Petition — Cross v. Jarvis

IN THE L_Micsee MONAM IR CERK |

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-636

WILLIAM HOWARD CROSS, SR.,

Petitioner,

versus

PAT JARVIS, SHERIFF,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA

THEODORE S. WOROZBYT

Attorney for Petitioner

2410 Peachtree Center

Cain Tower

229 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

404-659-7070

SCOFIELDS' QUALITY PRINTERS, P. O. BOX 53096, N, O., LA, 70153 - $04/822-1611

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

pe a 8 ts. re ii

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW .............. 1

EEE SE OR ee 2

et tS > a 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

POE OPTED cc ccccccccescccccese 2

RPE SOE FEE GO sc ccessbacccnysicses 3

Be I I sis ob Nuie cc ies cccceees 3

2. Synopses of State Habeas Testimony ....... 6

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD

EE ESSE OPPO E TE 20

aU Sunes cesccssesccccees 23

UE WLS oo cc csc cc ccccccece 26

APPENDIX

“A” — Opinion of the Court of Appeals,

ire cae is ede scvses cies la

“B” — Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

and Order of Superior Court, DeKalb

Se Re a hoe eee bes coges 8a

“C” — Opinion of the Supreme Court of

Nee ks tw sepeosscocs 13a

“D” — Denial of Motion for Rehearing,

Supreme Court of Georgia ............... 15a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Jeera. Tete, SORES: 20s Bl ices ties sesss 22,24

Allen v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 442, 443 ............ 22,24

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S: 525, $29 ......ccccccede 21

Cross v. The State, 136 Ga. App. 400 ..........0006. 3

Cross v. Georgia, 581 F.2d 102 at 104 (5th Cir.

ROD Sak ethic bee Re de heen vee 4 oudins 5

Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 .......... 22,24

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464; 82 L.Ed.

BE 144 vb ntki's-3,5 s wEb Ce 6 Sade Dae eee ae 20,21,23

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14; 18 L.Ed.2d

EF NG 6 8 ingen 0n'e'd's nes hee WERE ONE Dinh See OR al 20

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97; 49 L.Ed.2d

DE baka tA tenes bases os Cake Rene tile 23,24

Statutes:

SNES AMID jicedis sd ae dope va cohevasacndbas 2

ee ME, 2 bss Mini dra owl Wace nb ew 0 ee AA be 3

U.S. Constitution:

en ad eee caat eos eme une 4,25

Fourteenth Amendment ...............-05: 2,4,25

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

No.

WILLIAM HOWARD CROSS, SR.,

Petitioner,

versus

PAT JARVIS, SHERIFF,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to

review the judgment of the Supreme Court for the

State of Georgia decided on June 20, 1979, rehearing

denied on July 18, 1979. Appendices C, D.

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court for the State of

Georgia, Case No. 34822, decided June 20, 1979, re-

2

hearing denied July 18, 1979, is as yet unreported and is

set out in Appendix C hereto.

JURISDICTION

The judgment for the Supreme Court for the State

of Georgia was entered on June 20, 1979, rehearing de-

nied July 18, 1979. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Where a State Habeas Court, after hearing the testi-

mony of eight witnesses, finds as fact: that the Peti-

tioner did not waive his right to call witnesses; that the

State willfully withheld a crucial defense witness; that

the State agents in question had lied under oath about

the withholding of said witness; that the withheld wit-

ness’ testimony was exculpatory, may the State

appellate court ignore such findings and reverse the

Habeas Court’s granting of Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas

Corpus?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-

stitution.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Procedural Posture.

The Petitioner, William Howard Cross, Sr. (herein-

after referred to as “Cross”) was convicted for the

Georgia offense of bribery and sentenced to five years

on April 19, 1974.

Cross appealed the above-mentioned judgment and

sentence to the Court of Appeals for the State of Geor-

gia, which Court affirmed the conviction on October

16, 1975 (see Cross v. The State, 136 Ga. App. 400). Cross’

petition to the Supreme Court of Georgia for cer-

tiorari pursuant to the aforementioned affirmance by

the Georgia Court of Appeals was denied on January 8,

1976.

On April 13, 1976, Cross filed a Petition for the Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C.A.

§2254, in the Atlanta Division of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

On July 20, 1976, the District Court issued its Order

denying Cross’ Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On September 28, 1978, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District

Court's denial of Cross’ Petition for the Writ of Habeas

Corpus. Rehearing denied November 8, 1978.

4

On or about November 22, 1978, Cross filed a Peti-

tior. for the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Superior

Court for the County of DeKalb, State of Georgia. In

said Petition Cross alleged a substantial denial of his

rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution. (See 14 9, 10 and 11

of Cross’ Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed

in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, State of

Georgia, November 22, 1979.)

Cross factually alleged that the aforementioned de-

prival was derivative of the conduct of two DeKalb

County Police Officers, W. C. McGlamery and R. W.

Young (hereinafter “McGlamery” and “Young”).

Cross factually alleged that McGlamery and Young

had deprived Cross of his constitutional rights to call

witnesses in his defense by conspiring to alert a certain

crucial defense witness, one Marshall Blalock (herein-

after “Blalock”), of Cross’ impending State trial and

caused said Blalock to flee the jurisdiction beyond the

subpoena power of Cross. (Blalock was a police in-

former who, Cross alleged, acting in complicity with

the police officers, McGlamery and Young, had en-

ticed and entrapped Cross into paying Young a bribe in

the amount of $200.00. See 4412 through 18, Cross’

Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus, DeKalb Coun-

ty Superior Court, State of Georgia.)

Cross alleged that Blalock’s testimony would have

been crucial to Cross’ defense of entrapment as Bla-

5

lock was the conduit between Cross and the police of fi-

cers in question.

