Appendix — Lumber, Production & Industrial Workers Local 2362 v. Wondzell

of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

LUMBER, PRODUCTION AND

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS LOCAL 2362,

Appellant,

v.

ROBERT A. WONDZELL and THE ALASKA

STATE COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Alaska

APPENDIX A-100

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Connor

DERNARD JOLLES

JOLLES, SOKOL & BERNSTEIN, P.C.

721 S.W. Oak Street

Portland, Oregon 97205

Counsel for Appellant

ROBERT A. DeGRAFF

2212 N.E. Everett Street

Portland, Oregon 97232

of Counsel for Appellant

October 24, 1979

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a OE ES LT ARR AS

me na set

STEVENS-NESS LAW PUB. CO., PORTLAND, ORE. 10-79

Boas

No. 79-606

In the Supreme Court

of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

LUMBER, PRODUCTION AND

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS LOCAL 2362,

Appellant,

V.

ROBERT A. WONDZELL and THE ALASKA

STATE COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the Swpreme Court of Alaska

APPENDIX A-100

CONNOR, Justice, dissenting.

I am still not convinced that Anderson v. General

Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division, 589 F.2d 397

(9th Cir. 1978), or Burns v. Southern Pacifie Trans-

portation Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), provide

the proper legal resolution of the problem presented in

the case at bar. To require factual inquiries as to what

further accommodation can be made is to adopt a rule

which requires undue litigation of a question that must,

in the last analysis, be one of drawing a line between

two statutes which prescribe conflicting, opposite goals.

To cast the burden upon the employer and the union to

demonstrate further their ability to give way to Wond-

zell’s demands is really a roundabout way of saying

that the employee’s religious scruples must take prece-

dence over the principle of the union shop which is

deeply embedded in federal labor law. In light of Trans

World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 482 U.S. 63 (1977).

I do not believe that the employer and union were re-

quired to give way any more than they did.

Thus, I respectfully dissent from the majority opin-

ion on rehearing, and would affirm the judgment of

the superior court.