
F.Supp. 769 (M.D.Ala. 1976); and Davis
v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37 (Ark.Sup. 1979)
which held that language substantially
Similar to that involved in the above
cited cases was unconstitutionally vague.
“<a
9
sacrifice needed flexibility,° which is
traditionally regarded as essential when
determining what is "“best" for children.
This judicial insistence upon the freedom
to act to protect children has sanctioned
laws which, for lack of even remotely
objective standards, threaten every parent-
child relationship.
Failure to provide explicit standards
results in an absence of fair warning to
parents of what conduct is_ prohibited,
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and inhibits the parents’
legitimate exercise of their freedom to
raise their children. See Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S.104, 108-109 (1972).
Therefore, persons of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at the meaning of
such laws and differ as to their application.
Connally v. General Construction Co, 269 U.S.
385 (1926).
These conditions inhere in the Texas sta-
tute as well. It fails to provide objective,
ascertainable standards by which to measure
childrearing practices; nor does it specify
See, e.g., State v. McMasters, supra.,
at 2.5.
10
which needs and interests of the children
are sought to be protected, or the types and
degree of harm which justify the sanctions
of the statute. The Texas courts have failed
to provide a nalrowing construction. ’ With-
out statutory standards or judicial guide-
lines, the value judgments of caseworkers,
judges and juries regarding what are proper
and improper childrearing practices become
the decisive factor.
The Texas provision has been defended as
7. Although faced with numerous opportuni-
ties, the Texas courts in prior termin-
ation cases have failed to cure the
vagueness defects of §15.02(1)(D) through ~
narrowing construction of the statute.
The rule of law expressed, if any, is in
general terms and the decisions turn on
the specific facts of each case. See,
.@.» Higgins v. Dallas County Child
Welfare Unit, 544 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Civ.
App.--Dallas 1976, no writ); In the
Matter of R.E.W., 545 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.
Civ.App.--Houston [lst Dist.] 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); and, D.F. v. State, 525
S.W.2d 933 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [lst
Dist.] 1975, no writ).
In addition, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals in this case made no attempt
to restrict the scope of the statute or
to cure the vagueness defects of the
statute by a narrowing construction.
wind Benet no
=~ et neonnmeee a>
11
the best effort of the Texas legislature
because there would be "extreme difficulty
8 Yet commen-
in being more specific.
tators believe that it is both possible and
desirable to make termination laws more
specific, and have suggested model
standards and statutes which, at a minimun,
demonstrate that such laws can be made
definite. °
Laws containing more precise
standards "do not prevent judges from
examining each situation on its own facts
in order to determine the appropriate
disposition; rather they more _ clearly
define for the judge the kinds of harm with
which society is concerned. "1°
Sanchez v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources
581, S.W.2d 260, 267 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus
Christi, 1979, no writ).
Wald, supra; Goldstein, Freud and Solnit,
supra; and, Note: "State Intrusion Into
Family Affairs," supra, at n.2. See,
generally, Boskey and McCue, "Alternative
Standards for the Termination of Parental
Rights," 9 Seton Hall L.Rev.1, 35-46
(1978).
10 Wald, supra, 27 Stanford L.Rev. at
1003-1004, at n.2.
12
The importance of the parental right of
personal choice in directing the rearing of
their children, Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 #=(1977);
Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), requires unambiguous’ statutory
criteria for defining the circumstances in
which others may substitute their own per-
sonal views regarding childraising. By
examining Section 15.02(1)(D) for vagueness,
this Court can thereby provide needed
guidance to all jurisdictions of the minimum
due process requirements of termination
legislation.
II. THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER'S PAREN-
TAL RIGHTS, ABSENT A SHOWING THAT TER-
MINATION WAS THE LEAST DRASTIC MEANS OF
PROTECTING HER CHILDREN, CONSTITUTED AN
IMPERMISSIBLE INTRUSION UPON PETITI-
ONER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HER CHILDREN.
At stake in termination proceedings is
the very existence of the family. In asser-
ting its right and duty to safeguard the
welfare of children, the State seeks total
er
i
i
i
13
destruction of the family unit. The irre-
vocable nature of termination makes it the
family law equivalent of capital punishment
--the life of the family is thereby extin-
guished. The importance of the family re-
lationship requires that the State bear a
heavy burden to justify the necessity of
terminating that relationship.
A. A PARENT HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN
PRESERVING HER RELATIONSHIP WITH HER
CHILDREN.
Like the marriage relationship, the
relationship between parents and their
children is at the heart of traditional
family life. In addition to biological
bonds, a parent who has raised her children
shares with them emotional attachments,
values, loyalties, traditions and expecta-
tions. It is these bonds which give each
family, and the individuals who comprise
the family, the unique characteristics which
set it apart from all other families.
America has traditionally protected and
cherished the diversity of its citizenry,
which in turn depends upon differences bet-
ween families. When a family relationship
is ended by those who would substitute their
14
own judgments of what is "best", the unique
characteristics of that family are thereby
condemned and society suffers a dilution
of its diversity.
This Court has long been solicitous of
the relationship between parents and their
children. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). Although not explicitly stating
that the interest created by the parent-
child relationship is "fundamental," num-
erous decisions of this Court have recog-
nized the special importance of this right
and have subjected substantial state in-
trusions upon family relationships to the
exacting scrutiny required when "funda-
mental rights" are at stake.
In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769
(1977), the Court referred to the family
unit as "perhaps the most fundamental social
institution of our society." And in
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972), it was observed:
The Court has frequently emphas-
ized the importance of the family.
The rights to conceive and raise
one's children have been deemed
"essential," “basic civil rights
of man," and "[{rjights far more
Sn ee ee a _
PR
precious ...than property rights"
(citations omitted). . . .The integrity
of the family unit has found protection
in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Ninth Amendment (citations omitted).
The right of privacy encompasses only
those personal rights which are deemed
"fundamental" or “implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty." Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the
Court made a statement which it has fre-
quently repeated:
While the outer limits of [the
right of personal privacy] have
not been marked by the Court, it
is clear that among the decisions
that an individual may make with-
out unjustified government inter-
ference are personal decisions re-
lating to . . .family relation-
ships .. . (citations omitted).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978); Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S.
678 (1977).
