Amicus Brief — Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.

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> Fa IN THE

SS Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-669

DAWSON CHEMICAL COMPANY, CRYSTAL MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION and CRYSTAL CHEMICAL COMPANY,

Petitioners,

VU.

ROHM AND HAAS COMPANY,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NEW YORK PATENT

LAW ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF THE RESPONDENT

New York Parent Law Assoctation, Inc.

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, New York 10020

WiuuiaM F.. Eperze, Esea., President

By

Barry D. Rein

Of Counsel: 330 Madison Avenue

—_—. New York, New York 10017

195 Broadway and

New York, New York 10007 STANLEY H. LigBerstTEIn

Kennets E. Mapsen 260 Madison Avenue

59 Maiden Lane New York, New York 10016

New York, New York 10038 Attorneys for Amicus

Rory J. Rappine

330 ‘Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-669

—_——EE ee

Dawson CHEMICAL Company, CrystaL MANUFACTURING

CoRPORATION and CrystaL CHEMICAL CoMPANY,

Petitioners,

Roum anp Haas Company,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS

CURIAE OF THE NEW YORK PATENT LAW

ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF

THE RESPONDENT

The New York Patent Law Association hereby respect-

fully moves pursuant to Rule 42 for leave to file the ac-

companying brief amicus curiae herein on behalf of respond-

ent. The consent of the attorney for the respondent has

been obtained. The consent of the attorney for the peti-

tioners was sought but was refused. Copies of the letters

I!

concerning the foregoing consent and refusal have been

filed with the Clerk.

The New York Patent Law Association is an associa-

tion of over one thousand attorneys in private and corpo-

rate practice in the fields of patent, trademark and copy-

right law in the New York metropolitan area. Our Asso-

ciation is concerned with the advancement of the arts and

sciences through an effective patent system as well as

through effective application of the Antitrust Laws. This

case presents an important question requiring careful ap-

plication of both the patent laws and complimentary anti-

trust principles to effectuate the Constitutional mandate

‘‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts,’’

Article I, Section 8. The accompanying brief addresses

that issue from the point of view of the Association’s pub-

lic and professional interest in furthering that goal.

It is of particular interest to the Association that this

case presents to the Court for the first time issues with

respect to the Congressional intent and purpose underlying

enactment of Section 271 of the Patent Laws concerning

contributory infringement, because the Association was in-

strumental in drafting the first legislation seeking to define

and remedy contributory infringement. That legislation

was introduced at the Association’s request as H.R. 5988 in

the Kightieth Congress and was re-introduced as H.R. 3866

in the Highty-First Congress. Members of the Association

testified in support of it. Subsequently, in 1950, the Na-

tional Council of Patent Law Associations, composed of all

of the principal patent law associations in the United

States, together with a number of industrial associations,

IIt

formed the Coordinating Committee on Revision and

Amendment of the Patent Laws to assist Congress in

codifying the patent laws. Members of this Association

participated significantly in the work of the Coordinating

Committee and were instrumental in seeking enactment of

the present law, Title 35 U.S. Code, including Section 271.

Hence the Association has an additional interest born of

authorship in seeking to assist the Court upon this im-

portant issue.

Apart from this public and professional interest, we

have no interest in the outcome of this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Barry D. Rein

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE \

Interest of Amicus _ . | a er 1

Question Presented . | 1

Summary of Argument 2

Argument

I. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Sec-

tion 271 expressly sanctions Rohm and Haas’

conduct .... , | 4 4

II. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the

legislative history of Section 271 confirms the

intent of Congress to sanction Rohm and

Haas’ conduct | are 9

A. Congress intended Section 271 to reverse

not only the dictum in Mercoid but its di-

rect holding as well. oe 13

B. Congress intended Section 271 to draw a

clear line between actionable contributory

infringement and application of the mis-

USO. GOCEFING ............0..505., ce eee a ae

C. Congress expressly rejected in the 1952

Patent Act the compulsory licensing

sought here by Dawson 24

Ill. The decision reached by the Court of Appeals

is fully consistent with public policy . 26

A. The result sought by amicus is consistent

with antitrust policy ........ Pantani ees 26

B. Requiring compulsory licensing of Rohm

and Haas’ patent would cut against the

public interest . 30

gtr occ 5 a rr ig er eee Rice 33

Appendix

| |

Vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Cases:

Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development

I, Se OF 0s WE ER Doo sn scnbvcicsnnveserersccinersivarcsiess 10

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518

+ Sele REA spoon oD sec me spe ae ae vile Raraltly Uae oer ee UeaP a Ce 3, 26

Forrest v. Capital Buildings & Loan Association, 385

F. Supp. 881 (M.D. La. 1973), aff’d 504 F.2d 891

(5th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 421 U.S. 978 (1975) ...... 27

Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. et al.,

Be rE I oes cknacsccucgcenasivanbiccciacsdesspooinn 27

F.T.C. v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami Br. Off.,

SB ee Be Lae + et) ee 8

In re: 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigations, 1974-

2 Trade Cases [175,429] (N.D. Cal. 1974) ............ 27

KKugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmissious, Inec., 337

I’. Supp. 872 (D. Minn. 1971), aff’d 460 F.2d 1214

RR oti asi eeeicaeadmninesn ieee, 27

Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661

RMR estes) erick coe 3, 10, 11, 12, 18, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26

Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Reg. Co., 320

U.S. 680 (1944) ........................ 8, 10, 18, 15, 17, 19, 21, 96

Paul, et al. v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 1974-1 Trade

Cases (770,226) (ED. Mo. 1974) .............00...0.... BF

Redd y. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975),

cert. den., 452 US. 912 (1976) . Reeeaade 27

Rohm and Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., et al.,

599 F.2d 685 (Sth Cir. 1979) | ieee,

PAGE

Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United

States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) 27

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955) 8

Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200 (4th Cir.

1963) | | 8

Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17,100 (CC

Conn. 1871) | 15

Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Eleetrie &

Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) 28

Statutes:

U.S. Const. art I, 68 I

Plant bons Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§2321-2583.... 31

28 U.S.C. §1498 31

Patent Act of 1952, Title 35 U.S.C. .... 1u, 7, 24, 26, 29

30 U.S.C. §271 II, 11, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 18, 20, 25, 27, 28, 29

30 U.S.C. §271(a) 4,9

30 U.S.C. §271(b) 4,9

39 U.S.C. §271(e) 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29

30 U.S.C. §271(d) 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 20, 24, 25

39 U.S.C. $271 (d)(1) 2,5, 7, 8, 16, 19, 21

30 U.S.C. §271(d) (2) :.2, 5, 6, 7, 16

35 U.S.C. S271 (a) (3) 5, 16

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq. 31

Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 3

Miscellaneous:

Hearings on H.R. 5988, H.R. 4061 and H.R. 5248 Be-

fore Subcommittee on Patents, Peutieiiie &

Copyrights of House Committee on Judiciary,

80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) | 9, 13, 14, 15, 20

a

Vill

PAGE

Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcommittee No. 4 of

House Committee on Judiciary, 8lst Cong., 1st

SG ahead ccan retest an tarneen . 9, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23

Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of

House Committee on Judiciary, 82d Cong., Ist

MR CED oesccscecssss... Pare Y Be te

Froposed Revision and Amendment of the Patent

BE retin nN EL AS SREP AN rer CFA Wht ene 24, 25

—Section 66 ........ Ree te NE Te eee:

