Appellants Brief — Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
Supreme Court brief1979
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JAN 10 1989
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IN THE if
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1979
No. 79-565
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
Appellant,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
TELFORD TAYLOR
60 E. 42nd Street
New York, New York 10017
Tel. (212) 661-0930
Counsel for Appellant
Of Counsel:
WALTER A. BOSSERT, JR.
DAVISON W. GRANT
GOULD & WILKIE
One Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
Tel. (212) 344-5680
TAYLOR, FERENCZ & SIMON
60 E. 42nd Street
New York, New York 10017
Tel. (212) 661-0930
January, 1979
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I rcs oy daa 5 1
WN rg oR 5S ee oe oe ee ee ee. 2
ons ee eee ec Cae, ete 3
ME ie ov accw wed unke, Peas 4
SE os cnt uv beeencnelnls. 4
mummemary Of ATQUOME .. 2. cc cece ccecucn. 8
I cred oes oc a ice fe ee 12
I. Important First Amendment Rights are Infringed by
the Commission’s Order Prohibiting Promotional
Advertising by Electric Utility Companies . 13
A. The First Amendment Values here at Stake are
Substantial and Merit a High Degree of Protec-
tion Against State Infringement .........__.. 14
B. Appellant’s First Amendment Rights are not
Diminished by its Status as a Regulated Public
Utility Corporation or by the Commercial Char-
acter of its Advertising Message ............ 20
II. The State Interests Asserted by Appellee are Insuffi-
cient to Justify the First Amendment Infringements
Effected by Appellee’s Order ........... 22
A. Oll Conservation .................. 23
ee 26
C. “Misleading Signals” ..................... 30
III. The Order, and the Public Service Law as Construed
and Applied by the New York Courts, are Uncon-
stitutional for Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Lack of
I suet lap tego 33
A. Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Lack of Standards
of the Public Service Law as so Construed and
WE re a eon pees 34
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth of the Commis-
co , _ ES eN eara 37
IV. The Order, and the Authorizing Statute as Applied,
are Unconstitutional Under the Equal Protection
ME a eee eer te 40
WO axa retin yeesen ee ere eee 43
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
a ree ee 2, 4, 7 et seq.
Fourteenth Amendment ............ 2, 4, 22, 40 et seq.
CASES:
Arnett V Kennedy, 416 US 134............... re 36
Atchison R. Co. v Public Utilities Commission, 346 US 346 . 3
Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350 ............... 11, 14,
21, 22, 25, 33, 38
Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809 ......................., 14
Carey v Population Services, 431 US 678 ................ 21
Coates v Cincinnati, 402 US 611 ......... PP gees aE 37
Cox v New Hampshire, 312 US 569 .................... 41
Com v Leudsigme, S79 UG SOB na vie vc wc cece. nn. 41
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v Noerr Motors F reight,
| er ae hol Pe Si acs 20
Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville,422 US 205 ............. 41
First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765... 9, 20,
21, 38, 41
Friedman v Rogers, 440 US 1 ...................... ; 22
Hamilton v Regents, 293 US 245 ...................... 3
Hannegan Vv Esquire, 327 US 146 ..................... 11, 36
Hynes Vv Borough of Oradell,425US610 ........... a 37
Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589 ..........__._. 37
Kleindienst v Mandel, 408 US 753 ..................... 14
Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v Public Utilities Commission,
ee Se Me nk on ee eae a ee 3
Lamont v Postmaster General, 381 US 301 ...........__. 14
Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 ......................
Linmark Associates, Inc. v Willingboro, 431 US 85 11, 14,
25, 32
Live Oak Ass’n. Vv Railroad Commission, 269 US 354... 3
Supp— (E.D.N.Y., Docket No. 77C972, March 30, 1979) 16, 19
Lowa 0 GG, TS UB GS ook kkk dace 37
ili
PAGE
NAACP v Button, 371 US 415 ....................... 37
New York State Council of Retail Merchants, Matter of, v
Public Service Commission, 45 NY 2d 661, 412 NYS
MEN cael RISE Ss SR eg ro a 29
Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 US 447 ........._... 7,22
Pittsburgh Press Co. Vv Human Rel. Comm'n, 413 US 376 __ 14
Police Department of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92 ..____. 12, 42
vem, MOU, SO Whe ok. wk ee we kee ee, 22
Procunier V Martinez, 416 US 396 ........... Sat eee 14
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367 _. ee 14
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. vy Rodriguez, 411 US 1 12, 42
Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566 .............__. Oe rks 37
State V Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 536 P 2d 887 .. AD 24
Valentine Vv Chrestensen, 316 US52............. Teeter Ee
Va. Pharmacy Bd. v Va. Consumer Council, 425 US 748. 5, 6, 8,
11, 12, 14, 19, 21, 22, 25, 31, 33, 34
Washington Water Power Co. v Kootenai Environmental Alli-
ance and Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 99 Ida. 875,
EE er :, 33,40
Wome Verne, Ste Ueill....................... 24
Williams v Bruffy,96 US 176 ......................... 3
Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23... __. A En Rb RE none 41
STATUTES:
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978... 25
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, § 113(b)(5),
S2 US, §20000)(5) .......................... 6, 24
United States Code, Title 28,
AEE Se 3
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
SE 2
New York Public Service Law
EES EOS a ete 34, 35
es aS ana ee ee 35
Dee oe nc en 35
ES SS 2 acy a 17, 35
MEP eine ev es ost re 35
RE Ny a ae i ae 35
CS raed es lyse ee 4,17
hy REESE a eae a ae 18
New York Home Insulation and Energy Conservation Act
oo aa, OES EE SEE, . Sinema ies 18
iv
PAGE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS:
Capital Telephone, Case 25290, 13 NY PSC 461 ......_... 4
Fuel Conservation, Case 26532, 13 NY PSC 2183... 5
Fuel Conservation, Case 26532, 14 NY PSC 551 .....__.. 5
Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices
by Public Utilities, 12 NY PSC 108-R................ 4
Gas Restrictions, Case 25766, 11 NY PSC 1257... s—s—sists 4
Gas Restrictions, Case 25766, (order issued September 6,
on, . RPP SER are 0s ae ag ne i 4,29
Electric Rate Design, Case 26806, 16 NY PSC 671 ——s—s™ 27, 28
Relevance of Marginal Costs to Regulation of Gas Distribu-
tion Companies, Case 26835, Opinion No. 79-19 (Septem-
EAE... Rie eer eemey arena Riel aae ats actin ons 27
Rate Structure of All Electric Utilities, No. 5963, (order
issued July 27, 1979, Colorado Public Utilities Comm.) . 28
LEGISLATIVE HIsTory:
H. Rep. No. 95-1750 (95th Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 10, 1978) 24
H. Rep. No. 95-496 Part 4 (95th Cong. Ist Sess., July 19,
cg a, SE EERE Ra oie tia Os ei el ci alana 24
S. Rep. No. 96-394 (96th Cong. Ist Sess., Nov. :, 197s)... 18
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1 Tig tg te BL ne ag a ar ea eo 41
Draft Report, New York State Energy Master Plan, New York
State Energy Office, August 1979... sts 16, 28
Neb. Op. Att’y Gen. No.8 (1979) ................ 24
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1979
No. 79-565
CENTRAL Hupson Gas & ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
Appellant,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation, appellant,
appeals from the final judgment of the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York, entered July 9, 1979, denying rehearing of
a judgment entered May 1, 1979 which affirmed judgments of
the Appellate Division, Third Department, and the New York
Supreme Court, Albany County, and upheld the federal con-
stitutionality of the Public Service Law of New York State as con-
strued and applied by the Public Service Commission of the State
of New York in its orders of February 25, 1977 and July 14,
1977 prohibiting electric utility companies subject to the Com-
mission’s jurisdiction from promoting the use of electrical energy
by advertising. These orders are contemporaneous with the
order challenged in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission (No. 79-134), probable jurisdiction noted Octo-
ber 1, 1979, which has been scheduled for argument with the
present case.
Opinions Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York is reported in 47 NY 2d 94, 417 NYS 2d 30, and is set
forth in the Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement (J. S. App.
2
A, pp 1a-14a).* The opinion of the Appellate Division, Third
Department, is reported in 63 AD 2d 364, 407 NYS 2d 735,
and is set forth at J. S. App. B, pp 15a-21a.
The opinion of the New York Supreme Court is not reported
and is set forth at J. S. App. C, pp 22a-25a. The three opinions
of the Public Service Commission are reported in 13 NY PSC
2072, 17 NY PSC 1-R, and 17 NY PSC 17-R and are set forth
at J. S. Apps. D-1, D-2 and D-3, respectively.
Jurisdiction
Appellant (hereinafter “Central Hudson”) commenced this
action, seeking review of and declaratory relief against the
Commission’s orders of February 25 and July 14, 1977 under
Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, on
November 10, 1977 in the Supreme Court, Albany County. As
it had before the Public Service Commission (hereinafter the
“Commission”), Central Hudson challenged the order banning
promotional advertising as in violation of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 The
New York Supreme Court rejected Central Hudson’s constitu-
tional contentions, affirmed the validity of the Commission’s
orders, and denied the relief sought. The Appellate Division,
Third Department, on July 27, 1978, affirmed the judgment
below, and rejected appellant’s attacks on the orders as un-
authorized by statute and invalid under the federal and state
constitutions.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, rejecting all of appel-
lant’s statutory and constitutional contentions and affirming the
*“J. S. App.” refers to the Appendix to the Jurisdictional State-
ment (a separate volume filed with the Jurisdictional Statement).
“A.” refers to the Appendix filed with Appellant’s Brief. “R.” refers
to the Record on Appeal in the court below.
* Appellant’s petition to the New York Supreme Court is set
forth at J. S. App. E, pp. 68a-73a. It also challenged the validity of
the order under the state constitution, and other features of the
Commission’s order not involved in this appeal.