Where the State has sought to signi-
ficantly intrude upon family relationships,
the Court has required that the intrusion
be both justified by a compelling state
16 17
interest and limited to only the extent of the family relationship in those instan-
necessary to accomplish the state inter- ces where parents refuse to correct the con-
est. Moore v. City of East Cleveland,Ohio, duct or conditions which endanger their
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, supra. | children. But a growing number of state
In Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at 65l, with | courts have recognized that the fundamen-
regard to a parent's interest in children he tal nature of the family relationship re-
had sired and raised, the Court held that | quires strong protection, and have con-
the parent's interest "undeniably warrants sequently required the State to justify
deference and, absent a powerful counter- | the necessity for ending that relationship.
vailing interest, protection." Other alternatives must be explored and
The relationship existing between parents eliminated, with meaningful State assis-
and their children is so rooted in the con- tance provided to the neglectful parent to
science and traditions of our nation as to | help her remedy the situation. + The inqui-
be ranked as fundamental. ry becomes whether termination of the rela-
| tionship is necessary to adequately protect
mite gg Ba Meetead Gy eetor | the children "in the light of less drastic
THE EXTENT OF ITS INTRUSION UPON THAT means for achieving the same purpose."
nie catcsepniaceiciall Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
By completely severing Petitioner's ties | Texas does not inquire whether termi-
with her children, the State sought to 7 nation is necessary to protect the children,
protect the children by means having the
PEs Pomel erm ~
maximum destructive impact upon her family 11 state v. Robert H, 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H
, ; ‘ on.
unit. Sup. 1978); In re People inInterest of
Because the State has the right and duty | ae by = wee — BE gent? gra re
to protect children from the consequences 1974); In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851 (Vt.
: ! Sup.1977); Matter of S.D., Jr., 549
P.2d 1190 (Alk. Sup. 1976); Interest of
Walter B., 577 ¥.2a iis (Utah Sup.
1978).
of parental neglect, Stanley v. Illinois,
Supra, it must be free to seek termination
18
but only whether termination is in their
best interest. 1! It may, at the same time,
be in their interest to continue the rela-
tionship while returning all or some of the
children to the family home for progressive-
ly longer visits under State supervision, or
any of a reasonable number of other alterna-
13 but the Texas termination statute
tives,
does not authorize the jury to recommend
such intermediate solutions. As a result,
the State makes no effort to demonstrate the
inadequacy of other means of protecting the
children. 1}4
The State took possession of Petitioner's
children nearly two and one half years prior
to trial and scattered them into separate
a2 The statute is set out in its entirety
in Appendix D, infra.
_ See, Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769,
779 (M.D. Ala., 1976).
14
State objections, on grounds of ‘re-
levancy, to Petitioner's efforts to
elicit testimony regarding other alter-
natives were sustained by the tri.l
judge. The Court of Civil Appeals
agreed that such evidence was irre-
lavant. Appendix B, pp. 27-31, infra.
are am
L9
foster placements. She was permitted re-
gular visitation, but the State refused to
return any of the children to her home
on even a trial basis. The evidence was
undisputed that she substantially complied
with each instruction given to her by the
State, 1° yet she was denied the opportun-
ity to demonstrate that she had learned her
lesson and could care for her children
without endangering their welfare.?®
> During the pendency of the suit, assis-
tance provided Petitioner by the State
consisted largely of referrals for legal
assistance, employment and income based
upon disability. Petitioner underwent
psychological and neurological examina-
tions and attended Red Cross Health in
Home classes at the request of the State.
16 This case presents a graphic illus-
tration of the situation referred to
in the Commentary to the A.B.A. INSTITUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT: STANDARDS
RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1977):
Too often under current practice,
there is no direction or incentive
for parents or agency to work to-
wards the return of the child...
Dealing with the parents may be
time-consuming and, according to
the agency's priorities, unproduct-
ive...Therefore, no effort is made
to work towards return.
20 21
Given the fundamental interests at CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
stake, it was uncumbent upon the State
to demonstrate that the children could I, James E. Belton, do hereby certify
not be adequately protected by ~Mmeans that I mailed (3) true and correct copies
less drastic than termination of the parent- of the foregoing Petition for Writ of
child relationship. Because the State Certiorari, with first-class postage
failed to make such a showing, and because prepaid, addressed to Selden N. Snedeker,
the Texas termination statute does not re- Criminal District Attorney and Thomas
quire that such a showing be made, the state Sullivan, Assistant Criminal District
action constituted an impermissibly extreme Attorney, Attorneys of Record for Respondent,
intrusion upon the integrity of Petitioner's Cameron County Hall of Justice, 974 E.
family unit. Harrison, Brownsville, Texas 78520; and, E.
Dale Robertson, Attorney Ad Litem for the
CONCLUSION children, 950 E. Van Buren, Brownsville,
Texas 78520, on this 10th day of December,
For the reasons stated, the petition | 1979.
for writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted, [Px LE
JAMES E. BELTON
JAMES E. BELTON
SUSAN REES WILLIAMS
DAVID GRAY HALL
TEXAS RURAL LEGAL AID, INC.
103 East Third Street
Weslaco, Texas 78596
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
NO. 3076-N-T
IN THE INTEREST
OF JOHN HEATH,
MARTHA HEATH,
TOMAS GONZALEZ, JR.
ROBERTO G. DE LEON
ZULEMA DE LEON
AND MARIA G. DE
LEON, MINOR
CHILDREN
IN THE DISTRICT
COURT
CAMERON COUNTY,
TEXAS
197TH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT
SITTING AS A
JUVENILE COURT
FINAL JUDGMENT
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3lst day of
July, 1978, came on to be heard the above
entitled and numbered cause. The
Petitioner, Texas Department of Human
Resources, appeared through its appointed
representative, Remberto Arteaga, and by
and through its attorneys of record, Thomas
Sullivan and Reynaldo S. Cantu, Assistant
District Attorneys for Cameron County,
Texas. The Respondent, Maria Guadalupe
Heath Gonzalez appeared in person and by
through her attorneys of -record, James E.
Belton and Susan Williams of Texas Rural
Legal Aid, Inc. E. Dale Robertson, Attorney
Ad Litem, represented the interest of all
the children.
