Petition — Gonzalez v. Department of Human Resources

Supreme Court brief1980

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79

GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,

2 Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JAMES E. BELTON

SUSAN REES WILLIAMS

DAVID GRAY HALL

TEXAS RURAL LEGAL AID, INC.

103 East Third

Weslaco, Texas 78596

Attorneys for Petitioner

cae — +o eRe

Washington, 0.C ee CLB PUBLISHERS’ e LAW PRINTING CO. e (202) 393-0625

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tele GE BUEROTICAGS .. occ cicessaedscaen ii

CmimOme BOLOW 6 on cc ccc ci cecescccesececess 2

ee ee ee ee 2

Question Presented .......cccccccccccccces 2

Pe. BITC LUOE oc occ cckcewese seanesencen 2

Statement of the Case .....c.c ccc ccccccece a

Reasons for Granting the Writ ............ 6

PRE fn ns Cetccepesesdceebaseasenet hs 20

Appendix

A. Final Judgment, 197th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.......... 1A

B. Opinion and Judgment of the Texas

Court of Civil Appeals, Thirteenth

Supreme Judicial District......... 1B

Cc. Order of the Texas Supreme Court..1C

D. §15.02-Involuntary Termination of

Parental Rights Statute........... 1D

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Alsager v. District Court of Polk

County, Iowa, 406 F.Supp. 10

(S.D. Iowa 1975) aff'd 545 F.2d

Bee OO 6 CAPO Ps codec cacdesrscecs 8

Carey v. Population Services

International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)..15

Connally v. General Construction Co.,

ae ee LADEN Ss eee ss ccsaveccdce 9

D.F. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933

(Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [lst Dist. ]

fy A Sky er a ee hs eda a 10

Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37

ee se. ewes 8

Ginsberg v. State of New York,

ee ee ee EROS acc bc oweecccese 12

Grayned v. City of Rockford,

ee ee OO ERO eee ek wees ovees 9

Higgins v. Dallas County Child

Welfare Unit, 544 S.W.2d 745

(Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1976,

Oe Perr ra eS Pe EN ae ere 10

In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal.

I ee ear is a a ae Sad eee wwe %. 0 6.0 17

In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d

ad og 6. 4 0 0 0 ee ok ee VO ee 8

iii

In re D.T., 237 N.W.2d 166 (S.D.Sup.

Ls. | Se aren rae Sa arses ae te eee ae er 8

In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851 (Vt.Sup.

bgt Oe er ee Cee eee ee Pe 17

In re People In Interest of M.M.,

529 P.2da 128 (Colo.Sup. 1974)....... 17

In the Matter of R.E.W., 545 S.W.2d

573 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [lst Dist. ]

19077. WEL DOES Wil Gs} os cece cece 10

Interest of Walter B.., 377 2.24 139

(tan Sap. LOTS)... ck kc secs ieee en 17

Matter of S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190

CALE. BUD. L976) ccc vce ceccccsccseses 17

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390

ff" 3) Arn eet ee ee ee eee 14

Moore v. City of East Cleveland,

Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)........ Se ie tS

Roe v. Conn., 417 F.Supp. 769 (M.D.

SEDs des 26 66a Ok ne es Ow Sat 8,18

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113

Gh py i Perr errs ee ee ke ee 15,16

Sanchez v. Texas Dept. of Human

Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.

Civ.App.--Corpus Christi, 1979, no

PRES, oS 6 6k 6a 4s wee NS eee Re 8 8 11

Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479

So Sb eer eee ae ec a a eee 17

iv

Smith v. Organization of Foster

Families for Equality and Reform,

Sek: ees EW BRUT Ts 6 eta he ele le we 12

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,

CROCS 6 ERE O56 eed OMS Ook Re 14,16

State v. McMasters, 259 Or. 291,

Dae eee Oe PCO ete Ds ced ok ow dw ae 8,9

State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387

2k SR 7p Ae Or oe e serene a?

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 769

Cee ee Li ko eh ERE ARE Clie eek ee 14

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374

Pea dbs se a wt ed wae ee 12,15

STATUTES :

Tex.Family Code Ann.:

Section 15.02( Supe. 1979)... cick ceeds 2

Section 15.02(1)(D) (Supp.1979)..... z;

aeH, 7¢20,42

Be cee Ck BRAT COS oso os ke PE KOS ok eke 2

MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES:

A.B.A. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-

TRATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS

PROJECT: STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE

Aer MO. LEROY Eee. cb den hha euk Kets 19

Boskey v. McCue, "Alternative Standards

for Termination of Parental Rights,"

9 Seton Hall L.Rev. 1 (1978)....... t

Vv

Goldstein, "Medical Care for the

Child At Risk: On State Supervention

of Parental Autonomy, "86 Yale L.J.

645 (1977) .. csv ccs ce eee eee nein ae 7

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond

the Best Interests of the Child,

(1973). cece suet sh eee eee ioe st

Note: "State Intrusion Into Family

Affairs: Justifications and Limita-

tions," 26 Stanford L.Rev. 1383

(1974)... ws2etewe eu ue eee tenn

Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf

of 'Neglected' Children: Standards

for Removal of Children From Their

Homes, Monitoring the Status of

Children in Foster Care, and Termi-

nation of Parental Rights," 28

Stanford L.Rev. 623 (1976)....6,7,8,11

Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf

of 'Neglected' Children: A Search

for Realistic Standards," 27 Stanford

L.Rev. 965 (1978). cs005 0540s Fe ee

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

NO. 79

GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,

Petitioner

V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN’ RESOURCES,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

TEXAS COURTS OF CIVIL APPEALS,

THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

The Petitioner, Guadalupe H. Gonzalez,

respectfully prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment of

the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District,

entered on May 3, 1979, which judgment was

refused review by the Supreme Court of

Texas on September 12, 1979, upon a

determination that the judgment of the

Court of Civil Appeals presented no error

requiring reversal.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Civil

Appeals is reported at 581 S$.W.2d 522.

That opinion and the judgment of the Court

of Civil Appeals is set forth in Appendix

B, 2meee. The judgment of the 197th

Judicial District Court and the order of

the Texas Supreme Court are set forth in

Appendices A and C, respectively, infra.

JURISDICTION

By order entered on September 12, 1979,

the Supreme Court of Texas refused

Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error

to review the opinion and judgment of the

Texas Court of Civil Appeals. The judgment

and opinion of the Texas Court of Civil

Appeals entered May 3, 1979, is therefore

the judgment of the highest court of Texas

in which a decision could be had. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. Section

1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

a

WHETHER SECTION 15.02(1)(D) OF THE TEXAS

INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF #£PARENTAL

RIGHTS STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

VAGUE ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED TO

PETITIONER.

Il.

WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER'S

PARENTAL RIGHTS, ABSENT A SHOWING THAT

TERMINATION WAS THE LEAST DRASTIC MEANS

OF PROTECTING HER CHILDREN, CONSTITUTED

AN IMPERMISSIBLE INTRUSION UPON PETITI-

ONER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HER CHILDREN.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 15.02, Tex.Fam.Code Ann., (Supp.

1979, provides in relevant part:

A petition requesting termination of the

parent-child relationship with respect

to a parent who is not the petitioner

may be granted if the Court finds:

(1) the parent has:

2. Fe

(D) knowingly placed or knowingly

allowed the child to remain in

conditions or surroundings which

endanger the physical or emotional

well-being of the child,...

ze & ®

and

(2) termination is in the best

interest of the child,...

zx k

The statute is set out in its entirety in

Appendix D, infra.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 16, 1978, the State of Texas

officially decreed that Mrs. Guadalupe H.

Gonzalez was no longer the mother of five

of her nine children. Seven of Petitioner

Gonzalez' children, then aged one to four-

teen years, had been seized by State offi-

cers on April 15, 1976, and scattered among

several foster homes. The State accused

the Petitioner of neglécting her children.