Of crucial significance is the fact that Cross, pur-

suant to his Federal Habeas Corpus Petition filed in the

United States District Court for the Northern District

of Georgia on April, 13, 1976, had verily believed,

urged upon the Court, and failed to carry his burden of

showing, that it was the injudicious conduct of the trial

court that caused Blalock to flee the jurisdiction. (See

Cross v. Georgia, 581 F.2d 102 at 104 (Sth Cir. 1978)).

(Appendix A.)

An evidentiary hearing was conducted, pursuant to

Cross’ State habeas petition on January 11th, 16th and

17th, 1979.

At said hearing, Cross called five witnesses who testi-

fied in support of his factual allegations. Said wit-

nesses were Charlie Smith, a member of the Georgia

Bar for over 20 years who had initially represented

Cross when he was arrested in early 1972; E. T. Hen-

don, Jr., currently a Superior Court Judge of DeKalb

County, a member of the Bar of Georgia for over 20

years, who was Cross’ counsel pursuant to the trial of

the subject case in April, 1974 (and whose habeas testi-

mony plays a dominant role relative to the merits of

this Petition); Blalock, the police informer who was al-

leged by Cross to have entrapped him while acting in

complicity with Officers McGlamery and Young;

Blalock’s wife, Peggy Blalock, whose testimony cor-

6

roborated Blalock’s testimony relative to Blalock’s deal-

ings in the Cross matter with McGlamery and Young;

and Pamela Blalock, Blalock’s daughter, whose testi-

mony further corroborated Blalock’s testimony rela-

tive to Blalock’s dealings with McGlamery and Young

pursuant to the aforementioned allegations made by

Cross as to McGlamery’s and Young’s conduct.

Cross also called, as an adverse witness, for the pur-

poses of cross-examination, Police Officer Mc-

Glamery.

2. Synopses of State Habeas Testimony

References to “H.C.T. I” refer to the transcript of the

hearing on January 11, 1979; “H.C.T. II” refers to the

transcript of the second day of the subject hearing on

January 16, 1979;“H.C.T. III” refers to the transcript of

the hearing conducted on the third and final day of the

subject hearing on January 17, 1979.

Lewis Marshall Blalock, (hereinafter ” Blalock”) testi-

fied on January 16, 1979 (references H.C.T. II) as

follows:

Blalock first met McGlamery in approximately 1969.

Blalock, McGlamery and DeKalb County Police Officer

Robert W. Young (hereinafter referred to as“ Young”),

had a business relationship in 1970 and 1971 whereby

McGlamery and Young worked for Blalock. H.C.T. II,

5-6.

7

Blalock had known the co-defendant in the subject

case, Harold Johnson (hereinafter referred to as “John-

son”), since approximately 1964. During the summer

and fall of 1971, due to the nature of Johnson’s busi-

ness, Johnson had occasion to frequent Blalock’s place

of business at which McGlamery and Young worked,

and had occasion to speak with McGlamery quite often.

H.C.T. Il, 7.

In the summer of 1971, Blalock had occasion to have

lunch with McGlamery and others at the Bull & Bush

Restaurant when Cross entered said restaurant and

McGlamery identified Cross to Blalock. Two or three

days later, McGlamery told Blalock that “Big Al” was

out to “get” Cross. McGlamery knew that Johnson was

a good friend of Cross and that Johnson wasa friend of

Blalock. Blalock related to Johnson what McGlamery

had told Blalock concerning Big Al getting Cross.

H.C.T. Il, 7-8.

During the late summer and fall of 1971, McGlam-

ery would intermittently give information to Blalock to

pass on to Johnson. In late January, 1972, McGlamery

told Blalock that “Big Al” was fixing to come down on

Cross and that Blalock should let Johnson know.

H.C.T. Il, 9-10.

Within approximately ten days after Cross’ arrest

pursuant to the subject conviction, McGlamery told

Blalock that Blalock should make himself scarce for

three or four days and Blalock went over to the Execu-

8

tive Park Motel in DeKalb County and stayed three or

four days. H.C.T. Il, 10. )

While Blalock was staying at the motel, Blalock call-

ed his old friend, E. T. Hendon, Jr., who he had known

for approximately 20 years and told Hendon that Mc-

Glamery had told Blalock to make himself scarce.

H.C.T. Il, 10-11.

In the fall of 1973 and the spring of 1974, Blalock

lived at Tregony East Apartments with his wife, Peggy,

and his daughter, Pamela, who was 14 years old at that

time. H.C.T. II, 12.

Young was also living at the Tregony East Apart-

ments at that time. McGlamery used to come by twoor

three times a week to visit with Blalock during the fall

of 1973 ard spring of 1974. McGlamery was in uni-

form and would drive a uniformed police car. The

Tregony East Apartments, according to what Mc-

Glamery told Blalock, were within McGlamery’s terri-

torial patrol. When McGlamery used to come by to see

Blalock at the Tregony East Apartments, Blalock’s wife

would see McGlamery because Blalock’s wife was

working as resident manager and the office was next

door to Blalock’s apartrnent. McGlamery would come

by and ask Blalock to come out to the car where they

would talk. H.C.T. II, 13-14.

When McGlamery used to come by to see Blalock

during this period of time, Blalock’s daughter, Pamela,

9

would see McGlamery and would always hug Mc-

Glamery’s neck.

McGlamery came by one day and told Blalock that if

Blalock was planning to go to Florida, he better get out

because the trial judge in Cross’ case was issuing a

warrant for Blalock to put Blalock under bond so Bla-

lock would have to stay in DeKalb County and go to

court and testify, and that Hendon was going to serve

the warrant on Blalock. McGlamery told Blalock that

Sheriff Bonner had assigned two deputies to find Bla-

lock. H.C.T. II, 13-15.

That when McGlamery told Blalock that there was a

warrant out for him, Blalock went to Covington to stay

with his brother for two or three days and then came

back to Atlanta and stayed in a motel on Wesley Chapel

Road for acouple of days. That then Blalock rented a U-

Haul trailer and Blalock and his wife packed up his stuff

in boxes and put the stuff in the trailer and left for

Florida and never went back to the apartment in De-

Kalb Cou aty. H.C.T. Il, 15-16.