The Respondent, Tomas Gonzalez, Sr.,
executed an affidavit of Relinquishment of
Parental Rights, and an Affidavit of Waiver
of Interest in the child, Tomas Gonzalez,
Jr., he likewise waived citation and
service of process. Tomas Gonzalez, Sr.,
failed to appear and wholly defaulted. The
Respondent, Leonzo de Leon, although duly
notified and cited, failed to appear and
wholly defaulted. Rolando Heath, the
father of John Heath, Martha Heath and
Albert Heath was deceased in 1967.
All parties announced ready for trial by
their respective attorneys of record. A
jury of twelve good and lawful men and
women was selcted, impaneled and sworn.
The evidence was presented and concluded.
Following the submission of the Court's
final charge and the arguments of counsel,
the jury reached its verdict which was
returned into open court, having been duly
signed by the foreman, Jose R. Salinas, and
duly received and ordered filed by the
court without objection by counsel, which
charge of the court and the answers of the
jury to the special issues submitted to by
the Court are by reference, incorporated
herein for all purposes as fully and
completely as if the same were here set
forth verbatim.
It appeared to the Court that Tomas
Gonzalez, Sr., executed an Affidavit of
Waiver of Interest and Relinquishment of
Parental Rights in the child, Tomas
Gonzalez, Jr., and further that he failed
to provide support for said _ child,
according to his ability for more than a
year ending within six months of the date
of filing of this. suit. It further
appeared that termination of the parent-
child relationship between Tomas Gonzalez,
Sr., and Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., is in the
best interest of the child.
It appeared to the Court that there
exists neither in fact nor in law a parent-
child relationship between Leonzo de Leon
and the children, Robert G. de Leon, Zulema
G. de Leon and Maria Guadalupe de Leon. It
further appeared to the Court that
termination of the parent-child
relationship, if any, between Leonzo de
Leon and the children above named would be
yee oe - ——
> a
in the best interest of the children.
It appeared to the Court that, by
agreement of all parties, filed herein,
termination of the parent-child
relationship between Maria Guadalupe Heath
Gonzalez, and the minor children, John
Heath and Martha Heath is not sought. The
Court is of the opinion that said agreement
is in the best interest of John Heath and
Martha Heath, and should be approved.
It appeared that Maria Guadalupe Heath
Gonzalez had knowingly placed the children
in conditions and surroundings which
endangered their physical well being and
that Maria Guadalupe Heath Gonzalez had
knowingly allowed the children to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endangered
their physical well being. It further
that termination of the
relationship between Maria
Guadalupe Heath Gonzalez and the minor
children, Albert Heath, Tomas Gonzalez,
Jr., Roberto G. de Leon, Zulema G. de Leon
and Maria Guadalupe de Leon would be in the
best interest of the children.
It appears to the Court that’ the
Attorney Ad Litem spent 23.1 hours in the
discharge of his duties and should be con-
appeared
parent-child
Pitiiren
pensated accordingly.
IT
Is
THEREFORE ORDERED ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that:
1.
The parent-child
between Tomas
relationship
Gonzalez, Sr., and
the minor child Tomas Gonzalez, Jr.,
be and is hereby terminated except
that the child retain the right to
inherit from and through its dives-
ted parent.
The parent-child relationship, if
any, between Leonzo de Leon and the
minor children, Robert G. de Leon,
Zulema de Leon, and Maria Guadalupe
de Leon, be and is hereby terminated
except that the children retain the
right to inherit from and through
their divested parent.
The parent-child relationship be-
tween Maria Guadalupe Heath Gonzalez
and the minor children, Albert Heath,
Robert G. de
and Maria
Guadalupe be and is hereby termi-
nated except that the minor children
retain the right to inherit from and
through their divested parent.
Tomas Gonzalez, Jr.,
Leon, Zulema de Leon
6A
Texas Department of Department of
Human Resources, Cameron County
Child Welfare Unit, Remberto
Arteaga, Supervisor, and his succes-
sors in office, be and is hereby
named Managing Conservator of John
Heath and Martha Heath.
The Managing Conservator of John
Heath and Martha Heath has all the
rights duties and obligations as
enumerated in Article 14.02 of the
Texas Family Code except the right
to consent to adoption.
The Texas Department of Human-
Resources, Cameron County Child
Welfare Unit, Remberto’ Arteaga,
Supervisor, and his successors in
office, be and is hereby named
Managing Conservator of Albert
Heath, Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., Roberto
G. de Leon, Zulema G. de Leon and
Maria Guadalupe de Leon.
The Managing Conservator of Albert
Heath, Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., Roberto
G. de Leon, Zulema de Leon, and
Maria Guadalupe de Leon be granted
all the rights, duties and obliga-
tions as enumerated in Article
7A
14.02 of Texas Family Code including
the right to consent to the adoption
of the children named herein.
The Attorney Ad Litem be compensated
in the amount of $575.00 and that
Said amount be taxed as costs.
The costs of this suit be assessed
against the Petitioner.
SIGNED FOR ENTRY on the 16th day of August,
1979.
DARRELL HESTER
PRESIDING JUDGE
APPENDIX B
OPINION OF THE TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
NUMBER 1428
IN THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TEXAS
SITTING AT CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
eb heen 2 2 ie 2 RRR RSA BO 2B
GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,
Appellant,
V.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
Appellee.
2B
he ene 22D SD
On appeal from the 197th District Court of
Cameron County.
"RRR ES 2S 2 SOS
OPINION
Suit was brought by the Cameron County
Child Welfare Unit of the Texas Department
of Human Resources (State) to terminate the
parent-child relationship between Appellant
Guadalupe H. Gonzalez, the natural mother,
Tomas Gomzalez, the natural mother, Tomas
Gonzalez and Leonzo de Leon, the living
natural fathers, and seven of nine child-
ren: John Heath (born February 23, 1963),
Martha Heath (born April 3, 1965), Albert
Heath (born December 16, 1966), Tomas
Gonzalez, Jr., (born January 24, 1970),
Robert De Leon (born June 3, 1972), Zulema
de Leon (born May 5, 1973), and Maria de
Leon (born June 4, 1974).