—Section 72 MA Tad POINT ere ne et a. 20

—Additional Item D 25

H.R. 44, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) . 80

H.R. 46, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) °C

H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951) | 9, 26

H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949) 1, 9

H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) . 1,9

H.R. 9133, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) 26

Remarks of the President on Innovation Initiatives,

i ge A TPL ee eS |

S.814, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975) . LAL Se

S.1283, 938d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) | |

$.2040, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) | 30

S.2176, 938d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) | 30

Section 5 of H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) | 9, 14,

16, 17, 19

Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-

rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:

Compulsory Licensing of Patents Under Some

Non-American Systenis, Study No. 19, 85th Cong.,

2d Sess. (1959) Wanita eae

D. F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements

Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50

(1958) areeee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-669

I A BR

Dawson CHEMICAL Company, CrystaL MANUFACTURING

CorPoRATION and CrystaL CHEMICAL CoMPANY,

Petitioners,

v

Roum anp Haas Company,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

mE ae

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NEW YORK

PATENT LAW ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT

OF THE RESPONDENT

Interest of Amicus

The interest of amicus is set forth in the foregoing

motion for leave to file this brief.

Question Presented

Whether the owner of a patent for a new use of a known

non-staple chemical compound having no other commercial

use who sells the compound to users with instructions for

applying it to that use, is required to license all competi-

tors to manufacture and sell the identical compound in

order to render his patent enforceable.

Summary of Argument

The plain language of 35 U.S.C. Section 271 defines

Rohm and Haas’ conduct as not consiituting patent misuse.

The construction sought by the Government and Dawson

would impose a gloss on the statute subjecting the pat-

entee’s expressly recited rights to license and sell (Section

271(d)(1) and (2)) to an implied requirement of com-

pulsory licensing.

It would also emasculate completely Section 271(d)(1),

for a patentee’s mere sales of a component, less than all, of

his patented invention have never constituted misuse; the

sole effective purpose of that provision is to except from the

misuse doctrine sales of a component where the implied

license attendant the sale is the only license granted.

The legislative history of Section 271 establishes the

intent of the drafters and of Congress to place beyond the

scope of the misuse doctrine a patentee’s sales of material,

non-staple components of a patented process where the

implied license attendant the sales are the only licenses

granted. The clear line drawn by Congress was between

that conduct, which is permissible within the scope of

Section 271(c), and attempts to control staple articles

of commerce beyond the scope of Section 271(c), which

would constitute misuse. Congress in 1951 considered the

enactment of both restrictions upon licensing and com-

pulsory licensing that would bear on Rohm and Haas’

conduct. It rejected them. That rejection and the legisla-

tive history of Section 271 in its entirety overwhelmingly

provides the ‘‘clear signal’’ of Congress required by this

3

Court to change the pre-existing law as it had been estab-

lished in Mercoid, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,

406 U.S. 518 (1972).

The public policy of the Antitrust Laws against tying

does not require compulsory licensing here because the

patented process and the product propanil are so inextric-

ably interrelated in logic and in the marketplace as to con-

stitute but a single product. Tying, on the other hand,

requires that there be separate tying and tied products.

The rights granted under the patent laws have a direct

bearing on the issue of product definition.

Section 271 constitutes a legislative determination, as

applied to this case, that propanil for use in the patented

method is within the patent grant. The result is the same

as if the patent in issue contained a separate claim to

propanil per se for use in the claimed method, assertible

against sellers of the compound for use in that method.

Propanil is not ‘‘unpatented’’ in that sense; it is within

the legitimate scope of the patent grant. Hence no exten-

sion of the grant is involved here that would warrant the

result by Dawson and the Government.

The construction of Section 271 sought here by the

Govrenment and Dawson would not benefit rice farmers or

the public generally. It may, on the contrary, tend to

deprive them of the benefits of innovation and increase

rather than decrease the cost of agricultural products. It

would additionally burden the equrts with a wholly new

class of litigation to determine a reasonably royalty in each

specific instance.

ARGUMENT

I e

The Court of Appeals correctly held that Section

271 expressly sanctions Rohm and Haas’ conduct.

Section 271 is the section of the patent law defining a

patent owner’s remedy for infringement. Entitled ‘‘In-

fringement of Patent,’’ it contains four paragraphs (a)

through (d). Paragraph (a), not in issue here, simply

codified preexisting law as to so-called ‘‘direct’’ infringe-

ment. Paragraph (b) further includes as an infringer any-

one who ‘‘actively induces infringement of a patent.’’

Paragraph (c) recites that ‘‘whoever sells

a component

of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or

composition

or

a material or apparatus

for use in practicing a patented process,

constituting a material part of the invention,

knowing the same to be especially made or especially

adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,

and

not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for

substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a con-

tributory infringer.’’

Paragraph (d), which complements paragraph (c),* pro-

vides that ‘‘[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief

* The Court of Appeals correctly noted that paragraph (d) is

“ancillary to” paragraphs (b) and (c), 599 F.2d 685, 703, n.24,

quoting from the official Revisory Notes to Section 271.

5

for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent

shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal

extension of the patent right by reason of his having done

one or more of the following:

(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by

another without his consent would constitute con-

tributory infringement of the patent;

(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts

which if performed without his consent would

constitute contributory infringement of the pat-

ent; or

(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against in-

fringement or contributory infringement."

It is undisputed here that propanil, the herbicidal use

of which is the subject of Rohm and Haas’ patent, is a

‘‘material,’’ ‘‘for use in practicing a patented process,’’

‘‘constituting a material part of the invention,’’ and ‘‘not a

staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for sub-

stantial non-infringing use,’’ 35 U.S.C. §271(¢), and thus

directly within the carefully circumscribed scope of ‘‘con-

tributory infringement’’ as that term is incorporated in

each of (1), (2) and (3) of Section 271(d). Rohm and

Haas’ conduct therefore falls squarely within the express

authority of Section 271(d): it derives revenue from the

sale of propanil, an act which, if performed by another,

would constitute contributory infringement as authorized

by (1); and it has sought to enforce its patent rights

against contributory infringement as authorized by (3).**

* All emphasis herein is added unless expressly noted.

** A purchaser may resell propanil purchased from Rohm and

Haas because the sale, conveying by implication the right to use the

thing purchased in the patented process, exhausts Rohm and Haas’

(footnote continued on next page)

6

The statutory language on its face authorizes Rohm and

Haas to do any one, or two, or all of the foregoing acts

without being ‘‘denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse

or illegal extension of the patent... .’’? Yet it is the

crux of Dawson’s and the United States’ position that

merely by doing those acts, Rohm and Haas is guilty of

misuse.

The United States argues thus that Rohm and Haas,

although it has not committed any acts other than those

enumerated, has done more—it has ‘‘license[ed] the use of

its process on condition that the licensees buy unpatented

propanil from Rohm and Haas,’’ and that Section 271 is

‘‘silent’’ as to the legality of that behavior (GB-13).*

Perceiving on one hand this ‘‘silence,’’ Dawson and

the United States find on the other hand a statutory re-

quirement that if Rohm and Haas chooses to sell propanil,

it must license all of its competitors to do so at a reason-

able royalty. But then it must also be true that if Rohm

and Haas did not sell propanil but instead licensed an-

other to do so, it would equally be subject to compulsory

licensing. In each case purchase of the seller’s propanil

would be ‘‘tied,’’ in the Government’s and Dawson’s view,

to the right to practice the patented method. In each case

the public’s choice among propanil suppliers is equally

limited and the foreclosure of manufacturing competitors

rights in it. It may also be said, therefore, that Rohm and Haas has

authorized others (vendees) to perform acts which, without its con-

sent, would constitute contributory infringement, as sanctioned in Sec-

tion 271(d) (2).