3
judgment below, was entered May 1, 1979 (J. S. App. F-1, p
74a). Appellant’s motion for reargument was timely filed on
May 30, 1979, and was denied on July 9, 1979 (J. S. App. F-2,
p 75a). Appellant’s Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed
with the Court of Appeals and the New York Supreme Court
on August 22, 1979 (J. S. App. G, pp 76a-79a). This Court's
jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2). The following cases, inter
alia, sustain this Court’s jurisdiction on appeal: Williams v
Bruffy, 96 US 176, 183; Live Oak Ass’n. v Railroad Commis-
sion, 269 US 354; Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v Public Utili-
ties Commission, 249 US 422; Hamilton Vv Regents, 293 US 245;
Atchison R. Co. v Public Utilities Commission, 346 US 346,
348-49; Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820, 825.
On November 26, 1979 this Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion.
Statutes Involved
The Commission's initial order banning promotional adver-
tising by electric utility companies, issued December 5, 1973,
provides, in pertinent part (J. S. App. D-1, p 3la):
All electric corporations are hereby prohibited from
promoting the use of electricity through the use of adver-
tising. .. 8
This order was continued in effect by the Commission’s
orders of February 25 and July 14, 1977, as set forth in J. S.
Apps. D-2 and D-3, and it is these continuing orders which are
challenged in this appeal. The relevant provisions of the New
* The remainder of the order treats with promotion of the use of
electricity through subsidy payments and employee incentives. Cen-
tral Hudson is not here contesting the Commission’s authority to
prohibit such subsidy payments or employee incentives.
Despite the fact that the document establishing the ban is cap-
tioned “Notice of Proposal to Issue Order Restricting Certain Uses
of Electrical Energy” (J.S. App. D-1, p 25a), the portion which
referred to the ban on promotional advertising by electric utilities is a
final order (J. S. App. D-1, p 31a par. 2).
4
York Public Service Law, held by the Court of Appeals to au-
thorize the promulgation of these orders by the Commission, are
set forth in J. S. App. H, pp 80a-83a.
Questions Presented
The Court of Appeals of New York State rejected appellant’s
contentions that the New York Public Service Law gives the
Commission no authority to issue the orders here in question and
that the orders are in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The ques-
tions presented are:
(1) Whether the Public Service Law, as so con-
strued by the Court of Appeals and as applied in this
case by the Commission, and the Commission’s orders
banning advertising by electric utility companies, facially
or as applied to appellant, are in violation of the First
Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment; and
(2) Whether the Public Service Law, as so construed
and applied, and the Commission’s orders, facially or as
applied, are in violation of the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Statement of the Case
The Commission’s initial order banning “promotional ad-
vertising” by electric utility companies,‘ was issued in Decem-
*In 1970 and 1971 the Commission had banned promotional
advertising respectively by telephone and gas companies, at a time
when lack of telephone capacity and natural gas supplies jeopardized
continuing service to existing customers. The gas companies were
also ordered, pursuant to explicit statutory authority (Public Service
Law Section 66-a), to conform to specified limitations on the attach-
ment of new customers (11 NY PSC 1257). On June 21, 1972 the
Commission declined to impose a similar advertising prohibition on
electric utilities (12 NY PSC 108-R). The ban on telephone com-
pany advertising was lifted in March, 1973 (13 NY PSC 461). The
ban on gas promotional advertising has recently been lifted for some
gas _ utilities (including Central Hudson) due to the recent increased
availability of natural gas (Case No. 25766, Gas Restrictions, Order
dated September 6, 1979).
5
ber, 1973, at the height of the oil supply constraint conse-
quent upon the Arab oil embargo following the October 1973
Arab-Israeli conflict, and was based on the Commission’s con-
clusion that the electric utility system in New York State “does
not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue
furnishing all customer demands for the 1973-74 winter.” (J. S.
App. D-1, p 26a).° At about the same time the Commission
ordered a state-wide voltage reduction (13 NY PSC 2183). The
latter order was rescinded on March 29, 1974 after the Arab
oil embargo had been lifted, and upon a finding that New York
electric utilities had “substantial inventories” of fuel (14 NY
PSC 551); the advertising ban, however, remained in effect.
Opposition to continuance of the ban was publicly voiced,
and on July 28, 1976 the Commission issued a “Notice of Pro-
posed Policy Statement and Request for Comments on Adver-
tising by Public Utilities and Electric Promotion Practices” (the
pertinent provisions of which are set forth in J. S. App. I, pp
84a-87a). Numerous written comments were received, includ-
ing Central Hudson’s letter of September 10, 1976 (A. pp A10-
A12), urging that the ban be lifted on grounds both of policy
and of constitutional law as then recently determined in Va.
Pharmacy Bd. v Va. Consumer Council, 425 US 748 (1976).
No evidentiary hearing or adversary process was given, despite
requests to that effect by the Attorney General and the Con-
sumer Protection Board of New York State (R. 645 and 502).
On February 25, 1977, the Commission issued its “Statemerit
of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Public
Utilities” (J.S. App. D-2, p 32a), directing that “the existing
ban on promotion of electricity sales shall be continued”. There
was no evidence before the Commission of any shortage of fuel
° The validity of the Commission’s original ban of December,
1973 on promotional advertising is not in question on this appeal. At
the time of its issuance there was real doubt that fuel supplies for
electric generation would remain sufficient even to maintain existing
Service, and there was no reason for Central Hudson to contemplate
promotional advertising.
6
oil or electrical capacity; the Commission relied primarily on its
conclusion that (J. S. App. D-2, p 37a) increased use of elec-
trical energy “would aggravate the nation’s already unaccept-
ably high level of dependence on foreign sources of supply and
would, in addition, frustrate rather than encourage conservation
efforts”. Dr. Alfred E. Kahn, the then Commission Chairman,
concurring “with the greatest reluctance and distaste”, relied
also on the ground that promotion of electricity usage would
cause an increase in peak consumption which, under the existing
rate structure, “is artificially subsidized.” (J. S. App. D-2, p 51a).
On March 28, 1977 Central Hudson petitioned the Commis-
sion for a rehearing. This and other such petitions were denied
by the Commission in an opinion and order issued July 14, 1977
(J. S. App. D-3). The Commission relied primarily on the ground
previously voiced by Chairman Kahn, i.e. that the existing “im-
perfectly structured electric rates” do not “fully reflect the much
higher marginal costs of on-peak consumption”, and that: “The
promotion of electric consumption at rates that do not reflect the
costs of it to society is not the kind of commercial speech contem-
plated by Virginia Board of Pharmacy.” (J. S. App. D-3, p 58a).
Thereafter, Central Hudson commenced the present action,
as described above.* In the New York Supreme Court, the
ban on promotional advertising was upheld solely on the ground
(originally set forth by Chairman Kahn) that “because of ineffi-
cient rate structure” increased peak usage of electricity would
not be “properly priced”, and that therefore the ban “advances
a significant public interest” sufficient to justify the incursion on
°In the New York courts, Central Hudson challenged other
features of the Commission’s order of February 25, 1977, which are
not involved in the present appeal.
This appeal raises no question with respect to payment for the
costs of promotional advertising. The Commission’s ban applies re-
gardless of how the costs of promotional advertising are allocated.
Pursuant to Section 113(b)(5) of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2623(b) (5), a Federal standard is
established, for consideration by state regulatory bodies, requiring
that the costs of promotional advertising be borne by the shareholders
or other owners.
7
First Amendment values (J. S. App. C, p 23a). Affirming, the
Appellate Division, Third Department, cited, as establishing a
“compelling” state interest in the ban, three matters relied on by
the Commission, to wit: (1) increased use of electricity would
cause “spiraling price increases due to the fact that present rates
do not cover the marginal cost of new capacity”; (2) advertising
“provides misleading signals” that energy conservation is un-
necessary; and (3) additional usage will “increase the level of
dependence on foreign sources of fuel oil.” (J. S. App. B, p 19a).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Central Hudson’s
threshold challenge to the statutory authority of the Commission
(which had also been raised below), ruling (J. S. App. A, pp 3a-
7a) that “the legislature has conferred vast power upon the Public
Service Commission”, including “general supervision” of electric
utilities, and the duty “to encourage . . . the preservation of
environmental values and the conservation of natural resources.”
The prohibition of promotional advertising was held to be a
“reasonable measure” to “prevent wasteful consumption or un-
needed expansion of utility services.” (J.S. App. A, p Sa).
Turning to the First Amendment issue, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged (J. S. App. A, p 10a) that the Commission’s ban
“works a direct curtailment of expressional activity: an entire
category of speech is prohibited because of its potential impact
upon the society”, and that such regulations “have been subjected
to an exacting standard of review, the precise level of that
standard being determined by reference to the nature of the
communication.” However, relying principally on Ohralik v
Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 US 447, the Court of Appeals ruled
that (J. S. App. A, p 13a) “the ban on promotional advertising
of electricity is consistent with First Amendment strictures”.
In support of this conclusion the Court of Appeals first cited
the “extensive government regulation” to which public utilities
are generally subjected, and then concluded that since there is
no “competitive shopping” for electricity on the basis of price,
because the rates are fixed by the Commission, promotional
advertising conveys no information of value to the recipient.
Furthermore, in view of “the present energy crisis” (of which
8
the Court took judicial notice), such communications might be
“affirmatively detrimental” and “exacerbate the crisis”. This
hazard, said the Court, “constitutes a compelling justification
for the ban”.
Central Hudson’s motion for reargument was denied without
opinion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission’s order is unconstitutional under Va. Phar-
macy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 US 748, and this
Court's subsequent decisions dealing with “commercial speech”.
The advertising here in question does much more than propose
a commercial transaction; it conveys information of value to the
energy consumer and is entitled to substantial First Amendment
protection. The asserted contervailing state interests are insuf-
ficient to justify the prohibitory order.
a.
Important First Amendment Interests are Infringed. The
recent “commercial speech” decisions are in line with this
Court's increasing concern for the rights of the recipient of
information. The interests of the energy consumer in the free
flow of information were overlooked by the New York court.
A. Although appellant has a franchised monopoly of the
distribution of electrical energy in its service area, it has no
monopoly of the uses to which that energy is put. The New
York court mistakenly conceived that Central Hudson operates
in a “noncompetitive market”, whereas in fact the market for
the supplying of heat and power is highly competitive between
electricity, natural gas, and house heating oil, and electricity
has only a minor fraction of that market. Although Central
Hudson does not presently intend to promote electrical res:stance
heating (a situation which cost and supply factors could readily
change), it does wish to promote off-peak consumption and
energy-saving electrical uses and devices, among which the heat
pump is most important, as both state and proposed federal
9
legislation have recognized. Appellee’s attempts to belittle these
considerations are unconvincing.