1 Rolando Heath, father of the children
surnamed Heath, died in 1967. Tomas
Gonzalez, Sr., one of the natural fathers,
excuted an affidavit relinquishing his
parental rights to his child, Tomas
Gonzalez, Jr. Leonzo de Leon, the natural
father of the children with the same
surname, are the result of a meretricious
relationship with the Appellant. De Leon
although duly served with service of pro-
3B
The State based its suit on Section
15.02 (1)(D) and (2) of the Texas Family
Code Ann. (Supp. 1979) which provides that:
"A petition requesting termination of
the parent-child relationship with
respect to a parent who is not the
petitioner may be granted if the Court
finds that:
(1) the parent has:
zk kk
(D) knowingly placed or know-
ingly allowed the child to
remain in conditions or
surroundings which endanger
the physical or emotional
well-being of the child, .
kk
and eee
(2) termination is in the best
interest of the child."
Appellant answered by filing a general
denial, numerous special exceptions and the
following two “affirmative defenses": (1)
that there were available less drastic
alternatives to termination and that the
State had failed to adequately provide her
and her children the welfare, protective
and supportive services which would assist
cess and notification of the hearing,
failed to appear. Neither father appeals
from the trial court's order terminating
his parental rights.
4B
her in maintaining and strengthening her
family life; and 2) that although she
lacked a formal education, had limited
financial and economic resources, and was
suffering from physical and emotional
problems, she had never willfully denied
her children the care they needed nor had
she intentionally endangered their well-
being.
In response to numerous special issues,
the jury found: 1) that Appellant - had
knowingly placed each child in conditions
or surroundings which endangered his/her
physical well-being; 2) that Appellant had
knowingly allowed each child to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endangered
his/her physical well-being; 3) that
termination of the parent-child relation-
ship is in the best interest of each child;
4) that the appointment of the State as
managing conservator would be in the best
interest of each child.
After the jury verdict, the parties,
with the consent of the trial court,
entered into an agreement whereby the State
agreed not to seek termination of the
parent-child relationship between Appellant
and the two oldest minor children, John
5B
Heath, age 16, and Martha Heath, age 15.
Based upon this agreement and the answers
to the special issues, the trial court
entered a judgment which terminated the
parent-child relationship of Appellant and
both living natural fathers as to the five
youngest children, Albert Heath, Tomas
Gonzalez, Jr., Robert de Leon, Zulema de
Leon, and Maria de Leon. The court
appointed the State as managing conservator
of these children. The children have
remained in foster homes during the course
of this appeal.
Appellant brings forward nine points of
error for our consideration. We consider
Appellant's complaints concerning the trial
court's action in overruling her special
exceptions to the pleadings and in refusing
to submit to the jury her tendered special
instruction, before we address her legal
and factual sufficiency points of error
attacking the jury's finding and her other
constitutional complaints.
In point of error number two, Appellant
complaints that the district court abused
its discretion in overruling’ special
exceptions to the State's original petition
because such petition did not allege facts
6B
in support of the grounds for termination
of the parent-child relationship, thereby
depriving her of fair notice of what the
State expected to prove and what she had to
defend. In point of error number three,
Appellant, in a related argument,
complaint that the application to this
case of Section 11.08 of the Texas Family
Code resulted in an unconstitutional denial
of Appellant's procedural due process of
law. These contentions are without merit.
Section 11.08 requires, among other
things, that a petition which seeks
termination of the parent-child relation-
ship must include "a statement describing
what action the court is requested to make
concerning the child and the _ statutory
grounds on which the request is made."
Tex.Fam. Code Ann. §11.08(b) (10) (1972).
Section 11.14(a) provides that the rules of
civil cases generally shall be applicable.
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. §11.14(a) (1972). Rule
45, T.R.C.P., provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
"Pleadings in the district court and
county courts shall. ..
(b) Consist of a statement in plain and
concise language of the plaintiff's cause
of action or the defendant's ground of
eee
7B
defense. That an allegation be evidentiary
or be of legal conclusion shall not be
ground for objection when fair notice
to plaintiff is given by the allegations
as a whole. (Emphasis added).
This rule is consistent with the due
process notice requirements outlined by the
Supreme Court in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. l,
33 (1967).
Here the State filed an original
petition in which the State sought to be
appointed the managing conservator of
Appellant's children. Later the State
filed a pleading captioned "Original
Petition for Temporary and Permanent
Managing Conservatorship and to Terminate
the Parent-Child Relationship." In support
of each petition, the State alleged the
statutory grounds contained in Section
15.02(1)(D) and (2) of the Texas Family
Code as the basis for termination of the
parent-child relationship. In addition,
the State alleged that:
", . . temporary and permanent court
orders for the care and protection of
the children are necessary for the
reasons set forth in the affidavit at-
SAGOG ... «*
8B
The affidavit by Remberto G. Arteaga,
Supervisor for the Cameron County Child
Welfare Unit stated, in relevant part:
"The children, if required to return to
their natural mother, GUADALUPE GONZALEZ,
would suffer immediate and irreparable
injury for which there is no adequate
remedy at law and that their mother is
an alcoholic, unemployed and would be
unable to provide (1) decent, safe and
sanitary housing, (2) adequate parental
care and supervision, (3) proper nutri-
tional meals for the children. There-
fore, for the safety and welfare of the
children, the children should not be per-
mitted to return to their mother, and, in
my opinion it would be in the best in-
terest of the children if they’ were
allowed to remain in their present fos-
ter homes pending a hearing..."
In addition, the State filed a show cause
motion which alleged that the statutory
grounds which initially supported the
State's removal of the children were
continuing and that, therefore, the State
should continue as managing conservator
because:
"1. Respondent has no visible means of
support; _
2. Respondent has failed to stabilize
| her home environment, in that, she
9B
continues to consort with men who
physically abuse her;
3. She continues to deny that any pro-
blems existed in the past with res-
pect to the way that she cared for
and supervised her children."
Several months later, the Appellant
filed an answer which included special
exceptions directed toward the allegations
contained in the State's pleadings on the
basis that such allegations were "vague and
general and consist of conclusions of law
and do not state the family conditions and
circumstances and the specific facts,
dates, mames and places which support
Petitioner's conclusions of law." The
trial court overruled Appellant's special
exceptions. Contrary to Appellant's
assertions, the State did allege more than
the statutory grounds for termination as
contained in Sections 15.02(1)(D) and (2)
of the Texas Family Code. We note that
during oral argument, both parties stated
that the discovery process under our rules
had been utilized. Appellant's points of
error numbers two and three are overruled.