Over Petitioner's vigorous objections, a

jury in the 197th District Court of Cameron

County, Texas, found that she had neglected

her children in the circumstances condemned

by Section 15.02(1)(D) of the Texas Family

Code and that termination of the family

relationship was in the "best interest" of

her five youngest children. The strongest

evidence in support of the verdict showed

that the children were frequently at home

alone or in the care of their godmother,

that the home was not kept very clean, that

the utilities had been terminated for

nonpayment, that the children on occasion

wore dirty clothes, that the Petitioner had

"consorted" with men who had physically

abused her, and that the children had lice,

5

two were underdeveloped, while one also had

internal parasites and secondarily infected

scabies sores. None of the acts of neglect

had occurred more recently than twenty-seven

months prior to the trial.

Petitioner's trial pleadings raised

objections that the grounds pled for termin-

\ation were unconstitutionally vague and that

ermination was not the least drastic

means available to adequately protect her

children. The trial court overruled Petiti-

oner's objections to the special jury issues

and motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, each of which encompassed her

vagueness challenge as well as her objection

that it was not shown that termination was

necessary to protect her children.

The Court of Civil Appeals rejected the

vagueness challenge and overruled without

comment the "least drastic means" point of

error, 1 although the State had conceded

the legal theory of that point of error.

By her Point of Error No. 7, Petitioner

contended: The trial court erred in

denying Respondent's Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict, as there was

no sufficient evidence that no other,

less drastic, alternatives to termination

existed.

Petitioner raised the same assignments of

error on application for writ of error to

the Texas Supreme Court, which refused

review on a finding of no reversible error.

The children have remained in foster

care pending this appeal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Dependency and termination proceedings

are the vehicle through which the state,

acting in its capacity as parens patriae,

protects minor children from parental abuse

and neglect. The statutes which authorize

these proceedings have received little scru-

tiny from this Court, although contemporary

scholars uniformly decry their vague lang-

uage and overreaching character. The

Texas termination of parental rights statu-

2. See Wald, "State Intervention on Behalf

of 'Neglected' Children: A Search for

Realistic Standards," 27 Stanford L.Rev.

985 (1975); Wald, “State Intervention on

Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: Stand-

ards for Removal of Children From Their

Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children

tute is typical of these statutes.

I. SECTION 15.02(1)(D) OF THE ‘TEXAS

INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PAREN-

TAL RIGHTS STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIO-

NALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE AND AS APP-

LIED TO PETITIONER.

Texas provides that parental rights may

be terminated if the parent has "knowingly

placed or knowingly allowed the child to

remain in conditions or surroundings which

endanger the physical or emotional well-

being of the child." Most state statutes

define neglect and grounds for termination

in similarly imprecise language, 7 and the

result has been widespread confusion and

inc onsistency in their enforcement and app-

lication. Professor Wald, who has extensi-

in Foster Care, and Termination

of Parental Rights," 28 Stanford

L.Rev. 623 (1976); Note: "State

Intrusion Into Family Affairs:

Justifications and Limitations," 26

Stanford L.Rev. 1383 (1974); and,

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond

the Best Interests of the Child,

1973). See, generally, Goldstein,

"Medical Care for the Child at Risk,

On State Supervention of Parental

Autonomy," 86 Yale L.J. 645 (1977).

3. Id.

8

vely analyzed this problem, characterizes

termination of parental rights as a "“hap-

hazard process," . ultimately dependent

upon the personal values of social workers

and judges.

Thus, in Oregon, South Dakota, and

Maryland the parent-child relationship may

be extinguished based on statutory language

Similar to the statutes struck down by

courts in Arkansas, Iowa and Alabama. _ 5

is not uncommon to find courts resisting

vagueness challenges to these laws based

upon concern that greater specificity will

4 Wald, supra, 28 Stanford at 688-699,

at m.2%

See State v. McMasters, 259 Or. 291

S60 2.26 567 (2971); In xe D.ft:, 237

N.W.2d 166 (S.D.Sup. 1975); and, In re

Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968)

which upheld the constitutionality of

the statutory language challenged for

vagueness. Compare to Alsager v. Dis-

trict Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F.

Supp.10 (S.D. Iowa 1975) aff'd 545 F.2d

1137 (8th Cir. 1976); Roe v. Conn, 417

F.Supp. 769 (M.D.Ala. 1976); and Davis

v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37 (Ark.Sup. 1979)

which held that language substantially

Similar to that involved in the above

cited cases was unconstitutionally vague.

“<a

9

sacrifice needed flexibility,° which is

traditionally regarded as essential when

determining what is "“best" for children.

This judicial insistence upon the freedom

to act to protect children has sanctioned

laws which, for lack of even remotely

objective standards, threaten every parent-

child relationship.

Failure to provide explicit standards

results in an absence of fair warning to

parents of what conduct is_ prohibited,

encourages arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement, and inhibits the parents’

legitimate exercise of their freedom to

raise their children. See Grayned v. City

of Rockford, 408 U.S.104, 108-109 (1972).

Therefore, persons of common intelligence

must necessarily guess at the meaning of

such laws and differ as to their application.

Connally v. General Construction Co, 269 U.S.

385 (1926).

These conditions inhere in the Texas sta-

tute as well. It fails to provide objective,

ascertainable standards by which to measure

childrearing practices; nor does it specify

See, e.g., State v. McMasters, supra.,

at 2.5.

10

which needs and interests of the children

are sought to be protected, or the types and

degree of harm which justify the sanctions

of the statute. The Texas courts have failed

to provide a nalrowing construction. ’ With-

out statutory standards or judicial guide-

lines, the value judgments of caseworkers,

judges and juries regarding what are proper

and improper childrearing practices become

the decisive factor.

The Texas provision has been defended as

7. Although faced with numerous opportuni-

ties, the Texas courts in prior termin-

ation cases have failed to cure the

vagueness defects of §15.02(1)(D) through ~

narrowing construction of the statute.

The rule of law expressed, if any, is in

general terms and the decisions turn on

the specific facts of each case. See,

.@.» Higgins v. Dallas County Child

Welfare Unit, 544 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Civ.

App.--Dallas 1976, no writ); In the

Matter of R.E.W., 545 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.

Civ.App.--Houston [lst Dist.] 1977, writ

ref'd n.r.e.); and, D.F. v. State, 525

S.W.2d 933 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [lst

Dist.] 1975, no writ).

In addition, the Texas Court of Civil

Appeals in this case made no attempt

to restrict the scope of the statute or

to cure the vagueness defects of the

statute by a narrowing construction.

wind Benet no

=~ et neonnmeee a>

11

the best effort of the Texas legislature

because there would be "extreme difficulty

8 Yet commen-

in being more specific.

tators believe that it is both possible and

desirable to make termination laws more

specific, and have suggested model

standards and statutes which, at a minimun,

demonstrate that such laws can be made

definite. °

Laws containing more precise

standards "do not prevent judges from

examining each situation on its own facts

in order to determine the appropriate

disposition; rather they more _ clearly

define for the judge the kinds of harm with

which society is concerned. "1°

Sanchez v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources

581, S.W.2d 260, 267 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus

Christi, 1979, no writ).

Wald, supra; Goldstein, Freud and Solnit,

supra; and, Note: "State Intrusion Into

Family Affairs," supra, at n.2. See,

generally, Boskey and McCue, "Alternative

Standards for the Termination of Parental

Rights," 9 Seton Hall L.Rev.1, 35-46

(1978).

10 Wald, supra, 27 Stanford L.Rev. at

1003-1004, at n.2.

12

The importance of the parental right of

personal choice in directing the rearing of

their children, Smith v. Organization of

Foster Families for Equality and Reform,

431 U.S. 816 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail,

434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East

Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 #=(1977);

Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629

(1968), requires unambiguous’ statutory

criteria for defining the circumstances in

which others may substitute their own per-

sonal views regarding childraising. By

examining Section 15.02(1)(D) for vagueness,

this Court can thereby provide needed

guidance to all jurisdictions of the minimum

due process requirements of termination

legislation.

II. THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER'S PAREN-

TAL RIGHTS, ABSENT A SHOWING THAT TER-

MINATION WAS THE LEAST DRASTIC MEANS OF

PROTECTING HER CHILDREN, CONSTITUTED AN

IMPERMISSIBLE INTRUSION UPON PETITI-

ONER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HER CHILDREN.

At stake in termination proceedings is

the very existence of the family. In asser-

ting its right and duty to safeguard the

welfare of children, the State seeks total

er

i

i

i

13

destruction of the family unit. The irre-

vocable nature of termination makes it the

family law equivalent of capital punishment

--the life of the family is thereby extin-

guished. The importance of the family re-

lationship requires that the State bear a

heavy burden to justify the necessity of

terminating that relationship.

A. A PARENT HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN

PRESERVING HER RELATIONSHIP WITH HER

CHILDREN.

Like the marriage relationship, the

relationship between parents and their

children is at the heart of traditional

family life. In addition to biological

bonds, a parent who has raised her children

shares with them emotional attachments,

values, loyalties, traditions and expecta-

tions. It is these bonds which give each

family, and the individuals who comprise

the family, the unique characteristics which

set it apart from all other families.

America has traditionally protected and

cherished the diversity of its citizenry,

which in turn depends upon differences bet-

ween families. When a family relationship

is ended by those who would substitute their

14

own judgments of what is "best", the unique

characteristics of that family are thereby

condemned and society suffers a dilution

of its diversity.

This Court has long been solicitous of

the relationship between parents and their

children. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390

(1923). Although not explicitly stating

that the interest created by the parent-

child relationship is "fundamental," num-

erous decisions of this Court have recog-

nized the special importance of this right

and have subjected substantial state in-

trusions upon family relationships to the

exacting scrutiny required when "funda-

mental rights" are at stake.

In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769

(1977), the Court referred to the family

unit as "perhaps the most fundamental social

institution of our society." And in

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651

(1972), it was observed:

The Court has frequently emphas-

ized the importance of the family.

The rights to conceive and raise

one's children have been deemed

"essential," “basic civil rights

of man," and "[{rjights far more

Sn ee ee a _

PR

precious ...than property rights"

(citations omitted). . . .The integrity

of the family unit has found protection

in the Due Process Clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment, the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and

the Ninth Amendment (citations omitted).

The right of privacy encompasses only

those personal rights which are deemed

"fundamental" or “implicit in the con-

cept of ordered liberty." Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the

Court made a statement which it has fre-

quently repeated:

While the outer limits of [the

right of personal privacy] have

not been marked by the Court, it

is clear that among the decisions

that an individual may make with-

out unjustified government inter-

ference are personal decisions re-

lating to . . .family relation-

ships .. . (citations omitted).

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.

374 (1978); Carey v. Population

Services International, 431 U.S.

678 (1977).

Where the State has sought to signi-

ficantly intrude upon family relationships,

the Court has required that the intrusion

be both justified by a compelling state

16 17

interest and limited to only the extent of the family relationship in those instan-

necessary to accomplish the state inter- ces where parents refuse to correct the con-

est. Moore v. City of East Cleveland,Ohio, duct or conditions which endanger their

431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, supra. | children. But a growing number of state

In Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at 65l, with | courts have recognized that the fundamen-

regard to a parent's interest in children he tal nature of the family relationship re-

had sired and raised, the Court held that | quires strong protection, and have con-

the parent's interest "undeniably warrants sequently required the State to justify

deference and, absent a powerful counter- | the necessity for ending that relationship.

vailing interest, protection." Other alternatives must be explored and

The relationship existing between parents eliminated, with meaningful State assis-

and their children is so rooted in the con- tance provided to the neglectful parent to

science and traditions of our nation as to | help her remedy the situation. + The inqui-

be ranked as fundamental. ry becomes whether termination of the rela-

| tionship is necessary to adequately protect

mite gg Ba Meetead Gy eetor | the children "in the light of less drastic

THE EXTENT OF ITS INTRUSION UPON THAT means for achieving the same purpose."

nie catcsepniaceiciall Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).

By completely severing Petitioner's ties | Texas does not inquire whether termi-

with her children, the State sought to 7 nation is necessary to protect the children,

protect the children by means having the

PEs Pomel erm ~

maximum destructive impact upon her family 11 state v. Robert H, 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H

, ; ‘ on.

unit. Sup. 1978); In re People inInterest of

Because the State has the right and duty | ae by = wee — BE gent? gra re

to protect children from the consequences 1974); In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851 (Vt.

: ! Sup.1977); Matter of S.D., Jr., 549

P.2d 1190 (Alk. Sup. 1976); Interest of

Walter B., 577 ¥.2a iis (Utah Sup.

1978).

of parental neglect, Stanley v. Illinois,

Supra, it must be free to seek termination

18

but only whether termination is in their

best interest. 1! It may, at the same time,

be in their interest to continue the rela-

tionship while returning all or some of the

children to the family home for progressive-

ly longer visits under State supervision, or

any of a reasonable number of other alterna-

13 but the Texas termination statute

tives,

does not authorize the jury to recommend

such intermediate solutions. As a result,

the State makes no effort to demonstrate the

inadequacy of other means of protecting the

children. 1}4

The State took possession of Petitioner's

children nearly two and one half years prior

to trial and scattered them into separate

a2 The statute is set out in its entirety

in Appendix D, infra.

_ See, Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769,

779 (M.D. Ala., 1976).

14

State objections, on grounds of ‘re-

levancy, to Petitioner's efforts to

elicit testimony regarding other alter-

natives were sustained by the tri.l

judge. The Court of Civil Appeals

agreed that such evidence was irre-

lavant. Appendix B, pp. 27-31, infra.

are am

L9

foster placements. She was permitted re-

gular visitation, but the State refused to

return any of the children to her home

on even a trial basis. The evidence was

undisputed that she substantially complied

with each instruction given to her by the

State, 1° yet she was denied the opportun-

ity to demonstrate that she had learned her

lesson and could care for her children

without endangering their welfare.?®

> During the pendency of the suit, assis-

tance provided Petitioner by the State

consisted largely of referrals for legal

assistance, employment and income based

upon disability. Petitioner underwent

psychological and neurological examina-

tions and attended Red Cross Health in

Home classes at the request of the State.

16 This case presents a graphic illus-

tration of the situation referred to

in the Commentary to the A.B.A. INSTITUTE

OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE

JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT: STANDARDS

RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1977):

Too often under current practice,

there is no direction or incentive

for parents or agency to work to-

wards the return of the child...

Dealing with the parents may be

time-consuming and, according to

the agency's priorities, unproduct-

ive...Therefore, no effort is made

to work towards return.

20 21

Given the fundamental interests at CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

stake, it was uncumbent upon the State

to demonstrate that the children could I, James E. Belton, do hereby certify

not be adequately protected by ~Mmeans that I mailed (3) true and correct copies

less drastic than termination of the parent- of the foregoing Petition for Writ of

child relationship. Because the State Certiorari, with first-class postage

failed to make such a showing, and because prepaid, addressed to Selden N. Snedeker,

the Texas termination statute does not re- Criminal District Attorney and Thomas

quire that such a showing be made, the state Sullivan, Assistant Criminal District

action constituted an impermissibly extreme Attorney, Attorneys of Record for Respondent,

intrusion upon the integrity of Petitioner's Cameron County Hall of Justice, 974 E.

family unit. Harrison, Brownsville, Texas 78520; and, E.