On cross-examination by the State, Blalock testified

as follows: That Blalock considered himself a messen-

ger boy and passed information from Johnson to

McGlamery and from McGlamery to Johnson. H.C.T.

II, 16.

Blalock testified that he had made plans to go to

Florida. Blalock testified again that McGlamery used to

10

come by on a regular basis at Tregony East Apart-

ments and that McGlamery did come by and told Bla-

lock that Sheriff Bonner had deputies looking for Bla-

lock and that Hendon was going to serve Blalock witha

subpoena. H.C.T. II, 21.

On redirect examination, Blalock testified that he

left a week or two earlier than he had planned to go to

Florida when McGlamery came by his apartment to tell

him that Hendon was getting process and the Sheriff

had deputies out looking for him. H.C.T. II, 22.

On re-cross examination, Blalock testified that he

stayed with his brother in Covington and when he re-

turned to Atlanta and stayed in the motel, he kept in

communication with his wife. Blalock again testified

that McGlamery told Blalock that Blalock better get go-

ing if Blalock was going because they were going to pick

Blalock up and put him under bond. H.C.T. II, 23-24.

Synopsis of Testimony of E. T. Hendon Jr.

Ewell Theron Hendon, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as

“Hendon”) testified as follows at the Habeas Corpus

hearing conducted in January, 1979:

That he is presently a Judge of the Superior Court of

DeKalb County and has been a member of the Bar of

the State of Georgia since 1949 and has known the

witness Marshall Blalock for approximately 25 years.

H.C.T. I, 12-13. That in January, 1972, Marshall Bla-

lock (hereinafter “Blalock”) telephoned him from a

11

motel because Blalock was concerned about his legal

position in connection with a matter that was pending

against Cross before Judge Dan Duke in Fulton County

State Court. H.C.T. I, 15.

Hendon did not know Cross as of January, 1972. Asa

result of Blalock’s telephone call, Hendon went to meet

with Blalock at the Executive Park Motel.

Blalock told Hendon that he was awaiting a call from

either McGlamery or Young and that they would let

him know when the hearing before Judge Duke was

completed so it would be safe for Blalock to leave the

motel. H.C.T. I, at 15-16.

That Blalock told Hendon that McGlamery and

Young had advised him about the hearing regarding

Cross and that they would advise Blalock when it was

safe to leave the motel so he wouldn’t be subpoenaed to

testify at the hearing.

That Hendon took on Cross’ representation approx-

imately in the fall of 1973. H.C.T. I, at 19. Hendon def-

initely anticipated subpoenaing Blalock to testify in

Cross’ behalf. Hendon testifies to his efforts made to

subpoena Blalock. H.C.T. I, at 19-25.

Blalock told Hendon that Blalock did not want to give

testimony in the case because Blalock was close to both

McGlamery and Young and that Blalock’s testimony

would contradict theirs. |

12

Hendon obtained an attachment from the trial court

to have Blalock put in jail and put under bond to secure

his attendance at the Cross trial. That Hendon be-

lieved at that time that the trial court had advertently

or inadvertently alerted Blalock to the attachment and

that Blalock had gone to Florida. H.C.T. I, at 25-28.

That based on Hendon’s 25 years of experience as an

attorney, Blalock’s testimony was an integral part of

Cross’ entrapment defense and would have been a

totally crucial witness because Blalock, acting as an in-

formant for McGlamery and Young solicited and en-

trapped Cross. H.C.T. I, at 29-31.

Hendon testifies as to why he didn’t ask for a con-

tinuance. H.C.T. I, at 31-35. Hendon testified that he

was told in no uncertain terms by the trial court that he

would not get acontinuance and that Hendon could not

make the proper showing in any event to obtain a con-

tinuance. That Hendon had requested of the trial court

time to have the tapes expertly examined and was de-

nied said request. That Hendon was told by the trial

court that under no conditions would Hendon be

granted a continuance that is simply the reason why he

did not make the motion. That Hendon had done every-

thing he knew how to do to get Blalock in Court to no

avail. That it was imperative and necessary in order to

establish Cross’ defense of entrapment to have Blalock

testify.

That Hendon had no admissible evidence or any-

13

thing concrete to show at the time of the trial of the

subject case that McGlamery and Young constituted

the causation of Blalock’s fleeing to Florida.

Hendon testifies again in rebuttal after the State has

presented its evidence as follows: That the reason Hen-

don did not ask for a continuance is that the trial judge

had made it abundantly clear that he was not under any

circumstances going to continue the case. Further, that

he was not in a position to make a legal showing; that

the trial court had specifically told Hendon that the case

was going to be tried. That he had told the Court prior

to the trial of the case that Blalock had fled the jurisdic-

tion and attempted to avail Cross of the Uniform Extra-

dition Act and that the Court cut him off. H.C.T. IL, at

69-71.

That he absolutely did not intentionally relinquish or

abandon Cross’ right to call Blalock; that, as a matter of

fact, Hendon did everything in his power and authority

as an attorney to get Blalock in court. H.C.T. II, at 71.

That at no time during his course of dealings with

Blalock did Blalock ever tell Hendon that Blalock was in

fear of Bill Cross. H.C.T. Il, at 72-73.

That Blalock called him in the fall of 1978 and told

Hendon that he wanted to come forward to testify

because he did not think Cross ought to go to jail and

that Blalock had not come forward to testify because he

did not want to testify against McGlamery and Young.

H.C.T. Il, at 73.

14

On re-cross examination by the District At-

torney, Hendon testified that initially, he thought it

was the trial court’s actions which alerted Blalock to

flee the jurisdiction. That he did question McGlamery

and Young regarding Blalock’s departure and that Mc-

Glamery denied any involvement in said departure and

that McGlamery further testified at the trial of the case

that he had not seen Blalock for four months prior to

the trial time. H.C.T. II, at 75-77.