By her points of error numbers four and
10B
five, Appellant complains: 1) that there
is insufficient evidence to show that there
exists a present danger to the physical
well-being of the children; and 2) that the
trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to submit the following special
instruction requested by Appellant;
"In connection with the Special Issues,
you are instructed that termination may
not be based solely upon conditions
which existed in the past but no longer
exist. Before termination of the parent-
child relationship can be ordered, it
must be shown that the grounds upon
which termination is being sought pre-
sently exist."
The trial judge refused to submit the
special instruction. Appellant moved for a
directed verdict and a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the basis that
there was insufficient evidence to show
that there existed a present danger to the
physical well-being of the children. These
motions were overruled.
Rule a?i, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, requires the Court to "submit
such explanatory instructions and
definitions as shall be proper ..." An
instruction is "proper" if it finds support
in the evidence and the inferences to be
11B
drawn therefrom, and if it might be of some
aid or assistance to the jury in answering
the issues submitted. First State
Bank & Trust Co. of Edinburg v. George, 519
S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Civ.App.- Corpus Christi
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mejia v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Civ.
App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
The trial court has considerable discretion
in deciding what instructions are necessary
and proper in submitting issues to the jury.
We do not find that the trial judge abused
his discretion in this’' regard. See
Spradling v. Williams, 533 S.W.2d 143, 145,
(Tex.Civ.App.- Beaumont 1977), aff'd 566
S$.W.2d 561 (Tex.Sup.1978); McCane Sondock
Detective Agency v. Penland Distributors,
inc., 523 §.W.2d 62 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); First State
Bank & Trust Co. v of Edinburg v. George,
519 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Appellant's only specific objection to
the court's charge was to the effect that
the special issues (because they merely
"tracked" the vague, overbroad, etc., lan-
guage of the statutory grounds for termi-
nation), violated Appellant's constituti-
ee ae ree
ee
12B
onal rights in several respects. Other com-
plaints concerning the form of the spe 1
issues as submitted were waived. Alle. _
American National Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 604
(Tex.Sup. 1964); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n
v. Nueman, 379 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Sup. 1964).
The issues, as submitted to the jury, did
require the jury to make a judgment as to
the present conditions of Appellant and of
the children. For example:
"Do you find, from a preponderance of
the evidence, that termination is in
the best interest of the children, or
any of them." (Emphasis added).
The special issues directed the jurors'
attention to the ultimate issues of the
case. Appellant's points of error numbers
four and five are overruled.
In point of error number eight, Appell-
ant brings forward a “legal sufficiency"
point as to the jury findings relating to
the three youngest children by complaining
that the trial court erred in entering a
judgment which terminated the parent-child
relationship between her and Robert, Zulema
and Maria because there is "no evidence" to
support a finding that Appellant either
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed these
13B
three youngest children to remain in con-
ditions or surroundings which endangered
their physical well-being. In point of
error number nine, Appellant complains of
the jury's findings as to all five children
on "factual sufficiency" grounds.
At the outset we recognize that actions
which break the ties between a parent and
child "can never be justified without the
most solid and _ substantial reasons."
State v. Deaton, 54 S.W.901 (Tex.Sup.1900).
First, there is the strong presumption that
a child's foremost interest is usually best
served by keeping custody in and with the
natural parents. This is based on a logical
belief that the ties of the natural rela-
tionship of parent and child ordinarily
bring about strong assurances and genuine
efforts on the part of the custodians to
provide the child with the best of care and
most beneficial opportunities possible.
Usually, the best atmosphere for mental,
moral and emotional development of the
child is with its natural: ‘parent.
Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352
(Tex.Sup. 1976), citing Mumma v. Aguirre,
364 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Sup. 1963). See
and compare: Sanchez v.Texas Department of
14B
Human Resources, S.W.2d _ (Tex.Civ.App.
-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
The standard of our review of legal and
factual sufficiency points of error which
attack the findings made by the trial judge
or jury in an involuntary termination
proceeding pursuant to the Texas Family
Code is governed by the same general rules
applicable to other civil cases. See e.g.,
Woodard v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources,
573 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); In RekE. Ss. M., 550
S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.Civ.App. -Houston [lst
Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, in
deciding the "legal sufficiency" point, we
review the evidence only in the light most
favorable to support the jury's findings,
and in deciding the "factual sufficiency"
point, we must consider all of the evidence.
See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.
Sup.1965); In Re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d
660 Tex.Sup.1951); In Re E. S. M., 550
S.W.2d 749 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [lst Dist. ]
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). First, we consider
the legal sufficiency point. Frank DeGeer, a
child welfare worker for the State, testi-
fied that he had been assigned to the
Gonzalez case for approximately a two-year
15B
period which commenced in May, 1975, after
the State had received complaints that
Appellant had been leaving her children at
home alone. During this period of time, he
stated that he made 18 to 20 visits to
Appellant's home. On the date of the
first home visit in 1975, DeGeer stated
that he found, alone and without adult
supervision, the school-aged children,
Richard Roy, Martha, Albert and "another
eight year old" who "might have been
Tomas." DeGeer stated that a telephone
call from a neighbor who "was concerned
because just one of the children was there
alone" prompted further home visits.
Later, he made a visit to the school
attended by the school-age children to talk
with the school nurse. He stated that "a
home visit was made that same day and the
children were alone." Appellant was not
present at her home the following day
either. On this day, DeGeer discovered
2
The State dismissed the termination suit
as to Richard Roy prior to trial.
16B
that the children were with a neighbor,
Mrs. Guerrero, who was the godmother of the
Appellants children surnamed Heath.
Appellant had not made prior arrangements
with Mrs. Guerrero to have her look after
the children. DeGeer found it necessary to
take one of the older children with him
back to the Gonzalez home in order to
obtain clean clothing for the youngsters.