B. Appellant’s First Amendment rights are not diminished
by its status as a regulated public utility corporation, since it is
not only appellant’s self-interest but also the interests of the
energy-consuming public which are governing. First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 US 765. Making full allowance
for the “commonsense differences” between commercial and non-
commercial speech, which the Court has previously noted, there
is no feature of the present case which renders the caveats so
voiced applicable here. The Commission’s ban is not directed at
deceptive or misleading advertising, no person-to-person solicita-
tion is involved, and the challenged order is an absolute prohibi-
tion and not a mere regulation of time, place and manner. The
order bans speech which is entirely lawful and inoffensive, and
the order’s application is determined solely by the content of the
speech.
II.
The state interests advanced to justify the suppression of
speech effected by the order are insufficient. Three such inter-
ests are asserted by the Commission. The New York court relied
only on one of them, i.e. oil conservation.
A. Oil conservation. The New York court took judicial
notice of “the present energy crisis” and summarily concluded
(App. A, pp 13a-14a) that promotional advertising of electric
energy “would only serve to exacerbate the crisis”, and that this
constituted a “compelling justification for the ban.” The Com-
mission’s claim of conservational benefits from the advertising
ban was modest, and is not the primary factor invoked by
the Commission in its defense. Although the energy crisis (and
specifically dependence on foreign oil supplies) is a national
problem, no other state imposes such a prohibition, and the
pertinent federal legislation affirmatively recognizes the legiti-
macy of promoting the use of electrical energy. The quantum of
energy economy achieved by prohibiting the promotion of
electric resistance heating is insignificant, especially in compari-
10
son to luxury wastage of oil in, for example, large automobiles
and snowmobiles, the use and promotion of which the govern-
ment continues to tolerate. Inasmuch as the Commission’s order
prohibits promoting electrical usage which conserves energy and
diminishes the use of oil, it is counterproductive.
B. Ratemaking. The Commission’s principal defense of the
promotional ban is based on the “marginal cost” theory of rate-
making, which focuses on the proposition that unit-of-energy
costs are higher at peak load than off-peak periods, and there-
fore rates should be higher during peak periods. On this footing,
the Commission argues that promotion of electrical usage will
tend to increase peak loads, and that under presently used
“average cost” ratemaking the off-peak user subsidizes the on-
peak user. Therefore, the Commission concludes, promotion
must be prohibited until such “marginal cost” ratemaking can
be put into effect.
What this overlooks, however, is that prohibiting promotion
of electrical usage contributes nothing to a resolution of the
marginal cost ratemaking problem. The Commission has ample
power within the traditional bounds of utility regulation, by
the exercise of its authority over rates, accounting, metering, etc.,
to introduce marginal cost theory into the ratemaking process.
Marginal cost problems confront all the state utility regulatory
bodies, yet not a single other such agency has recognized any
need to prohibit promotion of electrical usage. Advertising is
but one of a myriad of factors that may increase peak load. The
Commission’s argument is of extraordinary breadth, and would
appear to justify the suppression of speech whenever its con-
tent may have collateral effect in the exercise of its traditional
and acknowledged powers.
C. “Misleading Signals”. The Commission contends that
promotion of electricity will give to the public “misleading
signals” that energy conservation is unnecessary. There is nothing
in the record to support the suggestion that Central Hudson’s
proposed advertising will convey any such impression. Even
if that assumption is indulged, this sort of argument is not new
and has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. Va. Pharmacy
1]
Bd., supra at 769-70 and 773; Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 US 85, at 96-97; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 US 350 at 374-75. Furthermore, since the order does not
prohibit utility companies from responding to inquiries about the
advantages of particular electrical uses, the effect of the ban is
to conceal from the public the fact that such information is
obtainable from the companies.
IIl.
The order, and the Public Service Law as construed and
applied, are unconstitutional for vagueness, overbreadth, and
lack of standards.
A. The Public Service Law. The governing statute suffers
from no inherent or facial constitutional defect, but in this case
has been construed and applied by the highest state court as
giving the Commission speech-limiting powers which are no-
where specified in the statute and which are thus wholly lacking
in legislative standards. The Commission concedes that the
Public Service Law “is not a statute designed to regulate speech.”
Its structure and provisions are comparable to those of at least
47 other states having regulatory bodies with supervisory power
over electric utilities. The “public interest” and “public wel-
fare” standards, while accepted as sufficient for ratemaking and
other economic purposes, are insufficient for the regulation of
speech. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 US 146. The New York
court did nothing to limit its construction, and the result of its
decision is to confer broad and unspecified speech-limiting
powers on the Commission. To affirm the decision below would
be to open the door, constitutionally, to like construction of the
Statutes in the other 47 states.
B. The Commission’s order itself is unconstitutional on
grounds of both overbreadth and vagueness. As far as concerns
oil conservation (the only ground regarded by the New York
court) the order is overbroad because it prohibits advertising of
electrical uses which conserve oil. Although the Commission’s
opinions are exclusively concerned with space heating and cool-
ing, the order is not so limited, and covers electrical use for
12
lighting, and for transportation and other power purposes. It
likewise suffers from vagueness, for the phrase “promotional ad-
vertising” is susceptible to a variety of interpretations. Does it
cover only public and general advertising, or apply also to indi-
vidual or institutional solicitation? These defects are, in all
probability, due to the lack of any evidentiary basis for the order,
which is based on little but the Commission members’ a priori
conclusions.
IV.
The Order and the authorizing statute are unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause. The prohibitory order ap-
plies only to promotion by the regulated electric utility com-
panies. The dealers in home heating oil remain free to ad-
vertise. The classification is irrational, as the oil sold by these
dealers constitutes over three-fourths of all residential heating
energy in Central Hudson’s service area. The fact that the utility
companies and not the oil dealers are subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction is constitutionally irrelevant. The standard of re-
view to be applied here is a rigorous one, since the discrimination
is in terms of First Amendment rights. Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 US 92, at 95-96; see also San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, at 34 n. 75, 61, 63, and
112-15.
ARGUMENT
The Public Service Commission’s order prohibiting “promo-
tional advertising”’ by electric utilities is plainly unconstitutional
under the principles repeatedly laid down by this Court in
the Virginia Pharmacy case, supra, and its other recent de-
cisions dealing with “commercial speech”. The Commission’s
order bans speech which is entirely truthful, and lawful in
all respects save under the order itself.
‘The term thus employed by the Commission embraces a wide
range of informational and invitational activities, from those whose
sole purpose is to increase existing types of consumption to those
which inform potential customers of new or little known uses or
devices in which they may find improved quality or economy.
13
Furthermore, the order bans speech which does much more
than propose a commercial transaction—speech which conveys
information of great importance to the consumer of energy
and touches closely on vital societal interests. Central Hudson
asserts, therefore, that its promotional speech is entitled to sub-
stantial protection under the First Amendment, which is in-
tended, above all, to protect the free flow of information from
the efforts, however well intentioned, of governmental officials
to prescribe what is “good” or “bad” for the public to know.
Accordingly, Central Hudson contends that the Commis-
sion’s order is facially unconstitutional, and that the Commis-
sion lacks constitutional authority to prohibit electric utility
companies from promoting the use, for any lawful purpose, of
the electric energy they distribute. Although Central Hudson
does not presently intend to promote electric resistance space
heating or conventional air conditioning, it does wish to increase
its off-peak load and to publicize new and improved uses of
electricity which are conducive to energy conservation and dimin-
ished reliance on oil. These devices, despite their energy-saving
characteristics, do involve increased use of electricity, and their
promotion is therefore prohibited by the Commission’s order. It
is Central Hudson’s immediate purpose in this litigation to be
freed of these restrictions on the promotion of electrical uses
which will benefit the public and, in the long run, help to alleviate
the national energy problem.
Important First Amendment Rights Are Infringed By
the Commission’s Order Prohibiting Promotional
Advertising By Electric Utility Companies.
This Court’s abandonment of the rule in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 US 52, and recognition of First Amendment
protection for commercial speech, was not an isolated decisional
development. Rather it was a logical outgrowth of the principle,
increasingly stressed during the last twenty-five years, that the
First Amendment is not for the sole benefit of those who speak
14
and write, but also of those who listen and read. Martin v.
Struthers, 319 US 141, 143 (1943); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 US 301, 307-08 (1965); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 US 367, 390 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 US 753, 762-63 (1972); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 US
396, 408-09 (1974). The applicability of this principle was
recognized in the first decision* applying First Amendment
values to commercial speech, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 US 809,
818-26, and was the fulcrum of decision in Mr. Justice Black-
mun’s germinal opinion in the Virginia Pharmacy case, 425 US
at 763-65, 769-70.
To be sure, the interests of the advertiser are not negligible,
and have weight in the First Amendment decisional scales. See
e.g., the Virginia Pharmacy case, supra at 762-63. But societal
rather than individual interests have been the principal focus of
decision in subsequent commercial speech cases involving adver-
tising. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 US 83 at
92, 96-97; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350 at 363-64,
368-79.
We believe that it was the tendency of the Commission and
the New York courts to center their discussion on the interests
of Central Hudson as they perceived those interests, and their
insufficient attention to societal values—primarily those of the
energy-consuming public—that led the Commission and the
State courts into grievous error in their disposition of the con-
stitutional issues in the present case.
A. The First Amendment Values here at Stake are
Substantial and Merit a High Degree of Protection
Against State Infringement.
Energy, be it electrical or in some other form, is not socially
useful in and of itself, but for the services it provides—chiefly
light, heat, and motive power. The ultimate source of energy
is the sun, but in terrestrial terms it is found not only in the sun’s
®*The demise of Valentine v. Chrestensen, supra, had been
adumbrated in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm’n., 413
US 376, 384-88, 393, 398, 401-02 (1973).