Dale Robertson, Attorney Ad Litem for the

CONCLUSION children, 950 E. Van Buren, Brownsville,

Texas 78520, on this 10th day of December,

For the reasons stated, the petition | 1979.

for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, [Px LE

JAMES E. BELTON

JAMES E. BELTON

SUSAN REES WILLIAMS

DAVID GRAY HALL

TEXAS RURAL LEGAL AID, INC.

103 East Third Street

Weslaco, Texas 78596

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

NO. 3076-N-T

IN THE INTEREST

OF JOHN HEATH,

MARTHA HEATH,

TOMAS GONZALEZ, JR.

ROBERTO G. DE LEON

ZULEMA DE LEON

AND MARIA G. DE

LEON, MINOR

CHILDREN

IN THE DISTRICT

COURT

CAMERON COUNTY,

TEXAS

197TH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

SITTING AS A

JUVENILE COURT

FINAL JUDGMENT

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3lst day of

July, 1978, came on to be heard the above

entitled and numbered cause. The

Petitioner, Texas Department of Human

Resources, appeared through its appointed

representative, Remberto Arteaga, and by

and through its attorneys of record, Thomas

Sullivan and Reynaldo S. Cantu, Assistant

District Attorneys for Cameron County,

Texas. The Respondent, Maria Guadalupe

Heath Gonzalez appeared in person and by

through her attorneys of -record, James E.

Belton and Susan Williams of Texas Rural

Legal Aid, Inc. E. Dale Robertson, Attorney

Ad Litem, represented the interest of all

the children.

The Respondent, Tomas Gonzalez, Sr.,

executed an affidavit of Relinquishment of

Parental Rights, and an Affidavit of Waiver

of Interest in the child, Tomas Gonzalez,

Jr., he likewise waived citation and

service of process. Tomas Gonzalez, Sr.,

failed to appear and wholly defaulted. The

Respondent, Leonzo de Leon, although duly

notified and cited, failed to appear and

wholly defaulted. Rolando Heath, the

father of John Heath, Martha Heath and

Albert Heath was deceased in 1967.

All parties announced ready for trial by

their respective attorneys of record. A

jury of twelve good and lawful men and

women was selcted, impaneled and sworn.

The evidence was presented and concluded.

Following the submission of the Court's

final charge and the arguments of counsel,

the jury reached its verdict which was

returned into open court, having been duly

signed by the foreman, Jose R. Salinas, and

duly received and ordered filed by the

court without objection by counsel, which

charge of the court and the answers of the

jury to the special issues submitted to by

the Court are by reference, incorporated

herein for all purposes as fully and

completely as if the same were here set

forth verbatim.

It appeared to the Court that Tomas

Gonzalez, Sr., executed an Affidavit of

Waiver of Interest and Relinquishment of

Parental Rights in the child, Tomas

Gonzalez, Jr., and further that he failed

to provide support for said _ child,

according to his ability for more than a

year ending within six months of the date

of filing of this. suit. It further

appeared that termination of the parent-

child relationship between Tomas Gonzalez,

Sr., and Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., is in the

best interest of the child.

It appeared to the Court that there

exists neither in fact nor in law a parent-

child relationship between Leonzo de Leon

and the children, Robert G. de Leon, Zulema

G. de Leon and Maria Guadalupe de Leon. It

further appeared to the Court that

termination of the parent-child

relationship, if any, between Leonzo de

Leon and the children above named would be

yee oe - ——

> a

in the best interest of the children.

It appeared to the Court that, by

agreement of all parties, filed herein,

termination of the parent-child

relationship between Maria Guadalupe Heath

Gonzalez, and the minor children, John

Heath and Martha Heath is not sought. The

Court is of the opinion that said agreement

is in the best interest of John Heath and

Martha Heath, and should be approved.

It appeared that Maria Guadalupe Heath

Gonzalez had knowingly placed the children

in conditions and surroundings which

endangered their physical well being and

that Maria Guadalupe Heath Gonzalez had

knowingly allowed the children to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endangered

their physical well being. It further

that termination of the

relationship between Maria

Guadalupe Heath Gonzalez and the minor

children, Albert Heath, Tomas Gonzalez,

Jr., Roberto G. de Leon, Zulema G. de Leon

and Maria Guadalupe de Leon would be in the

best interest of the children.

It appears to the Court that’ the

Attorney Ad Litem spent 23.1 hours in the

discharge of his duties and should be con-

appeared

parent-child

Pitiiren

pensated accordingly.

IT

Is

THEREFORE ORDERED ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that:

1.

The parent-child

between Tomas

relationship

Gonzalez, Sr., and

the minor child Tomas Gonzalez, Jr.,

be and is hereby terminated except

that the child retain the right to

inherit from and through its dives-

ted parent.

The parent-child relationship, if

any, between Leonzo de Leon and the

minor children, Robert G. de Leon,

Zulema de Leon, and Maria Guadalupe

de Leon, be and is hereby terminated

except that the children retain the

right to inherit from and through

their divested parent.

The parent-child relationship be-

tween Maria Guadalupe Heath Gonzalez

and the minor children, Albert Heath,

Robert G. de

and Maria

Guadalupe be and is hereby termi-

nated except that the minor children

retain the right to inherit from and

through their divested parent.

Tomas Gonzalez, Jr.,

Leon, Zulema de Leon

6A

Texas Department of Department of

Human Resources, Cameron County

Child Welfare Unit, Remberto

Arteaga, Supervisor, and his succes-

sors in office, be and is hereby

named Managing Conservator of John

Heath and Martha Heath.

The Managing Conservator of John

Heath and Martha Heath has all the

rights duties and obligations as

enumerated in Article 14.02 of the

Texas Family Code except the right

to consent to adoption.

The Texas Department of Human-

Resources, Cameron County Child

Welfare Unit, Remberto’ Arteaga,

Supervisor, and his successors in

office, be and is hereby named

Managing Conservator of Albert

Heath, Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., Roberto

G. de Leon, Zulema G. de Leon and

Maria Guadalupe de Leon.

The Managing Conservator of Albert

Heath, Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., Roberto

G. de Leon, Zulema de Leon, and

Maria Guadalupe de Leon be granted

all the rights, duties and obliga-

tions as enumerated in Article

7A

14.02 of Texas Family Code including

the right to consent to the adoption

of the children named herein.

The Attorney Ad Litem be compensated

in the amount of $575.00 and that

Said amount be taxed as costs.

The costs of this suit be assessed

against the Petitioner.

SIGNED FOR ENTRY on the 16th day of August,

1979.

DARRELL HESTER

PRESIDING JUDGE

APPENDIX B

OPINION OF THE TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

NUMBER 1428

IN THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

FOR THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

TEXAS

SITTING AT CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

eb heen 2 2 ie 2 RRR RSA BO 2B

GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,

Appellant,

V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,

Appellee.

2B

he ene 22D SD

On appeal from the 197th District Court of

Cameron County.

"RRR ES 2S 2 SOS

OPINION

Suit was brought by the Cameron County

Child Welfare Unit of the Texas Department

of Human Resources (State) to terminate the

parent-child relationship between Appellant

Guadalupe H. Gonzalez, the natural mother,

Tomas Gomzalez, the natural mother, Tomas

Gonzalez and Leonzo de Leon, the living

natural fathers, and seven of nine child-

ren: John Heath (born February 23, 1963),

Martha Heath (born April 3, 1965), Albert

Heath (born December 16, 1966), Tomas

Gonzalez, Jr., (born January 24, 1970),

Robert De Leon (born June 3, 1972), Zulema

de Leon (born May 5, 1973), and Maria de

Leon (born June 4, 1974).