* “GB” refers to the brief of the United States as amicus curiae

and “DB” refers to the brief of Dawson et al.

.

7

equally complete. Equally, then, the statute would com-

pel extending licenses on reasonable terms to all comers

upon any attempt to license one.*

This reading of the statute is inconsistent with its

plain meaning, for it would engraft upon it (1) a limitation

in Section 271(d)(2) precluding grant of an exclusive li-

cense, although nothing in the language suggests such a lim-

itation, and (2) a proviso that the rights to derive revenue

and to license in (d)(1) and (d)(2) are conditioned upon

granting compulsory licenses to all at a reasonable royalty.

Absolutely nothing in the 1952 patent act or its legislative

history suggests an intention by Congress to require com-

pulsory licensing of any patents.** Surely if Congress had

intended two of the three rights expressly granted the

patentee by Section 271(d) to result in compulsory licens-

ing, it would have expressly so provided.

Even more compelling is the fact that to read Section

271(d)(1) as the Government and Dawson read it would

result in its complete emasculation. The right of a patentee

or anyone else for that matter to s..il goods is derived not

from the patent law but from the common law. This is

true whether or not the goods are part of a patented com-

bination or a component for use in a patented process.

No case has ever held merely that a patentee may not sell

such a part or component. All that some have held is that

such sales constitute misuse if the implied licenses attendant

the sales are the only licenses granted.

* Dawson implicitly agrees with this conclusion for its list of ways

in which Rohm and Haas could exploit the patent dce: not include

licensing any propanil manufacturers unless it licenses all of them

(DB-30).

** Tmportantly, Congress in enacting the 1952 Patent Act expressly

rejected a proposal to make compulsory licensing available as a remedy

for improper use of a patent, see pages 24 et seq., infra.

8

The only conceivable purpose and meaning of the provi-

sion is therefore to shelter that type of sale, within the

scope of Section 271(c), from application of the misuse doc-

trine.* If the provision is not read as placing such sales,

including Rohm and Haas’ sale of propanil, beyond the

ambit of the misuse doctrine, then it will be of no force

whatsoever. A statutory provision should not be construed

so as to render it a nullity. This Court has noted that ‘‘ [i]t

is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and

word of a statute rather than to emasculate an entire sec-

tion, as the Government’s interpretation requires,’’’ United

States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (citation

omitted); see also F'.7.C. v. Manager, Retail Credit Co.,

Miami Br. Off., 515 F.2d 988, 994-995 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ;

Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir.

1963).

The Government argues, in an effort to reconcile its

construction with the necessity to give meaning to each

statutory provision, that ‘‘in accordance with subsection

(d)(1) the patentee is still free to obtain revenue from his

sales of the unpatented component. He is limited only by

the condition that he cannot arrogate to himself all these

sales by tying his grant of a license to the purchase from

him of the unpatented component’’ (GB-15). The fatal

defect in this argument is that it is not subsection (d) (1)

but the common law that permits a patentee to obtain

revenue from selling so-called ‘‘unpatented’’ components.

Subsection (d)(1) is superfluous unless read to permit such

sales without requiring the patentee to grant licenses apart

from the sales.

* This is fully consistent with the goals of antitrust policy reflected

in the misuse doctrine for reasons set forth at pages 26 et seq., infra.

Il.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the legis-

lative history of Section 271 confirms the intent of

Congress to sanction Rohm and Haas’ conduct.

As set forth in amicus’ motion to file this brief,

supra, this Association drafted the legislation, first intro-

duced as H.R. 5988 in the Hightieth Congress, in 1948, which

with minor changes became Section 271. That legislation

was introduced again in the Eighty-First Congress as

H.R. 3866 and in the Eighty-Second Congress as part of

H.R. 3760, the patent law codification bill. Testimony with

respect to H.R. 5988 and successor bills was presented at

length by members of this Association.* Together with the

testimony of industry representatives and the Government,

it formed the basis for Congress’ understanding of the pro-

posed legislation.

The essence of the testimony was that as a result of

abuses of the judicially fashioned right of a patentee to

control contributory infringement, a line of decisions of this

* Contributory Infringement in Patents—Definition of Invention:

Hearings on H.R. 5988, H.R. 4061 and H.R. 5248, before Subcom-

mittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the House Commit-

tee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), p.16 (hereinafter

“1948 Hearings”). H.R. 5988 was the first bill drafted by this Asso-

ciation to revive a remedy for contributory infringement. The “last

section” referred to, Section 5, was essentially identical to the present

Section 271(d); the first four sections with minor changes became

paragraphs (a)-(c) of Section 271. The same bill was introduced

in 1949 as H.R. 3866, see Contributory Infringement: Hearings on

H.R. 3866 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on

the Judiciary, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949) (hereinafter “1949 Hear-

ings”), and again in 1951 as part of H.R. 3760 to recodify the entire

patent law, see Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on

H.R. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the

Judiciary, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951) (hereinafter “1951 Hearings”),

10

Court beginning in Carbice and culminating in Mercoid

had unduly eroded that doctrine by an overbroad applica-

tion of the countervailing doctrine of patent misuse, and

therefore that Congress should draw a clear line between

actionabie contributory infringement and proper applica-

tion of the misuse doctrine.* The line sought to be drawn

by the proposed bill was one permitting a patentee to con-

trol a carefully circumscribed class of non-staples but pre-

serving the misuse doctrine with respect to staples. That

line was explained and defined throughout the three years

of testimony with particular reference to the Mercoid cases.

An appreciation of the holdings of those cases as they were

understood by the members of the congressional subcom-

mittees is therefore essential to an understanding of ‘the

purpose of Section 271(d).

Both Mercovd cases, decided on the same day, arose out

of efforts by Mid-Continent and its exclusive licensee Min-

neapolis-Honeywell to enforce patents covering a home

heating system against Mercoid. In each instance, the pat-

ent sought to be enforced covered a combination of ele-

ments, and in each instance Honeywell, Mid-Continent’s ex-

clusive licensee, did not sell the entire combination covered

by the patent but sold components of it having no use

other than in the infringing combination. Honeywell an-

nounced in advertising and otherwise that purchasers of the

components would automatically receive licenses to make

and use the patented combination. Mercoid, the accused

* Carbice Corp v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S.

27 (1931). Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S.

661 (1944) (hereinafter “Mercoid I”); Mercoid Corp. v. Minne-

apolis-Honeywell Reg. Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (hereinafter

“Mercoid IT”).

11

contributory infringer, likewise merely manufactured com-

ponents, less than all of the claimed combination, having no

use other than in infringing the patent.

The result in both cases was clear; the patentee Mid-

Continent and its licensee Honeywell were precluded from

enforcing the patent, and Mercoid’s claims were granted for

relief under the antitrust laws. The several opinions, con-

curring opinions and dissents were not as clear and, as

predicted by Mr. Justice Roberts, 320 U.S. at 674, en-

gendered much confusion among members of the bar and

inconsistency in the decisions of lower courts. Thus, on the

one hand, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in

Mercoid I, stated:

‘¢ |. we assume for the purposes of this case that Mer-

coid was a contributory infringer and that respondents

could have enjoined the infringement had they not mis-

used the patent for the purpose of monopolizing un-

patented material. Inasmuch as their misuse of the

patent would have precluded them from enjoining a

direct infringement they cannot stand in any better

position with respect to a contributory infringer.