15
direct radiation, but in coal, oil, and other fossil fuels, the na-
tural movement of water, and many other forms including, most
recently, nuclear fission. Some of these sources are useable only
by their conversion into electricity, while others (notably the
fossil fuels) can be tapped directly by the user.
Thus the consumer of energy is often confronted with op-
tions, for these several sources of energy, and forms of energy
distribution, have radically differing qualities and characteristics,
and comparative advantages and disadvantages, depending upon
the use to which they are to be put. Furthermore, these com-
parative factors are unstable, for both natural and human events
may and often do alter the circumstances in which consumer
choice must be made.
This is the complicated and fluctuating milieu to which pro-
motional advertising of any basic energy form such as electricity
must be addressed. But one would never realize this from the
Opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, which makes no
reference to energy sources that compete with electricity, and
reduces the First Amendment values at stake here to the “nadir”,
by reasoning as follows (J. S. App. A, pp 12a-13a): |
In view of the noncompetitive market in which elec-
tric corporations operate, it is difficult to discern how the
promotional advertising of electricity might contribute
to society’s interest in “informed and reliable” economic
decisionmaking. Consumers have no choice regarding
the source of their electric power; the price of electricity
simply may not be reduced by competitive shopping.* * *
Indeed, promotional advertising is not at all con-
cerned with furnishing information as to the “availa-
bility, nature, and prices” of electrical service. It seeks,
instead, to encourage the increased consumption of elec-
tricity, whether during peak hours or off-peak hours.
Thus, not only does such communication lack any bene-
ficial informative content, but it may be affirmatively
detrimental to the society.
It is true, of course, that Central Hudson is the sole distribu-
tor of electrical energy in its operational area, and that the price
is regulated by the Commission. But the description of the mar-
16
ket in which electric utilities operate as “noncompetitive” reveals
the depth of the court’s misunderstanding, for while electricity
does furnish virtually all light, it is in competition with other
forms of energy in supplying heat and power.® Furthermore, it
is apparent from the Commission’s two opinions continuing in
effect the promotional ban (J. S. Apps. D-2 and D-3), that the
Commission was primarily concerned with the use of electricity
for space and water heating and air conditioning.
In the market for space and water heating, there is intense
competition between electricity, natural gas (which Central
Hudson also distributes), and house heating oil. Electricity
has the smallest share of the three, and electricity and natural
gas together have less than one-quarter of the market.’° Each
of the three rival energy sources has comparative advantages
and disadvantages, in terms of both price and quality. The
significance of all this for First Amendment purposes was well
described by Judge Pratt in the Long Island Lighting case"
(J. S. App. J, pp 92a-93a):
Beyond LILCO’s economic interest is the public’s
interest in the free flow of information on the use of
electrical energy for home heating. The consumer has
a substantial interest in receiving truthful information
on electric space heating. Not only does promotional
advertising provide information of general public interest
concerning electrical energy, it also assists an individual’s
° Of total end use energy consumption in New York State in
1978, it is officially estimated that electricity supplied only 11.5%.
Petroleum products account for 67.5%, natural gas comprises 18.3%,
and coal furnishes the remaining 2.7%. See Draft Report, New York
State Energy Master Plan, New York State Energy Office, August
1979, Figure IV-14.
©In 1978 in Central Hudson’s service territory, residential
heating was 9.3% electric, 12.4% gas, and 78.3% oil. See Central
Hudson’s Annual Report for the Year Ended December 31, 1978 to
the Public Service Commission. Natural gas distribution facilities
are available in Central Hudson’s service territory only in and near
Cities.
11 Long Island Lighting Co. v. Public Service Commission, —F.
Supp — (E.D.N.Y., Docket No. 77C972, March 30, 1979), now
pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
17
economic decisions on the benefits and detriments of
electric heat. Choosing among oil, gas, or electric resi-
dential heating may significantly affect his budget and
daily comfort. Moreover, the public in general has an
interest in receiving information on the various methods
of heating, in order to utilize energy resources ecologically
and efficiently.’?
In contrast to the foregoing, the state court’s opinion in the
present case would give one to believe that Central Hudson
proposes, by advertising, to urge its customers to keep their
buildings hotter in winter and cooler in summer, Whatever
might be said for or against constitutional protection for such
speech, no such question is raised in this case.
Electrical resistance heating (the electrical method presently
in common use), is clean, odorless, and cheap to install, but it
entails running costs which have generally been higher than
those for gas or home oil, and it is this factor which accounts for
its present minor share of the space heating market.’ Apart
from resistance heating, however, there are heating uses for
electrical energy which are both economical and efficient, and
the use of which is highly conducive to energy conservation.
2 See also comparable portions of Chairman Kahn’s separate
opinion (J. S. App. D-2, pp 49a-51a).
‘8 By letter dated September 6, 1979, the Commission granted
Central Hudson permission to engage in promotional advertising of
gas heating. Central Hudson has subsequently done so, but piped
gas is available to customers only in urban areas, so that in the non- °
urban areas of Central Hudson’s service territory the competition is
between electrical and home oil heating. Despite the higher cost, elec-
trical heating’s advantages continue to attract customers.
In the past, the difficulty with gas heating has been the serious
fluctuations, for reasons largely unrelated to the world oil situation,
in the available supply of natural gas. In recent years, shortages in
New York State have been so acute that the Legislature has author-
ized the Commission to control the attachment of new customers,
and the extent of service to existing customers (Public Service Law
Sections 66(2) and 66-a). As noted above (footnote 4), in 1971 the
Commission banned promotional advertising by gas companies, but
more recently has been lifting the prohibition on a piecemeal basis.
18
Of these, the electrically-powered heat pump" is the most
immediately promising, as its technology is relatively advanced
and it is far more energy-efficient than any heating equipment
presently in general use.’° The New York State Legislature, by
amendment to the Home Insulation and Energy Conservation
Act of 1977 (L. 1977, c. 858), has very recently specified the
installation of a heat pump as an “energy conservation measure”
eligible for financing by public utilities under an approved “home
conservation plan”.'® Since heat pumps are electrically powered,
this has resulted in the anomalous situation that Central Hudson
is forbidden by the Commission’s order to promote the use of
a device the home installation of which, under the state’s con-
servation program, Central Hudson may be obligated to
finance.
With improving technology, self-generating energy sources
such as private hydro, solar, and windmill systems are now
4 Although the Commission’s order does not so specify, its
opinion on rehearing makes it clear the promotional ban applies not
onlv to advertising electric energy, but also to utility company adver-
tising of appliances that consume electric energy (J. S. App. D-3,
p 59a).
** A heat pump heats a building by drawing in heat from the
outside air, and cools it (like an air conditioner but more efficiently )
by expelling interior heat to the outside air. The pump heats effec-
tively as long as the outside air temperature is over 30° Fahr. which,
in Central Hudson’s area, is about 78% of the time during the
heating season. When temperatures drop below this level a back-up
system (oil, gas, or electricity) is required. In his opinion Chairman
Kahn expressed concern about the air conditioning capability of the
heat pump (J. S. App. D-2, p 51a), but the price of a heat pump is
high enough so that few would buy it who would not otherwise install
a less efficient air conditioner. Furthermore, pumps which heat but do
not cool are available.
*® Public Service Law Section 135-a, as amended November 6,
1979, by L. 1979, c. 741. See also the Senate Finance Committee’s
Rep. 96-394 (96th Cong. Ist. Sess., Nov. 1, 1979), reporting favor-
ably H.R. 3919, which provides in Sec. 202(a)(2) for a “residential
energy” tax credit for heat pumps which replace electric resistance
space or water heating, or are used as a back-up system for a solar
water heating system.
19
becoming practical. Electricity is the most suitable supplement
or back-up for these systems, and it is electrical uses such as
these, embodying improvements in quality or economy, which
Central Hudson presently wishes to promote."
The Commission’s effort to belittle these values (in their
Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at pp. 12-13) is unconvincing. True
it is that heating systems are not changed “every few years”,
but new homes are built, and existing Systems may be converted.
Whether the initial choice is made by the builder or the house-
holder is irrelevant. The suggestion that the availability of
information from electric appliance dealers justifies silencing
the utility companies is the same argurnent that this Court cate-
gorically rejected in the Virginia Pharmacy case, 425 US at 757:
“We are aware of no general principle that freedom of speech
may be abridged when the speaker’s listeners could come by his
message by some other means. . .”
Accordingly, the state court’s discussion of the First Amend-
ment issue in terms of the pfice of electricity is far wide of the
mark. The question is not one of shopping for cheap electric
energy, but of comparing electricity with other available energy
sources for furnishing heat and power. One of the most serious
concerns of electric and other utilities is technical obsolescence
or changing public life styles which may endanger the utilities’
survival, just as the urban electric trolley car and the railroads
are presently threatened. Thus the continued health of electric
utilities depends on the development and publicizing of new and
It is, however, our contention that the Commission’s prohibi-
tion is unconstitutional in toto, including its application to electrical
resistance heating, as was held by Judge Pratt in the Long Island Light-
ing case, supra n. 11. The reasons why Central Hudson has no present
intention of promoting resistance heating are its presently higher cost
and Central Hudson’s reluctance to increase its peak loads. Although
Central Hudson has excess generating capacity for present loads, a large
increase in peak load might require construction of additional gen-
erating plant at a time when the cost of capital is extremely high.
However, the field of competitive energy is multi-faceted and
volatile, and changing technical or cost factors may well justify
altered policies in the future.
20
improved methods which will redound to public benefit in terms
of cost and quality.
Of course, Central Hudson’s self-interest is very much a part
of its position on these issues. But that factor in no way limits
its right to promote its own interests and point of view. See
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motors Freight,
365 US 127, at 139: “Indeed, it is quite probably people with
just such a hope of personal advantage who provide much of the
information upon which government must act.” So must in-
dividuals. Whether or not Central Hudson’s voice is heeded, it is
entitled under the First Amendment to be heard. And, as we
will now show, its stifling cannot be justified by the fact that the
voice is that of a public utility corporation.