1 Rolando Heath, father of the children

surnamed Heath, died in 1967. Tomas

Gonzalez, Sr., one of the natural fathers,

excuted an affidavit relinquishing his

parental rights to his child, Tomas

Gonzalez, Jr. Leonzo de Leon, the natural

father of the children with the same

surname, are the result of a meretricious

relationship with the Appellant. De Leon

although duly served with service of pro-

3B

The State based its suit on Section

15.02 (1)(D) and (2) of the Texas Family

Code Ann. (Supp. 1979) which provides that:

"A petition requesting termination of

the parent-child relationship with

respect to a parent who is not the

petitioner may be granted if the Court

finds that:

(1) the parent has:

zk kk

(D) knowingly placed or know-

ingly allowed the child to

remain in conditions or

surroundings which endanger

the physical or emotional

well-being of the child, .

kk

and eee

(2) termination is in the best

interest of the child."

Appellant answered by filing a general

denial, numerous special exceptions and the

following two “affirmative defenses": (1)

that there were available less drastic

alternatives to termination and that the

State had failed to adequately provide her

and her children the welfare, protective

and supportive services which would assist

cess and notification of the hearing,

failed to appear. Neither father appeals

from the trial court's order terminating

his parental rights.

4B

her in maintaining and strengthening her

family life; and 2) that although she

lacked a formal education, had limited

financial and economic resources, and was

suffering from physical and emotional

problems, she had never willfully denied

her children the care they needed nor had

she intentionally endangered their well-

being.

In response to numerous special issues,

the jury found: 1) that Appellant - had

knowingly placed each child in conditions

or surroundings which endangered his/her

physical well-being; 2) that Appellant had

knowingly allowed each child to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endangered

his/her physical well-being; 3) that

termination of the parent-child relation-

ship is in the best interest of each child;

4) that the appointment of the State as

managing conservator would be in the best

interest of each child.

After the jury verdict, the parties,

with the consent of the trial court,

entered into an agreement whereby the State

agreed not to seek termination of the

parent-child relationship between Appellant

and the two oldest minor children, John

5B

Heath, age 16, and Martha Heath, age 15.

Based upon this agreement and the answers

to the special issues, the trial court

entered a judgment which terminated the

parent-child relationship of Appellant and

both living natural fathers as to the five

youngest children, Albert Heath, Tomas

Gonzalez, Jr., Robert de Leon, Zulema de

Leon, and Maria de Leon. The court

appointed the State as managing conservator

of these children. The children have

remained in foster homes during the course

of this appeal.

Appellant brings forward nine points of

error for our consideration. We consider

Appellant's complaints concerning the trial

court's action in overruling her special

exceptions to the pleadings and in refusing

to submit to the jury her tendered special

instruction, before we address her legal

and factual sufficiency points of error

attacking the jury's finding and her other

constitutional complaints.

In point of error number two, Appellant

complaints that the district court abused

its discretion in overruling’ special

exceptions to the State's original petition

because such petition did not allege facts

6B

in support of the grounds for termination

of the parent-child relationship, thereby

depriving her of fair notice of what the

State expected to prove and what she had to

defend. In point of error number three,

Appellant, in a related argument,

complaint that the application to this

case of Section 11.08 of the Texas Family

Code resulted in an unconstitutional denial

of Appellant's procedural due process of

law. These contentions are without merit.

Section 11.08 requires, among other

things, that a petition which seeks

termination of the parent-child relation-

ship must include "a statement describing

what action the court is requested to make

concerning the child and the _ statutory

grounds on which the request is made."

Tex.Fam. Code Ann. §11.08(b) (10) (1972).

Section 11.14(a) provides that the rules of

civil cases generally shall be applicable.

Tex.Fam.Code Ann. §11.14(a) (1972). Rule

45, T.R.C.P., provides, in relevant part,

as follows:

"Pleadings in the district court and

county courts shall. ..

(b) Consist of a statement in plain and

concise language of the plaintiff's cause

of action or the defendant's ground of

eee

7B

defense. That an allegation be evidentiary

or be of legal conclusion shall not be

ground for objection when fair notice

to plaintiff is given by the allegations

as a whole. (Emphasis added).

This rule is consistent with the due

process notice requirements outlined by the

Supreme Court in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. l,

33 (1967).

Here the State filed an original

petition in which the State sought to be

appointed the managing conservator of

Appellant's children. Later the State

filed a pleading captioned "Original

Petition for Temporary and Permanent

Managing Conservatorship and to Terminate

the Parent-Child Relationship." In support

of each petition, the State alleged the

statutory grounds contained in Section

15.02(1)(D) and (2) of the Texas Family

Code as the basis for termination of the

parent-child relationship. In addition,

the State alleged that:

", . . temporary and permanent court

orders for the care and protection of

the children are necessary for the

reasons set forth in the affidavit at-

SAGOG ... «*

8B

The affidavit by Remberto G. Arteaga,

Supervisor for the Cameron County Child

Welfare Unit stated, in relevant part:

"The children, if required to return to

their natural mother, GUADALUPE GONZALEZ,

would suffer immediate and irreparable

injury for which there is no adequate

remedy at law and that their mother is

an alcoholic, unemployed and would be

unable to provide (1) decent, safe and

sanitary housing, (2) adequate parental

care and supervision, (3) proper nutri-

tional meals for the children. There-

fore, for the safety and welfare of the

children, the children should not be per-

mitted to return to their mother, and, in

my opinion it would be in the best in-

terest of the children if they’ were

allowed to remain in their present fos-

ter homes pending a hearing..."

In addition, the State filed a show cause

motion which alleged that the statutory

grounds which initially supported the

State's removal of the children were

continuing and that, therefore, the State

should continue as managing conservator

because:

"1. Respondent has no visible means of

support; _

2. Respondent has failed to stabilize

| her home environment, in that, she

9B

continues to consort with men who

physically abuse her;

3. She continues to deny that any pro-

blems existed in the past with res-

pect to the way that she cared for

and supervised her children."

Several months later, the Appellant

filed an answer which included special

exceptions directed toward the allegations

contained in the State's pleadings on the

basis that such allegations were "vague and

general and consist of conclusions of law

and do not state the family conditions and

circumstances and the specific facts,

dates, mames and places which support

Petitioner's conclusions of law." The

trial court overruled Appellant's special

exceptions. Contrary to Appellant's

assertions, the State did allege more than

the statutory grounds for termination as

contained in Sections 15.02(1)(D) and (2)

of the Texas Family Code. We note that

during oral argument, both parties stated

that the discovery process under our rules

had been utilized. Appellant's points of

error numbers two and three are overruled.

By her points of error numbers four and

10B

five, Appellant complains: 1) that there

is insufficient evidence to show that there

exists a present danger to the physical

well-being of the children; and 2) that the

trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to submit the following special

instruction requested by Appellant;

"In connection with the Special Issues,

you are instructed that termination may

not be based solely upon conditions

which existed in the past but no longer

exist. Before termination of the parent-

child relationship can be ordered, it

must be shown that the grounds upon

which termination is being sought pre-

sently exist."

The trial judge refused to submit the

special instruction. Appellant moved for a

directed verdict and a judgment notwith-

standing the verdict on the basis that

there was insufficient evidence to show

that there existed a present danger to the

physical well-being of the children. These

motions were overruled.

Rule a?i, Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure, requires the Court to "submit

such explanatory instructions and

definitions as shall be proper ..." An

instruction is "proper" if it finds support

in the evidence and the inferences to be

11B

drawn therefrom, and if it might be of some

aid or assistance to the jury in answering

the issues submitted. First State

Bank & Trust Co. of Edinburg v. George, 519

S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Civ.App.- Corpus Christi

1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mejia v. Liberty

Mutual Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Civ.

App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).

The trial court has considerable discretion

in deciding what instructions are necessary

and proper in submitting issues to the jury.