Hendon testifies that Blalock indicated to Hendon

that Blalock did not want to testify in the case because

said testimony would involve McGlamery and Young

in their part of the entrapment of Cross, and that

Blalock was very close to both McGlamery and Young.

H.C.T. Il, at 78.

Synopsis of Testimony of Charlie Smith

Charles R. Smith (hereinafter referred toas“Smith”)

testified as follows:

Smith has been a member of the Bar of the State of

Georgia since 1956. In the early part of 1972, Smith had

occasion to represent Cross, and had been represent-

ing Cross for a number of years. H.C.T. I, 48-49.

That after Cross’ arrest in DeKalb County on the

subject case, the Solicitor for the State Court of Fulton

County filed a motion to revoke Cross’ suspended sen-

tence based on Cross’ arrest in DeKalb County pur-

15

suant to the subject conviction. Smith discussed with

Cross the facts surrounding Cross’ DeKalb County

arrest in great detail. Smith attempted to subpoena but

one witness to Cross’ revocation hearing, Marshall

Blalock. H.C.T. I, 49-50.

That Smith, over a period of four or five days, made

extensive efforts to locate Blalock to serve a subpoena

on Blalock. Smith went by Blalock’s place of business

seven to ten times attempting to locate him. Smith

attempted to telephone Blalock at Blalock’s residence

approximately 15 to 20 times at all hours of the day to

locate Blalock. Smith was never able to subpoena

Blalock and Blalock never testified at Cross’ revoca-

tion hearing. H.C.T. I, 50-51.

On cross-examination, Smith testified:

That Smith, although he did not know as a matter of

fact that Blalock was an informer for the DeKalb Coun-

ty Police Department, had strong reason to believe that

Blalock was an informer based on the information

given Smith by Cross and the co-defendant Johnson.

Smith had strong reason to believe in the early part of

1972 that Blalock was acting in collusion with

McGlamery and Young to get Cross out to DeKalb

County to set Cross up on this case. H.C.T. I, 51-52.

Synopsis of Testimony of Wendell C. McGlamery

Wendell C. McGlamery (hereinafter referred to as

16

“McGlamery”) testified at the habeas hearing under

cross-examination by Cross as follows:

McGlamery has been a DeKalb County Police Of-

ficer for 13 years. In 1969 he lived at the Greenacres

Apartments on Glenwood Road in DeKalb County. At

one period of time when he was living at the above-

mentioned apartment, a fellow law enforcement of-

ficer, Deputy Sheriff Chester Powell (hereinafter re-

ferred to as “Powell”) was temporarily staying with

McGlamery. McGlamery was working the gambling

squad of the DeKalb County Police Department at this

time. H.C.T. II, 33-34.

McGlamery is aware that Cross was operating a

gambling establishment and that Powell had frequent-

ed said establishment from information given Mc-

Glamery by Federal ATF agents.

McGlamery believed that Powell was getting infor-

mation to Cross, so McGlamery put a tap on his own

telephone without court authorization. McGlamery

then told Powell that he was going to raid Cross.

H.C.T. Il, 34-35.

McGlamery acknowledged that he had lied to Powell

about raiding Cross. McGlamery anticipated that

Powell would pass information on to Cross and that the

illegal tap McGlamery had on his telephone to inter-

cept Powell’s communications would reflect Powell

communicating the false information given Powell by

McGlamery.

17

McGlamery acknowledges that the false information

he gave Powell was bait and that one might call what he

did setting a trap. H.C.T. Il, 36-37. McGlamery did not

succeed in prosecuting Cross in early 1969 based on his

illegal tap of Powell’s communications. H.C.T. II, 37.

McGlamery acknowledged having lunch with

Blalock at the Bull & Bush Restaurant in the summer of

1971 and acknowledges identifying Cross to Blalock

and others. McGlamery acknowledges that he re-

membered his futile attempt to investigate and prose-

cute Cross in early 1969 at the point in time when iden-

tified Cross to Blalock in the summer of 1971. H.C.T. II,

37-38.

McGlamery testifies that at the probation revoca-

tion hearing before Dan Duke, in or about February,

1972, that he denied to the court that he knew or had

ever seen Cross. H.C.T. Il, 41.

McGlamery testifies that he was pretty sure he

didn’t go by to visit with Blalock during the Spring of

1974 immediately prior to the trial of the subject case.

H.C.T. Il, 42. McGlamery acknowledges that on the

trial of the subject case in the spring of 1974 that he

testified that he had not seen Blalock for a period of

approximately four months. Nevertheless,

McGlamery acknowledged that Young was living in

the Tregony East Apartments where Blalock was living

and that McGlamery utilized a police automobile dur-

ing this period of time. McGlamery denies having alert-

ed Blalock to the court process that had been issued

against Blalock. H.C.T. II, 43-44.

18

On direct examination by the State, McGlamery

acknowledged that Blalock was his informer and that

Blalock had given him information on gambling and

other criminal activity in the metro Atlanta area.

McGlamery denies that he told Blalock to make himself

scarce during the period of time that Cross had his pro-

bation revocation hearing on or about February, 1972.

H.C.T. Il, 44-45. McGlamery acknowledges that he

knew Blalock was living at the Tregony East Apart-

ments and that he used to visit and talk with him there.

McGlamery again denies that he alerted Blalock to the

process that was impending against Blalock. H.C.T. II,

45-46.

McGlamery testifies in response to the court's

questions that McGlamery knew some time prior to

the trial of the case that Blalock had been subpoenaed

by virtue of Blalock’s telling him so in November of

1973. H.C.T. Il, 49.

Synopsis of Testimony of Peggy Blalock

Peggy Blalock testified that she has been married to

Marshall Blalock for 22 years. They have two daugh-

ters, the younger daughter’s name being Pamela, who

is 19 years old.