B. Appeliant’s First Amendment Rights Are Not
Diminished by its Status as a Regulated Public
Utility Corporation, or by the Commercial Char-
acter of Its Advertising Message.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 US 765,
this Court dealt with a Massachusetts statute which severely
limited the right of specified types of corporations, including
banks, public utilities,“* and business corporations, to spend
money in order to influence elections or referenda. Holding that
the statutory restrictions violated the First Amendment, the
Court (per Justice Powell) observed (435 US at 775-76):
The court below framed the principal question as
whether and to what extent corporations have First
Amendment rights. We believe that the court posed the
wrong question. The Constitution often protects in-
terests broader than those of the party seeking their
vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves
significant societal interests. The proper question there-
fore is not whether corporations “have” First Amend-
‘8 Appellants in the Bellotti case included two banks and three
business corporations, but no public utilities. However, there is
nothing in the wording or logic of the Court’s opinion to suggest
that the ruling or opinion would have been different as applied. to
public utility corporations.
21
ment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with
those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be
whether [the statute] . . . abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.
The fact that the Bellotti case concerned “political” and the
present case “commercial” speech subtracts nothing from the
force of the point made: that the test is not the identity of the
communicator but the First Amendment interests of the com-
municants. Indeed, Justice White, dissenting (with Justices
Brennan and Marshall), thought that the communicants’ in-
terests would have been greater had the speech been commercial-
promotional (435 US at 807-8):
I recognize that there may be certain communications
undertaken by corporations which could not be restricted
without impinging seriously upon the right to receive
information. In the absence of advertising and similar
promotional activities, for example, the ability of con-
sumers to obtain information relating to products manu-
factured by corporations would be significantly impeded.
Accordingly, the emphasis laid by the New York court upon
the “vast power” of the Commission (J. S. App. A, p 4a) and the
“regulated and franchised” status of public utilities (J. S. App. A,
p 13a) as justifying restricting their right of speech, is mis-
placed,”® for these characteristics do not determine the communi-
cant interests involved in utility advertising. Furthermore, just
as the banks in the Bellotti case were under “extensive government
regulation” (J. S. App. A, p 13a), so were the pharmacists in the
Virginia Pharmacy case, 425 US 748, 750-51, and Carey v Popu-
lation Services, 431 US 678, 701, as well as the lawyers in Bates v
State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350, 353 et seq. In all these cases
the ban on advertising was invalidated.
’ See also the remarks of Chairman Kahn in his concurring
opinion (J. S. App. D-2, p 52a: “I do not regard flat prohibitions of
promotion by public utility companies abhorrent as a matter of
principle. Where a company enjoys something close to a monopoly,
conferred upon it by public franchise, it does not in my judgment have
an unfettered right to advertise.”
22
Nor do Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 US 447, and
other decisions noting “commonsense differences” between com-
mercial and other speech, support the validity of the Commis-
sion’s promotional ban, for none of the factors remarked or relied
on in those cases are relevant to the present one. The Virginia
Pharmacy case, 425 US at 771, referred to “deceptive or mislead-
ing” advertising, as did also the Bates case, 432 US at 383-84.
The Ohralik case, supra, particularly relied on by the New York
Court of Appeals (J. S. App. A, pp 12a-13a), and Jn re Primus,
436 US 412, both turned on the characteristics and dangers of
in-person solicitation of a lawyer-client relation, and weighed the
hazards of (436 US at 461): “. . . stirring up litigation, assertions
of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential
harm to the client in the form of overreaching, overcharging, un-
derrepresentation, and misrepresentation.” The decision in Fried-
man V. Rogers, 440 US 1, at 9-11, involved the allegedly decep-
tive and misleading use of optometrical trade names.
None of these matters is involved in the present case, and the
Commission’s ban on promotional advertising is not directed at
any of these problems or hazards. It is a total ban on all such
advertising, regardless of its character, quality, style, or purpose.
It bans speech which advocates no unlawful conduct, and is
neither fraudulent, deceptive, obscene, libelous, nor provocative
of violence. The order is not a regulation of “time, place and
manner”; its limits are fixed exclusively by the content of the
speech and, given the prohibited content, the ban is absolute and
all-inclusive.
In the light of the foregoing circumstances and considera-
tions, we respectfully submit, the Commission’s order cannot
survive scrutiny under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The State Interests Asserted By Appellee Are Insufficient
to Justify the First Amendment Infringements
Effected By Appellee’s Order.
Although the Public Service Commission and the lower New
York Courts relied on three separate reasons to support the
promotional advertising ban, the Court of Appeals made no
23
mention of two of them, and relied solely on the argument that
the prohibition would aid in “conserving diminishing resources”
of energy. However, in its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm (pp 16-
18) the Commission continued to press the arguments disre-
garded by the Court of Appeals, and accordingly we deal with
them following our discussion of the conservation argument.
A. Oil Conservation.
The sole state interest relied on by the Court of Appeals was
described, at the very end ef its opinion (J. S. App. A, pp 13a-
14a), as follows:
It would not strain the bounds of judicial notice for us to
take cognizance of the present energy crisis. Conserving
diminishing resources is a matter of vital state concern and
increased use of electrical energy is inimical to our inter-
est. Promotional advertising, if permitted, would only
serve to exacerbate the crisis. In short, this constitutes a
compelling justification for the ban.
Assuredly, oil conservation is a most important national
policy, but the question remains whether or not the promotional
advertising ban will measurably contribute to its fulfillment.
The Commission itself made but a faintly affirmative claim
(J. S. App. D-2, p 37a), acknowledging that the promotional ban
“may aptly be described as piecemeal conservationism since
promotion of oil for use in heating or internal combustion appli-
cations is not similarly proscribed”, and that the ban “will be less
than optimally effective, in a national context”, while lamely con-
cluding that it “will result in some dampening of unnecessary
growth so that society’s total energy requirements will be some-
what lower than they would have been had electric utilities
been allowed to promote sales.”?°
20 If it is true, as indicated in the Commission’s Motion to Dis-
miss (p 12, n. 4), that there is a shortage of the No. 2 oil used in
home oil furnaces, conservation considerations would suggest that
electric heating is now preferable, as there is no current shortage of
the residual oil used in the generation of electricity, and there is no
suggestion in the record that there was any such shortage at the time
of the Commission’s decision to continue the promotional ban.
Moreover, the record shows (contrary to the cited footnote) that the
heating oil dealers do in fact advertise (R. 351-52 and 579).
24
Now, if this were a case such as Wickard v. Filburn, 317
US 111, in which a general and nationwide prohibition is
enforced against persons whose individual impact on the problem
is negligible, on the basis that the impact of many such persons
is substantial, the New York regulation, whether or not constitu-
tional, might be rationally related to its avowed aim. But the
present case is not in that posture, for no other state is imposing
a similar ban. In no state save Oklahoma has a like prohibition
ever been imposed—even in 1973 at the time of the Arab oil
embargo—and in Oklahoma the promotional advertising ban
was held invalid as “arbitrary”. State v Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Co., 536 P 2d 887, 895 (Okla. 1975).
Furthermore, the “present energy crisis” of which the New
York court took notice, is a national problem dealt with pri-
marily by policies fixed at the national level. Federal energy
policies do not prohibit promotional advertising by electric
utilities, and by plain implication recognize their legitimacy.
Section 113(b) (5) of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §2623(b) (5), provides: “No electric utility
may recover from any person other than the shareholders (or
other owners) of such utility any direct or indirect expenditure
by such utility for promotional or political advertising . . .” The
incompatibility of this provision with prohibition of promotional
advertising is confirmed in the Report of the Joint Conference
Committee, which explicitly states that no prohibition of either
promotional or political advertising by electric utilities was in-
tended.”
Thus the Commission’s concern for the effect of electric
utility advertising on the energy crisis is shared neither by the
federal nor the other state governments.
*1In Nebraska, where electric utilities are publicly owned, a
promotional advertising ban for other privately owned utilities was
considered, but discarded after the State Attorney General ruled
that such a ban would be unconstitutional as an impairment of free-
dom of speech. Neb. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 8 (1979).
*2 Pertinent extracts from the United States Congressional
Committee Reports relating to Section 113(b)(5) of the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and its predecessor bill are
set forth in J. S. App. K pp 98a-100a.
25
In its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm (p 14) the Commission
professes that it “fails to understand” the relevance of these
circumstances. This Court’s recent commercial speech cases
have all involved the assertion of state interests to justify the
limitation on speech, and a balancing judgment by the Court.
Full recognition of the importance of oil conservation does
not obviate the necessity of scrutinizing the necessity for and
efficacy of official measures, adopted in the name of conserva-
tion, which abridge fundamental rights. Certainly the fact that
neither the federal government (the authority primarily charged
with responsibility for dealing with the national energy shortage),
nor any of the 49 other states, has applied a similar ban reflects
adversely on the need for and wisdom of the Commission’s
order. Equally, the universally negative attitude in the federal
and other state jurisdictions indicates that enforcement of the
advertising ban in New York State alone will have insignificant
results quantitatively.
Contrary to the Commission’s argument (Motion to Dismiss,
pp 15-16) there is no inconsistency between Central Hudson’s
support of conservation and its desire to regain freedom of
speech. As shown heretofore (supra, pp 17-19), there are uses
of electricity which wili diminish the use of oil, and it is these
energy-saving devices which Central Hudson presently wishes to
promote. Neither the National Energy Conservation Policy Act
of 1978 nor the 1977 amendments to the New York Public
Service Law, cited by the Commission (Motion to Dismiss, pp
15-16), lend any support to its arguments for, as we have seen,
the sponsors of the federal act consciously rejected the idea of
an advertising ban, and the New York conservation amend-
ments now provide for utility financing for heat pumps, which
the Commission’s order forbids utilities from publicizing.
Assuming that electric resistance heating powered by oil-fired
generators uses somewhat more oil than home oil furnaces,” the
5 See, e.g., the Virginia Pharmacy case, 425 US at 766-70;
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 US at 94-97; Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 US at 368-79.
4 As Chairman Kahn’s concurring opinion shows (J. S. App.
D-2, p 50a), the additional amount of oil used in resistance heating is
difficult to quantify.