DeGeer testified that, while he was in
Appellant's home, he noticed that’ the
toilet could not be flushed without using a
bucket of water; the electricity and gas
were turned off; there was no food in the
pantry or closets; the house was in a
filthy and unkept'- manner; andthe
refrigerator had no _ food--"Just ae few
cockroaches."
in March DeGeer testified that he found
John home alone. John told him that he was
not in school because he didn't have any
shoes. DeGeer stated that he took John to
school where he obtained shoes for him from
the nurse's office. During the time he was
in the nurse's office, DeGeer stated that
Albert, John's brother, was brought into
the office because he was crying and
disturbing the rest of the children.
17B
testified that,
quite by coincidence, another brother,
DeGeer further
Tomas was also brought into the office a
short time later because he was being
sullen and uncooperative in the classroom.
Tomas refused to talk with anyone present.
The next day DeGeer stated that he and
Remberto Arteaga, the present welfare
supervisor, made’ a visit to the Gonzalez
home during school hours. They discovered
that no one was at home and the door was
not locked. DeGeer stated that an
inspection revealed the absence of food and
no utilities in the home. In April, he
made another visit to the Gonzalez home in
response to a complaint by Mrs. Guerrero,
and found John again at home alone.
Olivia Guerrero testified that she was
the godmother of Richard Roy, John, Mary
and Martha and that she had known Appellant
only through the children for the past six
years. She stated that when she initially
knew the children, they would come over to
her home and visit. The visits became more
and more frequent. By the end of the
six-year period, they were coming to her
home almost every day, sometimes staying
two or three days in a row. Guerrero
geese anes eben
18B
stated that Appellant had requested her to
babysit with the children on only one
occasion, and that was the night before the
children were taken from the Appellant.
When the children came to visit, she stated
that they usually did not bring any clean
clothes or food and were generally dirty.
When the children came to her home, they
usually only told her that their mother was
not at home; that she was either with Mr.
de Leon or that they did not know where she
was.
DeGeer made a visit to the Guerrero home
at Mrs. Guerrero's request. Two school age
children, Albert and Tomas, and the three
pre-school children, Robert, Zulema and
Maria, were there. Mrs. Guerrero explained
that the Appellant had requested her to
take care of the children the previous
night, promising to return the following
day by 8:00 a.m. so that Mrs. Guerrero
could go *o work. She called because there
was no one else to supervise the children.
DeGeer stated that the children appeared as
though they had not bathed for quite some
time, their clothes were dirty and "they
were lice-ridden". DeGeer stated that he
went to the Gonzalez home to obtain some
19B
clean clothing for the children. Upon his
arrival, he found that the house was
unlocked, that the utilities were still
off, and that there was no food in the
house. DeGeer testified that the children
never seemed to known where their mother
was when he asked about her absence. He
stated that during the time he was working
with the family, the housing condition
deteriorated,became more unsanitary and the
house sometimes smelled of urine.
Dr. Antonio Diaz, a specialist in family
medicine, testified that he examined Albert
who was then 9 years old. Diaz stated that
Albert weighed fifty pounds, which piaced
his weight at only the third to fifth
percentile of children his age (i.e., 95 to
97% of children nine years of age weigh
more than 50 pounds), and his height was
only at the tenth percentile. D.az further
stated that Albert was uncommunicative.
His examination revealed that Albert had
lice and showed signs of "failure to
thrive." Dr. Diaz stated that his last
visit with Albert was after Albert had been
placed in foster care. He described the
child's progress as far as his weight,
health and emotional state to be good.
puiendkah Smee etamsinas memes —
20B
Dr. Diaz testified that when he examined
Tomas, a six (6) year old boy, he found
that Tomas was suffering from scabies, a
parasite that burrows under the skin. He
testified that the scabies had created
sores on Tomas' body which had become
secondarily infected. He further found
Tomas to be infected with lice and internal
parasites. Tomas' weight (42 pounds) was
at the 40th percentile for children his
age, while his height (44 inches) was only
at the 7th to 10th percentile. Dr. Diaz
stated that the medical condition of the
children was consistent with a history of
parental neglect. The evidence in the
record showed that all of the children
suffered from lice.
Dr. Michael de Socorrez, who holds a
Ph.D. in psychology, testified that the
Appellant was a woman of normal
intelligence, but nevertheless suffered
from a brain disfunction which was a result
of a brain trauma. Although the exact
cause of the terms could not be identified,
he calculated the condition with a history
of drinking and physical abuse. He
testified that she tended to relate to
others in a self-destructive manner. She
21B
had experienced an early history of emotio-
hal abuse and lack of warmth. As a result,
the Appellant was unable to sustain long
relationships. She related to men primari-
ly through physical sex. On the basis of
his evaluation, de Socorrez further stated
that Appellant "is unable to meet the needs
of her children in regard to emotional
warmth, caring and protection, protection
in every sense of the word." The doctor's
Prognosis for Mrs. Gonzalez was "guarded".
The prognosis for her learning to care app-
ropriately for her children was nil. He
did not believe that there was a program of
psychotherapy, psychoanalysis or counseling
which could provide the structure in which
Mrs. Gonzalez could learn how to provide
for her children adequately, emotionally and
lovingly.
Mrs. Elias Salinas, a foster parent of
Tomas, testified that when Tomas arrived at
their home on April 15, 1976, he had lice,
sores on his body and infected sores on his
buttocks. Tomas was wearing dirty shorts
and torn tennis shoes which did not fit.
She stated that Tomas did not remember ever
vating an egg. She described his health as
improved: “being much better now." He had
22B .
gained weight and had "grown up", she said.
She stated that Tomas calls her and her
husband "Mamma" and "Daddy."
Esmeralda Rodriguez, a foster parent of
Albert, testified that at the time Albert
(10 years of age) arrived at their home, on
April 15, 1976, he was slim and his stomach
was protruding. She also stated that he
had lice which took over three months to
clear up by shampooing every day. She
stated that he initially was somewhat
uncoordinated, stumbled easily and had
trouble in school; that he did not know his
right hand from his left; and did not know
the alphabet. She described him now as
being much taller, healthy, and more
conversant.
Bluford Bradford Hester,III, a child
placement worker for the State, testified
his duties included investigating reports
of abuse and neglect, working with families
which are having problems and working with
foster children. He testified that he was
assigned to the Gonzalez case in October,
1976. During his first visit with Mrs.
Gonzalez, which occurred in October, 1976,
Appellant informed him that she ‘was living
with a friend or relative because her
23B
utilities were out at her home. Appellant
showed Hester her accumulated utility bills
which showed an overdue and unpaid amount
of approximately $1,000.00. Hester stated
that the basic utility bill had been in the
neighborhood of $300.00 and $400.00 and
that the remainder was due to finance
charges imposed for non-payment. Hester
stated that Appellant's utilities were
turned on sometime in the spring of 1977
and remained on for approximately a year.