We do not find that the trial judge abused

his discretion in this’' regard. See

Spradling v. Williams, 533 S.W.2d 143, 145,

(Tex.Civ.App.- Beaumont 1977), aff'd 566

S$.W.2d 561 (Tex.Sup.1978); McCane Sondock

Detective Agency v. Penland Distributors,

inc., 523 §.W.2d 62 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston

[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); First State

Bank & Trust Co. v of Edinburg v. George,

519 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi

1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Appellant's only specific objection to

the court's charge was to the effect that

the special issues (because they merely

"tracked" the vague, overbroad, etc., lan-

guage of the statutory grounds for termi-

nation), violated Appellant's constituti-

ee ae ree

ee

12B

onal rights in several respects. Other com-

plaints concerning the form of the spe 1

issues as submitted were waived. Alle. _

American National Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 604

(Tex.Sup. 1964); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n

v. Nueman, 379 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Sup. 1964).

The issues, as submitted to the jury, did

require the jury to make a judgment as to

the present conditions of Appellant and of

the children. For example:

"Do you find, from a preponderance of

the evidence, that termination is in

the best interest of the children, or

any of them." (Emphasis added).

The special issues directed the jurors'

attention to the ultimate issues of the

case. Appellant's points of error numbers

four and five are overruled.

In point of error number eight, Appell-

ant brings forward a “legal sufficiency"

point as to the jury findings relating to

the three youngest children by complaining

that the trial court erred in entering a

judgment which terminated the parent-child

relationship between her and Robert, Zulema

and Maria because there is "no evidence" to

support a finding that Appellant either

knowingly placed or knowingly allowed these

13B

three youngest children to remain in con-

ditions or surroundings which endangered

their physical well-being. In point of

error number nine, Appellant complains of

the jury's findings as to all five children

on "factual sufficiency" grounds.

At the outset we recognize that actions

which break the ties between a parent and

child "can never be justified without the

most solid and _ substantial reasons."

State v. Deaton, 54 S.W.901 (Tex.Sup.1900).

First, there is the strong presumption that

a child's foremost interest is usually best

served by keeping custody in and with the

natural parents. This is based on a logical

belief that the ties of the natural rela-

tionship of parent and child ordinarily

bring about strong assurances and genuine

efforts on the part of the custodians to

provide the child with the best of care and

most beneficial opportunities possible.

Usually, the best atmosphere for mental,

moral and emotional development of the

child is with its natural: ‘parent.

Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352

(Tex.Sup. 1976), citing Mumma v. Aguirre,

364 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Sup. 1963). See

and compare: Sanchez v.Texas Department of

14B

Human Resources, S.W.2d _ (Tex.Civ.App.

-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).

The standard of our review of legal and

factual sufficiency points of error which

attack the findings made by the trial judge

or jury in an involuntary termination

proceeding pursuant to the Texas Family

Code is governed by the same general rules

applicable to other civil cases. See e.g.,

Woodard v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources,

573 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1978,

writ ref'd n.r.e.); In RekE. Ss. M., 550

S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.Civ.App. -Houston [lst

Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, in

deciding the "legal sufficiency" point, we

review the evidence only in the light most

favorable to support the jury's findings,

and in deciding the "factual sufficiency"

point, we must consider all of the evidence.

See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.

Sup.1965); In Re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d

660 Tex.Sup.1951); In Re E. S. M., 550

S.W.2d 749 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [lst Dist. ]

1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). First, we consider

the legal sufficiency point. Frank DeGeer, a

child welfare worker for the State, testi-

fied that he had been assigned to the

Gonzalez case for approximately a two-year

15B

period which commenced in May, 1975, after

the State had received complaints that

Appellant had been leaving her children at

home alone. During this period of time, he

stated that he made 18 to 20 visits to

Appellant's home. On the date of the

first home visit in 1975, DeGeer stated

that he found, alone and without adult

supervision, the school-aged children,

Richard Roy, Martha, Albert and "another

eight year old" who "might have been

Tomas." DeGeer stated that a telephone

call from a neighbor who "was concerned

because just one of the children was there

alone" prompted further home visits.

Later, he made a visit to the school

attended by the school-age children to talk

with the school nurse. He stated that "a

home visit was made that same day and the

children were alone." Appellant was not

present at her home the following day

either. On this day, DeGeer discovered

2

The State dismissed the termination suit

as to Richard Roy prior to trial.

16B

that the children were with a neighbor,

Mrs. Guerrero, who was the godmother of the

Appellants children surnamed Heath.

Appellant had not made prior arrangements

with Mrs. Guerrero to have her look after

the children. DeGeer found it necessary to

take one of the older children with him

back to the Gonzalez home in order to

obtain clean clothing for the youngsters.

DeGeer testified that, while he was in

Appellant's home, he noticed that’ the

toilet could not be flushed without using a

bucket of water; the electricity and gas

were turned off; there was no food in the

pantry or closets; the house was in a

filthy and unkept'- manner; andthe

refrigerator had no _ food--"Just ae few

cockroaches."

in March DeGeer testified that he found

John home alone. John told him that he was

not in school because he didn't have any

shoes. DeGeer stated that he took John to

school where he obtained shoes for him from

the nurse's office. During the time he was

in the nurse's office, DeGeer stated that

Albert, John's brother, was brought into

the office because he was crying and

disturbing the rest of the children.

17B

testified that,

quite by coincidence, another brother,

DeGeer further

Tomas was also brought into the office a

short time later because he was being

sullen and uncooperative in the classroom.

Tomas refused to talk with anyone present.

The next day DeGeer stated that he and

Remberto Arteaga, the present welfare

supervisor, made’ a visit to the Gonzalez

home during school hours. They discovered

that no one was at home and the door was

not locked. DeGeer stated that an

inspection revealed the absence of food and

no utilities in the home. In April, he

made another visit to the Gonzalez home in

response to a complaint by Mrs. Guerrero,

and found John again at home alone.

Olivia Guerrero testified that she was

the godmother of Richard Roy, John, Mary

and Martha and that she had known Appellant

only through the children for the past six

years. She stated that when she initially

knew the children, they would come over to

her home and visit. The visits became more

and more frequent. By the end of the

six-year period, they were coming to her

home almost every day, sometimes staying

two or three days in a row. Guerrero

geese anes eben

18B

stated that Appellant had requested her to

babysit with the children on only one

occasion, and that was the night before the

children were taken from the Appellant.

When the children came to visit, she stated

that they usually did not bring any clean

clothes or food and were generally dirty.

When the children came to her home, they

usually only told her that their mother was

not at home; that she was either with Mr.

de Leon or that they did not know where she

was.

DeGeer made a visit to the Guerrero home

at Mrs. Guerrero's request. Two school age

children, Albert and Tomas, and the three

pre-school children, Robert, Zulema and

Maria, were there. Mrs. Guerrero explained

that the Appellant had requested her to

take care of the children the previous

night, promising to return the following

day by 8:00 a.m. so that Mrs. Guerrero

could go *o work. She called because there

was no one else to supervise the children.

DeGeer stated that the children appeared as

though they had not bathed for quite some

time, their clothes were dirty and "they

were lice-ridden". DeGeer stated that he

went to the Gonzalez home to obtain some

19B

clean clothing for the children. Upon his

arrival, he found that the house was

unlocked, that the utilities were still

off, and that there was no food in the

house. DeGeer testified that the children

never seemed to known where their mother

was when he asked about her absence. He

stated that during the time he was working

with the family, the housing condition

deteriorated,became more unsanitary and the

house sometimes smelled of urine.

Dr. Antonio Diaz, a specialist in family

medicine, testified that he examined Albert

who was then 9 years old. Diaz stated that

Albert weighed fifty pounds, which piaced

his weight at only the third to fifth

percentile of children his age (i.e., 95 to

97% of children nine years of age weigh

more than 50 pounds), and his height was

only at the tenth percentile. D.az further

stated that Albert was uncommunicative.