In the spring of 1974, the Blalocks moved to Florida

with their daughter, Pamela, from the Tregony East

Apartments in DeKalb County. H.C.T. Il, 25-26.

Peggy Blalock testified that she knew both Mc-

19

Glamery and Young and had occasion to see

McGlamery during the two-month period of time prior

to their leaving for Florida. That McGlamery used to

come by the house quite a few times, maybe two or

three times a week, in uniform and driving a police

automobile. That when McGlamery would come by,

Blalock would go out to talk with him in the police auto-

mobile. That on one occasion in the spring of 1974,

Blalock went to stay with his brother for a couple of

days. That Peggy couldn’t remember whether

McGlamery had been there that particular day or not.

H.C.T. Il, 26, 27, 28.

That Blalock stayed in Covington two or three days

with his brother and then came back to a motel on

Wesley Chapel Road in DeKalb County and stayed

there a couple of days. That after Blalock’s stay at the

motel, they moved to Florida. H.C.T. II, 28-29.

Synopsis of Testimony of Pamela Blalock

Pamela Blalock testified as follows:

That Pamela was the daughter of Marshall and

Peggy Blalock and that she recalled moving to Florida in

the spring of 1974. That she remembered in the spring

of 1974 that they lived at the Tregony East Apart-

ments in DeKalb County. Pamela knew McGlamery

and testified that McGlamery used to come by to see

her father at the Tregony East Apartments. H.C.T. II,

30-31.

20

That McGlamery used to come by two or three times

a week to see her father. That McGlamery used to

come by quite a lot in the period of time just before they

left to go to Florida. H.C.T. II, 31-32.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT

SHOULD BE GRANTED:

This Court should issue the Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court for the State of Georgia for the follow-

ing reasons:

The Supreme Court of Georgia in reversing

the State Habeas Court’s Findings of Fact,

which findings were based on substantial

testimonial evidence, and in holding that

Cross waived his rights to call witnesses in his

behalf by virtue of Cross’ trial counsel's fail-

ure to move for a continuance, has emascu-

lated, by failing to apply, the landmark doc-

trine enunciated by this Court in Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 82 L.Ed. 1461, and its

progeny.

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses and

compel their attendance is unquestionably a right that

affects the fairness and accuracy of the fact finding

process. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19; 18 L.Ed.2d

1019.

In finding a waiver of a substantial constitutional

right which affects the fairness and accuracy of the fact

a

21

finding process, the law has been long established that

the State must demonstrate “an intentional relin-

quishment or abandonment of a known right or priv-

ilege”. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464; 82 L.Ed. 1461,

1466; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 525, 529.

Courts should indulge every reasonable pre-

sumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional

rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464; 82 L.Ed. 1461,

1466. |

Notwithstanding the extensive habeas testimony of

E. T. Hendon, Jr. Cross’ trial counsel, to the contrary,

the Georgia Supreme Court equated Hendon’s not

moving for a continuance to an “intentional re-

linquishment or abandonment of a known right or

privilege.” This, notwithstanding the findings of fact to

the contrary by the trier of fact, (the State habeas

court), after observing and listening to Hendon’s ex-

tensive testimony.

The State habeas court found in its Findings of Fact

as follows: (Appendix B.)

“After consideration of all the evidence, it is

found that Cross’ trial counsel did not inten-

tionally relinquish or abandon Cross’ con-

stitutional right to call Blalock as a defense

witness.”

The factual basis upon which the State Habeas Court

made the above findings is very substantial (See Synop-

sis of E. T. Hendon, Jr.’s testimony, infra.)

22

It is interesting to note here that the Georgia

Supreme Court has had a long-standing rule in dealing

with findings of fact of habeas courts in criminal cases

that where there is “any evidence” to support the

habeas court’s findings of fact, said findings ought not

to be disturbed. See Allen v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 442, 443.

Unless waiver is found, the conviction clearly must

fall. Blalock’s testimony, which was corroborated on

essential and crucial detail by four other witnesses,

minimally corroborates Cross’ trial testimony, which

renders Blalock’s testimony exculpatory under Alcorta

' -v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31. Blalock’s testimony is also evi-

dentiary of an absence of “predisposition” in Cross in

contemplation of Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484.

The Georgia Supreme Court held that the habeas

court applied incorrect law. The law applied by the

habeas court is correct, assuming the findings of fact of

the habeas court are correct.

The findings of fact by the habeas court were sup-

ported by substantial evidence flowing from the testi-

mony of numerous witnesses. Apparently, the Georgia

Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in ques-

tion was not newly discovered, therefore, the habeas

court ought not to have applied standards applicable to

newly discovered evidence, assuming said evidence was

willfully withheld. The habeas court squarely dealt

with the proposition of whether the evidence was new-

ly discovered and correctly concluded that what Hen-

23

don “knew” properly fell into the category of intelli-

gence, rather than admissible evidence. Thus, the

habeas court found no waiver by Hendon (see H.C.T. I,

pp. 44, 45).

The habeas court found, as a finding of fact after

listening to all of the evidence as follows: (Appendix B.)

“Upon considering all the testimony, it is

found as fact that but for state action, Cross

would have been able to compel Blalock’s testi-

mony in Cross’ defense. The conduct and ac-

tions of the state agents involved constituted a

willful and knowing withholding of Blalock’s

testimony.

“The state agents in question denied under

oath the aforementioned conduct.”

Thus, the habeas court properly applied the first test

of U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, i.e., the

“reasonable likelihood” test which is applicable where

exculpatory evidence is willfully withheld by state

agents and perjured testimony is utilized attendant to

such withholding as in the instant case.