Where there is a collision between the principle of the

Carbice case and the conventional rules governing ei-

ther direct or contributory infringement, the former

prevails.’’ 320 U.S. at 668-669 (Citation omitted)

This suggests that the Court would have enforced the patent

against Mercoid but for the fact that Honeywell, the exclu-

sive licensee, was itself selling less than all of the patented

combination and attempting thereby to license only those

12

who purchased the unpatented component from it or its

manufacturing sublicensees.*

As an additional and more expansive basis for the

Court’s holding, however, making reference to the Court’s

consistent holdings ‘‘that the owner of a patent may not

employ it to secure a limited monopoly of an unpatented

material used in applying the invention,’’ 320 U.S. at 664,

Mr. Justice Douglas stated:

‘¢. , . the competition which is sought to be controlled

is not competition in the sale of the patented assembly

but merely competition in the sale of the unpatented

thermostatic controls.’’ 320 U.S. at 667.

This language suggested that any attempt to enforce or

license a patent beyond the scope of its claim was imper-

missible, even though such enforcement is the essence of

contributory infringement.

It is the Government’s and Dawson’s view, as we under-

stand it, that Section 271 was intended merely to reverse

the latter dictum, and it is true that testimony was pre-

sented to Congress that Section 271(d) was necessary to

dispel the confusion resulting from Mercoid I and to rein-

* This is mirrored in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-

furter, 320 U.S. at 676:

“The court holds in effect that the owner of a patent who

exacts, as the condition of a license, that unpatented materials

used in connection with the invention shall be purchased only

from the licensor cannot obtain relief from equity against one who

supplies such unpatented materials even though the unpatented

appliance was not for common use but was designedly adapted for

the practice of the invention, but when so used did not involve an

infringement of the patent. The decision is thus merely an

appropriate application of what has come to be known as the

doctrine in the Carbice case, 283 U.S. 27. In this view I concur.”

13

state to any degree the remedy against contributory in-

fringement.

It is equally clear, however, that the members of the suc-

cessive congressional subcommittees, all lawyers, thor-

oughly understood the intention of the drafters of Section

271(d) to reverse the specific holding in Mercoid as well,

namely that a suit for contributory infringement is barred

if the patent owner is selling less than all of the claimed

invention and refuses to grant licenses independently of his

sales. It is that inescapable understanding and intent that

sanctions Rohm and Haas’ conduct in this case.

A. Congress intended Section 271 to reverse not only

the dictum in Mercoid but its direct holding as well.

Congress’ understanding of and intent to undo the

holding in Mercoid was reflected in the testimony of Theo-

dore S. Kenyon, a member of this Association:

‘““As a result of [Mercoid] and similar decisions,

great doubt has been cast upon the enforceability of

combination and so-called use ,atents where the patent

owner was engaged in manufacturing the essentials of

the combination or the special ingredient used im the

patented process, but where the claims were not liter-

ally infringed until these parts or supplies were com-

bined with others or used in a particular manner by

the ultimate purchaser.’’*

With almost clairvoyant application to the precise case

before this Court, Mr. Kenyon continued:

‘¢. .. in the chemical industry, a great many very

valuable ‘use patents’ have been granted for inven-

* 1948 Hearings, p. 17.

14

tions for the first time making useful some hitherto

known, but commercially useless, ingredient. These

inventions have given rise to new industries or the ex-

pansion of old industries in the manufacture and sale

of these special ingredients for the new and useful pur-

pose. Obviously the ingredients themselves could not

be patented per se because they had already been

known or described in textbooks. The real invention

lay in their utilization to achieve new and unexpected

results. The ‘misuse of patents’ doctrine has pre-

sented to the owners of such patents the alternatives

of either giving up the manufacture of these special

ingredients or in effect dedicating their patents to the

public. It is plain that neither of these alternatives is

in the public interest.

The bill which you have presented draws a line be-

tween the sale of staple articles having actual commer-

cial noninfringing use, on the one hand, and those spe-

cial components or ingredients which are particularly

made or adapted for use in the infringing combination

and are not suitable for actual commercial noninfring-

ing use, on the other hand; and it provides that the

sale of parts or ingredients of the latter type without

the consent of the patent owner constitutes a contribu-

tory infringement of the patent, and furthermore that

the sale of such parts or ingredients by the patent

owner himself shall not constitute a misuse of his

patent.’’*

Although the Department of Justice strongly disap-

proved of Section 5 of the proposed bill (corresponding to

the present Section 271(d)) in that it would ‘‘negate much

of the existing body of case law which has operated to

* 1948 Hearings, p. 18.

ee

ee 6 owe

—_——_—S 2 oo oe PP ee ee

15

prevent illegal extension of the patent grant... ,’’* the

Navy Department voiced its approval precisely in order

to foster the very conduct that the Justice Department

opposed, i.e., the bill

«é

.

. . would lend an incentive to the patent owner to

go into production when the field might be saturated

with only a few hundred machines, if, as a result of

producing the machines, probably at little or no profit,

he could be assured of a market for the parts or ma-

terial, peculiar to the patented structure but upon which

no separate patent may be obtained.

Inasmuch as the bill makes clear that staple articles

and commodities of commerce, not especially made or

adapted to use in a patented invention, and suitable

for actual commercial use are outside its scope, it would

appear that both the public and the Government are

amply safeguarded, if the doctrine is reestablished.’’**

The Committee’s specific awareness of the drafters’

intent to overturn the Mercoid holding with respect to a

patentee’s so-called ‘‘tie-in’’ sales was. equally clear in

1949. In a lengthy discussion of Wallace v. Holmes, 29

Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17,100 (CC Conn. 1871), holding that there

was contributory infringement of a patent on the combined

base, burner and chimney of a kerosene lamp by defendant’s

sales of all parts except the chimney, Congressman Bern-

hard stated:

‘‘Mr. Bernhard. I did not mean the defendant; I

meant the patentee. In other words, suppose that the

patentee was not interested in selling the complete

article for which he had a combination patent, but was

interested only in the sale of one of the component

* 1948 Hearings, p. 69.

** 1948 Hearings, p. 33.

16

items, the sale of the novel burner, and suppose he

sold the novel burner to the public with the condition

that those who bought his burner would be permitted

to use his combination patent by coupling it together

with these other articles which they could buy in any

store.

Mr. Rich. Well, Mr. Bernhard, you are importing

into this situation now an angle which was developed

much later on, and which has nothing whatever to do

with the problem of contributory infringement as such.

What you are thinking of is the misuse situation, and I

will come to that later.’’*

Mr. Rich then explained Section 5 of the proposed legis-

lation:

‘*Subsection (a) [271(d)(1)] above refers to cases

like the Lamp case or the Mercoid case where the paten-

tee has been in the busmess of selling less than the

entire invention claimed and has been making a profit

out of it; that is, derived revenue.

Subsection (b) [271(d)(2)] refers to this type of

situation: Suppose the patentee of the lamp had

granted a license to somebody to make the lamps with-

out chimneys or, as actually was the case, in the

Mercoid situation, the patentee licensed people to make

these switching units which had no other use except in

the case of this invention, and collected royalties.