26
fact remains that the Commission has not seen fit to limit its use,
but only its promotion by advertising.** Perhaps our society
should by now have concluded that no uses of oil which, in the
strictest sense, are unnecessary, should be advertised. But it has
not done so, and there is something more than faintly absurd
about praising the promotional ban on electric heating as a
conservation measure, while Cadillacs and snowmobiles are not
similarly treated.
Given the freedom of Central Hudson’s oil furnace com-
petitors to cry their wares, and the public tolerance of flashy
television advertisements for powerful cars and potent gasoline,
inviting consumer spending for services far less necessary than
home heating, it is nothing short of ludicrous to describe the
Commission’s order as serving any substantial, let alone compell-
ing, state interest in terms of oil conservation.
B. Ratemaking.
Despite the Court of Appeals’ disregard of it, the Com-
mission continues to place primary reliance** on the “marginal
cost” rate problem as justification for the promotional ban. In
summary form, this problem, in its supposed application to
promotional advertising, may be described as follows: (1)
electric utilities confront both hour-of-the-day and seasonal
fluctuations of customer demand, resulting in “peak” and “off-
peak” loads; (2) most utilities have several sources of supply
(i.e. generating plants, contract suppliers, etc.) of varying cost-
efficiency; (3) economy dictates that the most cost-efficient
sources be used first, and the less cost-efficient be drawn on only
2° To whatever extent the appellee’s argument that the competi-
tion between oil and electricity is quantitatively insignificant (Motion
to Dismiss, p. 13) may be taken is valid, it pari passu diminishes the
quantitative significance of the appellee’s arguments in support of the
ban.
6 See the Motion to Dismiss (p 18) repeating the Commission’s
intention to review the promotional ban “at such time as the problems
presented by an inadequate utility rate design no longer exist.” This
suggests that the other arguments are makeweight, and that the ban
would be continued, even if New York State were awash with oil,
until the rate structure is adjusted to the Commission’s satisfaction.
27
when necessary to meet increasing load, i.e., approaching peak;
(4) if there are reliable indications of future demand that will
create peaks beyond the company’s existing capacity, additional
plant must be constructed which, because of inflation, high inter-
est rates, and increased capital costs will probably be more
costly than existing sources; (5) therefore, the unit cost of
electricity will be higher during peak than off-peak periods; (6)
average cost, which has been the basis of ratemaking in the past,
does not reflect the aforesaid differential, with the result that
the off-peak consumer is overcharged and the on-peak consumer
undercharged; and (7) increased demand, which promotional
advertising may stimulate, will raise the peaks, and increase both
the unit cost of the energy and the degree to which the off-peak
consumer subsidizes the on-peak consumer.?* The term “mar-
ginal cost” denotes the cost of the last unit of energy furnished
to meet peak demand.
The New York Public Service Commission has concluded,
with regard to both electricity and gas, that marginal costs “pro-
vide a reasonable basis” for rate structure, and must be treated
as “an important element of rate design.”°* Appellant did not
oppose those determinations and does not question their rational
basis. But in assessing the validity under the First Amendment
of the promotional ban, it must be realized that, while there is
widespread professional agreement with the conceptual basis of
the marginal cost theory, there is equally widespread disagree-
ment and controversy concerning the extent, if any, to which
marginal cost theory can be used as the basis of utility ratemak-
** The “marginal cost problem” was not one of the factors listed
by the Commission for consideration when it opened the proceeding
leading to continuation of the promotional ban (J. S. App. I, pp 85a-
87a). Nor was it mentioned in the Commission’s statement of policy
continuing the ban (J. S. App. D-2, pp 36a-38a), but first surfaced
in Chairman Kahn’s concurring opinion (J. S. App. D-2, pp 51a-52a),
and then was picked up and stressed by the Commission in its opinion
and order denying rehearing (J. S. App. D-3, pp 58a-59a).
7° Case No. 26806, Electric Rate Design, 16 NY PSC 671
(1976); Case No. 26835, Relevance of Marginal Costs to Regula-
tion of Gas Distribution Companies, Opinion No. 79-19, issued Sep-
tember 17, 1979. ‘
28
ing,” in view of the many difficulties and complexities which
must be confronted.*® The Commission itself has characterized
its approach to the practical implementation of marginal cost
theory as one of “gradualism consistent with appreciable im-
provement”,” and it is indisputable that resolution of the marginal
cost “problem” will be a long and tortuous process, as the
Commission reveals (Motion to Dismiss, pp 17-18 and n. 6) by
its observation that after a proceeding commenced in January
of 1975 and concluded in August of 1976 “sufficient data has
not yet been accumulated”, and that “economically practical
time-of-day metering equipment” has not yet been devised.
Appellant possesses in ample degree the traditional utility-
regulatory powers over such matters as ratemaking, accounting,
and metering. The exercise of these powers to resolve the mar-
ginal cost problem presents, within the range of rationality, no
2° For example, the Public Utilities Commission of Colorado,
after a lengthy proceeding, recently decided that “marginal cost an-
alysis as a basis for determining costs upon which rates are established
is not now appropriate for implementation in Colorado. ...” Case
No. 5963, Rate Structure of All Electric Utilities, July 27, 1979,
p 100.
In New York State there is disagreement among state agencies
on marginal or incremental pricing of natural gas. While the Com-
mission supports such pricing (see n. 28), the New York State
Energy Office opposes it because of its concern that such pricing will
increase the cost of gas to industrial customers and drive them from
using gas to using oil. Draft Report, New York State Energy Master
Plan, New York State Energy Office, August 1979, Section V-D,
pp 46 and 49-50.
30 See, e.g., the Colorado decision cited in note 29 at pp. 84-101,
and the testimony of Dr. W. H. Melody in Case No. 26806, Electric
Rate Design, supra, n. 26, Tr. pp. 2624 et seq. Marginal cost-based
rates often must be scaled down to avoid exacting more than a fair
return on capital. If computed on a long-term incremental basis,
long-term forecasts are involved which are subject to inherent
uncertainty. The costs of metering for time-of-day rate purposes is
substantial. Furthermore, marginal cost theory appears to be of
comparatively little immediate value as applied to companies such as
Central Hudson, since its existing energy sources do not vary greatly
in cost-efficiency, and the load capacity (existing or contracted for)
is sufficient so that the need for additional capacity is not immediate.
81 Case No. 26806, Electric Rate Design, supra, at 692.
29
constitutional problems. Matter of New York State Council of Re-
tail Merchants v. Public Service Commission, 45 NY 2d 661, 412
NYS 2d 358 (1978). Furthermore, these are the only powers
by which the problem can be alleviated or eliminated; the promo-
tional advertising ban contributes nothing toward a solution. At
most, it artificially limits one of a host of factors which may (but
not necessarily will) exert an upward pressure on rates.
For nearly a century utility rates have been based on average
cost theory, and if the result is less than perfect, neither is it catas-
trophic. The issues of whether, when, and how to shift to mar-
ginal cost ratemaking confront the Commision irrespective of
the predicted effects of promotional advertising—indeed, the
problem would be there even if present peak consumption should
decline. If peak loads increase, the causes may be population
growth or shifts, location of new business enterprises, greater
customer demand attributable to prosperity, weather change, or
all or any of these and other factors, singly or in combination.
Advertising is but one among these many possible factors, and
_ there is no evidence that it would be of much significance.
The proper role of marginal cost in ratemaking is a question
that confronts all utility regulatory bodies. Not one of the state
regulatory agencies that have seriously considered the adoption
of marginal cost ratemaking, including the eleven or more others
that have decided to move in that direction, has prohibited adver-
tising as an adjunct to resolution of the problem nor, so far as we
know, has even considered such action.” It is hard to escape the
conclusion that, as far as marginal cost ratemaking is involved,
the Commission’s order is in the nature of an aspirin taken to
alleviate the headache caused by contemplation of a difficult
question. It is by the considered and energetic application of its
ratemaking powers, rather than by taping the mouths of electric
utility managers, that the Commission should engage the problem.
*° It may be noted that while the appellant has now approved
marginal cost ratemaking for natural gas (footnote 28, supra), it has
almost simultaneously lifted in large part the preexisting prohibition
of promotional gas advertising. Case 25766, Gas Restrictions, order
issued September 6, 1979.
30
In conclusion, we invite the Court’s attention to the ex-
traordinary breadth of the argument which appellee has based on
the marginal cost issue. Carried to its logical conclusion, the argu-
ment is that the Commission has constitutional authority to limit
or prohibit the utility companies’ speech whenever, in the Com-
mission’s judgment, the effect of the speech is to render more
difficult the exercise of its other powers, and to maintain the
prohibition in effect until it is satisfied that the other powers are
functioning satisfactorily. Surely there is no constitutional war-
rant for subjecting appellant to such a virtually unlimited reach
of state-censorship of speech.
C. “Misleading Signals.”
The third reason advanced by the Commission in support of
its prohibitory order is that (J.S. App. D-3, p 57a) “promotion
of electricity by regulated public utilities provides totally mis-
leading signals that conservation is unnecessary.” The Commis-
sion further observed this is “especially true since the utilities
in this State are expected to promote conservation by their
customers”, and (p 59a) distinguished the promotion of “electric
equipment and appliances” by manufacturers and dealers, whose
advertising “will not provide the same misleading signals to the
public and at the same time will provide a means for the public
to be advised of the available alternatives.”
Why the Commission thought that manufacturer or dealer
advertising of electricity-consuming devices would not carry the
same “misleading signals” as the advertising of the same sorts of
devices (such as heat pumps) by the utility companies, is not
apparent. Of course, the manufacturers and dealers are not sub-
ject to appellee’s regulatory jurisdiction, and it may be that
this was an ineffectual effort to obscure the fact that silencing
only the utility companies may not, after all, protect the public
against the dangerous knowledge.
However that may be, the Commission’s suggestion that
Central Hudson’s First Amendment rights can more justifiably
be infringed because manufacturers and dealers can say the
things about which the utility managers’ lips are sealed, is an
31
argument which this Court decisively rejected in the Virginia
Pharmacy case, 425 US at 757. Obviously, manufacturers and
dealers may say things that Central Hudson would not wish to
say, and fail to say the things that Central Hudson might deem
important.**
Conservation, of course, is not incompatible with necessary
or socially desirable consumption; indeed, it serves those ends.