CONCLUSION

The state habeas court, after hearing numerous wit-

nesses, made extensive findings of fact. Based on such

findings, the state habeas court: properly applied John-

son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 and its progeny, and found

24

there was no waiver of Cross’ right to call witnesses

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in con-

templation of law; properly applied, Alcorta v. Texas, 355

U.S. 28, in finding the missing witness Blalock’s testi-

mony to be exculpatory due to its corroborative nature;

properly applied Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, in

finding that Blalock’s testimony was exculpatory in

that said testimony was evidentiary of a lack of predis-

position in Cross, thereby supporting Cross’ defense of

entrapment; and, finally, properly applied the “reason-

able likelihood test” of United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,

in concluding that the State conduct in question con-

stituted a willful withholding of Blalock’s testimony

and that the State, through its agents, had utilized per- .

jured testimony to conceal said withholding.

The Supreme Court for the State of Georgia appar-

ently gave little or no weight to the State habeas court’s

findings of fact, in the face of substantial evidence to

support said findings, which action contradicted a line

of Georgia Supreme Court cases which generally in-

ures to the detriment of petitioners seeking the writ of

habeas corpus.

That is, the Supreme Court of Georgia has stead-

fastly applied the rule of Allen v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 442, in

affirming denials of petitions for the writ of habeas

corpus on the proposition that habeas court's findings

of fact will not be disturbed where there is any evi-

dence to support said findings, yet in the subject case

failed to apply its own case law to reverse a granting of

Cross’ Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

25

The above constitutes a denial of due process of law

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the

Supreme Court of the United States ought to inquire

into this matter more fully and grant Cross’ Petition

for Certiorari; and further, reverse the judgment of the

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, thereby rein-

stating the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued by the

DeKalb County Superior Court, State of Georgia.

Respectfully submitted,

THEODORE S. WOROZBYT

2410 Peachtree Center

Cain Tower

229 Peachtree St., N.E.

Atlanta, GA 30303

404/659-7070

Attorney for Petitioner

26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Theodore S. Worozbyt, hereby certify that Iam a

member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United

States and that I have served copies of the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari in the above-styled case on Counsel

for the Respondent by depositing same in the United

States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as

follows:

Mr. Randall Peek

District Attorney

DeKalb Superior Court

Decatur, Georgia 30030

Arthur K. Bolton

Attorney General

State of Georgia

Atlanta, GA 30303

All parties required to be served have been served

this day of October, 1979.

THEODORE S. WOROZBYT

la

APPENDIX “A”

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 76-4379

WILLIAM HOWARD CROSS, SR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

THE STATE OF GEORGIA,

Respondent-Appellee.

September 28, 1978

Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1978

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia.

Before JONES, GODBOLD and GEE, Circuit Judges.

JONES, Circuit Judge:

The appellant, William Howard Cross, Sr., was in-

dicted for bribery, convicted and given a five year sen-

2a

tence in the DeKalb County, Georgia Superior Court.

His defense was entrapment. The conviction was

affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals. 136 Ga.

App. 400, 221 S.E.2d 615. The Supreme Court of

Georgia denied certiorari.

A short time before the occurrence for which Cross

was convicted he gave four fifty dollar bills to his co-

defendant, Harold Johnson, with an instruction to give

the money to Police Sergeant Wendell McGlamory of

the DeKalb County Police Department as a belated

Christmas gift. Sergeant McGlamory refused to accept

the money. Detective Robert W. Young of the Police

Department, and Johnson arranged by telephone for a

meeting with Cross at an agreed location. Detective

Young went to the meeting with a concealed micro-

phone and radio transmitter. Two other officers in a

nearby police car received and taped the conversation

from Detective Young’s transmitter.

Following a brief discussion, Cross said, “How about

let’s making a deal? I'll give you two hundred dollars

now, two hundred dollars on the twenty-fifth of each

month, and if you give me information concerning a

known figure I'll get you a bonus, or a piece of pie from

him, and I'll handle that.” Young testified that Cross

took two hundred dollar bills from his pocket and gave

them to Young. This conversation was taped by the of-

ficers in the police car.

Cross was indicted and charged with the offense of

bribery of a police officer. He admitted the acts

3a

charged, and asserted entrapment as a defense. Cross

was convicted and sentenced to five years imprison-

ment.

Cross appealed from the denial by the trial court of

his motion to suppress the tape recording and the testi-

mony of the three police officers on the ground that

this evidence constituted an illegal search and seizure

of his conversation because there was no application

for, or issuance of, a warrant authorizing electronic

eavesdropping under Georgia Code Ch. 26-3000 et seq.

The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected this argument.

Cross v. Georgia, 128 Ga. App. 837, 198 S.E.2d 338. The

Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. Cross v. Georgia,

233 Ga. 960, 214 S.E.2d 374. His appeal from the denial

of an extraordinary motion for a new trial was consoli-

dated in the Georgia Court of Appeals with the appeal

from the judgment of guilt and sentence. Cross v.

Georgia, 136 Ga.App. 400, 221 S.E.2d 615. Cross has had

process in abundance. Whether he has had due process

is the issue before this Court.

At the hearing before the district court Cross assert-

ed two claims. His first contention was that the state

trial court had deprived him of Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by refusing to admit evidence ten-

dered by him which, he asserts, supported his defense

of entrapment. The district court ruled against Cross

stating that he “failed to establish the minimum re-

quirements for the defense of entrapment and it does

not appear to the Court that the trial court made sucha

ym

4a

grievous error as to ignore petitioner's rights on this

issue.” Before the Court this question is somewhat dif-

ferently stated. Here the question is said to be “May a

‘bribery’ defendant who pleads entrapment by coer-

cion attempt to negate his ‘predisposition’ by showing

other acts of coercion by the ‘bribed’ police officers?”

The conduct of the officers in unrelated matters is not

pertinent to the issue of the predisposition of the

appellant. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct.

1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.

423,93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366. We need not decide

whether the issue here presented is of Constitutional

dimensions. See United States v. Russell, supra. There is no

Fifth Amendment due process bar to the conviction of

the offense of bribery of police officers who antici-

pated the offense by electronic taping of the incident.