His examination revealed that Albert had

lice and showed signs of "failure to

thrive." Dr. Diaz stated that his last

visit with Albert was after Albert had been

placed in foster care. He described the

child's progress as far as his weight,

health and emotional state to be good.

puiendkah Smee etamsinas memes —

20B

Dr. Diaz testified that when he examined

Tomas, a six (6) year old boy, he found

that Tomas was suffering from scabies, a

parasite that burrows under the skin. He

testified that the scabies had created

sores on Tomas' body which had become

secondarily infected. He further found

Tomas to be infected with lice and internal

parasites. Tomas' weight (42 pounds) was

at the 40th percentile for children his

age, while his height (44 inches) was only

at the 7th to 10th percentile. Dr. Diaz

stated that the medical condition of the

children was consistent with a history of

parental neglect. The evidence in the

record showed that all of the children

suffered from lice.

Dr. Michael de Socorrez, who holds a

Ph.D. in psychology, testified that the

Appellant was a woman of normal

intelligence, but nevertheless suffered

from a brain disfunction which was a result

of a brain trauma. Although the exact

cause of the terms could not be identified,

he calculated the condition with a history

of drinking and physical abuse. He

testified that she tended to relate to

others in a self-destructive manner. She

21B

had experienced an early history of emotio-

hal abuse and lack of warmth. As a result,

the Appellant was unable to sustain long

relationships. She related to men primari-

ly through physical sex. On the basis of

his evaluation, de Socorrez further stated

that Appellant "is unable to meet the needs

of her children in regard to emotional

warmth, caring and protection, protection

in every sense of the word." The doctor's

Prognosis for Mrs. Gonzalez was "guarded".

The prognosis for her learning to care app-

ropriately for her children was nil. He

did not believe that there was a program of

psychotherapy, psychoanalysis or counseling

which could provide the structure in which

Mrs. Gonzalez could learn how to provide

for her children adequately, emotionally and

lovingly.

Mrs. Elias Salinas, a foster parent of

Tomas, testified that when Tomas arrived at

their home on April 15, 1976, he had lice,

sores on his body and infected sores on his

buttocks. Tomas was wearing dirty shorts

and torn tennis shoes which did not fit.

She stated that Tomas did not remember ever

vating an egg. She described his health as

improved: “being much better now." He had

22B .

gained weight and had "grown up", she said.

She stated that Tomas calls her and her

husband "Mamma" and "Daddy."

Esmeralda Rodriguez, a foster parent of

Albert, testified that at the time Albert

(10 years of age) arrived at their home, on

April 15, 1976, he was slim and his stomach

was protruding. She also stated that he

had lice which took over three months to

clear up by shampooing every day. She

stated that he initially was somewhat

uncoordinated, stumbled easily and had

trouble in school; that he did not know his

right hand from his left; and did not know

the alphabet. She described him now as

being much taller, healthy, and more

conversant.

Bluford Bradford Hester,III, a child

placement worker for the State, testified

his duties included investigating reports

of abuse and neglect, working with families

which are having problems and working with

foster children. He testified that he was

assigned to the Gonzalez case in October,

1976. During his first visit with Mrs.

Gonzalez, which occurred in October, 1976,

Appellant informed him that she ‘was living

with a friend or relative because her

23B

utilities were out at her home. Appellant

showed Hester her accumulated utility bills

which showed an overdue and unpaid amount

of approximately $1,000.00. Hester stated

that the basic utility bill had been in the

neighborhood of $300.00 and $400.00 and

that the remainder was due to finance

charges imposed for non-payment. Hester

stated that Appellant's utilities were

turned on sometime in the spring of 1977

and remained on for approximately a year.

In March, 1978, Hester stated that the

utilities were again turned off due to

non-payment and they remained off until

sometime in May or the first part of June

in 1978.

Hester testified that Appellant had no

formal education, no prior job experiences

and no special vocational job training. He

described her most recent employment as

that of a bar-maid at several different

locations. It was undisputed that, prior

to the time the children were removed,

Appellant's sources of income were social

security benefits that she and the surnamed

Heath children received. She also received

aid to families with dependent children for

Tomas Gonzalez, Jr., plus food stamps, for

24B

a total of approximately $500 to $600 per

month. Mr. de Leon had paid her past due

utility bill and provided some support

payments for the children with the surname

of de Leon. Appellant's home had been paid

for from the proceeds of an insurance

policy when her first husband died. The

title to the house had been placed in the

name of the Heath children. Hester

testified that Appellant requested a visit

with one of her sons who was in the South

Texas State School in Edinburg and, at the

Same time, asked whether there would be any

excess Over his allowance for that

particular month. He informed Appellant

there probably would be an excess, but that

it would take some five to six weeks for

the necessary paperwork to be completed

before she could receive such excess. He

testified that she seemed disappointed at

this response and subsequently cancelled

her visitation trip.

There is ample probative evidence, both

circumstantial and direct, to support the

jury's findings as to each child. See

Larson v. Ellison, 217 S.w.2a 420, 421

(Tex.Sup. 1949). Appellant's point of error

number eight is overruled.

25B

In addition to the evidence discussed

above, we have reviewed the entire record

and find that the jury's answers are not

against the great weight and preponderance

of the evidence. See In Re King's Estate,

244 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Sup. 1951). There is

ample evidence in the record from which the

jury could reasonably conclude that App-

ellant knowingly placed or knowingly

allowed all of the children to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endanger

their physical well-being. The jury is not

only the judge of the facts,. and

circumstances proven, but they are the

judge of the credibility of the witnesses.

They are at liberty to draw reasonable

inferences and deductions from the evidence

adduced at trial. Lynch v. Ricketts, 314

S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Sup.1958); Clark v. Brewer,

498 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus

Christi 1973, no writ). Appellant's point

of error number nine is overruled.

In point of error number one, Appellant

complaints that Section 15.02(1)(D) is void

for vagueness and is unconstitutional on

its face, and as applied to her. We have

recently considered the precise same

26B

contention that Section 15.02(1)(D) of the

Texas Family Code is void for vagueness in

Sanchez v. Texas Department of Human Re-

sources, S.W.2d (Tex.Civ.

App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ), and

found that contention to be without merit.

The record in this case does not support

Appellant's contention that Section 15.02

(1)(D) is unconstitutional as it was ap-

plied to her. Appellant's point of error

number one is overruled.

In points of error numbers six and

seven, Appellant complains that the trial

court erred by refusing to admit into

evidence certain testimony of Remberto

Arteaga, Supervisor of the Cameron County

Child Welfare Unit of the Texas Department

of Human Resources. After the State rested

its case, counsel for Appellant recalled

Mr. Arteaga and attempted to elicit certain

testimony allegedly relevant to Appellant's

“affirmative defense" that termination of

the parent-child relationship was not the

least drastic remedy available to the

State. During the course of direct

examination of Mr. Arteaga, the trial court

refused to hear testimony by sustaining

27B

relevancy objections to the following three

areas of inquiry:

1. (Counsel for Appellant): "And I believe

you testified earlier that these policies

and procedures of the [State] are cont-

ained in the Social Service Manual, is

that correct?

(Arteaga): Yes.

(Counsel for Appellant): Are you

camiliar with this manual?

(Arteaga): Yes, ma'am.

(Counsel for State): I am going to

object to the constant reference to the

material that pertains to the operations

of the Department. I don't see the

specific relevance to this case.

(Court): Objection will be sustained.

kkk

2. (Counsel for Appellant): [In light

of the witnesses' previous testimony],

can you tell me, speaking again for

the [State], how serious a matter is

removal of a child from its home?

(Counsel for State): I object on the

same basis, Your Honor, relevancy.

(Court): Sustained. That is for the

jury to decide.

zx kk

28B

3. (Counsel for Appellant): Mr. Arteaga,

how many other cases have you been in-

volved in where termination is sought?

(Counsel for State): We'll object to

that on the same basis, relevancy:

(Court): Sustained."

The trial judge granted Appellant's request

to make a formal bill of exceptions

concerning the excluded testimony.

The formal bill of exceptions, including

exhibits attached thereto, comprises 74

pages in the’ supplemental transcript.