There is absolutely nothing in (or outside) the record to suggest
that Central Hudson will cease promoting conservation, or that
its advertisements would raise doubts of its desirability. Essenti-
ally, the Commission is saying that the public cannot be trusted
to read appellant’s advertising of the availability and uses of
electric energy, because it will be confused and likely to forget
the continuing flow of conservation messages in the communica-
tions media.
That is a pretty severe reflection on the public intelligence,
and it is particularly surprising to see such a point made in the
light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions which, in three
opinions issued in 1976 and 1977, decisively rejected such argu-
ments based on fear of public misunderstanding. In the Va.
Pharmacy case, supra, the Court wrote (425 US at 769-70 and
773):
It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who
wishes to provide low cost, and assertedly low quality,
services is permitted to advertise, he will be taken up on
his offer by too many unwitting customers. They will
choose the low-cost, low-quality service and drive the
‘professional’ pharmacist out of business. They will re-
spond only to costly and excessive advertising, and end
up paying the price... . All this is not in their best inter-
ests, and all this can be avoided if they are not permitted
to know who is charging what.
*S It should be noted, as appellee agrees (Motion to Dismiss,
p 15), that with regard to the question of electric appliances and the
merits of alternative uses of electricity, “utilities remain free to pro-
vide advice to customers if they request it.” The effect of the adver-
tising ban, therefore, is to conceal from the public the knowledge
that the utility company is able and willing to supply electrical use
information.
32
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly
paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them. ... It is precisely this kind of choice, between
the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers
of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amend-
ment makes for us. .. .
*” * *
What is at issue is whether a State may completely
Suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful in-
formation about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that
information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipi-
ents. Reserving other questions [footnote deleted], we
conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.
A year later, in the Linmark case, supra, the Court re-affirmed
the principle thus established, in the context of an ordinance pro-
hibiting “For Sale” or “Sold” signs on real estate, in order to
stem what was believed to be the flight of white homeowners from
a racially integrated neighborhood. Holding the ordinance un-
constitutional under the First Amendment, the Court wrote (431
US at 96-97):
The Township Council here, like the Virginia Assembly
in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., acted to prevent its residents
from obtaining certain information. That information,
which pertains to sales activity in Willingboro, is of vital
interest to Willingboro residents, since it may bear on one
of the most important decisions they have a right to make:
where to live and raise their families. The Council has
sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it
fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions
inimical to what the Council views as the homeowners’
self-interest and the corporate interest of the township:
they will choose to leave town . . . If dissemination of this
information can be restricted, then every locality in the
country can suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the
locality, so long as a plausible claim can be made that dis-
closure would cause the recipients of the information to
act ‘irrationally’. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. denies govern-
ment such sweeping powers.
33
Seven weeks later, in the Bates case, supra, the Court struck
the same note in the context of Arizona’s ban on advertising by
lawyers (433 US at 374-75):
Advertising does not provide a complete foundation on
which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny
the consumer, on the ground that the information is in-
complete, at least some of the relevant information needed
to reach an informed decision. The alternative—the pro-
hibition of advertising—serves only to restrict the in-
formation that flows to consumers [footnote omitted].
Moreover, the argument assumes that the public is not
sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of adver-
tising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance than
trusted with correct but incomplete information. We sus-
pect the argument rests on an underestimation of the
public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification
that is based on the benefits of public ignorance. .. .
The fact is, of course, that the communications media are full
of “signals” of the most varied kind, which are generally con-
flicting. But the First Amendment says that there is no referee
empowered to identify and choose among these conflicting signals.
This is to be left to the discretion of the public. The decisions
quoted above have determined that, for better or worse, “con-
cededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity” (Va.
Pharmacy Bd., supra at 773) cannot be suppressed because of
fear that the public will draw what officials believe to be wrong
conclusions.
The Order, and the Public Service Law as Construed and
Applied By the New York Courts, are Unconstitutional
for Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Lack of Standards
The two points now to be addressed are related but basically
distinct, as independently based. The imprecision and breadth
of the Commission’s order are facially apparent, and were at-
tacked by Central Hudson in presenting the case to the New York
Court of Appeals. Unlike the Commission’s order, the Public
Service Law, which establishes the Commission and specifies its
34
powers, suffers from no inherent or facial constitutional defect,
but has now been interpreted by the highest court of the state as
giving the Commission powers, to limit and prohibit speech,
which are no where specified in the statute and which, therefore,
are wholly lacking in guiding legislative standards.** We will
address the second of these points first.
A. Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Lack of Standards
of the Public Service Law as so Construed and
Applied
The provisions of the New York Public Service Law
(McKinney 1955; Supp. 1978) empowering the Public Serivce
Commission to regulate electric utility companies (see J. S.
App. H), closely resemble those of at least 28 jurisdictions, in-
cluding the District of Columbia.** The Commission is given
34 In its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm (p 19), the Commission
contends that these points were not raised below and therefore are
not properly before this Court. As shown in appellant’s Brief in
Opposition to the Motion (pp 2-3), there is no basis for this con-
tention. The second point obviously did not arise until the Court of
Appeals had authoritatively construed the Public Service Law; it was
a principal point in Central Hudson’s Motion for Reargument in that
court, and was replied to by appellee. In presenting the statutory
point, Central Hudson had argued that to construe the Public Service
Law as authorizing speech-limitation would raise grave First Amend-
ment questions.
85 The approximately 48 states which regulate investor-owned
electric utilities grant their respective public utility regulatory bodies
general supervisory powers over such utilities. In addition, the fol-
lowing 28 statutes grant their public utility regulatory bodies implied
powers similar to the “powers necessary and proper” conferred upon
the Commission by New York Public Service Law § 4, subd. 1
(McKinney 1955) and upon which the New York Court of Appeals
based its determination that the Commission had authority to prom-
ulgate the ban on promotional advertising: Ala. Code tit. 37, § 37-
1-31 (1977); Alaska Stat. § 42.05.151 (1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 40-202(a) (1974); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 73-202 (1957); Cal. Public
Utilities Code § 701 (West 1975); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 16-6b
(West Supp. 1979); D. C. Code Encycl. § 43-1003 (West 1968);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 366.05 (West 1968); Idaho Code § 61-501 (1976);
Iowa Code Ann. § 476.2 (West Supp. 1979); Kan. Stat. § 66-101
(1972): La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:1164 (West 1979); Md. Ann.
(Footnote continues on next page)
35
(Section 4, subd. 1) “all powers necessary or proper to en-
able it to carry out the purposes” of the Law; it is directed
(Section 5, subd. 2, added in 1970) to “encourage” the companies
subject to its jurisdiction to plan and carry out their functions
“with economy, efficiency, and care for the public safety, the pres-
ervation of environmental values and the conservation of natural
resources”; it is endowed (Section 66, subd. 1) with “general
supervision” of all electric corporations, and is empowered to
order (Section 66, subd. 2) such “reasonable” service improve-
ments “as will best promote the public interest, preserve the
public health and protect” customers and employees, to prescribe
uniform accounting methods (Section 66, subd. 4) and “just and
reasonable rates” (Section 66, subd. 5) and to fulfill a variety of
administrative and investigative duties ancillary to the specified
substantive powers.
Code art. 78 § 1 (Supp. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 460.6
(1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-45 (1972); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 70-104 (Supp. 1977); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 62-6-4 (1978): N.C. Gen.
Stat. 62-30 (1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 49-02-02(2) (1978); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 153 (West 1953); Or. Rev. Stat. § 756.040(2)
(1975); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, § 501-(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-38 (1977); S.C. Code § 58-27-150 (1977);
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 1446(C) (Vernon Supp. 1978); Utah
Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (Supp. 1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 196.02 (West
1957); and Wyo. Stat. § 37-2-127 (1977).
While the Court of Appeals cited New York Public Service Law
§ 5, subd. 2, which empowers the Commission to “encourage” con-
servation, in its discussion of the authority of the commission to issue
the order, it is difficult to understand how a statute which authorizes
a governmental body to “encourage” the companies it regulates can
be regarded as limiting or rendering more precise the Commission’s
power to regulate and prohibit speech, with which (under the New
York court’s decision) it is now vested. Statutes in at least five states
empower their respective public utility regulatory bodies to consider or
encourage conservation, in a manner analogous to New York Public
Service Law § 5, subd. 2 (McKinney Supp. 1978); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 40-2-117 (Supp. 1978); Md. Ann. Code art. 78, § 56 (Supp.
1978). Nev. Rev. Stat. § 703.260(4) (1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4905.70 (Anderson Supp. 1978); and Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit.
66, § 308 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
36
These are the provisions which the New York courts have
now construed as authorizing the Commission to prohibit adver-
tising by electric public utilities. The construction so placed
on the New York Public Service Law is, of course, beyond the
province of this Court to review, but the fact of the construc-
tion is directly relevant to the federal constitutionality of the
Commission’s orders, and of the Law itself as so construed and
applied.
It is apparent that the Public Service Law sets forth no
standard appropriate for or sufficient to sustain a delegation of
authority to the Commission to determine what the companies
subject to its jurisdiction may or may not say publicly. Standards
such as “public interest” or “public welfare” are accepted as
sufficient for rate and other economic legislation, but are wholly
insufficient for speech-limiting regulation. Appellee concedes
(Motion to Dismiss, p 20) that “the Public Service Law is not
a statute designed to regulate speech. . . .”
In Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 US 146, the Postmaster General
contended that a federal statute authorized him to suspend second
class mailing permits for publications if he had determined that
they did not contribute “positively” to the “public good or public
welfare”. This Court refused so to construe the statute, saying it
would be tantamount to deciding whether a publication’s contents
were “good” or “bad”, and added (327 US at 151): “To
uphold the order of revocation would, therefore, grant the Post-
master General a power of censorship. Such a power is so abhor-
rent to our traditions that a purpose to grant it should not be
lightly inferred.”**
36 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U S 134, cited in the Motion to Dis-
miss (at p. 20) is not germane. The federal statute there involved
was not one setting up an administrative agency with “vast power”;
it was a statute narrowly targeted at relations between the federal
government and its own employees, and the statutory standard for
employee discharges was geared to that specific problem, and was held
sufficient by a majority of this Court.