Hampton v. United States, supra.

The other claim of the appellant is thus stated, “Did

the undisputed extrajudicial investigative and prose-

cutorial activity of the trial court deny appellant a trial

by a fair and impartial tribunal?”

A witness subpoena had been issued for Marshall

Blalock. Counsel for Cross sought the arrest of Blalock

and represented that Blalock would not respond to a

subpoena. The judge issued the order for the arrest of

Blalock in which bond was fixed for his appearance asa

witness, but before doing so the judge telephoned an

employee of the person with whom Blalock had been

residing. Blalock went to Florida. Whether he went

5a

before or after the telephone call was not shown.

Whether the substance of the call was made known to

Blalock was not shown. Cross did not meet his burden

of showing that he was prejudiced by the injudicious

telephone call of the trial judge.

The trial judge, before the trial, with a prosecuting

attorney and others, listened to the playing of the tape

recording of the “bribe”. He also examined the poly-

graph tests of the officers. Cross contends that these

actions were improper and evidenced prejudice on the

part of the judge. Due process requires a fair trial

before a fair and impartial judge. The conduct of the

trial judge during the trial is the measure by which

prejudice to the litigant is determined. The district

court held that Cross was not prejudiced by the actions

of the trial judge. We agree with this determination.

Cross was not deprived of any due process right to a

fair trial. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

I concur in the result but with this additional state-

ment.

I agree that Cross was not entitled to introduce evi-

dence tending to show unrelated efforts by the offi-

cers to coerce payoffs from other persons, offered on

6a

the theory that it negated Cross’ predisposition to com-

mit the bribery offense. In other circumstances such

evidence might be admissible as circumstantial evi-

dence of governmental involvement! or as impeaching

the credibility of the officers, but Cross disclaims any

such purpose in this case.

Some of the evidence proffered by Cross and not.ad-

mitted was not “unrelated.” If believed, it would have

tended to show efforts by the police officers to coerce

Cross through others. As noted by the Georgia Court

of Appeals in Cross’ merits appeal:

The claim of entrapment was based upon

testimony which tended to show the police of-

ficers McGlamery and Young were, through

others importuning and inviting Cross to pay

the money for protection and information as

to raids, etc.

1 U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366

(1974) and Hampton v. U.S., 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d

113 (1976), did not eliminate governmental activity from entrap-

ment law. U.S. v. Tate, 554 F.2d 1341, 1344 (CAS, 1977). Without

governmental activity entrapment does not become an issue.

Now, as before, the purpose of the law of entrapment is curbing

governmental activity so excessive as to be unacceptable to a civi-

lized society. Id. The sufficiency of the evidence of governmental

activity is a question of law for the court in the first instance. Id.;

Pierce v. U.S., 414 F.2d 163, 168 (CAS, 1969). If the court concludes

that there is sufficient evidence of governmental involvement to

submit the entrapment issue to the jury, the jury must consider

both the inducing governmental involvement and defendant's

predisposition. Id.

7a

Cross v. State, 136 Ga.App. 400, 221 S.E.2d 615, 618

(1975). Such evidence was entitled to be considered,

not as negating Cross’ predisposition but as tending to

show governmental involvement. The trial court was,

however, entitled to reject the proffered evidence as

too tenuous and remote to submit to the jury on the

governmental involvement issue. I cannot say that ex-

cluding it was error, or if error that it rose to constitu-

tional dimensions.

I agree that on the facts of this case due process does

not bar the conviction of the offense of bribery of the

police officers who anticipated the defense and elec-

tronically taped the incident. I do not understand the

court to be holding any more than that. Hampton v. U.S.,

which is cited as authority for the holding on this point,

is not authority that there can never be a due process

bar to a police-induced offense of a predisposed person.

The opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Hampton, advanc-

ing the view that due process is not involved when the

defendant is predisposed, was joined in by only two

other justices. Justices Powell and Blackmun con-

curred in the result but declined to join in Justice Rehn-

quist’s discussion concerning the predisposed defend-

ant. Three justices dissented on the ground, unrelated

to the point I make here, that where a government

agent sets up the defendant by supplying him with con-

traband and then brings in a potential purchaser the

defendant is entrapped as a matter of law. See the dis-

cussion of this point in U.S. v. Tate, supra.

8a

APPENDIX “B”

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

DEKALB COUNTY, STATE OF GEORGIA

STONE MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

WILLIAM HOWARD CROSS, SR.,

Petitioner,

versus Case No. 78-6608

PAT JARVIS, Sheriff of DeKalb County,

Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

AND ORDER

FINDINGS OF FACT

The witness, Marshal Blalock (hereinafter

Blalock”), was a material witness to the transaction

underlying the subject conviction.

Blalock was the conduit between the State agents

and the Petitioner (hereinafter “Cross”), i.e., Blalock

passed communications between McGlamery and/or

Young to Harold Johnson (Cross’ co-defendant, here-

inafter “Johnson”), and/or Cross.

9a

Officers McGlamery and Young, at all times rele-

vant, were agents of the State. Blalock, at all times rel-

evant, was McGlamery’s informer and agent in fact.

Blalock was also, at all times relevant, a close friend of

McGlamery and Young.

Blalock and Young were also business partners in a

certain Southern Vinyl Top Company on DeKalb

Avenue.

Blalock’s testimony corroborates, on crucial issues,

the testimony given by Johnson and Cross at the trial of

the subject case. Blalock’s testimony, independent of its

corroborative nature, lends itself to and supports a

reasonable theory of entrapment.

Blalock’s testimony, therefore, is exculpatory.

Had Blalock’s testimony been available to the

defense, the testimony of Blalock’s wife, Peggy, and

Blalock’s daughter, Pamela, would also have been

available.