In connection with subsection (¢) [271(d) (3) ], there

have been cases recently following the Mercoid case,

in which the courts have held that merely bringing a

suit is a misuse and that you are out of court on a

a motion to dismiss.

Mr. Bernhard. You also lose.your patent.

Mr. Rich. No; you do not lose your patent because

it is a case of the application of the unclean-hands

doctrine. The courts have said that you can wash your

* 1949 Hearings, p. 6.

17

hands when you have remedied the situation and have

stopped misusing your patent and that you may then

come back to the courts which may then possibly grant

you a recovery.

Mr. Boggs. How could you do that?

Mr. Rich. By changing your method of doing busi-

ness, perhaps, if practical. In the Lamp case, for ex-

ample, the lamps were sold with chimneys on them.’’*

Opposition to the bill was again voiced in 1949 by Mr.

John C. Stedman of the Antitrust Division, Department of

Justice, whose ‘‘most serious objections’? again went to

proposed Section 5. Mr. Stedman testified correctly that

the effect of that section:

‘*. .. is to permit a patentee to sell unpatented parts

for a device or composition covered by his patent or

sell unpatented materials or apparatus for use with a

process patented by him, and at the same time prohibit

his competitors, by suit for infringement, from selling

such unpatented materials in competition with him.’’**

Mr. Stedman’s testimony together with that of the bill’s

proponents thus clearly framed to the Subcommittee the

holding in Mercoid that the proponents sought to overturn;

it was not merely the dictum to the effect that there was no

residuum left of the contributory infringement doctrine,

but rather its holding prohibiting sales of a material, non-

staple component where no licenses to use were granted

apart from the implied license attendant the sales.

Lest there be any doubt that the congressmen under-

stood this distinction and the intent of the drafters, it is

dispelled by the following colloquy:

* 1949 Hearings, p. 14.

** 1949 Flearings, p. 52.

18

‘*Mr. Willis. The Supreme Court said in the Mer-

coid-Mid-Continent case:

‘Minneapolis-Honeywell in advertising its stoker

switches stated that the ‘‘right to use’’ the Cross

system patent was ‘‘only granted to the user’’ when

the stoker switches of Minneapolis-Honeywell were

purchased from it and used in the system. There was

ample evidence to sustain the findings of the district

court that respondents endeavored to use the license

agreement so as to prevent the sale or use of combus-

tion stoker switches in these heating systems unless

they were the switches made by Minneapolis-Honey-

well and purchased from it or its sublicensees.’

Do you not think that probably that influenced the

Supreme Court more than the fact that they assumed

that the switch had no other purpose than for in-

fringing uses? Suppose that element had not existed

and suppose they had not participated in those acts?

Mr. Rich. What element?

Mr. Willis. The fact that the right to use was

predicated solely upon the purchase of the element

from them.

Mr. Rich. That was the thing essentially which

they regarded as a misuse of the patent right. But, let

me ask this rhetorical question: ] f you are in the busi-

ness of supplying electric equipment for furnaces and

you are not im the furnace business, how are you going

to enforce a patent of this type which is on the heating

system? What can you do with it? What value does

it have to you unless you can go to the source of the

thing which has no other use which instigates all of

the infringements? It is the type of situation which

occurs over and over again where contributory in-

fringement is the only practical way to get any value

from your patent. I can see nothing wrong in that

method of doing business.

19

Mr. Willis. Js that one of the permissive things

granted by section 5?

Mr. Rich. Yes.’’*

Again, when Congressman Willis asked whether or not

proposed Section 5 made adequately clear the line between

what was misuse and what was permissible conduct, Mr.

Rich replied:

‘*Mr. Rich. I think that section 5 makes it perfectly

clear what is left of misuse in this way: it says that

certain things under the headings (a), (b) and (c) shall

not be deemed to be misuse or illegal extension of the

patent monopoly.

Take the first one, (a), that the patent owner has

derived revenue from acts which if performed by an-

other without his consent would constitute contributory

infringement of the patent. To determine what that

means you will have to look at the rest of the bill and

see what we say shall be considered to be contributory

infringement now and if he has derived revenue, for

example, by selling these elements with an implied li-

cense, obtaining a little extra profit because of his pro-

tection granted under his patent, then that shall not be

misuse,’’**

That was the conduct proscribed by the holding in

Mercoid, and that is the conduct in which Rohm and Haas

has engaged. It is ‘‘perfectly clear,’’ in Mr. Rich’s words

to Congressman Willis, that Section 271(d)(1) was in-

tended to permit that conduct.

* 1949 Hearings, p. 69.

** 1949 Hearings, pp. 70 and 71.

20

B. Congress intended Section 271 to draw a clear line

between actionable contributory infringement and

application of the misuse doctrine.

The line legislated by Section 271(c) and (d) between

actionable contributory infringement and misuse cut clearly

between (1) deriving revenue from, licensing or suing for

contributory infringement with respect to non-staples as

defined in 271(c), and (2) deriving revenue from, licensing

and suing for contributory infringement with respect to

staples outside the scope of 271(¢c).* It was plainly drawn

at the outset of the 1948 hearings by Giles Rich:

‘‘Now, following the Carbice case, several other

cases came to the Supreme Court in which they also

applied the doctrine, taking these cases up on cer-

tiorari, because they wished to apply it, until finally

in 1944 we come to the Mercoid cases.

Now, in the Mercoid cases, the court assumed that

the defendant was a contributory infringer. They

specifically so stated. But then they said that where

there is a collision between this doctrine of contribu-

tory infringement and the misuse doctrine, the latter

must prevail.

* * *

So our view, and we set to work to draft this bill,

was that contributory infringement as a useful doctrine

is dead and with it the enforcibility of many per-

fectly valid and very useful patents. The bill was

designed to correct this situation without giving sanc-

tion to practices such as those in the Carbice case.’’**

* We do not mean to suggest that conduct in the first categor

would be sheltered if the patentee was engaged in price Pee vA

comparable conduct violating the antitrust laws and not within the

purview of Section 271.

** 1948 Hearings, pp. 10 and 11.

21

The issue was posed throughout the testimony as it had

been framed in Mercoid, namely that ‘‘[w]here there is a

collision between the principles of the Carbice case and the

conventional rules governing either direct or contributory

infringement, the former prevails,’’ 320 U.S. at p. 669. This

recognition of a collision between the two competing doc-

trines is irreconcilable with the Government’s view because

that view refuses to recognize the line that the ‘‘collision’’

led Congress to draw was a line defined by the scope of con-

tributory infringement in 271(c), not by an implied lim-

itation on the patentee’s conduct sanctioned by 271(d) (1).

Congressional understanding of this line is reflected in

the following colloquy between Congressman Willis and

Mr. Stedman of the Department of Justice:

‘*Mr. Willis. The trouble in my mind is that the Su-

preme Court held in the Mercoid cases that in the event

of a clash between the two doctrines the contributory

infringement doctrine must yield to the misuse doc-

trine.

* * *

The final point which I would like to lead up to is

this: Do you believe that the passage of this act

would result in Congress choosing between the two

doctrines and going overboard in favor of the con-

tributory infringement doctrine too narrowly, when

you and I feel that we have use for both doctrines?

Mr. Stedman. Mr. Chairman, if we did not feel

that there was a very real danger of that, we would

not be here. That is our chief concern.*

* 1949 Hearings, p. 57.