Nowhere in the bill of exceptions is

evidence concerning the areas of inquiry

two and three above. Most of the substance

of Mr. Arteaga's testimony contained in the

bill of exceptions is a summary of his own

prior testimony or a summary of other

witnesses' prior testimony which had been

introduced into evidence without objection.

The bill of exceptions does contain the

following statements which Appellant did

not specifically attempt to introduce

through Arteaga's testimony during the

trial: 1) the family of Appellant, “at

all times pertinent hereto, [was ]

experiencing a 'protective situation' as

29B

that term is used throughout the Social

Services Handbook;" 2) Appellant "and her

family were at all pertinent times hereto

qualified for the services available

through Cameron County Child Welfare Unit

to families experiencing protective

Situations;" and 3) the Cameron County

Child Welfare Unit was able to provide

eight enumerated services to families

experiencing "protective situations."

Attached to the bill of exceptions as

exhibits were copies of: 1) "various

pertinent sections of the 'Social Services

Handbook' as those sections existed from

and after the date shown on each page;" and

2). “copies of Article 695c §18A(1),

V.A.T.S.; 42 U.S.C. §§601, 602 (a), 622(a);

45 C.F.R. §§220.1-220.40, [which would have

been offered into evidence]." These

exhibits comprise 71 pages of the bill of

exceptions.

As a general rule, error is not shown in

the exclusion of evidence unless’ the

Appellant brings before the appellate court

a record that shows clearly not only what

the evidence would have been if admitted,

but also its relevancy. Kieffer v. Miller,

560 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977,

30B

writ ref'd n.r.e.); Swinney v. Winters, 532

S.W.2d 396 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1975,

writ ref'd n.r.e.); Victoria Comfort Air Co.

v. Alamo Express, 529 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Civ.

App.--Corpus Christi 1975, no writ). The

complaining party has the burden to show

reversible error by demonstrating that the

exclusion of evidence was reasonably cal-

culated to and probably did cause the ren-

dition of an improper verdict or judgment.

Gomez Leon v.State, 426 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.Sup.

1968); Ryder Tank Lines Inc. v. Bentley,

397 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth

1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Reversible error

is not present where the substance of the

excluded testimony is cumulative or has

been previously introduced through that

witness or another witness. Brazos Graphics,

Inc. v. Irvin Industries Inc., 22 Tex.Sup.

309 (Tex.Sup. April 18, 1979); Hopkins v.

Clark, 20 Tex. 64 (Tex.Sup.1857); Yancy v.

Olvera, 518 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.Civ.App.--San

Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sanchez v.

| Billings, 481 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Civ.App.-

Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd

n.r.e.): Parten v. Wilson, 243 S.W.2d 198

(Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1951, writ ref'd

n.r.@.).

31B

Error is not shown by the exclusion of

evidence which previously had been

introduced. The remsi~der of Arteaga's

testimony and the Handbook (Exhibit "A")

contained in the bill of exceptions is of

such a general nature that we fail to see

its relevancy. No effort has been made to

tie Arteaga's testimony with any specific

sections of the attached Handbook, nor to

any of the other attached exhibits. We

conclude that Appellant has failed to show

that the exclusion of this evidence was

error or if we could say that it was error,

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that

such error was reasonably calculated

to and probably did cause the rendition of

an improper judgment in this case. Rule

434, T.R.C.P. Appellant's points of error

numbers six and seven are overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

PAUL W. NYE

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered and filed this, the 3rd

day of May, 1979.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District

Corpus Christi, Texas

32B

Below is the JUDGMENT in the numbered

cause set out herein to be Filed and

Entered in the Minutes of the Court of

Civil Appeals, Thirteenth Supreme Judicial

District of Texas, at Corpus Christi, as of

the 3rd day of May, 1979. If this Judgment

does not conform to the opinion handed down

by the Court in this cause, any party may

file a Motion for Correction of Judgment

with the Clerk of this Court.

CAUSE NO. 1428 (Trial Court No. 3076-N-T)

GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ,

Appellant,

Vv.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,

Appellee.

on appeal to this Court from Cameron

County, Texas.

re KR KR KR KKK

JUDGMENT

On appeal from the 197th District Court of

Cameron County, Texas. Opinion by Chief

Justice Paul W. Nye.

33B

THIS CAUSE was suhmitted to the Court on

January 18, 1979, on oral argument, briefs

and transcript of the record. These having

been examined and fully considered, it is

the opinion of the Court that there is no

error in the judgment of the court below

and said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

It is further ordered that Appellant

GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ pay all costs of

this appeal expended and incurred. It is

further ordered that this decision be cer-

tified below for observance.

kaAkRKRK KR KR KK

Shirley Selz, Clerk

APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN

NO. B-8601 September 12, 1979

GUADALUPE H. GONZALEZ 4

vs. 4 From Cameron

County,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF i) Thirteenth

HUMAN RESOURCES ) District

Application of petitioner for writ of

error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the

Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District having

been duly considered, and the Court having

determined that the application presents no

error requiring reversal of the judgment of

the Court of Civil Appeals, it is ordered

that said application be, and hereby is,

refused.

It is further ordered that applicant,

Guadalupe H. Gonzalez, pay all costs

incurred on this application.

I, GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk of the

Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify

that the above and foregoing is a true and

correct copy of the order of the Supreme

Court of Texas in the case numbered and

styled as above, as the same appears of

record in the minutes of said Court under

the dates shown.

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the

Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of

Austin, this the 3rd day of October, 1979.

GARSON R. JACKSON, Clerk

BY: Mary M. Wakefield, Deputy

APPENDIX D

§15.02 Involuntary Termination of Parental

Rights

A petition requesting termination of the

parent-child relationship with respect to a

parent who is not the petitioner may be

granted if the court finds that:

(1) the parent has:

(A) voluntarily left the child

alone or in the possession of

another not the parent and

expressed an intent not to

return; or

(B) voluntarily left the child

alone or in the possession of

another not the parent with-

out expressing an intent to

return, without providing for

the adequate support of the

child, and remained away for

a period of at least three

months; or

(C) voluntarily left the child

alone or in the possession

of another not the parent

and, although expressing an

intent to return, failed to

do so without providing

adequate support of the

child and remained away for

a period of at least six

months; or

(D) knowingly placed or know-

ingly allowed the child to

| remain in conditions or

(E)

(F)

(G)

(H)

2D

Surroundings which endanger

the physical or emotional

well-being of the child; or

engaged in conduct or know-

ingly placed the child with

persons who engaged in con-

duct which endangers. the

physical or emotional well-

being of the child; or

failed to support the child

in accordance with his abi-

lity during a period of one

year ending within six

months of the date of the

filing of the petition; or

abandoned the child without

identifying the child or

furnishing means of identi-

fication, and the child's

identity cannot be ascer-

tained by the exercise of

reasonable diligence; or

voluntarily, and with know-

ledge of the pregnancy,

abandoned the mother of the

child beginning at a time

during her pregnancy with

the child and continuing

through the birth, failed to

provide adequate Support or

medical care for the mother

during the period of aban-

donment before the birth of

the child, and remained

apart from the child or

failed to support the child

Since the birth; or

(2)

of the child.

Leg., p.

1975.

bist

(T)

(J)

(K)

1266,

3D

contumaciously refused to

submit to a reasonable and

lawful order of a court

under Section 34.05 of this

code; or

been the major cause of:

(1) the failure of the child

to be enrolled in school

as required by the Texas

Education Code; or

fai) the child's absence

from his home without

the consent of his

parents or guardian

for a substantial con-

sent of his parents

Or guardian for a

substantial length of

time or without the

intent to return; or

executed before or after the

suit is filed an unrevoked

or irrevocable affidavit of

relinquishment of parental

rights as provided by

Section 15.03 of this code-

and in addition, the court

further finds that

termination is in the best interest

Amended by Acts 1975, 64th

ch. 476, §31, eff. Sept. 1,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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