The testimony of Blalock’s wife and daughter would

have corroborated Blalock’s testimony regarding the

relationship and communications between Blalock and

McGlamery during the four-month period of time im-

mediately preceding the departure of the Blalock family

in late March or early April to Florida.

Upon considering all the testimony, it is found as fact

that but for State action, Cross would have been able to

10a

compel Blalock’s testimony in Cross’ defense. The con-

duct and actions of the State agents involved consti-

tuted a willful and knowing withholding of ‘Blalock’s

testimony.

The State agents in question denied under oath the

aforementioned conduct.

Cross’ defense counsel was very desirous of procur-

ing Blalock’s testimony in Cross’ defense and con-

sidered Blalock’s testimony crucial to the presentation

of the defense of entrapment.

Cross’ trial counsel had reason to believe that Blalock

was reluctant to testify and that Blalock would not re-

spond to ordinary subpoena process. Cross’ trial coun-

sel applied for and obtained extraordinary court

process as a means of obtaining Blalock’s testimony,

‘which was unsuccessful.

Cross’ trial counsel diligently sought, by all legal

means available, to procure the testimony of Blalock.

After consideration of all the evidence, it is found

that Cross’ trial counsel did not intentionally relin-

quish or abandon Cross’ constitutional right to call

Blalock as a defense witness.

After consideration of all the evidence, it is found as

fact that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s

verdict in the subject case would have been affected had

Blalock testified in Cross’ defense.

lla

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The constitutional right to call witnesses for the

defense embodied in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments to the United States Constitution and under the

Georgia Constitution is a right that affects the truth

finding process. It has not been shown that Cross in-

tentionally relinquished or abandoned the aforemen-

tioned right. That, but for State action, in contempla-

tion of law Cross would have been able to avail himself

of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right of com-

pulsory process.

That the standard applicable under the facts of this

case is the “reasonable likelihood” standard, i.e., the

first variation of the Brady v. Maryland doctrine as

taught by Agurs v. United States. That due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment means, in essence, funda-

mental fairness; and that Cross was denied same pur-

suant to the subject conviction.

That the administration of criminal justice requires

that no citizens be denied due process. It is in the inter-

est of preserving the integrity of our criminal judicial

system and the humanity of our system of jurispru-

dence that Cross’ conviction be voided and set aside.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Cross’ judgment conviction for the offense of

bribery and the attendant sentence of five years in the

State penitentiary are hereby vacated and set aside.

12a

Cross’ petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus is

granted to the extent that a new trial is ordered. Cross

is authorized to post good and sufficient bond contin-

gent upon his appearance at such new trial in the

amount of $5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

This the 19th day of January, 1979.

Hubert C. Morgan

Judge, Superior Courts

Stone Mountain Judicial

Circuit

Georgia, DeKalb County

I, Chandler Bridges, Clerk Superior Court in and for

said County, hereby certify that the above is a true and

correct copy of Order of Court in the above stated case,

as the same appears of file and of record in this office.

Witness my hand and seal of said Court this the 8th

day of August, 1979.

Is} CHANDLER BRIDGES

Clerk Superior Court

DeKalb County, Georgia

13a

APPENDIX “C”

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 20, 1978

34822. JARVIS, Sheriff v. CROSS

BOWLES, Justice.

Cross was convicted of bribery in 1974. He had ad-

mitted the crime but alieged entrapment. His extraor-

dinary motion for new trial was overruled by

the trial court. Both these decisions were affirmed by

the Court of Appeals in Cross v. State, 136 Ga. App. 400

(221 S.E.2d 615) (1975) and this court denied cer-

tiorari. Cross then filed habeas corpus petitions in fed-

eral court and relief was denied him both at the district

court level and in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.!

Two weeks later, Cross filed his petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the DeKalb Superior Court alleging

“newly discovered evidence.” He contends that his Six-

th Amendment right to call witnesses in his own be-

half was abridged in that a police officer was instru-

mental in having a witness, one Blalock, avoid Cross’

subpoena and leave the state. Allegedly, Blalock could

have corroborated Cross’ entrapment theory. The

habeas court granted the writ and ordered a new trial.

We reverse.

1 See Cross v. Georgia, 581 F.2d 102 (1978).

14a

The trial court applied incorrect law in reaching its

decision. The “evidence” in question was not newly dis-

covered. Trial counsel for Cross testified at the habeas

hearing and stated that prior to trial he had “learned” that

the police officer in question “apparently had gotten to

him [Blalock] and he had fled.” In fact, counsel cross-

examined the two officers on the stand on this point. In

addition, he apparently knew of a witness, already

under subpoena, who could have helped substantiate

the allegation. Cross’ proper remedy at trial was a mo-

tion for continuance when he learned of Blalock’s

absence. See Murphy v. State, 132 Ga. App. 654 (209

S.E.2d 101) (1974). A defendant cannot assert his de-

fenses piecemeal, Wallace v. Foster, 206 Ga. 561 (57

S.E.2d 920) (1950), thus extending indefinitely the

appellate process.

Furthermore, even assuming that the police officers

encouraged Blalock to avoid testifying and assuming

this fact were newly discovered, Blalock’s testimony at

the habeas hearing added nothing to substantiate

Cross’ allegation of entrapment. Wrongdoing by state

officers is, of course, inexcusable and reprehensible yet

the wrongdoing alone will not justify a new trial. As

was stated in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 at 110 (96

S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342) (1975): “... if evidence

actually has no probative significance at all, no purpose

would be served by requiring a new trial simply be-

cause an inept prosecutor incorrectly believed he was

suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense. If

15a

the suppression of evidence results in constitutional

error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not

the character of the prosecutor.”

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

APPENDIX “D”

CLERK’S OFFICE

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA

July 18, 1979

Dear Sir:

The motion for a rehearing was denied today: Case

No. 34822, Jarvis, Sheriff v. Cross.

Yours very truly,

MRS. JOLINE B. WILLIAMS,

Clerk.