22

The same distinction was again emphasized by Mr. Rich,

responding to Mr. Stedman:

‘‘Now as to section 5. For the most part I agree

with everything Mr. Stedman has said in his interpre-

tation of that section, but it seems to me that he ignores

the fact that that section is limited to contributory in-

fringement as defined in the preceding parts of the bill.

* * *

As I tried to make clear the last time, it is absolute-

ly necessary, to get anywhere in this direction we are

trying to go, to make some exception to the misuse doc-

trine because it is the conflict between the doctrine of

contributory infringement and the doctrine of misuse

that raises the problem. The court in Mercoid theoret-

ically did not touch contributory infringement, they

merely said where it conflicts with misuse, the misuse

must control. How are you going to put any contrib-

utory infringement, which I said no longer exists, back

into the picture?

I previously stated, and I wish to reiterate it, that

section 5 is the most important part of the bill from the

standpoint of accomplishing our purpose. The excep-

tion which we wish to make to the misuse doctrine

would reverse the result in the Mercoid case; it would

not reverse the result in the Carbice ease.

Mr. Willis. Say that again, because that is the ques-

tion that I am intrigued with.

Mr. Rich. The exception which we would make to

the misuse doctrine would reverse the result in the

Mercoid case as we read it, as logically abolishing con-

tributory infringement.

Mr. Willis. All right, what would the bill do to the

misuse doctrine? Would it preserve it and to what ex-

tent?

Mr. Rich. It would preserve it in such cases as the

Carbice case or the Barber Asphalt case; where the

23

things dealt with are staple commodities of commerce

and not especially for use in infringement of patents.’’*

Additional light is shed on the line sought to be drawn

by Congress by a specific example of conduct that would not

be permissible under the proposed legislation. In an ex-

change between Mr. Rich and Representative Rogers con-

cerning the scope of contributory infringement and the con-

tinued existence of the misuse doctrine beyond that scope,

Mr. Rich explained that if the patentee

‘*. .. tries to license somebody, for instance, to manu-

facture a staple article of commerce, to be sold in a

patented invention and collect royalties, let us say, for

the manufacturing of salt tablets to be used in a pat-

ented vending machine or dry ice to be used in a pat-

ented shipping container, that will be misuse because it

doesn’t come within the terms of [Section 271(c¢)].’’**

These testimonial excerpts coupled with the carefully

reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeals, relying on other

excerpts from the congressional testimony, 599 F.2d at 699-

703, compel the conclusion that the line drawn by Con-

gress between permissible and impermissible conduct, pre-

viously held by the Court to constitute illegal tying irre-

spective of whether or not the articles sought to be con-

trolled were staple or non-staple goods, was one limiting

application of the misuse doctrine to circumstances beyond

the scope of paragraph (c) and sheltering the patentee

from the misuse doctrine with respect to sales of goods

within the scope of that paragraph. That line runs direct-

ly athwart the boundary sought to be established here by

Dawson and the Department of Justice.

* 1949 Hearings, pp. 67 and 68.

** 1951 Hearings, p. 175.

24

C. Congress expressly rejected in the 1952 Patent Act

the compulsory licensing sought here by Dawson.

Legislative activity to revise and codify the patent laws

was initiated in 1950 by compilation of a preliminary draft

bill entitled ‘‘Proposed Revision and Amendment of the

Patent Laws.’’ This draft included the then existing code

provisions together with additional proposals derived from

a study of all relevant bills introduced in Congress since

1925." Section 66 of the proposed revision, entitled ‘‘Li-

cense Conditions in Contract,’’ provided in part:

‘“(b) Any condition of any contract for license to make,

use or sell a patented invention, or for the sale or lease

of a patented article, or relating to any such license,

sale or lease, shall be void to the extent that it... (2)

prohibits the licensee, purchaser or lessor from using

any article not supplied by ... the licensor, vendor or

restricts the right of the licensee, purchaser or lessee

to use any such article or process.

* * *

(d) A condition of a contract shall not be void by rea-

son of paragraph (b)(1) and (2) if at the time of mak-

ing the contract the licensor, vendor or lessor was will-

ing to grant the license or sell or lease the article on

reasonable terms without any such condition and the

licensee, purchaser or lessee is entitled under the con-

tract upon reasonable notice to relieve himself of his

liability to observe the condition and substitute there-

for a reasonable specified alternative condition.”’

Section 66(b) appears to proscribe Rohm and Haas’

conduct unless Rohm and Haas were to sel] propanil, as

provided in subsection (d), without the condition that the

* 1951 Hearings, p. 21.

25

purchaser not buy propanil from any other source. That

is the outcome sought here by Dawson.

An additional section of the Proposed Revision, entitled

‘Compulsory Licenses,’’ provided in part that:

‘‘Any person may apply to the Commissioner of

Patents for the grant of a license under a particular

patent at any time after the expiration of three years

from the grant of the patent, under any of the follow-

ing circumstances:

* * *

(c) If by reason of conditions attached by the

patentee to licenses under the patent, or to the pur-

chase, lease or use of the patented article or process,

the manufacture, use or sale of materials not pro-

tected by the patent is unreasonably restrained or if

the patent has been used to unreasonably restrain

trade beyond the actual rights conferred by the pat-

ent.’’

This section may well have been construed to require the

very compulsory licensing that Dawson would have this

Court enact judicially. The infringement provision of the

Proposed Revision, section 72, was consistent with the fore-

going provisions for it contained nothing along the lines of

the present Subsection 271(¢c) and (d).*

The fact is, however, that these provisions and the pol-

icy inhering in them were rejected by Congress in favor

of the policy reflected in Section 271. The preliminary

draft was widely distributed with a request for criticisms

and suggestions. Based upon the comments received, the

committee chose to reject these proposed provisions in

* A copy of the foregoing provisions is annexed hereto as Appen-

dix A.

26

favor of the present statutory structure, which was in-

corporated in H.R. 9133 and then, after distribution of

and receipt of comments with respect to that bill, in H.R.

3760, which was enacted as the present title 35 U.S.C.

(1951 Hearings, p. 21).

This conscious Congressional rejection of compulsory

licensing, even as a remedy for what the statute would have

defined as abuses of the patent grant, is irreconcilable with

any Congressional intent to sanction the compulsory licens-

ing requirement sought here by Dawson. @¢ foregoing ex-

cerpts and the entirety of the legislative history overwhelm-

ingly provides the ‘‘clear signal’’ of Congress required by

this Court to change the pre-existing law as it had been

established in Mercoid.*

The decision reached by the Court of Appeals is

fully consistent with public policy.

A. The result sought by amicus is

consistent with antitrust policy.

The result sought by amicus in this case is fully con-

sistent with the public policy of the United States as ex-

pressed in the Antitrust Laws. In this case it is the policy

of the Antitrust Laws to prohibit tying that Dawson and

* Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518

(1972). In Deepsouth,a majority of the Court failed to find any clear

signal of congressional intent to change the pre-existing rule that the

entire combination claimed as the invention must be assembled in this

country before there can be an infringement. Whatever support the

legislative history may have provided for the change in the law

sought to be established in Deepsouth, it cannot compare with the

overwhelming support for amicus’ position here.

“en awh

at as les ees:

27

the Government invoke to limit the application of Section

271. But there can be no tying as a matter of definition

unless there are in fact separate tying and tied products.

Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States, 345

U.S. 594, 622-23 (1953). It has been held in this regard that

there is not sufficient separateness of products to warrant

application of the tying doctrine as between the morning

and afternoon editions of a newspaper (Times-Picayune) ;

weekday and Saturday editions of a newspaper (Paul et al.

v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 1974-1 Trade Cases [75,116],

(K.D.Mo. 1974) ; the ‘‘Shell’’ trademark and gasoline sold

under it (Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir.

1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 912 (1976); mortgage loans and

attendant legal services (Forrest v. Capital Buildings &

Loan Association, 385 F.Supp. 831 (M.D. La. 1973), aff’d,

504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 421 U.S. 978 (1975)) ;

the several elements of a package provided to stores under

a franchise arrangement (In re: 7-Eleven Antitrust Litiga-

tion, 1974-2 Trade Cases [175,429] (N.D. Cal. 1974)); anda

franchise and related advertising requirements (Kugler v.

Aamco Automatic Transmissions Inc., 337 F.Supp. 872, 876

(D. Minn. 1971), aff’d, 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1972).*

While the standards set down for determining whether

there are separate products or a single product for pur-

poses of tying analysis are not entirely clear,** we submit

* But see Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. et al., 394

U.S. 495 (1969), holding that the sale of prefabricated buildings and

credit for the purchase of those buildings extended by a separate cor-

poration were separate products for purposes of tying analysis.

** See Mr. Justice Black’s comment in Fortner: “Whatever the

standards for determining exactly when a transaction involves only a

‘single product’, we cannot see how an arrangement such as that pres-

ent in this case could ever be said to involve only a single product.

394 U.S. at 507.

ev te

28

that this is an appropriate case to discern but a single prod-

uct. Rohm and Haas’ patent covers the only known use of

propanil and involves merely the application of that prod-

uct to certain crops. Propanil, on the other hand, has no

use whatsoever apart from its use in the process. Product

and process in this case are but two faces of the same coin,

both logically and in the marketplace. Because they are thus

inextricably interrelated, it would strain the application of

the tying concept to define them as separate for purposes of

antitrust analysis. This is consistent with the test enun-

ciated in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric &

Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 1951): ‘‘That there

are not dual markets strongly suggests that there are not

separate products.’’ Plainly, there is no market for pro-

panil apart from its use in the patented process, and con-

versely there is no market for the patented process without

propanil.

Indeed, a leading commentator has urged in this respect

that ‘‘one must take into account the patent laws, which

grant some minimum of substantial rights that bear on the

question of product definition.’’* This approach is also

consistent with the intent and effect of Section 271, which

was to give every patentee within the scope of Section

271(c) the right to protect his grant beyond the narrow

confines of the patent claims. Indeed, it is fundamental that

the essence of contributory infringement is an acknowledge-

ment of the scope of the patent grant beyond the confines of

the claims. The effect is no different than if each patent

susceptible of being contributorily infringed were to con-

* Turner, “The Validity of Tying Arrangement Under the Anti-

trust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50, p. 68 (1958),

Ce IS a

29

tain a separate claim having a scope defined by Section

271(c), assertible against sellers of articles or compo-

nents, the sale of which would constitute contributory in-

fringement. For that reason, the endless references in the

Government’s brief to ‘‘unpatented’’ subject matter is a

misnomer, indeed a misuse, of the term; it is a red herring

harking back to an era brought to a close by the 1952 Patent

Act.*

It is also significant that any ‘‘tie-in’’ in the context of

Section 271 could not merely be enjoined; an affirmative

decree would be necessary not only to compel licensing but

to establish the terms of each license. As one commentator

has pointed out:

‘‘In the ordinary tie-in case, where the foreclosed

competitors are producing the tied product, the re-

straint is removed simply by prohibiting the tie-in. No

compulsory-dealing provision is required, since it may

be presumed that the patentee will not sulk, but will

sell his tying produet without the tie-in, leaving com-

petitors free to compete in the sale of the formerly tied

product. But in our example the restraint can be re-

moved only by a decree compelling the patentee to sell

the component to the ‘foreclosed’ competitors. There

are at least two good reasons for stopping short of

giving them this protection. One is administrative.

Such a decree requires virtually a public-utility type

* It is not misuse for a patentee to sell a machine constituting a

complete combination as claimed in his patent, which of course carries

an implied right to use the machine, even though no use licenses are

granted except to purchasers of the combination from the patentee.

That is not a “tie-in” of the patentee’s machine sales to the right to

use the machine because the rights both to sell and use the machine

are within the scope of the patent grant. Equally, Rohm and Haas’

sales of propanil are not “‘tied” to the use of propanil in its patented

process because both are fully within the scope of the patent grant as

set forth in Section 271.

30

of regulation: There must be some limit on the price

at which the component is sold to competitors, for-

otherwise the patentee could achieve the same exclu-

sionary effect by pricing the item so high that they

could not compete in the sale of the finished product.

The almost insoluble problem of determining a ‘fair’

price need hardly be spelled out. But more important,

such a decree goes far beyond the protection of com-

petition on the merits—it compels the inventive manu-

facturer to raise the ‘merits’ of his competitors’ prod-

ucts by distributing the fruits of his own progressive-

ness to them. This is questionable policy even if a pat-

ent were not involved.’’*

B. Requiring compulsory licensing of Rohm and Haas’

patent would cut against the public interest.

Congress has time and again been presented with and re-

jected the concept of plenary compulsory licensing. First

proposed as early as 1790, it was again introduced in 1877,

in 1952 and, more recently, in several proposals during the

1970’s.** Apart from specific exceptions to Congressional

policy expressly carved out in the fields of atomic energy,

air pollution control, plant variety protection and the

* Turner, supra, 72 Harv. L. Rev. at pp. 69-70 (emphasis in orig-

inal) (footnotes omitted). The example referred to involved a manu-

facturer of radio receiving sets who had a patent on a transformer

which he sold only as part of the complete receiver, thereby driving

competing radio producers from a substantial part of the radio market.

The result is the same whether a decree forces a manufacturer to sell

a product to competitors, as in the example, or to license competitors

to make the produce, as in the case at bar.

** See, e.g., Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights

of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Compulsory Licensing of

Patents Under Some Non-American Systems, Study No. 19, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1959) ; S.1283, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) ;

S.2176, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S.814, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1975); H.R. 44 and H.R. 46, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ; and

S.2040, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

31

Government’s own entitlement to what is in effect a compul-

sory license under its eminent domain powers,* attempts

to legislate compulsory licensing generally have met with

failure for over two centuries. If imposed by this Court it

would create both a disincentive to innovation and a signifi-

cant volume of litigation to determine in each case, for each

license applicant, what a reasonable royalty would be.**

It would be inappropriate to create here a disincentive

to industrial innovation at the very time when the President

has recommended a strong program of initiatives to pro-

mote innovation.t Taking into specific account the current

severe inflation and its effect in discouraging managers in

the private sector from spending the sums needed for ad-

equate industrial innovation, the President mandated

changes in the patent system to achieve that goal, including

a uniform patent policy to grant either title or exclusive

licenses to private contractors in inventions developed un-

der government contracts.

This constitutes recognition at the highest levels of

government of an important public policy emphasizing the

* See, The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.

(1959) ), Clean Air Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 7401-7642 (1970, as

amended 1974) ), Plant Variety Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 2321-2583

(1970) ) and 28 U.S.C. 1498.