In March, 1978, Hester stated that the
utilities were again turned off due to
non-payment and they remained off until
sometime in May or the first part of June
in 1978.
Hester testified that Appellant had no
formal education, no prior job experiences
and no special vocational job training. He
described her most recent employment as
that of a bar-maid at several different
locations. It was undisputed that, prior
to the time the children were removed,
Appellant's sources of income were social
security benefits that she and the surnamed
Heath children received. She also received
aid to families with dependent children for
Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., plus food stamps, for
24B
a total of approximately $500 to $600 per
month. Mr. de Leon had paid her past due
utility bill and provided some support
payments for the children with the surname
of de Leon. Appellant's home had been paid
for from the proceeds of an insurance
policy when her first husband died. The
title to the house had been placed in the
name of the Heath children. Hester
testified that Appellant requested a visit
with one of her sons who was in the South
Texas State School in Edinburg and, at the
Same time, asked whether there would be any
excess Over his allowance for that
particular month. He informed Appellant
there probably would be an excess, but that
it would take some five to six weeks for
the necessary paperwork to be completed
before she could receive such excess. He
testified that she seemed disappointed at
this response and subsequently cancelled
her visitation trip.
There is ample probative evidence, both
circumstantial and direct, to support the
jury's findings as to each child. See
Larson v. Ellison, 217 S.w.2a 420, 421
(Tex.Sup. 1949). Appellant's point of error
number eight is overruled.
25B
In addition to the evidence discussed
above, we have reviewed the entire record
and find that the jury's answers are not
against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence. See In Re King's Estate,
244 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Sup. 1951). There is
ample evidence in the record from which the
jury could reasonably conclude that App-
ellant knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed all of the children to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endanger
their physical well-being. The jury is not
only the judge of the facts,. and
circumstances proven, but they are the
judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
They are at liberty to draw reasonable
inferences and deductions from the evidence
adduced at trial. Lynch v. Ricketts, 314
S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Sup.1958); Clark v. Brewer,
498 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus
Christi 1973, no writ). Appellant's point
of error number nine is overruled.
In point of error number one, Appellant
complaints that Section 15.02(1)(D) is void
for vagueness and is unconstitutional on
its face, and as applied to her. We have
recently considered the precise same
26B
contention that Section 15.02(1)(D) of the
Texas Family Code is void for vagueness in
Sanchez v. Texas Department of Human Re-
sources, S.W.2d (Tex.Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ), and
found that contention to be without merit.
The record in this case does not support
Appellant's contention that Section 15.02
(1)(D) is unconstitutional as it was ap-
plied to her. Appellant's point of error
number one is overruled.
In points of error numbers six and
seven, Appellant complains that the trial
court erred by refusing to admit into
evidence certain testimony of Remberto
Arteaga, Supervisor of the Cameron County
Child Welfare Unit of the Texas Department
of Human Resources. After the State rested
its case, counsel for Appellant recalled
Mr. Arteaga and attempted to elicit certain
testimony allegedly relevant to Appellant's
“affirmative defense" that termination of
the parent-child relationship was not the
least drastic remedy available to the
State. During the course of direct
examination of Mr. Arteaga, the trial court
refused to hear testimony by sustaining
27B
relevancy objections to the following three
areas of inquiry:
1. (Counsel for Appellant): "And I believe
you testified earlier that these policies
and procedures of the [State] are cont-
ained in the Social Service Manual, is
that correct?
(Arteaga): Yes.
(Counsel for Appellant): Are you
camiliar with this manual?
(Arteaga): Yes, ma'am.
(Counsel for State): I am going to
object to the constant reference to the
material that pertains to the operations
of the Department. I don't see the
specific relevance to this case.
(Court): Objection will be sustained.
kkk
2. (Counsel for Appellant): [In light
of the witnesses' previous testimony],
can you tell me, speaking again for
the [State], how serious a matter is
removal of a child from its home?
(Counsel for State): I object on the
same basis, Your Honor, relevancy.
(Court): Sustained. That is for the
jury to decide.
zx kk
28B
3. (Counsel for Appellant): Mr. Arteaga,
how many other cases have you been in-
volved in where termination is sought?
(Counsel for State): We'll object to
that on the same basis, relevancy:
(Court): Sustained."
The trial judge granted Appellant's request
to make a formal bill of exceptions
concerning the excluded testimony.
The formal bill of exceptions, including
exhibits attached thereto, comprises 74
pages in the’ supplemental transcript.
Nowhere in the bill of exceptions is
evidence concerning the areas of inquiry
two and three above. Most of the substance
of Mr. Arteaga's testimony contained in the
bill of exceptions is a summary of his own
prior testimony or a summary of other
witnesses' prior testimony which had been
introduced into evidence without objection.
The bill of exceptions does contain the
following statements which Appellant did
not specifically attempt to introduce
through Arteaga's testimony during the
trial: 1) the family of Appellant, “at
all times pertinent hereto, [was ]
experiencing a 'protective situation' as
29B
that term is used throughout the Social
Services Handbook;" 2) Appellant "and her
family were at all pertinent times hereto
qualified for the services available
through Cameron County Child Welfare Unit
to families experiencing protective
Situations;" and 3) the Cameron County
Child Welfare Unit was able to provide
eight enumerated services to families
experiencing "protective situations."
Attached to the bill of exceptions as
exhibits were copies of: 1) "various
pertinent sections of the 'Social Services
Handbook' as those sections existed from
and after the date shown on each page;" and
2). “copies of Article 695c §18A(1),
V.A.T.S.; 42 U.S.C. §§601, 602 (a), 622(a);
45 C.F.R. §§220.1-220.40, [which would have
been offered into evidence]." These
exhibits comprise 71 pages of the bill of
exceptions.