37
This Court has emphasized that in the First Amendment
area the “government may regulate . . . only with narrow speci-
ficity.” NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 433. Thus a delegation
of power to regulate speech requires much more precise guiding
standards than might pass muster in other areas. Hynes v
Borough of Oradell, 425 US 610; Coates v Cincinnati, 402 US
611; Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589; Lovell v
Griffin, 303 US 444. Otherwise such delegation would allow
government officials “to pursue their personal predilections.”
Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 575.
The Court of Appeals has done nothing to narrow, by con-
struction, the circumstances in or purposes for which the Com-
mission may prohibit or otherwise limit speech. It relied on the
“present energy crisis” as justifying the promotional advertising
ban, but said nothing to suggest that other state interests might
not support the promotional advertising ban or other speech
limitations. The Commission and the lower New York courts
relied on other factors, and their invocation of the “marginal
cost” theory, by its logic, would justify a promotional advertising
ban at any time the Commission deemed the rate structure in-
congruent with real costs. The Court of Appeals did not negate
other justifications which might be put forward by the Com-
mission for restricting the speech of companies subject to its
jurisdiction.**
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth of the Commission’s
Order.
Apart from the lack of guiding standards in the authorizing
legislation, the Commission’s order itself suffers from both vague-
ness and overbreadth. In part this is probably the consequence
*7 The New York courts’ cavalier disregard of these questions
of precision and authority may be compared with the thoughtful
treatment of a comparable problem in the Supreme Court of Idaho’s
recent decision in Washington Water Power Co. v Kootenai Environ-
mental Alliance and Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 99 Ida.
875, 881-82, 591 P 2d 122, 128-9 (1979).
38
of the wholly insufficient evidentiary procedures and record on
which the order is based. The Commission’s initial order in
1973 was based on general information and inference concern-
ing the effect of the Arab oil embargo on the supply of oil for
electric generation (J.S. App. D-1). Although the factual situa-
tion on which the order was based did not last beyond the spring
of 1974, in 1977 the Commission continued the ban on the
basis of comments received by mail. The suggestion of the State
Attorney General and State Consumer Protection Board, that
an evidentiary hearing be held (R. 645 and 502), was disre-
garded. In the Bellotti case, 435 US at 789, Justice Powell referred
critically to the lack of any “record or legislative findings” in
support of the challenged statute. In the present case, the legis-
lature has never considered, much less acted upon, the promotional
advertising ban, and this, together with the lack of any evidentiary
record made by the Commission, has basically flawed the decision-
making process.
For whatever reason, the Commission’s inclusive and un-
qualified order is fatally overbroad.** Although it is apparent
from its opinions that the Commission was concerned primarily
if not exclusively with space heating and cooling, it made no
effort to confine its order to that area. For example, the order
covers the use of electricity for lighting, which uses far less
energy than what is required for heating and air conditioning,
and which involves safety and human efficiency and productivity
values. The order also applies to the use of electricity for power;
88 We are mindful of the passage in the Bates opinion (433 US
at 380-81) stating that the “overbreadth doctrine” does not apply
to “professional advertising”. But there the Court was discussing
overbreadth in regard to its relaxation of the standing limitation, so
that a party whose own conduct is not constitutionally protected is
allowed to challenge a statute on the ground of its possible application
to others whose conduct would be constitutionally protected. No
standing problem is involved in the present case, since the Com-
mission’s ban is absolute, it applies directly to Central Hudson, and
no assertion is made that Central Hudson has not observed its terms.
39
it would prohibit Central Hudson from promotional advertising
of electric vehicles, despite their energy economy and pollution-
free performance. Furthermore, the order is more fundamentally
flawed in that it is not confined to speech that promotes the use
of energy or of oil, but of electricity. Thus it applies to the pro-
motion of devices and methods for the use of electricity in ways
which diminish the use of oil, as where electricity is used to
power energy-efficient new devices such as the heat pump, or, in
small quantities, to supplement solar or windmill heating systems.
Despite its all-inclusive coverage, the order is vague in that
the contours of “promotional advertising” are foggy. Does it
cover a consultation initiated by an officer of Central Hudson
with an industrial concern on improved and expanded lighting?
A speech by the president of Central Hudson to a businessmen’s
club describing various ways in which electricity can serve their
needs? Would it be permissible for Central Hudson to launch a
public attack on the wisdom of the Commission’s order, when the
most publicly effective means of attack would be to portray the
diverse uses and other merits of electrical energy? Under the
challenged order, the management of Central Hudson is continu-
ally faced with questions of this nature in which it must deter-
mine whether informational activities in which it wishes to engage
are proscribed by the order or not. This, Central Hudson believes,
improperly places a cloud over a matter which should be unre-
stricted, namely the furnishing of truthful information about its
own business.
The result of the decision in the Court of Appeals is that the
Commission has been allowed to exert prohibitory authority in
the sensitive area of freedom of speech, although the New York
legislature has never considered the conferring of such authority
and there are no appropriate legislative guidelines for its exercise.
Since comparable statutes prevail in a majority of the states,
affirmance by this Court may well result in similar assertions of
authority by state public utility commissions in many other states,
40
and involve them in problems for which their traditional areas
of expertise are wholly unsuited.*® The lack of governing stand-
ards here is reflected in an unqualified order with no evidentiary
basis, and thoughtlessly vague and overbroad.
IV.
The Order and the Authorizing Statute are Unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause.
As the Commssion itself recognized (J.S. App. D-2, p 37a),
the promotional ban to which appellant is subject does not apply
to Central Hudson’s non-utility competitors, such as oil furnace
and heating oil distributors. In the light of the purpose—i.e.,
oil conservation—on the basis of which the Court of Appeals
sustained the order, we submit that the discrimination thus
worked between electric utilities and their competitors is irra-
tional, undermines the plausibility of the “compelling interest”
so relied on by the Court of Appeals, and violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is true, of course, that oil furnace heating enterprises are
not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. But its lack of
authority over these dealers is not constitutionally significant
except to show that it is the state government as a whole, and
not the Commission alone, which is responsible for the discrim-
ination. The Court of Appeals has interpreted New York law as
authorizing limitations on advertising by utilities but not by their
competitors, and that is the discrimination here challenged.
89 Cf. The view of the Supreme Court of Idaho in the Washington
Water Power case, supra, addressed to the type of regulation at issue
in the Consolidated Edison case now pending in this Court: “The
subject matter of the Commission’s order at issue here does not deal
with the subject matter traditionally regulated by public utility
commissions and does not fall into a category of regulation which
requires the technical expertise of a commission as contrasted with
a legislature.” 99 Ida. 881-82, 591 P 2d 129.
41
The constitutional validity of the discrimination must be as-
sessed in the light of the objective the order purports to advance.
Since over three fourths of all residential heating in Central
Hudson’s service area is accomplished by individual oil furnaces,
the exclusion of direct oil heating from a prohibition, the purpose
of which is to limit the use of oil, is irrational on its face. The
situation is an aggravated version of the one confronting this
Court in the Bellotti case, where (435 US at 793-95) the pro-
hibition applied to banks, utilities, and business corporations but
not to “entities or organized groups” with “resources comparable
to those of large corporations.” The discrimination caused Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, to observe (435 US at 793): “Thus
the exclusion of Massachusetts business trusts, real estate invest-
ment trusts, labor unions, and other associations undermines the
plausibility of the State’s purported concern for the persons who
happen to be shareholders in the banks and corporations cov-
ered by [the statute]... .”
This Court’s decisions have long recognized a close relation
between equal protection and freedom of speech in other cases
where speech restrictions were applied in a discriminatory way.
Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23; Cox v New Hampshire, 312 US
569, 576; Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 536, 558. In the latter case
Justice Black, concurring separately in this portion o. the deci-
sion, and speaking of a statute which prohibited obstruction of
traffic while excepting labor union picketing from its scope, wrote
(379 US at 581): “This seems to me to be censorship in a most
odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. And to deny this appellant and his group use of
the streets because of their views against racial discrimination,
while allowing other groups to use the streets to voice opinions
on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to an invidious discrim-
ination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.” See also Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville,
422 US 205, 215; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum,
1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 30.
42
A comparable situation, confronting the Court more recently,
involved a Chicago ordinance which exempted peaceful labor
picketing from a general prohibition of picketing within 150 feet
of a school. Police Department of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US
92. Holding the ordinance unconstitutional, Justice Marshall
wrote for the Court (408 US at 95-96):
The central problem with Chicago’s ordinance is that
it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject
matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school’s
labor-management dispute is permitted, but all other
peaceful picketing is prohibited. * * * *
Necessarily . . . under the Equal Protection Clause,
not to mention the First Amendment itself, government
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views.
It is plain from these and other cases that the equal protection
standard of review is strict in cases such as the present one, where
First Amendment impingements are involved. In the Mosley
case, supra, the Court stated that (408 US at 101): “The Equal
Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First Amend-
ment rights be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives.”
And in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1,
the Court’s opinion (per Powell, J.) referred approvingly to the
Mosley case, saying (411 US at 34, n. 75): “The stricter standard
of review was appropriately applied since the ordinance was one
‘affecting First Amendment interests’.” See also the comparable
statements by the other Justices, 411 US at 61 (Stewart, J.), 63
(Brennan, J.), and 112-15 (Marshall, J.).
There is no rational, let alone compelling, interest to justify
the discrimination here in question, and accordingly the Public
Service Law as construed and the Commission’s order, taken
together, should be held invalid under the equal protection clause.
43
Conclusion
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment of the Court
of Appeals of the State of New York should be reversed and the
case remanded with directions that judgment be entered annulling
the order of the Commission.
Respectfully submitted,
TELFORD TAYLOR
60 E. 42nd Street
New York, New York 10017
Tel. (212) 661-0930
Counsel for Appellant
Of Counsel:
WALTER A. BOssERT, JR.
DAVISON W. GRANT
GOULD & WILKIE
One Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
Tel. (212) 344-5680
TAYLOR, FERENCZ & SIMON
60 E. 42nd Street
New York, New York 10017
Tel. (212) 661-0930
January, 1980
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