** We note in passing that the compulsory licensing sought by

Dawson as a contributory infringer results from the impracticability

of granting licenses to farmers, whose use of Dawson's propanil con-

stitutes direct infringement of Rohm and Haas’ patent. This case

does not present a situation where it is practical to license direct in-

fringers. Licensing direct infringers would allow them to purchase

propanil from any source; in that situation, which is not before the

Court, there would be no basis for requiring licensing of contributory

infringers.

+ Remarks of the President on Innovation Initiatives, October 31,

1979,

32

exclusivity of rights granted innovators by the patent sys-

tem. That public policy is worthy of recognition by this

Court. Antitrust policy should be construed to complement

rather than to undermine it. To render those rights non-

exclusive in a significant class of developments, as sought

here by Dawson and the Government, would necessarily

undermine that policy. It would also reduce competition by

encouraging a class of non-innovators who would await the

development by others of new uses for existing materials

and would then demand entree to the market created there-

by. This rewards the non-contributor at the expense of

the contributor and ultimately discourages development of

new products and processes, resulting in reduced competi-

tion, fewer products and fewer jobs.

To the extent that companies like Dawson and Crystal

may develop more efficient methods to produce propanil,

they may elect to license those methods to Rohm and Haas,

thereby benefiting both petitioners and the public. More-

over, the disclosure through the patent system of Rohm

and Haas’ use for propanil ought to stimulate others to-

wards finding additional uses for propanil, for their own

economic reward and to the public’s benefit.

If Rohm and Haas chose to confine its use of propanil

to itself rather than face compulsory licensing, that would

certainly not benefit the public. Nor would the administra-

tion of justice generally be benefited by subjecting the

courts to a new category of litigation to adjudicate what

is a reasonable royalty in each instance.

33

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court

of Appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Barry D. Rei

and

Stranutey M. Lieserstein

Attorneys for Amicus

Of Counsel:

Pau M. Entow

195 Broadway

New York, New York 10007

Kenneta BE. Mapsen

59 Maiden Lane

New York, New York 10038

Rory J. Rappine

330 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

March 22, 1980

APPENDIX

PROPOSED REVISION AND AMENDMENT

OF THE

PATENT LAWS

PRELIMINARY DRAFT

WITH NOTES

COMMITTEE PRINT

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1950

Conn on kf W to

Ch. 9 OWNERSHIP, ASSIGNMENTS, AND LICENSES § 67

§ 66. Licenses, conditions in contracts

(a) A patentee may grant licenses permitting making, using or

selling the patented invention, in so far as his exclusive right is con-

cerned, to the extent and subject to such conditions relating to such

making, using or selling of the patented invention or to the patent

as he may choose, subject to the provisions of this title.

(b) Any condition of any contract for license to make, use or sell

a patented invention, or for the sale or lease of a patented articlé,

or relating to any such license, sale or lease, shall be void to the ex-

tent that it (1) requires the licensee, purchaser, or lessee to acquire

from the licensor, vendor or lessor or his nominees any articles other

than the patented article, or (2) prohibits the licensee, purchaser or

lessee from using any article not supplied by, or any process not

belonging to, the licensor, vendor or lessor, or restricts the right of

the licensee, purchaser or lessee to use any such article or process or

(3) requires the licensee, purchaser or lessee to assign or otherwise

give control of any invention made by or owned by him to the licensor,

vendor or lessor.

(c) In any action for infringement of a patent it shall be a defense

to prove that at the time of the infringement there was in force a

contract, containing a condition declared void by this section, made

by or with the consent of the plaintiff.

(d) A condition of a contract shall not be void by reason of para-

graph (b) (1) and.(2) if at the time of making the contract the licensor,

vendor or lessor was willing to grant the license or sell or lease the

article on reasonable terms without any such condition and the licen-

see, purchaser or lessee is entitled under the contract upon reasonable

notice to relieve himself of his liability to observe the condition and

substitute therefor a reasonable specified alternative condition.

(e) This section shall not render void any contract or condition

with respect to sales agency or exclusive Sales agency, or for the supply

of parts, which would be valid without this section.

; Note

This section brings up the subject of valid and invalid conditions in license

agreements. The first paragraph is declaratory of a broad right to grant

licenses. The second paragraph (except clause 3 which is new) is an expansion

of section 3 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S. C. 14) to apply the licenses as well as

to sales or leases and follows decisions of the courts in holding such conditions

invalid. The third paragraph states the penalty which has been applied by the

eourts. The fourth and fifth paragraphs qualify part of the second paragraph.

53

CON OOP WN

§72. Infringement of patent

Any person who makes, uses or sells any patented machine, manu-

facture, composition of matter or improvement, or uses any patented

process or improvement, within the territory of the United States

and its Territories during the term of the patent therefor without

authority, and any person who intentionally aids and abets any such

unauthorized making, using or selling, infringes the patent and shall

be liable to a civil action for infringement, except as otherwise

provided in this title.

Note

The first part of this section is declaratory only, defining infringement.

The second part defines contributory infringement in broad terms, recent legis-

lative proposals on contributory infringement are: 80th Congress, H. R. 5988,

hearings May 1948; 8lst Congress, S. 2518, H. R. 3866, hearings May, June

1949, H. R. 6436.

59

ee

Conn kf Wilde

ADDITIONAL ITEMS

2. Compulsory Licenses

1. Grounds for compulsory license

Any person may apply to the Commissioner of Patents for the

grant of a license under a particular patent at any time after the

expiration of three years from the grant of the patent, under any of

the following circumstances: eae |

(a} If the patented invention is not being worked in the United

States on a commercial scale without reasonable justification.

(b) If the demand for the patented invention in the United States

is not being met to an adequate extent without reasonable justification

or is being met to a substantial extent by importation.

(c) If by reason of conditions attached by the patentee to licenses

under the patent, or to the purchase, lease or use of the patented

article or process, the manufacture, use or sale of materials not

protected by the patent is unreasonably restrained or if the patent

has been used to unreasonably restrain trade beyond the actual rights

conferred by the patent.

(d) If the decree of a court in an action by the United States under

the anti-trust laws has declared that the patent shall be available for

licensing to any applicant on reasonable terms.

(ce) If the use of the patented invention is necessary for public

health or public safety.

(f) That the applicant for license is the patentee of an invention

of an improvement on the patented invention which cannot be

worked without utiliziug the patented invention, provided that the

improvement is a substantial and important contribution to the art

and the applicant for license is willing and able to grant to the patentee

and his licensees a lieeuse to use his improvement on reasonable terms.

» In determining the existence of reasonable justifiestion under para-

graphs (a) and (b) there shall be considered, among other factors,

the efforts of, and measures taken by, the patentee and whether

sufficient time has elapsed since the date of the patent to work the

invention or supply the market, coustdertng the nature of the inven-

tion and the resources of the patentee.

Notes

This item brings up the controversial subject of compulsory licensing of patents.

Paragraph (a) of section | recites the customary ground for erant of a com pulsury

license and both (a) and (b) would apply in the case of foreign owned United

States patents when the invention was not being manufactured in the United

States. Paragraph (c) is a possible remedy in the case of abuse of patents.

Paragraph (d) relates to the existing power exercised by the courts in civil anti-

trust actions. Paragraph (ec) follows a recomn endation of the National Patent

Planning Commission (1943). Paragraph (f) is commonly found in laws of other

countries. There have been numerous legislative proposals for compulsory

licenses in this country.

4

91

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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