As a general rule, error is not shown in
the exclusion of evidence unless’ the
Appellant brings before the appellate court
a record that shows clearly not only what
the evidence would have been if admitted,
but also its relevancy. Kieffer v. Miller,
560 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977,
30B
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Swinney v. Winters, 532
S.W.2d 396 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Victoria Comfort Air Co.
v. Alamo Express, 529 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Civ.
App.--Corpus Christi 1975, no writ). The
complaining party has the burden to show
reversible error by demonstrating that the
exclusion of evidence was reasonably cal-
culated to and probably did cause the ren-
dition of an improper verdict or judgment.
Gomez Leon v.State, 426 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.Sup.
1968); Ryder Tank Lines Inc. v. Bentley,
397 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Reversible error
is not present where the substance of the
excluded testimony is cumulative or has
been previously introduced through that
witness or another witness. Brazos Graphics,
Inc. v. Irvin Industries Inc., 22 Tex.Sup.
309 (Tex.Sup. April 18, 1979); Hopkins v.
Clark, 20 Tex. 64 (Tex.Sup.1857); Yancy v.
Olvera, 518 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.Civ.App.--San
Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sanchez v.
| Billings, 481 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Civ.App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.): Parten v. Wilson, 243 S.W.2d 198
(Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1951, writ ref'd
n.r.@.).
31B
Error is not shown by the exclusion of
evidence which previously had been
introduced. The remsi~der of Arteaga's
testimony and the Handbook (Exhibit "A")
contained in the bill of exceptions is of
such a general nature that we fail to see
its relevancy. No effort has been made to
tie Arteaga's testimony with any specific
sections of the attached Handbook, nor to
any of the other attached exhibits. We
conclude that Appellant has failed to show
that the exclusion of this evidence was
error or if we could say that it was error,
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that
such error was reasonably calculated
to and probably did cause the rendition of
an improper judgment in this case. Rule
434, T.R.C.P. Appellant's points of error
numbers six and seven are overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
PAUL W. NYE
Chief Justice
Opinion delivered and filed this, the 3rd
day of May, 1979.
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District
Corpus Christi, Texas
32B
Below is the JUDGMENT in the numbered
cause set out herein to be Filed and
Entered in the Minutes of the Court of
Civil Appeals, Thirteenth Supreme Judicial
District of Texas, at Corpus Christi, as of
the 3rd day of May, 1979. If this Judgment
does not conform to the opinion handed down
by the Court in this cause, any party may
file a Motion for Correction of Judgment
with the Clerk of this Court.
CAUSE NO. 1428 (Trial Court No. 3076-N-T)
GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,
Appellant,
Vv.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
Appellee.
on appeal to this Court from Cameron
County, Texas.
re KR KR KR KKK
JUDGMENT
On appeal from the 197th District Court of
Cameron County, Texas. Opinion by Chief
Justice Paul W. Nye.
33B
THIS CAUSE was suhmitted to the Court on
January 18, 1979, on oral argument, briefs
and transcript of the record. These having
been examined and fully considered, it is
the opinion of the Court that there is no
error in the judgment of the court below
and said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
It is further ordered that Appellant
GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ pay all costs of
this appeal expended and incurred. It is
further ordered that this decision be cer-
tified below for observance.
kaAkRKRK KR KR KK
Shirley Selz, Clerk
APPENDIX C
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN
NO. B-8601 September 12, 1979
GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ 4
vs. 4 From Cameron
County,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF i) Thirteenth
HUMAN RESOURCES ) District
Application of petitioner for writ of
error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the
Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District having
been duly considered, and the Court having
determined that the application presents no
error requiring reversal of the judgment of
the Court of Civil Appeals, it is ordered
that said application be, and hereby is,
refused.
It is further ordered that applicant,
Guadalupe H. Gonzalez, pay all costs
incurred on this application.
I, GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify
that the above and foregoing is a true and
correct copy of the order of the Supreme
Court of Texas in the case numbered and
styled as above, as the same appears of
record in the minutes of said Court under
the dates shown.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of the
Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of
Austin, this the 3rd day of October, 1979.
GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk
BY: Mary M. Wakefield, Deputy
APPENDIX D
§15.02 Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights
A petition requesting termination of the
parent-child relationship with respect to a
parent who is not the petitioner may be
granted if the court finds that:
(1) the parent has:
(A) voluntarily left the child
alone or in the possession of
another not the parent and
expressed an intent not to
return; or
(B) voluntarily left the child
alone or in the possession of
another not the parent with-
out expressing an intent to
return, without providing for
the adequate support of the
child, and remained away for
a period of at least three
months; or
(C) voluntarily left the child
alone or in the possession
of another not the parent
and, although expressing an
intent to return, failed to
do so without providing
adequate support of the
child and remained away for
a period of at least six
months; or
(D) knowingly placed or know-
ingly allowed the child to
| remain in conditions or
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
2D
Surroundings which endanger
the physical or emotional
well-being of the child; or
engaged in conduct or know-
ingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in con-
duct which endangers. the
physical or emotional well-
being of the child; or
failed to support the child
in accordance with his abi-
lity during a period of one
year ending within six
months of the date of the
filing of the petition; or
abandoned the child without
identifying the child or
furnishing means of identi-
fication, and the child's
identity cannot be ascer-
tained by the exercise of
reasonable diligence; or
voluntarily, and with know-
ledge of the pregnancy,
abandoned the mother of the
child beginning at a time
during her pregnancy with
the child and continuing
through the birth, failed to
provide adequate Support or
medical care for the mother
during the period of aban-
donment before the birth of
the child, and remained
apart from the child or
failed to support the child
Since the birth; or
(2)
of the child.
Leg., p.
1975.
bist
(T)
(J)
(K)
1266,
3D
contumaciously refused to
submit to a reasonable and
lawful order of a court
under Section 34.05 of this
code; or
been the major cause of:
(1) the failure of the child
to be enrolled in school
as required by the Texas
Education Code; or
fai) the child's absence
from his home without
the consent of his
parents or guardian
for a substantial con-
sent of his parents
Or guardian for a
substantial length of
time or without the
intent to return; or
executed before or after the
suit is filed an unrevoked
or irrevocable affidavit of
relinquishment of parental
rights as provided by
Section 15.03 of this code-
and in addition, the court
further finds that
termination is in the best interest
Amended by Acts 1975, 64th
ch. 476, §31, eff. Sept. 1,
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.